"Unit frontage and rifle-musket engagement ranges?" Topic

I can see some of what Jim is saying. Certain things, like dressing the ranks will become second nature to veteran troops. I can see this with my own reenactment battalion. Often there will be no need for the officers to order them to dress the lines, they will do it automatically. In fact, their cohesion can actually become a problem during battle scenarios where we are called upon to retreat in disorder: the men will retreat, but it can be very hard to get them in disorder! They just automatically reform and dress their ranks--even though I don't want them to :)

But as for troops making tactical decisions on their own, I don't see it happening very often. I mean, how could it? What if some men decide to do one thing while others decide to do something else? Or maybe they do decide to do the same thing, but minutes apart. The regiment would disintegrate! The officers would be doing their utmost to keep the men together and in good order so that the regiment can act as a unit.

Scott:

Yes, I agree. That is why I was asking Jim what he was thinking of. Certainly well trained men will do what they have been trained to do well and without unnecessary orders or oversight. But what their doing is what they trained to do, what the have confidence doing…

Bill

Scott,

What I am refering to in part is when a unit becomes a team, of which the officer is only a part. A good officer will be the captain of that team. That doesn't mean that everyone does whatever they want, but that there was probably a relaxation of direct and strict control over making sure everyone was in their designated places with the i's dotted and T's crossed, so long as all team members were working towards achieving the objective. Staying within proximity, not necessarily shoulder-to-shoulder of other team members became second nature, instinctual. I also think there were situations were groups of men, in the absence of an officer or a direct command or direct order, would take the initiative together and on occasion individuals would do the same, those were situations when the book went out the door b/c those troops didn't need a direct order to "right shoulder shift".

Jim

Iniative will sometimes cause them to "Advance to the Rear" without concurrance of the chain of command.

Jim:
The questions are thien 1.when this would happen…under what circumstances, and 2. how do we know this happened?

These are the two behaviors you are talking about:

"Staying within proximity, not necessarily shoulder-to-shoulder of other team members became second nature, instinctual."

I am sure this happened, particularly if holding a defensive position. However, if a regiment in line was going to move in any fashion, troops needed to be elbow to elbow to stay in formation in any fashion.

"situations were groups of men, in the absence of an officer or a direct command or direct order, would take the initiative together and on occasion individuals would do the same, those were situations when the book went out the door b/c those troops didn't need a direct order to "right shoulder shift".

So when officers weren't present men would take the initiative? And the book went out the door because troops didn't need a direct order to 'right shoulder shift'? If they didn't need such orders, then what were they doing?

Do you know why such an order [e.g. right shoulder shift] would be given in the first place?

Bill

… and sometimes initiatve will cause them to a "refuse to advance" without concurrence.

Bill, you've asked questions which you obviously have answers to already, so I'd be happy to hear them. Why would right should shift be given as an order in the first place ?

Jim

Jim: You changed my (not Bill's) comment to "refuse to advance". I was merely pointing out that individual choice can also create a negative impact on the unit. Most, if not all soldiers, do not like to be shot at. I remember watching "The Making of Gettysburg" (I think) where the camera is at the rear of a regiment. One soldier moves to the rear, then two, then five, then 10, then 12 and then they are all going to the rear. It is training and the discipline that comes with it that contributes to unit cohesion, critical in linear tactics.

cwbuff, I was adding concurrently to your comment.

Jim:

I know my answers, not yours. You've used that 'right shoulder shift' several times as the analog for all such actions 'in the book' that are thrown out at some point. I am simply trying to picture what you feel is happening that leads veterans to toss out the book.

And 'right shoulder shift' is just one of many actions meant to aid in maneuvering a line efficiently while maintaining order. Both Napoleonic and ACW officers took pride in their men maintaining such things under fire.

Bill

Bill:

Pickett's troops may have taken pride in their halt to dress ranks under fire on July 3rd, but some of their contemporaries might have thought it would've been better had Pickett's division not had the need to do that.

Jim

Troops when they get scared or over stressed, will fall back on what they have been taught. I hve both read this, and seen it myself when things get rough. And the worse they get, the more they rely on "The Book". Even veterns. Perhaps especialy veterns, because they realize just how important it is to keep unit cohesi0n.

There is a school of thought in America, reenforced by hollywood, that military profesionals dont actualy know anything about thier job, and that people off the street will do a much better job, particularly after they throw away the useless official "Book".

The book is written by long term proffesionals, who mostly know what they are talking about. I dont see a couple of privates being able to just toss that out and doing what they want being a good thing. I can see troops dressing the line, or other drill movements as needed, but that is complying with the book, not tossing it out.

So what is meant by all this reference to right shoulder shift? I was under the impresion that you did it so you did not bonk the guy beside you oin the head with your rifle when you did certain movements. So tossing the book and then thumping your buddy just so you can feel independent sounds pretty dumb. ANd not something to be appluaded, or done by experienced troops.

In some times and places drill manuels appear to have become seperat4ed from the reallity of the battlefield. Neithr Hardees manuel nor Caseys seem to have done this. Nor Uptons for that matter. So tossing them out would be a bad move, not a good one.

So what are the examples of bad moves that are in the books, and why are they bad? Surely there are specific examples, other than a general reference to right shoulder shift, which doesnt show at all why it is a bad move and needs to be discarded. I have never reenacted, so dont know the manuel that well, but my son does, and says right shoulder shift is a perfectly usable movement, so why is it an example of what not to do? I dont get it.

Owen

Well, one way of looking at it is, if an infantry unit followed the drill manual to the T on a Civil War battlefield, especially an open one, I think they would've been shot to pieces pretty quickly… and that's pretty much what happened in the 2nd half of the war for the most part when both sides knew how to use their weapons to their full potential. I'm not so sure the same could be said of the Napoleonic Wars. Off the top of my head, Harris Farm, VA, 1864… I believe veteran troops refused an order to advance and took their own initiative cause they already knew it wouldn't succeed. Anyone know of any "refusals to advance" from the Napoleonic Wars for similar reasons ? The only other time I know of that happening was World War I.

Jim

PS And that's not to say that advances over open terrain weren't or couldn't be successful following the general principles of linear tactics as outlined in the drill manuals, BUT the conditions had to be right and the troops had to know what they were doing.

That's a circular argument based upon a spurious assumption.

By ascerting that the rifle was incredibly more effective than it actually was you make the deduction that close order formations can't have been used and therefore ACW soldiers were some kind of prototype stormtroopers.

The same argument can be made for the smoothbore, but it obviously is spurious.

In fact the rifle was not much more effective than smoothbore, close order formations were still used. The men weren't mowed down by rifled musket fire which eclipses machineguns and HE in their effectiveness.

Hi

Well, 67th, you have moved your opinion from "no better and possibly inferior" to now "not much better" in the rifle discussion!

I don't argue about "they didn't do close". My observation is that the casualty rate is higher in the ACW and at longer range in the ACW because of the rifle and that there were attempts to reduce the density of the formations.

I try to avoid the Nappy buffs, but I am unaware in my casual reading of, as one example, nappy troops going to ground under fire as happened in the ACW.

R

"Going to ground" is a failure of the troops. There are several possible reactions to combat: fight, flight, submit and posture. Going to ground is a form of flight.

It was extremely common in undisciplined irregulars. The whole point of la amalgam was to stiffen these low quality troops enough that they'd actually fight. Still happened though. The 93rd Highlanders were low quality troops and they went to ground in front of the American works at New Orleans. How did that do for them?

67th Tigers,

I think the circular arguments and spurious assumptions are your own, but that said, I would argue the rifle musket was more effective enough to change the approach to linear tactics and yes, I agree close order formations were still used under certain circumstances.

Jim

Jim wrote:

Well, one way of looking at it is, if an infantry unit followed the drill manual to the T on a Civil War battlefield, especially an open one, I think they would've been shot to pieces pretty quickly… and that's pretty much what happened in the 2nd half of the war for the most part when both sides knew how to use their weapons to their full potential. I'm not so sure the same could be said of the Napoleonic Wars. Off the top of my head, Harris Farm, VA, 1864… I believe veteran troops refused an order to advance and took their own initiative cause they already knew it wouldn't succeed. Anyone know of any "refusals to advance" from the Napoleonic Wars for similar reasons ? The only other time I know of that happening was World War I.

Jim:
How about some examples of troops being shot to pieces because they followed the drill manual.

There were bad tactics at times, but I don't see any troops being shot up simply because they used the methods for movement and formations found in the regulations. Those were just the building blocks used by commanders, not the battle tactics. A regiment could form line or columns to move from point A to point B, but when and why and together as part of what larger formation was the decision of the commanders in the field.

Yes, troops in the Napoleonic wars did refuse to advance, for a wide variety of reasons. At Waterloo: a number of Belgian and Dutch troops, even some KGL cavalry, Albuera: several Spanish regiments, Salamanca: British, Portugese and French units, Vittoria: British and French battalions, Austerlitz: French and Russian regiments, Borodino: Troops from both sides, etc. etc. etc. Usually, they refused because they didn't trust their orders/commanders and/or thought the orders were doomed to failure. Sometimes it was a decision by the troops and sometimes by the officers leading them.

It is interesting that when by 1864 the 'old tactics' didn't work, the Union attacked in columns at Cold Harbor I and II, and Petersburg and after, even when the soldiers knew the outcome, as you note.

Yet at Spotsylvania, Upton takes the Confederate works having his division deployed in open columns--right out of the drill manual and the Napoleonic wars. His success is seen as 'unique and more modern' in conception.

The only times I have read where veteran soldiers, or even green troops tossed the book is when cohesion had been lost, mistakes made and saving themselves was the priority. And what were the actions then? Restoring order and the ability to operate…according the the manual…

The only time the book went out the door was when so much disorder had been caused by either friendly mistakes or the enemy that the unit couldn't operate 'by the book.' And the first thing that was attempted was to somehow return to a state where they could operate 'by the book.' I'll be glad to provide several examples of that from just the 2nd day of Gettysburg.

Bill

No, all the contemporary observations and the recent scholarship show there was no "rifle revolution" and that the ACW was a close order linear affair.

If you wish to believe something contrary to those that actually observed and experienced it, go ahead.

The purpose of a battle is to defeat your opponent. If you just go to ground, then you cannot defeat him other than by attrition, and the weapons and ammo loads of the day made that largely impossible. The agruement that vets would not close because they might get hurt should be exteneded to why didnt they just disert? After all refusing to advance is not throwing the rule book out, it is mutiny.

The idea that the ACW was a easrly WWI is just wrong. The weapons are not that accurate, and much more importantly, not that rapid fireing.Plus the Artillery is not the dominating facot it would become later.

When I enlisted in ther Army I did not get a certificate saying it was a safe proffesion. I dont think they did in the ACW either. Spreading out seems like a great idea to those familiar with the casualties of WWI, but given the weapons they had to use, the linear tactics where about the only way to mass enough firepower to overcome your opponent. Always going to ground and skirmishing only just gives the intiative to your opponent, something neither side was willing to do unless they had to.

As for the troops knowing better about an attack than thier officers, that sounds a lot like Lions led by Donkeys transposed to the ACW. I dont find it valid where it came from and certainly not in another period.

I dont agree with 67thtigers about the ineffectiveness of ACW rifled muskets, but I do agree that they where just not capable of battlefield interdiction such that two units could not survive directly in front of each other. There are way to amny example of units sluggin it out for an extended time and still not being wiped out. Sure the casualties where high, but that was over time. Often a lot of time. HAd they closed, likely the casualties would have been lower, as there was less time to apply that fiorepower. All going to ground does is stop your attack, and cause thencasualties tombe extended over time, to no useful effect, just general attrition. Really a bad way to go.

More to say but have to go to work. Overnight shifts suck.

Owen

Yes, the notion that the rifle-musket made the old tactics obsolete is a myth. There were plenty of times when fire did stop an attack cold, but that's war. Fredericksburg, Pickett's Charge, Cold Harbor are all used as examples of the rifle's supremacy, but in fact they are all just examples of poor generalship. Poorly conceived and/or executed attack OUGHT to fail!

There's no doubt that we see the advantage pass to the defensive as the war goes on, but that has a number of reasons in addition to the improved firepower of the rifle (there definitely was an improvement, but it was incremental rather than quantum). Some of these other reasons are war weariness among the troops, the South giving up on the offensive, and perhaps most critically, the fact that supply by rail allowed armies to dig in and stay dug in and yet not starve. In prior wars armies had to stay on the move so they could forage. Entrenching was usually pointless because an army could not stay put for any length of time. If you didn't want to attack an entrenched enemy then just wait a bit, eventually he'll have to move. If armies were in the field, it was because they wanted to fight. But after 1863, the Southern armies were no longer looking for that one decisive battle as they had earlier and started digging in routinely. The North had to follow suit and entrenching obviously made it much harder trying to attack. But that wasn't the fault of the tactics.

I think the most persuasive argument that the tactics still worked is the fact that Emory Upton wrote a new tactics manual in 1866 which was adopted by the Army in 1867. He had the full benefit of all the lessons learned in the war. And what was the battle formation that Upton gave the Army? Why it was the same two rank, shoulder-to-shoulder line of battle that had been used throughout the war! Upton made plenty of good changes that simplified the drill enormously, but the basic combat formation didn't change at all. (He did allow a single rank line, but he clearly states that was primarily for times when there aren't sufficient troops to hold the necessary front with two ranks. Where the troops are sufficient, two ranks should be used.) And this was even when the Army was adopting a breechloading rifle. Clearly Upton didn't think that linear tactics were obsolete.

I could write more, but it's late and I'm sleepy :)

Scott

Bill:

So, by your understanding, if ACW troops deviated at all from the drill manual there was a immediate loss of cohesion and ensuing disorder. Moreover, there was a progression towards more close order formations and tactics as the war went on which has been called a progression towards modernity. Lastly, the drill manuals, weapons and tactics applied on the ACW battlefield were nearly the same as the Napoleonic Wars and if there was a degree of distinction, the difference would be irrelevant.

Jim

Deviating from the drill manual won't always lead to immediate disorder or disaster, but it will definitely make things more difficult for the commander. Let's say I've allowed my men to spread out, take cover, lie down and break up the formation. Then I discover that the enemy is threatening to turn my left flank. I need to swing my regiment around to meet this threat. Now I could start screaming at my men to do this: "Hey! All of you! Swing the line around to the left! No! your OTHER left! I want the right of our line on that big tree--no THAT big tree! Hey! Stop firing and listen to me!" And maybe, if I was lucky and the enemy gave me enough time I might be able to get it done before they crushed us.

Or, if I had my men in good order I could simply command: "Battalion! Change Front Forward on the 10th Company! By Company, left half-wheel! March! And depending on the size of my battalion a minute or two later the movement is complete and we're ready.

The tactics manuals couldn't predict every situation on a battlefield but they provided a tool kit for the commander to meet most of them with a standard maneuver that could be practiced on the drill field. But it would only work if the men stayed in good order and formation was intact. Once you let the men start acting on their own, your options shrink dramatically.

Scott

Scott,

Great example. Wish it were easy to post diagrams here. But here's what I think you just ordered by company (I'm assuming a 6 co. battalion for brevity).

C2
Cn
Cd
Cp
Co
Cs
C C C C C C
1st postion

My first thought is, if you were under fire, wouldn't your official command be just as hard to hear as an informal one ?

But what would be the command if you wanted this ?

1st Postion
C C C C C C
C2
Cn
Cd
Cp
Co
Cs

Jim

PS Spacing didn't come out perfectly, but the general idea is there.

Jim,

Being heard in battle is always a challenge. I remember at the 135th anniversary reenactment of Gettysburg at the height of the Pickett's Charge scenario we had 20,000 muskets and 100 cannon blasting away and it was literally impossible to hear anything at all but the roar of the guns. Most of the time it's not quite so bad and that's another advantage of having standardized commands that everyone knows. I could just send my two wing commanders running down the line in each direction and have them tell each company commander: "Change of front on the 10th company!" and they'd immediately know what I wanted. I'd wait a few seconds to make sure they all had the order and then wave my sword and off we go.

Your diagrams are spot on. The first one is just what I ordered in my post. As for the second diagram, the order for that one would be: "Battalion! Change Front to the Rear on the 6th Company! About--face! By Company, Right Half-Wheel--March!" It's a bit trickier than the first maneuver since you have to turn around and move back into position and then turn around again, but it's another manuever we can practice on the drill field. I might note that when Stannard's Vermonters took Pickett's division in the flank, they used a Change of Front movement just like the first one instead of trying to wheel.

One of the reasons the tactics manuals are so long is that they provide so many different variations on each of the movements. From line of battle you can form a column, by company or division, on any one of the companies or divisions. Likewise to deploy back into line you can also deploy on any company or division. It's all to give the commander the maxiumum flexibility to meet any situation.

Scott

PS- I posted this before reading your previous post.

May have answered my own question:

"Left face, file left, march"

or potentially

"About face, right wheel, march"

and might not your command be narrowed to

"Forward, left wheel, march" ?

Assuming it's too loud to command the entire battalion with the voice, could you go to each company commander--or the nearest at hand if speed is of the essence--and order "About face, right wheel" ?

What I'm seeing is that if one narrows the commands down, the general principles can still be applied to a company which has spread out a bit, is using all availabe cover, may be lying on the ground, etc… but is still in general proximity to one another working as a team.

What if the 10th company commander had noticed the enemy flanking move before you, the battalion commander ? That company is on the ground or behind trees and in general proximity to each other, but they are going to get flanked very shortly. Might not that company commander simply yell "Fall back, face left" ? Or does he use a combination of yells and hand signals to warn his company and get them realigned as quickly as possible ?

What if a smaller number of men or maybe just 1 within that 10th company noticed the enemy threat even before the company commander ? And without a word they or he just got up, fell back a bit and faced left ? Maybe on the way they catch the captain's attention and/or the attention of their company comrades, maybe they just slap them on the shoulder and point to their left as the passby to realign ? Is this by the book ?

In both cases, either officers or troops might be making the decision to realign facing left even before you, the battalion commander, are aware of it. By the time you notice or are warned, your two left most companies might be facing left already, but you can see that even that "unoffical" flank refusal isn't going to be enough to keep your battalion from getting flanked ? What do you do ? What's your next order ?

Definitely, interesting stuff !

Jim---PS I posted this before reading your previous post.

Hi

Now we are back to "no effect, stupid governments bught expensive rifles when they could have just kept cheap muskets" argument.

"Going to ground" doesn't mean hiding, it means fighting prone. Something americans have done in all wars I am aware of.

No effect? The whole purpose of the minie' was to improve rate of fire FOR RIFLES. In another thread a couple years ago, someone asserted that muskets were inefficient with the ball rattling down the barrel. He ASSumed that no one patched the ball which allows the gun to be pointed other that up!

"not that accurate" is a matter of defination. A patched smoothbore musket has a range of minutes of arc of some 36 to 40. This means that at 100yards and perfect aim, the whole line is in the kill zone, though, of course, msolid lines are not that "solid". At 200 yards, only 1/3ed is.

Compare and contrast, the usual minie' ball will place within 5minutes of arc, meaning properly aimed, all in the chest at 100 yards, all in the body at 200.

As a comparison, a patched round ball "kaintuck" or '41 will do 3minutes of arc. But the ballistics of the round ball don't carry the sorts of energy to make the 500 yard shots the minie will make.

That's the physics of the situation. Now, some argue that it doesn't matter because of the "present fire" aspect. Which, frankly as with most of the above arguments takes the concepts of "best" to mean "always".

Rocky

That's incorrect.

A loose ball in a musket is 30-36 MOA, depending on how much windage there is.

A springfield rifle-musket has an MOA of 10.5, or did in the experiments of the time.

It's an improvement, but not as big a one as you'd believe. The actual combat ranges remained the same (about 100 yds) and actual hit rates remained the same (about 1%).

Jim wrote:

"What if a smaller number of men or maybe just 1 within that 10th company noticed the enemy threat even before the company commander ? And without a word they or he just got up, fell back a bit and faced left ? Maybe on the way they catch the captain's attention and/or the attention of their company comrades, maybe they just slap them on the shoulder and point to their left as the passby to realign ? Is this by the book ?

Jim:
Yes, each company commander had primary responsibilities and a certain latitude in decisions, all outlined in 'the book'. 'The Book' wasn't some straightjacket that kept men from responding to real war. The book was an attempt to provide the tools for commanders at all levels to fight a war, one which they all knew required flexibility. Did 'The Book' cover all contingencies? No, and no book could, but it covered most.

So, by your understanding, if ACW troops deviated at all from the drill manual there was a immediate loss of cohesion and ensuing disorder. Moreover, there was a progression towards more close order formations and tactics as the war went on which has been called a progression towards modernity. Lastly, the drill manuals, weapons and tactics applied on the ACW battlefield were nearly the same as the Napoleonic Wars and if there was a degree of distinction, the difference would be irrelevant.

No, I didn't say that. I said that when there was a loss of cohesion, the typical response was to restore order 'by the book'. 'The Book' defined what order and cohesion looked like, what was needed for large bodies of men to respond to commands. And no, I was pointing out that what was done later in the war often was in direct opposition to what many today say was obvious…close order tactics just got men shot to pieces, and that a number of 'new' tactics were simply older tactics.

And yes, if you read the British or French Regulations circa 1800 and then Hardee's and Casey's regulations, you will see few differences, several places where whole passages are lifted from the earlier books. One big difference was that Hardee and Casey who copied him, were following French light infantry regulations from the 1830s and 40s, which also were based on earlier Napoleonic manuals.

There are just so many ways to move a body of men in unison, and there weren't any reasons to change methods that worked so well in the past. Even troops today who do close-order drill follow the same methods, only now what was used on the battlefield is now just for parades.

Bill

Bill:

My point about the book being tossed was that not only were there times that much of the minutiae from the manual got ignored, but that indeed it HAD to get ignored or the attack or the defense might fail. In addition, tactical decisions were not always made from the top down, but sometimes from the bottom up, and perhaps slightly more often as combat teams based at the company level. Moreover, I would speculate that this occurred to a greater extent during the ACW than during the Napoleonic Wars. The nature of the ACW battlefield as well as its tactical requirements had changed significantly from the Napoleonic Wars, and this by necessity broadened the latitude by which commanders needed to interpret the drill manuals, though I agree it wasn't "revolutionary". However, the fact that Hardee's and Casey's were Light Infantry Manuals based on French manuals from the 30's & 40's with instruction for firing while laying prone is evidence enough of the significant difference between the American Civil War and the Napoleonic Wars… and even here more latitude for initiative beyond the manual was required during the ACW. I agree with you that tactics during the ACW were still linear being based on the whole upon Light Infantry Tactics (unlike the Napoleonic Wars)that still required a close proximity, if not necessarily a close order between troops, but the number of instances when the book couldn't cover all contingencies--as you say-- tossed--as I say--looks to have increased from the Napoleonic to the ACW.

Jim

The light infantry manuals of Rottemburg 1798, Schutzen instructions 1788 and the Russian Jager manual of 1798 by Kutusov all had instructions for firing prone. It was taught and used. The famous shot by the 95th Rifleman Tom Plunket was made lying prone. It brought down French General Colbert during the Corunna Campaign.

I am not sure what 'minutia' you are thinking of. Personally, I don't see book tossing increasing in the ACW. I do see a movement, starting with the French Revolutionary wars, where formation reguirements became less rigid, but that was found in 'the book'. For instance:

INFANTRY TACTICS
by WINFIELD SCOTT 1840

EVOLUTIONS OF THE LINE—PART V. , ARTICLE 1.
To advance in line of battle deployed. [That is, advancing into combat.]

2242. To carry through the same principle, colonels will not scrupulously endeavour to maintain their battalions abreast with each other; consequently, they will not cause the step to he lengthened or shortened, the time to be marked or quickened, except when one or the other should evidently be necessary in order to preserve a certain degree of harmony in the line; if it happen that a battalion find itself a pace or two in advance or in rear of the neighboring battalions, this slight irregularity may soon correct itself without particular orders or interference.

In other words, don't sweat the small stuff. This instruction is repeated twenty years later in Hardee and Casey's manuals, among others. Yet, Benning, an experienced brigadier,on the second day of Gettysburg, during the advance, goes to the left end regiment in his brigade and hurrys them up because they were lagging, losing alignment. He still sees such things as important.

I'll dig up an example or two, from regiments on up--and how each level affected lower and higher levels. The Second day of Gettysburg is where I'll go.

Bill

The question of where the tactical decisions are being made is a fascinating one. When I was working on my PhD I did a lengthy research paper on the evolution of infantry tactics between the Civil War and World War I. I read hundreds of articles written in American and European military journals and this was the hottest topic of discussion for decades. Up through the Civil War it was very much a top-down process of decision-making just as it had been for centuries. The battalion (regiment) was the basic tactical unit and decision-making basically stopped there. Tactical decisions at lower levels rarely ever happened and were, in fact, actively discouraged. (Aside from minor decisions like ‘I think I'll hide behind that tree instead of this one'. In other words, decisions that had no real affect on a battle.)

But after the Franco-Prussian War where both sides had breechloading rifles and firepower had increased enormously, the handwriting was on the wall for the old linear tactics. The generals realized that troops in close order just couldn't survive anymore. The troops were going to have to disperse and it would no longer be possible for the battalion commander to keep his whole force under his personal supervision. Tactical decision-making was going to HAVE to go down to the company level. The devil was in figuring out how to make this work, Few senior officers liked the idea of giving lieutenants and captains that sort of initiative. A great deal of thought and experimentation took place in all the world's armies. As the years passed and weapons got even better, a few visionaries (or wild-eyed radicals depending on your point of view) theorized that tactical decision-making would have to go even farther down the chain of organization to platoon or even squad level (a level that didn't even exist during the ACW). This was too much for most military men. The idea of giving ENLISTED MEN tactical initiative was anathema. Everyone KNEW that enlisted men were too stupid for such things (The 1890s US Army Regulations comes right out and says this.) So, it had to wait for the later part of World War I before NCOs were allowed to make tactical decisions.

The ACW was still very much a war in the old style. I have no doubt that there were times where company commanders made decisions and even some times (out on the skirmish line) where some sergeants did so, too. But by and large, the decisions were coming from above and pretty much stopped when you got to the regiment. The colonel got his orders and made decisions on how to carry them out. But his subordinates were not making decisions, their job was to make sure the colonel's orders were carried out properly and there was little or no leeway for improvisation.

Bill,

You missed my point. The book wasn't the same in the ACW as it was in during the Napoleonic Wars. If anything the Napoleonic "book" got more complicated and had less latitude for interpretation. The AWI saw more necessary interpretative freedom of the "book" than even the Napoleonic Wars which followed it, due in large part to the differences between the American and European countryside, pool of available technology, and culture. The rhetorical application of a vague and yet somehow unified "book" or singular drill manual equally applicable to all eras of military history without reference to differences in geography, technology and culture has a distinct list towards the ahistorical. Next you'll be arguing that the Roman Legions followed the same book as the French Imperial Guard or the Texas Brigade for that matter.

Jim

"Next you'll be arguing that the Roman Legions followed the same book as the French Imperial Guard or the Texas Brigade for that matter."

Actually, I could make a strong argument supporting that… :)

Jim wrote:

You missed my point. The book wasn't the same in the ACW as it was in during the Napoleonic Wars. If anything the Napoleonic "book" got more complicated and had less latitude for interpretation.

Jim:
Love to see an example of that comparison.

Here are two quotes, one is from the British Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry printed both in 1798 and 1814 from Rottemburg's manual.[p.25 Chapter V] The Second is from Upton's book On Tactics from 1867 p.117.

Tell me which is from 1798 and which is from 1867: Both are written by experienced infantry officers.

When a company of light infantry is destined to form the chain without any other corps to support it, the commanding officer signifies that one fourth of it, i.e. one half platoon or section, will remain formed as a reserve: suppose, for instance, the fourth section is fixed on for this service; in this case the three first advance fifty paces in quick time; the order is then given to form the chain to the right of left, or as circumstances may require;…

and

Whenever a company is to be deployed as skirmishers, the captain designates one or more fours from the right or left, preferably those having vacancies in the rear rank, to act as a reserve, and desginates the officer or non-commissioned officer to command it; the commander of the reserve immediately causes it to step a few paces backward. The guide on the flank of the company, remains with the reserve to act as a guide.

The only difference is one has the reserve step back and the other has the rest of the company move forward instead…

And as Scott mentioned, there are a number of common practices in handling infantry from Roman times through to the ACW. There is a good book out Inside Wellington's Peninsular Army 1808-1814, and in Chapter Four "Order of Battle" the author shows the connections between ancient Greek and Roman practices and Napoleonic. The ACW officers used the same methods for forming and moving men.

There are just so many ways of maneuvering bodies of men and ACW and earlier American military men didn't come up with anything new. They simply used European methods that fit the American landscape. The teacher of American soldiers was von Stueben, a Prussian using Prussian methods. Right from the start, when Americans were going to fight battles, they took their lessons from European models, right down the two ranks used by ACW troops.

Bill

Another book worth mention is Matt Spring's With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: link

It shows the use of extended order tactics in the AWI of much greater sophistication than those used in the ACW.

Hi

67, the only way your 10.5 "from tests" is real, is that you are comparing two different tests without isolating the variables. In other words, you repeat BS that is at variance with my experiences, other tests, and the mechanics of the machines.

And your last point wedded to "100yd no difference" begs the question I keep asking. There is ZERO reason for either buying rifles OR buying the minie ball and a new line of cartridges if there is no difference.

And the other question you ignore revolves around engagement ranges. Others, besides me, have cited longer engagement ranges from other battles. Do you hold in your rules that as you have decided that 100 is universal and optimum, you prohibit ANY shooting with effect beyond that range? Or as I keep asking, does "best choice mean, no other choice?

I suspect your insistence on this concept is based more on the way you play than the history.

R

67th wrote:

It shows the use of extended order tactics in the AWI of much greater sophistication than those used in the ACW.

How is it more sophisticated?

Bill

Bill:

Here are my picks, the first is 1798 and the second is 1867. The 1/4 strength reserve seems to be the primary parallel. But I note the first seems to be a bit more picky, specifying how quickly and how far the chain will deploy ahead of the reserve. In the second, I noted that a non-com is specifically identified as capable of commanding the reserve, whereas in the first mention is only made of the commanding officer.

Jim

Scott wrote: "The idea of giving ENLISTED MEN tactical initiative was anathema. Everyone KNEW that enlisted men were too stupid for such things."

Scott,

That may have been the expectation prior to the ACW, but i think as the war progressed and units gained more combat experience, I can see company level officers acquiring the authority to exercise greater tactical initiative--within limits of course… and let's not forget how literate the American enlisted man was… and many were pretty good shots too.

Jim

Jim,

But the sources I'm drawing this from are long after the Civil War. They still thought this way in the 1890s and early 1900s.

And the manuals the ACW officers used and the training the men were given do not bestow any real authority on NCOs or even the junior officers except when deployed as skirmishers. The smallest tactical unit recognized by the manuals was the platoon and this was supposed to be commanded by an officer. NCOs and privates would never receive any training in making tactical decisions and the tactical system being used by the army made no allowances for them to make tactical decisions. So why would we expect them to do so?

I think that we as military buffs and watchers of movies and TV know far more about tactics than any of the enlisted men from the Civil War era. Their perception of war would be formed by lithographs of Napoleonic or Mexican-American War soldiers in nice straight ranks advancing with bayonets fixed. This is the sort of war they knew. This was the way war was supposed to be fought. The experience of battle might have given some of them some new ideas, but battles were rare and the chance to experiment few. The practical problems of improvising new tactics were enormous. I just can't see it happening very often.

Scott

Bill,

Have you read it (effects the answer)?

Scott,

I'm not sure how you come to the conclusion that battles were rare and the chance to experiment few in the ACW. Are we talking about the American Civil War ? Besides, it didn't take the experience of many battles for most units to shake out the incompetent and identify the efficient. I can see strict top down control prelimary to battle and in some circumstances during it, otherwise, once things warmed up I think top down control became one of general guidance and trust in your subordinates. How much top down control do you think a battalion commander was able to exercise in the Wilderness, let alone a brigade commander ? When battles are fought in terrain like that, you need good company and battalion level officers, especially on the attack. I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on this one.

Jim

67th:

I'll bet it does! ;-7 No, I haven't read it. I was just curious. Where they different formations, or the typical extended line formation used in different ways?

Bill

Bill:

Here are my picks, the first is 1798 and the second is 1867. The 1/4 strength reserve seems to be the primary parallel. But I note the first seems to be a bit more picky, specifying how quickly and how far the chain will deploy ahead of the reserve. In the second, I noted that a non-com is specifically identified as capable of commanding the reserve, whereas in the first mention is only made of the commanding officer.

Jim:
You're right, but not for the reasons you give. Part of the problem is lifting sections without context. Both books are organized in similar fashion as were all manuals, School of the Soldier, School of the company etc. I was sure the reference to "light infantry" would give it away.

The 1867 manual is easily as picky as the 1798 manual, maybe more so. Second, the sections that are being called out for reserve are already commanded by a NCO, so there is no reason to mention them in the 1798 book. In both cases a captain is in over-all command.

Here are the instructions given by Upton for deploying skirmishers:

Section 300 p. 108 To Deploy Forward

The captain commands;
1. As skirmishers, 2. On the Left (or right)four take intervals, March

At the command march, the left four, conducted by the sargeant on the left of the company, moves straight to the front; the other fours make a partial wheel to the right, those near the right increasing the wheel considerably beyond 45 degrees. The partial wheel being completed, each four moves in a new direction until its left file, who is the guide, gains a distance of 40 yards from the left file of four next on its left; when it makes a partial wheel to the left, and marches to the front, maintaining its interval.

When the left four arrives on the line, the captain commands: 1.Skirmishers Halt. At the command halt, the four left halts and deploys in double time upon the number four of the front rank, who stand fast; the other front-rank men move to his right, the rear-rank men to his left, and place themselves, in their order, at five yards apart.</q.

The 1798 light infantry manual gives the same instructions in thus:

page 25-26

The order is given to form the chain to the right or left, or as circunstances may require; the signal from the guble is immdeiately given and the detachment extends in division of two files at ten paces distant from each other; the fourth section remains formed. This disposition being made, the signal from the bugle is given to march.

What is obvious is that by deploying skirmishers by sections rather than fours from the line, a great deal of instruction isn't necessary, though both instructions produce the same results.

The point being, while the instructions differ in content organization, both are just as detailed. The idea that the ACW manuals were somehow less detailed, less demanding, imparted more 'initiative' to enlisted men or were somehow fundamentally different from Napoleonic instruction just isn't the case. They followed the same organization, presentation style [right down to giving first orders in italics]and addressed the same formations, maneuvers and types of transitions.

Were there differences? You bet, but at best they were superficial. Upton states what is 'new' in his On Tactics in his preface. He feels that some specific deployments from column to line are simpler and can be done faster using his instructions, but nothing radical or basic from earlier manuals is included… In fact he has to answer the question, "Why is another Drill Manual necessary?" because he knew that is what military men would be asking, even two year after the ACW.

Bill

Jim,

Compared to World War I or II yes battles were quite rare in the ACW. In those later wars the soldiers could constantly be in action for months with hardly a pause. Every day they faced death and had the opportunity to learn if they managed to escape it. In the ACW regiments could go months without any action at all. How many major battles did the Army of the Potomac fight in four years? Less than twenty by my count. And not every regiment was engaged in every battle. Even famous hard-bitten regiments might have only heard the hiss of enemy minnie balls a dozen times in their whole careers.

And yes, command control would break down in close terrain like the Wilderness. And it did break down! Those battles were unholy messes and I don't see any evidence of the company commanders and NCOs taking charge and bringing any order out of it. That's why the armies tended to not fight in terrain like that.

Civil War soldiers received nothing like modern basic training or infantry combat training. They were not trained to think or solve problems. They were trained to stay in their formations no matter what and listen for their officers' commands. I have no doubt that there were times where low-ranking officers or NCOs took the initiative but I haven't found many accounts in all the reports I've read. I have to believe such things were pretty rare.

Scott

Following Kershaw's Brigade on July Second at Gettysburg might be a good example of both how 'The Book' played out in combat situations and what happened when officers took the initiative when the plan goes wonky. Kershaw's brigade is a veteran unit and the regiments have been together for a long time.

Kershaw was the directing brigade for McLaw's Division. His orders were to advance while keeping his left anchored on Emmittsburg Road and his right connected to Hood's Left Flank. Hood was ordered to attack perpendicular to Emmittsburg Road, which he protested several times because he could see he wasn't on the Union flank as Lee's plan had assumed. Hood took the initiative and moves his division by leading Laws' brigade farther east than ordered, all the way to the Round Tops. That is why Anderson and Benning were 'out of position with the first line of Robertson and Laws when they emerged from the woods. It is also why Robertson and then Kershaw were broken up trying to maintain contact with Laws left.

Kershaw can not keep his left on Emmitsburg and right connected to Robertson. The distance is too great. He is advancing against several batteries of Union artillery. He splits his brigade into two wings or divisions [in the book] and attempts to continue advancing. He orders the left wing to move to the left. This is done by Kershaw giving the command to the officers nearest him, then every officer yells out the order all down the line. [by the book] This is done. The problem is that the right wing of the brigade, which Kershaw didn't want to move, hear the orders and assume [as usual when acting as one unit] that the command is for them too and march to the left, taking them right into the guns' field of fire. Things fall apart and the troops go to ground.

Men are firing on their own, but no one is moving. Kershaw
then does what? The officers don't act on their own, other than to attempt to follow the orders by getting their men to move. Kershaw goes to Semmes and asks for support. Because of the broken parts of Kershaw's and Robertson's brigades, Semmes' brigade is stuffed in the gaps to maintain the line. Part of Robertson's Brigade goes off with Laws and is never under Robertson's command for the rest of the day.

The advance is taken up again, because being veterans, they form line with other regiments from other brigades and continue on…and they can do that because they are all following the same rules in the book.

Law, having taken command once Hood is wounded, sees his left becoming detached from McLaws' right [Kershaw] and travels down the length of the division to re-establish that connection [restore order by the book]

Barksdale, who is is supposed to move on Kershaw's left, attacks forward and then moves off to his left because he sees a target of opportunity--on his own initiative. His right flank regiment [the 23rd AL IIRC] is left behind because it is still attempting to maintain contact with Kershaw.

Wofford is ordered to advance. The *First* thing his does is meet with Kershaw to coordinate his advance so that it connects with Kershaw's left [This seems to have been mentioned specifically in the orders to advance.]

What you see is:
1. Every instance of officers like Hood and Barksdale taking personal initiative creating problems.
2. Lower level officers from Brigadier down to company commanders working to maintain order [by the book] or to re-establish it, using methods outlined in the book.
3. And when things are cobbled together, the veterans making it work…and by working, I mean establishing order…as defined by the book, even in a jumble of different regiments…. and fighting very well.

Of course, one reason the Union came off second best on July 2nd is because the Rebs were very orderly compared to the actions of the Union commanders visa vie 'the book'.

'Order' was defined by the book, methods used to move and direct troops depended on that 'order' and when the order broke down, the first thing officers with initiative did was work to restore that order--by the book.

Bill

The AWI:

In 1774 the British were still using the 3 rank close order line. However Howe in 1775 dropped the 3rd rank, retaining close order. The close order 2 rank line was how they fought at Boston.

However, Howe had already devised alternate regulations. The British infantry moved to 2 rank open order (18" between files) even for general parades. In action they frequently extended and on a few occasions (which were exceptional) moved to single ranks. Files also opened out, with the 2nd file typically 4 yds behind the first, closing up to 3 ft for firing, and then so close at the charge that IMHO the line effectively became a close order single rank at the point of contact.

Movements were conducted rapidly, at the standard pace of 120 paces/min out of contact, the quick within the outer limit of weapons range (reckoned to be 300 yds against riflemen) and at the charge (i.e. a flat out run) in the last 50-75 yds. This was disparingingly called the "English Gallop". British battalions did not carry their Colours into battle, and often not even on campaign (explaining why no British Colours were captured at Saratoga).

The standard British attack was to accelerate to a trot upon entering rifle range (300 yds), give a single volley of voluntary fire at 50-75 yds (meant as much to cause the defenders to shoot back as to cause damage) then rush straight on at the run to bayonetpoint, which would usually cause the rebels to flee.

It should be noted the Continentals adopted essentially identical formations.

Hi

Now rifle range is 300 yards?

R

67th wrote:

However, Howe had already devised alternate regulations. The British infantry moved to 2 rank open order (18" between files) even for general parades. In action they frequently extended and on a few occasions (which were exceptional) moved to single ranks. Files also opened out, with the 2nd file typically 4 yds behind the first, closing up to 3 ft for firing, and then so close at the charge that IMHO the line effectively became a close order single rank at the point of contact.

Thanks for that. As two rank deployments as well as extended and open order formations were already found in most all European manuals as options before the SYW. Actually, those were found in Bland's Treatise from 1726 for the British….Which was THE standard until the British Army adopted their first official regulations in 1791.

So Howe didn't adopt alternative regulations…all the formation options you mention already existed, however it sure sounds like he applied them across his entire infantry force rather than as an option to be used in particular tactical situations.

And yes, 300 yards was seen as the limit of rifle range. Scharnhorst, in his Military Handbook for Officers, circa 1804, which came to be a best seller, he lists 200 yards are the outside range for volley fire. I have read in a number of primary sources the same thing. Oman mentions the French opening up volley fire at 200 and 250 yards/paces at Talavera and other battles. Go figure… The use of 'effective range' can have a number of meanings.

Bill

Hi

Bill, 1804 is roundball. Roundball ballistics suck and 300 is extreme range. ACW rifles are shooting either "conical" or minie' rounds which have very different ballistics. The greater sectional density means it carries more velocity, longer, flatter at range and is a 500 yard weapon.

To put it simply, my "long rifle" and my "hawkin" with round ball 300 yard weapons. One thing that happens to a round ball at range is that it suddenly wanders off target. With the my current Hawkin, this is 125 yard, and the ball "flies" in a random direction. My old kentucky is a little more stable.

What happens with a conical is that it does not do this when it slows down. Thus, one rifle with 4" moa is 4" out to any range.

Rocky