"Un Contre Dix" Topic

Rothenberg remarks of the 82 of the Line's achievements at Graz that this seems to contradict the oft-stated view that the French of 1809 had somehow degenerated from the superb Grande Armee of 1805.

Obviously a stellar performance from the French on this occasion but was it that exceptional?

I am interested to know why the French are popularly regarded as a lesser force as Rothenberg says.

Casualties from Eylau?
Transfer to the Peninsula?
Age & disillusionment with war?

Is this a valid criticism of the French in their war against Austria in 1809?

It is Nap propaganda to say to his army, just defeated at Aspern, "You can do better". It was about Un Contre Deux with the Un in a defensive position facing a force mostly made up of Croatian Insurrection.

Sorry? Not written in your usual lucid prose Dave (though it might be me).

I'm assuming you're ignoring the question I asked, which was about the quality of the 1809 French to attack the Graz story?

I've heard you on this before Old Friend & I still find Rothenberg et al more convincing.

Could we stick to the point for at least a post or two?

Herding cats is easier then having Napoleonic fans stick to a topic.

With regards to your question, IMO , the reason for Napoleon's difficulties in 1809 were due in a large part to the improvement in the Austrian Army. They had a better than average Commander in Archduke Charles who had done a lot to reform both the structure and tactics of the army. The Austrians were fighting on " home " ground .

Napoleon and his generals underestimated the changes in the Austrian army and thought that the campaign would be a repeat of others so when they made a mistake the Austrians were ready to take advantage of it a lot quicker and with more effect than before.

With respect to the 84th Ligne at Graz remember that the French force under Marmont that had been sent to occupy the Adriatic coast after 1805 were veterans firstly of the Camps and the 1805 Campaign and then had not been worn down by subsequent campaigns in 1806 & 1807 in central/eastern Europe or the Peninsula in 1808/9. Davout's 3rd Corps sustained 30% + casualties at Auerstadt, Augerau's 7th Corp was destroyed at Eylau, Lannes 5th Corps heavily damaged at Pultusk, Soult's Corps was hurt at Heilsberg and all this was missed by the regiments of the "Army of Dalmatia" under Marmont. Thus the 84th Ligne was in excellent shape, typical of the quality of a good French Regiment of the 1805 Campaign when they entered the fight at Graz.

I think the French infantry performance throughout the 1809 Campaign, across all the theatre's varied tremendously. This was no longer the uniformly high quality Grand Armee of 1805 anymore. Its this variety that contributes to the fascination with the 1809 Campaign. The Austrian rank and file overall were vastly improved and the French and their Allies were up and down. Makes it interesting.

This relates to a point I make to gamers across all periods when they say things like "This unit did well, so it is elite" etc. One set of rules (in its rating troops section) asked how to account for a brigade(I forget which one) that did well at battle X, but not at battle Y (I'm not about to search all my books for the actual names!)

It simple. They threw good dice.

Most games have a randomised elemnt for most factors – shooting, morale etc. This is an attempt to model the unaccountable variables of real life. However gamers forget this, and say things like 'because this unit fought to the last man, I will make their moral high'. Unless theer is good historical reason to do so (same consistant outcome for that unit over a campaign), we should assume a lot of the results are part of the this randomness.

Our games frequently have stats for 'Guard'. This unit is the Bongolesian Royal Guard, ergo it is Guard. Really? Why, apart from the name?

Maybe we should gove morale modifiers for being attacked by a unit with a reputation – deserved or not. "The Old Guard always win, we are being attacked by the Old Guard, ergo we will lose".

Certain Nations, and troops with in the nation will be better, but that is often through training and tradition. Few Napoleonic units received 'extra' training.

Like wise for WW2 I would give US para's higher morale than regular troops, but would not give the defenders of Bastogne anything extra, just because they didn't surrender – that's built into the 'Para' mod. (-2 on the dice for being surrounded – we're para's, we're meant to be surrounded…)

There is plenty of mythology surrounding what was simply a piece of propaganda (Un contre Dix, Guard at Marengo, Young Guard at Essling village) or practicality (57e at Teugn climbing the ridge in open order), but is made out to be something special worthy of +1 (for being French really!).

AS for the comments about the Austrian army, this is likewise myth built up from the "1807 reaction" nonsense. In what way was it better? Charles had good subordinates in many cases, so his own copmmand capabilities depend far more on that.

As I said, if you bother to check the OB, rather than N's Marchfeld propagnda, you will find that Un contre Dix was un Contre Deux with an outcome as you would expect from decent troops in an defensive position against mostly untrained militia. I am sure any game would produce the same result without the +2 supermen modifier.

OD,

In spite of your second post I am not sure what your question really is. Are you asking about Graz, or the French army as a whole? The context of 84e and ‘Un Contre Dix' is relatively simple to understand and I suggest Gill Vol3 pp141-147 as a start. The latter is much more difficult and generalisations are not very helpful I think.

What are Rothenberg's remarks concerning Graz and where may they be found?

In what way is Rothenberg (and others) more convincing? Who are the others?

What are Rothenberg's remarks about 84e and where may they be found?

How is Graz a "stellar performance"? If Gill's account is right it seems a pretty lacklustre affair on both sides. If you mean 84e in particular, the context was unusual.

What do you mean by "a lesser force"? Lesser in the context of relative numbers at Graz? Lesser in general terms than previous French armies? It is a matter of fact that the French army included conscripts who had neither the exposure to training, such as the Grande Armee of 1805 had received at the Channel Camps, or the experience of the veterans of the 1805-1807 campaigns.

Is what a valid criticism? All the campaigns from 1805 had resulted in casualties and every year inexperienced conscripts entered the army.

Bill

I think nsolomon99 has hit the nail on the head. The quality of Napoleon's army was very variable because its recovery from the losses incurred 1805-07 was patchy, and expereinced cadres diluted to some extent.

Far too many commentators who should know better (like Rothenberg in this instance) draw conclusions on troop quality from the overall result of a battle, when that is only one factor among many. For example, to state that the French loss of Aspern-Essling reflects on the poor quality of their troops is nonsense. The loss was due to a strategic mistake by Napoleon; his men fought magnificently and this prevented a much worse defeat. Then again, the battlefield was so cramped that there was little scope for tactical finesse on either side.

I like to rate troops based on objective factors, known to commanders before a battle starts. This includes selective recruitment, training, experience, etc. Further evidence can be gained from the missions with which the units were entrusted (best troops in advance guard or reserve, etc). Performance on the day depended on the dice, as it were. The same goes for commanders; I don't like rating them based on perceived performance in hindsight, though that is what many people like to do.

Matthew

ochoin deach

It seems that it is always a 'myth' surrounding events when French units do well against the Austrians, or rather, it is to some people. Or the French were veterans fighting militia.

I researched the action a few years back and the Austrian force also included several line regiments, not just militia, as suggested, and did indeed vastly outnumber the French regiments involved.

On the first day of fighting, 25th June, the French 84th Line infantry regiment (2 bats) alone, had to hold their position against Austrian infantry, cavalry and artillery. They were also said to have run out of ammunition,

On the 26th June, French reinforcement reached them and while some sources suggest that the French then attacked the Austrians and forced them to retreat, the Austrians may well have been retreating anyway, due to the arrival of the French reinforcements, which may have indicated further French troops were on the way.

Were the 84th outnumbered 10-1, yes and no. In the actual troops that attacked them, I would say no, it was more of two or four to one at the most. But overall, if counting the number of troops the Austrians could but did not throw at the 84th on the first day, then yes, they were. And being outnumbered by such a large number was not new to this regiment, as Digby Smith points out in his excellent title Napoleon's Regiments, page 136, where he mentions the regiment holding off 10,000 Prussians for 4 hours.

Ochoin

As they say, one swallow does not make a summer . The performance of the 84th at Graz, as impressive as it was (even if you don't accept the 10-1 odds, it was still a very good performance, that reflected well on the training and morale of the soldiers), it can't be extended to all the Grande Armée. 1805's army was better trained, overall, than 1809's. However, that doesn't mean that the French army that fought the Austrian campaign was bad. It was a well balanced, well commanded army, with plenty of veterans to bolster the intake of new recruits.

Of course, casualties suffered in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, plus the commitments in Spain, reduced the pool of veteran regiments available to Napoleon, in 1809. But that wasn't as significative as Rothenberg assumed; or, at least, it wasn't if we accept Gill's analysis -which I do, by the way-.

Best regards

Dave, dave, dave …. mate … feeling grumpy are we today.

Of course there was a difference between the Austrian infantry that fought so well at Eckmuhl and Sacile and Aspern-Essling and Wagram and Znaim and so on during 1809 and the dismal efforts of the Hapsburg infantry at Gunzberg and Elchingen and Haslach-Junginen and so on in 1805. Huge differences in tenacity, morale, drill and formations, organisation and regimental structure, low level leadership at regimental and battalion level.

What are you suggesting? That all of Archduke Karl's efforts made no difference? Surely you cant mean that?

I absolutely agree Karl was better than Mack? Even the Austrian Corps/Column commanders, the senior generals, did a better job than in 1805. Not sure the divisional commanders were significantly better.

Cheer up mate, we're all alive and breathing and the sun'll come up in the morning! :)

Second Caldiero? Charles did not command as Nap did (or mack sought to do). What about his reforms? Okay, the late reorganisation did create significant C3 problems, but drill and formations? What was it then? They had no money for drill camps.

(Incidentally, I have addressed these issues in the Armies of the Nap Wars book as there is a lot of mythology here).

Could I thank most of you for so intelligently answering my query?

It has been off-putting, on many occasions, to consider asking a question here knowing a flame war could erupt from the hard-core denizens of the Napoleonic boards.

Ochoin

Don't worry about flame wars in the Napoleonic Boards. There is a lot of myth about them. Many people are polite and helpful, even when they are in disagreement.

Best regards

"many people are polite & helpful even when they are in disagreement"

You bet!

Thanks.

Low level command structure was degraded in the French move to 6 companies.
Conversely it had improved slightly in the Austrian.

Hence the difference in 'inherent combat potential' had been narrowed at the basic level.