"Wellington and the British Army: a question of morale" Topic

Hi Dave

That's an interesting point re roads if true, but did it also apply to the six days of fighting leading to Eckmuhl? That was well to the northwest of the Danube, was it not?

Incidentally my main army is Austrian. I don't think they're very good doctrinally – all that dispersed cavalry and what not – and they seem to have bee a bit sluggish, but they were certainly capable of winning.

It is an interesting thread. I have some observations:

1. Wellington and the British army had to learn their trade. The British troops weren't uniformly excellent during the Peninsula, let alone during the 1790s when it tripled in size. There were any number to examples of British troops not behaving like Imperial Guard Grenadiers. At Talavera, it was the first battle where Wellington ever commanded division-sized units and he screwed up on several points…so did the divisional commanders. But Wellington and the British learned.

2. The British Culture Several had stated that national characteristics had nothing to do with the British army's accomplishments. I know why folks today might agree with that, but what do you do when the combatants themselves, both British and French don't? Commenting on Talavera, the Duke of York writes through his secratary Col. Tolen to Wellington that the Bayonet best matched
the temperment of the British soldier. This thinking wasn't restricted to the British.

For instance, Guibert in his famous Essay states categorically that in the 1770s the French rejected the Prussian doctrines and reliance on firepower, precise drill and maneuver "because it didn't fit the character of the French soldier." The search for another set of tactical doctrines was motivated by the belief that the current successful methods weren't a psychological match for the French National Character. There are lots of examples. A Peninsular veteran and Royal Science Academy member wrote a well-respected book on how to train the British soldier based on his national character traits, other nations' characteristics are mentioned for contrast.

There is a good book out about British Naval tactics and the British character" Seize the Fire by Adam Nicolson. In it he describes the thinking behind the tactics at Trafalgar. Almost as an asside, he notes the similarity between Nelson's naval tactics at the sea battle, the drive to go straight in and decide the issue is much like the British propensity for volley and bayonet charges.

Just some thoughts to throw into the mix.

Bill

"This cavalier was from the island of England and brought with him a train of his vassals, men who had been hardened in certain civil wars which had raged in their country. They were a comely race of men but too fair and fresh for the appearance of warriors. They were huge feeders also and deep carousers and could not accommodate themselves to the sober diet of our troops, but must fain eat and drink after the manner of their own country. They were often noisy and unruly, also, in their wassail, and their quarter of the camp was prone to be scene of loud revel and sudden brawl. They were withal of great pride, yet it was not like our inflammable Spanish pride… their pride was silent and contumelious. Though from a remote and somewhat barbarous island, they yet believed themselves the most perfect men on earth… With all this, it must be said of them that they were marvellous good men in the field, dexterous archers and powerful with battle axe. In their great pride and self will, they always sought to press in their advantage and take the post of danger… They did not rush forward fiercely, or make a brilliant onset, like the Moorish and Spanish troops but went into the fight deliberately, and persisted obstinately and were slow to find out they were beaten. Withal they were much esteemed yet little liked by our soldiery, who considered them staunch companions in the field, but coveted but little fellowship with them in the camp".
"Chronicle of the Conquest of Granada" by Antonio Agapida.

@ McLaddie

This is why I still like national characteristics in rules. They work for me because they were believed in at the time.

McLaddie

Thanks for your insights. I am convinced that culture is a major component on how soldiers fight, how a campaign is carried on, and even what military technologies are deemed worthy to be used.

Those 'national characteristics' that you mention, can be extended to all British nationalities? i.e. they were shared by English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish; or are they a by-product of acculturation of the recruits once they joined His Majesty Army? i.e. a top-down imposition of English cultural values.

Another question: how much those traits you mention in the British soldiers are an effect of their cultural background, or a by-product of, precisely, the breakdown of cultural constraints when they joined the Army and went overseas?

Thanks in advance!

Like you guys I find the national British characteristsic of being unneccesarily agressive to be inextricably linked to the combat performance of our troops. Some people, notably ex-servicemen it appears, misconstrue the analysis as being offensive because the likes of football yobs are just that. I can totally understand this sensitivity, but I have to say from my time as a cop in the UK that there was rarely anything worse to deal with than a bunch of drunk squaddies and regularly the cells that used to fill up on Saturday afternons during the 1980s had a fair smattering of off-duty squaddies out for trouble.

There is no point us ducking our nature, regardless of which quarter of the British Isles we hail from. I always smile at things like Zulu Dawn where it shows the muscular and agressive Zulus outperforming our chaps in the tight, because I bet that even while they were winning they got the shock of their lives at how utterly unpleasant we are.

Other nations seem to resent this self assessment as somehow being braggadocio, but I can assure people there is nothing big and clever about getting smashed out of your brains and then trashing your own country. That's why we were at our best invading places, because we could at least trash other people's homes instead.

Now that we have to stay home (other than ruining holiday resorts around the world) a great proportion of our own population is, frankly, somewhat embarrassing. We were built for war in a world where it is no longer fashionable.

Old Bear

I don't know if your assessment can be translated to other times, before Victorian Great Britain. The levels of violence in pre-XIXth societies were mostly identical in all European countries. For example, I've read some authors that claim that the British soldiers performance was based upon xenophobia and disdain for other countries people. Evidence points that although that insight is correct, soldiers in other European armies had exactly the same biases, but they didn't improve their performance in the battlefield. Therefore, even if xenophobia was present in the British soldiers, it can't explain why they were so effective in battle, as other armies had the same trait but weren't.

Best regards

"Fist Fights: Old Russian Traditional Entertainment

Fist fights were usually held on holidays, with the raging of combats starting during Maslenitsa (Pancake Week). In summer the fights took place in squares and in winter on ice-covered rivers and lakes. Both common folks and traders took part in the fights. Depending on the number of fighters they were of different types, such as single combats, or group line combats: "street vs street", "village vs village", or "suburb vs suburb".
The oldest type of combats was the Russian version of Greek Pankration, mix-fight without rules. It was called something roughly translated as "grappling fight" and "helter-skelter scuffle". It was the kind tussle when every wrestler fought for oneself and against everybody, without any formation or order. "One had to have not only dexterity and strong blow, but also outstanding composure", N. Razin pointed out.
The most widespread type of fist fighting was "line to line" battle. The battle fell into three parts: first boys would fight, then unmarried youths and later only mature men. It was not allowed to beat a fighter in a lying, crouching or squatting position and clutch at the clothes. The task of each side was to make the opponent flee or retreat at least. The side that lost "the field" (the area of fighting) was considered defeated. Each of the sides had its leader, who determined the fighting tactics and encouraged his comrades. Each of the teams also had "fighters of hope" meant to break the line of the "enemy" by tearing off several combatants at once. Special technique was applied against such "fighters of hope": the line parted letting the "hope" inside, where special fighters expected them, and closed up at once, without allowing the enemies line in. The fighters that faced the "hope" were experienced masters of one-to-one combats."

I don't know if your assessment can be translated to other times, before Victorian Great Britain. The levels of violence in pre-XIXth societies were mostly identical in all European countries. For example, I've read some authors that claim that the British soldiers performance was based upon xenophobia and disdain for other countries people. Evidence points that although that insight is correct, soldiers in other European armies had exactly the same biases, but they didn't improve their performance in the battlefield.

Bas,

I think we have 'benefitted' from having frequent influxes of blood from some of the nastiest folk Western Europe has had to offer, going back to the Saxons, Vikings and of course, the Normans. Whilst I appreciate that other countries can be equally xenophobic (certainly my expereince from my mother's homeland of the Ukraine suggests they are far worse than we are when it comes to such things) we managed to combine it with a number of technological revolutions over the centuries that gave us a huge advantage over our enemies, many of whom didn't appear to know they were our enemies until we turned up and shot them!

Probably about 1700 was when we really started to get a taste for destruction (or empire). Many countries are more than capable of fighting when they have to. I think for a long time our trait over here was a happiness to get stuck in whenever we could.

It's hard to quantify when one looks at individual societies, many of whom perform in theory just as well as we do and with much more ruthlessness on occasion. However none of these societies seem to be so socially inept whilst at home. We are, perhaps, simply unreasonably violent. Even this can be argued against, though – for example, we are a bizarrely tolerant country, putting up with a selection of appalling governments and a largely unwanted migratory influx. I saw a recent study from the EU (I think) which suggested we we more than twice as unhappy with immigration as the EU average, yet our extremist parties can barely attract enough people to fill a big pub, so go figure!

We do, of course, have football, which is our substitute for war, but even then one can look at the likes of Russia and Italy to see we are by no means unique in this as well.

Continually we seem to come back to the rather embarrassing admission that we have a whole social group in this country are so stupid that the most they can aspire to is getting drunk, fighting, copulating and urinating, often all in the same place. This of course might explain my desire to retire to France in a few years.

4th – If you look at the road maps, you can see all sorts of things. Charles' 1796 campaign and N at Ulm were both run along the main German roads – N always looked at the road network and that is why he invaded neutral Bayreuth. Mayer's plan in 1809 was to move against Regensburg from Bohemia to get on to the main roads, but when Charles was forced into a more cautious advance from the south, which has a rotten road network and many rivers, plus bad ground. Even past Landshut, the roads are bad – only the left hand column at Teugen was on a halfway decent one, the others were on tracks, which had been flooded with rain. Davout was marching down the only good chausee in the area – Regensburg to Ingolstadt. I don't think N was deluded going to Landshut – he has the best roads and caneasily turn up the main one from landshut to Eckmuhl. Why do you think Charles fell back into Bohemia?

To stay with the main subject – Waterloo was on a major road to Brussels.

It is easy to march fast, when you march along good roads.

The question of whether any of these beliefs about National character are actually true or not may be a moot point if contemporary military men believed them and formed their strategy and tactics accordingly. Napoleon more than once said that he always attacked because the French were no good on the defensive. Whether actually true or not, whether Napoleon actually believed it, it was given as a rationale because there were military men who did.

basileus66:

There are a number of period books found on google that address the supposed differences of the nationalities. Yes, there were beliefs about the Irish, Scots and Welsh as soliders. For instance, the British used the Scots for light infantry during the SYW and after, a number of the light infantry regiments being formed in Scotland like the 90th Light. Why, because they felt they were better 'suited' for the role bacause of their nature, just as the central Germans, Cossacks and Grenz were.

The books that I have found most directly deal with the issue are:

A Summary Account and Military Character of the Different European Armies Engaged in the Late War translated from the French 1803

A View of the Formation Discipline and Economy of Armies by Robert Jackson MD Inspector General of Army Hospitals 1818 with several editions past 1845. Jackson was a Peninsular veteran too. Part II, Sketch of Military Character is what you want to read.

Jackson goes through them all, including the Scots, Welsh, Irish, AND North Americans. A member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, his book was well respected by Military men.

Here is the dispatch after Talavera I spoke of. It wasn't written by Tolen… my bad.

From Welly's Dispatches, vol. iv, p. 539, following Welly's report on Talavera, is the reply from the British Military Establishment which noticed, among other things….

GENERAL ORDER
Horse Guards, 18th August, 1809
[p.539]…. "His Majesty has observed, with satisfaction, the manner in which he {sherbrooke] led on the troops to the charge with the bayonet—a species of combat which on all occasions so well accords with the dauntless character of British soldiers." […]
"By order of the Right. Hon. the Commander in Chief,
HENRY CALVERT,
Adjutant General.

And just to make clear how widely this view of National Character was accepted:

The new royal encyclopædia; or, complete modern dictionary of arts and sciences, on an improved plan.

By William Henry Hall, … assisted by other learned and ingenious gentlemen. Hall, William Henry. London [1788].

Nation: A collective term, used for a considerable people, inhabiting a certain extent of ground, enclosed within fixed limits and under the same government. Each nation has its particular character, and it is proverbially said, light as a Frenchman, Waggish as an Italian, Grave as a Spaniard, Serious as an Englishman, Fierce as a Scotchman, Drunken as a German, Idle as an Irishman, Deceitful as a Greek etc.

Bill

To basileus66,

<<<<<<<<I can be as ed off by Anglocentrism of Peninsular War stories as anyone else. But that doesn't preclude me to recognise that without British money, soldiers and Wellington leadership, Spain would have been forced to surrender, no matter how brave my ancestors were or how many guerrillas they raised. I've been studying guerrilla warfare in Spain for 10 years, and wrote my PhD on them. I know that without the guerrillas, the Spanish and Anglo-portuguese armies would have had harder times to defeat the French; and, more importantly, the war would have been a lot cheaper for Napoleon, both in money and men -many of them irreplaceable veterans-.>>>>>

I disagree. I think Spanish nation could achieve the similar results without British. The final outcome would not be much different. It were Spanish partisans who held hundreds of thousands of French troops – NOT Wellington's army. Napoleon, having his capital threatened would pull out sooner or later anyway even without Wellington.

There are plenty of examples where even modern armies having unimaginable to Napoleon technology failed badly against guerrillas. You spent 10 years studying guerrilla warfare in Spain – honestly that's impressive > but I can't agree with you.

I spent 3 years in the middle east fighting Islamic terrorism (pathetic how Defiant posted that I am "easterner" who "dislikes westerners") and I am absolutely convinced that wars against guerrillas, not to mention nation in arms (exactly what Spain was) cannot be won, especially by Napoleonic era technology.

Maybe one day we will come up with something better which will allow armies to defeat guerrillas but until now it's a nightmare for the modern armies and it was much worse for Napoleonic era armies.

<<<<<<<<
To say that in Spain the French troops were second-tier soldiers is a false assumption. Just take a look to which commanders and which soldiers fought here. In Spain, the French had, at some point, 350,000 men (some claim 420,000, but I believe that figure is too high, so I stick to the more conservative number). They lost around 200-300 thousand men in Spain -illness, desertion, casualties, ecc-. Many of those men were veterans, not recently recruited conscripts. In 1813, Napoleon pulled off many NCOs and officers from his Army at Spain, to provide cadres for his army in Germany. >>>>>>>>>

First page of this thread – its all there. I don't have time to retype paragraphs after paragraphs. The conscripts who entered Spain were eventually becoming veterans but:

a). There was a constant drain due to Spanish guerrillas operations. Note – not due to Wellington operation who caused only 45,000 French casualties through the whole affair in Spain. Replacements who came from depot battalions were conscripts as well, which the diluted the quality once again.

b). Napoleon considering Spanish theatre as a secondary and failing to grasp the scale of the Spanish resistance consistently pulled out his cadres from Spain for the Guards, for the Invasion of Russia in 1812 and to rebuilt the army in 1813.

<<<<<<<<You say that British historians are nationalists that glory in re-telling myths about Wellington and the British Army in Spain. Well, some present dilettante historians and XIXth Century trained historians -when Nationalism was at its height in ALL countries- were biased by Nationalism; but modern histories, written by trained historians, are not precisely biased by nationalism. Sometimes you can appreciate that they trend to use sources that are more accesible for them -and if you know how much money costs to research in foreign archives, you will know that the nation-centerness have nothing to do with nationalist pride, but with availability of funds. Also, they are writing for an audience interested in the past of its own country, and therefore the narratives will be commonly centered in the experience of history of their own ancestors. However, please, tell me how many histories in Russian, German, French or Spanish don't do the same?>>>>

Agree. Totally. Nationalistic sentiments , lack of funds for research and reliance on the previous historiography is root of the problem. That's why Waterloo myth is still alive amongst common folks.

This follows a set pattern where a British teenager learns about "British" victory at Waterloo in high school (of course not a word about Prussians), then he watches superman Sharpe massacring poor French soldiers in hundreds, then the ignorance is reinforced by video games like Napoleon Total War and the myth is confirmed by reading the a few books (like Oman, Philip Haythornthwaite, Parkinson, Robertson, Wellington dispatches etc), then we see very exciting forum posts on English speaking forums. That's common.

My thoughts were this forum is for more history orientated discussions rather than national myths oriented discussions. The common trait for national myths is putting things out of context > exactly what we see here > that's failing to analyse the conditions under which two opposing armies were operating in Spain and for that matter in 1815 with Napoleon being badly outnumbered and operating simultaneously against two armies.

No doubt that in this situation Wellington would embark on the ships without even consideruing the battle. Unfourtunately for Napoleon , he had nowhere to go > he had to fight here and now and to achieve a decisive victory, something that Wellington did not have to ahcive in Spain as the fate of the war was decided in Cnetral / Eastern Europe. Hence Wellington preffered less risk and accordingly less retuns which was accpetable to him > but that does not make him a general in the same league as Napoleon who was figtinh for the survival and only a descive victory was acceptable to him.

This is what many members here do not want to admit > the strategic situation and challenges French, Russian, Prussian and Austrian armies were facing were beyond anything Wellington ever experienced in Spain.
These unique conditions in Spain were created by Spanish resistance and Napoleon's mistakes and Napoleon's absence > not the "genius" of "Iron Duke".

[BTW Wellington's ferrous nickname "The Iron Duke" had nothing to do with his behaviour in battle. He got this nickname for iron shutters he placed over his house's windows against the mob in London who hated him.]

Failure to go into that sort of analysis creates very exciting posts here which indirectly suggest that Wellington was if not the best but at least on par with Napoleon. Makes me wonder why the era was named after Napoleon rather than after Wellington.

Supercilius Maximus,

<<<<<<What I don't understand is how you get the idea that a commander that knew how to preserve his army, to accomplish brilliantly with the strategic interests of his country; that knew how to chose a position to optimise his chances to defeat his opponents; who learnt from his mistakes; and that had an almost spotless record of victories; how can be that commander such a lousy general as you imply Wellington was? I don't follow your rationale. However, commanders that lost entire armies, that didn't care about how many casualties costed their battles and that were blinded by hubris, you praise them to the skies? How can that be? >>>>>>>>>

Certainly, did not say he was poor. I think at least three times I mentioned that he was "able strategist and tactician" and a "good general" – but comparing him to Napoleon is a far cry.

These commanders who as you say "didn't care about how many casualties"[very surprising statement from someone who has been studying the period for over 10 years], were operating under different victory criteria and against different opponents with different resources, under different environment and timeframes. Two different wars. Apples with Apples. Oranges with oranges.

<<<<<<<Well, I suspect the genius Wellington would not have fought in those places, prescisely because those positions would not have suited his army/tactics. And not least because exposing his army to "hundreds of guns" wasn't his style – he didn't aspire to the brilliant tactic of macho meat-grinder battles, unlike the "great" Russian commanders you cite, who thought nothing of having their men "prove their manhood" by standing still for hours under heavy bombardments. The British operated close to water precisely so that they could be properly supplied – it's called "good thinking". Again, what is special about over-stretching your supply lines and making your troops suffer un-necessarily?>>>>>>

I doubt that you have an understanding of moral, political, tactical, geographical, factors which effected Russian commanders. You statement of "prove their manhood" by standing still for hours under heavy bombardments" is a life evidence that you judge Napoleonic warfare by 21st century standards and through the prism of British experience in Spain, which was a completely different type of war, due to mountain terrain and guerrilla factor (e.g supply, communications, intelligence)and ablity to dictate when and where the battle would take place (thanks to the above factors).

I don't have any desire to retype paragraps on the tactical principles of Napoleonic warfare which was primaraly based on the principle of a desicive victory and tactical ability to hold formation under fire, ability to manoeuvre under fire, ability to achieve artillery concentration, ability to combine arms, ability to push assaults despite the losses without breaking the formation in order to gain the vital ground and envelope the enemy achieving a major victory. Perhaps the below reading can clarify this point for you.

Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814
link
A Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars: v. 1: Russian Army in the 18th Century and Tactical Response to the French Revolution, 1801- 1809
link
L'armée de Napoléon
link

But honestly I doubt that you are really intrested in this anyway.

<<When retreating behind that water ditch called LaMansh is not possible….>>
So now we're being criticised for an accident of nature? Of course the British used The Channel (intersting that you chose the French name for it) – it would have been stupid not to. That's like saying the Russians simply hid behind the vastness of their own country (forcing invaders to over-extend their own lines of supply/communication) and allowed the weather to do the job, eh? Perhaps the only "great" Russian commander was "General Winter".>>>

This double standard is exactly what strikes me:

1. In 1812 the biggest invasion force in history invades Russia. Outnumbering Russian army at least two to one and, with military genius in charge they fail to achieve another Jena and Auerstedt in 1812. Instead of lighting victories of previous campaigns Napoleon fails to cut off and destroy even one Russian regiment as a result of battles around Mir, Vitebsk, Krasnoe, Saltanovka and Ostrovnoe. Do you blame the General winter or Russian rearguards with Russian generals?

2. Then the advance to the Russian capital St Petersburg is halted as a result of Battle of Klyastitsy where Russians outnumbered 2 to 3, defeat the French destroying 25% of the French force while suffering a lot less and forcing Oudinot to retreat – do you blame the General Winter or the Russian army?

3. If Napoleon finally got the battle he wanted but instead of another Austerlitz he got the bloodiest battle in human history with undecesive result, then he falls into depression while his soldiers are astonished ("…there were no songs around bivouacs that night, no enthusiastic exchange of experience and tales fo glory…….") do you blame General winter or the Russian army?

"When the enemy is driven back (esppcecially a mere 1-1.5 km), we have failed. When the enemy is cut off, surrounded, and dispersed, we have succeeded." Alexander Suvorov

"The dense Russian deployment was designed to force Napoleon to fight a battle of attrition….with Napoleon present in person and his army considerably outnumbering the Russians as regards trained troops (militia or Cossack), Russian victory was in any case unlikely…. in may ways therefore the battle of Borodino was a microcosm of the 1812 Campaign as a whole, during which the Russian high Command had forced Napoleon to fight the kind of was that suited them but not him (D. Lieven, Russian against Napoleon. page 195) . Do you blame General winter ?

4. Then the French troops enter one of the most reach cities in Europe but instead of enemy surrender, Peace and a magnificent reception by city mayor – something they saw many times all over Europe in Milan, Naples, Rome, Munich, Prague, Berlin, Vienna they get a pile of burned rubble – do you blame the General winter or the Russians?

5. If Kutuzov performs his famous Tarutino manoeuvre which "by accident" proved to be of dramatic consequences to the French army and French strategic situation – do you blame General Winter or Kutuzov?

6. If French soldiers trying to get food in vicinity of Moscow find their death at the hands of partisans, Cossacks and light detachment dispatched by Kutuzov do you blame general winter or Russians ?

7. If Napoleon decides to retreat from Moscow via south where there are plenty of supplies and food but instead his path is blocked by Kutuzov at Maolyaroslavetz and Napoleon is forced to retreat back via the devastated Smolensk route – do you blame General winter or Kutuzov and the Russian army?

8. While retreating if the French cannot leave the road and go into country side to search for food because they are afraid of Cossacks do you blame the General Winter or the Cossacks?

9. If a French soldier falls behind because he needs to defecate and he hopes to catch up with his unit in a next two-three hours as he did many times in Italy, Austria, Germany but instead he is captured by the Cossacks – do you blame the General Winter or the Russians?

10. If a French colonel losses his regimental train because Russian advance Guard maneuvered aggressively and the regimental life-supporting system (food, clothing, supplies, ammo) is lost and the regiment progressively loses combat worthiness – does the unfortunate colonel blame the Winter or the Russian advance Guard?

11. If y a French Corps Commander and loses his cavalry , and artillery because Russian hussars of the "flying detachments" kill his foraging companies – does he blame the General Winter along with the lack of forage or the Russian hussars along with Kutuzov who dispatched them?

12. Or if Napoleon cannot halt his army for more than one night at his depots, to rest, feed, reorganize and refit his exhausted army [ which also makes people prone to diseases as immune system fails] because, firstly he finds out that his depots are already captured by "outsmarted and outmanoeuvred" Russians as a result of the Battle of Polotzk, secondly Kutuzov is making a parallel march threatening to cut him off completely, who does he blame for that? General Winter?

Guess what – General Winter is exactly what is being blamed by majority of historians in Britain.

Yes, the Russian high command utilised space and time to its advantage > but Western historiography prefers to believe that it was General Winter rather than Russian strategy and Russain army.

On the other hand when Wellington utilises the unique conditions in Spain to his advantage > it is not considered to be "great British General Spanish guerrillas" or "great British general lack of French supplies, or unity of command etc." It is considered to be the "brilliantly calculated strategy of General Wellington".

I hope you get the point.

<<…and British army under Wellington have to endure weeks of forced marches and to maneuver against Napoleon and his Grande armee and defend the vital strategic points in open battle not only whenever it suites you but whenever the geopolitical and geographical situation does not leave the choice.>>
Has it occurred to you that Wellington avoided prolonged marches whenever possible precisely BECAUSE he knew – from being a "Sepoy general" in India – how badly it affected the physical and moral state of an army. That's ANY army, not just his own – hence he made every effort to make his opponents in Spain do the marching, and the standing around, and the starving. Once again, it's called good thinking. >>>>>
Agree. Its called good thinking. The only difference is that French, Russain, Prussian, Austrian could not afford this kind "good thinking" due to the different nature of war on the main theatre. Mainly > because it was Napoleon who dictated the pace and the Campaign. And Napoleon was not in Spain. However, when he visited briflly this ended up in another British embracement on the ships > something Russians (with the exception of 1812), Austrians and Prussains could not do because they are not an island.

<<History tells us that that being 18th century army, Wellington and his army hardly would be able to make to the battlefield on the first place.>>
No it doesn't. (18the Century army? Really? Ever heard of The Light Division? Shrapnel? Rockets? Hardly evidence of backwards/conservative thinking, are they. There are plenty of occasions when British troops – like all others – performed poorly; the fact that they rarely did so when Wellington was in command suggests he was an important factor in their successes.)>>>

Did not mean they were backwards from technological perspective. Although, if talking about technology – artillery was the high-tech weapon of the period and the British army had the lowest ratio of guns per 1,000 of troops, which would be another huge barrier for British to perform on par with other European armies on the main theatre.

What I meant is that British army had a backdated operational doctrine which relied on supply systems mainly due to "fragile" nature of the British soldiers who were in fact mercenaries and were not prepared to endure forced marches.

"Their (French) movements compared with ours are as mail coaches to dung carts. In all weathers and at all times the French are accustomed to march, when our men would fall sick by hundreds …" John Mills of British Regiment of Coldstream Guards.

Light Division – I consider it to be one of the best formations of the Napoleonic era but I hope you see the difference between manoeuvring a light force of a few thousand men as opposed to manoeuvring an army of 100,000 and above along with hundreds of gun and esppcecially heavy guns.

PS. Amusing to see calls for my ban but yet people from the same group who "are all united against Alexey" talk about "freedom of speech" – What a hypocrisy….

In fact, I am not sure what PH did so he is banned here but if a historian of his calibre is banned from here I would not miss much if I get banned too for saying "bunch of lies" – same expression Wellington used for Clausewitz's assessment of his performance in 1815. Of course it is rather comfortable to base official history on Wellington's dispatches. Makes me wonder why the French did not use Napoleon's bulletins as official version of history or perhaps there was a conflict of interests in that ?

PH is banned I beleive not do to his stance, or even his raging Anglophobia but due to his repeated bad behavior.. which I beleive follows this pattern. He posts a claim, Prussians were super awsome, Wellington was crap, British couldnt fight ect ect.
Some one contests.
PH would denounce them as insane, mental or of being abused as a child.

Maybe thats "high calibre" historian in your book. And as far as Im aware, many French histories DO use bulletins for history. In fact on the Arc of Triumph arnt there several French defeats on there like Fuentes d'Onoro and Albuera?

Edwulf is correct, Alexey, PH is banned because of his manner of arguing (or, more accurately, of not arguing), but not for what he represents. But I don't think that will be an issue with you!

I'll leave the debating with you for those who know more about the period than I. But thank you for your interesting perspective, which has certainly made me self-critique some of my own opinions.

And let's hope that just because you represent something quite opposite to the views of many others here, that the debate can still be gentlemanly on both sides.

Alexey, I was one of those select members of this forum who was told to return to my padded cell by PH.

My offence – pointing out that he had deliberately ignored one of the key primary sources relating to one of his tenets.

It is clear from your postings that you have little or no respect for British official despatches; well thats fair enough, much better to jump on the modern post relativist 'anything British must be suspect' bandwagon…

But in this case, the truth or othersise of that despatch was irrelevant, as I hope simple commonsense will show:

PH's tenet was that Wellington was desperate to conceal his debt for the victory at Waterloo to Blucher and the Prussians.

Firstly please allow me to place the Waterloo Despatch in context, it was the first account of the Battle to reach the Royal court and thus be released to the public – it would be carried by the best horsed staff officer, be given the swiftest vessel, etc etc. It was Wellington's golden opportunity to place his slant on the battle…

I won't retype all of it here, the source is easily accessable through google. Sufficient to say that any reasonably open minded interpretation of it will show that Wellington concludes his account of the battle by clearly attributing victory to the timely intervention of Marshal Blucher and the gallant Prussian army.

So even if you doubt the value and veracity of a British Military Despatch in an age when honour was worth more to a man than his life, you can see that asking PH why he had not referred to this source might be a reasonable question and not grounds for insanity….

Alexey:

I am keeping an open mind about the points that you raise. You do bring up some relevant points about the "status quo" and what happens if you question it.

You noted; "My thoughts were this forum is for more history orientated discussions rather than national myths oriented discussions." I salute you for trying to maintain a debate where we can learn and not getting tied up in the rancour that seems to often develop.

The British soldiers were in fact mercenaries?? Is that as intelligent an observatios as the Russian soldiers that were in fact slaves?

Yes – They were slaves – but I guess we are not here to discuss the ethical side of authoritarian regime of tsarist Russia.

Arteis,
Glad to see some independent view and objective approach – something Kiwis have been known for around the world.

The artillery argument makes no sense. Numbers don't equate with effectiveness. It could be argued that large numbers compensate for low effectiveness. Anyway, any argument that the British army was comparatively ineffective simply reinforces the idea of Wellington's skill.

I disagree. I think Spanish nation could achieve the similar results without British. The final outcome would not be much different. It were Spanish partisans who held hundreds of thousands of French troops – NOT Wellington's army. Napoleon, having his capital threatened would pull out sooner or later anyway even without Wellington.

?

You have massively inflated the problems that the Spanish Guerillas caused the French. They were a considerable annoyance, but when the French had the time and space to conduct contra-guerilla warfare they were quite successful in most areas. The performance of the Spanish Army – with all of the same factors helping them as with the British, plus a few more – are a useful contrast here. You are overstating the case – it is the combination of the Spanish Army, Spanish and Portuguese popular resistance with the fighing of the Anglo-Portguese Army which defeats the French.

There are plenty of examples where even modern armies having unimaginable to Napoleon technology failed badly against guerrillas. You spent 10 years studying guerrilla warfare in Spain – honestly that's impressive > but I can't agree with you. I spent 3 years in the middle east fighting Islamic terrorism (pathetic how Defiant posted that I am "easterner" who "dislikes westerners") and I am absolutely convinced that wars against guerrillas, not to mention nation in arms (exactly what Spain was) cannot be won, especially by Napoleonic era technology.

Maybe one day we will come up with something better which will allow armies to defeat guerrillas but until now it's a nightmare for the modern armies and it was much worse for Napoleonic era armies.

Pretty tangential to the main debate, but as far as it goes, the reverse is true – the guerillas benefit from improved communications, technology and ease of supply relatively more than their regular opponents. The French counter-guerilla effort was reasonably successful, taken as a whole during the wars.

"To say that in Spain the French troops were second-tier soldiers is a false assumption. Just take a look to which commanders and which soldiers fought here. In Spain, the French had, at some point, 350,000 men (some claim 420,000, but I believe that figure is too high, so I stick to the more conservative number). They lost around 200-300 thousand men in Spain -illness, desertion, casualties, ecc-. Many of those men were veterans, not recently recruited conscripts. In 1813, Napoleon pulled off many NCOs and officers from his Army at Spain, to provide cadres for his army in Germany. >>>>>>>>>

First page of this thread – its all there. I don't have time to retype paragraphs after paragraphs.

Sigh. And I pointed out to you that in addition to the 'Conscript Armies' of 1808 (which the British never faced – they only fought the Spanish), Napoleon left the vast majority of his Grande Armee in Spain. The troops who had the 1805-07 fighting. THE EXACT SAME ONES. THE SAME PEOPLE. Do your research.

The conscripts who entered Spain were eventually becoming veterans but:

a). There was a constant drain due to Spanish guerrillas operations. Note – not due to Wellington operation who caused only 45,000 French casualties through the whole affair in Spain. Replacements who came from depot battalions were conscripts as well, which the diluted the quality once again.

b). Napoleon considering Spanish theatre as a secondary and failing to grasp the scale of the Spanish resistance consistently pulled out his cadres from Spain for the Guards, for the Invasion of Russia in 1812 and to rebuilt the army in 1813.

Not a significant factor until 1813, 5 years after the beginning of the war. As for the French casualties, the vast majority were caused by sickness. The French casualty rolls show that direct action by the guerillas was not the factor you are claiming it was.

<<<<<<<<You say that British historians are nationalists that glory in re-telling myths about Wellington and the British Army in Spain. Well, some present dilettante historians and XIXth Century trained historians -when Nationalism was at its height in ALL countries- were biased by Nationalism; but modern histories, written by trained historians, are not precisely biased by nationalism. Sometimes you can appreciate that they trend to use sources that are more accesible for them -and if you know how much money costs to research in foreign archives, you will know that the nation-centerness have nothing to do with nationalist pride, but with availability of funds. Also, they are writing for an audience interested in the past of its own country, and therefore the narratives will be commonly centered in the experience of history of their own ancestors. However, please, tell me how many histories in Russian, German, French or Spanish don't do the same?>>>>

Agree. Totally. Nationalistic sentiments , lack of funds for research and reliance on the previous historiography is root of the problem. That's why Waterloo myth is still alive amongst common folks.

Which myth? That the Allies won at Waterloo? That the Allied plan on June 18th worked a treat and the French were left in a howling rout?

It is not enough to dismiss something as 'nationalistic'. It is a charge that may be true or may be false in any particular case and it may be true or false of every single combatant. In sum, it gets us nowhere.

This follows a set pattern where a British teenager learns about "British" victory at Waterloo in high school (of course not a word about Prussians), then he watches superman Sharpe massacring poor French soldiers in hundreds, then the ignorance is reinforced by video games like Napoleon Total War and the myth is confirmed by reading the a few books (like Oman, Philip Haythornthwaite, Parkinson, Robertson, Wellington dispatches etc), then we see very exciting forum posts on English speaking forums. That's common.

Ludicrous. Everyone frequenting these forums is well aware of the 'Allied' nature of the victory at Waterloo. We have searched in vain for ONE British historian's book that denies the centrality of the Prussian contribution at Waterloo.

My thoughts were this forum is for more history orientated discussions rather than national myths oriented discussions. The common trait for national myths is putting things out of context > exactly what we see here > that's failing to analyse the conditions under which two opposing armies were operating in Spain and for that matter in 1815 with Napoleon being badly outnumbered and operating simultaneously against two armies.

No doubt that in this situation Wellington would embark on the ships without even consideruing the battle. Unfourtunately for Napoleon , he had nowhere to go > he had to fight here and now and to achieve a decisive victory, something that Wellington did not have to achieve in Spain as the fate of the war was decided in Central / Eastern Europe. Hence Wellington preffered less risk and accordingly less retuns which was accpetable to him > but that does not make him a general in the same league as Napoleon who was fighting for survival and only a descive victory was acceptable to him.

My friend, the person most unable to grasp contexts is you. Setting unachievable objectives is the mark of the poor general. Setting a series of achievable objectives is the mark of great campaign strategy. Your 'withdrawal' to the ships slur on Wellington is ridiculous – He held on to Lisbon at precisely the point where a less cool head muight have done so. Losing with your back to the wall does not make you a better General than one who wins not under those conditions. And at the time it was possible, when the French Armies were reduced to a level where a strategic victory in Spain was possible i.e. 1813 Wellington achieved this in short order.

This is what many members here do not want to admit the strategic situation and challenges French, Russian, Prussian and Austrian armies were facing were beyond anything Wellington ever experienced in Spain.
These unique conditions in Spain were created by Spanish resistance and Napoleon's mistakes and Napoleon's absence > not the "genius" of "Iron Duke".

And your argument is a non-sequitur: "Because he did not face the same challenges, but was very successful in the ones he did, he is therefore a poorer General than those who were defeated facing different challenges."

You are entitled to your opinion of course, but you are clearly making an incorrect case.

Failure to go into that sort of analysis creates very exciting posts here which indirectly suggest that Wellington was if not the best but at least on par with Napoleon. Makes me wonder why the era was named after Napoleon rather than after Wellington.

So because the period was named after Napoleon, he must have been the best General. Right… Don't know about anyone else but that has got me convinced. And to think I'd thought it was because the wars of 1803-1815 were a period of large wars fought against Napoleon which ended in his ruin and defeat (by two armies, one of which was led by…erm…Wellington).

Supercilius Maximus,

<<<<<<What I don't understand is how you get the idea that a commander that knew how to preserve his army, to accomplish brilliantly with the strategic interests of his country; that knew how to chose a position to optimise his chances to defeat his opponents; who learnt from his mistakes; and that had an almost spotless record of victories; how can be that commander such a lousy general as you imply Wellington was? I don't follow your rationale. However, commanders that lost entire armies, that didn't care about how many casualties costed their battles and that were blinded by hubris, you praise them to the skies? How can that be? >>>>>>>>>

Certainly, did not say he was poor. I think at least three times I mentioned that he was "able strategist and tactician" and a "good general" – but comparing him to Napoleon is a far cry.

These commanders who as you say "didn't care about how many casualties"[very surprising statement from someone who has been studying the period for over 10 years], were operating under different victory criteria and against different opponents with different resources, under different environment and timeframes. Two different wars. Apples with Apples. Oranges with oranges.

Yes. As you say. Different conditions and criteria. I don't say that I know that Wellington was 'the best' General during the Napoleonic Wars. But if you have a 100% success record and never lose your Army, then it is by no means obvious that you are a worse General than the one who wins many victories, but suffers some a couple of huge defeats and loses three of his armies (Egypt, 1812, 1813). Frankly, it is you who hasn't been reluctant to make these oranges and apples comparisons.

<<<<<<<Well, I suspect the genius Wellington would not have fought in those places, prescisely because those positions would not have suited his army/tactics. And not least because exposing his army to "hundreds of guns" wasn't his style – he didn't aspire to the brilliant tactic of macho meat-grinder battles, unlike the "great" Russian commanders you cite, who thought nothing of having their men "prove their manhood" by standing still for hours under heavy bombardments. The British operated close to water precisely so that they could be properly supplied – it's called "good thinking". Again, what is special about over-stretching your supply lines and making your troops suffer un-necessarily?>>>>>>

I doubt that you have an understanding of moral, political, tactical, geographical, factors which effected Russian commanders. You statement of "prove their manhood" by standing still for hours under heavy bombardments" is a life evidence that you judge Napoleonic warfare by 21st century standards and through the prism of British experience in Spain, which was a completely different type of war, due to mountain terrain and guerrilla factor (e.g supply, communications, intelligence)and ability to dictate when and where the battle would take place (thanks to the above factors).

I don't have any desire to retype paragraps on the tactical principles of Napoleonic warfare which was primaraly based on the principle of a desicive victory and tactical ability to hold formation under fire, ability to manoeuvre under fire, ability to achieve artillery concentration, ability to combine arms, ability to push assaults despite the losses without breaking the formation in order to gain the vital ground and envelope the enemy achieving a major victory. Perhaps the below reading can clarify this point for you.

Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814
link
A Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars: v. 1: Russian Army in the 18th Century and Tactical Response to the French Revolution, 1801- 1809
link
L'armée de Napoléon
link

Well that was generally how they were fought. But they didn't have to be fought that way and Wellington didn't. That isn't an overwhelming argument for British tactical inferiority and doesn't deal with the 100% British success rate. In general, at the point of battle, the French were not under terrible adverse 'environmental' factors.

Your 'choosing the ground' argument is also weak. The French didn't have to accept the battles Wellington offered but they did. None of the factors you mentioned compelled Junot to fight at Vimiero, Soult at Corunna (against Moore), Victor at Talavera, Massena at Bussaco or Fuentes d'Onoro. Marmont was forced to fight at Salamanca because of Wellington seizing the moment. Only perhaps Vitoria fits your pattern.

But honestly I doubt that you are really interested in this anyway.

On the contrary, most people on this forum love hearing new facts and opinions, especially about armies which haven't yet received modern, updated treatments in English.

<<When retreating behind that water ditch called LaMansh is not possible….>>
So now we're being criticised for an accident of nature? Of course the British used The Channel (intersting that you chose the French name for it) – it would have been stupid not to. That's like saying the Russians simply hid behind the vastness of their own country (forcing invaders to over-extend their own lines of supply/communication) and allowed the weather to do the job, eh? Perhaps the only "great" Russian commander was "General Winter".>>>

This double standard is exactly what strikes me:

1. In 1812 the biggest invasion force in history invades Russia. Outnumbering Russian army at least two to one and, with military genius in charge they fail to achieve another Jena and Auerstedt in 1812. Instead of lighting victories of previous campaigns Napoleon fails to cut off and destroy even one Russian regiment as a result of battles around Mir, Vitebsk, Krasnoe, Saltanovka and Ostrovnoe. Do you blame the General winter or Russian rearguards with Russian generals?

2. Then the advance to the Russian capital St Petersburg is halted as a result of Battle of Klyastitsy where Russians outnumbered 2 to 3, defeat the French destroying 25% of the French force while suffering a lot less and forcing Oudinot to retreat – do you blame the General Winter or the Russian army?

3. If Napoleon finally got the battle he wanted but instead of another Austerlitz he got the bloodiest battle in human history with undecesive result, then he falls into depression while his soldiers are astonished ("…there were no songs around bivouacs that night, no enthusiastic exchange of experience and tales fo glory…….") do you blame General winter or the Russian army?

"When the enemy is driven back (esppcecially a mere 1-1.5 km), we have failed. When the enemy is cut off, surrounded, and dispersed, we have succeeded." Alexander Suvorov

"The dense Russian deployment was designed to force Napoleon to fight a battle of attrition….with Napoleon present in person and his army considerably outnumbering the Russians as regards trained troops (militia or Cossack), Russian victory was in any case unlikely…. in may ways therefore the battle of Borodino was a microcosm of the 1812 Campaign as a whole, during which the Russian high Command had forced Napoleon to fight the kind of was that suited them but not him (D. Lieven, Russian against Napoleon. page 195) . Do you blame General winter ?

4. Then the French troops enter one of the most reach cities in Europe but instead of enemy surrender, Peace and a magnificent reception by city mayor – something they saw many times all over Europe in Milan, Naples, Rome, Munich, Prague, Berlin, Vienna they get a pile of burned rubble – do you blame the General winter or the Russians?

5. If Kutuzov performs his famous Tarutino manoeuvre which "by accident" proved to be of dramatic consequences to the French army and French strategic situation – do you blame General Winter or Kutuzov?

6. If French soldiers trying to get food in vicinity of Moscow find their death at the hands of partisans, Cossacks and light detachment dispatched by Kutuzov do you blame general winter or Russians ?

7. If Napoleon decides to retreat from Moscow via south where there are plenty of supplies and food but instead his path is blocked by Kutuzov at Maolyaroslavetz and Napoleon is forced to retreat back via the devastated Smolensk route – do you blame General winter or Kutuzov and the Russian army?

8. While retreating if the French cannot leave the road and go into country side to search for food because they are afraid of Cossacks do you blame the General Winter or the Cossacks?

9. If a French soldier falls behind because he needs to defecate and he hopes to catch up with his unit in a next two-three hours as he did many times in Italy, Austria, Germany but instead he is captured by the Cossacks – do you blame the General Winter or the Russians?

10. If a French colonel losses his regimental train because Russian advance Guard maneuvered aggressively and the regimental life-supporting system (food, clothing, supplies, ammo) is lost and the regiment progressively loses combat worthiness – does the unfortunate colonel blame the Winter or the Russian advance Guard?

11. If y a French Corps Commander and loses his cavalry , and artillery because Russian hussars of the "flying detachments" kill his foraging companies – does he blame the General Winter along with the lack of forage or the Russian hussars along with Kutuzov who dispatched them?

12. Or if Napoleon cannot halt his army for more than one night at his depots, to rest, feed, reorganize and refit his exhausted army [ which also makes people prone to diseases as immune system fails] because, firstly he finds out that his depots are already captured by "outsmarted and outmanoeuvred" Russians as a result of the Battle of Polotzk, secondly Kutuzov is making a parallel march threatening to cut him off completely, who does he blame for that? General Winter?

Guess what – General Winter is exactly what is being blamed by majority of historians in Britain.

Yes, the Russian high command utilised space and time to its advantage > but Western historiography prefers to believe that it was General Winter rather than Russian strategy and Russain army.

No. SM was showing you where your arguments would lead, to provoke you. The Russian Generals and soldiers fought very hard and well and I can't think of an English historian who has denied this.

On the other hand when Wellington utilises the unique conditions in Spain to his advantage > it is not considered to be "great British General Spanish guerrillas" or "great British general lack of French supplies, or unity of command etc." It is considered to be the "brilliantly calculated strategy of General Wellington".

I hope you get the point.

I assume from this paragraph that you have never read Oman (your criticism of his work is way off the mark BTW) or Gates, say. You haven't fully grasped the point – it was no accident that the French and Spanish armies suffered more logistical problems than Wellington's troops.

<<…and British army under Wellington have to endure weeks of forced marches and to maneuver against Napoleon and his Grande armee and defend the vital strategic points in open battle not only whenever it suites you but whenever the geopolitical and geographical situation does not leave the choice.>>
Has it occurred to you that Wellington avoided prolonged marches whenever possible precisely BECAUSE he knew – from being a "Sepoy general" in India – how badly it affected the physical and moral state of an army. That's ANY army, not just his own – hence he made every effort to make his opponents in Spain do the marching, and the standing around, and the starving. Once again, it's called good thinking. >>>>>
Agree. Its called good thinking. The only difference is that French, Russain, Prussian, Austrian could not afford this kind "good thinking" due to the different nature of war on the main theatre. Mainly > because it was Napoleon who dictated the pace and the Campaign. And Napoleon was not in Spain. However, when he visited briefly this ended up in another British embracement on the ships > something Russians (with the exception of 1812), Austrians and Prussians could not do because they are not an island.

Your remarks about the Corunna campaign just show ignorance of what Moore was attempting to do and why he was always going to retreat. The object of that campaign from the French point of view was to catch and destroy the British Army – which they failed to do.

As for the other stuff, yes, Central Europe was a very different theatre with very different issues. But you make the unwarranted assumption that because Wellington dealt with one set of problems successfully, then he and his troops could not have campaigned successfully in different conditions. You have also not taken into account the fact that Wellington was fighting on Allied territory, he was not permitted by British politics to be rapacious even if he had desired. Note also his decisions before the invasion of France – he refused to take more troops than he could supply. This sharply contrasts with the strategy of the French in the reverse situation.

<<History tells us that that being 18th century army, Wellington and his army hardly would be able to make to the battlefield on the first place.>>
No it doesn't. (18the Century army? Really? Ever heard of The Light Division? Shrapnel? Rockets? Hardly evidence of backwards/conservative thinking, are they. There are plenty of occasions when British troops – like all others – performed poorly; the fact that they rarely did so when Wellington was in command suggests he was an important factor in their successes.)>>>

Did not mean they were backwards from technological perspective. Although, if talking about technology – artillery was the high-tech weapon of the period and the British army had the lowest ratio of guns per 1,000 of troops, which would be another huge barrier for British to perform on par with other European armies on the main theatre.

This applied to all armies in the Peninsula, not just the British. There was just no point in having more guns than you can actually move. The moving of horses (for teams) overseas was always a logistical headache for the British.

What I meant is that British army had a backdated operational doctrine which relied on supply systems mainly due to "fragile" nature of the British soldiers who were in fact mercenaries and were not prepared to endure forced marches.

"Their (French) movements compared with ours are as mail coaches to dung carts. In all weathers and at all times the French are accustomed to march, when our men would fall sick by hundreds …" John Mills of British Regiment of Coldstream Guards.

Light Division – I consider it to be one of the best formations of the Napoleonic era but I hope you see the difference between manoeuvring a light force of a few thousand men as opposed to manoeuvring an army of 100,000 and above along with hundreds of gun and esppcecially heavy guns.

Every British commentator from Wellington onwards has admired the hardihood and campaigning skill of the French. But it is a pity that the compliments on the battlefield skill of the British are rarely returned.

PS. Amusing to see calls for my ban but yet people from the same group who "are all united against Alexey" talk about "freedom of speech" – What a hypocrisy….

In fact, I am not sure what PH did so he is banned here but if a historian of his calibre is banned from here I would not miss much if I get banned too for saying "bunch of lies" – same expression Wellington used for Clausewitz's assessment of his performance in 1815. Of course it is rather comfortable to base official history on Wellington's dispatches. Makes me wonder why the French did not use Napoleon's bulletins as official version of history or perhaps there was a conflict of interests in that ?

PH got banned for directly abusing other people on the other forum. I, and I think many others, would really welcome his presence here if he could rise above some of the provocations he gets.

Napoleon's bulletins contain deliberate lies for propaganda and intelligence reasons, Wellington's depatches are reports to his superiors. I know that you know what the difference is.

Regards

<<<<<Numbers don't equate with effectiveness>>>>>>>

I take it that your immediate assumption is that British guns, crews and doctrine were materially better than all other European nations?

So if British had less guns that defiantly means they were MUCH better. Is that so?

In 1904, Colonel Nylus, the inspector of Artillery Academy and the author of a few textbooks on artillery undertook a gigantic research with a goal of establishing the effectiveness of similar guns across various nations from Napoelonic era. He examined the following sources:

1. Gassendi: „Aide memoire a l'usage des officiers d'Artillerie". 1801
2. Lamartilliere: 1) „Reflexions sur la fabrication en general des bouches a feu — 1847" и 2) „Recherches sur les meilleurs effets a obtenir dans 1'artillerie". 1819
3. Cotty: „Encyclopedie methodique". 1822
4. Tables des principales dimensions et poids des bouches a feu des artilleries principales de l'Europe. 1827.
5. Marion: „Notice sur les obusiers",
6. Duchand: „Observations critiques sur l'organisation nouvelle de l'artillerie". 1835
7. Le Bourg: „Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie". 1836
8. „Cours special a l'usage de sous-officiers de l'artillerie". 1840
9. Migout et Bergery: „Theorie des affuts et des voitures d'artillerie". 1840.
10. Thiroux: „Instruction d'artillerie". 1842.
11. Poisson. Memoire sur la probabilite du tir a la cible",
12. Poisson. Formules relatives aux effets du tir d'un canon sur les differentes parties de son affuts" 1825 и 1838
13. Piobert „Proprietes et effets de la poudre". 1839
14. Piobert Cours d'artillerie — theorie et applications", 1841
15. Piobert Traite d'artillerie theorique et pratique 1846
16. Piobert Memoires sur les poudres de guerre des differents procedes de fabrication". 1844.
17. Piobert Recherches sur le mouvement des projectiles dans les armes a feu". 1864
18. Didion: 1) „Memoire sur la balistique". 1846;
19. Didion „Traite de balistique" 1848;
20. Didion „Des lois de la resistence de l'air". 1856 и 1857
21. Helie: 1) „Memoires sur la probabilite du tir des projectiles de l'artillerie". 1856
22. Helie: Traite de balistique experimentale". 1865
23. Fave: „Nouveau systeme d'artillerie de campagne de Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte". 1850
24. Timmerhans: „Essai d'un traite elementaire d'artillerie".. 1839
25. Timmerhans: Experience faites a Liege sur les carabines a double rayure et celles a canons lisses". 1840
26. Timmerhans: Historique de l'artillerie Belge". 1836.
27. Coquilhat: „Percussions initiales sur les affuts". 1863
28. Coquilhat: „„Notes sur les projectiles creux". 1854
29. St. Roberto Des effets de la rotation de la terre". 1858.
30. St. Roberto Du mouvement des projectiles dans les milieux resistants
31. St. Roberto Sur l'analyse du charbon". 1860
32. St. Roberto Etudes sur la trajectoire que decrivent les projectiles oblongs" 1866
33. St. Roberto Notes sur le volume de l'embrasure" 1859.
34. St. Roberto Consideration sur le tir des armes a feu rayees". 1860;
35. St. Roberto Memoires scientifiques" (Balistique et Artillerie). 1872–73
36. St. Roberto „Des projectiles lenticulaires
37. „Leitfaden zum Unterricht in der Artillerie". 1818 и 1829.
38. К. и J. Smola. „Handbuch fur k. k. Oestereichische Artillerie-Officiere". 1831 и 1838 г
39. Otto „Mathematische Theorie des Ricoscheten schuss
40. Kameke: „Erlauterung zu der Sammlung von Steindruckzeichnungen der materiellen Gegenstende der Preussischen Artillerie" 1837 и 1847
41. Jacobi: „Beschreibung des Materials und der Ausrustungs des Niederlandische (1836), Franzosische (1837)[263], Wurtembergische (1837), Englische (1837), Hessische (1838), Nassauische (1839), Schwedische (1840), Bayerische (1841) und Oesterreichische (1843) Feld-Artillerien
42. Burg: „Zeichnen und Aufnehmen des Artillerie Materials". 1845
43. Hutz: „Die Feldartillerie und ihre Organisation". 1853 и „Die Organisation und die Leistungen der Feldartillerie" —
44. A. Schuberg: „Handbuch der Artillerie Wissenschaft". 1856
45. Oelze: „Lehrbuch der Artillerie". 1856.
46. Handbuch fur die Officiere der kon. Preuss. Artillerie. 1860.
47. Hand- und — Taschenbuch fur Officiere der Preussischen Feldartillerie." 1865
48. „Leitfaden zum Unterricht in der Artillerie." 1866
49. Decker: „Geschichte des Geschutz-wesens und der Artillerie in Europa", 1822
50. „Die Artillerie fur alle Waffen", 1826
51. „Les batailles et les principaux combats de la guerre de Sept ans consideres principalement sous le rapport de l'emploi de l'artillerie". 1837
52. E. Tennent. „The story of the gun". 1864
53. Griffiths: „The artillerists manuel and british soldier's compendium",1847, 1859 и 1873
54. 1. „Краткое обозрение состояния артиллерии с 1798 по 1848 гг.". 1853
55. 2. „Краткое историческое описание древних российских пушек". 1808
56. 3. „Разные положения о иностранных артиллериях
57. 4. А. Маркевич. Артиллерийского искусства
58. Гогель: „Основания артиллерийской и понтонной науки". 1816
59. Резвый: „Артиллерийские записки". В 1843, 1847 и 1853
60. Вессель: „Артиллерия". 1851–57. С
61. Безак: „Руководство для артиллерийской службы". 1853.
62. Крыжановский. Очерк устройства и хозяйства французской артиллерии. 1858
63. Шварц и Крыжановский: „Справочная книжка для артиллерийских офицеров", 1862 (III часть — 1870).
64. Баранцев „Краткий обзор преобразованиям в артиллерии с 1856–1865".
65. Анкудович. „Теория баллистики". 1836
66. Маиевский. „О давлении пороховых газов на стены орудия и приложение результатов опытов к определению толщины стен орудий". 1856.
67. Douglas: „A treatise on naval gunnery", 1820
68. Dub (перевод Риффеля): „Manuel concernant la connaissance, la fabrication etc… des armes a feu", 1858.
69. Breithaupt: „Technisches Handbuch fur angehende Artilleristen", 1821.
70. Busch und Hoffman: „Die Kriegsfeuerwerkerei der Preussischen Artillerie", 1851.
71. Meyer: „Erfarungen uber Fabrication des eisernen und bronzenen Geschutzes", 1831, и „Handbuch der Thechnologie fur Artillerie Offiziere", 1835.
72. Muller: „Waffenlehre", 1859.
73. Больдт: „Руководство для изучения военного огнестрельного оружия", 1858.
74. Bottee et Riffault: „L'art de salpetrier", 1831 (переведено на русский язык в 1849 г.) и „Traite de l'art de fabriquer la poudre a canon", 1811.
75. Cazaux: „Nombreuses experiences nouvelles confirmant la theorie de la poudre", 1837.
76. Charpentier-Cossigny: „Recherches physiques et chimiques sur la fabrication de la poudre", 1837.
77. Rieffel: „Recherches sur la Theorie de la force de la poudre", 1851.
78. Schiesspulver und Feuerwaffen: „Illustrirte Ubersicht", 1866.
79. Decker (перевод Terquem'а): „Experiences sur les schrapnels, faites chez la plus part des puissances", 1847.
80. Tortel: „Memoires divers sur les obus a balles ou schrapnels", 1889.
81. Dahlgren; „Shells and shell-guns", 1857.
82. Badini: „Cenne sulle granate a cassa sferica dette comunemente schrapnel", 1852.
83. Espiard de Colonge: „Artillerie pratique".
84. Scheel: „Memoires d'artillerie, contenant l'artillerie nouvelle". 1765
85. Durtubie: „Manuel de l'artilleur". 1792–1795
86. Monge: „Description de l'art de fabriquer les canons". 1794
87. Scharnhorst: „Handbuch der Artillerie". 1804–1814
88. Th. Morla: „Lehrbuch der Artilleriewissenschaft". 1795
89. Papacino d'Antoni: „Institutioni physico-mechaniche".
90. Papacino d'Antoni: „Uso delle Armi da fuoco" — „De l'usage des armes a feu", 1785
91. Hutton: „Nouvelles experiences d'Artillerie".— 1802
92. Данилов: „Начальное значение теории и практики артиллерии". 1762
93. Вельяшев-Волынцев: „Артиллерийские предложения", 1767
94. Шувалов: „Описание новой артиллерии". 1758.
95. Лопатин: „Записки о штате артиллерии до 1772 г".
96. Русская артиллерия в памятниках своего искусства" (1389–1889)
97. Ген. Бранденбург: „Исторический каталог С. П. Артиллерийского музея"; 1877–1889

His conclusion was:
"…The above data, gathered from many sources, suggests that: despite the best attempts to classify and compare the findings, it is clear that due to contradictions, imperfection and inaccuracies in statements of different authors and contemporaries, no generalisation can be made. ……Inaccuracy of the data available, variety of different metrics systems, lack of the data on projectiles initial velocity, lack of the data on the quality of gunpowder and the lack of data on the level of gas pressure in chambers, variety of munitions and aiming sights used – all of this, does not allow us to perform a reliable and meaningful comparison of ballistic qualities of similar types of guns used by various nations. Furthermore, due to lack of quality scientific experiments, even a theoretical hypothesis for such comparisons would be very questionable. …"

What it means that there is no basis to claim that Russian guns were better than Austrian guns of the same calibre, or British guns were better than French guns of the same calibre or vice versa and etc.

Your assumption that British guns had the necessary quality to balance the lack of quantity has no basis.

In fact the comparison does not favour the British who did not have many heavy 12-pdr guns (which fortunately for them, French hardly had any of these in Spain too due to supply and transportation issues). Furthermore, the comparison of per gun ammo provisions suggests that British would be outgunned by default:

1. French 8 pdr ammo provision > 212
2. British 9 pdr ammo provision >106.
(Nafziger, Imperial Bayonets).

Comparison of the ammunition provision for the 12pdrs cannons suggests that in a firefight the British would have been out shot:

1. French artillery – 222 rounds
2. Russian artillery – 172 rounds
3. Austrian artillery – 150 rounds
4. Prussian artillery – 114 rounds
5. British artillery – 84 rounds
(- Anthoy Dawson )

Accordingly, British artillery would be outgunned with all things being equal. However, fortunately for them things were not equal in Spain as French struggled to supply their guns > slow moving ammo carts were easy targets for Spanish partisans and obviously ammo cannot be maintained "off the land".

This is of course not a problem when you are in Spain and you the one deciding where the battle will take place (e.g use of ridges) – but on the main theatre Allied and French commanders hardly had this luxury not to mention that Central / Eastern Europe is rather flat as compared to mountains Spain.

The root cause of lack of artillery in the British army was once again related by overreliance on supplies – where all other European armies used the space for artillery carts – the British army was using the same space for carts with "tents" to keep their infantry happy.

Increase of number of guns would slow the British army even further. This was possibly possible in Spain but not on the main theatre where Napoleon was dictating the rules of the game.

"Prussian officer Müffling asked Wellington why the Brits advance so slowly and Wellington explained: "Do not press me on this, for I tell you, it cannot be done. If you knew the composition of the British Army and its habits better, then you would not talk to me about that. I cannot leave my tents and supplies behind. I have to keep my men together in their camp and supply them well to keep order and discipline." [Peter Hofscshroer]

"In the very end of the battle of Waterloo, Wellington and Blucher decided together that the Prussians alone would continue the pursuit. This decision is usually explained by citing the exhausted condition of Wellington's infantry, but Blucher's were surely no less tired. More likely the choice reflected the plodding management and slowness of movement that characterized British troops". [A. Barbero]

Furthermore, Wellington did not have a concept of "mass artillery" – something that other European armies have been practicing since 1807, when "… the Russians gave a lesson in technique [of massed artillery] to the French." [ Patrick Griffith] by being first to deploy TRULY "Grande battery" (although French had 42 at Jena) –"" in fact three of batteries – of 72, 40 and 30 guns at Eylau > this had a devastating impact on tactics > Napoleon was the first to evaluate and appreciate this and to make it a common feature of Napoleonic tactics going forward.

On the other hand Wellington as late as 1815 was still dispersing his guns along the large front (however considering the amount of guns he had it is unclear to me whether it's a good or bad thing.)

"Guns were spread in front of a position rather than massed, and in most cases must have been regarded as an infantry-support weapon rather than an independent force with aims and goals of its own. Much of this might be attributed to the small quantities of artillery available to Wellington in the Peninsula. He was unable to provide even one British battery for his eight divisions and had to depend on the Portuguese for artillery support." [Nafziger]

Also, Wellington did not have an appreciation for his artillery officers – in fact he dislikes them viewing them as "middle-class technicians". He was not happy with their performance at Waterloo – many crews abounded the guns too early or preferred artillery duel rather than fighting French infantry or cavalry. It is not by mistake Wellington opposed the monetary reward for artillery officers after Waterloo. The antipathy was quite mutual however [Rothenberg].

My postulation that British guns had the necessary quality to compensate for small numbers is entirely reasonable, given they tended to win.
Given the alternative to an 'over-reliance' on supplies, a slower rate of movement was clearly acceptable. Wellington was sensible enough to know it and act on it.
Do you mean "He was unable to provide even one British battery for EACH OF his eight divisions"?

Alexey

First of all, thanks for your thorough answer to my previous post. It's very engaging to debate with a knowledgable individual.

I am absolutely convinced that wars against guerrillas, not to mention nation in arms (exactly what Spain was) cannot be won, especially by Napoleonic era technology.

Before I started to study the guerrilla warfare in Spain, I would have agreed with you wholeheartedly. However, today my opinion is more… don't know… balanced, perhaps.

Since 1702 (not a typo, I mean 1702) the French had been able to put down several partisan rebellions. Not without troubles, of course, but they managed to defeat them in the long run. And the French weren't the only army which managed to defeat insurgencies, in XVIIIth Century and Napoleonic times. Just to mention some examples: Corsica (1768-1769), Vendée (1794-1797), Calabria (1806-1808), and, of course, Tyrol (1809). In all those cases, the French were able to defeat the insurgencies because they weren't fighting regular armies at the same time; they could focus all their efforts in defeating the insurgents, effectively separating the partisans from the people -through repression, yes, but also through giving protection to the locals that were sympathetic to the French forces-.

In Spain that didn't happen. French commanders faced a connudrum: if they focussed their efforts in defeating insurgents, their field forces would be too weak to face the regular Spanish and Angloportuguese armies; but if they choosed conventional operations, the insurgents had free hand to rise havoc in the rear areas. They had two possible choices: first, to send many more troops to Spain or to rise a pro-French Spanish army.

I have been able to determine that the French needed at least a 5:1 superiority over the insurgents to put the partisans on the run, and 7:1 to pacify the region. The insurgents never raised over 50,000 men, probably no more than 35,000 in any given moment (counting auxiliar divisions, which were actually regulars operating deep in the strategic rear of the French). That means that the French would have need something between 175,000-250,000 to pacify their rearguard areas (probably, even more). They never could to use in counter-insurgency ops more than 100,000 men (in 1811). With those numbers they were just barely able to hold to the major population centers and to protect the lines of communication. They could -and did- pacify temporarily a region, but as soon as the French troops moved to other region, the former was again under guerrilla control.

If Jose I would have been able to rise a Spanish army, perhaps the French could have used those troops to protect the pacified regions. But Napoleon didn't allow for it, neither he was disposed to give his brother the resources he needed to rise such an army. Napoleon was suspicious of arming the Spaniards, or that José would have the means to follow independent policies, perhaps conflicting with Napoleon's own (that was, by the way, one of the reasons why Napoleon decided to intervene in the Spanish affairs in the first place).

My point is that the guerrillas were, by themselves, not enough to defeat the French. The French knew -and have done- how to defeat an insurgency. If they failed in Spain was because Napoleon wasn't prepared to spend the money necessary to provide his commanders in Spain with the forces they would have needed to defeat BOTH the guerrillas and the regular armies.

Best regards

Can you expain what you mean by the British being "mercanries" who cant endure forced marches.

Id like you to clarify HOW they are more mercanary than any other regular soldier, such as a regular Austrian, Bavarian, Prussian or French soldier.

Secondly id like you to explain if you can how or why it is Mercanaries can't march. Id have thought they would actually be better marchers than regular or conscripts, due to doing it so often.

To my knowledge the British could march. Maybe slower than the French and Prussians but they could march. They also werent hired out to the highest bidder which disqualifies them from mercanary.

Maybe, the Independent Companies of Forigners are the mercenaries your thinking of, maybe they couldnt march? Have you got them mixed up with the regular army. KGL? on my understanding, they were nearly as good as the British, and could march too. And I think mercanary is a little harsh, George was their king and The Ogre had "stolen" their homeland. So they werent really following the gold but more fighting to liberate their home. maybe the Swedes, sold into the war by Bernadotte?, or if you beleive it, the Russians, Austrians and Prussians are the true mercanaries bought with British gold. By which logic they also cant march.

In terms of forced marches, what do you mean?, do you mean like hard pushed retreats, like Corunna and Burgos (in both cases, most of the army made it home and the army was still effective, though a bit knocked about) as opposed to Moscow (with only 10% of its strength). Now you could complain that all three were forced marches, and that discipline broke down in all three to some extent, but that the French had more extreme weather. Or do you mean forced over night marches, The Light Division endured a 30 mile a day forced march to reach Talavera, in the middle of July, in the sweaty Spanish heat.. something your Russian/German continental troops would never have coped with, or the famous "paralell march" of the British and french armies in July 1812, in which the British were able to keep pace and speed with the French, which im sure a plodding Prussian or beer and homecomfort loving austrian would not have managed.

Armand,

Davout was also undefeated during his militrary career, though he did not have an independent command as Wellington did. Auerstadt and Eckmuhl were battles that Davout fought on his own, as was moghilev in Russia in 1812.

His troops were always the best trained and equipped in the Grande Armee and were favorable compared to those of the Imperial Guard. Even in the mess of the Berezina fighting it was remarked that Davout's troops crossed the bridges over the river smartly, in formation, with fifes and drums playing.

One of Davout's overlooked talents was that he was excellent at training cavalry commanders. Montbrun, Pire, and Jacquinot came out of III Corps.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Say whatever you want about Wellington (and it really doesn't matter if you like the man or not) he was a great captain who did more than his assigned duty.

While he himself believed the Archduke Charles to be the best of the allied commanders, Wellington fought campaign after campaign in Spain against long odds, forced withdrawals, hard-won victories, as well as fighting the bureaucrats in London.

He formed his army in his own image, created his staff especially to be able to command the army he formed, integrated the Portuguese troops, as well as assorted Germans, into his army and kept them supplied and equipped.

Wellington became a master of logistics, undoubtedly helped by his experience in India and with never enough British troops not only tied down large numbers of French troops, he finally accomplished his mission and invaded southern France to boot.

If Wellington had lost in Spain, French troops would have been released into the main theater in central Europe with an outcome that probably would have been detrimental to the allied cause. Wellington's army and operations were key to allied operations in central Europe. If 200,000 French veterans had been moved into central Europe in, say, January 1813 there is no doubt that the Prussians and Russians would have lost and the Austrians would not have come in.

The idea that the French troops in Spain from 1809-1811 were 'second rate' is ludicrous. The French army that invaded Spain the second time were the veterans of the 1805-1807 campaigns and their operations splattered Spanish armies across Spain and pursued Moore's army out of it, forcing a reembarkation. The French troops that remained in central Europe after Tilsit were Davout's command and the heavy cavalry.

There was a regular French cuirassier regiment in Spain, the 13th, and it was part of Suchet's army.

While the bulk of the French dragoon regiments were sent to Spain for 'on the job training' it should be noted that three dragoon divisions took part in Murat's famous charge at Eylau-there was only one cuirassier division present-d'Hautpoul's.

Denigrating Gribeauval field pieces that were employed in Spain is as interesting as it is nonsense. The adoption of the 6-pounder was not a unanimous decision in 1803 and Gribeauval field pieces were very much in evidence with the Army of Germany in 1809. French Guard artillery still had Gribeauval 4-pounders in 1811.

Wellington was the best British general since Marlborough and Great Britain has seen few of his caliber since. While it is very true that Wellington's army would not have survived without the Spanish guerillas, it is also true that the guerillas would have been tracked down and destroyed by the French without the presence of Wellinton's army. The actions of Suchet's army is an example of how that could be done. The French had done it before in Italy, the Tyrol, and the Vendee and were experienced at counterinsurgency warfare. An insurgency cannot survive without outside support and the presence of a regular army in the field.

Interestingly, the French thought the Tyroleans much tougher opponents than the Spanish guerillas.

As for the British artillery, that arm has always been well-trained and skilled. The problem they had in the Peninsula was that there was not enough of it. After the reforms in the 1790s and the establishment of the British horse artillery arm, the British once again had a world-class artillery arm as to equipment. Woolwich was a first-rate artillery school and the design of the British gun carriages and ancillary vehicles (limbers and caissons) were the best in the world. The block trail carriage was a great innovation and set the trend for gun carriage design after, the bracket or split trail was on the way out after the British innovation. Both the French and the US copied it after the wars were over, the French more readily than the US because they had seen and admired it on campaign.

K

Kevin

I agree with most of your message. I would appreciate if you can tell me from which source came the following statement:

Interestingly, the French thought the Tyroleans much tougher opponents than the Spanish guerillas

It's not the first time I read it, but so far I have been unable to track the actual source. Most of the memoires of French veterans that fought in Spain don't make any comparison with other theaters of war, except en passant to say that as hard as it was to campaign in Spain it was better than being in Russia (in Roguet, if I remember correctly). I guess it was someone that fought both in Tyrol and then in Spain (the other way around it wouldn't make sense, because in 1809 the Spanish insurgency wasn't really very active; until Spring 1809, and only in some areas in centre and northern Spain, the partisans were only small bands, a nuisance more than a danger… heavy fighting didn't started until later, around the end of 1809).

Thanks in advance.

Bas,

It's mentioned in Swords, but I believe that you'll find it in Teste's letters, as he fought there during the pacification.
There is a quote from General Broussier on page 501 of Swords that intimates that idea, but his letter and Teste's are in La Sabretache, which is a gold mine of primary source information. Some of them are on Google, but I prefer the older volumes which are actually books, not magazines.

Sincerely,
Kevin

The French knew -and have done- how to defeat an insurgency.

Would not several Spanish civil wars – Carlist wars and the Spanish Civil war come to mind – give us examples of successful fights against guerillas?

I think we are running into two problems here:

1. Folks are discussing a multitude of operations of a variety of armies and arms as one quality of best, better or worse. Things changed. Military men gained experience, received better equipment, learned better tacitcs, created better units, and just as readily that could all be lost in a single campaign.

2. There is an effort to determine which troops, artillery, generals are better with no specific criteria for comparison. Just because Russians had larger batteries doesn't mean they were worse, or that the British, with less artillery, were better. The Russians always had more artillery, long before the Napoleonic wars. The British didn't have a lot of artillery because they had to transport whatever they had. Many British batteries were left behind on campaign because Wellington didn't have enough horses.

Many of the issues discussed here were issues for the military men of the period. For instance, lots of discussion among French officers about whether eight pounders should have eliminated in the French arsenal. The Russians were never certain whether their artillerists should defend the guns to the last, or limber up and leave without delivering the last, most telling shots close up.

Even Teste's comparison of the Spanish guerillas and Tyrolian insurgents requires further understanding as to 'what' was being compared. The two were on far different scales, duration and methods.

3. Making sweeping generalizations are also a problem. For instance,

While the bulk of the French dragoon regiments were sent to Spain for 'on the job training' it should be noted that three dragoon divisions took part in Murat's famous charge at Eylau-there was only one cuirassier division present-d'Hautpoul's.

There would have to be some orders or commentary to that effect covering what, five or six years? On the face of it, the high toll in horse-flesh recorded by both the British and French fighting in Spain, sending cavalry to 'train' in Spain [mainly on the plain] was an expensive proposition.

Lots of great information, but not a whole lot of focus in or criteria for answering specific questions, let alone the thread inquiry….

Bill

I'm tring to follow this but I agree w/ McLaddie this argument is turning into apples and oranges

Kevin

Broussier wouldn't be a reliable witness (for a comparison, I mean). He never served in Spain -at least, George Six, in his Dictionnaire Biographique des Généraux et Amiraux Français de la Révolution et de l'Empire 1792–1814, doesn't mention he did. He served for a while in Tyrol, in March 1809, against Gyulai though. He had experience of Tyrolean rebels, but not of Spanish guerrillas; thus any comparison he did would be second hand and hearsay.

Did Teste serve in Spain? If he did, he could be a reliable source to compare both experiences.

Thanks for your answer, by the way.

Bas,

Good points-but you can compare what they say about the Tyroleans with what others said about serving in counterinsurgency operations in Spain. Heinrich von Brandt did serve in Spain (but not in the Tyrol) and he has some interesting things to say about the Spanish.

Sincerely,
Kevin

This thread has indeed gone off topic, but I think that's because the original question, has been answeered: (To take the liberty of paraphrasing – Was the quality of the British army responsible for its victories or was it Wellington's leadership?

To answer the question directly, clearly it was Wellington's leadership that was responsible, since he was also able to win victories with other armies where British troops were a minority – Seringapatam, for example.

The case is proven by the converse, the British Amy got into fearful scrapes before Wellington got the command, or when he was absent – Albuera for example.

(Wellington's naysayers will often argue that because his Indian victories were on a small scale and fought against native troops they don't count – I suspect these people would be the first to laud Kutusov's victories over the Turks!)

To answer the question directly, clearly it was Wellington's leadership that was responsible, since he was also able to win victories with other armies where British troops were a minority – Seringapatam, for example.

The case is proven by the converse, the British Amy got into fearful scrapes before Wellington got the command, or when he was absent – Albuera for example.

I'm not sure that I draw that conclusion Sparker. The fact was that there were many victories when Wellington wasn't in charge – including Albuera – but only Wellington really seemed able to put together a campaign. As is often pointed out around here, when he wasn't in charge the campaigns would often peter out or fail.

Whirlwind

Therefore we can conclude that the forte of Wellington wasn't just his tactical ability to read the battlefield and the flux of the battle, but his strategical analysis. I think I agree with this conclussion. That would make him comparable to Napoleon. Even though Wellington wasn't a head of state, as the Emperor was, he planned all his campaigns with the big strategic picture in mind. Of course, that picture had in all times the interests of Great Britain at heart.

Best regards

@ Alexey,

You responded to four quotes (or blocks of quotes) under my name.

The first was nothing to do with me, I'm afraid.

The second, about European commanders leaving their men under fire as some sort of "honour code" – you clearly lost track of the point I was making (ie that Wellington tried at all times to preserve the lives of his men). I'm not sure what relevance your comments about tactics have to do with wasting lives unnecessarily.

The third was my comparison of your allegation that the British simply hid behind The Channel, with a similar allegation that the Russians simply hid behind the vastness of their country and extreme weather. Again, you missed the point (as Basileus rightly pointed out) – namely that both allegations were equally ridiculous, hence your multiple-point response was redundant.

The fourth, technology and artillery, has been dealt with by 10th Marine. Again, you missed the point about the Light Division – it wasn't about the size of the formation, but about the level of (modern) tactical thinking that created it (ie clearly NOT the mindset of an 18th Century army as you alleged).

I think you need to understand that much of the "praise" that Wellington receives from British posters on this forum is deliberately exaggerated not to elevate him above his actual prowess, or pursue some out-dated nationalistic agenda, but because of our national sense of humour. Quite simply, it amuses us to "wind up" those who are perceived to be (seriously, as opposed to humourously) downgrading his achievements just because they don't like the man (and/or his nationality) than because they genuinely think he was useless – the American comment about Santa Claus is another example of someone missing this point.

To illustrate this point – you won't find any British posters starting a thread on here about Wellington being better than Napoleon because he won at Waterloo. You will find us pricking the pomposity of Napoleon-worshippers by pointing out that he lost to a "Sepoy general". Perhaps not an easy distinction to spot in emails, I admit, but no British posters on here would deny Wellington had faults.

Whirlwhind and Bas,

Whilst I agree with the general tenor of your points, I would still assess Albuera as a defeat, or a phyrhic victory at best.

But yes, he was a capable and farsighted campaign manager, which in his case included managing the politicians at home to a far greater extent than Napoleon did, in the sense that Napoleon was the state.

His appreciation of the Peninsular was brilliant at all levels –

logistical: a country where small armies lose and large armies starve;

Grand tactical: that the keys to the kingdom of Portugal were the two pairs of matched fortresses, Almeida-Ciudad Rodriguez; and Elvas-Badzjoz; and that the Tagus would always afford a secure bolthole for a small army;

Joint: that both the British supremacy at sea, and the reformed logistical train could allow him to switch his lines of communications by 90 degrees overnight (from Lisbon to Santander) and so wrong foot the foe's expectations;

But in my view his supreme achievement, one in which he was consistently better than Napoleon was in his ability to read the battle – to be at exactly the point of crisis every time. I think Rommel called it 'Fingertipfeeling', an almost preternatural (he was Irish after all!) ability to sense where the tipping point is before the enemy does…

Whilst I agree with the general tenor of your points, I would still assess Albuera as a defeat, or a phyrhic victory at best.

It was not a smashing victory, but the Allies achieved their minimal objectives, while the French did not.

As Napoleon once commented, 'An army of lions led by a sheep is not an army of lions' or words to that effect. The commander has great influence on how an army performs and what it does in general. An army is a reflection of its commander.

Wellington organized and led his army through six years of a tough war in an inhospitable environment. His veterans, led by someone else, didn't do as well-witness British performance at New Orleans and Plattsburg in 1814 in North America.

You have to assess a commander by what he does tactically, logistically, on the battlefield, and on campaign, and what he is like as both a leader and a commander (they aren't the same thing). Wellington scores high in all categories which makes him a great captain. It is also noteworthy that he always had to command a multi-national force; something that is not an easy task.

The bottom line is that he accomplished his mission-something most of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian general officers did not do. To my mind he is the best of the allied commanders of the period, Archduke Charles or no, and he should be given his historical due.

K

In 'The Age of Napoleon' J. Christopher Herold includes some nice quotes about Albuera:

Soult: "They could not be persuaded they were beaten. They were completely beaten, the day was mine, and they didn't know it and wouldn't run."

Herold says that Beresford believed he had been defeated and said as much in his report to Wellington, to which Wellington replied: "This won't do. It will drive the people in England mad. Write me down a victory."

Herold concludes: "Beresford wrote down a victory, and a victory it has been ever since. Thus, sometimes, battles are won."

Just because people have prejudices and misunderstand what the true factors behind combat potential does not mean that 'National Characteristics' has any logical basis in ethnicity and culture whatsoever.

Firstly you would need to explain how the unique cultural,ethnic,dietary,xenophobia blah,blah,blah national characteristics of an English speaking Londoner of 1800 were identical to a Gaellic speaking clanman of the Highlands, a german speaking hanoverian, a portuguese speaking peasant of Oporto region, and an itinerant italian.
Equally how half of those very same people magically absorbed the very same national characteristics of a garlic eating Gascon when they served in the French army instead of the Anglo-Allied.

Yes I grant you if you take the extreme example of an Amazonian jungle warrior and give him an M16 he wont behave quite the same as a New York high school dropout BUT.

You want to look up Montesquie Laws who was largely responsible for the 'hot blooded' attack minded nonsense.
Oddly enough the cold blood / hot blood definition changes and manages to wander around from North Africa to France to Scandinavia to Hungary to Italy – depending on the era and which troops are behaving like that. Quite clearly its nothing to do with a DNA based 'National Characteristic' and everything to do with an armies characteristic.

Look at army recruit training – the main basis of boot camp is quite clearly to destroy the individuals characteristics and rebuild them as cookie cutter clones in the current required format for that army. Which country they first suckled in is pretty irrelevant.

It is ALL about the way units are trained,organised and controlled and absolutely snuff all about ethnicity and culture – a great deal of waffly high faluting hearsay illogical nonsense to the contrary, that has deluded almost everyone to the truth for centuries.

Thin red line, stiff upper lip, my @r53.
Command and control. Simple as.

It is ALL about the way units are trained,organised and controlled and absolutely snuff all about ethnicity and culture – a great deal of waffly high faluting hearsay illogical nonsense to the contrary, that has deluded almost everyone to the truth for centuries.

Jeff

This is an interesting point. However, do you actually deny the influence of culture in how soldiers were trained, organized and were controlled? Do you think that the cultural prejudices of the incumbent society didn't permeate the training and therefore how the soldiers fought?

To be honest with you, I do believe the opposite, i.e. that not military establishment in history is ruled by logical rules, or to be more precise, that the logic that rules the military is necessarily twisted by culture, and by how they thought of themselves. That's not the same that saying that British were naturally aggresive because it is imprinted in their DNA. However, if they BELIEVED that case was true -i.e. being British meant to be aggresive, otherwise you weren't British- it follows logically that that idea would shown in how soldiers were trained and how they fought.

Best regards

Soult: "They could not be persuaded they were beaten. They were completely beaten, the day was mine, and they didn't know it and wouldn't run."

So instead Soult had to run himself leaving his wounded behind.

Herold says that Beresford believed he had been defeated and said as much in his report to Wellington, to which Wellington replied: "This won't do. It will drive the people in England mad. Write me down a victory."

It seems, that Beresford was morally crushed by the heavy British casualties and his black mood was, probably, reflected in that letter. Wellington knew value of the well-written battle report as any other good general and if Kutuzov could turn Borodino into glorious victory it was very easy to make major victory from the not-so-clear success.

Firstly you would need to explain how the unique cultural,ethnic,dietary,xenophobia blah,blah,blah national characteristics of an English speaking Londoner of 1800 were identical to a Gaellic speaking clanman of the Highlands, a german speaking hanoverian, a portuguese speaking peasant of Oporto region…

Jeff, I have to respectfully disagree. There is no requirtement to analyse the reasons behind a certainty. If I'd met any particular social group from the British isles that weren't aggressive, punchy and dedicated to alcoholic imbibing then perhaps I'd wonder if there was an odd case. There aren't.

I'd also suggest that your extension of the British Isles to include parts of Germany and Portugal might be constrfued a bit mischievous.

As for 'stiff upper lip', there's vast chunks of this country that still couldn't fully spell those three difficult words let alone relate to them. It should also be pointed out that in my experience even football yobs crave organisational order. there's any number of trashy books out glorifying these thugs now that love to point out their leadership structures, organisations and marshalling of their 'troops' on specific match days. This, I would suggest, is a key element in the nature of our epople. Whilst we have a lot of people who like violence they are quite happy about respecting authority as a means to an end.

Whilst I fully understand that you and others clearly disagree with the theories forwarded by me and others I seem to rarely see any evidence of why you might be right, as opposed to why others are wrong. On what experience do you base your opinions? Please note this is not a veiled slight suggesting you don't have any, but rather a sincere interest in hearing a contrary opinion.

Old Bear

What I think that Jeff means -and please, Jeff, correct me if I am wrong- is that British 'agressiveness' (even if true) didn't play a significant role in the efficiency of the British army in the Napoleonic Wars, but how they were trained, organized and leaded. In other words, there was not -and there is not- a 'national character' that shaped how the army fought.

Although, I trend to agree with him if we limited the 'national character' to some alleged 'Briton DNA', I also believe that if instead of 'national character' we use 'cultural bias' (which would include how Britons thought of themselves), we will find some characteristics that were particular of the British army, and therefore we will understand better the reasons of their success than if we stick only to the 'mechanical' parts, i.e. how soldiers were trained, organized, ecc.

Best regards

To get back to the original question, I've just read in the last two weeks Kincade & Tomkinson. From them and other things I've read in all the years it seems to me the British (loosely) soldier was a good professional for the most part. There were elements that had to be knocked around but for the most part the soldiers and officers were professionals. On Wellington's part success breeds confidence & confidence breeds more success.

Jeffsayshi:

Just because people have prejudices and misunderstand what the true factors behind combat potential does not mean that 'National Characteristics' has any logical basis in ethnicity and culture whatsoever.

Jeff:
I don't think anyone [or at least me]is arguing that such National Characteristics have any 'logical' basis for folks today--certainly not like they did during the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries.

However, military men THEN did feel they had a logical basis, and used such 'understandings' in formulating tactics and strategies. Because the men of the period believed it, made a difference in perfomance on the battlfield…morale isn't 'logical' in all cases.

Firstly you would need to explain how the unique cultural,ethnic,dietary,xenophobia blah,blah,blah national characteristics of an English speaking Londoner of 1800 were identical to a Gaellic speaking clanman of the Highlands, a german speaking hanoverian, a portuguese speaking peasant of Oporto region, and an itinerant italian.
Equally how half of those very same people magically absorbed the very same national characteristics of a garlic eating Gascon when they served in the French army instead of the Anglo-Allied.

Emmanual Kant, the philosopher who wrote "Critique of Pure Reason", "Critique of Practical Reason" etc @1760-1788, felt the same way and felt he had explained it. He did it so well that Schornhorst made Kant's works required reading in all Prussian military academies and schools--and the only philospher on the curriculum.

Here are some opinions of educated Frenchmen about the French soldier, consistent for nearly 100 years:

". . . the fire of French infantry is rarely superior and usually inferior to that of other nations. It can be said with as much truth that the French nation attacks with the greatest impetuosity and that it is very difficult to resist its shock."

---Voltaire, 1734

"It is the distinctive characteristic of the French nation to attack."

---French Marshal de Saxe, Rêveries, 1725

"The French were without discipline, hardly suited to fire fights . . . .redoubtable in all attacks with cold steel . . .. They had then, as today, that initial moment of vigor and impetuosity, that shock which one day nothing can stop, and which the next day, a slight obstacle throws back, that incredible combination of a courage sometimes above everything and a consternation sometimes carried on to a weakness."
--General Comte de Guibert, Essai Génénal, 1783

The following is from pages 165-66, vol. II of the Military Mentor, written by a British general in 1809:

"The French soldiers are impetuous; their courage requires something to excite it, and movement to keep up its ardour. Their attack is more violent: but they are not, like the Austrians, able to sustain a regular and open fire from the line; they have not that moral and physical immobility which, without being affected, can see[stand up to] whole ranks swept off by the cannon. The courage of the French is less constitutional than artificial; emulation and vanity are its most powerful incentives; honour, example, and habit, keep it up to its proper pitch.'

Now, lets assume that after one hundred years, both the British and the French soldiers both believe this, however illogical. Don't you think that it would have a significant effect on tactics, expectations in battle, and particularly on morale? There are any number of examples of this.

Bill H.

'"Many of the regiments in Spain lacked uniforms, horses and equipment. For example in Spain they were dressed in the brown cloth of the Capucines found in convents and churches. They also had difficulty in obtaining eppaulettes for their elite companies and chin straps. For lack of sufficient number of regulation sabres the old Toledo-swords with three edges were used"'

It should also be noted that brown cloth was plentiful in southern France and that the Capuchin comments might be apocryphal.

I also read somewhere that the old Toledo three-edged sword was quite effective and in the hands of a good swordsman, quite deadly.

'The terrain greatly deterred the French from employing heavy cavalry. Consequently, apart from a tiny handful of provisional cuirassiers, the heaviest mounted troops consistently used were compromised quality dragoons.'

What are/were 'compromised quality dragoons? Reading Parquin's memoirs of service in Spain the French dragoon units gave good service and the 13th Cuirassiers with Suchet's army in eastern Spain were quite good.

'Bloodbaths like Eylau, wiped out much of the cream of the French army and by the time the Peninsular War was in full swing many of the troops that had won Austerlitz and Jena were dead.'

How many 'bloodbaths like Eylau' are we talking about. Further, some, not most (at least not usually) of casualties incurred are dead or die. The overwhelming majority are wounded and about half of those return to their units. There is an interesting section of Parker's Three Napoleonic Battles dedicated to Larrey and his work among the wounded. I highly recommend it. Interestingly a little over half of the Grande Armee had combat experience. One-third of III Corps in 1806 were newly joined conscripts, well-trained, but still rookies. Some of the veterans were killed in action as the wars progressed, but most? Without a detailed analysis of the regiments, divisions, and corps of the Grande Armee this statement cannot be sustained.

'For the decisive years 1808 to 1812, French annual conscript calls ranged from 181,000 to 217,000. During 1810 and 1811, when France was at peace in the rest of Europe, the majority of these conscripts went to the Peninsula and substantially diluted the quality of the French forces serving there.'

Where did you get your figures? This seems just a little high. That means for those five years between 905,000 and 1,085,000 men were called to serve. The total levy from 1800-1815 was 2,646,957 of which 1,350,000 were called to active duty. So, by your figures, almost all of the conscripts called to active duty were for the five years stated in your paragraph. That is incorrect. Are you making a distinction between those levied and those actually called to active duty? There is a difference.

In actuality, here's what I've found on the numbers called up per year, what they were used for from 1806-1813:

1806:160,000, 60,000 of which were for the reserve.

1807:80,000, 20,000 of which were for the reserve.

1808:80,000, 20,000 of which were for the reserve.

1809: 135,550.

1810: no figures, but a 'small levy' was recorded.

1811: 287,000, 97,751 were for the reserve.

1812: 245,000, 122,000 were for the National Guard.

1813: 350,000

That adds up to 995,000 active duty soldiers for eight years, compared to the figures you gave (between 905,000 and 1,085,000) for six years. Comparing the numbers just for the six years you provided its even more in evidnence that you have erred: 550,000 by my cound compared with twice that for your figures.

Do you have the places where the conscripts were sent? 1810 is an outlier as the levy was small. 1811 and 1812 were build-ups for Russia. 1809 was because of the Austrian invasion of Bavaria. Seems to me your 'analysis' is just a little off.

'Simultaneously, troop quality declined further as veterans suffered some of the nearly 100,000 casualties sustained in the Peninsula in 1810-1811. The impact of this dilution is clearly stated by General Anne Savary. Savary's report on the 1809 Battle of Essling, where he fought with troops substantially better than the average Peninsula soldier, observes, "if instead of troops consisting of war levies [raw conscripts], we had opposed to them such soldiers as those of the camp of Boulogne [the Grande Arm§Ûe], which we might easily have moved in any direction and made to deploy under the enemy's fire without any danger their being thrown into disorder". Innumerable Peninsular battlefields demonstrated this need¡­.'

What does Savary's report have to do with Spain? And the troops fighting the Austrians did excellently, and Davout's command along with the heavy cavalry were in large part veterans.

'The cr¨¨me of French army like Guard and Cuirassiers spent is Spain about 8 weeks only. Whatever Wellington faced in Spain were a second tier worst quality French troops.'

There were Guard units in Spain in 1808, 1809, 1810, and 1811. I believe they were in Spain just a little over eight weeks.

Artillery pieces deployed in Spain were also aging Grobevile system pieces with all new guns being deployed in the main Theatre. Finally the precious howitzers were priority for the Grande army, accordingly French Spanish army hardly ever had a sufficient number of howitzers to negate Wellington's tactic's of hiding his units behind ridge. Needless to say that somewhere in the plains of Europe British army spoiled by greenhouse like conditions of Peninsular War did not stand a chance against a Grandee army with its best troops and concentrated aggressive artillery fire tactics and personally commanded by Napoleon.'

Why do you characterize the Gribeauval field pieces as 'aging?' They were still being cast in the late 1790s and were still in use in central Europe through 1811 if not later (12-pounders). Do you have a source for this?

Where did you get your information on French howitzers? Two things: first, all of the artillery of this period were direct fire weapons in that you had to see your target to hit it. Even though the howitzer could fire at high angle, they still had to see the target to hit it. And, if the French didn't know that Wellington was positioning troops behind a ridgeline, not only could they not see them, they couldn't hit them with any accuracy with howitzers anyways.

'I disagree. I think Spanish nation could achieve the similar results without British. The final outcome would not be much different. It were Spanish partisans who held hundreds of thousands of French troops ¨C NOT Wellington's army. Napoleon, having his capital threatened would pull out sooner or later anyway even without Wellington.'

How? The Spanish armies were repeatedly defeated after the French second invasion of Spain. Guerillas cannot exist effectively without the support of either a field army or outside assistance. Without Wellington's field army, the French would have defeated the Spanish guerillas even though it would have taken time.

'In fact the comparison does not favour the British who did not have many heavy 12-pdr guns (which fortunately for them, French hardly had any of these in Spain too due to supply and transportation issues). Furthermore, the comparison of per gun ammo provisions suggests that British would be outgunned by default:
1. French 8 pdr ammo provision > 212
2. British 9 pdr ammo provision >106.
(Nafziger, Imperial Bayonets).
Comparison of the ammunition provision for the 12pdrs cannons suggests that in a firefight the British would have been out shot:
1. French artillery ¨C 222 rounds
2. Russian artillery ¨C 172 rounds
3. Austrian artillery ¨C 150 rounds
4. Prussian artillery ¨C 114 rounds
5. British artillery ¨C 84 rounds
(- Anthoy Dawson )'

I don't find Dawson's figures accurate, at least for the French. French artillery normally went into the field with a double-issue of 350 rounds per piece. Not all of it was with the gun companies, but also with the trains and artillery parcs. I would say the same for the other nations' artillery arms. You not only have to look at the number of rounds with the gun companies/batteries, but how many have been accomodated with the trains, etc.

K