"Unit frontage and rifle-musket engagement ranges?" Topic

Rocky:

I understand what you are saying and I am not disagreeing with you. I am simply noting what contemporary Military men said and did. Supposedly Plunket hit Colbert in the forehead at between 250 to 400 yards depending on the witness.

See Scharnhorst's ordinance tests for rifles in 1811. Hanover did similar tests ten years earlier, and those are just two of dozens. I don't think those tests are much different from your experiences. However, Scharnhorst still wrote it.

I can think of reasons why they might put down 300 yards as the limits to the 'effective range' of a rifle, but I haven't read anything specific that tells me what Scharnhorst or others were thinking…

Bill

The problem with accuracy tests both in the past and today is that they aren't done in real combat situations. Which makes them pretty much irrelevant. Sure in the hands of a well-trained man a rifle-musket can hit a man at 400 yards or even longer. But under real battlefield conditions, a hit at that range is just luck.

Whenever I think about real battlefield accuracy I can't help but think about the action at Pitzer's Woods on July 2nd where a hundred Berdan Sharpshooters, trained marksmen with excellent weapons, still needed 100 shots to inflict one casualty in a fairly close range firefight.

A target range is one thing. Real battle is something else entirely.

I have just went back through my copy of Hardees, specificly looking for the much derided minutia, and I just dont see that much. A few things that could be streamlined, sure. But enough to throw the book out, no it just isnt there. As has been said, there are a limited number of ways to move people around.

Take 40-50 people and try to get them to do anything at all togather and in a timely manner. Even something as simple as walk across a field. There are always somebody that wants to stragle. Or stop and talk, or look at a flower or some such.

I know that those on here with military experience already know this. As to the reenactors. Apperently though some just dont get how hard it is to get people to do stuff togather. Even ves wont do the right thing, without formal command, because they will not agree on what the right thing is.In fact, vets in particular know this, that you are better off doing not quite the best thing all togather at the same time, rather than a bunch of individual great ideas.

As foir spreading out, the problem is that it dilutes the firepower of the formation. Spread out to much and you no longer have enough to stand up to a line formation. And, the individual soldier has no idea how far they have spread out, it takes somebody stepping back and taking a good look. One of the theories of the why of Isandlawana is that the British soldiers simply spread out to much to cover the ground they needed to with thier slow fireing weapons. and they where a lot faster fireing than ACW weapons for sure.

So how about some concrete examples of movements used in the field that could be despensed with. What parts of the manuel where so bad that soldiers would abandon it in the middle of a fight, right when they needed cohesion the most?

Owen

The question should be what are some concrete examples of COMMANDS used in the field that could be despensed with. What parts of the manuel where so MINUTE that soldiers would abandon them in the middle of a fight, right when they were operating at FULL SPEED as a team ?

Someone else can double-check me on this one cause I don't feel like looking it up, but I believe the order that Kershaw gave according to Kershaw which chewed his left wing up so bad was "By the right flank". Now that one wasn't even minute but that is definitelty one that Kershaw wished his left wing had dispensed with or abandoned. A surefire example of when it would've been better if the book had been TOSSED.

Jim

Someone else can double-check me on this one cause I don't feel like looking it up, but I believe the order that Kershaw gave according to Kershaw which chewed his left wing up so bad was "By the right flank". Now that one wasn't even minute but that is definitelty one that Kershaw wished his left wing had dispensed with or abandoned. A surefire example of when it would've been better if the book had been TOSSED.

Jim:
Kershaw gave the order to his left hand division, each officer yelling out the order down the line. Kershaw had 'thrown out' the book in dividing his brigade in the face of the enemy, all in an attempt to obey his orders to keep one flank on Emmittsburg Road and the other connected to Hood's Division, according to 'the book'.

He'd ignored one rule to save another. Why did he have to? Because Hood had ingnored orders and 'tossed out the book' regarding how his division supposed to coordinate with McLaws.

The problems caused Benning and Anderson to become out of position; caused Laws ride back to the left flank of Hood's division to fix the disconnect; led to Barksdale to tear up his brigade, as it tried to stay connected to Kershaw's left; and caused Kershaw to try and cobble together a solution to a problem cause by Hood's 'tossing the book.' Kershaw's solution was to forget 'the book' by dividing his brigade to cover more frontage. He gave an order to the left division of this brigade and…

As is often the case when the game plan, the book is tossed in mid-stream, more mistakes were made. Kershaw's right group of regiments thought [as was usually the case] that the order shouted out by the left was for them too. There was no reason for the right hand section of the Brigade, veteran officers and men to go, "Oh, ignore that order cause guns we can't see are going to chew us up if we follow the order."

One moment of tossing the book leads to other officers being forced to cobble something together to deal with the problems caused, more mistakes insue and officers like Law spend their time fixing the problems on the far left rather than leading Hood's division's attack on the right.

If you look at a map, you see that Hood's decision to move farther [toss the book] to the left instead of following the plan and insisted on by Longstreet caused:

1. McLaws to start nearly an hour late waiting for Hood.
2. Kershaw', Barksdale's and Robertson's brigades to fracture. It wasn't the enemy that did it.
3. Benning and Anderson to be out of position, and along with Semmes, they to be injected piecemeal into the battle line to shore up Kershaw and Roberstons brigades.
4. Wofford was committed to continue the attack, but where was primarily chosen to fill the gap that was created between Barksdale and Kershaw.

The OR reports detail all this.

"Tossing the Book" whenever a part of the team feels it's necessary leads to problems for everyone. It is like the Horn section of a marching band deciding that going left in the middle of a performance is a good thing.

Teams have plans so they can act as a team, and if they work together long enough, practice long enough, the parts of the plan become second nature… So when problems do arise or someone has decided to use their own plan, the rest of the team can still function, carry out the original plan and be successful.

Point out an example of any level unit 'tossing the book' and I am 98% sure there will have been someone like Hood or Barksdale who had already decided to ignore orders or 'the book' and the rest of the team has to cobble something together to save to day… In otherwords, they toss the book because someone else screwed up the plan by tossing the book in the first place.

Bottom line: Things are rarely better because someone tossed 'the book', the game plan, out the window. The only time 'the plan' is ignored is when there is a broken play on the field.

Bill

When we talk about "The Book" we have to be aware that we're really talking about two different things. The tactics manuals used during the war, Scott's, Hardee's, Gilham's, Casey's, were just a set of mechanical instructions, a tool kit to allow commanders to get their men where they wanted quickly and efficiently. But they were not what we would call today "doctrine". There is nothing in any of those books that tells a commander how or when to use the tools in the tool kit. As Sherman put it when he was General-in-Chief in 1880 recommending that a new tactics manual was needed: "… thus far in our history tactics, in all areas of the service, have been simply a collection of rules for passing from one formation to another. How to fight has been left to the actual experience of war." There's nothing in the manuals telling a commander HOW to fight (with one very minor exception in Casey's). Upton's post-war manual has a few suggestions, but it isn't until we get to the Infantry Drill Regulations of 1891 that we start to see actual tactical doctrine appearing in the regulations.

In the ACW, tactical doctrine would be learned from Jomini or Halleck's book or the experience of Mexican War veterans, or, more often, the hard school of real combat.

So, if we talk about "throwing away the book" we need to be clear about which book we mean. My research leads me to believe that commanders continued to use the 'book' methods for moving troops found in the tactical manuals throughout the war. But as they grew more experienced, they found better ways to use the tools those manuals gave them.

Scott

So, if we talk about "throwing away the book" we need to be clear about which book we mean. My research leads me to believe that commanders continued to use the 'book' methods for moving troops found in the tactical manuals throughout the war. But as they grew more experienced, they found better ways to use the tools those manuals gave them.

Scott:

I agree. Hood's amending a direct order is counter to a different book of regulations than Kershaw's spliting of his brigade. I think Jim and we have been talking about Tactics.

The term 'tactics' in the military dictionaries of the first half of the nineteenth century cover just that The school of the soldier through the school of the battalion. Only Casey discusses brigade formations and maneuvers in any real detail.

Duane's 1810 Military Dictionary says this:

Tactics A word derived from the Greek signifying order. Tactics consist of a knowledge of order, disposition and formation, according to the exigency of circumstances in warlike operations. These dispositions are severally made, or one disposition follows another by means of manoeuvres and evolutions. Hence the necessity of paying the greatest attention to the first principles of military art; and hence the absurdity and ignorance of some men, who would pass for great and able tacticians without having grounded themselves in the elements of their professions.
As well might a person assume the character of a mathematician under total ignorance of the first rules.

H.L. Scott's 1861 Military Dictionary gives a definition that records the continuity of the concept of "Tactics" over the last 100 years:

Tactics: As distinguished from strategy, is the art of handling troops. Sect. 7 Act of May 8, 1792 prescribes the tactics established by Congress in 1779, as the rules for the exercise and training of militia.

The author goes on with several published manuals in 1813, 1820, and 1826. He finishes with the then current manual:

Tactics for the Manoeuvre of Infantry of the Line and Light Infantry

A fascinating book from 1907 on the changes in tactics and the concept of tactics as seen from the perspective of a 19th Century military man is Major Gerald Gilbert's The Evolution of Tactics

When General Dundas wrote his 1797 regulations, he wrote, the very first sentence:

The want of uniformity, of method, of regulation, in the movement of British troops has long been felt, the attendent bad consequences too apparent, and the remedy earnestly and universally desired.

Of course, he was talking about Tactics.

Bill

Hi

Well, again, the issue of accuracy usually involves people picking their points to prove some rules they like rather than a real discussion.

While, in the field, under combat, modern or vintage, most people will not assay a successful 400 yard Kill, that isn't the issue I am addressing.

Some rules take "not very effective" as we have all read, and have the rule be "never". Or the reverse, Carlos Hathcock kills a man at 1200 yards, therefore everyone does.

In the tests, the target is not usually addressed. Hitting a french column is easier than hitting an individual. Even better, we have all read where just taking a volley ment the unit either stops or fails. Both are aspects that the commander makes choices about. For instance, if you knew your muskets are 60 yard weapons and the opposition at 400 has rifles, then tactical choices are made. One does not stand off and swap volleys, but tries to close. The Riflemen MIGHT accept the wastage with the idea of gaining the effect.

This applies, oddly, in modern parlance. For a while the british who so perfected "sniping" in WW1 also observed that their snipers didn't usually get "one shot/one kill" beyond 400 yards. Americans with the same equipment and NO formal sniper school upset the british with their wastage at long range. The issue was tactical choices.

Some of the above opinions suggest a "top down" approach, essentially while talking drill and tactics seem to want their rules to make sure you do the "right" thing. The example of the above failure of Berdan's of course, illustrates my point. The commander TRIED to do long range effect and failed. In other fights it worked. But citing ONE failure is reasoning from the specific to the general.

From the basic mechanics point, there is a real difference between musket, roundball rifle and conicals. And thus, there should be the OPTION of the shot even if the odds are poor. A few lucky shots?

R

In my example of the Berdans I wasn't trying to suggest that all long-range fire was ineffective. There is much evidence that under the right circumstances the Berdans, and other sharpshooters, could hit their target at amazing ranges. My point with the Pitzer's Woods engagement was that in a general firefight with all the attendant noise, confusion and fear, even good marksmen would have trouble hitting a target.

But you do make a good point about how we reflect things in the rules. Long range hits were rare so do we eliminate the possibility entirely? Logic might say no, just work out the dice so that a reasonably small possibility exists and let the players decide if they should take the shot or not. Sounds good, but it doesn't take into account the other factors that would influence a real commander. Do the rules also include ammunition supply? How about the cumulative fouling of the guns? I've read accounts of veteran officers declaring that they wouldn't let their men fire at ranges beyond 200 yards because it was a waste of ammunition. If they had had unlimited ammo and never had to worry about dirty muskets, then why not fire away? Even a few casualties inflicted would be worth it--if you didn't have to pay any price to do it. So, do you include ammo supply and dirty muskets to your rules to counterbalance the chance of a few hits at long range? Or do you just keep it simple by not allowing any of it? The end results might be about the same.

We all have our personal hobby-horses when it come to rules. Mine is the "Extended Line" formation that we see in almost every set of ACW rules. It's in the rules because of what the 20th Maine did on Little Round Top. The rules want to allow you to so that. But this allows the player to do it any time he wants and in circumstances totally inappropriate. And since there's no penalty (there ought to be a penalty) players use it as they please even though it was actually a rare event.

But I shouldn't be so quick to criticize. Transforming reality into an accurate rules set is incredibly difficult. I've been trying, without success, for years :)

Scott write:

But I shouldn't be so quick to criticize. Transforming reality into an accurate rules set is incredibly difficult. I've been trying, without success, for years :)

Scott and Rocky:

Hi. I think it is a question of *why* long range fire was even attempted. When most ACW game systems are based on casualties, and then morale checks, that ignores other reasons for such fire, other effects. I mean really, why would the Napoleonic French, veteran officers, open fire at 200-250 yards, when there was so little chance of actually causing enough casualties to make it worth the expenditure of ammo? The same can be said for any number of ACW engagements. Obviously not causing casualtie per se, and just as obvious, the participants felt they has a reasonable chance of achieving some kind of effect, or why do it?

And transforming historical reality into a set of rules is made much, much harder when there is so many bad ideas about how to do that floating around our hobby.

Bill

Hi

Well, Imagine that you know your guys can hit that column of muskets at 400 yards and they cannot reply in any meaningful fashion until 100!

It would be a choice.

A little later than this period, the choice of going to the trapdoor springfield single shot weapons instead of repeaters was exactly this issue. The Civil war carbines and repeaters using various rimfire cartirdges were, in essence, 50 yard weapons. The indians not standing up to a proper fight, the experience was getting long range shots ONLY. The Trapdoor 50 or 45 both, in essence, use the same bullets and loads as the civil war rifled muskets, 400 to 500 grain rounds at about 1400fps.

Owning examples of all of them, I accept the decision. My revolving carbines and the like are 50 yard weapons. My trapdoor is actually a thousand yard weapon against individuals!

As an aside, all ammo with all of them are made with period tools, molds and so on.

Rocky

Good thread, guys. Lots of knowledge being shared. Thanks.

Well, Rocky, if you can hit a man-sized target at 1000 yards with your trapdoor then you definitely belong in the sharpshooters :) The vast majority of ACW soldiers couldn't have hit a barn at 1000 yards--with any weapon available. And their officers would have been well aware of that.

Scott wrote:

"Mine is the "Extended Line" formation that we see in almost every set of ACW rules. It's in the rules because of what the 20th Maine did on Little Round Top. "

How about Longstreet's flank attack(s) during the Wilderness? I'd hazard a guess and say he was using extended brigade line assaults successively and with success… Hancock later said he was about to roll up the entire Federal flank like a "wet towel". And that certainly doesn't sound like the Rebel attacks were in an "unholy mess". I think as the troops learned to discard the training wheels of the drill manual, in much greater evidence in the later half of the war--perhaps even earlier out West-- extended lines became more viable. The demand for massed firepower was addressed by the troops themselves becoming better and more proficient shooters.

Jim

By "Extended Line" I'm referring to going from a 2-rank line to a 1-rank line. Chamberlain did it in an emergency situation on Little Round Top. I imagine that it was done from time to time when a regiment had some nice linear obstacle to defend and didn't plan to move anywhere else. But trying to use it in the open field would just be asking for trouble. You automatically have only half the firepower per yard of front of a 2-rank line and any reduction in vulnerability to enemy fire is trivial. Trying to maneuver is a nightmare since 95% of the standard maneuvers can't be done from a 1-rank line and the probability of your formation coming apart are much higher. Longstreet's 'extended brigade line' that you speak of is something else entirely.

Hi

Yes, Scott, I have that background and training. The issue isn't me, or some vague "couldn't hit an elephant at that range", but my discussing the weapons capabilities.

You could argue, I suppose, that qualty of the gun doesn't matter as "they couldn't hit anyway", but then you have no reason for the governments of the time to buy rifles at all.

In the discussion here, no one objects to the idea that Sharpes shooters could do this at longer range than most. What I am saying is that mechanically, there is no difference between the Trapdoor, the Remington model 1 and 5, the Sharpes 30" business rifle or for that matter the Martini Henry. We are talking about moa between 3 and 5" versus 36 to 40 for a musket.

R

How about Longstreet's flank attack(s) during the Wilderness? I'd hazard a guess and say he was using extended brigade line assaults successively and with success… Hancock later said he was about to roll up the entire Federal flank like a "wet towel". And that certainly doesn't sound like the Rebel attacks were in an "unholy mess". I think as the troops learned to discard the training wheels of the drill manual, in much greater evidence in the later half of the war--perhaps even earlier out West-- extended lines became more viable. The demand for massed firepower was addressed by the troops themselves becoming better and more proficient shooters.

Jim:
There are no training wheels in a drill manual. It isn't some kind ofHow to Maneuver a Regiment for Dummies. It was simply the "How To" book, period.

Extended lines are in the drill manual and had been for ages. They had been used for ages. The British used them in the Peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars. The Americans did the same during the War of 1812 and the Mexican War.

Let's not 'hazard a guess'. Either Longstreet did or didn't deploy in extended line. If you don't know, why bother to guess. If he did, that wasn't discarding some training wheels, and certainly not the drill manual. If he extended the line, that would have been done the way the troops were trained to extend the line--and very much for the same reasons. There was nothing new or outside the drill manual in Longstreet's attack…IF he did use extended line.

The term "extend the line" has a very specific, techincal meaning. When ACW officers used the term "Extended Line", they all knew what that meant, because they all used that formation, trained with that formation as detailed in the drill manual.

They didn't say one day, "I'm going to discard the manual and invent 'extended lines', or that now that we can shoot straight, we can use extended lines. Extended lines had been used since the beginning of the war… depending on the circumstances, which is true for ALL of the different formations and maneuvers explained in the drill manual.

It is possible that new regiments hadn't trained in all the maneuvers/formations detailed in the manuals of the day, but that was a problem with time and the quality of the training, not some problem with the manual. It could well be that new troops couldn't do an extended line with any proficiency, but that is a lack of training, not training wheels…

Bill

Just a further note on "Extended lines"

If you look at the following manuals, all available for free on Google Books:

Dundas 1798
Rottemburg Rifle and Light Infantry Instruction 1798/1814
US Infantry regulations 1792/1813/1826
Scott's Infantry Tactics 1830/1845
Hardee's Light Infantry Manual 1850/1861
Casey's infantry manual 1863
Upton's On Tactics 1867/1882
US Infantry Regulations 1904

They all define, rationalize the use of, and instruct on deploying in the extended line formation in nearly identical terms without exception. And for the entire century every manual described how it could be done from four, three, two and one rank. [Yes, even 1904]

Bill

Bill,

I'm a little confused about your reference to the "Extended line". Are you talking about a formation where the men are in a SINGLE RANK? (Excluding the files closers.) I just did a quick look through Casey's and the only place I can find a mention is at the end of the School of the Company where it describes how to take a company in two ranks and put it into a single rank (and the reverse to put it back into two ranks). It mentions that if you want to do this with a whole battalion that first you break by files to the rear to put the battalion into a column of companies and then each company forms a single rank as if by itself. I can find no mention of ever forming a battalion line of battle into a single rank. There are no battalion manuevers described while being in a single rank.

Scott:

Thanks for your clarification on the the specific and technical meaning of extended line. Strictly speaking, yes, I meant something different.

Jim

Ah, okay, glad we cleared that up :) The 'hobby-horse' I was referring to above are the rule sets that allow you to spread out a regiment to twice its normal frontage. Most rules sets call this an "extended line". It's not skirmish order since skirmish order only had 1/10th the density of a 2-rank battle line. The only thing that would have twice the frontage of a 2-rank line would be a 1-rank line. And as noted, while it was probably done from time to time, it would have been pretty rare and only done under special circumstances.

The rule sets I've seen it used in, namely Johnny Reb, seem to treat/play it as more of a loose order line, something that might develop as the training wheels came off and wasn't necessarily due to a strict command. I see it more as an appropriate mis-label.

Do the drill manuals make a distinction between a heavy skirmish line and a skirmish line ?

Scott:

Check out the Skirmish section of Casey. It is there that 'extended line' is described.

An extended line is just that, a line [of however many ranks] that have been spaced out. There is the closed line, extended line and open formation… the only difference is the space between the men in the ranks. Elbow to elbow, two to three feet apart and and five to six feet apart. Beyond that is referred to as chains, usually formed from two ranks, but can be three ranks to a file in the chain, usually five to ten yards apart.

Scott, that means an officer have methods for having the skirmish line in one, two or three or more ranks in each file by combining the instructions you note at the end of the School of the Company and the Article on Skirmishing. It was just a matter of what the commander wanted. I haven't read of ACW troops skirmishing or maneuvering in a single rank, most always two ranks or pairs, but they could have using Casey and other manuals.

In Casey it is Title IV Instruction for Skirmishers, Article One, Deployment, #3 line 35 and then line #51 "The extended intervals" The terms are different, as earlier regulations simply call it Extending the line, such as Rottemberg's Light infantry instruction 1814 pages 22-24.

But the methods are very much the same for lengthening the line. While this process is used by the British and the Americans for forming what is generally used as a skirmish line, it is nothing more than a close-order line spread out or 'extended.' A two rank line would have the two men in each file skirmish together as a pair, or not, if in a single rank, which Casey has diagrams showing that extended formation.

The British and ACW units would 'skirmish' which was a form of combat where troops skirmish as a skirmish line. It was not a unique formation, but rather troops deployed AS skirmishers in extended line, open order and/or in chains. Casey, as do other manuals talk about units deploying as skirmishers, not in skirmisher formation. The reason is that while spread out, the movement and formation of a skirmish line is identical to the movement of infantry in any formation. Lines are to keep abreast and maintain alignment, bugles and officers give orders and movement is on the regulating file or flank. A skirmish line is seen as a line of infantry, just not in close formation.

ACW regulations never use the term 'chains' that I have seen, but anything over 20 paces apart would be identical to what Napoleonic manuals call a chain.

I hope that is clear.

That means that a two rank line of troops using extended line out to 40 paces could cover from twice to five times or the front of the same number of troops in close formation.

And Jim, the difference between an extended line, an open line and a skirmish chain, all used while skirmishing, is the distance between the men/files of men. Casey has that distance spread from 2 to 40 paces. That would get you your 'loose order' and the distinction between a 'heavy'skrmish line and a 'lighter' one. Neither phrase had any technical meaning in any regulation manuals I have seen. The terms are usually general observations, mainly about the enemy actions during battle.

Manuals tried to make one set of formations serve as many needs as possible with minor modifications.

Bill

Bill,

I suggest you take a closer look at the sections of Casey's you cite. Skirmishers are always deployed in a single rank with five paces between each man. The only exception is in very dense terrain where the men may be closer together so that they can stay in sight of each other. The extension of intervals refers to the distance between the groups of four that the skirmishers operate in. These distances may be increased or decreased (back to the minimum of five paces) but the distance between the men in the groups is habitually five paces. Nowhere can I find any reference to deploying a battalion in multiple ranks of skirmishers with variable distances between the men. There is a section on deploying a whole battalion as skirmishers but this merely describes how the designated companies spread out to prescribed distances and then deploy as skirmishers as any individual company would per the standard regulations.

In response to Jim's question about "Heavy Skirmish Lines", there is no such thing mentioned in Casey's. So perhaps here is where we find the improvised tactics that some insist must have existed. I have certainly recalled reading about "heavy skirmish lines" and in theory there's no reason why the colonel could not have ordered the men to deploy as skirmishers with only three or two paces between men. He could fit more men on the skirmish line that way and it would not screw things up the way it would if you tried to 'spread out' a regular line of battle. So, it is a possibility. Of course I've also read about multiple lines of skirmishers and that has always puzzled me. In theory, by the regulations, a company should only deploy one platoon as skirmishers and keep the other platoon in close order 150 yards to the rear as a reserve. I suppose it's possible that if there was enemy artillery fire the reserve platoon might be deployed as skirmishers, too to make them less vulnerable. Of course a second (or third or fourth) line of skirmishers could fire for fear of hitting the line in front of it.

This is interesting stuff. i wish the actual soldiers could have left us better records! :)

Here's how Longstreet recovered the battle for the Rebels on the morning of May 6, 1864:

"As full lines of battle could not be handled through the thick wood, I ordered the advance of the six brigades by heavy skirmish lines, to be followed by stronger supporting lines." ---Lt.Gen. James Longstreet

This wasn't the flank attack which occured a couple of hours later, which apparently involved more tactical innovation. According to Rhea (google books) the Rebs used ravines to channel their attacks onto and into the Federal flank and rear. At one point, the Rebs were 25-30 ranks deep…stacking up too much by B.G. Mahone's standards. But that didn't stop them from rolling up the Federal line.

Jim

Scott:

Oh, I noticed. I was speaking mainly of the methods for extending the line, and that it could be done by one, two or three ranks. Casey doesn't limit the skirmish line to five paces, only the deployment process. Casey writes about extending the line beyond that five paces, in #51 through #59+, including 20 paces and even 40, and doesn't associate those distances exclusively to woods operations from what I can see.

However, Casey does give a single line deployment…until there is an advance or withdrawal by fire. Then the front rank man is forward, the rear rank man is back, then the roles are reversed, so that one man is always loaded and several paces behind the front rank. In other words a two rank line. But I need to explain a few things:

1. During the Napoleonic wars, light infantry, Prussian Fusiliers, Russian Jagers, French Legere and all British troops deployed in a two rank formation, partly to simplify going to extended formation or any wider front for skirmishing. It was always done in pairs--by files. Front rank man forward, rear rank back, spaced 5 or more yards from the next file of two men. That was a chain. Rear man remaining loaded until he passed the front man who had reloaded. [Hardee speaks of chains of skirmishers…and for a similar reason, but more on that below.]

2. Later, the Americans developed this into 'fours' or two files of men working together. The very same deployment process as seen with Napoleonic skirmishers, but simply groups by fours instead of twos. It is still the same basic process, only divided up differently in deploying.

3. Hardee, whom Casey copied to a large extent, has the same process for deploying skirmishers, bringing the four up as Casey's diagram shows, a group of two files of two men, two up front, two behind. Then the men step sideways front and back ranks as with Casey. There is one significant difference. Unlike Casey, Hardee doesn't have the rear rank men step into the intervals. The rear two men remain behind facing the gaps between the front rank men. They are not instructed to step forward into the intervals. They are in position to act as pairs.

4. Casey chose to have the men deploy into the intervals creating a one rank skirmish line, but then the in the skirmish fire instructions, the front and rear men of each file act as a pair in advancing and withdrawing just as Napoleonic and Hardee have them operating…in pairs, one forward and one back, the rear man remaining loaded before moving up.

5. Any officer following Casey's manual could keep the two rank formation in skirmishing if desired simply by not having the rear rank step into the intervals. That would be neither odd or awkward for the soldiers because they operate in two ranks in line most times anyway.

6. Another method for 'heavy skirmish lines is the companies of skirmishers being deployed behind one another, as Casey gives instructions for. Lastly, if five paces between soldiers is necessary when deploying, rallying and relieving troops, the question would be what constitutes a 'heavy skirmish screen.' It would not be the typical five paces for a company to cover a regimental front, or they wouldn't call it 'heavy', and whatever formation constituted a 'heavy' skirmish screen, would have to be built from the existing methods.

The 1911 US Infantry regulations have skirmishers deploying/extending lines by squads with almost the same methods in Hardee's manual. And they are specifically in two lines. [p. 25] Upton also gives almost an identical description for deploying skirmishers as Casey and Hardee, but with the men stepping into the intervals.

The point being, the regulations allowed for the extension of lines in one, two or three ranks, in not in the actual deployment, then after the actual deployment was carried out as in Casey…if that was felt to be necessary.

Whatever the regulations, the building blocks were the same, allowing for the same variety of formations and maneuvers. One manual may have a different SOP than another, such as Casey and Hardee, but that was it.

As for Longstreet's attack. I gave one Confederate General's description on how troops maneuvered through woods. And from reading Casey and Hardee, it is easy to see how those heavy skirmish lines with stronger supporting lines could have and probably were deployed.

Bill

Bill,

The problem is that no matter what the details of the deployment the end result is the same: one man for every five paces of front. Whether the men are stepping up into the intervals or not, there is still five paces between each man. Nothing in Hardee or Casey gives you a denser formation than that.

So the mystery of the "Heavy Skirmish Line" is still a mystery.

Jim,

It would have been great if Longstreet explained just what this Heavy Skirmish Line was :) The 'by-the-book' method for battalions to pass through heavy woods was to 'Advance by the Right of Companies' where the battalion advances in a series of small parallel columns with each company finding its way through the woods as best it can, but trying to maintain contact with the companies on either side. Once contact was made with the enemy the line of battle can quickly be reformed.

Scott

The problem is that no matter what the details of the deployment the end result is the same: one man for every five paces of front.

It is if you insist that the "heavy skirmish line" referred to can only be the single line of men, yes it is a mystery and probably will remain one, particularly if you only reference Casey, which I doubt the Rebs were. Other manuals and treatises provided for other variations.

If you count supporting lines of companies, reserves etc. and entire battalions/regiments deployed as described in Casey and Hardee, one can see how ACW commands could create heavy skirmish lines.

In the Napoleonic wars, 'clouds of skirmishers' could refer to 'heavy skirmish lines' or simply whole battalions. When Massena asks for a heavier skirmish screen at Bussaco, for example, it generally meant that more than one company was deployed per regiment/battalion or more reserves for the line.

There are a number of reasons to believe it was done the same way during the ACW.

Bill

Bill,

I'm not doubting that it was done. I'm just curious HOW it was done :)

As a reenactor battalion commander I look at this problem by asking: "Okay. if I had to form a 'Heavy Skirmish Line' how would I go about doing it? I know Casey's like the back of my hand. My battalion has performed EVERY SINGLE movement described in Casey's School of the Battalion at least once and 75% of it is utterly routine to us. There is no out-of-the-book command to form a heavy skirmish line or anything even approximating it. I would have to invent something new and explain it to my men (and hopefully practice it before going into a battle). Thinking about it now, I can see several different ways to accomplish it, but it would be a new thing, not found in the Book.

Scott

I'm not doubting that it was done. I'm just curious HOW it was done :)

As a reenactor battalion commander I look at this problem by asking: "Okay. if I had to form a 'Heavy Skirmish Line' how would I go about doing it? I know Casey's like the back of my hand. My battalion has performed EVERY SINGLE movement described in Casey's School of the Battalion at least once and 75% of it is utterly routine to us. There is no out-of-the-book command to form a heavy skirmish line or anything even approximating it.

Scott:

Understood. It is a question of 'how to do it.' This is my suggestion. Look at 'the skirmish line' in it's entirety, and not just the chain of men in the front no closer than 5 paces. [I found Casey using that term too.]

Here is what Casey says at the beginning of Title V on Skirmishing, pp. 181-2 [Italics mine]

4. Every body of skirmishers should have a reserve, the strength and composition of which will vary according to circumstances.

5. If a body of skirmishers is thrown out within sustaining distance of the main corps, a very small reserve will be sufficient for each company, whose duty it shall be to fill vacant spaces, furnish the line with cartridges, relieved the fatigued and serve as a rallying point for the skirmishers.

6. If the main corps be a considerable distance, besides the company reserves, another reserve will be required, composed of entire companies, which will be used to sustain and reinforce such parts of the line as may be warmly attacked; this reserve should be strong enough to relieve at least half of the companies deployed as skirmishers.

7. The reserves should be placed behind the center of the line of skirmishers, the company reserves at one hundred and fifty, and the principle reserve at four hundred paces. ,However, this rule is not invariable. The reserves, while holding themselves within sustaining distance of the line, as much as possible, should be in a position to afford each other mutual protection and must carefully profit from any accidents of the ground to conceal themselves from the view of the enemy, and to shelter themselves from his fire.

Now, depending on how hot the commander believes the skirmish engagement will be, deploying say ten companies to skirmish would require 'at least five' to act as a principle reserve. The distance between the reserves and skirmish line as well as the numbers committed to the skirmish line in the form of reserves is variable. I believe that is what determines a 'heavy' skirmish line. During the Napoleonic wars, all the troops committed to the skirmish action, reserves included, were considered part of the skirmish 'line' in function and discussed in that fashion. I think it became an unspoken assumption by the time of the ACW. The reserve was simply an extention of the skirmish line.

With the reserves brought up to within fiftey paces, repesenting at least half again as many men as were on the line, that could look pretty 'heavy' compared to a company per regiment providing its own reserve as well as the skirmish line…

The mechanics for a 'heavy' skirmish line have to be in the manuals in some form for the term to be so widely used.

Bill

A guess at the Heavy skirmish line:

A whole battalion of two ranks plus a line of closers, 5 paces between each man approx., i.e. "skirmishers 3 deep" with maybe the color company or just the color guard as a skirmish line reserve? What would you order to put everyone 5 paces apart ? Behind that "stronger supporting lines" or whole battalions advancing by the Right of companies.

Jim:

The only variation in a skirmish line according to Casey is the amount of men in support. As Scott points out, five paces between men is the minimum distance. There is no reason to have them closer because that sorta negates the whole benefit of a skirmish line--being spread out. More than one observer during the Napoleonic wars noted how inexperienced troops were at skirmishing by how thick their skirmish lines were.

In a heavily supported skirmish line, it could well be that as many troops would be in reserve as in the front lines. As Casey says, this is to sustain the skirmish line…fill in the vacant places, maintain the ammo…as that was one real problem with active skirmish lines.

The reserves would move in coordination with the skirmish line. They were usually placed in the center of the skirmish line behind the company/or battalion's companies. The diagrams also show reserves on the flanks, which make sense. The process for deploying men into skirmish lines, relieving and reinforcing skirmish lines is given in Casey and Hardee etc.

They would run through ammo quickly, even veteran troops. [for instnace, it happened with the 17th Legere at Saalfeld and Jena in 1806, only three days apart.]

So what made the skirmish line 'heavy' was not more men on the line, but more men committed to the line in the reserve, so that a skirmish line could be 'sustained' over a longer period of time… and certainly overwhelm skirmishers without similar support.

The color guard was directed to stay with the reserve.

Bill

Bill:

Napoleonic War observers could note how dense the skirmish lines were because they weren't in the Wilderness.

Yeah, yeah, running out of ammo. Heard that one before. "Well, sir, we had to high tail it 1/2 mile to the rear because we ran out of ammo."

Bill, you make a better lawyer than a general :)

Jim

Jim:
Regardless of where they were or who saw them, The point was that 'dense' skirmish lines negated the whole reason for skirmish lines…that they were spread out and more difficult targets, able to use cover etc. That was one reason dense skirmish lines were seen as 'amateurish' or poor skirmishing. Now, certainly ACW soldiers could be amateurish, but I doubt that is the case for Longstreet's men in 1864.

A better lawyer than general? Well, never having been either a lawyer or a general, I wouldn't know. I do know what generals and soldiers report doing during the Napoleonic wars and ACW. I have also read several historians, including Allen Guelzo, Director of Civil War Studies at Gettysburg College, stating that reaching any conclusion in history is like building a case for a court trial, establishing facts, building a case 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' So I'll take that 'lawyer' as a compliment. ;-7

Bill

Bill,

Re. Your excellent post of 08 Dec 2010 8:48 p.m. PST regarding Kershaw's Brigade on July Second at Gettysburg.

Obviously its in your own words but where did you get the original info from – was it the OR?

I'm asking as its really valuable stuff for showing some of my gaming group just how things really fell to bits and I'd like to see some more!

Trajanus:

Most of it is from the OR, but some bits are from memoirs. I went all out and posted a good deal of my research in full qoutes last year during a thread on "Command Radius"…the thread lasted 21 pages. While the focus was on the use of regulating regiments, brigades and divisions to command and maneuver during the Confederate operations on the 2nd of July, I quote Kershaw extensively and the 'wheels coming off' events are there, starting on page 14. I list the sources too.

TMP link

So much of what is said by contemporaries in describing battles is in short hand, partly because they all know 'the book', so there doesn't seem to be any reason to explain actions, or when actions are explained, the details have more significance because of 'the book' than we usually realize. That's been my experience getting to know the regulations and drill manuals.

Bill

Trajanus:

Here is the pertinent parts of that discussion. At the time I couldn't italize, so I had to capitalize the significant parts of the quotes regarding regulating units--so I am not quoting all of Kershaw's description of his problems during the attack, but the sources are there:

McLaw's Division:

Longstreet:
General Lee at the same time gave orders for the attack to be made by my right – following up the direction of the Emmitsburg road toward Cemetery Ridge, holding Hood's left as well as could be toward the Emmitsburg road, McLaws TO FOLLOW THE MOVEMENTS OF HOOD, attacking at the Peach Orchard the Federal Third Corps, with a part of R.H. Anderson's division FOLLOWING THE MOVEMENTS OF McLaws to guard his left flank. As soon as the troops were in position, and we could find the points against which we should march and give the guiding points, the advance was ordered–"
Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896), p.367.

KERSHAW's Brigade:

"Hood's division was then moving in our rear towards our right to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging round towards Peach Orchard and at the same time establishing connection with Hood on my right and co-operating with him. It was understood he was to sweep down the enemy's line in a direction perpendicular to our then line of battle. I was told that Barksdale WOULD MOVE WITH ME AND CONFORM TO MY MOVEMENT. These directions I received in various messages from the Lieutenant-General and the Major-General commanding, and in part by personal communication with them."

Kerhsaw, B&L (1888), iii/1:332. Kershaw's report of 1 October 1863 is very similar in Southern Historical Society, Papers, "Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg" (1877) v4, 178-82:

Kershaw restates this again on the next page of Battle & Leaders:

"In the meantime General Hood's division was moving in our rear to the right, to gain the enemy's flank, and I was directed to commence the attack as soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the Peach Orchard, and AT THE SAME TIME ESTABLISHING CONNECTION WITH HOOD ON MY RIGHT, AND COOPERATING WITH HIM. It was understood that he was to sweep down the Federal lines in a direction perpendicular to our line of battle. I was informed that Barksdale WOULD MOVE WITH ME AND CONFORM TO MY MOVEMENT; that Semmes would follow me, and Wofford would follow Barksdale. These instructions I received in sundry messages from General Longstreet and General McLaws, and in part by personal communication with them."
Kershaw, B&L (1888), iii/1:333.

Did Kershaw worry about this conforming? Kershaw in Southern Historical Society, Papers, "Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg" (1877) v4, 178-82 :

"Meanwhile, to aid this attack, I changed the direction of the Seventh regiment, Colonel Aiken, and the Third, Major Maffett, to the left, so as to occupy the rocky hill and wood, and opened fire on the battery. Barksdale HAD NOT YET APPEARED, but came up soon after and cleared the orchard with the assistance of the fire of my Eighth South Carolina, Colonel Henegan, on my left, and James' battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Eice, the next in order of battle. THIS BRIGADE [Barksdale] THEN MOVED SO FAR TO THE LEFT AS NO LONGER TO AFFORD ANY ASSISTANCE.

"In a few minutes after my line halted the enemy advanced across the wheat field in two lines of battle, with a very small interval between the lines, in such a manner as to take the Seventh South Carolina in flank. I changed the direction of the right wing of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, to meet the attack, and HURRIED BACK TO GENERAL SEMMES, THEN SOME 150 YARDS IN MY RIGHT-REAR, TO BRING HIM UP TO MEET THE ATTACK ON MY RIGHT, and also to bring forward my right regiment, Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel DeSaussuere, which, SEPARATED FROM THE COMMAND BY THE ARTILLERY AT THE TIME OF THE ADVANCE, was now cut off by Semmes' brigade."

[Note that Barksdale was 'supposed' to conform to Kershaw and when artillery battalions gets between him and some regiments of his brigade, and then Semmes, and calls the regiments 'cut off.'

And note that when Kershaw he realizes that Barksdale will not be following him and that his left would be in the air, he is worried and acts to correct the problem.

Here is the voiced order that screwed up Kershaw's brigade. It was called out without authorization and taken up by the whole brigade, causing the Left wing, split from the right with Kershaw to stop it's attack on the artillery.

"After passing the buildings at Rose's, the charge of the left wing was no longer visible from my position; but the movement was reported to have been magnificently conducted until the cannoneers had left their guns and the caissons were moving off, when the order was given to ‘MOVE BY THE RIGHT FLANK,' by some unauthorized person, and was immediately obeyed by the men. The Federals returned to their guns and opened on those doomed regiments a raking fire of grape and canister, at short distance, which proved most disastrous, and for a time destroyed their usefulness."
Kershaw, B&L (1888), iii/1:334-6

Major Maffett (3rd SC) reported this same mistake: OR, 27 (2) 372, Maffett's report of 31 July.

"At 3 p.m. our artillery opened upon the enemy's position at the foot and upon the sides of a mountain range, and at 4 o'clock our regiment, with others, was ordered forward to the attack, across an open plain, 1,500 yards in width."

"Our orders from General Kershaw were to gradually swing round to the left until nearly facing an orchard, from which the enemy were pouring a deadly fire of artillery. The wheel was accomplished in gallant style by the regiment, when we moved forward under a galling fire of grape, shell, and canister. When within 300 or 400 yards of the batteries, THE ORDER WAS PASSED ALONG DOWN THE LINE FROM THE RIGHT TO MOVE BY THE RIGHT FLANK DOUBLE-QUICK. The regiment moved, in obedience to this order, to the cover of a piece of woods, and formed upon the left of the Seventh South Carolina Regiment, WHICH WAS THE BATTALION OF DIRECTION. In making this move, we lost several men from the enemy's artillery fire. Sheltering ourselves behind some rocks and trees, the left was directed to open fire upon the artillery of the enemy, while the right was instructed to open fire upon their infantry in our front."

BARKSDALE's Brigade:

" The brigade was placed in battle line—formed with the 21st, Col. B.G. Humphreys, ON THE RIGHT, then the 17th, Col. W.D. Holder, next the 13th, Col. J.W. Carter, with the 18th, Col. Thos. M. Griffin, on the left—under the crown of a low ridge, five or six hundred yards distant from the position of assault. […] General Barksdale's appearance, riding rapidly along in rear of the line, was the signal to the respective regimental commanders to get alert. […]…General Barksdale turned the right of the line and rode as rapidly down the front, to take his position at the head of his old regiment, the 13th. As he turned he called out to Colonel Humphreys [21st MS] THE WORDS WHICH DICTATED THE DIRECTION FO THE ATTACK—to move forward and ‘swing to the left.'" [Note: The 21st MS was the regiment on the right flank and as the directing regiment would be the one to receive the order for the direction of movement.]

"Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade at Gettysburg", by J.S. McNeily (21st MS), Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, v14 (1914), 235.

"Barksdale's release was by order. Wrote McLaws (in 1878): "Barksdale was standing in front ready to give the word and to lead. He was not far from me; and so soon as it was signified to me I sent my aid-de-camp, captain G.B. Lamar, Jr., to carry the order to General Barksdale…."
(Longstreet's account confirms the order: "I rode to McLaws, found him ready and Barksdale chafing in his wait for the order to secure the battery in his front. […] After additional caution McLaws ordered Barksdale in."

"Driving the routed enemy before him Barksdale, with three of his regiments, swung to the left so as to flank the adjoining (Humphreys') division. The 21st Mississippi swinging to the right became separated from the brigade [as will be explained below.] After carrying the Peach Orchard hill and moving to the attack of the enemy to the right of that position Barksdale's left WAS JOINED ON THE LEFT by Anderson's division of Hill's corps. But by one of the many misadventures of the day, after the breaking up and dislodging of Humphreys' division, THAT CONNECTION WAS LOST."
McNeily (21st MS), v14 (1914), 235-241.

Barksdale was not released until almost one hour after Kershaw had moved off. No explanation has been forthcoming. It appears that Barksdale moved his brigade by the center battalion [the 13th] away from the right without informing the directing battalion, the 21st MS, who continued to follow his original orders. In an effort to take on targets of opportunity, Barksdale not lonely lost ¼ of his brigade, but the connection with Anderson.

The 21st charged Bigelow's battery at the Trostle House and later took Watson's battery This is what Humphreys commanding the 21st says he did:

McNeily of the 21st writes: "…Colonel Humphreys found himself the center of a remarkable situation. Looking to HIS LEFT, SOME HALF A MILE DISTANT, HE SAW THE OTHER REGIMENTS OF THE BRIGADE engaged with Willard. Behind him about the same distance was Alexander's guns making trouble for the enemy in two directions. To our right, toward Round Top, half a mile off, was a disorganized mass of apparently some thousands of the enemy, fleeing before Hood with Wofford and other brigades of McLaws' division."

Then McNeily quotes from an unpublished manuscript of Col. Humphreys' memoirs which illuminate how he led his regiment off to the right from his brigade:

"I discovered that a federal battery to my right had rallied and was annoying Kershaw to our right and rear, and would soon turn on Barksdale's brigade as enfilade fire. I immediately wheeled the 21st to the right and headed directly against the battery which was captured…. "…. I NOW WANTED TO REJOIN THE BRIGADE.. But just then another battery was seen in position three hundred yards off, beyond the ravine. The order was given to charge it. On the brave regiment moved—yelling and firing and captured the battery of five guns [Watson's battery?]. From the position I occupied then, no enemy could be seen or heard in my front. Nor a gun was being fired at me. The federal army was cut in twain."

"Eight hundred yards, to my right a confused mass was retreating, driven by McLaws, and Hood. […] Eight hundred yards to my left, the enemy's line was kept busy by Barksdale. Soon a long solid line of infantry was seen advancing down the road towards us. The work [sic – ‘word'?] for retreat was given, and the regiment fell back to the stone fence where we captured the first battery."
J.S. McNeily (21st MS), v14 , p. 249.

And there Humphrey's regiment stayed until he learned of Barksdale's death, and as the senior colonel, assumed command of the brigade—but being isolated so far from the brigade, he was late in returning to it--and the brigade failed to do any more than hold it's position.

This is McNeily's conclusion about Barksdale's actions:

"…the brilliant isolated success of Barksdale's brigade at Gettysburg [was] rendered fruitless, alas, by its isolation…. Thoughts of Gettysburg have never crossed the writer's mind, unaccompanied by the sad reflection of what might have been had the plan for Wofford to support Barksdale, and for Anderson's brigades, whose strength was wasted to the west of Emmittsburg [sic] road, to cling to Barksdales left not miscarried. Meade's retirement on the night of the 2nd would have followed and the 3rd of July, that dies irae of the Confederacy, would not have been closed in disastrous defeat."
"Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade at Gettysburg", by J.S. McNeily (21st MS), Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, v14 (1914), 262.

Barksdale's actions left him isolated, disconnected and unsupported, not a good thing--and it happened because he disregarded the conforming mechanisms for his brigade and the division.

************

Bill

Cheers Bill,

Of course! The Legendary "Command Radius" thread! I'd forgotten all about that! Some mighty good stuff went under that particular bridge! Most enjoyable one to contribute to.

I'm just getting into the 'On Line' OR. Very interesting detail of what it was really like from the front line – well and the back line too, come to that.

Find it a bit of a to use though. You have to take some inventive paths to get through the millions of items if you are looking for individual clues.

Nice of you to post the extra detail – much appreciated!

Bill wrote:

"It appears that Barksdale moved his brigade by the center battalion [the 13th] away from the right without informing the directing battalion, the 21st MS, who continued to follow his original orders."

Bill:

How is it that you come to the conclusion that the 21st was the directing battalion according to your mechanism of conformity when you just got done pulling this quote from Humphrey's memoir:

"I discovered that a federal battery to my right had rallied and was annoying Kershaw to our right and rear, and would soon turn on Barksdale's brigade as enfilade fire. I immediately wheeled the 21st to the right and headed directly against the battery which was captured… "

By Humphrey's own statement above, which you quoted, he took the initiative himself in splitting the 21st off from the rest of the brigade. Even though his was the rightmost regiment, it certainly doesn't sound like the 21st was doing any regulating or directing just prior to the split. Moreover, it was an enfilading enemy battery which caused him to deregulate his regiment from the rest of the Barksdale's Brigade.

One might draw the conclusion that if Humphrey's had followed the "book", like you would have him, the entire brigade would've been raked with artillery fire OR if the 21st had been the regulating battalion by the "book"--which it wasn't (or if it was, wasn't for long) than Willard's Brigade would've missed Barksdale's Brigade entirely and Barksdale or Humphrey would've won the Battle of Gettysburg single-handedly. Either way, a robotic, regulating mechanism-minutely laid out in the "book"-- which you argue should've been making decisions for the commanding officers-seems to sort of fall apart into quivering heaps as soon as the first shots are fired.

All of which is to reiterate what I was arguing before, there were times when the "book" needed to get tossed or people were going to get killed and battles lost, both unnecessarily, because some old fart of general couldn't think past the drill manual when it came to making command decisions.

Jim

Jim:

Here is the beginning of the action--which explains your question:

The brigade was placed in battle line—formed with the 21st, Col. B.G. Humphreys, ON THE RIGHT, then the 17th, Col. W.D. Holder, next the 13th, Col. J.W. Carter, with the 18th, Col. Thos. M. Griffin, on the left—under the crown of a low ridge, five or six hundred yards distant from the position of assault. […]

General Barksdale's appearance, riding rapidly along in rear of the line, was the signal to the respective regimental commanders to get alert. […]…General Barksdale turned the right of the line and rode as rapidly down the front, to take his position at the head of his old regiment, the 13th. As he turned he called out to Colonel Humphreys [21st MS] THE WORDS WHICH DICTATED THE DIRECTION OF THE ATTACK—to move forward and ‘swing to the left.'"

So, why would Barksdale, from the center of the line, call those words out specifically to Humphreys? Because his regiment on the far right was the directing unit.

Humphrey, the directing battalion, saw if he continued to wheel to the left would open his flank and that of the brigade to infilade fire. Deciding to wheel right, Humphreys WAS following the book. That was his progative as the directing battalion when the brigadier was not there. He was both taking initiative and following the book. Barksdale chose to continue and leave his flank in the air.

The reason that Humphreys sees a 'remarkable' sight afterwards is that he expected the brigade to wheel on him and was surprised that it didn't. Barksdale continued wheeling dramatically to the left and leaving Humphreys--by choice, as Barksdale would have had to countermanded the brigade following Humphreys, tossing that part of the book, and have it follow him, probably using the 13th as the directing brigade on the center where he was.

Barksdale broke the line by choice, tossing the book on that point, and created a mess in the process:
1. breaking up his brigade, weakening it,
2. ignoring orders which didn't have [part of] his brigade going off on its own.
3. creating problems for both Kershaw and Anderson's division, uncovering their flanks.

Jim wrote:

Either way, a robotic, regulating mechanism-minutely laid out in the "book"-- which you argue should've been making decisions for the commanding officers-seems to sort of fall apart into quivering heaps as soon as the first shots are fired.

There is nothing robotic about it, any more than it is robotic for the left guard to pull on a sweep to the right--and if he doesn't, the whole play is weakened.

You have this rather odd idea of how 19th Century troops worked together. ACW veterans knew that things do fall apart as soon as the first shots are fired, and the side that keeps order the longest, wins--which is why the Rebels did so well on the 2nd day. They kept their order far better than the Union.

The officers like Kershaw, Law, Benning and others spent most of their time in battle keeping and restoring order--by the book--and the reason that veteran regiments, all mixed up together did so well is because they knew ALL new the same book, the same game plan and used it.

The regulations described how units moved, formed and communicated… not what objectives to chose.

McNeily, who I quoted was a veteran of the ACW. This is his assessment of Barksdale's action:

"…the brilliant isolated success of Barksdale's brigade at Gettysburg [was] rendered fruitless, alas, by its isolation…. Thoughts of Gettysburg have never crossed the writer's mind, unaccompanied by the sad reflection of what might have been had the plan for Wofford to support Barksdale, and for Anderson's brigades, whose strength was wasted to the west of Emmittsburg [sic] road, to cling to Barksdales left not miscarried.

And what 'miscarried'? Barksdale's decision was what made the wheels come off, and I have never read anything by any ACW veteran defending Barksdale's decision to ignore flanks, orders and formations was a good thing because "some old fart of a general couldn't think past the drill manual when it came to making command decisions."

Barksdale went for a target of opportunity 'brilliantly', but in doing so screwed up Mclaws formation and dissapated
the entire attack. That isn't my assessment. That is the conclusion of most battle commentaries, many of them not 'old farts of a general.'

Every general who made command decisions had to think past the drill manual, because the drill manual only explained HOW companies, regiments and brigades operated, not WHAT a General was supposed to do or where. The drill manual didn't tell Lee where to attack on the second day, or how. He chose to have two divisions two brigades up, and two in support. It could have been dozens of other formations or their variations, all described by the book. The one he chose was very common during the ACW. HOW to move such formations of 20,000 men and how to keep their formation and order was what was covered by regulations and Military treatises.

You don't throw out the methods practiced for maneuvering and combat by those 20,000 men and expect things to go better because of it.

Again, if there were times when the 'book' needed to get tossed, I have yet to see an example of that from the ACW.

What I have seen in reading narratives of Napoleonic, ACW and later 19th century veterans is when things got tough, the tough veterans worked on staying in order and following the plan, using the tools available [the book], methods they had practiced--and been successful with--for so long.

And it wasn't because these veterans were unthinking or robotic, or that couldn't think beyond the drill manual. They could be very creative with all the building blocks provided them in the manuals. For example, both Longstreet and Upton demonstrated that in 1864.

Jim, if you see these veterans tossing the book after the first shots were fired, if that is the way you see the ACW being fought, how about some examples.

Bill

It seems to me that its easy to assume "tossing the book" has occurred if one does not know how much was in "the book" and how it was applied.

Most rules for the 19th Century period(s) are all the more annoying when they expend pages on charts and tables for shooting and melee and little on how the units got to where this action could happen in the first place!

A lot of which stems from lack of understanding of how this took place, or a fundamental 'dumbing down' to allow players to whoop with joy at the effects of there dice rolling!

Skill in generalship is not confined to good tactics or sneaky moves, its having the ability individually and collectively to effectively deliver your force onto the target.

Bill:

Left guards don't pull on a right sweep.

Jim

Bill:

Left guards don't pull on a right sweep.

Jim

Jim: That is only true of some old fart of a coach who can't see beyond the play book. ;-j

Bill

Most rules for the 19th Century period(s) are all the more annoying when they expend pages on charts and tables for shooting and melee and little on how the units got to where this action could happen in the first place!

Trajanus:

I agree. When you stop and ask "how did they move 20,000 men in concert? How did a regiment deploy skirmishers? What was the method for moving through woods? I have found that the answers don't jive well with a number of game systems or what game designers claim the rules are representing. If a game rule is recreating history, that game rule is pretty much dependent on what history says happened and how.

That was the fundamental problem I have with 'Command Radius' rules, at least for Divisions and Brigades in most games. It assumes a method of communication and command [apparently based on the distance a horse could travel] when that wasn't the way things were primarily done…. A commander riding to a specific point in the battle line was really a last resort effort rather than the basic control methods used during the 18th and 19th centuries.

But when you question the premise of any part of a set of beloved rules and or even one game mechanic, lots of folks get very defensive--for a variety of reasons, with a variety of accusations that have nothing to do with the actual issue. Hence 21 pages of that thread.

What is even sadder is that players often don't know what the rules are intended to portray and apply their own interpretations which only confuse the situation even further. The classic example is the Fire and Fury 'command radius' rule and what it is supposed to represent…

Bill

Hi

Bill, that is a totally different thread the "it amazes me what gamers come up with under pressure of fear of losing" with their rules!

I do agree as a rules writer that I try to keep the movement reflecting the drill limits. No matter how simply and clear the rules are, though, gamers can be very creative. If you remember the "that guy" thread, that is one issue of "that guy" gaming.

Rocky

A drill manuel is a lot like a hammer, you can use it to build a bookcase, or whack your own thumb. Neither has any efect on how good the hammer is, only how well you use your tools.

Just because somebody made a bad decision does not meen he was just following the book, any more than a good decision was made by throwing out the book.

Badger hits the nail… er, well, you know :)

As I noted earlier, the ACW drill manuals are just a tool kit to allow a commander to get his troops from Point A to Point B in the formation he wants, pointed in the direction he wants in the quickest and most efficient manner possible. They give no advice on HOW or WHEN to use the tools or the best method to defeat the enemy.

Scott

And war gamers don't need drill manuals b/c their soldiers are glued to bases. For inverse reasons, command radii try and make the 500 ft player only 15mm tall in exercising control of their troops. For reverse reasons, as well as the historical ones of officer/soldier initiative and rapidly changing combat conditions, a written regulating battalion rule probably gets tossed right quick. All of which is to say, things get "wonky" when you try and fight the Battle of Gettysburg on a 10 foot table.

And Bill, the best battle plans are the one's that are the hardest for anyone to figure out. McNeily's and Humphrey's orders were to advance and left wheel. PERIOD. They followed those orders until enemy dispostions forced them to do something different. Easy to conjecture up breakthroughs and what if's after the fact…

Jim

Scott, Badger and RockyR.

Yes, that's what I understand concerning the manuals of the 19th Century: A set of tools, all aimed at moving large bodies of men around efficiently and in order--which by the ACW have a long, conherent history and development.

A wargame designer can chose anything he wants to represent or not, and that is fundamental. As no wargame design, regardless of the medium, can't do it all, they have to chose what to include. And there are any number of ways with any number of mechanics one aspect of history can be represented in a game. That's why there can be dozens of games of the same war at the same scale representing the same thing…and each can be very different. But if they decide to portray command control for the 19th century, they can't avoid simulating what we have been posting about.

Scott:
Does the idea of how much support is behind a skirmish line sound like it might explain or describe a 'heavy skirmish line'? A heavy skirmish line could be heavy in the total number of men committed to skirmishing even though they wouldn't all be stuffed into the actual skirmish line all at once.

Bill

Bill,

I really can't see how having more support could constitute this mysterious 'heavy skirmish line'. If you still only have one man per five paces of front it doesn't give you much fighting power. If the enemy is in a close-order line of battle, they will have ten times the number of muskets in action. Your own casualties might be kept down, but you won't be able to either take or hold ground against the enemy.

I speculate that as the war progressed officers did begin to 'throw away the book' at least to the extent that they adhered to the five paces between men on the skirmish line. It would be simple enough to instruct the men to only go two or three paces when they deployed instead of five. When training my reenactors I've done exactly that just to keep the formation more compact so I can talk to them without having to scream :) It works fine. All the movements remain exactly the same, you just have a denser formation. To me this makes far more sense than trying to 'spread out' a close-order line of battle. A dense skirmish line can still function just as it's been trained, while a 'loose' battle line creates all sorts of problems.

The challenge now is to find some confirmation of this in the records. Unfortunately, the only confirmation may well be the references to 'heavy' skirmish lines. The authors of the reports may have just thought: "Everyone will know what I mean."

Scott