"'The Gilded Staff'" Topic

The Austrian General Staff

Since there was much ‘wailing and grinding of teeth' because of my comments in a book review on the Austrian chapter in the new book Armies of the Napoleonic Wars, I found the following material from either excellent military historians (Craig and Rothenberg) or from historic personages on the general weaknesses and shortcomings of the Austrian general staff of the Napoleonic period from which I drew my conclusions for the review. I also have a copy of Horsetzky which appears to be a main reference for the Austrian staff in the subject chapter and it should also be noted that Horsetzky was used by Rothenberg as a reference for his material also.

‘In the broadest sense, a general staff has two functions: ‘first, the systematic and extensive collection in time of peace of specific information which may be important to the conduct of future operations or to proper preparation for future operations; and, second, intellectual preparation for the future conduct of operations either through systematic development of skill for the handling of contingently anticipated situations or through the elaboration of specific plans for war, or both.' The second function generally includes the training of a corps or specifically designated staff officers who can serve at army, corps, brigade, and division headquarters, and give appropriate information and advice to commanding officers. In Austria, the machinery for the accomplishment of these tasks was developed, but the results were none the less hardly impressive.'

‘As in other countries, the Austrian general staff system had its origins in the eighteenth-century Quartermaster-General's Staff, an organization charged with the totality of arrangements necessary for the quartering of troops in the field. In Maria-Theresa's time, a start was made towards widening the functions of this staff (which originally resembled an engineering corps) and adjusting them to the changing nature of war…Daun encouraged the Empress in her support of her new military schools at Wiener-Neustadt and bent his own energies towards such tasks as the improvement of cartographic work, the beginning of serious operational studies, and the introduction of yearly maneuvers for the army.'

‘The momentum which Daun gave to the development of a staff system was not maintained in the years that followed, although Joseph II showed some fleeting interest in the subject. It was not until the Archduke Charles' reforms in the years 1800-1809 that new progress was made…Charles sought to systemize officer training so that it would be continuous from the level of subaltern all the way up to the rank of general. At the same time, he set about reorganizing the Quartermaster-General's Staff by removing from it all officers who had been serving as adjutants or administrators, and converting it into a body exclusively devoted to strategic and operational duties, the preparation of technical and cartographic duties, the accumulation of intelligence about foreign armies, and other modern staff functions. This systemization was carried farther after 1809, when Radetzky was Chief of the Quartermaster-General's Staff. In 1810 this body was reorganized to provide separate sections for cartography, intelligence and communications, war archives, general staff corps (service with army and divisional commands), and service with legations and embassies abroad (the beginning of a system of military attaches).

‘All this represented progress, although no more than was being made by other states in this period. In the years after 1815, unfortunately, while other countries (especially Prussia) continued to develop the efficiency and authority of their general staffs, the reverse was true in Austria.'

‘One reason for this was that the Chief of the Quartermaster-General's Staff occupied a relatively modest position in the military hierarchy…'

‘But more important than these things was the widespread disregard of the importance of learning as a military virtue, which diminished the prestige of staff work even in the eyes of some of those who became staff officers. In 1811 Radetzky had said (with perhaps a premonition of what was to happen) that vigilance would have to be exercised lest general staff work become ‘a fertile ground for lucky mushrooms (Gluckspilze, careerists) and lest ‘a glib tongue, a good seat on a horse, and a good supply of technical terms be considered sufficient to qualify a man for staff service.' When the later Chief of the General Staff Beck was assigned as a lieutenant to the Operations Bureau of the chef of the Vienna Army Command in 1851, he found conditions that justified Radetzky's fears. With few exceptions, all of the officers on the staff were ‘happy idlers, who either had names that showed they belonged to the high nobility or possessed powerful protectors.' Among them was the son of a horse-dealer who took care of the commanding general's stable. A year later, when Beck qualified for admission to the War College, he discovered that that organization, in the very first year of its existence, was adapting itself to prevailing values. The emphasis was on rote learning, and horsemanship played an excessive role in the curriculum.'
Gordon Craig, ‘Command and Staff Problems in the Austrian Army 1740-1766' in The Theory and Practice of War, edited by Michael Howard, 54-57.

‘He was not a general in the true sense of the word, for he required guidance. But we must repeat that it is far more important than is commonly supposed for a man to be capable of being guided consistently in a given direction. This takes a firmness and certainty on the part of the one guided, which only a few men possess. If a general who is likely to become even more uncertain and end up in a position, where he can form no coherent judgment, no conviction, and therefore no decision.'
-Theodore von Bernhardi on Prince Schwarzenberg, allied commander-in-chief 1813-1814.

‘There are generals who need no advice; who judge and decide for themselves, and their staffs merely execute orders. Such generals are stars of the first magnitude, appearing only once in a century. In most cases, commanders of armies feel the need of advice. This can be given in conferences attended by large or small groups of men whose training and experience qualifies them to give expert judgment. But at the conclusion of such a conference, a single opinion should prevail to facilitate the infinitely more difficult task of deciding to execute the proposed plan. This responsibility rests solely upon the commander.'
Von Moltke the Elder, 1859

‘It has sometimes been thought that the defects of an army commander, such as inexperience, inadequate training, weakness of character, may be made good by assigning an exceptionally qualified man as chief of staff. Experience, however, has shown that these attempts invariably fail. Why the experiment has been tried so often through history calls for study.'

‘All men have some weak points and the more vigorous and brilliant a person may be, the more strongly these weak points stand out. It is highly desirable, even essential, therefore, for the more influential members of a general's staff not to be too much like the general, or the shadows will be even more distinct. Ideally, the general and his principal assistants should in a sense supplement one another. Such a mutually supplementary relationship, however, produces desirable results only when the general himself is fully qualified for his office in all professional respects. Mutual supplementation is often misinterpreted, however, to mean that a lack of some indispensable quality in the general may be compensated for by some special talents in the chief of staff. This is a dangerous error.'

‘As illustrations of complementary personalities, we usually think of Radetzky and Hess, Blucher and Gneisenau. But it should not be forgotten that Radetzky, a general in the fullest sense of the work, was over eighty years old at the time of the campaigns of 1848-1849, and hence required some support, both physical and mental. For this there could be none equal to his old confidant Hess-a noble, self-sacrificing, devoted, and modest character, thoroughly competent for this work.'

Blucher, although he was much younger and more vigorous at the time of the Wars of Liberation than Radetzky was in 1848, was of limited education; but he had great experience in war, clear insight, sound knowledge of men, great perseverance, and an iron will that could not be shaken by any difficulties. He was no mere thrusting trooper; and his deficiencies could be fully compensated for by the highly qualified and modest Gneisenau. There could be no doubt that these famous chiefs of staff could not have made full use of their brilliant qualities had they served with officers without moral authority, accessible to irresponsible and incompetent influences, instead of with highly talented generals.'

‘There are things that no one can give to the general, if he does not possess them himself. If he does not have the independence of mind to select the most appropriate course from among the many that are possible, if he lacks the firmness to carry out his decision, and under all conditions to maintain obedience and discipline in his army; then no one can help him.'
-Archduke Albert of Austria

‘Staff work proper was handled by the Quartermaster General Staff according to procedures laid down in Lacy's Generals Reglement of 1769, a compendium of standing orders, field service regulations, and staff instructions. Lacy had created a small staff corps, 30 including the director in early 1792, as well as staff troops to serve as escorts, guards, and orderlies. In peacetime the permanent staff officers were employed making surveys and collecting data on potential theaters of operations. On the approach of war a chief of the Quartermaster General Staff with the rank of Feldmarschall Leutnant, was appointed, staff officers were detailed to the various armies and additional officers ‘who know how to draw and have some command of geometry' were collected. According to the Prince de Ligne, regimental commanders all too often recommended officers ‘they want to get rid of, or the ones they wish to favor, boldly claiming that they have the necessary qualifications.' Together with the adjutant general and his assistants, the Quartermaster General Staff formed the Small General Staff of each field army.'

‘In the field the chief of staff assisted the commander in making plans, but the primary duty of staff officers was topographical reconnaissance. Maps still were scarce and none too accurate, though it does appear odd that as late as 1796 an officer had to be sent to reconnoiter the Stuttgart area, ‘as unknown to us as America,' while Bavaria, a frequent scene of Austrian operations for nearly a century, was described ‘as little known as Kamchatka.' These and other deficiencies clearly demonstrated the need for a permanent chief of the Quartermaster General Staff, but the first such was appointed only in 1801.'
Gunther Rothenberg, Napoleon's Great Adversary, 25-26.

[The Archduke Charles] could take some credit for improving the position of the General Staff. In March 1801 he requested the emperor that this organization should not be disbanded or reduced at the end of each war and that a permanent cadre of 21 staff officers-the term ‘staff officer' denoted a rank above major-be retained together with 16 captains and 12 subalterns. On 23 March, Francis appointed General Duka as ‘Quartermaster General even in peacetime' and generally approved the archduke's proposals. In his first instruction to Duka, Charles instructed him that his staff was to be engaged in making plans ‘covering long periods and entire campaigns,' and that the Chief of the Quartermaster General staff would not merely implement the commander's ideas into practice, but act as his ‘proper and well prepared advisor to examine intelligence and projects of all kinds.' At the same time, however, Charles indicated that the commander retained ultimate decision-making powers.'

‘The new arrangements remained largely on paper until 1805. Duka did work out plans for the archduke and generally supervised the operations of the staffs with the armies in Italy and Germany, but a real operational General Staff did not function until late in 1809.
Rothenberg, 91-92.

‘[For 1809] The Austrian command and control structure , however, was defective. High-ranking officers, including corps commanders, were selected by seniority and birth rather than by merit and experience. In early 1809, Archduke John handled the Army of Inner-Austria, while command of the nine corps was entrusted to two archdukes…three princes…and the remainder, except VI Corps which was led by Hiller, to members of the old high aristocracy. None of these men had any experience or schooling in operating under the corps system and this increased demands on their staff. Archduke Charles later held that too much reliance had been placed on the staff officers.'

‘The staff was not capable of handling the corps system. The officers of the Quartermaster General Staff still were primarily trained in mapping, mathematical computations, horsemanship, drawing and penmanship. Many were personally brave and on paper quite capable of elaborating plans for moving troops. In the field, however, it was a different matter. The new system created much confusion and the Austrian general staff lacked a common doctrine and manuals of procedure. And this became especially critical when because of the small size of the permanent staff untrained officers had to be assigned for duty when the army was activiated.'

‘Functions and composition of corps staffs were outlined on 6 March 1809 by General Prohoska. The chief of staff was to advise the corps commander in all matters, but clearly was to remain his subordinate. He was assisted by a number of general staff officers looking after reconnaissance, march routes, quartering, and the operations journal. In addition, the chief of staff controlled the technical corps troops, engineers, miners, and pontooneers. The other official at corps headquarters was the adjutant general responsible for internal administration and the direction of staff troops, military police, and medical services. The adjutant general also supervised discipline and strength returns. In addition, corps headquarters housed the chief of artillery, the chief surgeon, the chief commissary, and a great number of other officers and functionaries. Altogether, the official history concluded that while the absence of staffs at the division level required large corps staffs, administration in the field consumed too much valuable time.'
Rothenberg, 165-166.

‘An army order of 6 April 1809 constituted four major as well as a number of minor departments. Among the major departments, the first, the Secret Chancery, handled all correspondence with the emperor, the ministries, and with allies and enemies. In addition, it looked after promotions and disbursed secret funds. The second department, the Operations Chancery, issued orders and kept the secret operations journal, while the third department, the Detail Chancery looked after reports and returns. The curiously named Armee-Generalkommando, the fourth major department, dealt with transport, supply, pay, medical, and disciplinary matters. Other important officers and officials included the directors of artillery, engineers, and the commissary general, as well as the army minister, Count Zichy, who was supposed to assist the Generalissimus in procuring supplies. Altogether, with its subsidiary staffs, bureaus, escorts, and attached personnel, headquarters became extremely large and its movement and activities slow and often inefficient.'
Rothenbert, 166.

Trail that coat….

I am not sure how these quotes demonstrate the accuracy of any claims in Amazon reviews. The comments are well-known, albeit partly inaccurate. Howeevr, it was clear to me that a key part of the information about the army was missing – namely what its upper command structure was and how it changed during the period. I never made any secret of the fact that the staff (like much of the army) lacked a lot of the necessary training and experience, especially on p.72. Indeed, the whole chapter starts with the economic limitations Austria laboured under and why she could not maintain a huge peacetime establishment with training camps etc. It is all there in the chapter, if anyone bothers to read it.

I only used Horsetzky for the quote about Radetzky as he was writing in 1905, when he was familiar with the Moltke organisation and was not one of the many affected by the subsequent events of the 20th century. Beyond that, the sources are as in the notes plus Gallina and Wolf-Schneider as per the Bibliography.

Rothenberg is rather tainted by the rather outdated (and French Revolutionary propaganda) view of the army leadership, which I had hoped was corrected in Elite 101. His comments generally are about the effectiveness of its staff without giving its structure first. Craig (in his adulation of all things Prussian) got the story wrong, not least the changes in the 1790s, when Schmitt and Mayer directed Charles' most successful campaign – such that his comments about the CoS are wrong. He fails to look properly at the political backdrop to all this, where no Vienna politician ignored the senior staff officers. The post-war decline of the staff was in line with the whole army, so that should not be a surprise, but where staffs began was in Austria, not Prussia or France, as it was in Austria that the CinC's duties were spread across several men to relieve the load (Moltke is right, when talking about Napoleon).

I am still intrigued to know where the text of the fabled Berthier 1795 Instruction is – no-one seems to produce it, yet much is made of it. for all we know, it could be 3 lines on the back of the proverbial fag packet.

Ben,

Kevin Kiley is a specialist in deliberately provocative behaviour of which this thread is another example.

'…where staffs began was in Austria, not Prussia or France, as it was in Austria that the CinC's duties were spread across several men to relieve the load …'

Source or sources?

K

Read the book – they are all listed there. You may also find p.381 of Duffy helpful.

Before we get into a rerun of the usual claims about Berthier, I am as I said interested to see the text of this fabled 1795 order. there is also another problem, which needs explaining. We know about Thiebault and four depts in his 1800 manual. Why then on p.87 of Swords does it say: "(in 1805) there were three divisions".

Bill, I realise this was designed to provoke, but it does actually flag up two things: 1) there was until Armies, no complete narrative on the development of the Austrian command and 2) the reviewer claiming that the Austrian staff was erroneously presented has not read the relevant texts.

The posting was not placed to provoke, but to enlighten. Your view of the Austrian general staff is very narrow and, again, I don't believe that you understand what a staff or a chief of staff is for and what their purpose actually is. Referring to NATO is not a good example. When I served in Europe during the Cold War, we stated the acronym actually stood for 'Not Allowed to Operate.' And NATO without the United States has a lot of problems, which are surfacing in the Libayn mess now-such as a shortage of munitions.

What are 'the relevant texts' for the Austrian staff. Your material, Duffy, and Horsetzky are all secondary material. I offered both secondary and primary material and I disagree with you that Rothenberg is outdated. He did a very large amount of in-depth work and understood armies and soldiers. You cannot claim the latter.

Gordon Craig does not 'adulate' the Prussians. That is a misrepresentation of what he has written. His Politics of the Prussian Army is very critical of the Prussians and is still an excellent and relevant reference.

Since I haven't brought up the French of the period your bringing up Berthier is merely a strawman argument, undoubtedly designed to deflect your own shortcomings in your staff analysis. Praising your own work also detracts from anything positive you actually might contribute.

Again, what is your source for the statement '…where staffs began was in Austria, not Prussia or France, as it was in Austria that the CinC's duties were spread across several men to relieve the load…'

K

Read the sources – you will find they are the primary instructions from Lacy, Mack, Charles and Radetzky.

I'm afraid Craig, who concentrates on the post-1815 period and Rothenberg both get their facts wrog. Rothenberg relies on the Staff histories and documents published by Criste for most of his material, if you check the notes. He even quotes Craig at n.16 in Chapter 1.

If you read and follow through the instrictions, you will see that the Austrian staff and especially its CoS, which took the workload off the CinC, while directing the various departments, prompting Horsetzky's comment.

Berthier wasn't a strawman, merely a comment that (yet again) we see both documents being cited without the text ever being produced and a remarkable inconsistency in what is even claimed. If you are such an expert on the staff, perhaps you can tell us where the 1795 document is and why there is the obvious inconsistency and includes Horsetzky in his bibliography. Neither actually gives a coherent narrative to the staff, hence my long piece in my chapter, but you have to understand the structure before getting into discussions about its performance. That is where Rothenberg falls short – Craig is just following conventional wisdom without checking the material.

The only person who has cited or referenced Berthier is you and you are arguing about Berthier-that's a strawman argument. Berthier has nothing to do with this discussion unless you would like to broaden it?

K

NATO? Libya? Ammunition shortage? What is this about?

Dunno – cannot even name the CoS on the current mission! The NATO designation is the standard usage, among others by Paddy Griffiths in : Art of Warfare in revolutionary france, where he attempts to shoehorn the Thiebault 4-dept staff into Gs1-5. We have to start with a definition to see which nation is closest to it, otherwise we cannot say which is.

I am still intrigued by the missing 1795 Instructions – Griffiths gives the 4 depts set out in it, but draws on de Phillip for the information; Elting on p.83 also mentions this document, but gives no further information and we then have the apparent contradiction of the three depts in 1806. It seems that a coherent narrative on the French staff in the period is needed. Vachee in contrast notes on p.19, quoting Meneval 3,50, that "in reality, it was (N) who did everthing", which points to the French staff doing little to carry the CinC's burden.

That's what *she* said.

Mr Kiley,

>Referring to NATO is not a good example.<

Why not and in what context?

>When I served in Europe during the Cold War, we stated the acronym actually stood for 'Not Allowed to Operate.'<

I do not understand why what you called NATO is relevant to anything under discussion here.

If this is a private thing between you and Mr Hollins perhaps you could enlighten us because it doesn't make much sense as far as the thread is concerned.

Thank you.

Bill

No, not at all – the NATO system is based on the Us system after all! I am not sure what other definition yhou could use – perhaps Moltke's army, but then see Horsetzky.

Yes but it is not quite that straightforward.

The staff practice and philosophy of the Armed Forces of the United States are almost completely of European origin. The modern general staff was developed in Prussia during the nineteenth century.

Distinctive features of this staff system included the staff's semi-independent position within the Prussian War Ministry, the staff's special concern with military theory and doctrine as well as with the higher military education of senior officers, and the exchange of officers of the general staff corps between positions on the general staff and duties with field units. The general staff improved commanders' ability to control the field operations of mass armies.

These advantages eventually brought about the adoption of a staff system by all major Western powers. Isolated from Europe and concerned mainly with internal affairs during the nineteenth century, the United States did not adopt the military staff system for the Armed Forces until the beginning of the twentieth century.

In 1917 Pershing set up the staff and logistical organization for managing the growing American force. Reflecting a strong similarity to the French bureaux system, his General Staff ultimately included a chief of staff, a deputy chief, and five assistant chiefs supervising five sections: G-I (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), G-4 (Supply), and G-5 (Training). This served as a model for the postwar General Staff in Washington.

The French Staff organization and methods of 1917 replaced the Napoleonic ones that were found so inadequate in 1870 and were based on the Prussian/German organization and methods. So the NATO organization, practice and philosophy is the same as the US which was itself based on the French of the early 20th century, which in turn reflected the Prussian/German developments of the 19th Century.

Bill

Bill

Just curious which country you served with when
you were with NATO.

James

James,

I am not sure how one 'serves with NATO' which is an alliance of 28 countries with its HQ in Brussels staffed by civilian and military personnel from member states. If you are asking for details about my career and background I am afraid that you will just have to speculate.

Bill

No not your service Bill, what country you served for
France, Germany, USA, Canada EH!…? or is this a big
secret.

James

You are not making much sense. I am English.

Bill

It is a good illustration of how the Germanic record has been wiped from the traditional view of most things connected with the Nap period.

Let's not be coy! We all know Bill was in Lichtensteinian service!

Ok Bill I didn't know that that is why I was asking
I wasn't sure.

Lichtensteinian service

I was beginning to wonder.

James

I think the Germanic record was wiped out because of WWI &
WWII which is a shame. Things might have been made a lot
clearer.

James

Where is Lichtensteinia?

Bill

« Document sur le service de l'état-major général à l'armée des Alpes » (1796)
link

A nice article (in English) provides some context:
link

Dave has suggested that we compare Berthier's proposal for organizing French general staff work based on his 1795/1796 experience (linked in my preceding post) with work on staff development of de Lacy.

Linked below are de Lacy's 1769 general staff regulations for the Austrians ….

Generals-Reglement.
Erster Theil. Reglement für den General-Quartiermeisters-Stab.
Feldmarschall Franz Moritz Graf von Lacy [1712-1801]
Wien : J.T. Trattnern, 1769
link

For some context, biographical notices about de Lacy :
German link
English link

Warninng …. now follows pure personal opinion. I apologize for this, as it may be an affront to those with other opinions. I offer mine only because of a potential language barrier for others to access the linked original sources.

I can't really draw any astounding conclusions. Overall, maybe the Berthier organization is a bit more broad in its functions and, of course, it benefits from 30 years of intervening experience and seems to envision alot more people on the staff compared to de Lacy. On the other hand, Berthier did have only half as many leading staff officers in 1795 as his own system called for (2 out of 4 positions noted as vacant), while his proposal actually asks for even more staff billets. So maybe the extra headcount was "optimal" but not "required".

But really, I don't see the great difference or innovation that "franco-phile" secondary source authors seem so ready to identify in Berthier's proposal, even compared to a 30-years earlier Austrian scheme. Maybe they get excited about it becausee of (i) Berthier's later rôle under Napoléon while (ii) much of the similar material under the ancien régime seems to have been lost from the archives during the revolution. The combined result is that Berthier's work looks (i) more important and (ii) more novel.

I think that the degree of success in the implementation of these two structures would have more impact that any inherent differences in their construction. This is especially true in terms of game mechanics or rules writing for "battle" or "grand-tactical" scale wargaming.

I would rather see something like "chef d'état-major adjudant-commandant Martin was really good at his job, so +1 for ammunition re-supply and +2 variable reinforcements for the French, unless his headquarters stand is eliminated".

I just don't see the potential differences in the theorectical construction of the staff, even if such exist, making a measurable difference to most games.

Again, sorry to be so personal-opinion-oriented in this post.

Amicalement.

Sotnik,

Thank you for your argument here, I appreciate it because you are relating it within a framework for wargames design. For that I am thankful. If others who are knowledgeable did the same thing then gamers like me could more readily understand the discussion in relation to what we are trying to achieve on the table top to improve or validate what we are doing.

I commend you for this.

Shane,

Thank you very much for your kind comments.

I do not seek to convince anyone I am correct – it is only my opinion. I just wish everyone could read the sources for themselves, then I would not have to impose myself or my ideas into the conversation.

Thanks again!

Amicalement.

Sotnik,

Thanks for that. Informed opinion is always useful and interesting.

My opinion for what it is worth is that you are absolutely correct when you say "Maybe they get excited about it becausee of (i) Berthier's later rôle under Napoléon while (ii) much of the similar material under the ancien régime seems to have been lost from the archives during the revolution. The combined result is that Berthier's work looks (i) more important and (ii) more novel."

The association with Napoleon is fundamental. There was I think a gradual rehabilitation of Napoleon's reputation after his death which went beyond just France and by the turn of the 19th century he had become larger than life, a romantic hero in popular imagination, a combination of champion of liberalism and nationalism and dazzling military commander and leader.

So anything attached to Napoleon, such as Berthier and his staff, Gribeauval and his artillery, and skirmishing, to mention but three things, are elevated to a status that is quite unwarranted on the assumption that because they are associated with Napoleon they must be exceptional and unusual.

Bill

Dear Bill,

"because they are associated with Napoleon they must be exceptional and unusual."

Yes, it does seem to work this way at times. It is a shame really, because the actual acheivements of the real people (Berthier, Gribeauval, the French light infantry officers in your examples) get cast both in the epic story of the régime but also into the shade of Napoléon.

Berthier and Gribeuaval, our recent examples, appear to me to have been really good at their actual functions – hard-working, educated, professional, somewhat innovative (if perhaps not revolutinary). But when they get "puffed up" as part of the Napoléon epic, their own real acheivements and even their own identity seem harder to see clearly.

And they also get drawn into the question of "Napoléon's legacy" – how do we see the effect of Napoléon on later history and military affairs. Look at this thread for an example. I – more personal opinion – hate this part. It runs instantly into anachronism, it is often nationalistic or political, it is almost always a speculative or analytical exercise (as opposed to a factual investigation) and …. (wait for it) ….

There is no effect on my wargaming!
Whether or not Napoléon changed anything in the years after 1815 (or 1823 at the latest) does not make a single die roll modification in any game I will ever play.

Amicalement.

A lot of this is down to trying to wipe the Germanic component – authors have this Moltke problem, so they have pounced on the 1917 US adoption of the French staff system, which includes a numbered dept set-up. From there, they deduce that this actually came from Berthier, either directly or that somehow Moltke was a conduit based on a Prussian reaction in 180…. well, not sure! They see Thiebault's manual and are impressed by the number of translations of it, although no major nation adopted it – UK was still using the 18th century QMG logistics/military secretary system. This can be traced further back to Berthier's 1796 order (thanks for flagging that up at last, Sotnik), so that must be the root of it, not that these authors have read it, preferring to rely on de Philip in fact.

You can see the muddle they get into when in 1805, Berthier has dropped to three depts, and in their comments about Bourcet. Thiebault does not even mention him. He was writing about mountain warfare and from the NSF item, it seems he was just pointing out that any army in that terrain would be in smaller columns or sub-formations, to which staff officers would be attached. That is perfectly sensible and had apparently been Austrian practice (and presumably French) when detaching forces in the 7YW – it certainly was standard procedure in the Austrian army during the Revolutionary Wars. However recent authors have suddenly read into Bourcet the start of the divisional staff system – this is a feature of Moltke in fact – and it has fitted in with another false claim about divisional staffs starting in 1780 – they are the peacetime admin staffs in each division of France, not a wartime organisation at all. This gets extrapolated into Boudet's so-called divisional staff of 1800 being taken over by Desaix for his supposed proto-"corps" at Marengo.

Reputedly, it was the French ambassador, who suggested in 1757 that Austria should move work from the CinC to the CoS and post-7YW, it would appear that Austria and france drew several similar conclusions about their experiences. The problem in France comes in 1790 with the disbandment of the staff corps for being too "ancien regime". My first impression of Berthier's 1796 order is simply that he is dividing up the jobs in some detail – Austrian CoSs perhaps found such an essay simply unnecessary – and Berthier is making a case for more staff as he is two senior men down.

Dave,

"A lot of this is down to trying to wipe the Germanic component – authors have this Moltke problem"

The context of our sources is important. Here is an example that requires only a little eplanation ….

We see Kevin and other modern English-language writers often referencing J.D. Hittle's "The Miitary Staff". Usually the work is cited (if any citation is given) as : "Harrisburg Pa. : Stackpole, 1961." Hittle is the first author in English that I have found to rely heavily upon lieutenant-colonel de Phillip's "Étude sur le service d'état-major pendant les guerres du premier Empire" (Paris : R. Chapelot, 1900) wherein the 1795/1796 proposal by Berthier is noted.

Seems like this should be just fine, right ? But, the context might give one some pause ….

It was actually Stackpole's military service division that published an edition of Hittle's work in 1961. The book first appeared in 1944 as an instuctional booklet for US officers. Here are some of the editions :
link
link

A biography of Brigadier General Hittle USMC (1915-2002) :
link

The author was a USMC Major (1944 LTC) attending the division officers course at Benning and then serving at Quantico when his booklet was authored (August 1942 through May 1944). The only obvious academic training he had received in history was an MA in oriental history and geography from the University of Utah (1937). His biograpghy from the Arlington National Cemetery notes of his 1944 work : "Written during the Second World War by then-Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Hittle, USMC, this work presents an American-spin on the history and evolution of what is commonly called the General Staff."

To expect such a work to provide a scholarly and balanced account of the relevance of the German or "Germanic" staffs is perhaps unreasonable. To proffer the work without explanation, as if it were a neutral scholarly work, is perhaps unwise. The need to understand the context of a source and its author is quite clear.

Amicalement.

lieutenant-général ingénieur Pierre-Joseph de Bourcet (1700-1780)

"Principes de la guerre de montagnes"
link
- a manuscript of 1775, published in 1888
- the author was the "directeur des fortifications du Dauphiné" from 1756 to 1777.
- the Dauphiné is/was the area around Grenoble

"Mémoires militaires sur les frontières de la France, du Piémont et de la Savoie …."
link
- published 1801

Biographical notes ….
English link
French link

The first work is about mountains and mountain warfare. The second one is about frontier forts on France's southeast border.

A quick google search will show how de Bourcet is often noted in connection with Napoléon, most notably by modern works in English, and especially those written for an audience composed largely of military officers.
This does appear a tad odd when you then look at de Borcet's actual work, as linked above.

Comment ….

Like Berthier's 1795/1796 proposal, the work on mountain warfare also appears to have been found by archivists during the wave of research for staff historical studies conducted by the French army at the end of the 19th century.

It is unclear to me the extent to which, or even if, the few manuscript originals of either the Berthier proposal or of de Bourcet on mountain warfare were read before being filed into an archives. Thus the degree to which these works were influential on military theory prior to 1900 might be low or even negligable.

Amicalement.

Bourcet is also quoted in relation to Napoleon as he apparently suggests Rivoli as a really good defensive position and N is suppsoed to have used some of his mountain warfare ideas in 96-7. However, if you look at the index, there is nop specific section on staffs, so I suspect that many of the claims are exaggerated – the Wiki fn2 goes to Parker's Three Napoleonic Battles, also published in 1944. I shall have a read of Bourcet next time I visit the British Library, but Thiebault's ignoring of him suggests there is actually little in it.

Indeed, we must consider not just what a book is about but also when it was written to see the influences upon it. I suspect that several authors only get as far as Hittle, not even de Philipp when pronouncing on this French staff. The same seems to be happening with Berthier – his four depts are stated over and over again, but the text is actually mostly about who writes what report to whom and when. It suggests that the Directory and maybe senior commanders are not happy with how reports are being sent, not the suggested detail of what each staff officer actually did.

Dave,

The two published works by de Bourcet are linked above in my post and fully viewable and downlaod-able in the USA. If you can't read them from your IP (in the UK ?), access the page from a proxy server in the USA.

This sevice will also work, and is 100% safe and secure (journalists and ngo's use it all the time) :
torproject.org
Tor provides you the equivalent of a random proxy server from all over the world, and so you must sometimes reload the service a couple of times to get a connection that can read a specific google book.

If this fails, let me know and I will download what you want and upload it someplace else where you can get it easily.

Amicalement.

"so I suspect that many of the claims are exaggerated"

The work by de Bourcet on border defense in the Piedmont was printed in 1801. So it could have some influence. There is nothing even indirectly about staffs in this one that I could find.

The work about mountain warfare might be, if one wanted to read it this way, said to include some advice for organizing forces and operations. And this might possibly be considered, especially later, to pertain to staff work.

But, as I noted above, I do not know of any publication before 1888 and have no idea how many people even read the presumably few manuscript versions. Three manuscripts were known in 1888 (including one lost and two partial – the two partials used to reconstruct a more full text for rpublication in 1888). These were in the usual places : the local departmental archives where de Bourcet served (partial, likely his own draft copy), and two listed as ever being in the ministry of war's possession (one lost at an un-specified time, one damaged in 1871).

It is 100% unproven that anyone even read this work from the era of its composition (1775) until that of its publication (1888). For much of that time, it appears that no complete manuscript was even located in the same place for it to be available to be read.

This might also be the simplest explanation for "Thiebault's ignoring of him" – Thiebault just never saw a manuscript.

It's influence seems to arise from about the 1940's and then mostly among Enlgish-language writers. As I said, "a tad odd" to me. But, it is linked here and everyone can read it and decide for themselves what they think about it. My opinion is not important at all.

Amicalement.

Dave

Can you email me re this stuff, need some additional info…

melgum30@yahoo.co.uk

K