"Unit frontage and rifle-musket engagement ranges?" Topic

Scott wrote:

I really can't see how having more support could constitute this mysterious 'heavy skirmish line'. If you still only have one man per five paces of front it doesn't give you much fighting power. If the enemy is in a close-order line of battle, they will have ten times the number of muskets in action. Your own casualties might be kept down, but you won't be able to either take or hold ground against the enemy.

Scott:
From what I understand, a skirmish line wasn't meant to go head to head with a close-order line of battle. A skirmish line would win an attritional firefight because they wouldn't take as many casualties being spread out.

I agree that in a skirmish, maintaining intervals is difficult, particularly when men are taking cover. That is all discussed in Hardee and Casey. I also agree that changes from 5 to 3 paces could be done, as well as simply maintaining the two rank formation. The front rank could be 5 paces apart, but the second rank in the gap behind several paces as described in Hardee.

However, what is the point of a 'heavy skirmish line' if they are packing in the same number of bodies in the same space as a close-order line to match their fire? There is a point of diminishing returns, where density of the skirmish line negates any advantages of cover and spacing, but still can't match the density of the close-order enemy.

At this point, the points below are simply inferences, but it goes like this: [building a case, as it were.]

1.The reserves dedictated to and positioned in support of the skirmish line are considered part of the skirmish line when referring to 'heavy skirmish lines.'

2. The increased reserves did several things that a close-order line couldn't do: It immediately replaced fallen men on the line. It provided for re-supply of ammo, so there was no conservation of fire involved. The entire skirmish line could be relieved, so unlike the close-order line, even with ten times the number, a fatigued skirmish line could be replaced. Again, such a skirmish line, already taking fewer casualties because of spacing and cover could win an attritional firefight against a close-order unit.

3. The reserves are the place in the manual where increases are allowed at the commander's discretion, whereas the actual skirmish line has a very specific limit both minimal and maximum. Meaning that while a company might be on the skirmish line, three times that number could be dedicated to skirmishing in the reserves, which according to the manual could up very close to the skirmish line in cover.

As I said, during Napoleonic times, densely packed skirmish lines were seen as evidence of poor training/raw troops as that bunching negated the advantages of a skirmish formation. Obviously, the experience from the Napoleonic period was that close-order troops in a firefight with skirmishers was going to lose if their own skirmishers weren't deployed too.

And for Napoleonic military men, the supports to the skirmish line were seen as part of the formation, not separate. When they speak of 'clouds of skirmishers', the image is one of depth too. As there is a strong continuity between Napoleonic and ACW manuals and methods, this too might have a similar, but unspoken outlook concerning skirmish lines.

I have been keeping an eye out for skirmish related observations in the OR and memoirs. I certainly have found that 'procedures' were followed when something is mentioned. I just fould a reference of how Union skirmishers were thrown out at South Mountain, a company captain being designated to command the multi-company skirmish line…as per the manual.

Bill

they don't need an officer barking a command in order to know what the command is

Whether they "need" it or not they are going to get it.

"the book" lays down what to bark and when to bark and who barks in what order.

Timing, co-ordination and learned response trigger all in one. Troops know what the command means and how to play their part but if properly trained, no bark means no go!

And for Napoleonic military men, the supports to the skirmish line were seen as part of the formation, not separate. When they speak of 'clouds of skirmishers', the image is one of depth too

Which is no doubt why the French in Spain had problems trying to figure where the skirmish line finished and the Line started!

Being a good officer does not mean being a good technical writer. After Action Reports are a major pain to have to write up. Usualy you have a dozen other things to get domne, and often just want to get some sleep. However if they are put off to long details start to slip.

Some are better at taking the time than others. I know that right after 73 easting I wrote down a number of things, because I am aware of how time effects memory. Unfortunetly, I seem to have lost all of it during one PCS or another.

I dont imagine 19th century Officers where any less burdened with extra things they needed to do. So a heavy skirmish line probably meant something to all of them and they wre not writing for us, they were writing for thier pears and superiors. I remeber a mortning when I was getting reamed for something while I was a recruiter. At one point the station commander questioned something I had writen as not being clear to everybody. I replied that I had not written it for some knucklehead who wondered in from the street, but for other recruiters, and unless it was thier very first day on the job they would know exactly what I meant.

Most things written right after an action are not meant to be read by us 150 years later. Now things like memoirs are, but those are wriotten a long time afterwards, and details about skirmish lines tend to get blurred. I know I still use army expresions from time to time, even though I have been retireed from the Army for a numbermof uyears. Check and march order and SP and di di mau will probably never completely leave my vocabulary. And I wasnt even in Vietnam.

I also think that instances of throwing out the book would get more of a special mention. You might mention breaking camp in the morning, but you eont go into brushing teeth and stoking up the fire and things like that. You mention the unusual, like if you got some special treat for breakfast. Battle formations are the same. If the book was thrown away, there would be mention of the fact.

lastly this whole "barking orders" thing bugs me. What do you want the guy to do,whisper them? If you dont put some oommff into them they asre not heard.Every time I hear somebody use that expresion they seem to be truying to portray some officer wandering around spouting out streams of orders that dont make sense ro that everybody is ignoring. For one thing, you can only do so much yelling in one day. Your voice just wont last forever. There are more than enough things you need to say to need to pointlessly add to the load.

Soldiers do not have some sort of hive overmind. If you have two hundred soldiers in a formation, you have two hundred opinions on what the best movement, time and place to do it are. That wont work. And soldiers know it. And for the ones that do decide to try to do thier own thing, well that is why officers have grouch old NCOs like me to thump the privates on the head and get them goin in the right direction.

Moving masses of men about is very much an exercise in confusion. Even a peacetime parade can get messed up in a hurry, even with the soldiers well in hand. Something like a battle with all the tremendous noise and confusion, if soldiers are not tightly controled things are going to disolve into a mob in short order. If you give soldiers the freedom to decide this is a good time to loosen up the formation, they are very quickly going to decide this is also a good time to go find a creek and fill up the canteens.

The idea that a bunch of privates can make good decisions is appalling. If they could make good decisions, they would not still be privates. Stop by a staff duty desk some weekend and yiu can quicklly learn abvout all the hoorendously bad decisions privates can make on a regular basis.

The idea that in the middle of a battle they suddenly grow 40 extra IQ points and figure out what is going on, just doesnt work with real privates.

Owen

Owen:
I agree. Officers wrote their battle reports to other officers. They had specific purposes in mind, both personal and operational. And short hand and glossing over what *everyone* understood was common. That means to really understand what they are saying, we have to get into their mind set, we have to ferret out what was common speak for those men.

Certainly controlling the movements of large groups of men have shared challenges whether 1861 or 2011. And some of the practices are shared because the medium, men, are still the same. Even in something as simple as a business workshop at a conference, with a room filled with experienced, intelligence conference goers, things go much smoother when the workshop leader tells the group how do to a group task and then 'barks' Start! to get them all to begin the activity.

However, some of the solutions, such as placing soldiers elbow to elbow to maneuver and fight, let alone maintaining 5 pace intervals in a skirmish line are quite different than squad tactics today, both physically and psychologically. The command process is different too.

There is a need to put yourself in the head of past participants and see the world the way they do. What is nice is that they communicate this without fail. ;-j

Bill

The idea that a bunch of privates can make good decisions is appalling. If they could make good decisions, they would not still be privates

Spoken by a man who knows what he is talking about!

Bill the largest element I have ever moved myself is company sized (Artillery Battery). And that is just moveing around. The idea of controling them n a skirrmish line is daunting. I think it would take a good bit of practice to get it right. In that respect Scott has a better grasp on thingsa.

However, in many ways, i have a better grasp that Scott, because my guys did not want to be there. Not at all a knock on reenactors, but they want to be there. They went to a lot of trouble to get there and do this stuff and they want to get it right.

Most real soldiers9 Or maybe active duty is a better term) dont want to be out marching around, they want to be back in the barracks drinking beer, or downrange hanf=ging out with young women with no sense and few morals.

They will march and fight because that is the job and what they do, and because nasty old NCOs make them do what the officers want them to. Left to make thier own choices, they are going to go to ground and stay there. Nothing in it for them to move foprward, whether in line formation or skirmish or some mishmash they suddenly thought up.

I would bet that if we had videos of the action, most if not all of these priveates throwing the book out are in fact the barking officer in charge tried to do sonmeething to meet the situation and the NCOs tried to find a way to make that happen. Had they done it own thioer own the AAR would have read "the little s mutineed and went off on thier own in a gaggle of some sort"

Owen:
I have no doubt you're right in many respects, particularly when I read that very mentality among the ACW enlisted men, even though volunteers were more committed than the drafted fellows later on. There were 'little mutinies' galore during th ACW for no more than a chance to get drunk or visit Hooker's ladies.

Yet the American culture in 1861 was far different than today, and so was the ACW from our wars today.

Can you imagine a regiment's einlisted men today establishing debating societies or lending libraries in camp for such works as the Ancient Greek histories or Lord Acton's treatise on liberty?

A Illinois sergeant's diary describes these debates in winter camp near Vicksburg 1863-4: "Took part on the affirmative of 'Resolved that the Constitutional relations of the Rebel sates should be fixed by Congress only." Or another debate he says "discussed th equestion of reducing rebel states to territories… Witnessed some rare outbursts of untutored eloquence."

Not all officers were pleased with these kinds of activities. One wrote "A soldier should have nought to do with politics." wrote one Union colonel. "The nearer he approaches a machine,…the more valuable he becomes to the service. Our soldiers are too intelligent [!], for they will talk and they will write, and read the papers." This was a distinctly minority view. The intelligence and commitment of the common soldier was often noted and prized. U.S. Grant himself noted after the war, "our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who know what they were fighting for."

Very different from the soldiers you are describing. James M. McPherson wrote two books, What they Fought For 1861-1865 and the larger study Why They Fought that I can recommend. The hundreds of letters he studied and provides in his books tell of a very different kind of soldier on a number of levels, even with the attitudes you describe. It made a difference on the battlefield too.

Bill

What about the Reb debating societies ? Were those about how to keep the slave in his or her place ?

Jim

I think the above is an interesting question in light of the fact that the southern armies fought so tenaciously for so long and many did not want to give up even after surrender. I'm not familiar with those particular works of Prof. McPherson's, so I don't know if he attempted to cover those questions from the southern perspective as well. In general I know I've seen more studies of that question from the northern perspective. But it would seem that an impending social revolution in southern society if the war were lost would be a motivating factor, even for those who didn't own slaves--in addition to defense of home. For example, there were whole counties in many areas of the deep south which were 80%+ African-American by population.

What makes it more interesting is that southern soldiers were particularly good "fighters" then as now, IMO, and I think its no small coincidence that all of the major US military bases such Fort Benning, Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, etc.. are in the South which is to also say as an American, I'm glad our southern brothers decided to stick with us.

Far afield from Unit Frontage and Rifle-Musket Engagement Ranges !

Jim

I'm not disputing what you wrote, but I think that many modern army bases are in the south more due to the desire for weather that allows year-round training than because of the militancy of the local population :)

I never said "militant" !

So, are they named after Confederate generals cause of the weather ? :) I have an African-American neighbor who is a police officer and MP reservist. We were talking about the military bases and he found it interesting and hadn't known that all those bases were named after Reb generals ! Either way, there is something about Southern culture which produces good soldiers, IMO, then as now, with or without slavery.

What the??????? That is 3 posts this stupid thing has eaten today!!!! RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG

OK, one more try. I read somewhere that the state with the highest percentage of soldeirs was West Virginia. Not a surprise, I have known a lot of good soldiers from there. But Mormons also make good soldiers as a genmeral rule. And also in general, and my personel observation is that country boys tend to be better soldiers.

Which brings up a question, where the southern armys composed largley of backwoods rednecks, or is that another myth? And I dont think you can carry that to far, there where certainly good soldiers from everywheere.

Bill I wonder how much of the stuff like debating societys was because there wasnt much else to do? If they had gameboys available, would they still have the societys, or would they be lost in thier own worlds just like so many of todays troops?

Owen

To go back to the OPs question. Ranges are very tricky, because then and now most people are poor at accuratly guessing how far something is. They probably had a very good idea of how far they could shoot and hit something, but a bad idea of exactly how far that was in yards.

And combat does strange things to your mind and yur memory. So even somebody who could calmly determine a distance to something might not be able to figure it out when the bullets where flying.

And that very stress also clouds the issue of how far somebody could hit a target when under fire. Sure both sides had people that could stalk and kill squerls and deer and such like critters. But those same critters where not shooting back, and the was not the huge amount of smoke and noise all around.

Ever watch a proffesional golf game? When everybody has to be super quiet so the dude doesnt mess up the shot? Think maybe that if somebody shot off a rifle right by his ear it might have a bad effect on his accuracy? Or if there was a big cloud of foul smelling smoke between him and the hole there would be a drop in accuracy?

And just like in the drill movemnts above, they where not writing after action reports for us gamers, they where writing them for thier superiors, and where largely includig things they thought important, and not writing about those that they did not consider important. And what we think are important is not always what they saw that way.

I would bet that at least half the time they didnt know exactly how far the target was, shortly forgot even that much, and didnt bother to write about it anyway. So a statistical anylasys like many have done are not as useful as they could be because we dont know that the data was right to start with, and certainly the sample is to small.

I think there's truth to that country boys make good soldiers observation. Especially in this country where just about everyone owned there own land and weren't renters with landlords and whatnot. You sank or swam and made it on your own land that cultivates self-reliance, independence of mind, technical know how with firearms, familiarity with the killing of large mammals, etc… all things that make for good soldiers and perhaps more importantly soldiers who aren't afraid to take the initiative at times.

Regarding the reports, I think many of those writing reports weren't just writing for their superiors, but I also sense they knew they were writing for posterity as well.

Also, from what I've read, it took a couple of engagements for troops to get used to the noise, smoke, confusion of battle and then according to what I've read a soldier settled down. The mark of a veteran was slow and deliberate fire with a mindful target in eye not just blind fire. Now if you've got good or excellent officers running a battalion they might attempt to cultivate or harness those traits of "seasoning". Of course, not all units achieved the same level of seasoning and yes, some took longer than others and of the one's that didn't, you had to hope that enough would survive the engagement for the unit to feel the difference in the next action. On the Federal side, the recruiting practice of building new regiments instead of filling the old one's I think had a serious effect on a unit achieving and maintaining a veteran status, especially in the AOP. The Rebs at least kept cycling in recovered, healed troops into the same outfits.

Regarding the "barking" of orders, I think good officers with well seasoned troops only had to do that on a limited basis. Unseasoned or green troops needed a lot of that. There is also the dimension of two-way communication between officers and soldiers DURING combat. You've got to communicate in order to be an effective team and officers needed to be able to listen to their soldiers. I can picture troops talking and yelling a lot to one another and their officers during combat. "I can see 5 of 'em behind a log up there !" "There's a bunch of 'em working around our right !" Etc… etc… I've never been a real soldier, but I remember when I played Skirmish or paintball with my brother and a bunch of his friends on a regular basis a few years ago. We got better with each game and even when we were outclassed by better paint guns we could still hold our own and even win against a better equipped team. But the deciding factor when we took a major step forward was when we learned to communicate while playing. You gotta talk with each other and let the other guy know where you are and what you are facing and even come with a plan of action while on the move. Yelling to each other was important. I remember the key moment was the realization that the other team might hear you yelling, but all they really know is that you're in front and that doesn't necessarily give them any clear idea about what you are doing or where you are exactly or in what numbers.

Communication from the officer to the soldier is obviously very important. I'm not so sure about the reverse. In heavy woods or when deployed as skirmishers, perhaps, but not so much in a regular open-field battle. I know from experience as a reenactor that when you are a soldier in the ranks a curious sort of 'tunnel vision' occurs where you are aware of what's to your immediate front, but completely oblivious to what's going on around you. The officers, not being tied up in the mechanical process of loading and firing, are going to have a much greater opportunity to observe and report to their commander.

Real combat can tunnel vision you as well. I have a stark memory of sticking my head up and wondering where the sun went. I had been standing in the hatch but was so focused on the 2 radios I had to talk on, and the fire control screen that I just had not noticed that the sun went down.

Besides tunnel vision to your front is not such a bad thing. After all that is your sector to cover and watching somebdoy elses leaves a gap.

Jim I agree that in modern combat, back to about WWI soldiers talking is very important. I have never played paintball, but have done a lot of the armys version of laser tag, and knowing what the other guy is going to do is a major asset. Of course the longer you work together the better that becomes.

But I am not sure how relevent your expeirence or mine is to actual ACW combat. The majority of the fights where stand up and shoot each other, at least from the soldiers point of veiw. And while hiding behind a tree is good when there is shooting going on, it is not so good when you are reloading. I overran an MG pit one day with a bayonet because I saw them start to change belts I coverde enough ground to get there before they could finish.At the AAR they commented that one of them should have grabbed a rifle to keep that sort of thing frm happening.

Now yes the second rank man is supposed to cover when the first one is reloading, but what do you do when 5 guys sweep up on you? That one round isnt going to go far enough. And it is not a certain hit in any case. So a solid line can overrun a dispersed one just about every time. And the dispersed guys where very aware of it.

The purpose of most ACW battle was to seize a peice of dirt that both sides wanted. You did that by fire and manuever. Killing people was only incidental to the overall picture. Look at Antietum. The fedrals had higher casualties, but won the battle, and sent Lee back to Virginia. Same thing at Chanslersville, The Reberls actualy took more casualties, but soundly beat the fedrals.

we always have to be careful comparing ourselves to people of other eras. Just as Bill pointed out, my soldiers are not the same in all respects as guys in the AOP. They have much in common, they like to drink more whiskey than they should , they like the company of young ladys of little to no morals, and they dont want to do anything they dont feel is needful. But they are not going to for debating societys, or company theatrics clubs or a great amny things those other soldiers did. In general my soldiers went to a lot more school, but seeem to have learned a lot less in all those years..

A problem any soldier has is focus. My troops really wanted to shift position at 73 easting because they knew Iraqi tanks where getting close, and artillery units do very poorly in direct combat with tanks. but I knew more than they did about the over all basttle, and knew that there was no question of us taking our guns out of the fight even for a little while. Had they been willing to "throw away the book", they probably would have shifted on there own, which would have had a very bad effect on the Cav troop we where firing for. As it turns out I was right, between the tanks and ourr guns we stopped them. Of course it want really my decision, I was just the voice on the radiothat the guns heard. but in a real way it was, becaue I had the radios and the map and could see what was going on, and could have advised the battery commander that we needed to move. I did no such thing because I felt we needed to be right where we where doing what we where doing.

A few tanks did leak past the front, but the regimental commander picked them off himself.Had they contacted any of the support elements, or any of the artillery it would have been bad for that unit, but still for the over all battle, staying was the right decision. And that is a problem when soldiers strat making decisions own thier own. they are part of a very big brawl, and what may seem smart in a local sense can be very bad for the big picture. Instead of losing a few you can lose hundreds. not a good exchange rate. And that is why commanders dont want soldiers makeing to many decisions. They just dont have enough information to make informed ones, and there is never enough time to tell them.

say a brigade is attacking a single regiment that is guarding the flank of a corp. The regiment is dug in. The brigade has enough ccmmbat power to overwelm the regiment, but will take losses doing it. But that attack will unhinge the full line, and cause the corp to have to retreat. So, in the big picture the attack will save amny lives on the attackers side. But to the guys making the attack they are going to take losses. So if they toss the book and make thier own decision, they are going to spread out and go to ground, slowly picking off the defenders, but giving them time to redeploy aditional units to defend the flank. So what seems to be a great idea to the privates on the scene, is infact a very bad idea for the rest of the army. Not a good trade. So you need Officers and NCOs driveing them on to do what needs to be done.

Now of course sometimes those attacks dont work out so well. And the privates know that. So they start to get the idea that all attacks wont work, which is a self full filling prophecy.

Refilling units is in general a much better plan than creating new ones. It gives you a balance of newbies enthousiasm with veterens know how. Otherwise you wind up with knew units that know very little, and burnt out old ones that doent want to do anything.

Owen

I wonder how much of the stuff like debating societys was because there wasnt much else to do? If they had gameboys available, would they still have the societys, or would they be lost in thier own worlds just like so many of todays troops?

Owen:
I don't know. Obviously they worked to avoid boredom. Whether or not ACW boys would play game boys instead of joining debate societies etc. if they could is an unanswerable question. Much of the diversions of American civilian life, which leaked into army life were communial/social. Playing cards, games, dances, parties and hunting.

What I can say for certain is that because the average ACW soldier grew up in a different world, lived in a different society--which included different diversions available in fighting boredom--that the ACW soldier thought and acted differently in a number of ways from today's soldiers. Not all ways, but more than enough to not assumed that soldiers in the past think and respond to military life just like soldiers today.

In WWII, American soldiers and German soldiers shared a number of behavioral traits in combat. However, there were differences too. For instance, German soldiers were constantly yelling and calling out to one another, reacting to combat in a number of ways different from our G.I.s. The German culture was different, their reasons for fighting often different, and not surprisingly, their infantry tactics were different too.

Jim: McPherson does examine both the Southern and Northern reasons for fighting. I was just providing an example of how ACW soldiers are different form today.

The Southern soldiers could have been 'better' for the same reasons soldiers are tougher whenever their homeland is threatened. The Union troops were fighting for far more philosphical and conceptual reasons, Preserve the Union, end slavery, etc. than the Southerns who saw themselves as simply defending their rights and home.

Bill

Bill I grew up so far out in the country you start to come out the other side if you go any farther. One TV station that covered 4-5 countys. Eventualy we picked up a sencond and fimnaly a third, so we had all the major networks

Often entertainment when we came back to the house from whatever we where doing in the fields was either go vist a friend some miles away, or all get together to play our own music. With insturments, not a radio.

I am not saying that I understand where they where, because I dont. Even as far out as we where, we did have the TV, a few radio stations, even though I didnt know there was anything but country music until I hit high school.

But the gapp between me and the city kids i met in the army show me how far that gap can be. In many ways I am closer to the old guys because things like duty to country meant something to me. Still do for that matter. Many of the kids I dealt with had no comcept of that. And of course perhaps many of those then didnt either. No way to know for sure. People are often not honest about motives, sometimes even to themselves.

as far as how they responded, certainly they where different. just in the 21 years I was in the Army changed radicaly. When I was a private, women in the day room only, never in the barracks. By the time I got out, as long as you signed them in at the CQ desk, no problem.

Things like alchohol in the barracks yo yos. One time they want to limit the amount you can have, then somebody realizes that when they run out, soldiers drive to get more, not a good plan. In the ACW they still issued soldiers whiskey.

And I suspect that there where more than two cultures involved. Not just the south and the north, but also the west. And probably a gap between city and country folks in all three locations. And individual variations on all of them besides.

The Army has a tradition that Phil Sheridan said that if a man would not perform certain intamate activetys with a woman, he would not fight either. Nothing I have seen would imndicate he was wrong.

As for not responding in the same ways, I totaly agree. for one thing, todays soldiers are treated totaly different, and are expected to act totaly differently. And I am also aware of cultureal differences in todays militarys. I Germany we used to have what where known as partnership units. Some of thier soldiers came to our field problems, and some of us got to go to thiers. I was one of those. And even though we used the same howitzer thier methods and ways of doing things where very different. As was our way of planning to defend West Germany. No big surprise. For us falling back one village to shorten a line was just the lose of a few kilometers. For a German unit it might mean exposing cousen gertie to the mercys of invading Infantry, never a good thing.

I can just about be certain that if we could either bring a few of them forward, or send some of us back, that we would be shocked by some of the things that would be similar, and by some of the things that would be different.

I have always had freinds from other cutltures in the Army, and at 0300, sitting in a foxhole on a perimeter, or in a track on radio watch there is not a lot to do but talk. I have been surprised many times by ways we thought alike, and by things that are different.

So I hope I never make the mistake of thinking they are just like us. But in many ways they most likely where, we just donmt know which ones, or what the differences would be and how great.

Interesting thread by the way.

Owen

Owen:
Yes, great examples. It is very much trying to understand a different culture in looking back, even to our own society in 1861.

I find the hunt for those similarities and differences, the effort to 'get into their head' an enjoyable journey, even if it can be tedious.

For instance, I do believe that ACW men were much better at estimating distances than we are today. Every infantry movement calculation, every artillery operation, every range estimation required a fairly accurate ability to estimate. Every field book had a description of what a person sees at different ranges. Obviously men could exagerate and make errors, but in general I imagine they were for more on target than off. Even the estimation in 'paces' is a good example of them transforming the physical actions into estimations.

Bill

Bill the estimation of range is a skill just like any other. The more you do it the better you get. I have no doubt that at short ranges they where quite good. At over 50 yards, not so sure siomply because i cant think of what they might have been estimating at those ranges regularly.

I am not saying they didnt just not sure what it would have been. I know my forwars observer friends where very good at estimating lnogr ranges, simply because they did it a lot. I dont know if an ACW battery would have live fire practiced enough to have sharpened the skill.

And I suppose that is the real question for long range rifle fire. Not just did they practyice enough to hit anything at over 100-200 yards, but did the Officers get in enough practice to be able to get the range right? I simply dont know, and dont have any evidence either way. But then this is a relatively new period for me to game and study so the evidence may be there, but if so nobody here has brought it out yet.

Owen

Owen, I'm not talking about troops doing whatever they want or feel like is the safest thing for them to do as the safest thing might be to desert. I'm talking about troops who have a will and the know how to carry the objective in the most expeditious manner possible. Regarding your 1 brigade vs. 1 regiment flank attack, crack troops wouldn't disperse b/c they would be able to see the odds as well as their officers and they would know that if they moved fast they could overwhelm the defenders even if they took more casualties on the way in. I don't think your modern artillery analogy is applicable as far as ACW infantry taking the initiative. If anything, ACW artillery would've taken a similar approach to what you did. The tactical "ethic" of artillerymen seems to be different as their primary weapon and means of defense and offense can only be served as team. Also, I'm not quite convinced that ACW fights were primarily stand up. I've read quite a few accounts of troops--especially Rebs early on-- hitting the dirt and having extended fire fights in combination with sudden charges to get as close as possible. G.W.Smith notes Rebs doing this at Seven Pines. Of course, many of those trooops were armed with smoothbores, but infantry on foot (not armored inf. or tanks) were the primary element of tactical decision in the ACW, so a dispersed line of infantry would probably without loss of morale or face fall back when facing a closed line of infantry and even here I think there are late war examples of heavy skirmish lines beginning to repel major infantry assaults. So, if you got 1 guy facing 5 attacking troops who are rushing him, his chances might depend on how much open ground is between him and the enemy. If he's a shooter he might take the first guy out at 400 yards, the next guy at 300, the next guy at 200… and the two guys remaining might say… "Well, this is far enough." But you probably meant in a close combat situation, in woods or something like that. I would argue chances are that one guy might be expecting a rush, take one good shot and then high tail it.

And I'm surprised no one mentioned another past time of many ACW troops…. church services.

Jim

Oh certainly church services where a big part of what they did. And that has been a major difference until recently. For most of my carreeer it just wasnt cool for most young men to admit tht they went to church. Recently that seems to be changing back again. Then it would have been very unusual to not go to services.

The problem with dispersion is it dilutes the firepower, slows down the rate of fire, and makes command and control much harder. That doesnt mean it didnt happen, just how often it did.I realize we will disagree onn how often. No problem, I dont thaink a definative answer is possible with the data we have, either way.

Tactics is an art, not a science. So there is never the universal best answer. Lots of times you take what amounts to the best guess you can. Some times you get the bear, some times the bear gets you. The thing about the veteren privates is that they would have veteren foficers that have been there just as long. And should have a better grasp of the overall situation. Parrticularly in the South there seems to have been plenty of prefectly good junior officers. yet these are they guys you seem to insist where barking needless and senseless orders, so thier good ole southern troops took matters into thier own hands.

I just dont see it. Sure, there may well ahve been things happening like going to ground and short rushes and such. But I bet it was tightly controled by thosde same order barkers, because something like a regiment is just to big to make the yell back and forth thing work. And again, most of the things they where doing would have been in the book. Trying to wing it in a battle is 99% of the time a great way to generate a disaster.

Back to rate of fire for a moment. the fastest way to load a muzzle loader is standing up. Anything else is slower. Sure it can be done, just not as well. And that single soldier shooting at 5 incoming guys is not going to pick several of them off as they come in. The rate of hit was so low that he most likely wont hit but possibly one. we have had a good number of arguments about how effective the fire freally was, but even the best estimates dont show much damage until you get under a hundred yards, and at that range the laying down guy just cant get enough shots to do much.

also there is always the morale question. it is much harder to keep troops steady when they are dispersed than when they are bunched up. Gun and tank crews have this going for them, they are in close contact with each other. Civil war infantry had it going as well, until they dispersed. As far as a heavy skirmish line, the heavier it gets the less advantage you get from the dispersion, so if you use a heavy line it is not much better than a ordered line. And it certainly doesnt have the punch to overwhelm a line, it can only atrrit it, an lengthy process that allows trhe enemy time to react to what you are doing.

Getting to tiered tonight to keep this up, but there are many more nights and I dont believe we have worn this one out yet.

Owen

Troops knew when they were in skirmish lines. As the skirmish formation came with certain tactical expectations, which included giving way to formed troops, giving the opposition a few shots and 'hightailing it' would be a given in most cases. Standing their ground would be the uncommon response.

The estimating of distances. Scott may be able to speak to this. Moving a regiment or even company required a fairly competent sense of distances, as an officer would not only have to estimate the frontage of his unit and then whether it could traverse the terrain up ahead, but also how far it was away and the time involved to make it there. In combat as well as simply moving, such estimations would be vital.

I have read of instances where a regiment would have a soldier that was particularly skilled at that kind of judgement being called on or placed in a needed position, as guide or flanker. The same is true for combat fire, whether small arms or artillery. For instance, US artillery ammo boxes had the ranges in yards for various ordinance printed there. The ranges went from a few hundred yards to 1500. What is the point of the information if the artillerists couldn't determine those ranges, at least roughly? It obviously took training and experience to estimate distances well, but a great deal of combat operations required it.

Even in civilian life, a farmer has to have a sense of paces and distances. I know from my own experience backpacking that done on a regular basis, you get to know how far a mile is on a wilderness trail, or how far away the next ridge it in factions of a mile.

Bill

Hi

Implied contradictions here. No one can reliably estimate range unless I am using a quote on range to prove my point!

Grin.

The whole issue of a volley is not that every shot hits, these guys are not Carlos Hathcock, but that of some hits. Being shot AT is its own effect. The sound of rounds hitting in front or passing over is its own effect beyond actual casualties. Dunno about you guys, in the real world when I have been shot at, I never said "ha, that guy is badly trained and could not hit an elephant at this range".

Your range may vary.

Rocky

Hi

As another aside referring to the 19th century thread on Islandwana, the brits, when they could, would mark the ranges as part of their prep for a formal fight in the late 19th, I don't know if anyone in this period did.

R

Two extracts from the report of Col. Jacob F. Taylor, 40th Ohio Infantry, commanding 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, 4th Corps during the Atlanta Campaign which sheds some light on the discussion regarding what heavy skirmishers could and couldn't do. My caps.

"The Thirty-fifth Indiana was detailed to picket the brigade front. Next morning, the 4th instant, being ordered to strengthen and advance the line of skirmishers, I ordered the Forty-fifth Ohio to the support of the Thirty-fifth Indiana, and immediately advanced the line. The Thirty-fifth Indiana made a brilliant charge on the enemy's skirmish line (WHICH WAS NEARLY EQUAL IN STRENGTH TO A LINE OF BATTLE), and, being well supported by the Forty-fifth Ohio, carried the rifle-pits and held them….The remaining regiments of the brigade were promptly advanced to within supporting distance of the skirmish line…"

And a description of a later battle.

"The main line of battle was halted about 100 yards beyond the captured pits of the enemy, and immediately erected a line of breast-works. The skirmishers advanced so close to the main rebel works, and were in such an exposed position that they were unable to throw up any protection for them- selves, especially on the left of the line held by the Twenty-first Kentucky. The Fortieth Ohio was relieved by the Fifty-first Ohio at 5 p. in., but it was impossible to relieve the Twenty-first Kentucky at that time without too much risk. About two hours before dark the rebels advanced from their works IN LINE OF BATTLE, and charged the skirmish line with the intention of driving it in. They were not only defeated in their object, but were repulsed with great loss. Great praise is due to the officers and MEN of the Twenty- first Kentucky and Fifty-first Ohio for the pertinacity with which they held their ground on this occasion. "

Extracted from the Report of Brig-Gen Walter C. Whitaker, 2nd Brigade, 1st Div, 4th Corps, same brigade, but prior to Taylor taking command. I think the battle as described on the 20th might have been an instance when it would've been difficult to exercise "tight control", but that doesn't seem to have effected their performance. The brigade was 7-8 regiments strong and listed at 3,028 officers and men just prior to the campaign.

"June 18, advanced, my skirmishers being the Ninety-ninth Ohio… This regiment advanced most gallantly, DRIVING the enemy with GREAT IMPETUOSITY, and taking position within 100 yards of the enemy's lines. It rained incessantly, and these brave men in their rifle-pits, some in water nearly waist deep, resisted successfully every effort made to dislodge them. Following up the advance made by the Ninety-ninth Ohio, with the Eighty-fourth and Thirty-fifth Indiana and Fifty-first Ohio, we again threw up works and held the advance gained. The skirmishing was very severe.

June 19, the rebels, being hard pressed, had again vacated their position and left their formidable works. We pursued along the road to Marietta. Between two and three miles the enemy were again found in force in strong earth-works. This brigade went into line with heavy skirmishing, the right of my skirmishers having to wade and stand in a swamp with the water above the knees.

June 20, advanced my front line and again threw up strong works; the enemy's position was such that he could enfilade as far as the range of his guns our lines, right and left. I was ordered to dislodge him. My skirmishers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Watson [40th OH], were strengthened and advanced. The Twenty-first Kentucky, Colonel Price commanding, was ordered to storm the first line of works. The Fifty-first Ohio, Colonel McClain, was ordered to support, while the pioneers of the brigade were held in readiness to fortify immediately any vantage ground taken.

The skirmishers having advanced, at 4 p. m. the assault was made. It was one of the most brilliant and successful assaults of the war. So RAPIDLY and EFFECTIVELY was it done that the great bulk of the rebels occupying the works were killed or taken prisoners. The officers and men of the Twenty-first CHARGED BEYOND THIS LINE, and up to within a few yards of their main lines. The color-sergeant, Henry Bryant, being wounded, Sergt. William L. Lanham seized the colors, and bearing them forward was in the act of mounting the parapet of the enemy's main works when he was fatally shot. The brave men then with him brought back their colors to the first line of works, where they firmly maintained themselves until the Fifty-first Ohio and the pioneers [arrived], making the works more tenable.

They were relieved from their position by the Ninety-ninth Ohio, which formed on the left of the Fifty-first. The Ninety-sixth Illinois was formed on my extreme right, and the Thirty-fifth Indiana on my extreme left, the Fortieth Ohio, Eighty-fourth Indiana, and Twenty-first Kentucky now forming the rear line. This disposition of forces was made with GREAT CELERITY, but none too soon to secure the important position taken from the rebels.

Two rebel regiments were sent to recover the lost ground. They boldly advanced to within a few rods of my line and were mowed down by the deadly fire of my brave men. The contest was again renewed with additional forces by the enemy to regain their lost ground. Boldly they advanced, but as boldly were they repulsed. Three brigades from night-fall till 11 oclock at night made desperate and persevering assaults to recover the lost position.

Five companies on the right of the Thirty-fifth Indiana were driven by superior numbers from their position, and the enemy gained a lodgment in my line. TWAS DARK. FRIEND AND FOE WERE MIXED. Brave Major Pufficy fell boldly and fearlessly rallying his men. Colonel Cummins, with the Ninety-ninth Ohio, repelled them from his left flank, while the Fifty-first Ohio and Ninety-sixth Illinois drove them from their front. It was a time of peril and great danger, but ordering forward the Fortieth Ohio, those bold soldiers soon drove out the rebels from their lodgment on my line in wild disorder and with heavy loss.

It was a most fiercely and deadly contested battle- ground. In two instances coming under my observation the bayonets of the loyal and rebel soldiers were found in each others per- son. My loss was 273 killed, wounded, and missing. The enemy's loss was reported to me by prisoners to be between 500 and 600 killed and over 1,000 wounded. We fought their best troops and drove them from an important position, and held it firmly.

Among the missing is Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, of the Fortieth Ohio, [the commander of the skirmish line] who in the darkness charged into the rebel lines and with several of his men were surrounded and captured. He is a very valuable officer… Every officer and MAN, with few exceptions, did their duty, and I REGRET THAT I CANNOT MENTION EACH ONE PERSONALLY. WITHOUT THE MOST DETERMINED COURAGE AND EFFICIENCY AS SOLDIERS ON THEIR PART, I MUST HAVE BEEN BEATEN. I congratulate them on winning one of the most fiercely contested fights in the history of this rebellion. This fight took place on one of the spurs of Kenesaw Mountain."

Further instances of when the book was tossed or where there are clearer instances of soldiers taking the initiative, indeed where success of the attack demanded a higher-level of soldier initiative than was ordinarily expected perhaps.

Report of Lient. Cot. P. A. Work, First Texas Infantry. JULY 9, 1863.

….Benning's brigade made its appearance, but instead of occupying the ground to the left of Robertson's brigade, so as to enable the latter to move forward with its left flank secured from attack, it occupied the ground still occupied by a portion, at least, of this brigade, the Fifteenth Georgia Regiment falling in and remaining with the First Texas Regiment. After several ineffectual efforts upon the part of both the commanders of the Fifteenth Georgia and myself to separate the men of the two regiments, we gave the order to move forward, when both regiments, thus commingled, moved forward and occupied the crest of the hill, some 100 yards or more to the front, and where the enemy's artillery was stationed, where we remained until the close of the day and until 2 o clock on Friday morning…

Once during the evening the troops upon my left were driven back, and my left was exposed, when, directing Capt. H. E. Moss, Company D, to take charge of the colors, and retaining them there with a few men to hold the hill until the regiment could safely retire, I ordered the regiment to fall back to a stone fence about 100 yards in rear. The major portion of the regiment and the Fifteenth Georgia fell back, as ordered, but quite a large number, having noticed that the colors were not moving to the rear, REFUSED TO WITHDRAW, and, remaining upon the crest of the hill, SUCCEEDED in holding the enemy in check in their immediate front, and obliquely upon their front and left, until the troops upon my left had been reformed and were again advanced…

Report of Col. Van Manning, Third Arkansas Infantry. NEAR HAGERSTOWN, MD., July 8, 1863.

…I ascertained that I was suffering from a fire to my left aid rear. Thereupon I ordered a change of front to the rear on first company, but the, noise consequent upon the heavy firing then going on swallowed up my command, and I contented myself with the IRREGULAR drawing back of the left wing, giving it an excellent fire, which pressed the enemy back in a very short while, whereupon the whole line advanced,

The Fifty-ninth Georgia Regiment, coming also at this time, occupied the line with my command. Some little time after this, I was disabled by concussion and wound on my nose and forehead. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, who will report its operations subsequent to this time. IT WOULD BE INVIDIOUS TO MAKE SPECIAL MENTION OF GALLANTRY WITH EITHER OFFICERS OR MEN WHEN ALL DID SO WELL, fighting greatly superior numbers and at great disadvantage. I might safely assume that the bearing of the entire command was of the highest creditable character.

The excerpts above are gleaned from a preliminary search of the OR. Better examples of soldier initiative, team work, the effectiveness of heavy skirmish lines to both hold and take ground, and the maintanence of unit cohesion when top down, drill book manuevers got tossed are probably scattered throughout. And I'm not arguing that the above was the norm, but perhaps it was more the norm than we have heretofore suspected. Unfortunately, many of the actions on the Confederate side were not covered in tactical detail in the later half of the war and one might suspect that given how the Rebels re-filled their units with recuperated/recovered veterans, one might suspect that better examples went unrecorded.

A couple of notes, I see now Bill why you emphasized the reserve of the skirmish line. Though I disagree with you in your contention that the reserve or the "strong supports" is what made it heavy, the strong supports seem to have played an important role in making the heavy skirmish line effective. Moreover, in dense terrain such a the Wilderness, heavy skirmish lines would probably need to operate on the initiative of the sub-unit or subordinate as battalion level control beyond general guidance would be very difficult. In addition, I suspect that b/c heavy skirmish lines were able and expected to exercise subordinate control and initiative it made them excellent formations for locating, forming, and then flanking enemy units if the opportunity was there. A strong line of skirmishers operating in front and on a or the flanks followed by the arrival of the close order supports might just be enough to send a defending unit into hasty a withdrawal.

Jim

Couple of points quickly. I am working 12 hour shifts right now so dont have much time, but will get back to it.

In one example the assualt was not made by skirmishers. they moved up and then the assualt was made. Nothing is stated about the formation of the assualt force. In a couple of the examples, praise is not made to the men, but men and officers. And the part where they held the line after refusing to withdraw, is not tooing the book, that is refusing oreders.

Like I say i need to read it again more carefully, but on first read, it doesnt really seem to be a bunch of privates becoming tactical geniuses, but rather junior officers making things work. And refusing orders is noit tossing the book.

As for the heavy skimish line, we jsut dont know what they meant. from this it almost seems to be more of a midified line than a true skirmish formation. But as the troops where under orders, there is no evidence that they decided to adopt that formation on thier own.

Owen

I agree that in that one example the assault was not made by skirmishers, but by the assault force behind, but a secondary point is that they were considered an integral part of the assault… "The skirmishers advanced, at 4 pm, the assault was made." That said it is possible that they not only advanced, but also assaulted--perhaps without orders--given the fact that the commander mentions the "rapidity" of the attack.

Yes, praise is made of the officers AND men. An interesting study would be to compare how often "the men" were praised in Napoleonic battle reports in comparision to the ACW. Refusing orders to advance or withdrawal IS tossing the book… that was agreed to earlier in this thread. But the better example of tossing the book was Van Manning contenting himself with an irregular line b/c his orders couldn't be heard. If he contented himself that means someone else was already taking the initiative to refuse the line, maybe it was the officers and men collectively working as a team on that flank, but it's obvious from Van Manning's report that the flank refusal occured without his command and he acquiesced.

Owen, when have my arguments been about "privates becoming tactical geniuses" or troops "winging it 99% of the time" ?
I mentioned earlier in the thread that there were times when the book got tossed and troops had to work as a team or teams in order to be successful and/or carry and/or defend the objective. The top down, battalion level paradigm with the Colonel barking orders for perfect formation changes, flank refusals by the 10th company and whatnto wasn't going to cut it.

As far as what the heavy skirmish line was, THEY called it a heavy skirmish line or a strong skirmish line, not an extended, loose or modified line.

Jim

Interesting stuff! And yet we're no closer to understanding exactly what a 'heavy skirmish line' was or how it was formed or controlled :)

OK Scott, here's an amateur's attempt…

After reading Casey's a bit, couldn't the battalion commander deploy the entire unit as skirmishers in "close intervals" maybe keeping a small battalion reserve with the colors ? Therefore, a heavy skirmish line might be an entire battalion with all ranks and files 5 paces apart, in other words with "close intervals" of 5 paces ?

Excerpted from Casey's "Instructions for Skirmishers" (my caps):

54. The men of the SAME GROUP will continue to preserve between each other the distance of FIVE PACES, unless the nature of the ground should render it necessary that they should close nearer, in order to keep in sight of each other. The INTERVALS refer to the SPACES BETWEEN GROUPS, and NOT TO the distances between the men in each group. The intervals will be taken from the right or left man of the neighboring group.

To close intervals.
59. This movement, like that of opening intervals, will be executed according to the principles prescribed for the deployments.
60. If the line of skirmishers be halted, and the captain should wish to close intervals to the left, he will command:
1. By the left flank, (SO MANY PACES) close intervals. 2. March (or double quick—March).

And though the diagrams are a bit confusing, it appears two ranks was the norm for skirmishers as according the instructions for firing: (I also extracted more interesting tidbits)

ARTICLE III.
THE FIRINGS (for skirmishers)

Commence—Firing.
108. At this command, briskly repeated, the men of the FRONT RANK will commence firing; they will reload rapidly, and hold themselves in readiness to fire again. During this time the men of the REAR RANK will come to a ready, and as soon as their respective file leaders have loaded, they will also fire and reload. The men of each file will thus continue the firing, conforming to this principle, that the ONE OR THE OTHER SHALL ALWAYS HAVE his piece loaded.

109. Light troops should be always CALM, so as to AIM with ACCURACY; they should, moreover endeavor to ESTIMATE CORRECTLY the distances between themselves and the enemy to be hit, thus be enabled to deliver their fire with greater certainty of success.

110. Skirmishers WILL NOT remain in their place whilst reloading, unless protected by accidents in the ground.

121. They should be practiced to fire and load KNEELING, LYING DOWN, and SITTING and much LIBERTY should be allowed in these exercises, in order that they may be executed in the manner found to be MOST CONVENIENT. Skirmishers should be cautioned not to forget that, in whatever position they may load, it is important that the piece should be placed upright before ramming, in order that the entire charge of powder may reach the bottom of the bore.

122. In commencing the fire, the men of the same rank SHOULD NOT all fire at once, and the men of the same file should be particular that one or the other of them BE ALWAYS LOADED.

Yes, interesting stuff!

Jim

A report which shows how heavy skirmishers could support an attack by close order troops.

Reports of Col. Joseph Thoburn, First West Virginia Infantry, commanding First Infantry Division, of engagement at Snickers Ferry and Kernstown, with itinerary of the division, July 1-24, 1864.

"I posted my command in two lines near the river- bank, the Second Brigade, then commanded by myself, on the right, the First Brigade, commanded by Colonel Wells, on the left, and the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Frost, in the center…. After lying in this position about one hour, the enemy advanced a heavy skirmish line upon my front and flanks, at the same time a heavy force was moved forward upon my right flank, moving in two lines of battle at nearly right angles to our lines; the Second Brigade was ordered to change its front to the right to meet this attack, which was gallantly done, but the sharp ENFILADING fire from skirmishers and sharpshooters upon the high ground in front caused some unsteadiness, and finally the first line gave way and fell back to the second line… "

Jim

PS Owen, the very first excerpted example of the attack of the 35th Indiana was meant to show how heavy skirmishers were intended to lead assaults. Also, the 21 KY during the June 20th action--according to the brigade commander--was not required to charge the main line of the enemy, but they did it anyway.

Jim,

It's easy to get a little confused when reading the drill manuals :) While it's true that for the purpose of the firings while in skirmish order the men retain the front-rank, rear-rank designations they had WHILE IN CLOSE ORDER, the skirmish line is deployed in a single rank:

(Hardee and Casey, Paragraph 26): "…the men composing each group of fours will then immediately deploy at five paces from each other… the rear rank men placing themselves on the left of their file leaders [the front rank man they were behind]."

It's clear from the description and from the diagrams in the books that the skirmishers are in a single rank. When firing the former front-rank man and the former rear-rank man work as a team, alternately loading and firing. And when firing while advancing or retreating they will leap-frog forward or back which will momentarily create a front and rear rank to the formation with the front-rank men ten paces apart and the rear rank men ten paces apart, but shifted five paces to the side to be in the intervals between the other rank.

So, the end result is a line of skirmishers with one man for every five paces of front. No matter how much support is provided to the rear, you still only have one man in action for every five paces of front. (I'm assuming that if a second or third line of skirmishers were deployed behind the first line, they could not fire for fear of accidentally hitting the rank in front of them.)

So, I can't see how a 'heavy skirmish line' is going to differ much in actual fighting power from a normal skirmish line. Obviously with lots of reserves the heavy skirmish line could stay in action a lot longer, rotating companies in and out of the front firing line (the manuals give instruction on how to do that), but this doesn't increase the amount of fire you can put on the enemy at any given moment.

This leaves us still in the dark. My personal theory is that commanders started telling their men to deploy with less than five paces between men, thus putting more men on the firing line. But until I can find some confirmation of that in the records, it will just remain a theory.

Scott

Scott:

Concering the "heavy skirmish line." Jim gives an interesting quote:

The Thirty-fifth Indiana made a brilliant charge on the enemy's skirmish line (WHICH WAS NEARLY EQUAL IN STRENGTH TO A LINE OF BATTLE), and, being well supported by the Forty-fifth Ohio, carried the rifle-pits and held them….

Here is a quote from:

William T. Sherman on Tactics and Entrenching
(Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman, 1891, vol 2, 394-397)
Transcribed and annotated by David W. Lowe

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and every cover.

The italics are for Jim. Just to note that Sherman states that lines were deployed according to tactics, that is the dirll manual like Casey's "Tactics." Tactics meaning the formation and movement of units.

It would appear that a 'heavy skirmish line' could well be a unit in close formation/two ranks, only with extended lines, rather than the formal skirmish line. The example of Longstreet's attack in the Wilderness, as well as Jim's example have one thing in common with Sherman's description. The combat descriptions were carried out in wooded areas.

If we see all descriptions of 'heavy skirmish lines' being in wooded areas, this might clear it up. A heavy skirmish line in the open would have far less utility than a wooded area, which not only would make a close formation difficult, but would provide cover that would protect the heavier or denser skirmish line.

Bill

Jim:

Your examples of 'Tossing the Book' don't really support that notion. I am assuming the capitalized portions are the evidence you feel support that idea.

"GREAT IMPETUOSITY", COURAGE, EFFECIENCY, GREAT CELERITY, do not mean that they ignored normal formation and maneuver.

The example of the Texas and Georgia regiments is a good example of the book being first ignored, then the officers trying to rectify the situation, finding that impossible move forward with both regiments, which would only be possible if both regiments were following the same methods, being mingled together. So, until this point, the book hasn't been tossed to anyone's benefit.

Benning's brigade made its appearance, but instead of occupying the ground to the left of Robertson's brigade, so as to enable the latter to move forward with its left flank secured from attack, it occupied the ground still occupied by a portion, at least, of this brigade, the Fifteenth Georgia Regiment falling in and remaining with the First Texas Regiment. After several ineffectual efforts upon the part of both the commanders of the Fifteenth Georgia and myself to separate the men of the two regiments,[!] we gave the order to move forward, when both regiments, thus commingled, moved forward and occupied the crest of the hill, some 100 yards or more to the front, and where the enemy's artillery was stationed, where we remained until the close of the day and until 2 o clock on Friday morning…

The example of the of the refusing a direct order isn't 'tossing the book' The part of the regiment remaining with the colors didn't sudden form a new type of line formation. They remained with the colors, which is about as traditional as you can get, formed on them and there is not indication that they then fought in some 'unbooklike' formation.

Once during the evening the troops upon my left were driven back, and my left was exposed, when, directing Capt. H. E. Moss, Company D, to take charge of the colors, and retaining them there with a few men to hold the hill until the regiment could safely retire, [The company was following orders] I ordered the regiment to fall back to a stone fence about 100 yards in rear. The major portion of the regiment and the Fifteenth Georgia fell back, as ordered, but quite a large number, having noticed that the colors were not moving to the rear, REFUSED TO WITHDRAW, [They didn't change formation or invent a new form of combat] and, remaining upon the crest of the hill, SUCCEEDED in holding the enemy in check in their immediate front, and obliquely upon their front and left, until the troops upon my left had been reformed and were again advanced…

Part of the reason that happened was that the two regiments WERE mixed together, so in the confusion, many in the regiment didn't believe they were supposed to withdraw…particularly with the colors still in place. Staying with the colors was very 'by the book.'

So where did they 'toss the book'? They didn't suddenly develop squad tactics or form four rank lines. They simply didn't follow an order to withdraw. Their response was based on the confusion first caused by a mistake in NOT following the book, the regiments forming in the wrong place, the fallout from that creating confusion and a loss of time trying to sort it out.

Showing initiative, refusing to obey an order, or doing things well as a team doesn't suggest, let alone prove, that they were ingoring the methods they trained to perform, only that they were doing them well.

Bill

Jim wrote:

Yes, praise is made of the officers AND men. An interesting study would be to compare how often "the men" were praised in Napoleonic battle reports in comparision to the ACW.

Ah, are you suggesting that officers and men weren't praised in Napoleonic battle reports. How do you think the 57th Ligne got the moniker 'the terrible' or the British 57th 'The Diehards' or 'Steelbacks'? Individual soldiers were mentioned in battle reports. For instance, Wellington's comment "The ever fighting, often tried, but never failing fifth."

Refusing orders to advance or withdrawal IS tossing the book… that was agreed to earlier in this thread.

Who did? I didn't. Refusing an order is simply refusing an order. It isn't forming a new kind of line or suddenly using squad tactics. The book simply laid out how troops maneuvered and formed up. The book on martial law dealt with following orders and the consequences for not doing so. That is the book tossed when refusing to follow an order, not Casey's or Hardee's manuals.

But the better example of tossing the book was Van Manning contenting himself with an irregular line b/c his orders couldn't be heard. If he contented himself that means someone else was already taking the initiative to refuse the line, maybe it was the officers and men collectively working as a team on that flank, but it's obvious from Van Manning's report that the flank refusal occured without his command and he acquiesced.

Certainly the officers and men were collectively working as a team on that flank, but your conclusion that they did it by 'tossing the book' and ignoring 'the plan' is not accurate at all.

You say:

I mentioned earlier in the thread that there were times when the book got tossed and troops had to work as a team or teams in order to be successful and/or carry and/or defend the objective. The top down, battalion level paradigm with the Colonel barking orders for perfect formation changes, flank refusals by the 10th company and whatnto wasn't going to cut it.

Jim, you need to read Casey's volume on brigade and regimental operations. A team can only work together if they have a common understanding of their role and perogatives. It was SOP that a company captain could refuse the line if he deemed it necessary. It didn't require a direct command and THAT is why Manning 'acquiesced.'

The manuals were written by veteran soldiers who realized, with alot of practical history behind it, that things happen in battle that require 'on-the-spot' decisions, and each level of command had understood perogatives in decision-making. A company commander could refuse the line on a flank, but not in the middle of the line. He could extend the line on a flank, but not in the middle of the line. He could counter-attack with his company, but could not leave his portion of the line. etc. etc.

No one is arguing that the drill manual required soldiers and low level officers to be little robots. They did require soldiers to know their role in the team effort call the company and regiment, brigade and division.

You seem to think that the manual kept men from showing initiative and working as a team, when 'the book' was what allowed a large group of men to function as a team…even in disobeying orders, the Texas group held to their training and the SOP of forming on the colors. Teams need a plan of who-did-what to act as a team and that was what the manual was.

Bill

Bill,

Here's the report from the 35th Indiana on that action:

Report of Lieut. Gol. Augustus U. Tassin, Thirty-fifth Indiana Infantry, of operations July 1-September 8.

"The following morning, the enemy having evacuated their position on Kenesaw Mountain, the regiment took the line of march in pursuit, passing through Marietta, coming up again with the enemy about four miles south of that place. Here the brigade was ordered to halt for the night, the Thirty-fifth being detailed to PICKET the brigade front. Early next morning orders were received to advance our lines with a view to drive back the enemy's skirmishers, capture their rifle-pits, if possible, and thereby check an enfilading fire which seriously annoyed the troops on our right. The length of our lines at this time was about 500 yards, and extended through a thick wood bordering an open field, in the center of which some 300 yards in our front the enemy's rifle [pits] could plainly be seen. The command being given to advance, the men rushed forward with a cheer, keeping up an incessant running fire until they reached the enemy's pits, which they took possession of, capturing 1 officer, 15 enlisted men. The troops on our left failing to advance, left us exposed to a galling flank fire, but the men unflinchingly held their ground until relieved by a portion of the Forty-fifth Ohio. I cannot speak too highly of the con- duct of my officers and men on this occasion. Our total loss in the action, which lasted one hour and a half, was 4 enlisted men killed, and 6 wounded. "

According to the regimental returns and listed casualties the 35th Indiana's strength was no more than 200 men when this action took place on July 4th, 1864. If they were stretched to approximately 500 yards, then they certainly would've been considered something of a picket line, as Lt. Col. Tassin mentioned. Perhaps it was the fact that they made their attack so widely dispersed as a picket line and not a heavy skirmish line which is what elicited the response in the brigade commander's report that the skirmish line they attacked was "nearly equal in strength to a line of battle" ? Hard to say definitively.

Jim

Jim:
Yeah, it isn't clear. Both Sherman and Upton referred to soldiers occupying 'rifle pits' as skirmishers, so that 'skirmish line' could be a line of rifle pits. With twenty men per company spaced out 5 paces [@2.5 feet] across 500 yards means that about 125-140 men would have been in line with sixty back in the supports, or seven or eight companies up, and two to three in support.

The skirmish line they attacked are identified as rifle pits. There is no way that men deployed in a line of rifle pits could have been nearly the strength of a line of battle. 500 yards in a line of battle would mean more than 1,000 men in two ranks.

Now rifle pits were often dug in depth, but with only 10 Union casualties, or 5% in an assault against at least five times their number doesn't ring true. Perhaps the rifle pits were in front of a heavier skirmish line behind, perhaps the Brigadier was including the front of the 'troops on their left' that didn't advance, or he could have been blowing smoke up some senior officer's pant leg.

My guess is probably a little of all three because the Rebs could have counterattacked and easily blown the 35th OH back they way they came if they did have 1,000 men or more facing them.

The low casualties in a skirmish is typical, including the 5%. I think there have been some studies on that. Paddy Griffith did some research comparing casualties with formed lines and skirmishers, I believe.

Sherman in his memoirs also wrote this:

Advance by rushes
When a regiment is deployed as skirmishers, and crosses an open field or woods, under heavy fire, if each man runs forward from tree to tree, or stump to stump, and yet preserves a good general alignment, it gives great confidence to the men themselves, for they always keep their eyes well to the right and left, and watch their comrades; but when some few hold back, stick too close or too long to a comfortable log, it often stops the line and
defeats the whole object.

Therefore, the more we improved the fire-arm the more will be the necessity for good organization, good discipline, and intelligence on the part of the individual soldier and officer.

Most the examples you have given are from the later part of the war, 1864, and so some of these tactics would have been in place. Note though, as I italicized, the methods Sherman described are still following the book. In fact, the whole process is basically what Hardee and Casey describe for skirmish advances, just applied to entire battle lines.

Bill

Disobeying orders is throwing out the book alright, just not the drill manuel. The book that throws out is the one that can get you stood up infront of a tree and shot, if it doesnt get you hanged.

Other than the heavy skirmish line, I still dont see where the soldiers have on thier own suddenly used a new formation. That is what the book is about. useing initiative is not throwing out the book, that is part of the book.

Jim you may not have directly said the privates became tactical geniuses, but you certainly implied it by saying the soldiers knew better what to do, and did it despite the barking officers. Other than a couple of examples that look more like confusion than delibertate actions, I dont see a single action where the privates have suddenly developed a new tactic. Every action you have listed used tactics straight out of the manuel. The only one not in there is the heavy skirmish line, and that seems to be something that the officers used somewhat regularly.

There is more than just a brigade commander, and a few regimental commanders. There are captains at the company, and lots of LTs running around doing things. Not to mention lots of grouchy old sgts keeping things going. Much of what you seem to think was privates doing it on thier own was junior officers barking orders at a lower level.

Just how are the privates to have arrived at the plan they want to execute? tactics is a performing art. there is no best solution, or if there is, it is one in the book. So to chuch the book, the privates need, on the spot to arrive at this new and novel idea, and somehow communicate it to all the other privates, nd get thier agreement on what they are going to do.

We have all agreed I beleive that we cannot take modern experiences to far in examining the old guys. It seems at times you are almost saying that they suddenly developed WWII tactics and started useing fire and manuever in thier short rushes. No way. That is a hard thing to do, and the soldiers that use it have to practice long and hard to getr there. And, as has been noted several times, short rushes are in the book. Just not the fluid action that became common years later. part of that was due to the weapons. Perhaps most of that was due to the weapons.

In this ear, the only way to up firepower was to up soldier density. They only way that a skirmish line could rival a regular line was to increase that density to the point where there was little advantage to the heavy skirmnish line. Some, just not a lot. In the opemn, the lose of command and controol was prbably not worth the small amount of extra protection.

In the woods, this is a different story. The ability to hide behind trees helped a bit. But as has been pointed out elsewhere, trees where cut down in ACW fights by bullets. Unless you got a big enough tree it might not stop the bullet at all. But at least it kept somebody from aiming right at you. Was it woirth doing? Sure it was, otherwise it would have not been used and mentioned so much. But it does not seem to have been something the privates decided to do on thier own, what ever it was.

This was not the Army of Fredrick the Great where everything was totaly regulated. nor was it a mob of wildeyed snas-culottes that thought obeying orders may be a crime against the people. It was somewhere in between, probably closer to the republican armys than the lace wars armys.

Historians sometimes talk of soldiers battles, as if all the officers in an army stopped haveing an effect. Largely this is a fiction they create themselves. It is just that Generals lose control, but lower officers are still there barking the needed orders.

Scott can give a much better acount than me, but I dont know off-hand of a single formation or tactic in Hardees that doesnt have a use. I dont remember any parade ground only movements in it, but my knowledge is admittedly much less than scotts. Thiose manuels where written to be used on the battlefield, not conduct parades. The contents reflect that.

Earlier in the thread you mentioned right shoulder shift as an example of a useless movement. I asm told by a couple of reenactor friends that it is used so that in certain movements you dont bonk the guy next to you on the head with your rifle. I dont see how throwing out the book and thumping the other guy is more usefull than going to riught sholder shift.- Perhaps there is a reason, and I am awaiting enlightenment.

At some point many of us discover that something they thought for a long time is simply wrong. For many years I agrued that Sherman tanks where just a bd tank. More careful reading, and experience with a lot of real tanks has shown me the error of my ways.

I beleive you are wrong bout the drill book. I think it is a much more usefull book than you realize. And that it allowed a lot more flexibility than you realize. As I said upthread, I like arguments like this, it is how I learn things. It was my research into why the Sherman was bad that led me to understand why on a real battlefield it was in fact a great tank.

Owen

And hey this makes a lot more sense than arguing about bricoles at least.

owen

Years of studying (and using) the tactics manuals have only increased my admiration for them and their authors. They are remarkably well thought out and very admirably fit both the weaponry and the soldiers of the Civil War era.

But the systems were not perfect and it is perhaps possible to detect the flaws by seeing what was changed after the war. Emory Upton's tactics manual dramatically streamlines the tactical system. What previously took three volumes was condensed into just one. The primary way Upton was able to do this was to do away with the old traditional system of trying to always retain the proper ordering of the companies in the battalion. For centuries the position of the companies within the battalion was determined by the seniority of the company captains. The senior was on the right of the line, the second senior on the left, the third senior was the color company, etc. The tactical systems went to great pains to preserve this order and many of the maneuvers were needlessly complicated in order to accomplish this. Upton threw all that out and made each company an interchangeable part. When deploying from column to line the companies just got on the line in the quickest manner possible, ignoring the ordering of the companies. Similar streamlining took place within the companies, too. Upton also took some tentative steps toward the creation of the infantry squad--something that did not exist in the Civil War.

Upton may also gives us a clue about the mysterious "Heavy Skirmish Line" (I should have checked him sooner!) His "Instruction for Skirmishers" in his tactics manual states in paragraph 640: "Skirmishers will habitually be deployed at five paces' interval; this may be diminished or extended according to the desired strength of the line."

THE DESIRED STRENGTH OF THE LINE! Diminished intervals = stronger line. Extended intervals = weaker line. Or, I might say: Diminished intervals = "Heavy line".

I stress that this is a post-war manual and we cannot assume that this was done during the war. But since Upton based his manual in great part on lessons learned during the war, it is a possibility. Hopefully we will be able to find some confirmation of this.

Scott

Scott:
I am still not sure that simply having men closer than 5 paces in a single rank would be considered a 'heavy skirmish line.' I have no doubt that it was done during the ACW, especially when even a formed line could extend or open their ranks as the commander chose.

Scott wrote:

The primary way Upton was able to do this was to do away with the old traditional system of trying to always retain the proper ordering of the companies in the battalion. For centuries the position of the companies within the battalion was determined by the seniority of the company captains. The senior was on the right of the line, the second senior on the left, the third senior was the color company, etc. The tactical systems went to great pains to preserve this order and many of the maneuvers were needlessly complicated in order to accomplish this. Upton threw all that out and made each company an interchangeable part.

It is quite true that Napoleonic and later tactical systems went to great pains to maintain a specific order, but there were very practical reasons for that--and a number of organizations were used beside the one you mention. The same system was followed by brigades and divisions. It was also used during the ACW. I am not sure where Upton makes companies interchangable in a battalion. His Tactics only covers squads and companies. His regulations for the battalion were included in Reed's manual in 1882. Here is what he says is written by Upton:

Reed's Elements of Military Science and Tactics compiled from Upton's Infantry Tactics… 1882 p. 129

XII.—formation of a Battalion.
373. For manreuvers the battalion is generally divided into an even number of companies. Two companies constitute a division.

In forming line the companies are so posted that the senior captains may command divisions, having under them the junior captains corresponding in rank. The senior captain commands the right company, the second captain the 'left company, the third captain the right center, or color company (a) the color bearer of which is a sergeant, and his post is No. 2 of the left four of his company; the left four is the color-guard. The color-guard does not fix bayonets.

Companies are designated numerically from right to left when in line, and from front to rear when in column, first company, second company, and so on.

The numbers of companies change when the left is in front. H233.) [That means the typical rear to front in column. BH]

Where is this process abandoned? It is a very conventional array starting with the SYW, the Senior captain often being the designator of the 'senior company'. Unless the 'senior captain' simply changed companies interchangably, the senior captain would be with his company, which would then be on the right.

Bill

Bill,

I'm sitting here with an 1868 copy of "Upton's Infantry Tactics" and it has School of the Soldier, School of the Company, School of the Battalion and Evolutions of the Brigade just like Casey's (no Corps d'armee, however). Where did you get the notion that Upton only covered squads and companies?

The passage that you quote is just when the battalion forms a column of divisions (two companies wide by five divisions deep) and the senior captain of the pair should take charge of the division. It has nothing to do with the old ordering of the companies in the line of battle that I was talking about. (Actually, to be honest, Upton doesn't completely abandon the old ordering system. When the battalion first lines up the order of the companies is just as before. But during the various ployments and deployments the order often gets reversed and Upton doesn't seem to care at all.)

And your first comment: "…especially when even a formed line could extend or open their ranks as the commander chose." has me confused.

A battalion can open its ranks by having the rear rank fall back four paces, but there's no mechanism I know of to 'extend' a line of battle. It might seem like a simple thing to just order the men to 'spread out until you have a pace between each file' but to actually get a large body of troops to do it would involve a great deal of shuffling about and confusion. There's certainly nothing in the manuals about it.

Scott

Hi

given the inaccuracy of the weapons and field use, the other issue of the skirmish line is that while the density of fire is less than a formed line, so is its vulnerability to fire.

Or back to the older part of "effective range" differs if you are shooting into a column, a forme 3 rank or 2 rank line, or a skirmish line.

Rocky

Scott wrote:

It has nothing to do with the old ordering of the companies in the line of battle that I was talking about. (Actually, to be honest, Upton doesn't completely abandon the old ordering system. When the battalion first lines up the order of the companies is just as before. But during the various ployments and deployments the order often gets reversed and Upton doesn't seem to care at all.)

? As I quoted from Upton earlier:

The senior captain commands the right company, the second captain the 'left company, the third captain the right center, or color company (a) the color bearer of which is a sergeant, and his post is No. 2 of the left four of his company; the left four is the color-guard. The color-guard does not fix bayonets.

Companies are designated numerically from right to left when in line, and from front to rear when in column, first company, second company, and so on.

I only had Upton's abridged copy by Reed. I found the 1875 version of his Tactics for Double and Single Rank, so now I'm on the same page as you.

One page 151, School of the Battlaion it says:

In forming line, the companies are so posted that the senior captains may command divisions, having under them the junior captains corresponding in rank. The senior captain commands the right company, the second captain the left company, the third captain the right centre, or color company.

When the number of companies is uneven, the company commanded by the second captain is regarded as aD odd company, and is posted on the left of the line; the fourth captain commands the second company from tin left. In the manoeuvres by division, the odd companj constitutes a division by itself, and is so designated iu thecolonel's commands.

There is a Table showing the order of companies in line from right to left numbered accordingly at this point.

Companies whose captains are absent, are posted in line according to the relative rank of the officers present in command of them. At the discretion of the colonel, a company whose captain is absent for a few days only may retain its place according to his rank.

After line is formed, no cognizance is taken of the relative order of the companies, either in the evolutions or under fire.

I can see in Upton's writing where companies and battalions might change designation in formation, but I am not clear how that jives with the seniority of the captains and battalion commanders dictating their location in line.

In The School of the Brigade, p.242

At parades, reviews, and other forms of ceremony, the regiments are posted in line from right to left according to the rank of colonels, the senior colonel on the right. On all other occasions, the regiments are posted at the discretion of the general.

Battalions are designated from the right when in line, and the head when in column, first battalion, second battalion, and so on. If in two lines the battalions of the first line are designated from the right first, and second; those of the second line third, and fourth.

If in two columns,. the battalions last in the front line are designated from the head of the column first, and second; those of the second line third, and fourth. These designations change whenever, in facing to the rear, the left of the line becomes the right, and the rear the head of the column.

School of the division
p.313

Brigades in line are designated right, centre, and left; or, if one be in rear, right, left, and rear; in column they are designated leading, centre, and rear. In order that no mistakes may occur in transmitting orders, the names of the brigade commanders will always he mentioned.

While this is at the descretion of the divisional commander WHO will be the right, left and center brigades, during the ACW and afterward it was almost always the senior brigade commander on the right. This is all SOP for 19th Century battle arrays.

Bill