"Unit frontage and rifle-musket engagement ranges?" Topic

First, did ACW drill still use the term "pace" for deploying troops?
This conveniently works out to about 30" or 2.5' correct?
Finally, for a 2-rank firing line in close order, would they still be using a pace of frontage per man per rank (so regiment strength / 2 = Frontage in paces?

Second, we all know the minie rifle was good to about 400m or so. At what range would troops actually be permitted to fire? I'm thinking more like 100m, maybe 200m for suppressing fire.

Thoughts appreciated.

HesseCassel 20 Nov 2010 8:34 a.m. PST
First, did ACW drill still use the term "pace" for deploying troops?
This conveniently works out to about 30" or 2.5' correct?
Finally, for a 2-rank firing line in close order, would they still be using a pace of frontage per man per rank (so regiment strength / 2 = Frontage in paces?

Second, we all know the minie rifle was good to about 400m or so. At what range would troops actually be permitted to fire? I'm thinking more like 100m, maybe 200m for suppressing fire.

Thoughts appreciated.

*NJH: This is a serious can of worms you've just opened – sort of like asking about artillery on the Napoleonics board. The rifled musket wasn't initially wisespread. However, by the end of the war it was uncommon to find an infantry unit without them. As to the range at which they were used, welllll, that's a musket of a different caliber. There exists all sorts of anecdotal information regarding the range at which they were consistently used. In my readings, which span the better part of 55 years, I have learned that I wouldn't want to bet my life on a definitive statement regarding range. Sometimes they were used at virtually point blank range (Bloodly Lane, Antietam, Confederates), and sometimes at 300-400 yards (The Stone Wall, Gettysburg, Federals, a unit or two). Those are the extremes I know of, and in these two cases the geography dictated the specific tactics.

Some folks will parrot Paddy Griffith as the gospel, or will echo Earl Hess. They assert that the rifled musket was used in the same manner as the flintlocks of the Napoleonic era. Others will provide data in opposition to Griffith and Hess in this regard.

Personally, I think the range was determined by the circumstances as dictated by mission, supply, geography, officers commanding, and the length of service time of the unit.

Or not.

Yeah you can really get into a mess of private opinion on this, but maybe a simple answer is best. The less cover the target is in, the flatter the landscape, thick smoke or bad weather NOT obscuring line of sight, the longer the effective range probably was for the good (Springfields/Enfields) rifled muskets! Of course you can see how some or all of these factors could limit ranges to smoothbore era distance fairly quickly! So IMHO is was very situational and not so much a technical revolution, that really came a decade or two later!

The drill manuals emphasized standing elbow to elbow rather than specifying a distance for a single man to occupy. However, for all practical purposes when looking at the frontage of a company or regiment in a two rank deep line, the frontage in feet is more or less the same as the total number of men. Thus a 300 man regiment would occupy a frontage of 300 feet or 100 yards.

You will see opinions that veterans spread out more, but I have yet to see anyone explain how this was accomplished for a full regiment deploying from column to line. The whole thing with drill was to make certain actions standard when given a specific order without the men having to think about it (I guess you could say it became habitual). Overcoming that training would take an agreement within the full regiment that they would do things a different way and then practicing that new method until it became habitual. I believe people tend to think in terms of small groups rather than mass units.

Regarding rifle-musket engagement ranges, I tend to agree with Earl Hess in his book "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat" that someone who lacks the training or practice will not know how to properly use a black powder rifle and this limits the range for which it's used. Once troops had enough practice or received training on how to use the actual effective range of the weapon, then it did become more the matter of "if you can see it, you can likely hit it." There is also the matter that units typically held fire until commanded to fire and this made the range dependent on the commanding officer and what they thought would be the proper range to fire. I think the only people who ever used these weapons to their true ranges were skirmishers and sharpshooters who took time to get a clear view and knew how to aim over a long distance (which could have been based on practical experience and having a feel for such things as much as any formal training).

My own opinion is most units didn't open fire at ranges over 150 yards or so and some units, especially with smoothbore muskets, held fire to shorter ranges in order to achieve a greater effect. You do read of green units opening fire at ranges of 400 yards or so and having little impact on their targets.

There are folks on this site who are experienced with black powder weapons who will talk about how long of a range they can hit targets with an amazing consistency and I don't doubt them for a moment. But it would be interesting to hear how well they were able to hit things at a long distance the first few times they fired a black powder weapon (i.e., not how well they shoot now, but how well they did at first). Then again there are some folks who are "naturals" with any firearm.

No matter what you're armed with, there are advantages to holding your fire until the advancing enemy is very close. Not only because this increases accuracy, but because it makes it difficult for the enemy to escape your fire with a quick retreat or by going to ground. The difficulty, of course, is getting your troops to withstand the psychological pressure of seeing large numbers of enemies, armed with bayonets, bearing down on them and not fire until ordered to do so.

As a reenactor I would say that frontage of units are pretty standard, because they are dictated by regulation.
As for range, I have fired rifled muskets. As a practical matter I would agree with gamertom that 150 yards is a long shot if you are standing in firing position firing at a single target. Firing at masses of men at longer range may have been useful. I also agree that it depends on the moral of the troops. Imagine the effect of firing on an enemy at 400yds. Little damage is done and they continue to advance while you frantically reload. After 20-30 seconds you repeat the process at 300 yards. More of the enemy fall, but not enough to stop them. Those bayonets just keep coming. At what point do you break and run.
Now instead, suppose you wait until they closes to effective range (150yds or less). Your men can take aim at individual targets. The better shots can pick key targets like standard bearers and officers. One massive volley sends the enemy reeling with massive casualties and loss of command. If you are writing rules it all depends an a sliding scale of competency and moral.
Although I know there is a large group of gamers out there that believe all troops were inept with the Rifled musket, I believe that there is evidence that some units were much more proficient in their musketry than others. This is maybe not so much a function of training as of background and reputation.

Gamertom pretty much nails it. Of particular importance is his point about the difficulties of trying to use non-standard tactics. While it might seem logical for the troops to just 'spread out' in actual practice it's not nearly so simple. Once the men are in a non-standard formation, all the carefully drilled movements and maneuvers are no longer possible and the regimental commander will have trouble controlling the men. That's not to say such things didn't happen, but it was probably pretty rare. From reports in the OR we can see that veteran regiments were still using by-the-book tactics right up to the last days of the war. Not because their commanders were stupid, but because they worked.

Yeah, I think Gamertom has this one.

Although, I also agree with DJCoaltrain that "the range was determined by the circumstances as dictated by mission, supply, geography, officers commanding, and the length of service time of the unit"

My own view on "At what range would troops actually be permitted to fire?"

Would be the above statement and "Closer than you think!"

Agesilaus 20 Nov 2010 11:38 p.m. PST
…….Imagine the effect of firing on an enemy at 400yds. Little damage is done and they continue to advance while you frantically reload. After 20-30 seconds you repeat the process at 300 yards. More of the enemy fall, but not enough to stop them. Those bayonets just keep coming. At what point do you break and run.
Now instead, suppose you wait until they closes to effective range (150yds or less). Your men can take aim at individual targets. The better shots can pick key targets like standard bearers and officers. One massive volley sends the enemy reeling with massive casualties and loss of command. …..

*NJH: As a commander with a regiment that has 60 rounds available per man I might reason thusly:

1. My men can fire 4 rounds a minute.

2. I can fire at 400 yards with some effect.

3. I will be able to volley fire several times before the enemy is within 150 yards. Those several volleys will reduce their ranks

4. At 150 yards I can still fire a devastating volley as the men take aim at individual targets.

5. Those marching toward me have been taking casulties from musketry for 400 yards. That means when they do fire (probably at 100-150 yards) their ranks will contain fewer muskets firing at my regiment.

6. There is no downside to shooting at ranges further than 150 yards. Especially if the targets are massed ranks, such as at Fredricksburg or Gettysburg. Even if a shot misses the front rank it may hit the one behind.

Now that's the reasoning of a 20th century line officer. If I were a 19th century officer, I may have held fire until the enemy were only 150 yards away. I can't say for sure what I'd do, I wasn't there.

We can't change history, we can only note the facts we have, and not those we do not have.

DJC:

A couple of issues with your reasoning.

1. The rate of fire for a rifle-musket was between 2 and 3 shots a minute. Definitely not 4.

2-3. "Effective" fire at 400 yards is highly questionable. You might inflict some casualties against a big target or you might fire a regimental volley and not score a single hit at that range. A lot of factors are involved including the low muzzle velocity of the weapons and the need to estimate the range to the target very accurately.

4. If you open fire at 400 yards then you won't be firing volleys at 150 yards. Once you open fire the men will start firing independently despite your orders to the contrary.

5. Maybe. If the enemy is advancing on you then he probably has the numbers to take some losses and still fire back effectively.

6. There are a number of downsides. Your are using up ammunition to little effect that you might need later. Your men's muskets are getting fouled which will slow down the rate of fire and increase the number of misfires ensuring that your fire will be less effective at shorter ranges. And if your long-range fire does not inflict significant casualties then your men's morale will suffer as they see their efforts having little effect and the enemy's morale will improve as they see your efforts aren't really hurting them.

There can be no hard and fast rules here. There are accounts of long-range fire doing what you suggest and other accounts of it doing little or nothing. Likewise there are accounts of troops holding their fire until short range and then unleashing a volley that devastates the enemy and other accounts of that not working so well, either. Of course, few game rules factor in the down-side issues I mention, so what the heck, fire away! :)

The consensus seemd to be a reasonable "it depends".

In converting "paces" to something useful note that the standard marching pace was 28 inches (71 cm), the frontage per man was shoulder width plus some play for lightly touching elbows, or about 2 1/2 feet (about 76 cm) and the distance between ranks was 13 inches (33 cm).

An Enfield rifle could in theory reach 1,200 yards (1,000 meters), but in actuality troops tended to open fire at much shorter distances. Putting aside extreme short range slugfests like the sunken road or Brawners farm, it seems that in an open field they would open up at about 200-300 yards (180-270 meters) See Fredericksburg or Pickett's charge.

One last note: the emphasis in training was on fast firing, not accurate firing. They used to say that it took a man's weight in lead before he was hit.

Hi

Again, this can of worms. No one is isolating the variables for this discussion. To illustrate, as war gamers, do you want "usual" or "unusual".

Do your commanders think or just follow the manual?

These are real issues. Simply, the "toolbox" is the issue. The troops cannot really be expected to do anything they weren't drilled for no command for a brigade, for instance, to "spread out a little". So, you are probably safe by limiting the troops to drill.

for the rifled musket thing, I question where the "2/3 rounds top" comes from. Or in fact, most of the "impossible" things above. Which misses the real issue, when the commander can be ALLOWED to order a volley.

Allowed? See, no one is looking at a chart in a manual that says "well, you shoot at 400 yards, you need a 12 to hit". One side issue is "casualties". Gamers confuse "casualties" with "dead" and "effectives". There are historical incidents of people getting volleyed and running without significant hits. And examples of taking a lot of dead and wounded and continuing.

This means that it is not as simple as "how many dead from a volley" but the effect that the commander hopes for, or you as a gamer/commander might hope for.

I suspect Coultrain knows better than I, but did not units at Pea Ridge start firing and causing effect at 500 yards?

As an aside as a shooter, the minie certainly has the ability to reach out to 500 yards, but on the usual 60gn powder load, the skirt expansion is marginal and produces a lot of "flyer" rounds, rounds that just do not go where aimed. Under optimum load, you cannot expect better than 4minutes of angle for these weapons, meaning if on target, hitting within 4" of aimpoint at 100 yards. Do your own sums at 1000 yards!

Anyway, the paradigm in this usually starts from napoleonic gamers thinking "brown bess" which didn't even have sights and then reasoning from there. In this period, the guns come with iron sights, but they are simple to use and have "ranges" on them that I could even teach my wife to use in 10 minutes.

Rocky

I agree Scott. I was in the Second Wisconsin, which was a pretty well drilled re-enactment group, and even without using our ram rods, it was all we could do to get off three rounds per minute. I often took a pass. Even though the boys in the ACW drilled extensively, I'm not sure how much ammo they were issued for target practice. Speed may have increased due to drill, but I doubt it exceeded three rounds per minute and it could be less for all sorts of reasons. Accuracy would probably be more dependent on natural ability. The muskets had simple long range sights, but some troops removed them and just used iron sights.
As for the question of "why wait to fire?".
60 rounds per man, 3 rounds per minute. The Iron Brigade faced off against the Stonewall Brigade at close range for 1-2 hours at Brawner's Farm, depending on the account. That's bad news for the man that expended all his ammo in the first 20 minutes.(that's just one example)

The thing is, that that 3 rounds a minute only lasts for about 6 rounds, then the fouling starts to accumulate and the rate of fire begins to slow down.

I would also defy any American to traverse a civil war battlefield and find an area where Infantry could engage a target at more than 400 yards. Despite the way things look from pictures, once you traverse the actual battlefields, you find all sorts of swells, depressions, outcroppings, knolls, etc that disrupt the line of sight and provide all sorts of cover and concealment.

And yes, the rule of thumb for frontages is 1 foot for every man in the unit. A 300 man unit thus takes up 300 feet of frontage.

V/R

The "touch of elbows" is an absolute necessity for ordered movement. When in a firefight the troops did spread out but not laterally. Instead they thinned out by numbers dropping out of the firing line.

The range of rifle-musket use was about the same as the smoothbore. There is no record of an effective battalion volley above 200 yds at all. When ranges at Antietam are analysed ( link ) the average opening fire range of effective fire is 64 yards. Batteries were able to move to about 150 yards from enemy infantry before harassing fire became effective. By Gettysburg there is some opening of the range, but only to 200 yards, and only then with cleared fields of fire ( link ) . Effective firefight range IN PRACTICE was 100 yds.

The average rate of fire in a firefight ( Hess ) was 1 round every 2 minutes. Firing as rapidly as possible averaged 2 rounds per minute for a short period of time. Fouling rapidly becomes problematic.

However, the shooting is not homogeneous in a firing unit, it is extremely heterogeneous. A small core will fire rapidly and effectively, and do almost all of the actual hitting. The bulk will not effectively use their weapons, or will decline to use them at all. See Grossman's work on this.

67thtigers brings up a good point when thinking about the volume of fire coming from a unit. A full regiment firing one volley would have a devastating effect, but at the cost of having everyone unloaded for 20-30 seconds -- not always a good idea. Units might fire by company, by rank or the ever-popular fire by file. In a stand up firefight troops were given the order "independent fire", which means in actuality that some guys fire as fast as they can, others take aim and others do pretty much nothing.

Thus, the same volume of fire you would expect from one volley ends up being extended over time. Add the effect of fouling (I have live fired and it gets pretty tough after 6 or so shots)and casualties and the effectiveness of shooting declines pretty rapidly.

Hi

So, with all this "proof", 67, your rules require all shooting at 60 yards and no difference between smoothbore and rifles? And you explain the mad dash by the governments of the world to forgo smoothbore for those useless rifles by what rationale?

Smoothbore round ball slows down faster than a minie and does NOT have the same ultimate or effective range. when you compare the usual MOA of 36 for the smoothbore with 4 for the rifle, again, you have a basic factual difference.

The only correct point is that with 40rounds or 60 rounds per trooper, they would be empty in a few minutes. The presumption is "wargaming" thinking, however, where turns are an hour or 15 minutes or some such and a "volley" is continuous fire. Meaning your gaming is influencing your understanding.

A modern M4 can burn up all the ammo the trooper carries in a couple minutes. Modern fire fights do not look like the movies where people just rock and roll until dry. Similarly, volley fire in the ACW isn't just "we keep firing because of the hour turns".

while we are referring to anacdotes, remember how often the officer has one or two volleys and the opposition breaks. This means, one or two, the fight is decided and there is nothing to shoot at!

In that period, John, shooters kept a "wet patch" for running through the bore periodically to reduce the fouling. Try it sometime. I have never done re-enacting fire, but only live fire at range with actual bullets.

Rocky

My live fire has been with actual bullets. We tried re-enacting fire with actual bullets but the guys on the other side complained.

Troops were often issued "cleaning rounds" that had a hard metal ring (like brass) that was supposed to reduce fouling. They also might try to run a patch through after a few rounds. Nothing works like pouring boiling water down the bore a couple of times (by the way, that works for an M-14 as well), but that was not very practical during the heat of battle.

As for the contention that a rifle and smooth bore were about the same – I don't buy that either. See my earlier post about the 200-300 yard ranges for opening up. Smooth bores at 60 yards firing buck & ball, now that was effective! Ask those poor Rebs in the sunken road who had to endure the Irish Brigade's fire.

Hi

John, famously, you urinate down the barrel. The added ammonia helps here as well!

R

The Williams Cleaner rounds used a zinc washer in the base. They were also wrapped in blue or green paper, so that those bundling the cartridges back at the arsenals could put one or two rounds into every bundle of 10 rounds.

Unfortunately, the Williams rounds kicked so much that the soldiers were loath to use them. As a result, and because of their distinctive colored paper wrapper, they were often thrown away by the soldiers.

Additionally, in "Ready…Aim…Fire…" there is a letter from an officer of the 11th US Infantry dated early in 1864 to the Ordnance Department. He complains about the great wastage of ammunition by the men in the Army of the Potomac. He writes that the men are routinely issued 60 rounds of ammunition when their cartridge boxes can only hold 40, and as a result the men simply throw away the extra rounds rather than carry the extra weight.

Soldiers often complained about orders to carry 10-20 extra rounds (2 bundles of 10 rounds each) because that was another 2 pounds to lug, and there often wasn't space to carry them. If they put them in their pockets, then they'd likely be broken up and dampened by motion and sweat, there was no place in the haversack that wasn't covered with grease, oil, or other food bits, and putting them in the knapsack was counter-productive, since most soldiers dropped their knapsacks before going into action.

Between a blanket and groundcloth, perhaps a spare shirt and pair od socks, three day's rations, a canteen of water, his accouterments and rifle-musket, the soldier had plenty enough to carry without extra ammo with no place to put it.

Suggest you measure it yourself by using the "Rule of Thumb" – You and a buddy go out to a large open field. You stand at a fixed point and have your buddy walk away until he is the size of your thumb. Measure the distance.

The max. range of the weapon and the max. range of the shooter are not always the same.

The Austrian Army did a detailed study on the effective ranges of mass musketry following the Napoleonic Wars. Maybe someone can find the info from them – I remember it was something like 40% hit the target at 100 yards (this was under best conditions).

When looking at the CW you will notice a change in tactic between the early war and that of 1864-65. This change does correspond to the percentage of troops being armed with rifles. When Grant took Vicksburg he rearmed a large number of his men with captured rifles, replacing smooth bores. Ordinance returns from the AoP also show that many regiments were still armed with smooth bores and second rate weapons through the Gettysburg campaign.

As to carrying the extra ammo – "40 in our boxes and 20 under our caps". Personal military experience taught me that you carried Ammo, water, food, then the other junk, in that order. If you are hungry you can wait to eat, if you need ammo, you may not be able to wait.

As to carrying the extra ammo – "40 in our boxes and 20 under our caps". Personal military experience taught me that you carried Ammo, water, food, then the other junk, in that order. If you are hungry you can wait to eat, if you need ammo, you may not be able to wait.

That's true today, and in the 20th century generally, but definitely countered by contemporary accounts from the ACW. Soldiers complained bitterly about the amount of stuff they had to carry, and account after account talks about serious decisions about what t take and what to leave behind in the Spring campaigns.

There isn't just the one letter I referenced above, but a steady stream of correspondence between Federal Ordnance officers and various commands about discarded ammunition, and almost to a man they talk about the problem being the soldier's refusal to carry the extra rounds.

Respects,

It's not just infantry. At Gettysburg Federal batteries were observed throwing their ammunition away and then retiring claiming to have fired it all. Probably happened elsewhere too.

Hi

In 'nam my buddy the crazy ranger got the nickname "water wagon" because of all the water he carried. Everyone carried lots of extra ammo, and often back up weapons, but his extra water was unusual enough to get him the nickname.

But we both agreed on that, no such thing as "too much" when it is water and ammo.

As for the "40% number. I have seen a lot of tests done by various people in the period. My observation is that this is always "hits on a company front"…usually derived by using a fence or sheet 33 yards wide and 6' tall. A wall of men, however, is not as solid as a fence, and usually that 40% would mean a lot lower percentage of actual hits. Throwing in "doubles" and the like, that is optimistically 15, I think.

The conversion from sheet to actual target was known. 2/3rds of those that hit a sheet would hit a man in a 2-rank line (more if a deeper column).

The British actually painted realistic figures on theirs and only counted actual hits on people. It had another effect, it battle innoculated the shooters, leading to the British being far more likely to fight rather than posture in actual combat.

Targets like this: picture

Hi

The pic is not coming up on my computer. The ones I remember seeing, however, had the soldier standing sholders square as opposed to sideways in a shooting position.

R

According to my reading, 200 yards or meters seems to have been the typical maximum engagement range with RM's in line of battle through to the end of the war cause that appears to have been the maximum range with level aim. Units armed with smoothbores firing buck and ball wanted to get to about 100 yards at least and when they did it would seem they had greater effect. As skirmishers and heavy skirmish lines became more widespread and tactically useful, the troops wanted rifles b/c they were much more accurate, i.e. better for skirmishing, and if used correctly could "hit" beyond 200 yards.

To what extent veteran troops who, whether they were zouaves or not, knew zouave or light infantry tactics, would need to stay shoulder to shoulder to remain in order, could probably be debated.

All the major manuals of the time included skirmish drill and pretty much all the troops were trained in it. Troops had to be shoulder to shoulder (actually, "elbows lightly touching") to be order, otherwise they were not in "order".

An interesting side note: the three NY regiments in the Irish Brigade were aremed with smoothbores up until late 1864 while the 28th Mass had Enfield Rifles. Guess who did the skirmishing and flank guard for the Brigade? Those Bay Staters put on about twice the mileage as the Empire State boys. The 116th PA fell somewhere in between.

"At Gettysburg Federal batteries were observed throwing their ammunition away and then retiring claiming to have fired it all. Probably happened elsewhere too."

Well to clarify this, Gen. Hunt in a report stated it was discovered that one particular battery did this but he did not name it. The battery was thought to have fought in/near the Peach Orchard area. We don't know exactly which battery it was. He intimated it was because of cowardice but did not say those words precisely. The unused rounds were found east of the Trostle farm in some woods. Most if not all the batteries which fought in that area gave a heroic effort and withdrew only when the Rebs were within 20-30 yards away but possibly not all. We know which batteries it was NOT though.

Don

actionfront.blogspot.com

One thing to keep in mind when speaking of veteran regiments modifying the tactics as they gained experience is that even veteran regiments had relatively little real combat experience compared with veterans of later wars. Battles and even skirmishes were infrequent and many a veteran regiment might only be hotly engaged a few times during its career even though it has a dozen battle honors embroidered on its flag. This wasn't like WWII where you were on the front line every day and had to learn the tricks of fighting and staying alive quickly. It's certainly true that there were veteran troops who adopted different methods over time and the most obvious aspect of that was the tendency to use more and more entrenchments. But I've yet to see any evidence that the fundamental tactical system that existed at the start of the war had been abandoned or even substantially modified by the war's end.

Well, Scott, I'll speculate that the close order, shoulder-to-shoulder tactics of 1st Bull Run loosened up a bit once those rifled bullets and/or "buck and ball" started to fly. Nevermind, the canister which was shooting steel, not lead.

That's the exact opposite of the behaviour of men under fire. They tend to bunch into tight-packed groups seeking mutual emotional support.

Bottom Dollar: That would certainly be the logical conclusion. But all their training and the nature of the tactical system doesn't really allow it. All the movements and maneuvers require the close order formations. The officers and file closers would be screaming at them to keep the lines dressed and would physically push them where they were supposed to go. Plus, since most of the time you'd have other regiments on your flanks, there really wasn't anywhere spread out to.

The basic tactical system remained unchanged throughout the war. It was partially dictated by the low rate of fire for the weapons and partially dictated by the need for command and control. The two major shifts during the war were the increased willingness (or desire) to entrench and the willingness to advance by rushes ("indian style" as it was sometimes called).

Of the two, the use of entrenchments was by far the one that changed the nature of the fighting. Note that during the Penninsula campaign Lee was derided by his men for being the "Queen of Spades" but at Spottsylvania the Army of Northern Virginia built an outstanding defensive work practically overnight.

Hi

67th, ya I have read the same accounts all over. Being aacinated by the 7yw, for instance, that is the observation for the disaster at Jouminville and others.

I would also observe that people like Wellington also observed that the thing that made "americans" natural skirmishers was that they did NOT do this but spread and "went to ground"

It has been observed that american units in the ACW, the more experienced they were, up to "war weary" the more quickly they went to open order or went to ground.

I don't know what the variable was EXCEPT when dealing with the british napoleonic army, the emphasis was order and under stress, people revert to training. US troops are often sourced from more rural backgrounds and might see "going to ground" as training that pre-dates being in the army.

Rocky

"It has been observed that american units in the ACW, the more experienced they were, up to "war weary" the more quickly they went to open order or went to ground."

My reading of Union accounts from Cold Harbor and beyond is full of instances where veteran units went prone as soon as they got under heavy fire, while the new units, such as the artillery heavies and newer(ish) Army of the James regiments continued straight on toward the Confederate works. The newer units suffered the high casualties.

I think there's a big difference between an infantry unit which has internalized the drill manual, knows the commands and the manuevers and goes a step beyond in taking full advantage of tactical opportunities when they arise and an infantry unit which follows the manual to the T because they have to or they'll fall into complete disarray and disorder. It was the first kind that were especially dangerous… maybe we should call them crack… and the ANV was full of them. Men who took the initiative, knew what needed to get done and how to do and didn't need to be coddled with commands for every movement by their officers. Also, The Army of the Potomac, with a few exceptions, was notorious for not encouraging tactical flexibility, so relying on AoP reports can often give a skewed perspective.

Yes, bunching was a natural reflex and I've read reports depicting it in the open, but most are standing on the defensive and are not attacking. When I read reports of officers forcing their men to stand in line without allowing them to take advantage of cover, etc… that would raise a redflag in my head about how much confidence the officers had in their troops. Bunching is not shoulder-to-shoulder which was my point and bunching behind cover probably happened quite a bit. The worst kind of bunching is of course, bunching out in the open in a very large group which is EXACTLY what Pickett's Division did and that was probably the moment when every experienced CS field officer on Seminary Ridge lowered their field glasses and said to themselves, "It's over".

Here are some observations on ranges of fire, frontage distances and tactics from 1861 through to 1875:

Tactics for Officers of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery L. v. Buckholtz. J.w. Randolph, Richmond, VA January 1861

The different kinds of fire are: by battalions, by half-battalions, by companies, by platoons, by half-platoons, by ranks and file. For instance in mass, if the distance be 200-250 paces [166-208 yards], in one minute can be fired two or three round, therefore at an advancing enemy can be fire four to five rounds. p.21

Buckholtz suggests that with the new rifled muskets, that the range can be increased to 300-400 paces. It is also the range that skirmishers are expected to begin firing.

Upton's Infantry Tactics first published in 1875 suggest that a few sharpshooters can open on the enemy at 600 yards, but that skimish fire in general should be held until 400 yards. 400 yards is the qualifying range for firing practice and the limits for formed infantry.

In Scott's, Burkholtz, Hardee's, Casey's and Upton's manuals 22 inches is the space of one file, 88 inches for four men.

In all the manuals, fire by battalion, company, rank and file are described.

I think it has to be remembered that

1. manuals were designed to describe 'the way to do it' and usually offered a variety of options, when actual combat decisions for formations etc. are discussed.

2. There were a variety of reasons for opening fire at long range and close, depending on the circumstances, and destroying the enemy was only one of them. Fire at long range could be employed to slow the enemy, or draw out their own fire, which as has been mentioned is hard to stop once a fire fight has started. Sometimes it would be done to mask weakness, or simply hide the line with smoke. [Yes, that was a tactic in the Napoleonic and Civil War.]

Holding fire certainly was a favored tactic. You could see the enemy before smoke was thrown up and the troops had a better chance of hitting something. remember the Iron and Stonewall brigades' firefight the day before 2nd Manassas. They stood facing each other for about twenty minutes, only 100 or so yards appart, but finally stopped firing because they couldn't see each other. Both sides were amazed to find anyone still standing. [Actually about 30% casualties IIRC]

IF Pickett's Charge employed typical formations and maneuvering, then the shoulder-to-shoulder advances were to be expected. They only started bunching when they stopped to fire and were taken in flank by some PA regiments on the left. After that formations basically failed and that is the point where officers knew 'leading' or maneuvering the men other than bunches straight ahead by individual officers was all that could happen.

It is very hard to discover 'the way' it was done when even the training manuals offered different ways to do 'it.' As was said, tactics, officers, training, experience, circumstances all influenced what was actually done.

Bill

Another often, if not conveniently, overlooked consideration to the question at hand…

The mark of an expert and veteran regiment was one that could go about its business of making an attack or counter-attack, i.e. manuever, in the woods (light or heavy) which was done quite often. The shoulder to shoulder, parade ground stuff pretty much went out the door by necessity. This is probably why Napoleonic armies didn't look to capitalize on the tactical merits of woods very often, while ACW armies did. The advantages of concealment and cover provided by woods during the Napoleonic Wars were outweighed by the capabilites of the infantry weapons and the need to preserve close order so that those weapons could be effective.

Bottom Dollar, can you give some examples of these 'crack' regiments that could maneuver and win battles without guidance or commands from their officers? Knowing how to take cover or not bunch up in the open might reduce casualties, but won't, by themselves, win a battle. To win battles you have to mass a superior force at the critical point at the right moment. With the possible exception of the Union attack on Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga I can't recall too many times where the soldiers in the ranks managed to pull that off on their own initiative.

I never said anything about not needing guidance, but here are some brigades that didn't need to get coddled into action. In reading the reports by the officers themselves, you get the distinct impression that there wasn't a whole lot of minute attention to "right shoulder shift" stuff.

Gettysburg-- CS Brigades 2nd Day, Wilcox, Barksdale,
Wright, Semmes, Law, Benning, Wofford,
Kershaw, Anderson.

US Brigades, all of Caldwell's Division,
Ward, Vincent, Weed were all capable of quick
time manuever, but were on the defensive.

BD and et al:

All the 'right shoulder shift" stuff was adhered to on the second day of Gettysburg by both the Rebel brigades and the US brigades of Caldwell's division. [His entire division became inverted because of his 'quick time maneuver' which created problems later in the battle.

Semmes and Anderson's brigades in the second line of Hood's got 'lost' and shifted west of the first line by the woods they had to traverse. Both brigadiers comment on having to re-align and 'dress lines' once out of the woods.

Manuals weren't written to 'coddle' troops anymore than a manual on fixing a Ford Mustang is written to 'coddle' mechanics. It's a book on how to get things done, and one of the only ways to get it done is to make sure everyone is doing it the same way…hence a manual.

Whether that constitutes 'minute' attention, I don't know, but order in a formation was seen as important if anything was going to be done effectively. Experienced troops would have to pay less attention to such things, just as an experienced mechanic wouldn't have to reference the manual as much…however, that doesn't mean that experience would lead him find a totally different way to do the job. For example:

Fighting in Woods and Attention to "Stuff"

Commanders had to adopt ways of controlling their forces in woods, particularly brigades and divisionsn. Barlow's attack at Spotsylvania in 1864 was guided by a compass. Even so, fighting in woods was not new to the American armies or European troops for that matter. ACW soldiers had such things down to a fine art--by following procedures. General Harris, Army of Northern Virgina, explained the techniques used: [Which are much like those of line troops in general]

When a regiment or a brigade advanced through a heavily wooded country such as the Wilderness, the point of direction was established, and the officers instructed to conform to the movements of the 'guide' company or regiment [Regulating unit as used in all movement] Each regiment, moreover, was provided with a right and left 'general guide', men selected for their special aptitudes, being good judges of distance, and noted for their steadiness and skill in maintaining the direction.

The again, the line of battle was greatly aided in maintaining the direction by the fire of the skirmishers, and frequently the line would be formed with a flank resting on a trail or woods road, ravine or watercouse, the flank regiment in such cases acting as the guide. In advancing through thick woods the skirmish line was almost invariably strengthened, and while the 'line of battle' covered by the skirmishers, advanced in two deep line, bodies in the rear usually marched in columns of fours, prepared to come by a 'forward into line' to the point where their assistance might be desired. I never saw a compass used in woods fighting.

Practical experience taught us that no movement should be permitted until every officer was acquainted with the object in view and had received his instructions. I may add that brigade and regimental commanders were most particular to secure their flanks and to keep contact with other troops by means of patrols.

I quoted the entire passage because:

1. Harris is implying that 'practical experience' had taught or influenced the processes described, yet,

2. The procedures and processes described are for the most part right out of the infantry manuals of the time, and

3. What is interesting is that when in the woods, Harris' description of how the main battle line was deployed and reinforced, maneuvered and commanded is almost exactly the way Hardee and Casey, Upton and others describe deploying and maneuvering skirmish lines.

So, one can see the new uses of established procedures meant for skirmish lines applied to brigades maneuvered in woods, yet nothing particular new in methods are described and both the methods of guiding unit and flank guides, determine objective point etc. are all basic methods found in any infantry treatise or manual.

Bill

Nicely put, Bill!

Far too often adherence to the drill manual is seen as inflexible or even foolish. I've been a Civil War reenactor for over 25 years and a battalion commander for most of that time. Now I would be the first one to admit that reenacting is not the same as the real thing, but there are some similarities when it comes to trying to move large bodies of men over various terrain in the midst of smoke, noise and confusion. I've probably spent as many hours at the head of a battalion as many of the real officers from the real war. I know the manual backwards and forward and the more I get to know it the more impressed I am with just how well the whole system works. The drill and tactics were VERY carefully thought out and they work well. It must always be remembered that the tactics were developed with an eye on winning battles, not necessarily on reducing your own casualties (although it's always good if you can do both).

I've had the good fortune to be blessed with an outstanding battalion to work with and some very talented and dedicated junior officers and NCOs. The stuff they can do and the level of precision and cohesion is pretty amazing. And yet time and again I see that if we try to do something that is not in the manual, something we haven't practiced, it can get very difficult. A movement that might seem entirely logical can turn into a nightmare because I'll have no standard command to give and no way of quickly communicating what I want to the men. Usually it's far safer to use a by-the-book manuever, even though it might not be the cleverest thing to do, rather than to risk disorder. I have to believe that many a real commander felt exactly the same way.

And if the men take matters into their own hands, well, then I've basically lost control of my battalion. If the men start spreading out, taking cover and acting on their own, how am I going to get them go where I want, when I want? Spreading out and taking cover might work okay if we are already in the proper position and I know there aren't going to be any orders from above to go somewhere else. But if my brigade commander suddenly rides by and orders me to move, I'm going to be out of luck! Again, the real officers must have had such things on their minds :)

From my experience, one of the main values of veteran troops is the fact that they know the drill so well that they can do all of this stuff quickly and under adverse situations. While green troops will be standing around in confusion, getting shot to bits, the veterans will follow their commanders orders, get where they are going fast and hopefully get the job done.

One final thing to remember is that junior officer, NCOs, and privates were neither trained, nor expected to make tactical decisions. They were expected to follow orders. The real decisions were coming from their battalion commander--or even higher. The battalion was the basic tactical unit. It wasn't until well after the Civil War that tactical decision-making started happening at the company, platoon or squad levels.

Scott Washburn
Mifflin Guard

Bill,

Right out of the tactical manuals ? How to advance a line of battle in extensive or large woods ? Almost exactly as described in Hardee, Casey and Upton ? How so ? Anderson and Semmes got lost ? Did Semmes even write a report ? Did Anderson write a report ? Did they "dress" on the move or at a standstill ? What kind of problems did Caldwell's division have in smashing the Rebels out of the Wheatfield and nearly entirely out of the Rose Woods even though they were inverted ?

How did the 59th Georgia and 3rd Arkansas manage to pile into the same line and then just fought the rest of the 2nd Day battle intermixed… as stated in the OR ? Wouldn't that cause havoc to regimental commands being given simulataneously to the two intermingled units ? There were times to do things by the book or as near to as you could, and there were times when the book went out the door and it was done on instinct informed by hardened experience. Troops that needed coddling couldn't do the latter.

Jim

Jim wrote:

Right out of the tactical manuals ? How to advance a line of battle in extensive or large woods ? Almost exactly as described in Hardee, Casey and Upton ? How so ? Anderson and Semmes got lost ? Did Semmes even write a report ? Did Anderson write a report ? Did they "dress" on the move or at a standstill ? What kind of problems did Caldwell's division have in smashing the Rebels out of the Wheatfield and nearly entirely out of the Rose Woods even though they were inverted ?

Jim:
Whew, that's a lot to respond to… IF you have the OR then some of these questions can be answered for yourself. Semmes didn't write a report IIRC, but his regimental officers did.

And no, I didn't say Casey and Hardee described how a brigade or division should travel through the woods. I said that the 'practical experience' that Harris said devised the method for doing that took the methods for moving skirmish lines from Hardee and Casey and used them with larger organizations. Using a guiding regiment or battalion is SOP for Napoleonic and ACW troops, just being applied in new ways.

Most all troops could dress on the mover or standstill. And I made an error about which division was inverted. It was Humphreys division. Bad memory.

Jim wrote:

How did the 59th Georgia and 3rd Arkansas manage to pile into the same line and then just fought the rest of the 2nd Day battle intermixed… as stated in the OR ? Wouldn't that cause havoc to regimental commands being given simulataneously to the two intermingled units ? There were times to do things by the book or as near to as you could, and there were times when the book went out the door and it was done on instinct informed by hardened experience. Troops that needed coddling couldn't do the latter.

Jim:

Are you saying the 59th GA and 3rd AR became intermixed by choice or accident? Were they giving up any unit integrity on purpose, or simply managing in the confusion of battle? Your meaning will determine how I answer that. And yes, that intermixing would make it difficult for both regiments to maneuver and follow commands.

There were times to 'do things by the book'? I don't think any unit went into battle having decided to stop using the methods that they trained to use, had experience using, and were the basic methods for moving large bodies of men.

Breakdowns in order and formations during combat certainly
occurred, and the second day at Gettysburg is a prime example of that. When things go wonky, certainly troops did what they could at that moment to salvage the situation.

I can discuss why those things happened and how the men coped with them, but I have rarely read where troops with any level of experience 'tossed the book out the door', instinctually or otherwise. Poorly experienced troops found it much easier than experienced troops. That troops had to 'wing it' at times, there is no doubt. What is interesting is what they tried to do in 'winging it'. Often it was to maintain some order 'according to the book.'

I'd be glad to examine those breakdowns and how troops 'used the book' to determine the breakdowns and how they tried to salvage the situation afterward… Specifically looking at the Second day of Gettysburg. One reason that 20,000 Rebels were able to defeat 40,000 Union troops, as Alexander points out, was because the Union did let 'the book go our the window' in many ways in what they saw as an emergency. It was a very costly decision. One reason the Confederates did so well is because they kept better order 'by the book.' I'll be glad to provide evidence for that.

Bill

Bill,

In what order were the Rebel assaults on the western, southern and eastern faces of Little Round Top made ? In fact, how many assaults in total were made, by which combination of units and in what sequence ? I have no doubt, that there were times where the only "book" they were following was the "order" given by their commander to take that hill. "Right shoulder shift" stuff went out the door pretty quick under those circumstances and that's not to say that that "right shoulder shift" stuff didn't play an important roll--at some point in time--in enabling those troops to make those assaults.

But I suppose the key would be to explain how Vincent and Weed's brigades didn't breakdown under the circumstances, given the fact that they weren't standing shoulder-to-shoulder or worrying about their "right shoulder shifts" when they did it.

Jim

Not sure about an explanation for Weed's but certainly Vincent's from the 20th Maine right round to the 'front' of the Brigade had 'territory' to defend.

Its a well researched area that troops always fight harder in an established position that they can identify with and the local geography would have provided this psychological boost.

I think Scott's excellent post gives a general view of things. A battalion/regiment of troops is like a marching band. It has a routine it follows, practiced, everyone knowing their role. Change the plan in mid-performance and at best you have problems completing anything.

Jim:

Let's be clear on what we are saying about the "Right shoulder shift" stuff.

What exactly do you see soldiers doing when making an assault that would necessitate ignoring 'the book?' What does it mean in practical, concrete terms when you say the book "went out the door pretty quick under those circumstances"? What circumstances? Are you saying that the troops never practiced assaults or that 'the book' didn't address such things?

Bill

Bill,

I thought I was clear on that….

"and there were times when the book went out the door and it was done on instinct informed by hardened experience. "

When the book--the drill manual-- gets internalized by the troops, the reason for the book in the first place has been fulfilled. Sure it still exists, but the soldiers don't necessarily need the hard copy anymore. In other words, they don't need an officer barking a command in order to know what the command is. They now it already, what needs to get done and how to do it. "out the door" is a figure of speech, not to be taken in a literal sense.

Jim

Jim:

Well, 'out the door' may be a figure of speech, but we are talking about literal--concrete--actions of hundreds or thousands of troops. Sooo…

When you say "they don't need an officer barking a command in order to know what the command is", how does that work?

A regiment or brigade is facing the enemy. What is the next action? How do those hundreds of men *know* what the command is OR how to carry it out, OR when to start? If you are thinking of something like Missionary Ridge, those men didn't start without orders, they just kept going on the same orders. And during the advance, those men didn't throw the book 'out the door'.

In other words, what to you see as an example of this--literally?

A battle during the ACW wasn't WWII squad tactics. Skirmishing maybe, but even there it was far more organized and linear than 20th Century combat.

Bill