"Austrian Elite Units 1809 Campaign?" Topic

Edwulf

I doubt youd realise you were fighting the guard most of the time until you were in a position to stop and examine uniforms in a quiet moment.

Actually, that is not entirely true. I remember reading in one book on 1813 (can't remember which one) which discussed one of the major battles where the allies were pushing the French back. Napoleon sent in the Guard and the allies broke off the attack once they realised who they were facing.

The history of this period has many incidents where the French old guard caused the enemy to panic and retreat. I would not go over board with this statement but it does have some fact behind it. For instance, 1815 Waterloo, two French OG btlns pushed out 14 btlns of Prussians virtually without a fight from Plancenoit if you remember.

It's not the allied soldiers so much that might understand who they are fighting but their "officers" who might. They are the ones with telescopes and can see clearly who it is advancing at them. Given enough time this leads to a fear that can cause commanders higher up the food chain to weight up the risk of facing them and order a retreat. This happened more than once and is worthy of consideration on a wargames table top.

The history of this period has many incidents where the French old guard caused the enemy to panic and retreat.

Please share!

I would not go over board with this statement but it does have some fact behind it. For instance, 1815 Waterloo, two French OG btlns pushed out 14 btlns of Prussians virtually without a fight from Plancenoit if you remember.

I do remember. It is an open question how much of this was due to the fact that the Prussians had been heavily engaged beforehand with the Young Guard Division and how much to the innate scariness of the Old Guard. Similarly, if there are other examples, we must be careful to see that it was the 'Old Guard' having that effect, not merely 'a large uncommitted reserve'.

Regards

they did seem to have a big influence on the French army and other armies, possibly out of all proportion to their ACTUAL abilities, this doesn't seem to have been the case with other nations guard units, propaganda maybe had a lot to do with this, but it seems to have worked.

I think we'd all have to really look at this and check our primary sources. Not an easy thing to prove either way, I reckon.

Regards

what useless propaganda stories about the Old Guard – I wonder why they were routed by Hannoverian Landwehr battalions?

Usually the Old Guard infantry – in a lot of battles stood in reserve – watching, way in the rear, so no need to panic for the poor opponents.

When for once they were called to decide the day, they failed.

I cannot see what influence they should have on other armies – other than the French.

The Guard were good but the rest of the French army was also generally good, and was one of the factors that enabled them to beat the Austrians so often. The mere fact they were there probably acted as morale factor for the French troops and their allies, not that they really needed it against the Austrians and Prussians. But unfortunately, it didn't work against the British.

I was reading Gill's second volume of the 1809 campaign last night, and in particular about the second day of Aspern-Essling.

Late in the day, Napoleon needed a quick localized counterattack to give Lannes in particular an opportunity to break off and withdraw. He had five battalions of middle and young guard available. He sent forward Mouton with three Tirailleur battalions. Their attack was halted by Austrian resistance, so Napoleon sent Rapp in with the remaining Fusilier battalions. Rapp arrived and saw things weren't going so well for Mouton. For Rapp there was only one option – attack. The five battalions launched themselves into the enemy, who wavered and broke before the onslaught.

As Clausewitz would say, this was the decisive moment, and it tends to be where the elite troops excel. Their esprit de corps combined with the determination of their senior officers, regimental officers and NCO's will, in most cases, lead them to victory. In this case the French had a greater sense of their own superiority and were able to seize the decision with the threat of the bayonet.

But any force, whether guard, elite, line or conscripts, when adequately worn down by incessant combat, the destructive element of battle, and then aggressively threatened by an apparent superior, or simply more confident, opponent will break. That was certainly the fate of the middle guard at Waterloo when counterattacked by Chasse's Dutch-Belgians.

But if one side has given their all in a firefight, and yet the enemy were still coming at them, it was probably time to look for a safer location…….. And if wearing a bearskin made you feel bigger, and better than your enemy, or being a member of an elite unit that had a serious track record, then sometimes that was all it took to impose your will on the decisive events of the day.

npm

You clearly have no idea of the experience and eliteness of the collectiveness of these men and their units have you?

7 years in the Catering Corps Reserve does not a warrior make…

what useless propaganda stories about the Old Guard – I wonder why they were routed by Hannoverian Landwehr battalions?
Usually the Old Guard infantry – in a lot of battles stood in reserve – watching, way in the rear, so no need to panic for the poor opponents.
When for once they were called to decide the day, they failed.
I cannot see what influence they should have on other armies – other than the French.

Sometimes you show even less actual knowledge of combat than Hollins. You conveniently forget the selection of circumstances and support that the landwehr had at the time. Would you like me to list them?

Old Bear

Well said. Perhaps some people have not heard or have deliberately chosen to ignore their courageous action at Aspern-Essling, and didn't TWO battalions of Guard infantry rout FOURTEEN battalions of Prussians at Plancenoit in 1815? That sounds like two very good reasons for considering the Guard as elite, for a start, no matter which side you may favour?

It is a joke that 2 battalionso of the Old Gaurd routed 14 Prussian battalions at Plancenoit – I wonder why the 7 battalions failed then to rout 49 battalions in the center then?

It is no doubt – that the Old Guard was elite, but human as well.

Dear von Winterfeldt

Yes, they were human, as all soldiers were, of course, whatever nation they were from, and of course they were not immortal, except perhaps in memory, since their exploits will always be there and live on. Love them or hate them, the units of Napoleon's Imperial Guard are however, one of the many reasons we love the period.

As for the 2 battalions of Guard routing 14 Prussian battalions. I have only a basic knowledge of the hundred days campaign (one of the reasons I bought Mike Robinson's 1815 title and others recently) but I was quoting from Waterloo 1815 (Osprey Campaign No 15 by Geoffrey Wootten), page 58, in which it states that a Young Guard Division took Plancenoit from the Prussians and then the Prussians took it back. The situation looked bad until Napoleon sent TWO battalions of the Old Guard to attack the Prussians. They stormed through Plancenoit and flung (authors words) a full FOURTEEN battalions of Prussians back from the immediate area. Are you saying that the author is incorrect?

TWO battalions SUPPORTED by the troops already there counterattacked and threw out the DISORDERED and DEPLETED Prussians, HOWEVER MANY of them were IN the village AT THE TIME, and I SERIOUSLY DOUBT it was a whole FOURTEEN battalions.

@Gazzola

Yes, the author paints a too simple picture

"Two of their battalions (Old Guard, v.W.) along with the Young Guard and the remaining troops in the village took control of it again, forcing our men to withdraw."

Peter Horschröer : 1815 The Waterloo Campaign The German Victory

'Within twenty minutes, the village was in French hands, and no less than fourteen battalions of Prussians were in hasty retreat before the disciplined fury of a bayonet charge by two battalions of the Old Guard.' (p1086-The Campaigns of Napoleon by David Chandler)

'Just as Pelet was starting to despair of being able to maintain his position and rally the voltigeurs and tirailleurs, the 1/2 Grenadiers a Pied arrived. Their rush forward with the bayonet (and Drum-Major Stubert clubbing his opponents with the mace) tipped the scale in favour of the French.' (p387-The Waterloo Companion by Mark Adkin)

Of course there were other troops fighting in the area, on both sides, but the charge of the two battalions of the Old Guard did force the Prussians to retreat, albeit only for an hour, as far as I am aware. Would the charge of two line regiments with the bayonet instead of the Guard have had the same effect, I'm not so sure. The Guard were an Elite unit. It is pretty clear to anyone, except perhaps those who don't want to hear of anything positive for the French. And perhaps Drum-Major Stubert could be classed as an 'elite' bandsman?

"Two of their battalions (Old Guard, v.W.) along with the Young Guard and the remaining troops in the village took control of it again, forcing our men to withdraw."

Peter Horschröer : 1815 The Waterloo Campaign The German Victory

"Indeed – quotes do not prove anything"

Do you remember who said that, VW? That would be your pocket companion, Hollins. Of course Hofschroer is the very paragon of equanimity and tolerance, so we can safely assume that anything he says is top notch while you slap Geoffrey Wootten's rep around.

Yeah Roy.

von Winterfedlt

Thanks for mentioning Peter Hofschroer's book. I forgot I had them. It is very interesting what he says on page 120, in 'The German Victory' volume .

'Napoleon moved most of the Old Guard infantry from their positions between Rossomme and Belle Alliance off to his right to face the Prussians. Two veteran battalions went forward against the village itself. Without firing a shot , and even though they were greatly outnumbered, they threw the Prussians back in disorder. With this example the Young Guard rallied from their defeat and they and Lobau's men also pushed forwards.'

It suggests that the Young Guard and Line infantry had been unable to hold back the Prussians until the arrival of the two battalions of the Old Guard. In my opinion, this certainly confirms that the Old Guard were an elite unit.

It is certainly a very interesting and suggestive passage. What key things might we draw from this?

1. The Landwehr defeated a force of Young Guard and Line Infantry. We should be sceptical about creating too great an increment in skill between the French units and their Prussian opponents.

2. After a long combat, the French were defeated. Presumably, because the combat had been long, the Prussians had lost a lot of their cohesion.

3. The two Old Guard battalions threw the Prussians back in disorder without firing a shot . Whatever the incident may prove, it cannot prove superior 'firing' or 'melee' skills for the Old Guard. The key point is that the two fresh battalions were not afraid of the numerical odds against them.

4. The Prussians, disordered and faced by advancing fresh troops, retreated. Once the Old Guard battalions had advanced, the 'incident' was over. Was the key to the incident that the Old Guard had advanced, or that fresh troops had advanced? Would, for example, two battalions of Austrian Grenadiers have served just as well?

It is answers to all of this that will determine how one rates the various units. My initial feeling is that any two fresh, confident, well-led battalions may well have achieved the same result.

Regards

@Gazzola

You don't have to convince me that the Old Guard was elite. but as you say – they did it not alone, when left on their own – they could not perform wonders as seen a bit later in front of Wellington.

Otherwise I agree with Whirlwind.

Dear von Winterfeldt

I'm not sure I agree with you there. The two battalions attacked alone and flung out the Prussians. I don't think they were supported until they had achieved this, because it seems that their action inspired both the Young Guard and French Line infantry to get stuck back in. And surely, in most battles, other units will generally be in the vicinity anyway, on both sides. But it was the courageous action of the two Old Guard battalions alone, without firing a shot, as PH states in his book, that made the difference at that particular time and in that particular battle. And I'm sure you'll find the Guard did well in other battles, although, as with any regiment from any army, I wouldn't expect them always to do well alone or unsupported. But I'm glad you agree they are an elite regiment. With that cleared, I think we should get back to the topic thread, as I also think there are some Austrian regiments that might be considered as elite. For a start, during my research I did read about one (or maybe two) units that held out against the odds when surrounded by the French during a battle, and they were only evicted from some buildings after the battle was over when they had no choice but to surrender. The French had made many attempts but failed to force them out. I'll have to try and search it out.

This is turning out to be a better thread than expected.

My opinion only

The Young Guard was a body of better-than-average recruits who were like grenadier divisions – intended to be used in battle on a regular basis.

Old Guard was a different animal, and had many impacts. One of these was army morale. The presence of the OG on the battlefield gave the army a confidence it did not otherwise enjoy, and the mythology was part of that power. That's why they were so carefully preserved. In order to exercise this power, they had to remain in tact.

The same was bound to reverse for the enemy, as long as they could see and identify the OG units – one reason why the bearskin was retained.

I don't know the details of how two OG battalions scared off many Prussian battalions at Plancenoit, but at close up I'm sure they were quite scary. Tactically, they should be expected to endure high casualties in the performance of their duties. I suppose that defines "eliteness" in a certain sense.

They were frequently engaged in 1813-14. I guess a critic would argue that the battle attrition should count against them, as replacements were bound to be inferior. And in periods when they were not as active, their lack of combat should count against them.

A note on primary sources – they are all individually suspect, and biased. It is only by comparing many such accounts of the same event that we can try to deduce what actually occurred in any given encounter. How many primary British sources claim encounters with the "red" lancers at Quatre Bras, when we all know that they were not engaged?

I find it almost impossible to judge unit quality from battlefield accounts, especially combat outcomes between opposing units. So often other factors (tactical situation, disorder, fatigue, momentum) were more important. Plus most battlefield accounts are propaganda designed to show somebody in a good light (another Waterloo example: the tale of a few companies of British Guards holding off an entire French corps at Hougoumont). It's not so much that they are lies, as they leave leave vital details out (usually the involvement of other friendly units, especially allied ones).

Instead I prefer to go back to fundamentals: training, selection and experience. Also high status units might be able to induce a greater fear of disgracing the regiment in their men – though we should be careful here; every regiment thinks it is the best regiment in the world – it's the officers' job to make them think so (one of the reasons there is so much biased propaganda..)

The French Guard scored because they were highly selective of their recruits (both veterans and conscripts). The were high status units who were paid a lot more than line units and were given an assortment of other privileges – that would enhance the "fear of disgrace" factor. Very often also they seem to have had plenty of opportunity to practice and perfect drill. The senior regiments seem to have been very fluid in actions. (At Waterloo advancing in square, for example). Plenty of reason to given them extra oomph in combat ratings.

The Austrians are another matter. They often seem to have quite low cadre ratios compared to the French – officers were spread more thinly (There are exceptions – I think in 1800 at Marengo, a year or so's attrition had raised the officer ratio back up). This is a downside. The fact that they did not go in for creaming off the best recruits is probably an up (apart from the 10% taken away into grenadier units). Prestige regiments like IR4 could probably have some say in the selecting their recruits (officers and men) so may have been able to raise the quality. I think they had one burst of glory in 1809 in the retreat to Landshut, though as ever it is difficult to tell from the accounts. They suffered badly and were never the same.

Austrian grenadiers have the benefit of selection; they are top 10%ers. Equivalent to French grenadiers before 1808 when serious dilution of French elites set in….and Young Guard or maybe Middle Guard thereafter.

Matthew

One thing nobody has mentioned is that Guard units are expensive. They are typically paid more, and have fancier uniforms and equipment. They also have a political role.

I think it was quite courageous of the Austrians to ignore the fashion for guard units – as they were often poor value for money, and could simply undermine the morale of the line. I think a lot of Austrian decisions can be understood in terms of making limited resources go as far as possible. They seem happy to trade quantity for quality – low officer ratios is another example. But they could produce impressive numbers of troops given their economic circumstances.

Dear Widowson

Good posting. I think the Guard, both young and Old, performed very well at Dresden 1813 and Montmirail 1814. Considering the disasters of 1812 and Leipzig 1813, the Guard are well worth the elite status, in my opinion.

I think the Austrian unit I was thinking about, which could be considered as elite, again, in my opinion, was the Regiment Strassaldo Infantry No 27. During the whole of the Battle of Raab, 1809, where Eugene defeated Archduke Johann, two companies of the regiment defending a farm, held out against all French attacks during the whole of the battle. However, some sources do suggest they were aided by elements of the 2nd Grenz Regiment. But still a good achievement and many others units may have simply surrendered earlier or made a run for it.

Old Guard was a different animal, and had many impacts. One of these was army morale. The presence of the OG on the battlefield gave the army a confidence it did not otherwise enjoy, and the mythology was part of that power. That's why they were so carefully preserved. In order to exercise this power, they had to remain intact.

The same was bound to reverse for the enemy, as long as they could see and identify the OG units – one reason why the bearskin was retained.

I'm not sure I can be certain of this. Perhaps I can show this by a series of questions. To take the 'enemies' first:

Did the presence of the Old Guard at Waterloo lower the morale of the Allied Army as compared to Quatre Bras?

Did the absence of the Old Guard increase Austrian spirits at, say, Eckmuhl or Raab, while its presence decreased it at Aspern?

To take the French side:

Was the morale of the French Army at Jena appreciably higher than that of Davout's Corps at Auerstadt?

Was the morale of the French units in the Army of Italy in 1809 lower than their compatriots in the Army of Germany because of the absence of the Guard?

I can think of no clear-cut example of an Old Guard 'fear factor' in operation.

Regards

Austrian grenadiers have the benefit of selection; they are top 10%ers. Equivalent to French grenadiers before 1808 when serious dilution of French elites set in….and Young Guard or maybe Middle Guard thereafter.

Very generous to the French I'd say. If the Old and Middle Guard is creaming off the best 'Grenadier' material, then I'd rate the Austrians as better than French Line Elites, especially as the French had a higher proportion of 'elites' anyway. Similarly, if the Young Guard is creaming off the best recruits, then the French Line and Light regiments should be downrated.

And I reckon the serious dilution of French 'elites' comes later, after 1812. The Young Guard especially should not be considered elite at all, perhaps a little better than its brother regiments in the line at most. French units transferred to NW Europe and Germany should be better than the Allies they face, but French units remaining in Spain should be down-rated as they lose men for unit re-building.

Austrian Grenadiers should be rated highly, if not the highest, pretty consistently throughout the period.

Regards

Dear Whirlwind

I've found when researching battles and campaigns, from 1796 to 1812, that 'clear-cut' anything is really hard to come by. However, two battalions of Old Guard, charging with the bayonet, and forcing 14 battalions of Prussians to retreat, comes very close. Of course, they may have only forced a smaller amount of Prussian battalions to retreat, which may then of started a chain reaction, so that all of the Prussians ended up retreating. And I'm not saying it was definitely a 'fear factor' concerning the Guard, but it may well have been, although, as already suggested, a 'fear factor' of fresh troops can not be instantly dismissed. But it seems to me, that the 'myth' of the Guard, as some people prefer to see it, certainly had an effect and who wouldn't want that type of 'myth' on their side.

As to the OPs question, I can only answer it in terms to the rules I use most often, Polemos and HFG. This would only refer to 1809.

Polemos:
Austrian Grenadiers – Veteran
(for comparison: French Old Guard – Veteran/Elite; French Converged Grenadiers – Veteran; French Young Guard – Raw or Trained/Elite)

In these rules, 'Elite' is an add-on, rather than a rating. It basically gives a small bonus to a unit when attacking. So a Trained/Elite unit will have modifiers +1att/0def; a Veteran unit wil have +2att/+2def. I over simplify, but you get the idea.

I'm not sure where Austria would have other 'Veteran' units from. If getting really detailed, I'd give it to units that had performed well in 1805 but hadn't suffered heavy casualties, or suffered from extensive re-organiztion in the intervening periods. If some regiments were genuinely popular enough to be realy choosy about recruits, I'd give them 'Trained/Elite' – I'm a bit dubious of this however.

HFG:
All of them 'Elite'

Regards

During the 1813 campaign, the French Marine Artillery battalions gained an enduring reputation, and it was noted that coalition forces gave them respect because they were often times confused for Guard units, primarily because they wore dark blue overcoats which had been exclusive to Old Guard infantry units. That would suggest some sort of 'fear factor' associated with the Old Guard – to my knowledge neither the Middle nor Young Guard wore dark blue greatcoats at this time.

npm

Gazzola,

I've no argument with your post – perhaps just a slight difference of emphasis between us? And naturally you'll see from my earlier posts I have no problem with defining the Old Guard as elite – the same as vW. The difficult question is which other, if any, units in the same or other armies could have performed the same task with the same effectiveness and if we think the Austrian 'elites', their Grenadiers, could not have performed a similar feat.

Regards

npm,

That is very interesting – can you share a source for that?

Regards

Whirlwind,
Let me see what I can do for you over the weekend – probably picked it up from an albeit secondary source, such as Bowden, or Nafziger, but hopefully they will offer a primary in a footnote. I am sure I came across this in reference to the battle of Mockern, 1813, where Marmont's VI Corps were heavily engaged, and of which the Marine Artillery regiments were a constituent part.

npm

Opponents of the French troops were continually reporting Guard units, when all they saw were marines or grenadiers (or maybe not even them!). We also see a tendency of French witnesses to report Hungarian grenadiers in battles where they didn't take part. If certain troops have a mystique, people will often report them when they weren't there.

Now try creating a wargames rule for that!

Matthew

Dear Whirlwind

That's a good point and a very good question and I'm not trying to challenge anyone's viewpoint. We all have our own opinions and it is nice to hear and discuss them, even if you don't necessarily agree with some of them. Even so, I'm enjoying the debate. However, in terms of fear-factors, I do feel that a 'fear-factor' did exist, to a certain degree, when it came to the Old Guard. Perhaps the same sort of 'fear-factor' that persuaded the Allies not to risk taking on Napoleon himself, but to tackle other French commanders instead, during the later campaigns. As for other nations, I think the Russian Guard (infantry and cavalry) may have had a fairly good 'fear-factor' going for them. But I suppose it is up to the individual wargamer who they want to consider as elite, from whatever nation, based on whatever research they undertake concerning that unit. But I imagine that might cause a lot of arguments when they are brought to the table.

Dear Ligniere

Nice posting. That bit about the Marines rang a bell for me, as well and I think Line regiments were sometimes mistaken as Guard units. And in your posting you mentioned a unit being given respect, which made me wonder if definite Elite units like the French Old Guard, could be given a 'fear-factor', while other regiments, which wargamers might want to consider as being elite or close to elite, could be given a 'respect-factor'. That could go for any unit of any nation, which wargamers could consider as worthy of elite or near-elite status. It is just an idea I'm throwing onto the table.

Guys, good discussion.

Some of you have described my thoughts on the French guarde much better than I could, we seem to be all in a very general agreement on Guards and elite status and the benefits and drawbacks of them.

The French Marine artillery got their reputation because they were well drilled troops, according to Marmont his own units which could deploy in line.

The Old Guard was elite but not superhuman, as some like to see them, otherwise two battalions of Old Guard – or let's say maybe three at the most – would have cetainly crushed – routed and destroyed the entire Russian Army at Borodino, when Ney demanded them. ;-)

Unfortunately, Nafziger's error on the Austrian leadership has created a lot of mythology – he used the peacetime NCO numbers instead of the (essentially doubled) wartime versions. Others have compounded this by taking Korporal as corporal and saying that there was almost no senior NCO cadre – Korporal was corporal and sargeant. Austria also put its brightest recruits into the Kadett officer positions, although many were carrying out NCO duties for several years (esp in the lighter cavalry). That seems wiser that putting them in a new guard unit and from Wagram onwards, it was apparently French infantry, who needed the light guns again. There was a problem in the Austrian officer corps in the 1790s, although not as bad as Zach painted it. However, the key advantage for the Frenchw as simply that the doors of the Temple of Janus were nearly always open and so, creating more veterans and allowing greater practice time than others could get.

von Winterfedlt has it completely wrong!

Napoleon was really Superman

Davout was really Iron Man

Ney was really Flame

And if the truth be known, it was when those darned Brits found kryptonite and took away Superman's powers that things went down hill.

Whirlwind,
The comment relating to the Coalition Allies perception of the Marine Artillery
can be found in Elting's 'Swords around a throne', with the quote:

'Their steadiness under heavy fire at Lutzen, plus those blue overcoats, fooled the Allies into thinking they were part of the Guard.'

Elting also notes that officers for the expanded 1813 regiments were provided, in part, by Velites from the Imperial Guard. The regiments were composed of 1/3 conscripts from the class of 1812 [according to Bowden 'Armies of 1813'], but the average age was apparently 23 years, whilst the majority of the reformed army [50%] was composed of 18-19 year old conscripts.

Interestingly in Detaille's book 'L'Armee Francaise', he states that initial
reaction from Marmont and GB Pelleport, corps commander and brigade commander of the 1st Regiment repsectively, were less than complimentary. Marmont was concerned that their effectiveness would be hampered by the preponderance of old and sedentary officers and NCO's, noting that the best officer cadre had been retained by the Navy. Upon initial inspection he reported that they lacked everything, some being equipped with dragoon muskets, which he proposed be replaced. Pelleport, initially, complained of their lack of discipline and poor skill at marching and maneuvering. However, following thorough reorganization and additional training the regiments gained a commendable skill in battle, which was praised by Marmont, Pelleport and others, including Baron Fain, Napoleon's secretary.

We shouldn't forget that troops rarely came into physical contact with one
another during battle, so the opportunity to accurately identify an opponent was limited by distance, and clouded by smoke and stress of battle. The basic
identification was through headgear, dress and probably uniform color. The
Coalition allies were probably well aware that the French Old Guard typically
wore blue overcoats, virtually exclusively amongst the infantry of the French
army. The Marine Artillery had never taken the field in any strength prior to
1813, so there was no experience of facing these units, who also were attired in blue overcoats. Compound this with the fact that the 1st class gunners were entitled to wear red epaulettes, the confusion at a distance for the Allies can be imagined. Unfortunately Elting offers no sources for his comment to the 'fooling' of the Allies, maybe someone else has that – the original
source presumably being Russian or Prussian, both of whom faced the Marine
Artillery during the 1813 campaign where there reputation was acquired.

I realize this is probably all a little off topic, but hopefully of interest to the discussion.

npm

Dear Ligniere

Nice posting. And the mention of the Guard usually wearing Blue greatcoats just inspired me to paint more Guard units up in greatcoats. I was considering grey or brown but I think I'll go with blue now. Much appreciated. Keep up the great posting. Good debate all round.

Thanks Ligniere for taking the time to do that. Your comment had rung a bell for me as something I had heard before – and placing it in Elting has reminded me exactly where!

Unfortunately Elting offers no sources for his comment to the 'fooling' of the Allies, maybe someone else has that – the original source presumably being Russian or Prussian, both of whom faced the Marine Artillery during the 1813 campaign where there reputation was acquired.

The problem is that the source Col Elting used might have been French, so it might be that a French witness 'thought' that the blue overcoats and the steadiness had fooled the Allied troops etc – notthat would automatically make a French observer mistaken, naturally. It is hard to know without finding the original.

Thanks again, Ligniere.

The whole subject is fascinating, I think – whether individual units cause fear amongst their enemies by their mere appearance in the Napoleonic Wars. IIRC Elting claims something similar for the French Cuirassiers.

Regards

Whirlwind/Gazzola,
To be honest, I was shocked that I managed to unearth the line in the Elting book – I thought I was looking for a needle in a haystack.

During my research I did look through Hofschroer's Osprey Campaign Series Leipzig 1813, and there's an interesting painting by Knotel, which depicts Prussian cavalry overthrowing the French Guard Marines. It's was in the section related to Mockern, and the blurb was to the effect that the Prussians overthrew Marmont including the elite Marines. To the best of my knowledge, the Guard Marine battalion was not in this sector of the field, they were in the south. So either the reference in the picture is incorrect, and PH assumed the Guard Marines represented the Marine Artillerists, or the painting is depicting another event altogether. I tried to Google the image, but unfortunately nothing came up online. But the notation did use the word 'elite'.

npm

It is interesting that elite units can cause fear in the eyes of their enemies indeed. The fact that this is true should be incorporated into wargames rules but must be careful not to unbalance the system.

In WWI allied soldiers thought every German tank was a Tiger
In 1812 the French feared the Cossacks
Allied soldiers in the Napoleonic period feared the French Cuirassiers, this is well documented.
British forces in Spain defeated French Grenadiers wearing bearskins and thought they had defeated the Old Guard – their reputation was strong even down there.
and so on…

I distinctly remember though a specific battle in 1813 that described how the Allied formations upon realising they were facing the French Old Guard quickly called off the engagement and withdrew. Thing is, I cannot find the reference. This was before the allied plan was introduced that stipulated that when facing Napoleon directly, forces should disengage and withdraw.

However, one should also remember that when the OG made an appearance the allied commanders were sure that Napoleon would be personally commanding them or that his presence was nearby. This could have a profound affect on allied morale and willingness to fight. Some might argue this was a deliberate ploy but the point is that his propensity for success created the idea for the plan to disengage when facing him personally in 1813. So it was fear that drove the idea for that plan…

Allied soldiers in the Napoleonic period feared the French Cuirassiers, this is well documented.
British forces in Spain defeated French Grenadiers wearing bearskins and thought they had defeated the Old Guard – their reputation was strong even down there.

Shane, I've read the first in Elting and read the second somewhere I have forgotten. Any ideas where these come from originally?

Regards

However, one should also remember that when the OG made an appearance the allied commanders were sure that Napoleon would be personally commanding them or that his presence was nearby. This could have a profound affect on allied morale and willingness to fight. Some might argue this was a deliberate ploy but the point is that his propensity for success created the idea for the plan to disengage when facing him personally in 1813. So it was fear that drove the idea for that plan…

But fear of Napoleon rather than the Guard?

Regards

British forces in Spain defeated French Grenadiers wearing bearskins and thought they had defeated the Old Guard – their reputation was strong even down there.

I suppose this would show their fame but not be such a good argument for a fear factor?

Regards

It might contribute to a 'contempt factor'.

Shane, I've read the first in Elting and read the second somewhere I have forgotten. Any ideas where these come from originally?

Lol, I have a huge book shelf full of Nappy books, although I have read it several times I cannot for the life of me remember which one.

But fear of Napoleon rather than the Guard?

That is my point, fearing Napoleon's presence enables the OG to cause fear…on top of their perceived fighting prowess

I suppose this would show their fame but not be such a good argument for a fear factor?

The fact that this was news worthy enough to report clearly indicates that even the British soldiers knew of the reputation of the OG and were at least intimidated enough to think that they were indeed fighting them.

In the actual action reported on the Brits did not run, they did fight and win and had their fears reduced because they overcame what they thought was the OG. The point is that the ordinary rank and file may not have known who they were but the higher ranking officers obviously had some idea of who they might have been even if mistaken.

If the French in this battle were ordinary ligne units there would have been little to say about it other than in passing. So I doubt that the British would have been as intimidated if fighting an enemy in shakos rather than in bearskins…

It is very obvious that wearing bearskins was a symbol of fighting prowess and a source of intimidation (fear) when facing an enemy so attired. This is the reason they were adopted. So I think units facing any enemy wearing bearskins or even any head dress that denotes Grenadiers should cause some kind of fear factor. i.e. a reduction of morale if even slight…

I have a rule in my own system that enemy units facing the OG suffer a negative 10% morale – in the scheme of my morale system this is very slight but it can mean the difference between good morale and becoming shaken or worse. Obviously enemy veteran units are not so easily intimidated in my system because of their experience but they still can be intimidated if the situation is right.

We have discussed this at length and the notion that raw troops should be less fearful than veterans has come up and I do feel there is some truth in this. But the premise we hold in the system we play is that it is not the men in the rank and file who are effected but their officers who are on the whole more experienced and understand these things more than their men. They have the telescopes to see the enemy and who they are, they "usually" have more years of service and experience and their reactions to seeing the OG is what causes the responses that are indicated in our morale system.

Officers that become fearful tend to show it and respond in ways that cause their men to take note and fear spreads like wildfire. This is what we are trying to recreate.

maybe consideration also should be given to nationality…I can't remember which French marshall said it but something to the effect of "I'd rather face a battery of guns than a battalion of Hungarians"