"French Staff" Topic

'Reading the original source material' has proven other sources incorrect and no longer of value-really, which 'original source material?'

Just as one possible example, Dave comments over and over and over again about the '1762 report' being quite different when you read the source material (ie the report itself). Though of course he words it in a much nastier manner. But assuming he is correct, could that be an example?

Sorry, I haven't got your book to check if he is actually correct in his comment, and I can't locate where you may have countered his comment – so I may be wrong. But at face value it seems to be an example of 'reading the original source material'.

Anything new related to the topic than the usual smoke screens and moving gole posts by 10th Marines?

I am surprised that the Prussian Army of 1806 did not come up yet, neither did Germany exist in the Napoleonic time or not, etc.

That aspect might be better on the inaccurate books thread – this was about ney and his staff in 1813.

I think titles of threads on this board are probably irrelevant, Dave! The discussions are so free-wheeling, and very, very seldom stay on topic.

I guess an ideal would be if each and every specific issue had its own thread, and we all stuck to the rule that only that issue could be responded to on that thread, and no other issue could be mentioned other than in a reference to "see the such-and-such thread". That would make it much easier to track when and how each issue is responded to.

However, as we're all human beings trying to get one-up on each other, I think it is impossible to resist the temptation to throw in as many red herrings and sidetracks as we can! C'est la vie!

'Anything new related to the topic than the usual smoke screens and moving gole posts by 10th Marines?
I am surprised that the Prussian Army of 1806 did not come up yet, neither did Germany exist in the Napoleonic time or not, etc.'

Absolutely incredible. Ignorant, but incredible all the same.

Are we seeing how many cheap shots can be taken on the forums?

K

Arteis,

No, he's not correct. He hasn't been correct on anything he has 'mentioned' regarding me or my work.

For example, if I'm not mistaken the comment was made that the subject letter by Gribeauval is contained at the back of Hennebert's book (the 1896 edition, I have a copy). It isn't there-it's in the middle of the book from pages 36-44 (there are 125 pages in the volume).

Just like the comments made about Ken Alder and others on Gribeauval, these are incorrect. The letter was the beginning of the new artillery system, and the questions/responses are the correct questions to ask if a new system is to be designed and to be superior to the Austrian system, which it was.

The 'version' of the intellectual process I wrote, which contained a quote from the report, is an opinion piece, a vignette if you like, on the initial workings of Gribeauval's thinking on how to begin the new system he was tasked to design as well as an historical 'probably' which is a valid tool in historical inquiry.

K

For example, if I'm not mistaken the comment was made that the subject letter by Gribeauval is contained at the back of Hennebert's book (the 1896 edition, I have a copy). It isn't there-it's in the middle of the book from pages 36-44 (there are 125 pages in the volume).

The page numbering is hardly important.

The letter was the beginning of the new artillery system, and the questions/responses are the correct questions to ask if a new system is to be designed and to be superior to the Austrian system, which it was.

But this is more important. Assuming the translation at PDF link is the entire unabridged report, it is just a series a questions and answers, and there is no specific statement that it is about "the beginning of the new artillery system".

However, from that evidence you deduce that "the beginning of the new artillery system" is the reason for the questions and answers, or certainly what came out of it. Assuming, of course, your summary above summarises the main thrust of what is in your book, which I don't have.

I agree with you, Kevin, that that could indeed be the reason – but only so far as it *could* be. There are plenty of other just as feasible reasons for asking and answering those questions, which *could* also (or instead) have been the case.

So it is not a proven fact – well, on that evidence, anyway. Instead it is a deduction (or opinion, as you put it) you've made based on one of the feasible possibilities. This, in my own opinion, is perfectly fine and certainly not worthy of the abuse that Dave Hollins heaps on you for this one aspect.

You will not be the first nor the last historian who presents his deductions or opinions as "this is what happened" rather than "this is what I believe happened". It actually seems to be the done way of doing it!

So, I come back and find…a Bricole moment!

K

Khevenhuller:

Indeed!

10th's reply to Bill (XVB) puzzled me. What is an "advanced degree in military history?" A Master's Degree? If so, why phrase it as an "advanced degree?"

10th states "All in my cohort were amazed at the commicated [sic] idea from some of the instructors that to pursue a PHD in history was futile for us-it also meant more competition for them, which was the point." I'm not sure what this has to do with the "quest" for new material being "manic." The reason that the professors would tell you that is not to limit competition for them, but because the odds of getting a position in academia in the field are extremely limited (especially with a military history focus). PhD programs that offer little chance of employability are frowned upon. Several institutions are no longer supporting a PhD in history. By 2007 the number of people seeking a PhD in history (U.S.) decreased from previous years and thus the advertised history job postings were slightly higher than the number of PhD graduates, but in this economy getting a position is tough. Why recommend spending all the time and money chasing a PhD with little opportunity to employ it?

10th also asserts "What is happening to my mind is that some academics and authors have to make a name for themselves that they do it by first denigrating prior works even if the scholarship is excellent in order to push forward their agenda." What "agenda?" You make an unsupported claim here. What is your "agenda?" Defend the status quo? You cannot point the finger at others as having an agenda and act as though you are posting for the benevolent benefit of we historically-challenged wargamers. You have not earned a PhD. Perhaps you would change your tune if you had to fulfill the requirements of getting a doctoral degree (including dissertation and learning a foreign language well enough to do primary research). You further claim "And it isn't the material that is 'new' it is the opinions expressed, and many of them are incorrect in fact and logic." You express an "opinion" and present it as supported fact. I would think that you would have learned that much from an "advanced degree." There are many sources in overseas archives that have not been tapped into yet (and "manic" doctoral students are probably the only ones that will spend the unappreciated time and effort to share them).

LWF,

You're not only being consescending, but somewhat obtuse. I was asked for an opinion and gave it-nothing more nothing less. If you disagree on this topic, who really gives a flip?

It seems to me you're merely disagreeing to start an argument-if that is so please find someone else with whom you can grind your axe. I gave an opinion based on my experience. If you don't like that, it really is too bad. Get over it.

K

10th:

I understand. I am "obtuse" because I'm not fawning about your "advanced degree." You post a batch of mere assertions and criticisms and when someone calls you on them they are condescending, obtuse, and axe grinding. Did you learn that technique at the advanced degree school? So much angst in this thread if you know what I mean.

I am surprised that the discussion about the 1762 report reproduced in Hennebert has only arisen since I found and read it in the British Library a couple of years ago. perhaps more illuminating is Kevin's bibliography – there amongst a dozen German language books, none of which he has read, is no listing of Hennebert or indeed any other book containing the text. Kevin's flight of fancy itself goes unfootnoted.

Yes, there is one of the introductory paragraphs – but that particular paragraph is reproduced in other books! The reason? Well, typical Ruling Theory. It is produced as "proof" that G's remark about combining the L and de Valliere guns would create a battle winning system. the French had his guns and won lots of battles, so G must have been the fount of all this. the actual text of the report has been conveniently ignored as it is so basic that it could have been written by anyone, who bought my NV72.

So, what do we make of this? has Kevin read the report? Clearly no as his version bears no relation to it and it is not listed in the bibliography, which does include many books he has not read. Let us look at the bricole – told a year before publication that a page on a book he did use shows the bricole in Austrian service 18 months before G arrived,. Kevin says at least 4 times in his book that G inveneted "this important piece of equpiment". Look at the text on the Strassburg tests – all French guns and there is only one mention of Gribeauval, where he agrees with the reduced windage. (Consider that Martiz designed new barrels in 1761 and you cans ee what was being tested along with the reason for the 1762 report request from Paris).

If we then look at many of the claims made by Kevin, we see a similar pattern – G tested Austrian and Prussian full sized guns apparently, but there is no sign of test data and in fact, he brought one model back from Prussia. G apparently invented the hausse sight and the 1790 Table des constructions was the latest version of some plans sent out around 1765 – but what do we find in de Coudray? G was to thanked for "introducing" the new sight (it is shown in the Austrian 1767 plates) and that G sent out tables of measurement in 1765 (much as the Austrians did in 1716).

Arteis may think I am being rude, but what are we to make of all this, esp the 1762 report? If it bears no relation to the text and there is no secondary claim about G's plans making these claims, then that only leaves only conclusion. We have been lectured since 1999 on using "the right sources" by someone, who has failed to check the fundamental material in his own work. Instead, we get a lot of assertions from secondary authors, who have likewise failed to do the basic reading.

Still, he was in the USMC artillery, so he must be right ….. (LWF should be fawning over that too).

Kevin,

I don't know what I have written that you perceive as beneath my dignity or why you think I am furious about anything. I am far too old to risk being furious. I don't understand why you claim that my rendition of what you said somehow distorts what you meant but you have not explained in what way so I am no more the wiser I'm afraid. You are either amused, annoyed and troubled about the quest for information or you are not, but lot of things seem to annoy you and I fear you give the appearance of feeling scorned most of the time and of regarding any criticism as disparaging.

I am not entirely sure what you mean by an advanced degree and I presume you to mean a postgraduate MA. Lots of people have degrees these days so you are not unusual except perhaps as far as your experiences are concerned. I read your post with mixture of incredulity and dismay and if it is an accurate reflection of American universities it is a disgrace. The attitude of your tutors you describe is not acceptable but they do not tend to take kindly to students who think they know better than they do. Have you considered that the problem might have been yours, after all you seem extremely unreceptive yourself when it comes to other peoples' points of view and your responses here invariably give the impression that you are unwilling to listen to positions other than your own.

I would not expect new material to be at the core of an MA dissertation. An MA is almost always a taught course rather than a research course and the dissertation tends to be an examination of selected literature of the subject rather than research per se. It is also very poor that your tutors could not seem to agree on the advice to give you which must have been very confusing. Your comments about the popularity of military history in American universities, true or not, and references to Lynn, Alder and Rosen and your differences with people on TMP and most of your post to be blunt, really have nothing as far as I can see to do with your concerns about the quest for new information and why you are amused, annoyed and troubled by it.

Your fifth paragraph almost answers the question by itself without any of the stuff before and afterwards. Your view "that the quest for 'new' material ….. is to my mind hurting not only the writing of military history but the study of it" is astonishing. You don't so how or why but in my view there is absolutely no point in repeating the views of secondary sources. The entire point to historical research is to uncover what we do not know about something and if you do go on to attempt a PhD or some other kind of research course you should find that it is focused on research rather than learning and your thesis will need to reflect the former but your graduate and post-graduate degress should have given you the skills to do it.

Bill

Bill

Well pointed. I am spending a very long time plunging around Europe doing interviews with key individuals to gather research and it drives me nuts…I rather think I would prefer them dead so they do not change their minds or contradict themselves.

Some tutors, or at least here in the UK, accept that they cannot know everything and accept that their students may be better informed by them. Indeed it is unlikely that you will find a Phd supervisor who will, particularly as you get closer to completing your thesis. Yet, the supervisor is not meant to be an 'expert' or know more than you, but rather someone to keep you aimed in the right direction, offer different interpretations or perspectives and make sure you come up with chapters on time!

I did find Kevin's assertion that a drive to unearth new material, reinterpret old material and look at what exists in different contexts, as something to be afraid of as a little baffling. Taking that to a ridiculous conclusion would mean we would never have left the trees for fear of discovering the ground can support us.

Anyhow, as no-one has actually come up with any real information about the disposition of French staff to armies not led by Boney (such as Massena's Army of the North in 1811)I guess no-one really knows.

K

The 'version' of the intellectual process I wrote, which contained a quote from the report, is an opinion piece, a vignette if you like, on the initial workings of Gribeauval's thinking on how to begin the new system he was tasked to design as well as an historical 'probably' which is a valid tool in historical inquiry.

Thank you Kevin, that explains a lot, should this have been made obvious, the paragraph in your book looks like you are quoting directly from the report when in fact you are doing an opinion piece, so that bug*** Dave was right all this time!!

'I did find Kevin's assertion that a drive to unearth new material, reinterpret old material and look at what exists in different contexts, as something to be afraid of as a little baffling.'

And where did I state or assert that? Could you please show me where and in what context? Not only are you incorrect, but you are misinterpreting what I wrote.

K

Kevin

This is what you actually said:

"That being said, the 'quest' for 'new' material, especially in the academic venue, is close to manic. Having seen it at first hand it is at first amusing, then annoying, and finally troubling."

But as I was not quoting you directly (that is what "…." are for) this is an interpretation in context, i.e the summary is what new research actually does, even if the material itself is not new.

Now, if you are troubled in a way that does not mean 'afraid' then in what context are you 'troubled'? Equally I could have pointed to the word "annoying". Why is new research or looking for new material annoying? I know that it is a real issue for conservatives with a small 'C', but thankfully the discipline is always moving and changing which keeps it fresh, as opposed to being pickled into some sort of dogma.

K

Oh I see now. I found some material and asked for new material to be found to see how it might fit with the monograph.

Now I need to find out if I am amusing, annoying or troubling

:)

K

K,

Did you notice the use of the word 'manic?' The so-called 'search' is annoying because the focus is on something 'new'-an angle, a viewpoint, maybe even 'new' material (though, unfortunately, that is rare) and what is ignored is good scholarship, a respect for facts and other people's prior work, and last and most important, historical accuracy. The focus is on 'new' and generally nothing else. That to me is very troubling (and quite annoying), for some authors present their viewpoint as 'new' when that material has been in print for decades, or it is presented as 'new' because the author wants it to be that way, regardless of any evidence to the contrary.

What is not being written is good history too many times and it is hurting the discipline as well as those who have an active interest in military history. The search should not be primarily for something 'new' but a topic one is interested in and if something is found that really is new information, then that's a great benefit. People frantically searching for something 'new' will always find it, whether it is accurate or not. People conducting historical inquiry as it should be conducted will probably end up with a solid product that adds to the literature of any period.

Again, you misinterpreted what I wrote and intended. And from what you have written I really don't think you understand historical inquiry.

K

Isn't this the French staff thread?

I was wondering how much staff you actually need to run a couple of French Corps? didn't the French corps have all its own staff to function, it just needed guidance on where to go, who to attack etc, Ney would have the use of the Corps aides as well as any of his own aides, but could he read a map? did he have any?

Napoleon needed the large GA staff because he was directing ALL the Corps and armies as well as the country.

@Graf Bretlach

Here my apparoach, I would try to get

1) the number of staff officers and adjudants of an allied army. This would be IMHO the upper limit, as these army staffs had to do work, which on the French side Napoleon's staff could perform for the other French army staffs/army commander.

2) Try to get a list of critcal command decisons on the side of French army commanders – here the paper Keraunos provided is a good starting point – and check, to which extend these decisions require an additional staff.

Graf,

The central case being made – outside of the swiping off topic – was that to command three corp, you need more than 3 staff officers.

good luck sifting through the back posts to make sense of the debate though – its a low post to topic ratio here.

Austria had 61 General Staff officers in 1806 and my source said they went to over 170 for 1809. However, I suspect that includes the Adjutant Staff too, in which case, they are spread over 11 Korps (reduced to 10) and two Army HQs (Ferdinand having just one corps). That would suggest 10-12 per Korps plus the artillery and technical directors & staff.

Keraunos,

before Dennewitz Ney split the cavalry corps of his army and assigned the two cavalry divisions to other corps. I would expect that this gives a few "spare" staff officers.

I should say that I agree with Kevin in his criticism to revisionism for the shake of revisionism. Although it's not limited to Military History, but to all History. Some scholars bring up new material and help us to improve our knowledge of the past. However, other authors, in their desperate search of something 'new' (how many times it's only new for them?) end throwing the baby with the water.

One thing is legitimate revisionism -all History book is revisionist, by its own nature-, and other is to twist the evidence until it fits in a allegedly 'new paradigm'. That's bad scholarship. I have seen plenty, of lately. The pressure on new historians to sell lure them into a dynamic of looking for controversy, even if the known evidence it's not controvertial at all. Sometimes they try to debunk past historian's works using just anecdotal evidence, whithout recognising that, at most, it can cast some doubts in previous interpretations of the facts, but that it's not significant enough to merit a new paradigm. At least not until it's supported by a more complete documental corpus.

As for the topic of the thread, after reading the arguments of both sides, I would say that Dave's opinion about that the French staff was actually an administrative support, that operated in an ad hoc basis, rather than a General Staff in the contemporary meaning of the term, looks right. However, it can't be negated either that the basis of the future, professional General Staffs, can be traced to Napoleonic times. Both Berthier and Gneisenau created what can be labelled as embryonic General Staffs. Berthier didn't make the planning -that was Napoleon's realm-, but he was who 'translated' his master's ideas into actual, workable plans that could be implemented by the commanders of the army corps. That's more than a glorified clerk, but less than an actual (in the modern sense of the word) Chief of Staff.

Best regards

I would aagree on the sensationalised revisionism of which there has been quite a lot recently – that numpty Clive Ponting's biog of Churchill springs to mind. Much of it, like rent-a-gob Roberts, is doesn't even get past the reworked lazy histort level. However, we have not seen so much in the Nap world – much of it here has been the simple digging up of new material in ignored or previously less accesible archives, which has led to a reassessment of the prevailing wisdom, despite the efforts of some to shout it down.

Unfortunately, some Ruling theories have survived and this staff question is one of them, largley due to the Moltke/Prussian problem for post-WW2 authors. You can read the myth at link

It fits in well with the Nap new warfare copied in a reaction by the Prussians in particular. Unfortunately, it is a reading of the material to get round the Moltke problem. What Berthier did was nothing more than the job of the office chief clerk (a senior warrant officer in most armies) and it is interesting that Vachee and Jomini reach thos conclusion independently. berthier's job was less than an Austrian CoS did in 1714.

The key to the problem has been twofold – 1) "interpretation" of N's orders and 2) the 1795 manual follwod by Thiebault, which breaks the staff into depts.

To start with (1) the interpretation: n actually tells us the reality (This also comes from an item Kevin wrote on the Nap Series) 'In my campaigns Berthier was always to be found in my carriage. During the journey I used to study the plans of the situation and the reports sent in, sketch out my plans for battle from them, and arrange the necessary moves. Berthier would watch me at work, and at the first stopping-place or rest, whether it was day or night, he made out the orders and arrangements with a method and an exactness that was truly admirable. For this work he was always ready and untiring. That was Berthier's special merit. It was very great and valuable, and no one else could have replaced Berthier.'

He is playing no part in advising his commander or summarising the intelligence situation. All he is doing is some detail on the movements of the various corps, following N's lengthy dictation. That of course should not actually necessary under a true corps system, which just gives the corps commander his objective within the overall strategy and leaves him to get on with it. He is just fleshing out detailed dictation.

On (2), the French had abolished their staff corps in 1792, so any spare bod was brought on to the staff, but needed to know what he had to do – hence a manual. The division of tasks was just to simplify things for them as knowing nothing, these guys needed to limit what they were doing to get hold of the task in hand. Manuals are today a familiar concept in military and non-military organisations, but that doies not make this manual an innovation. the problem is further magnified by all the other departments N needed to run his government on campaign, giving the impression of a structured organisation.

The myth is that the old general plus entourage led by the CoS as chief secretary was replaced by N/Berthier and then copied by the Prussians, notably Gneisenau and then developed by them. In fact, N had an old style staff – he did all the G2 and G3. We get vague assertions of corps staff being smaller versions of the Army staff, but yet, we cannot even find the blokes suppsoedly doing it! In contrast, Austria has a CoS taking much of the command burden from his boss from 1757 and a peacetime staff from 1767. There was no manual as such simply because the small permanent staff was expected to join the one main field army and would thus be up to speed from the off. It didn't really work out like that, but the CoS's responsibilities are there in 1767 and he just delegates them, depending mainly on who he has. However, Mack in 1794 and Charles in 1805 move to a formally structured staff, doing all the jobs modern staffs do. Few people have read Mack's instructions and I suppose Charles' vorschrift must be part of the "reaction", even though it predates the first clash with the Grande Armee! The reason for a CoS witha wioder role in 1757 was the Succession War followed by initial setbacks in the 7YW – Prussia was reforming, but was pushed to the same position in 1806, when its own "great brain" likewise failed. However, they do not copy the French, but the Austrians, as they ahd worked together in 1792-5 and there is plenty of contact going on from 1805. Prussians are like the Japanese – relatively little innovation, just better versions of someone else's ideas (they took the Krumper system from Austria's reserve battalions too). By 1813, it is easy for the two nations to work together, but Austria is directing operations.

Berthier is just the last knockings of the old entourage system – the French kept this fabled system right up to Sedan and suffered for it! Look at it another way – what happens when Berthier is not about?

There is a nice quote by PH in his Staff & Specialist Troops MAA from Moltke: "There are commanders, who need no advisers, who can consider and decide for themselves; their retinue is only there to execute orders. However, these are stars of the first order, which appear only once a century, if that. In most cases, the commander of an army cannot do without advice. That may come from a council …. whose training and experience makes it capable of giving the correct judgement". PH points out that n's marshals lacked any staff training and indeed, a common philiosophy, highlighting Ney's failure at Bautzen.

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are the well known guys, but it is probably Massenbach, who advised the Prussian King to modernise Frederick the Great's system, which like N's was purely administrative. In 1787, the Prussuans use the term "General Staff" for the first time. In 1790, the Quartermaster General (CoS) was Pfau, who had two Assistant QGs, 4 Qs and 10-12 Assistant Qs, plus 12 Engineer-Geographers. In1796, when peace was made, the Prussian staff was reduced to 3 AQGs, 6 Qs, 6AQ and 18 Adjoints plus some civilian planners. In 1803, the staff is divided into three geographical brigades. The job thus still remains pretty admionistrative and the Prussian functions are very similar to the Austrian 1716 list, although the staff did provide aides to the commander. Like Austria, a lack of cash had caused problems from FW3's accession in 1797 and in 98, it had dwindled to ten officers, who were hastily supplemented by 20 Feldjaeger.
In 1802, Massenbach begins the rform into an operational GS with peacetime officers being tasked with looking at and mapping likely theatres of war to produce operational plans, using 21 officers spread across the three districts. In 1806, there were hasty reforms into a divisional structure, aping the French, but the lack of trained officers meant that the command fell apart. Gneisenau recognised that something different was required. He knew that Prussia needed to train its leaders and commanders. The admin is consolidated into the Ministry of War with the War dept led by the CoS with direct access to the King. The GS was however still spread across the depts of the Ministry and the field units, although in jan 1810, a training programme for GS officers was established, so that they could move into the field staff positions on war breaking out for both army and corps command really (although these formations are variously referred to as brigades and divs depending on their actual size).

Sample of commands from PH's Prussian Landwehr and Landsturm 1813-1815
I Corp Commander – Gen Lt v. Yorck
General Staff –
Chief of Staff – Gen. Maj. V. Rauch, His aid – Kapt Delius
Oberst v. Zielinski, Maj v. Schack, Stabs Kapt Loellhoeffel
Attached – Sek Lt Wussow II from Leib Inf Regt, Volontair Officer Martens
Adjutants – Maj v. Hiller, Maj Diederich, Maj Graf Brandenburg, Kapt Selasinski, Pr Lt Roeder
1st Brig Commander – Oberst v. Steinmetz
General Staff – Kapt Kauffenberg, Sek Lt Loelhoeffel
Adjutantants – Stabs Kapt Lutzow, Sek Lt Graf Henckel

Berthier didn't make the planning -that was Napoleon's realm-, but he was who 'translated' his master's ideas into actual, workable plans that could be implemented by the commanders of the army corps. That's more than a glorified clerk, but less than an actual (in the modern sense of the word) Chief of Staff.

Berthier did not develop any plans on his own – or critizised any of his masters plan and demanded blind obience from the Marshals and any other général en chefs.
Berthier war running nothing else than an office – nothing less – nothing more.

Certainly he was way off to be a modern Chief of Staff. In case he would have been he could have compensated the lack of understanding of logistics from which Napoléon was suffering.

Bas,

Good posting. Regarding your last sentence, what do you think the duties of a modern chief of staff are?

The present US Army chief of staff is not an operational billet, but the service chief who has no command authority with troops in the field-that is the same with the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Air Force Chief of Staff.

The Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a command billet either-it is an advisory one to the President.

Chiefs of staff at the army, corps, and division levels are quite different. Their first duty is to run the staff for the commander-there is no 'dual command' system in the US armed forces. It is the same in US joint commands and staffs.

Sincerely,
Kevin

As a general question to the forum at large, what are the opinions regarding the duties of an army, corps, and division chief of staff?

K

'Berthier did not develop any plans on his own – or critizised any of his masters plan and demanded blind obience from the Marshals and any other général en chefs.
Berthier war running nothing else than an office – nothing less – nothing more.'

If this is so, then who planned the movements of the Grande Armee? It certainly wasn't Napoleon. The staff's purpose is to relieve the commander of all ancillary duties and the minutaie that comes with commanding and running an army.

What exactly were the 'admin' duties of the staff? That is continually mentioned, that the French general staff was merely dealing with 'admin'-well, what did that entail?

Further, if 'troop movements' and 'reconnaissance' were duties of the general staff, what did they ential? Both were certainly operational and not administrative in nature.

Thiebault definied the general staff as 'the central point of the grand operations of armies.' Thiebault also cites that the first 'staff section' is concerned with, among other things, 'everything appertaining to the movement of troops' as well as 'to the organization of the army.' Further, this staff section is responsible for 'making up of situations' which as far as I can conclude is about intelligence (which is partially shared with the fourth section). Thiebault, 15,22-23.

Further, on page 12, Thiebault states that a 'new organization' was decreed into law by the National Assembly, a corps of adjutants-general, who were to be general staff officers and were to be the chiefs of staff of the French divisions. The law was put into effect on 29 October 1790 and thirty general staff officers were created by this law, later increased to 110 by the law of 23 Fructidor, AN VII. Thiebault, 11-12.

So, it appears that the French general staff did have operational responsibilities, including ancillary planning as well as intelligence duties, and that a French staff corps was created in 1790.

K

'Berthier did not develop any plans on his own…'

If that was the case, who planned the movement of the Army of the Reserve across the Alps and into northern Italy in 1800? The correspondence in du Cugnac/Lanza tends to negate that statement.

Further, who planned the movement from the English Channel into Germany in 1805?

Who planned the concentration of the Grande Armee in 1812 for the invasion of Russia? There is some interesting material on the movement of the Vistula Legion out of Spain and into eastern Europe in von Brandt's memoirs.

Again, von Funck's comment is very appropriate and clearly demonstrates Berthier's far-reaching abilities:

All the problems connected with the needs of the army and their transport…were thrown on him…The armies were scattered from Bayonne to the Bug, from Calabria to the Helder, and as far as Stralsund; they were shifting their positions incessantly, had to be supplied and directed, and the whole of it passed through [Berthier's] hands…He always was the clearing house through which all business was transacted…the infallible day book to whcih Napoleon was referring every minute of the day to amke sure how his balance stood. For this reason he had to be in attendance on him on every battlefield, on reconnaissance, at every review…without fail on every study of terrain.'

K

I would refer you to my post of 17/2 at 7.09 am, where this and the myths about Bourcet are addressed.

However, on the subject of the USA, you should try this

link

It is the US Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1. The AFSC is where staff officers from all services are trained.

Chapter 2 of Pub 1 ends with the staff divisions J1,J2/J3 etc. as listed above, which will tell you what a staff does and what its head is responsible for.

Of particular interest is para 103 to Ch 1:

103. ORIGINS OF AMERICAN MILITARY STAFF PRACTICE

a. European origin. The staff practice and philosophy of the Armed Forces of the United States are almost completely of European origin. The modern general staff was developed in Prussia during the nineteenth century. Distinctive features of this staff system included

•the staff's semi-independent position within the Prussian War Ministry,
•the staff's special concern with military theory and doctrine as well as with the higher military education of senior officers, and
•the exchange of officers of the general staff corps between positions on the general staff and duties with field units.
The general staff improved commanders' ability to control the field operations of mass armies. These advantages eventually brought about the adoption of a staff system by all major Western powers.

"The Road to Sedan" by Richard Holmes gives a good expose of the failings of Napoleonic-type staffs where everything was centralised in the commander, just as under N. Vachee sums up Berthier at Ch2 p26 "If then with Jomini, we consider the chief of the staff as being, and rightly so, the confidential assistant of the general in chief – his intellectual collaborator "who seconds him, is even in a position to direct everything himself, and who prevents errors by supplying him with sound information" – we must recognise that Berthier did not fill with Napoleon such a role, for which, moreover, he had no aptitiude."

Berthier was a passive taker of dictation – N planned the moves you refer to and left Berthier to send out the movement orders without the overall operational concept. Indeed, 1800 was simply a rush to get over the Alpine passes, once N found out that Genoa was under attack – contra the lanza mythology.

As a general question to the forum at large, what are the opinions regarding the duties of an army, corps, and division chief of staff?

Well, to me, as a non-military man, they are the same; namely, the chief of staff is the Office Manager for the pertinent commander, ensuring that everything is in place so that the commander's orders can actually be followed through and then managing the delivery of those plans. I have been an office manager, and I think a good one, but whilst I had a lot of leeway in ensuring stuff was where it needed to be, I had zero command input (i.e. decison making on company products) although from time to time my opinion was sought, as often being disregarded as taken. Maybe more often…

How did I do? probably hideously wrong, but I'd be interested to learn.

Ian,

Not bad, actually, but the 'office manager' for the French general staff was the charge des deatails (in 1805 it was Colonel Vallongue whose excellent history of Marengo was ordered destroyed as Napoleon 'rewrote' the history of the battle).

I found the following this afternoon and perhaps this will help.

FM 101-5
Staff Organization and Operations

This US Army field manual simply, succinctly, and expertly outlines and details what a staff us supposed to do as well as the duties of a chief of staff are (this generally applies to the US Marine Corps as well) and what his relationship to the commander are. Chiefs of staff are found at army, corps, and division commands, and executive officers are found at the brigade, battalion, and company/battery levels of command.

What is striking in this publication are the similarities to what Berthier and Berthier's staff did and what the modern staff and chief of staff are detailed to do in this publications.

This manual tends to negate the negative comments and common myths about Berthier and the French general staff, which was the most modern and advanced general staff of its day. The French were the first to organize themselves into staff sections, and contrary to some commentary on the forum, Bourcet is generally recognized as the father of the modern staff, and Berthier as the first modern chief of staff. During the period, neither he nor his general staff had an equal in any army.

Chapter I, Command and Staff Relationships

Page 1-1

‘Staffs exist to help the commander make and implement decisions…Staff organizations and procedures are structured to meet the commander's critical information requirements.'

Page 1-2

‘Although ultimate authority, responsibility and accountability rest wholly with the commander, he can delegate specific authority to staff officers to decide and to act within their own areas of responsibility. Each subordinate staff officer must understand authority, responsibility, and accountability as they relate to his relationship with the commander, other staff officers, and subordinate commanders. Most important, the staff member must always remember that he is there to support and assist his commander.'

Page 1-3, The Staff's Role

‘The commander and his staff focus on recognizing and anticipating battlefield activities in order to decide and act faster than the enemy. All staff organizations and procedures exist to make the organization, analysis, and presentation of information manageable for the commander. The commander relies on his staff to get from battlefield ‘information' to battlefield ‘understanding', or situational awareness, quicker than his adversary. Once a decision is made, the commander depends on his staff to communicate the decision to subordinates in a manner that quickly focuses the necessary capabilities within the command to achieve the commander's vision or will over the enemy at the right place and time.'

Chapter II, Staff Organization

Page 2-2, Chief of Staff (Executive Officer)

‘The CofS (XO) is the commander's principal staff officer. He directs staff tasks, conducts staff coordination, and ensures efficient and prompt staff response. The CofS oversees coordinating and special staff officers. He does not necessarily oversee the commander's personal staff officers, although he normally interacts with them every day. The commander normally delegates authority to the CofS for the executive management of coordinating and special staff officers.'

Chapter III, Characteristics of a Staff Officer

Page 3-1

‘The staff officer's duty is to assist the commander in accomplishing the mission. He relieves the commander of routine and detailed work and raises to the commander those things that only the commander can act on. The staff officer's character (values, attributes, and skills) and competence are crucial in all that the command accomplishes.'

‘A commander always retains the ultimate responsibility to make the final decision. The staff officer's job is to accomplish the commander's intent by operating within his assigned authority to perform his duties within his area of expertise. He must ensure the commander has been provided the necessary, timely, and correct information to make the right decisions.'

Chapter IV, Staff Responsibilities and Duties

Page 4-2, The Commander-Staff Relationship

‘The commander makes and communicates decisions to several people, but this manual describes his communication of decisions and intentions to his staff. He also provides his staff leadership, direction, and guidance. The commander may personally communicate his intent or decisions, either verbally or in writing, or he may relay information to his staff through orders, commander's guidance or other means.'

‘The commander is responsible for training the staff. He may delegate routine staff training to the chief of staff, but the commander must train the staff to relay information and perform the mission to conform to his leadership style. The staff is an extension of the commander. The staff must know his leadership style and understand his intent to best support him, and subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters.'

Page 4-2, Chief of Staff (Executive Officer)-Staff Relationship

‘The CofS (XO) is the commander's principal assistant for directing, coordinating, supervising and training the staff, except in areas the commander reserves. The commander normally delegates executive management authority (equivalent to command of the staff) to the CofS. The CofS frees the commander from routine details and passes pertinent data, information, and insight from the staff to the commander and from the commander to the staff.'

‘The value of a close and special relationship between the commander and the CofS cannot be overstated. The CofS must be able to anticipate battlefield events and share with the commander a near-identical battlefield vision of operations, events, and requirements. He must understand the commander's intent better than, or at least as well as, subordinate commanders. The CofS must understand the commander's personality, style, and instincts as they affect the commander's intentions. Staff members must inform the chief of staff of any recommendations or information they pass directly to the commander or of instructions they receive directly from the commander.'

‘The CofS helps the commander control subordinate units in their preparing for future employment. He monitors their combat readiness status and directs actions that posture units for use by the commander. Under special conditions or missions, the commander may give the CofS temporary command of a portion of the force (such as in deployments, retrograde operations, and obstacle crossings, or when the commander and deputy or assistant commanders are unable to command).'

Now, I didn't post the entire chapters here, and if anyone wants to read an entire field manual, it is easily found on the internet.

As a footnote, not all staff officers in the US armed forces go to the Command and Staff college. The US Armed Forces do not have a staff corps, but line officers are rotated onto the various staffs as well as being given command from time to time, just as the French general staff officers were required to do if they wished for promotion. That practice, among others from the French system, were later 'borrowed' by the Prussians for their new general staff after 1806.

Sincerely,
Kevin

That all rather demonstrates that berthier did not undertake the key functions – read Elting on the subject again, where hje shows Berthier reduced the functions to 3 depts, none of which covered the key operational work.

As for Bourcet, he wrote one book about Mountain Warfare – where is this great work on the staff? Looks like we have another load of mythology, where its proponents have not actually read the original works. If you disagree, please cite the relevant pages in that book.

Kevin,

Hey, go me! I don't quite get the need of some to denigrate the likes of Berthier. What's the point of avidly reading tons of stuff in a swathe of languages if you cannot then get your head around living in a different age and handling different problems?

Looking around Google books, it would appear that (yet again) we have misuse of words and unjustifed "extended interpretation".

According to Wiki, based on the pro-french/N mythology Hittle, "Under the direction of the minister of war, Choiseul, in 1764 Bourcet established a staff-officer training school at Grenoble (it disappeared in 1771), where he taught" mountain warfare, military engineering and fortifications. "He advocated officer training, a permanent staff corps and organised dispersion (having a large army march in separate columns along parallel roads, thus allowing them to be rapidly concentrated for attack or defence and to form three columns within each column and thus deploy onto the battlefield faster". Looking at the other secondary works, he was actually advocating trained staffs to coordinate multiple columns in mountain warfare, not some proto-corps system on flat land. He was a 7YW General, so corps still meant detached units etc. Bourcet had seen his local problem and selected the obvious solution, but of course, the staff college disappears quite quickly.

In the year of his death, 1780, the French state was divided into 17 component parts called "divisions" for the purposes of adminstering large forces in that area. Naturally enough, they get an administrative staff to run these all arms districts – other nations are using similar ideas. Austria uses a provincial Generalkommando system and Regiments in the Frontier for example. It is also worth noting that the Prussians break their organisation into Abteilungen in 1803 – "divisions" of the whole and this was also the name used by the Austrians in 1813 in place of corps in the field army.

It seems natural enough to transfer these "divisions" into their own little armies on the outbreak of hostilities, especially when the French soldiery expands massively in the early 1790s, (albeit they seeme to be developing the idea in the 1780s). The idea was that these divisions would then be coordinated to come together to win battles.

In 1791, this rather mysterious staff corps was abolished just as the Thirteen Armies were being raised! Curiously, the peacetime divisional system (that "permanent" one) was abolished in 1789 and then resurrected in 1791 when the 23 Divisions were established. (per Griffiths, Art of warfare p.157). Griffiths then explains that the wartime use of these administrative divs was abandoned almost straight away and more revealingly, remarks that "A bewildering mixture of nomenclature was in force during 1792-3 in which brigades, divisions, detachments, wings, columns, corps and commands might all stand … for formation".

However, there seems to be something in the block formation idea – the original 17 and 23 divs produce (albeit jumbled up) the 13 armies and an idea about coordinating them. The real problems surfaced in Germany, where the only coordination betwen two commanders, Moreau and Jourdan, comes from Paris. The clue is here – suddenly various authors start to talk about the corps within these two French armies and the lack of coordination, such that some did fight on their own with the support of the rest of the army or the other wole army.

Consequently, what we have (yet again) is misuse of words. "Division" did not mean two brigades as it later did, because that is four regts of infantry, maybe one of light cavalry and some artillery. This later definition did not produce a formation expected to fight on its own – that was a corps!

So, what we have is a "division" or subdividing of whole national armies into provincial administrations in peacetime and army components in wartime. The size of these formations is so big that they need an admin staff in peacetime, but critically in wartime, a staff capable of coordinating them. The name can change – it could be one of the national divisions, it could be one of the 13 armies or indeed, it could be a corps as the first subdivision of an army. What it isn't is a division as we now understand it and consequently, the commander of any "true" division, say Boudet in 1800, just has his General's entourage – of course, we have more wordplay from this entourage being called a "staff" and suddenly, Desaix takes it over and what do we have? A 3-day corps, cited as an example of N's early use of the corps system!

So, what actually happens in France? The staff corps is abolished and in effect, Bourcet is ignored! There is some coordination due to operational requirements, but the Paris politicians do not want generals with big armies (esp after Dumouriez's failed attempt to march on Paris). So there are two Armies in Germany with the remains of some of these 13 armies/corps/divisions under each of them – in Italy, N's army is so small that it is just an army, albeit not much bigger than corps size. He is centrally controlling it and the habit continues.

Looking at the other abused word, "staff", it is interesting to see what happens here. Did France ever have a permanent staff corps? There are plenty of references to its disbandment in 1791, but I cannot find a start date, just this reference to Bourcet's school and the permanent divs with their staffs!

Oh well, what happens next? The fabled staff has gone and blokes are just taken from the line (AdCs really). the coordination falls apart at this level too – each army had a chief of staff as they always had done. Decrees in 1790 the main staff functions were to be performed by adjutants genereaux, and by 1794, there are suddenly 110 of them. (In 1800 they become adjutant commandant) They are assisted by adjoints. it is all getting pretty shambolic and there is quite a revolving door. Berthier decides to do something – allegedly based on a 1788 plan, but that went missing. In his 1796 Document de service, Berthier allocates jobs to the four adjutants genereaux in the Armee des Alpes: 1) staff records and reports, unit strengths, justice and PoWs; 2) journal, armament, artillery, engineers, subsistence, hospitals, police, 3) reconnaissance, orders, plans, communications, guides, 4) HQ admin. So, what we actually have is Berthier doling out the tasks to the men he has, not a departmentalisation, especially a s he has a bunch of guys at this level and below, who don't know what they are doing.

How do we know this not a structural proposal, despite it being read as such? Turn to Elting, pp.86-88: In 1805, when he did issue regualtions for the whole army, Berthier had reduced the number of depts to 3; 1) troop movements, issuing orders, officer assignments and correspondence; 2) supply, HQ admin, police and hospitals, 3) PoWs, recruiting and justice. No sign then of the intelligence and operational planning roles at all – the Bureau Topographique is separate as is d'Albe's Table. Logistics comes under the Intendant General. A 4th dept in 1806 looked after the lengthening line of comms and in 1807, at least reconnaissance makes an appearance, but it is really about fortresses and HQ troops. Le Duc, one of Berthier's private secretaries, was the bag man for paying spies.

So much for the army staff, but what about the fabled lower levels? Davout with 3e Corps in 1806 had 6 AdCs, a CoS, 4 adjutants commandants, 5 adjoints, two Polish captains and the chiefs of the technical branches. Turning up with 3 (probably) AdCs in 1813, you can see why Ney felt a bit shorthanded! Without mentioning any examples, Elting claims that the divisional staff comprised "generally" 3 AdCs, an adjutant commandant as CoS, 3 adjoints and possibly a Pole plus the artillery commander. A brigade had an AdC and possibly an officer d'ordonnance. I suppose you could work your way up.

Hittle does seem to the latest Alder in misrepresenting what was actually happening. One US essay footnotes: "The Generalstab is thoroughly covered by Hittle, however, the development of the American general staffs is more closely traced to the French."

It seems that the french staff corps was founded by de Segur in 1783 as a Corps de l'etat major, three years after the divisions were establihsed. It was this corps, which was disbanded in 1791. Curiously, it has proven impossible to locate any detail on Berthier's 1796 instructions, so they depend on an interpretation by Hittle!

Ian,

I don't quite understand the denigration of Berthier either, at least by modern authors. Apparently, the research undertaken by some modern authors is merely 'skin deep' and they don't tend to look at the background of either Berthier himself, or what he had done and accomplished. To simply label him a 'chief clerk' is nothing more than mimicking Jomini, who is not a reliable witness at all. Too many, also, don't comprehend the fact that in 1809 Berthier was not the commander of the Army of Germany. He was sent ahead as Napoleon's chief of staff and the errors committed were the fault of Napoleon's, not Berthier. In point of fact, it was Berthier that bluntly told Napoleon to get in theater so that the mess could be cleared up.

Seems to be now the same with Bourcet. There are at least four books where any serious work on Bourcet can begin. All four are easily attainable and I have them in my library:

-The French Army Before Napoleon by Spencer Wilkinson
-The Background of Napoleonic Warfare by Robert Quimby
-The Military Experience in the Age of Reason by Christopher Duffy
-War in the Age of Enlightenment by Armstrong Starkey.

The Sword and the Pen is supposed to have excerpts from Bourcet also, but I have not seen that one so I can't comment on it.

Interestingly, the difficulty in finding a copy of Bourcet's Principes de la Guerre de Montagnes is explained very succinctly by Spenser Wilkinson in his appendix (which contains extracts in the original French from the book): the copies of the book are rare and Wilkinson know of only one in the UK in 1915. Robert Quimby contributes that the work was not published 'but was circulated in manuscript form among of the officers of the French army. A copy was sent to the Ministry of War in 1775. It was privately printed, though not published, by the Ministry in 1888.'

Further, you can google 'Bourcet' and find more material on him. Both Wilkinson and Quimby undoubtedly got hold of and studied Bourcet's book which is why they can both comment and quote from it.

There are quite a few references for the period which are hard to get hold of. I waited for over forty years to find a copy of JB Avril's Avantages d'une bonne discipline which is a history of the French infantry before, during, and after the period and half the book is tables of the various and many reorganizations of the French infantry arm from about 1770-1815. It is both informative and an excellent study. It was published in 1824.

To denigrate a publication or a historic personage and his work without reading the publication or knowing either nothing or very little of the personage in question is to my mind reprehensible historically. Those actions can be nothing more than either agenda- or ideology-driven and have nothing to do with historical inquiry or the study of history. It is also intellectually dishonest. To my mind, there is too much of that going on here and it is gone way past any type of revision.

Sincerely,
Kevin

What I don't understand is why if a French staff didn't exist during Napoleon's Empire, why the Russians sent Volkonsky to Paris in 1808 to study how it worked and see if it could be implemented for the Russian Army? At least that's what Lieven affirms in his book; and as his research looks pretty thorough to me, I am inclined to believe that a French general staff that was something more than simple clerks did actually exist. I know it's just circumstancial evidence, but it can't be dismissed out of hand.

May be we are using a excesively modern meaning of what are the duties of a General Staff, instead basing our understanding in what was intended for it in the times of Napoleon.

Best regards

Bas,

Excellent question. And two ancillary questions would be, if there were no French general staff, why would they have a staff manual and why would that staff manual be translated during the period into English and German, and published as such?

There was also a central planning staff in Paris during the Revolution (Napoleon spent some time being a member of it).

I think that part of the problem is that some don't actually know or understand what a staff is, let alone a general staff, and that there is too much axel-wrap about the Prussians and what they did after the period with their embryonic general staff.

Scharnhorst remarked before 1806 that unless what the French were doing organizationally, tactically, and administratively was not copied, they'd lose. The Prussians adopted some of the staff procedures developed and implemented by Berthier, such as chiefs of staff of equal organizations (armies, corps, etc.) could and did communicate to accomplish tasks without consulting their respective commanders. The French practice of having staff officers rotate into the line was also adopted by the Prussians later. The French also were the first to implement staff sections and number them (which is in Thiebault's manual-which it should be noted merely codified the existing French practices), and this was later copied by the Austrians and Prussians.

Finally, I believe that some folks just don't like to give credit to the French for any military developments during the period. If someone doesn't agree, instead of actually researching a topic, they label what they don't agree with or refuse to accept (even if clear evidence is offered) as a 'myth' and then ridicule any attempt to have a discussion based on accurate source material.

Sincerely,
Kevin

bas – No-one is saying that the French did not have a staff, because the commander of any army since ancient times had always had an entourage, headed up by one of his minions. The question is what did it do? Moltke (who knew a thing or two about staffs and corps) tells us that N was perhaps the last great commander, who could manage it all on his own with some entourage help. He had after all just defeated a French army at Sedan, which had persisited with N's methods, but found itself lacking the "great brain/energy" to do it all (as Holmes notes). There is still a CoS, but there was an Austrian one in 1716, when his duties were admin and head of entourage.

Alternatively, we have this suggestion that somehow Moltke's own system, which is undisputedly the origin of all modern systems, was descended from Napoleon and his CoS, Berthier. Ccnsequently, we need to find where this idea comes from and given that unfortunately regularly appearing tendency to twist words and (let's be kind) extrapolate the original French sources, while ignoring the German ones all together. We can see that this claim of "permanent divisional staffs from 1780" is such a mangling of words and sources!

It should come as no surprise that the Russians looked at N's system of war as it had been successful – every army will do this after a major war. Kevin claims that the proof of the CoS's position lies in one corresponding with another in 1800 (this is in Elting). This is another distortion – the CoS was always responsible for correspondence and would sign off most letters – you can see it in the Autrian War Archive files.

So, it does indeed seem that Wilkinson, described as an "arch Imperialist" on one US page I saw, is one of the chief players. Indeed, he is writing at a key time in this story: Not only do we have the Anglo-French raprochment in the face of a rising Germany (Petre is another author from this period), but it is just at the time when Bourcet's book about mountain warfare is widely published for the first time.

As another US site puts it: "Some time between 1764 and 1770, Pierre de Bourcet wrote a treatise entitled "The Principles of Mountain Warfare." This may seem to be going a long way back, but Bourcet's volume and that of the young Comte de Guilbert on general tactics have historical interest and importance because, according to Spenser Wilkinson, they show where some of Napoleon's strategic "miracles" were born."

So, what we are actually hearing is Wilkinson's interpretation – designed to lionise N and the French, a process, which is of course magnified by the wars of the 20th century. Look in many secondary works and you will find no direct citation of Bourcet or indeed Berthier's Manual (which could have been written on one side of A4 as far as anyone seems to know). You will find many claims, but as we have found often recently, these claims do not actually have any basis in the original French works. You will note that as far as de Segur is concerned, he seems to have raised a staff corps in 1783, but you will see claims that he set up a staff college (a confusion with Bourcet).

There is no doubt that the French were looking at army management in 1770s and 1780s, but to the extent that anything was done, it was actually swept away by the French themselves in the 1790s and afterwards.

Never mind, help is at hand

link

although the critique of the staff is apparently in another book (allegedly) by Bourcet

link

Perhaps we can establish what Bourcet actually said now? Nevertheless, whatever he said, it is worth noting that his college was abandoned in 1771 and that segur's staff corps was disbanded in 1791. So, is there even a direct relationship to what Berthier did?

I am not sure which one Elting is talking about when he says: "indeed, much of modern staff organization came from Pierre-Joseph Bourcet's (1700-1780) work on staff organization and functioning." as he not list or cite either directly!

Dave:

Elting was most likely influenced by the writings of your own B.H. Liddel Hart. You can find references to Guibert and Bourcet in Hart's writings. In Strategy (1954), page 95 (and other pages) Hart wrote "Napoleon Bonaparte, whose military ability was stimulated by study of military history and, even more, by the food for thought provided in the theories of Bourcet and Guibert, the two most outstanding and original military writings of the eighteenth century." Hart notes that the plan Napoleon executed in his first campaign was "based on one that Bourcet had designed half a century earlier."

Hart (Fuller, et.al.) influenced Elting and other American military historians. Hart does not cite the sources used for his claims.

I can probably find some other references to shed light on the issue (but I'm tied up on another project right now). I know there is at least one earlier source about Guibert and Bourcet that probably influenced Hart (but it has been some years since I ran across the information and I'll have to dig into dusty file boxes to find my notes).

One snippet view I found on Google is from a Cyril Falls: Art of War: From N to the present day (1961). "Spenser Wilkinson and Liddell Hart, who later discussed them, should somewhat over-estimate (N's) debt to his …" when talking about the French historical education. Wilkinson and Hart are apparently like minded in their view.

I posted these links on another thread, but will post here as well for those that missed them.

Two downloadable articles on the etat-major 1804-1814 on that board game site.
PDF link

PDF link

I didn't notice any mention of Bourcet though, Dave sounds like you have been reading them.

'Elting was most likely influenced by the writings of your own B.H. Liddel Hart. You can find references to Guibert and Bourcet in Hart's writings.'

'Hart (Fuller, et.al.) influenced Elting and other American military historians. Hart does not cite the sources used for his claims.'

You are horribly incorrect. If you had done a little looking you would have found that Col Elting didn't think too highly of either Hart or Fuller. His very negative comments on them both as historians are in the excellent The Superstrategists by Col Elting, Chapter VIII, 210-218.

There is also this comment by Col Elting at the beginning of the Bibliography for Swords:

'In preparing this book I have used original sources whenever possible but have ignored the alleged memoirs of Louis Bourrienne, Paul Barras, Clare de Remusat, Laure Permon, and Miot de Melito, which are mendacious and worthless. I have used Thiebault with much caution and have avoided Liddell Hart's and JFC Fuller's dashing potboilers.'

When I went to visit Mrs. Elting shortly after the Col's death in 2000, I was in his study and there was a sticky note on his set of Fuller's three-volume A Military History of the Western World stating that it belonged in the dust bin. I thought that was noteworthy.

You have made a grave error in your comment on Col Elting and it shows to me that your suppositions are done without research and to my mind you have insulted an old and very dear friend, now unfortunately no longer with us.

K

10th:

You only see what you want to see and only find what you want to find.

Elting cites Fuller in his Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars for just one example. "Fuller's ideas of history and its moving forces are very much his own, he is occasionally careless of details, but he tells a sweeping story of the great storms of empire." He may have changed his mind in later years, but he did read many of Hart's and Fuller's works. Your points are maudlin proclamations.

This is a wargaming board where wargamers meet to discuss their hobby and history, you are not an historian, and your deus ex machina pronouncements about historical veracity are getting quite boring.

Your comment "to my mind you have insulted an old and very dear friend [the late Col. Elting]" is an egregious fabrication devised in your own mind. Too much angst I fear.