I am sorry to crash on your party here but for objectivity purposes I think there a few points to consider regarding the above statement of people being "unfair to Wellington" and etc.
It is hard to see how public opinion can possibly be "unfair to Wellington" considering the that due to banal national pride facto writers such as Oman, Philip Haythornthwaite, Parkinson, Roberts, Wellington himself (his dispatches) etc dominate the current public opinion in English speaking countries , especially amongst people with casual interest in Nwars and casual reading background on the subject. This surely makes a perfect sense on a national-identity level:
"Renewed militarism, a devotion to royalty, an identification and worship of national heroes, together with a contemporary cult of the personality, and racial ideas associated with Social Darwinism. Together these constituted a new type of patriotism, which derived a special significance from Britain's unique imperial mission."(Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880-1960, by John M. MacKenzie)
Wellington was a perfect candidate for a "national hero" so he, being the most powerful men in Britain made himself one and became one. No doubt he was a fine general but "we are too unfair with Wellington" ? you gonna be joking.
"Waterloo-mania" swept Britain with noisy re-enactments of this great British victory. A combination of politics and pride refused to allow that Napoleon's destruction was due to anything other than British pluck and dash and the genius of Wellington. It is a tale of arrogance and conceit that denigrated Prussia and enormously elevated the reputation of Wellington. The present state of affairs is not better, welcome to the dodgy world of hype, in which the Duke is pumped up like mammoth beach ball…."
link
David Chandler writes "No battle has received more attention from soldiers and historians, or evoked greater popular interest and recognition, than Waterloo." This is probably correct, but let's don't forget that approx. 90 % of these books and articles were written in English-speaking countries.
The prolific Waterloo-industry flooded the book market and internet with books, articles, illustrations, and websites. Some of authors describe Waterloo in bombastic words such as "the most important battle in history", "an epoch-making incident, a directional laser-beam of light from the past to the future" (Andrew Roberts – "Waterloo" 2005) or "that world-earthquake, Waterloo" (- Lord Byron). Is it really accurate to refer to Waterloo as "directional laser-beam of light.
Majority of the Waterloo-books were written for particular market and are likely to continue to do well in that very specific market with myths and tall tales " [the Waterloo industry] link
"The Duke of Wellington lived for almost four decades after Waterloo and was in a position to make his own view on the battle almost canonical in Britain…by the time he died he was a national icon." (Leiven).
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"Wellington was constrained by problems that Napoleon hadn't."
The whole attempt to compare Napoleon with Wellington makes me smile. Napoleon is a legend in World terms, Wellington is a self-made and homemade hero promoted by the spread of the British Empire and its culture. It's like comparing latest stylish Ferrari to the latest solid built Toyota. Toyota is a fine car and a pride of Japanese car manufacturing but comparison is really inappropriate, but of course very flattering to Wellington fans.
The so called constraints which put Wellington in "disadvantaged" to Napoleon are worth mentioning anyway. Fighting Grand army in Europe with Napoleon in charge and fighting French in Peninsular campaign – these are two different wars:
1. French supply problems.
Napoleon diverted minimal resources to Spain failing to realise the scale of Spanish resistance. This resulted in totally insufficient flow of money, transport wagons, food, ammo, arms. French Marshall Maourmont writes:
"His Majesty may judge from this fact the comparison between their means and our's -we have not 4 day's food in any of our magazines, we have no transport, we cannot draw requisitions from the most wretched village without sending thither a foraging party of 200 strong; to live from day to day, we have to scatter detachments to vast distances, and always to be on the move … Lord Wellington is quite aware that I have no magazines, and is acquinted with the immensely difficult character of the country, and its complete lack of food resources … He knows that my army is not in a position to cross the Coa, even if nobody opposes me, and that if we did so we should have to turn back at the end of 4 days, unable to carry on the campaign …"
On the other hand British military budget was translated in a has an adequate supply of money and transport. "7,000 to 8,000 pack mules bring up its daily food"
Other equipment was also at constant shortages. Chronic shortage of horses This was especially damaging for the cavalry and artillery.
"Many of the regiments in Spain lacked uniforms, horses and equipment. For example in Spain they were dressed in the brown cloth of the Capucines found in convents and churches. They also had difficulty in obtaining eppaulettes for their elite companies and chin straps. For lack of sufficient number of regulation sabres the old Toledo-swords with three edges were used"
2. Spanish partisans and supplies.
"In the mountainous Spain, the French transport wagons could only be dragged with difficulty and toil, by hill and hollow, over roots, rocks and stumps. Nature had formed the country for a war of ambuscades and surprises, and no pains were spared to guard against them".
"French troops to simply protect messengers, escort supply trains, and hold the territory. These wild warriors held down 250,000 of Napoleon's troops. Especially busy were the French dragoons. But their mission was a mission impossible; the roads were poor, the terrain was difficult, the populace was hostile and the guerillas were elusive"
"The countermeasures employed by the French give some idea of how effective the guerrillas were: eventually 200 cavalry would accompany a messenger to ensure safe
passage, and as many as 1,000 men would escort a French general wishing to travel independently of his army. By the summer of 1813 dispatches sent by King Joseph to
Paris had to be escorted by 1,500 men to guarantee safe passage to the French border. (Napooleon wars Oxcley page 223)."
Even when managed to assemble some supplies with the greatest difficulties a high portion was destroyed by Guerrillas. This was especially painful for artillery ammo supplies which could not be obtained "off the land". As a result French artillery was frequently outgunned even by lower number of British guns as there was a constant shortage of artillery ammo. Thanks to the Spanish partisans Wellington had this important tactical advantage without moving his finger while obviously Wellington's force did not have to worry about fighting partisans.
3. Communications and Intelligence.
"The French had great difficulties with communicating with each other, it resulted slower concentration of troops. Napier writes: "..the French could never communicate with each other nor combine their movements, except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph an advantage equal to a reinforcement of 30,000 men." (- Napier p 129)"
Starting from 1810 French resorted to assigning as many as 200 cavalryman stretching poorly equipped French dragoon regiments to their limits to accompany the one courier. Obviously this was not always possible and frequently the couriers even of a General rank disappeared with no trace failing to deliver critical information.
John Tone, whose study of the guerillas of Navarre is by far the most detailed work that the English language boasts on the subject, writes: "Armed peasants made chaos of French communications and performed other tasks of value to both English and Spanish regular forces. Partisans scoured the countryside of French spies and symphatizers and brought a continuous stream of information to the Allies.
As a result, clear vision of operations by all filed commanders, skilled supply organisation, wide scouting / reconnaissance, skilled enemy disinformation and perfect flow of information from staff to troops was impossible for the French in Spain thanks to Spanish guerrillas. It is perfectly clear what French General Foy meant by "only the slowness of Wellington saved French from the destruction".
4. Quality of French troops in Spain.
"The first French army to march into Spain in 1808, for example, was predominantly composed of inexperienced conscripts." Baron de Marbot writes: "But it was easy to perceive how astonished they were at the sight of our young infantry soldiers. The moral effect was wholly to our disadvantage, and as I compared the broad chests and powerful limbs of the Spaniards who surrounded us with those of our weak and weedy privates, my national pride was humbled. Though I did not foresee the disasters which would arise from the poor opinion of our troops on the part of the Spaniards, I was sorry that the Emperor had not sent into the Peninsula some veteran regiments from the Army of Germany."
"Bessiers' corps contained just 2,000 reasonably seasoned soldiers, whilst the cavalry was particularly weak, out of 12 troopers, a mere 1,250 had had any real previous experience. Junot's "Army of Portugal" was little better either, only half approached veteran status. Bloodbaths like Eylau, wiped out much of the cream of the French army and by the time the Peninsular War was in full swing many of the troops that had won Austerlitz and Jena were dead."
Students of Napoleon's central European campaigns will be struck by the relatively small numbers of cannon employed in Spain. This is largely explained by the terrain and a chronic shortage of horses. The atrocious roads and mountainous topography of Spain and Portugal, were unsuited for larger number of guns.
The terrain greatly deterred the French from employing heavy cavalry. Consequently, apart from a tiny handful of provisional cuirassiers, the heaviest mounted troops consistently used were compromised quality dragoons.
"For the decisive years 1808 to 1812, French annual conscript calls ranged from 181,000 to 217,000. During 1810 and 1811, when France was at peace in the rest of Europe, the majority of these conscripts went to the Peninsula and substantially diluted the quality of the French forces serving there.
Simultaneously, troop quality declined further as veterans suffered some of the nearly 100,000 casualties sustained in the Peninsula in 1810-1811. The impact of this dilution is clearly stated by General Anne Savary. Savary's report on the 1809 Battle of Essling, where he fought with troops substantially better than the average Peninsula soldier, observes, "if instead of troops consisting of war levies [raw conscripts], we had opposed to them such soldiers as those of the camp of Boulogne [the Grande Armйe], which we might easily have moved in any direction and made to deploy under the enemy's fire without any danger their being thrown into disorder". Innumerable Peninsular battlefields demonstrated this need….
The problem worsened as the Peninsula became a secondary front. A typical Peninsula regiment of 2,500 men would send 120 to 200 men back to France as a depot unit, 50 to the artillery, 10 to the gendarmes, and 12 of the best men to the Imperial Guard. These subtractions, coupled with the unprecedented guerilla-inflicted losses experienced in the never secure rear areas, seriously eroded the staying power of the infantry regiment. It got worse in 1811 and thereafter when Napoleon withdrew the best troops from the Peninsula to prepare for the Russian invasion." (James Arnold – "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War")"
"Facing in Spain by seemingly endless struggles that entailed a great deal of danger but precious little glory, the once loyal soldiers of the emperor grew cynical and resentful, with the result that their willingness to sacrifice their lives fell off dramatically. Still worse, perhaps, frightened, harassed and frustrated, the troops became increasingly undisciplined and engaged in acts of revenge or casual brutality. The guerillas also effected a kind of psychological warfare in which the French had to be constantly on the alert, while the Allied armies could rest securely in the midst of a vigilant peasantry. The guerilla war was a long and demoralizing nightmare for France."
The crème of French army like Guard and Cuirassiers spent is Spain about 8 weeks only. Whatever Wellington faced in Spain were a second tier worst quality French troops. Artillery pieces deployed in Spain were also aging Grobevile system pieces with all new guns being deployed in the main Theatre. Finally the precious howitzers were priority for the Grande army, accordingly French Spanish army hardly ever had a sufficient number of howitzers to negate Wellington's tactic's of hiding his units behind ridge. Needless to say that somewhere in the plains of Europe British army spoiled by greenhouse like conditions of Peninsular War did not stand a chance against a Grandee army with its best troops and concentrated aggressive artillery fire tactics and personally commanded by Napoleon.
5. Napoleon's absence
I guess not much to be said here. Presence of this man meant the difference between a crushing defeat or total victory. This man transformed the warfare and the whole period in history was named after him. Wherever he appeared his charisma and military genius made French army to perform heroically in mass often defeating their enemy despite being outnumbered. However, whenever he was absent the magic spells were absent too leaving the way to Marshalls' / General's indecision and slackness.
"It was no use for the French soldiers to shout "Vive le Emperor" at the battle of Bar-sur-Aube to cheat the Russians. From the start of the battle and by French manoeuvres it was clear that Napoleon was not present" (Ahnri Usse).
He briefly visited Spain only once and the immediate result for the British army was:
"The people of Portsmouth looked on in horror at the spectacle that was emerging from the harbour. The British expeditionary force had returned home, but there was no grand parade through the streets, no pomp or colour, no tale of victory. What appeared seemed rather to be the mere wreckage of an army." (Esdaile – "The Peninsular War" p 140)
6. French Unity of Command and Quality of French Commanders in Spain.
"Whenever Napoleon was absent there was a disaster" (Rothernberg).
Glory grabbing and basic feeling of envy was a common attribute among French marshals and generals. Occasionally, of course provided Napoleon was not around they were "fighting" against each other rather than against the enemy. Majority of them were young energetic men who had an extremely successful career and most of them were extremely selfish and self-confident men considering themselves the centre of Universe. Not surprisingly in the atmosphere of constant wars and living in empire ruled by an Emperor being ex-artillery officer each of them had to fight for his prestige preferably overshadowing others.
In Spain where Napoleon was absent, there were almost always two, three or more marshals around and each of them was convinced that he was the second in charge man after Napoleon and accordingly none of them wanted to take orders from each other even if there was a direct order from Napoleon. Not surprisingly this led to a very grim outcome in Spain. None of the marshals obeyed orders from king Joseph who was their formal commander. Each of them operated in their region and ignored the interest of his neighbours who were obviously paying back with the same attitude. As a result there were numerous lost opportunity to defeat the British decisively.
In January 1811 Soult offered very little assistance to Massena undermining his opportunity of victory in Spain. Augerau being the commander in Catalonia pulled time to help Souchet, Bessier being the Commander of the Northern army came with a handful of troops to assist Massena in a major battle of Fuentes de Oñoro against Wellington and than refused even to commit them in a decisive moment. As a result Wellington being in a desperate situation due to strategic error retreated almost unharmed.
The "cold war" led by French marshals against each other was not a secret for the French army. After the battle of Talavera, on of the French officers wrote: "it is highly suspicious that Jourdan intentionally delayed his march to assist Soult to deny him from getting to much glory…. As far as I am concerned whenever the Emperor is absent there is a chaos and confusion in a senior command and if the Emperor will not do something about his marshals this will not end happily"
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"Enjoying many advantages over the French, Wellington achieved a record of victory perhaps unmatched in the history of the British army……By these battles he [Wellington] inflicted a total loss of some 45,000 men only – counting killed, wounded and prisoners – on the French during the 5 years' campaign… According to British authors, it was Wellington's army, and not the Spaniards, was the primary cause of victory in Spain." (Hart – "Strategy" 1991, pp 110-111)
Could the Spaniards harm the French in a same way without British money and Wellington's British-Portuguese army ? To high degree probably yes. One has only to look at the example of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to realize that armies – with facilities and innovations beyond anything that Napoleon could ever have dreamt of – were strained by the type of warfare that he encountered in the Peninsula.
The tactical and strategic challenges Wellington faced are absolutely nothing to challenges faced by Napoleon through his career. Or for that matter challenges faced by Russian, Prussian, Austrian generals in 1797-1813.
As already noted Wellington had a luxury, unlike French Marshalls, to fight whenever he wanted and whenever he had a clear tactical numerical advantage.
In the major battles in Spain Wellington outnumbered the French:
- at Talavera Wellington had 55.000 vs 46.000 French.
- at Salamanca Wellington had 52.000 vs 49.500 French.
- at Vittoria "Wellington's 105,000 British, Portuguese and Spanish troops, with 96 guns, defeated 60,000 French with 138 guns
But yet every time he failed to fully utilise his advantage and every time French army was able to recover. Wellington had his chance for decisive victory in Campaign in 1813 and 1814 but unfortunately for the Coalition to no avail.
No doubt he was a able strategist and tactician but he stands nothing near Napoleon as strategic challenges Wellingotn faced were nothing near what Napoleon, Davout, Benningsen, Kutuzov, Barclay, Charles experienced in their military careers. Wellington's Peninsilar war is a mere child's play beside epic clashes and strategic dilemmas of Polish 1807, Austrian 1809, Russian 1812 and German 1813 campaigns.
Fighting Grande Army with Napoleon in charge is a different affair to fighting an isolated, undersupplied, lacking intelligence, demoralised and exhausted by Spanish guerrillas French corps without centralised command, while themselves being in Greenhouse like conditions supported by guerrillas, provided by intelligence and excellent supply system. These are two different wars.
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It was only once when Wellington was put to the real test in 1815.
Wellington was 'running scared' of Napoleon, and that's why may not wanted to face him alone and without Blucher at Waterloo. In that battle he ran about like a wet hen from battalion to battalion praying for the Prussians to come as early as possible. "I observed that in talking about Waterloo he invariably mentioned it with some expression of horror … holding up his arms above his head and shaking his hands. "- Thomas Sydenham
"Wellington was extremely unwilling to stand on his own against Napoleon. One could almost venture to say that the Duke was running scared of Napoleon – - and thats why he not wanted to face him alone at Waterloo".
"The psychological factor was that Wellington and Blucher were only mediocre strategists. Wellington was skilful in tactical defence but not much good at manoeuvres – slow to get going, prudent, over-cautious, egotistical; Blucher, the fiery hussar with "Forward !" on his lips, was a firm believer in attacking with the utmost force … " (- Lachouque, p 59)
At the start of the 1815 camping Wellington showed incompetency which is natural when facing Napoleon. Wellington dismissed Napoleon's ability to attack at Charleroi as – "We are too strong to be attacked here." The next day Napoleon stormed Charleroi with his classic manoeuvre of trying to separate two allied armies.
They [Allies] had been put in possession of the fact that considerable masses of French troops had moved by their right, and assembled in front of Charleroi. Still, this baring of the frontier beyond Tournai , Mons , and Binche , of the troops which had previously occupied that line , and t h e i r concentration in front of Charleroi , might be designed to mask the real line of operation, to draw the Anglo-Allied troops towards Charleroi , upon which a feigned attack would be made , while the real attack was intended to be by Mons. Hence no alteration was made by the
Duke in the disposition of his forces; but [Blucher] immediately ordered the concentration of his own troops at a point where they would be at hand in case Charleroi should be the real line of attack … " (Siborne – "The Waterloo Campaign, 1815")
In other words Wellington was totally out of touch of reality having significant numbers of troops on his right flank and not expecting the attack at Charleroi. This behaviour reminds Austrian General Mack was in 1805 was similarly out of reality expecting Napoleon to appear from the West and having the bulk of his forces at Ulm where Napoleon did not plan to strike. Unfortunately for General Mack he had not 100,000 Prussian army to help him.
On top of that due general slowness usual for the British army and poor staff organisation which was a direct Wellington's fault Wellington failed to concentrate at the start of the Campaign.
Later his forces failed to join Prussians at Ligny Wellingtons' error led to Prussian defeat at Ligny and to the dangerous separation of Allied armies. Blucher and Napoleon had their armies in hand, Wellington didn't. But it was Napoleon and Blucher who bled on that day, not Wellington. Wellington also lied to Blucher to cover his mistake and let down his allies – he promised to provide rapid and substantial aid to Blucher at a crucial point in the battle at Ligny, although he knew he could not do so. Later he claimed that it was "old fool" Blucher who was to be blamed for Ligny defeat.
Furthermore, when realising his mistake at Quatre-Bras he also failed to order his entire army to Quatre Bras on 16 June, although he was later to claim that he did do so. However, the orders issued and received do not correspond with that claim. There was tremendous chaos and traffic jam on the highway north of Quatre Bras where British divisions were trying to approach Prince Orange's position.
Likely for the Allied armies Prince Orange ignored previous incompetent order form Wellington to withdraw from Quatre-Bras. He ignored Wellington's order and held the position thus preserving the chance for Allied armies to unite in the future.
"The Nassau and Netherlands troops had fought a combat with some French the previous evening. They had done so on their own initiative, choosing not to carry out Wellington's orders to move their entire force on Nivelles. Thanks to Constant Rebeque and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, the French had just about been thwarted in their attempt to drive the two Allied armies in Belgium apart"
[ amazing to see how prince Orange is portrayed in popular British film:
"In June of 1815 Richard Sharpe is assigned to the Prince of Orange's staff…. Not only must Sharpe deal with incompetent orders from the Prince of Orange, that lead to slaughter…" not surprisingly Prince Orange is blamed with tactical failures at Qautre-Bras while Wellington is credited with saving the strategic situation" ]
"There was chaos at the various choke-points on the line of march.Constant Rebeque found state of confusion on the road to Quatre Bras, as von Alten's (British-German) and Chasse's (Netherland) divisions had arrived at the same time. The noise of battle could be heard by many troops on the road. The road to Nivelles was blocked by the baggage of the British 3rd Division. Nobody seemed to be in charge of traffic control. The chaos was such that much of Wellington's force would not arrive until the late evening, when the battle was over."
This was a direct outcome of British overreliance on supplies – the overall strategic ineffectiveness of the British army in this case transformed into inability to concentrate to defeat outnumbered Ney. The numerous wagons accompanying British divisions delayed them significantly.
When finally Foot guards arrived at Qautre-Bras they were so poorly led into the battle and were deployed at the place where they were immediately attacked and routed by French cavalry. Despite having the numerical advantage at Quatre Bras Wellington suffered heavier casualties and mind you Ney was not Napoleon and not even Davout. Of course Wellington claimed it as a British victory .
"Even thirteen-thumbed Michel Ney , outnumbered and quite possibly under the handicap of a thudding hangover, fought Wellington to a draw there . " (- John Elting )
"Wellington reported Quatre Bras as an English victory, won over superior forces [actually the Duke enjoyed 2 to 1 advantage], and so it has remained in British history. As for the hangover, belgian legend has it that Ney and his staff had billeted themselves on a Belgian dignitary who was famous for his wine cellar, which they thoroughly reconnoitered." (Elting – "Swords Around a Throne" p 732")
"At Quatre Bras Marshal Ney lost 4,140 men. The French captured British color. Ney also successfully stopped any of Wellington's forces going to the aid of Blьcher's Prussians. Wellington losses were approx. 4,800 killed and wounded. The next day Wellington's forces left the battlefield to the French and fell back." ("Victory" huh?)
As for the Waterloo itself – the only reason Wellington decided to give battle is because he knew that Prussians are coming, while Napoleon was let down by Grouchy and was not having the same information Wellington had.
The battle was conducted in a such unfavourable conditions for the French being outnumbered by 1.5 to 1 and being attacked to the rear and flank so it cannot be seriously looked at as a proof of Wellington's victory over Napoleon.
Wellington, in his first battle against the main French army with Napoleon in charge after losses of less than 20% was considering it to be a near run thing. And this all considering:
- Despite that Wellington was outnumbering Napoleon who had to send around 15,000 French to hold Prussians.
- Despite that Wellington had extremely strong defensive position – the ridge and chateau, stone farms on the main axes of French advance.
- Despite that Napoleon could not utilise his artillery effectively due to mud and ridge
- Despite the fact Napoleon had not chance but to attack frontally due to weather and time constraints he could not conduct his classic envelopment manoeuvre.
- Despite the horrendous tactical errors conducted by Ney.
[Compare this to Russian army performance and Borodino or Austrian army at Wagram, where they had to hold positions for 12 hours + under concentrated artillery fire of hundreds of guns, with no place to hide and with no Prussian coming to help them in 5 hours.]
It is possibly more relevant to say that it were Prussians under Blucher and his chief of staff who won Waterloo– it was them who took the initiative, recovered after the defeat, conducted 24 hour forced march, with minor rearguard actions, lost Grouchy and overall performed an astonishing manoeuvre to save Wellington from total destruction.
To cover his fundamental errors in Waterloo campaign Wellington literally rewritten history in his Waterloo dispatches which once investigated appeared to be a mixture of lies and inconsistencies. National pride and political reasons made British government to accept Waterloo dispatches as official version of history
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British soldiers Wellington commanded were also had their "issues". The strong defensive position and ability to dictate when and where the battle will take place allowed British lines to defeat French columns however as per Napoleon himself «Columns don't break through lines unless with superior artillery."
Unfortunately for the French in Spain they never had sufficient number of Howitzers and they were poor quality as Napoleon left in Spain old- aging pieces. To make things worst French had a constant problem with limited ammo because of the mountain terrains, Spanish guerrillas, and long distances separating French forces from their depots.
Poor quality 2nd tier French troops in Spain contributed to the problem. Finally, Wellington had a luxury to decide where and when the battle would take place and Wellington was not burdened with protecting vital strategic points like Russian army in 1807, 1812, 1813 or Austrian in 1809. He accepted the battle only if he had a tactical advantage. I am afraid on the plains of Wagram or Borodino thin red line would be torn apart by the Grand army columns under Napoleon himself with concentrated artillery and mass charges of heavy cavalry. But as we know British army was no prepared to fight this kind of war – it is far more safer to skirmish with some French in Spain rather than trying to take on Napoleon with his main army. Certainly makes sense. Let others do the job.
On top of that Camping's in Europe were often conducted at extreme speeds and often at extreme weather conditions (1806, 1807, 1812, 1813) . As a result of Napoleonic style maneuverers, logistical support often failed and armies had to operate with being grossly undersupplied.
Both French and Russian armies fought 1807 Winter Campaign, 1812 Summer and Winter Campaigns under extreme weather conditions, with constant forced marches, heavy combat casualties and failed supply systems. There were cases when Russian soldiers were without food for 7 days, had nothing to eat but a piece of a hide, steeped in water that they might be enabled to chew it when softened. But then they remained under arms and then on the field of battle for 18 hours.
Whenever British army faced similar conditions desertion went totally out of control. British soldiers did not want to endure month and month of forced marches with extremely high combat casualties and to be left with no food for days. They had to be kept happy other wise they just turned around and went wherever to look for better life (Corruna retreat and Talavera).
"The British, seem to have been peculiarly inept at surviving without plenty of supplies. Even in times of minor food shortages, indiscipline erupted on a vast scale. The British divisions went to pieces in the lean days after Talavera for example – and as late as the Waterloo campaign of 1815, we find Wellington commenting to his amazed Prussian friends that 'I cannot separate from my tents and supplies. My troops must be well kept and well supplied in camp …" (- Gates).
My point is that British army was not in position to sustain such war as they would be not in position to get to the battlefield in the first place or they would not be able to sustain the constrains of truly Napoleonic Camping.
"These infantry… and their appointment appeared as if they had not moved futher than from barracks to the parade during that time. The horses and men of the cavalry bore the same freshness of appearance. …. If English battalion ad marched a tenth part of the way they would have been crippled for weeks…" (Sir Wilson about Russian reserve battalions in 1813).
Interesting view on the differences in quality of Wellington's troops presents Italian historian Mr. Barbero:
"Nevertheless, there were still some identifiable differences in quality between the armies in the field that had little to do with national character. Such an assertion would have surprised the combatants' contemporaries, who put great faith in cliches about the racial qualities of various peoples; indeed, many generalizations of this kind were considered to have indisputable scientific value.
In fact, however, the compartment of troops on the battlefield at Waterloo was substantially the same whatever their nationality. Even in Wellington's composite, heterogeneous army, the gap between British troops and "foreign" troops – a gap that British officers and soldiers, with their ingrained chauvinism, considered unbridgeable – did not prove signifcant under fire …
So heterogeneous an army certainly had its disadvantages from an organizational point of view, but on a tactical level, contary to what some historians have maintained, the fighting quality of battalions and squadrons in Wellington's army was substantially the same irrespective of their nationality". (Barbero – "The Battle" pp 19-20)
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What Wellington can be surely credited for:
1. ability to understand of larger geopolitical picture and the role of British army in this big game. That is: let Austrians, Prussians and Russians fight Napoleon and his Grande Armee and British can "win" the war with no fighting at all.
2. ability to understand the strategic picture and the role of British army in Peninsular war. That is: time is his ally. Every single day French occupational army lost their combat worthiness due to partisan warfare. In that sense Wellington was deciding to give battle ONLY if he had a tactical advantage, something that French could not afford.
3. ability to adopt to the Spanish theatre on a tactical level – use of ridges to minimize his casualties something that British army having recruitment practice was very sensitive to. The backside of it was far less decisive battles than on the main theatre in Europe in terms of casualties, morale impact, and camping progress. But this favored more Wellington than the French because of points 1). and 2). above.
Accordingly, Wellington cared more for the safety of his troops rather than damaging the French – which is perfectly understandable considering that his army was recruited and supplied by 18th century standards and was not a match for mobile Grande armee operating in the main theatre.
Wellington's achievement are more than modest considering all the advantages he enjoyed over French, all problems French faced in Spain, Napoleon's and best French troops absence. Despite all that, Wellington's progress was terribly slow and as per French general Foy on a number of occasions "only the slowness of Wellington saved French armies from the destruction".
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"a truly great general is the one that plans and maneuvers in such a way that he put his army in the best possible position, gaining every single advantage he can before even battle is joined….. To me a brilliant general is the one that has his enemies defeated even before the first shot is fired. And the truly brilliant is the one who defeats his enemies without firing any shot!"
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Interesting to see how the Russian strategy in 1812 is considered to be "luck" and the "the act of God (weather)" while Wellington's retreats in Peninsular (e.g. Torres Vedros) are "brilliantly calculated strategy".
paints his first three ships from the starter set.
