"Light Infantry evolution in the Bavarian Army 1792 - 1814" Topic

Hi all,

Now that we have had several enlightening and very thorough conversations about Light Infantry of a few nations so far I would like to continue the discussion focusing on the utilization of light troops in the Bavarian army during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. Discussing their roots, influences that guided them, the tactical doctrines that were used as a blueprint for their foundation and the outcomes they produced in terms of innovation and effectiveness.

p.s. The more historical quotes that can be supplanted here the better so start researching!!

Regards,
Shane

According to Nafziger, the Bavarian army of 1804 had line regiments made up of 2 x 5 company field btlns with one company designated as grenadiers. This gave the btlns a total of 1,000 affective's in the field.

The Light btlns (of which there were 6) also had a field strength of 1,000 affective's also in 5 companies, all designated as light infantry.

So basically the field strength of any Bavarian company was 200 men on a war time footing.

He also states that each regiment was to assign 20 men from each company as "riflemen" (schuetzen) which would give a grand total of 100 men per btln of 1,000 as rifle armed light troops. One assumes that these were properly armed rifle troops as per the Prussian army?

I also assume that the Bavarian army followed the Prussian regulations at this time?

However, in 1805 there seems to be a complete change of organisation where the line regiments were reorganised 2 battalions each of 4 x 155 man companies. Which was broken into 1x grenadiers and 3x fusilier companies. It also appears that the Light battalions were reduced to 4x155man companies as well.

In 1806 it also states that an order was given to direct that all schuetzen of the line and light infantry be given sharpshooting practice on a regular basis. What I take from this is that before this date the marksmanship of these men would have improved from this date onwards compared to the rest of the units they were apart of.

In 1806 another order raised the strength of all line and light infantry companies to 185 muskets each but each btln seems to have remained at 4 companies strong.

Also, in 1807 a Tyrolian Jager battalion was raised with 4 companies for a total of 888 men. And in 1808 this was raised to 5 companies. However, it seems to have suffered major desertion problems in 1809 and did not last long, being totally disbanded in 1811.

What I do not see is any indication of the use of the third rank of the line regiments as 3rd ranker style light infantry. It seems that the duties of light infantry were taken up by the schuetzen instead leaving the rest of the btln to operate as 3 ranks on the battlefield?

Gill's with Eagles to Glory adds a few details to this, mainly with reference to 1809. He says that in March 1809 the number of shuetzen was increased to one-fifth (36 for a full strength company) and that a three-rank system was adopted after moving to two ranks in 1801. The shuetzen were put into the third rank. He implies that the jagers were organised along similar lines (i.e. they had their own shuetzen).

My guess is that in 1809 the skirmishing duties were carried out by the shutzen and the jagers (who were spread out between the divisions – i.e. one battalion in nine), without much recourse to other third-rankers. This would amount to nearly 30% of infantry strength available.

Nothing on tactics. My supposition is that in period 1801 to 1809 there would be a transition to French style tactics.

Matthew

Matthew

So all Bavarian btlns (line and light) were formed into 2 ranks right up until just before the 1809 campaign?

Confusingly, according to Rawkins this is the organisation of the Leichtes-Infanterie-Bataillonen 1805-14:

The light infantry battalions were formed in 1804 with the amalgamation of several existing units of Feld-jager-korps, and were given official line status. Organisation was as for the line infantry battalions each battalion having a strength of one elite heavy company, 'Karabinier-Kompanie', one 'Schützen-Kompanie', and four centre companies 'Ordinarkompanien', and was commanded by a Oberstleutnant, with a major as 2IC and a reduced staff. Company strengths were as for the line regiments.

So I am a little lost as to which is correct, both seem contradictory.

Shane,

Sorry I can't help on this one, but damn! You are the bomb, man. You must be filthy rich with nothing but time on your hands to look into this kind of stuff and develop the rule system you have. No doubt, however, that you are THE MAN for wargamers on this list. Always reasonable, always looking for the relevant details, occasionally defenestrating. Never offensive.

I strive for wealth in the hopes I can get to AUS and meet you personally for a turn at the game, a pint.

Good luck with this thread. I looked into what sources I had and realized my sources were pretty useless.

G'day
Bill

Hi Bill,

Thanks for the comments. Last year I took a risk to quite my job at Boral Limited Australia which I had for the previous 10 years to go back to full time study at university. One year later I gained a business degree (GPA of 6.5) and now I am half way through a Masters degree in Project Management which is what I had done at Boral for many years.

This means I sit in front of my computer all day, every day. As much as I want to finish my masters as quickly as possible and get back to the workforce I still find time with my family to go to the beach and surf on weekends or spend times with friends but at times I find it hard to focus on my studies during the week lol. I still enjoy talking and playing Napoleonics, especially when I want to learn more of the micro details of formations of the various nations. Thus I tend to drift towards the TMP forum a great deal when I am sick of reading journals and text books. It is either that or watch Dr Phil or Oprah…

My wife works full time atm in an agreement that she will work while I study. If she knew I get bored and jump on the TMP forum as much as I do I would be back at work without touching the ground…so ssshhhhhhhh!!!

Shane

Can't see where Rawkins is coming from. I've had a look in a couple of other books (Haythornthwaite's Source Book; von Pivka's Osprey; Digby Smith's Armies of Napoleonic era). None add anything to the Nafziger data you've already mentioned. The light battalions were formed from a reorganisation of two light regiments in 1799; no reorganisation is mentioned for 1804, still less a six-company establishment. Sounds like a different army (But which one? I don't think any of the significant Confederation states had a six-company establishment in 1804.)

Another detail. Gill says that only seven of the Schuetzen in each company were armed with rifles. On the cover of Gill's Eagles is a print (don't know how old) of Bavarian jagers in action outside Landshut. They seem to be using muskets with bayonets attached…

There may not have been many rifles in use.

Matthew

According to Müller and Braun, the Schützen did receive in

31. März 1804 die bei jeder Kompanie eingestellten 20 Schützen der Infanterie Regimenter gezogene Flinten, die der leichten Infanterie Stutzen.
Diese gezogenen Flinten unterschieden sich zur glatten Infanteriemuskete durch Züge ohne Drall sowie durch einen geringerem Bohrungsdurchmesser (also kleineres Kaliber) das Kugelkaliber wie die Ladeweise blieb die gleiche wie beim glatten Gewehr.
MB, S. 23

Müller, Braun : Die Organisation, Bekleidung, Ausrüstung und Bewaffnung der Königlich Bayerischen Armee von 1806 bis 1906, München o. J

So the Schützen in the line had a rifled "musket" the grooves and fields not twisted and those in the light battalions did get rifles.

For 1809 go for Gill.

Hi Mat,

So you think Rawkins is wrong? This was my thought also.

If the schuetzen received straight grooved rifled muskets I wonder how more effective (ranges) this was over smoothbore muskets? I am thinking that the range might have been longer but accuracy nothing like that of a rifle? This is only a guess…

Shane

Hi Shane

The only Rawkins I've seen is the one on the Austrians. This quote seems so out of line with the other sources that I'd have to say it's wrong. I trust the other authors – though I'm sure they are all using the same original source. It intrigues me just where the Rawkins error came from though. Perhaps he is referring to the Baden army – but the 1804 date is still quite wrong (they didn't adopt the six company structure until 1808).

As for the question on rifles my guess would be the same as yours – but I'm guessing that the straight grooves would be quicker to load.

A slight digression on rifles: I think their extra effective range over smoothbores came from accuracy. My understanding is that the smoothbore musket had a pretty high muzzle velocity and was lethal at quite long ranges (over 500m say)…but was useless at long ranges because of its inaccuracy. That means that when fired too high (as was quite often the case) they could cause damage to troops behind the intended target.

And, a different digression, I have just found this quote from Scharnhorst:

Rifle and musket produce the same effect over the same period of time but the musket needs three or four times the ammunition as the rifle. Furthermore, under fire the Jager is more liable to aim than the ordinary infantryman because he is convinced that without aiming he never hits at all and he has been trained and is accustomed to aim from youth on.

Take from Summerfield's vol 2 on Prussian infantry – with no further attribution.

Matthew

scharnhorst's conclusion is only valid for a mass target but not for individual targeting, here the rifle was superior.

Hi guys,

Rawkins data that I have is definitely for the Bavarians for the period of 1804. So I agree with you that he is wrong. I will go with Nafziger on this, having the Bavarian light infantry btlns organised as 6 companies along the lines of the French does not fit well with me for 1804 but does indeed seem right for 1808…

What is more frustrating is that the Osprey book on the Bavarian army states that the Light btlns (known as fieldjagers) had one elite company and the rest were ordinary companies and that a Karabinier company was not introduced until 1811.

I've found the Rawkins on the web. I think he's a little confused about dates. He suggests six company structure was adopted by line infantry in 1806, by light infantry in 1804, but the Tyrol jagers were formed on 4 company structure in 1807.

Haythornthwaite suggests 6 company structure was adopted in 1809, when reserve battalions were raised. I think this was after the main campaigns of April-July – hence Gill doesn't mention it. But it is clear that it was adopted at some point.

Haythornthwaite backs up the Osprey by saying that the carabinier company was formed in 1811 for the jagers(but who was his source?). Originally their were 5 companies (one a depot according to Gill), including an "elite" company (green plume). Were these the shutzen? (I suspect not…).

So nobody has been quite interested enough in the Bavarians to be quite clear on the details in English – a bit frustrating for us.

MAtthew

Definitely, it is very frustrating when trying to paint up these units to be historically correct. I am hoping an expert on the Bavarian army will come along and give us a definitive answer on this soon.

Shane

A good start

Münich, Friedrich : Geschichte der Entwicklung der bayerischen Armee seit zwei Jahrhunderten, München 1864

For Bavarian Army, check Bavarian books, or books printed in Bavaria, also see the plenty very good regimental histories which sometimes provide amazing detail.

A lot is available for free at google books.

also – quite interesting, with a view on tactics of the Schützen in the line

Dauer, Joseph : Das königlich Bayerische 10. Infanterie Regiment Prinz Ludwig, 2. Teil, Ingolstadt 1901

He gives a completly different organisation than Rawkins

In case I understood correctly

1804 – 1805 (till 1st of october) one regiment of two battalions, each battalion of 1 grenadier and 4 fuslier companies, 20 Schützen per company.

1806 – 1811 – one regiment of two battalions, each battalion of 4 companies, 1 grenadier and 3 fuslier companies

In 1809 increase to 36 Schützen per company, re – introduction of forming into three ranks.

in 1811 – a regiment of two field battalions – a field battalion of 1 grenadier, 1 Schützen and 4 fusilier companies (6 company system)

ahh thank you VW, this was what I thought the organisation was in the end.

I guess Rawkins misunderstood the late 6 company organisation as beginning much earlier than it actually did.

for the organisation of 1811 see also

link

Ahh, nice link. Thanks, saved that one now

Has anyone found information suggesting the intervals between schutzen when skirmishing? I believe Empire rates them semi-skirmishers (relatively close grouping) but I've never seen anything that even hinted at their petite tactics.

I think you have to first identify the regulations they followed at the time. For example, Spain followed Prussian regulations until 1806 when they switch to the French regulation (IIRC). But I have a sneaking suspicion the Bavarians adopted Austrian regulations before their reforms…

Empire is clearly not knowing what they are talking about, I will have a look in the regimental histories to find out more.

This is what I found in the history of the 10th line regiment, concerning 1804 – 1809.
I inserted some rough translations.

Dauer, Joseph : Geschichte des K. Bayerischen 10. Infanterie – Regiments Prinzregent Ludwig von 1664 bis 1907, Ingolstadt 1901

1804

Jede Regiment hatte 4 Kadetten. 20 Mann jeder Kompagnie, darunter sechs Gefreite, waren als Schützen bestimmt und trugen Pulverhörner und grüne Huppen als Abzeichen ; die Schützenhornisten zählten zu den Hoboisten ; der Schützenoffizier genoß besondere Auszeichnung, wurde besonders ausgewählt und trug einen grünen Federbusch auf dem Hut.
S. 173

Zum Exerzieren rückte die Kompagnie mit 80 zweigliedrigen Rotten aus, die Schützen standen gleichmäßig verteilt hinter den vier Zügen.
S. 173

For drill the company marched out in 80 files of two ranks, the Schützen were placed evenly behind the 4 platoons.

Wurden sie im Bataillon verwendet, so traten sie unter Befehl des Schützenoffiziers; zur Bildung der Schützenlinie gingen sie durch die Lücke zwischen den Zügen vor, und stellten sich 50 – 80 Schritte vor der Kompagnie so auf, dass sie dieselbe beiderseits um etwas 8 – 10 Schritte überflügelten.

For use in the battlion they were under command of the Schützenofficer. For forming the Schützenline they advanced between the gaps of the platoons and placed themselves 50 – 80 paces in front of the company so that they surpassed it by apporximatly 8 – 10 paces.

This seemingly was also the use in 1809 – only that now the Schützen were 36 soldiers strong and were placed in the re-introduced third rank, when the battalion was in close order.
For more details see below 1809.
When being in close order the Schützen did not shoot but loaded guns – and in my view just stood in reserve doing nothing as a lot of other three ranks in other armies did as well.
When used as skirmishers – see above.
In 1809 not all schützen were armed with a rifle (according to the regimental history)

Die Vorschriften über Verhalten und Verwendung der Schützen waren damals ungefähr dieselben, wie sie das Reglement noch nach dem deutsch-französischen Kriege enthielt.
S. 174

1809

Am 9. März werden die Schützen auf ein Fünftel der Kopfstärke der Kompagnie (d.h. auf 36) vermehrt, aber nur teilweise mit Stutzen und Haubajonetten bewaffnet. Sie stehen in dem wiedereingeführten dritten Glied und sollen beim geschlossenen Feuer hauptsächlich die Gewehre laden. Um die im Gefecht den Kompanien entzogenen Schützenoffiziere zu ersetzen, werden "supernumeraire" Offiziere angestellt. Ferner enthält die Kompagnie nunmehr 2 Vizekaporale, das Regiment 4 Hornisten.
S. 219, 220

So 36 schuetzen cover a company frontage of about sixty files, say 50 paces. This sounds like "semi-skirmisher" in Shane's parlance, even if you allow for reserves.

The jagers may have fought in more extended formations.

Don't forget that the the Schützen fought in pairs, it wouldn't be just 36 in a single skrimishing line, moreover surpassing the flanks of the companies as well.

Semi-skirmishers is in my opinion a stupid designation – what is that?

Schützen were elite, destinguished by their uniform and the Schützenofficer was highly esteemed.
Most of them had a special arm.

so – consequently fully trained skirmishers – and not semi – skirmishers – if such beasts ever existed.

One would have to find stories how they fought in battle.

Actually Matthew,

In my own system I classify all schuetzen as specialized light infantry. Therefor, in my system they are full skirmishers being fully trained and capable of proper spacings etc.

It is only non-specialized light infantry that I put into semi-skirmish formation much like Empire does. Troops that performed light infantry duties when called on but not trained as such.

p.s. thank you VW for all of the information you have provided. This goes a long way in understanding the Bavarian use of light troops for me.

VW "Semi-skirmishers" as I was using the term (perhaps misunderstanding Shane's system slightly..) is an awkward modernism trying to describe something which is significant to wargamers but for which I don't have the proper contemporary words. I will galdly use an alternative term if I can find a better one.

The main practical feature is that "semi-skirmishers" usually deploy at 5 paces between pairs, as opposed to 10 paces for "full" skirmishers.

For the Bavarians 18 pairs at five paces each would be 90 paces – when a company front would be typically 50 paces. 10 paces would be 180 paces. Actually typically half would be held back as a reserve line, so the respective numbers are 45 paces and 90 paces. While skirmishers would be required to cover flanks, this would not be such an issue when the battalion's four companies were deployed in line (because the extra strain would be spread across all four companies, or because the flanks would be covered by other units). Typically it was more of an issue for columns, when there would still be plenty of men to cover at a 5 pace interval, since two or more companies' shuetzen would be available to cover a single company front.

Hence I think that in 1809 Bavarian Shuetzen would deploy more densely than you find in typical specialist light infantry. They might be highly capable individual fighters, some with specialist arms (though in 1809 their numbers had been rapidly expanded) – but this does not necessarily equate to practice and training higher level tactical manoeuvres and more dispersed deployments. This for me, if not for Shane, is the critical distinction. It is distinct from how accurate their fire was, how well they used cover, etc – which are covered by separate competence ratings.

Ps. And thank you too VW for providing us with the benefit of your researches in a field where the English language literature is once again sorely lacking. It has shone light into a dark place!

@Matthewgreen

So how whould you figure out a voltigeur company covering a battalion in company width columns – or company column?
Semi-skirmishers?

French Voltigeurs might have 5 paces intervals as well, or 10 paces or 15 paces, I assume it would depend on the tactical circumstances.

It also would depend in what tactical formation the Bavarian battalion was, like being in line or column.

And again, maybe only one Schützen platoon was used to cover the whole battalion, or two, or whatever.
We generally lack information about the actual tactical performance of the Bavarian Schützen.

Agreed VW. The evidence I've cited far doesn't really prove anything. All I have shown is that is was not necessary for the schutzen to deploy at extended intervals to do its job – that doesn't prove that they couldn't. The same can be said of French voltigeurs.

I think the more dispersed deployments were recommended for most tactical circumstances as the denser ones simply created more targets to no real extra effect (to summarise a recent discussion on another thread).

I have had a quick look at Gill and the Battle of Abensburg to see if this sheds some light. From this it seems that it was commonplace for the shuetzen platoons to be combined at battalion or regimental level – and they proved highly effective. This supports the idea that they did have the opportunity to develop more advanced light infantry tactics, rather than just providing local cover.

In Scott Bowden's "Empire" he differentiates between semi-skirmishers (SS) and full skirmishers (SK) by their spacing between each figure which represents 60 actual men. Basically SS rated troops cannot form SK but SK rated troops (which are specialized) can form either SK or SS in this system (from memory).

The problem is – that the section of the drill regulations dealing with the skirmishers on battalion level has disapeared.

Thanks to Steven Smith I could download the drill regulation for the citizen soldiers – of 1809 – which is a sort cf anodated and commented drill regulation – I just looked through it – it contains quite a lot about skirmishing.

By the way, it is available on google

Exerzier-Reglement für das Bürger-Militär im Koenigreich Bayern. 1809:

link

so Shane go for it.

thanks VW, I have a friend who can translate it for me. Hopefully I can gain some good use out of it.