"Skirmish Doctrine gathering " Topic

Napoleon had 96,000 troops in the area compared to Hohenlohe's 51,000.

At 1100 on 14 October, Napoleon had Lannes and Augereau, St. Hilaire's division of Soult's IV Corps as well as Soult's corps cavalry, Ney's advance guard and the Guard available, a total of approximately 55,000 against the 38,000 Hohenlohe had on the field. Ruchel's 13,000 were ordered to the field at 0800, didn't march until 1000 and it took him four hours to march six miles.

Meanwhile Davout at Auerstadt with no more than 26,000 completely defeated the main Prussian army of about 63,000.

At the beginning of the Jena fight, there was no reason for Hohenlohe to dawdle, which he did feeding in his forces piecemeal, even when his artillery outnumbered the French artillery on the field.

And it wasn't until between 1200 and 1230 that Soult, the bulk of Ney's corps and the Cavalry Reserve were nearing the field. Of the 96,000 French only about 56,000 were actually engaged. So, the odds were not actually over two to one for the entire action.

As for Grawert, you can take a look at Bressonet, translated by Scott Bowden, on page 165 reads:

'Seeing that he only had one thin line, without any reas support, unsure of the forces he was facing, completely ignorant of how to fight the French tirailleurs, but feeling that it was imperative to conquer Vierzehnheilegen, Hohenlohe, confused and irresolute, called a halt.'

'During that time, general Reille had reinforced the left of the village with the 34th line.'

'The French, hidden behind bushes and fences, were firing intensely. Their action, as well as that of the tirailleurs on the plain, combined with the fire of the grand battery and the artillery of the 5th corps, inflicted heavy losses to the Prussian line that could not be replaced because of the lack of reserves.'

'Grawert's infantry responded to that terrible fire by first sending isolated tirailleurs to the front, then by battalion volleys and platoon fire, mostly without results; meanwhile, the French fire was causing such devastation that Sanitz's regiment recoiled a bit. Prince Hohenlohe, however, brought it back into the line.'

What is very clear here is that Grawert did stand in the open delivering ineffective volley fire while being shot to pieces by French infantry in open order supported by artillery (which was the French doctrine). Grawert did deploy 'isolated' skirmishers, but they accomplished nothing.

Prussian infantry tactics were too formal and not flexible while the French tactics were exactly the opposite. The most telling thing I saw, though, was that the Prussians outnumbered the French in artillery and didn't employ it effectively. The Prussian artillery did not train to cooperate with their infantry in the field.

K

Thank you Kevin,

I really want to get hold of this document now.

sending isolated tirailleurs to the front

This tells me they sent out their own integral Schuetzen platoons (40men per btln) only. Hardly enough to counter the French Voltiguers and whatever other skirmishers they advanced with.

If true this enhances my opinion that although capable of using their 3rd ranker's the Prussians were reluctant to do so. I want to know why?

I feel that this was for several reasons:

1 – Senior commanders did not trust or believe in this more modern tactic. Being old school under the Great Frederick 30 years previously they felt it not an advantage to do so but a disadvantage?

2 – Throwing them out would weaken the parent battalions thus weakening the line. The Prussians focus on linear tactics would have directed them to focus on formal strong lines?

3 – Failure of regimental colonels to utilize them probably for the same reasons stated in point 2?

4 – Lack of coordination between the arms of the army. If the artillery and cavalry had done so maybe the Prussian infantry would have been more confident and able to employ the 3rd rank as it was meant to be used?

5 – Prussian thinking dating back to Frederick's day relied on rapid accurate volley fire. Weighing up the options maybe the Prussian reliance on this tactical doctrine prohibited the optimal utilization of the 3rd rank?

Either way, I strongly feel that the 3rd rank was not used anywhere as much as modern historians want us to believe. The tactical doctrine was there, the training was done but when the crunch came they just could not do it. With such high stakes the Prussians decided to fall back on the tried and proven reliance of rapid volley fire as they had done 30 years earlier and probably a combination of all 5 points I have made.

Yes this is just my opinion but it is based on all of the reading and research I have done over the years and there is just way too much evidence to discount or dismiss. The Prussians had the innovation right there with them to counter the French but failed to use it optimally. Too much trust in old tactical doctrines defeated them which was the fault of its commanders as it commonly said in most of the books I have read. Not their age, but their over-reliance on what worked for the 30 years earlier.

Take out all the hyperbole about national characteristics, apparent military superiority and all of that the result was that the once powerful Prussian army was completely and utterly shattered in a single day's combat. I personally do not care about any of this, I want to know why, what caused this disastrous defeat and I think this debate is getting us a much better picture as to why.

I have personally felt that the only way to find out what caused it is to study all of the changes that were made in 1808 when the leadership made all of the changes. What they focused on, what they corrected and fixed, what they introduced and how the army was re-born. The French restrictions imposed curtailed much of their plans but it was clear to me be seeing what the Prussians focused on was a window into their thought process based on the issues and problems they went through in 1806.

If you have a system that fails you have to study why? what are the causes and focus on fixing them, This is what the Prussians did. If you study their reforms you understand why they were made.

Shane

Bill,

I can't tell from the accounts you summarize if the Prussians took the town by bayonet-point or not. The phrasing seems to suggest they did – but then we find them declining to attack it later on without a mention of them losing it in between.

Kevin (or anyone else who has read it for that matter),

Bressonet wrote at the beginning of the 20th century, right? Which primary sources did he use from the battle?

Regards

Shane
I think you are right to try and probe the reasons why many Prussian officers at Jena seem to have been reluctant to deploy their third rank…to see if similar issues can be replicated in wargames rules.

I think weakening the line was probably a big deal. The Prussians were outnumbered (though did they know that?). This might suggest that a two deep line is more fragile than a three deep one. Perhaps that can simply be reflected in reduced unit size.

A further issue might have been lack of confidence in the third rank skirmishers. Less experienced skirmishers tended to fire off their ammunition too quickly, and then demand reinforcements or retreat burnt out. A third of your force could be wasted away rapidly. I read in Barbero's Waterloo that the Prussians had similar worries in the very different circumstances of Bulow's advance on Plancenoit. They used clouds of skirmishers backed by columns. But the skirmishers were "consumed" too quickly, severely reducing the available strength when they reached the village. Prussian third-rankers in 1815, and no doubt in 1806, were rather a flawed instrument.

Matthew

Matthew, Whirlwind, Shane, Kevin et al:

Matthew: No, the Prussians didn't take Vierzehnheiligen with the bayonet. Marwitz says that is what would have been necessary to take the town and the intent of Hohenlohe's attempted attacks…

Whirlwind: Bressonet was writing an Army Study to a French audience in large part from French documents. He relied heavily on Hopfner for the Prussian actions though he does cite Jany once or twice. If there is a problem with Bowden's translation, it is that much of the Prussian documents and quotes have been translated into French from the German, only to be then translated into English. What happens, for example, is that there are references to Prussian "Tirailleurs", but you don't know whether those are Schutzen, Fusiliers or line troops being referred to, or whether the Prussians themselves were calling them skirmishers or 'Tirailleurs'…and the last two terms weren't necessarily interchangable.

Kevin wrote:

What is very clear here is that Grawert did stand in the open delivering ineffective volley fire while being shot to pieces by French infantry in open order supported by artillery (which was the French doctrine). Grawert did deploy 'isolated' skirmishers, but they accomplished nothing.

Your brief on the battle has some fine quotes, but you have not only taken some of them out of context, the quotes are also out of chronological order, so you have Sanitz's regiment recoiling after Hohenlohe has decided not to attack, irresolute, and wait for Ruchel… Not a big help.

The biggest problem I had with Bressonet's very fine narrative of the battle are the reasons he gives for Hohenlohe's actions, when those aren't the reasons the Prussian army reports give, but there is no explanation why from Bressonet.

You do show Grawert's first action as sending out skirmishers, however you fail to mention the artillery he brought up afterward. The Prussian volleys were in support of that effort and the artillery did clear the face of the village.

Shane: Again, you have to realize that the reference to the skirmishers Kevin gives was just before the village of Vierzehnheiligen involving the Grawert and Zastrow Regiments, four battalions--not the entire Prussian line.

That is 160 Schutzen. Certainly not enough to push three or more French Battalions out of the village. And yes, the Prussians realized very quickly that that they weren't going to take the village…the Skirmishers only made it clear what the Prussians were facing.

Now, at this point there is no reason for the Prussians to deploy more skirmishers, to be just more targets standing out in the open to get shot by the French. In fact that is not how the French took Vierzehnheiligen and Issertadt--they used formed infantry, so that isn't some "we don't skirmish" response when the Prussians don't send out more. The Prussians brought up artillery instead, which did eventually drive the French into the town.

If true this enhances my opinion that although capable of using their 3rd ranker's the Prussians were reluctant to do so.

My first response is that they weren't. In fact they did use third rankers and I gave you two example only half way through the battle. They were also willing to deploy whole companies and send out volunteers. I take it you don't agree with my examples of Tauentzien and Holtendorf's actions? Both commands deployed third rankers.

I want to know why?

Then you have to look at the specific tactical situations and see what they actually did.

I feel that this was for several reasons:

1 – Senior commanders did not trust or believe in this more modern tactic. Being old school under the Great Frederick 30 years previously they felt it not an advantage to do so but a disadvantage?

Okay, so if that is so, why did the Prussians deploy 1 in 4 of their infantry as skirmishers? The discussions that Prussians had about skirmishers before 1806 were not about whether skirmishers were necessary. Everyone agreed that they were. It was a question of who should be skirmishing, light specialists or line infantry.

2 – Throwing them out would weaken the parent battalions thus weakening the line. The Prussians focus on linear tactics would have directed them to focus on formal strong lines?

I agree that this was an issue and one the Prussians, like the British, Austrians and Russians all seemed to feel were better handled by specialists, saving the line troops for close formation action. It was a strong tendency, but not a hard and fast rule with any of them.

3 – Failure of regimental colonels to utilize them probably for the same reasons stated in point 2?

This may or may not be true. The first was the poor and inconsistent training Prussian regiments received, so the colonels may not have known how to utilize them. They also hadn't had a war in ten years, so inexperience could be a factor. However, regimental colonels may not have been the ones responsible for that decision…beyond the Schutzen, which were always deployed as skirmishers. It may have been the brigade commanders who determined whether 3rd ranks were used.

4 – Lack of coordination between the arms of the army. If the artillery and cavalry had done so maybe the Prussian infantry would have been more confident and able to employ the 3rd rank as it was meant to be used?

I certainly would agree with that. The coordination between the three arms was really bad during Jena.

5 – Prussian thinking dating back to Frederick's day relied on rapid accurate volley fire. Weighing up the options maybe the Prussian reliance on this tactical doctrine prohibited the optimal utilization of the 3rd rank?

I doubt it. First of all, the reliance on volley fire was hardly a Frederickian notion by 1806, even in the Prussian army, unless you want to say the British were followers of Frederick. But I do believe that any use of the 3rd rank was a weighing of tactical options in a moment of battle, which is why sometimes volunteers or whole companies were used instead.

There may well have been a reluctance to deploy the 3rd rank, but how do you determine that? If the Prussians were deploying the third rank, or if they chose not to where it is tactically reasonable not to… how do you find evidence that they were 'reluctant'?

I would be glad to provide more evidence for large scale deployments of skirmishers at Jena, but so far the two examples I have provided seem to have been dismissed because? Is it because it isn't Grawert four battalions before Vierzehnheilegen?

Bill

Bill,

doubt it. First of all, the reliance on volley fire was hardly a Frederickian notion by 1806, even in the Prussian army, unless you want to say the British were followers of Frederick. But I do believe that any use of the 3rd rank was a weighing of tactical options in a moment of battle, which is why sometimes volunteers or whole companies were used instead.

Possibly slightly off topic but, would it be fair to say that the Prussian doctrine called for a more sustained firefight, which would make the relative value of the third rank, as a source of reinforcements and replacements for losses amongst the front and center ranks, more important. Particularly when you compare this to the British tactic of one or two volley's to be immediately followed by a sharp advance with the bayonet, where the third rank was almost superfluous. Or, in 1806, did the Prussians lean towards the British and French doctrine of shorter musketry duels, with the decision determined by the threat of the bayonet?

npm

Thank you Ligniere, that is a very good point. I strongly believe that the Prussians of 1806 were reluctant to throw out the 3rd rank completely. Yes there is evidence that supports that they did but I really think this was not consistent throughout the entire battle. I strongly think that there was grave inconsistencies in the army on that do that was anything but uniform in the use of the 3rd ranker's.

It seems that every quote thrown up here is misquoted, contextually incorrect or wrong for whatever reason in Bills eyes except his own. Bill, no offense but not everyone of these quotes can be wrong. These must be some truth to them and I do not believe they are "all" completely take out of context at all. Several reasons have been put up by not just me for reasons the Prussians lines may have failed to optimally utilized the 3rd rank. I think there has to be some truth in this regardless of your constant dismissal of them all.

Shane

Ligniere:

I agree with your assessment. And Frederickian tactics recognized that attritional aspect of any firefight. Paret outlines "Frederickian" doctrine in his book on Yorck, pp.19-20:

Peter Paret summarizes this well:

"To win battles with these methods ("Frederickian tactics") [inserted here by Paret], the commander had to satisfy three fundamental requirements:
1. Tactical surprise could be achieved only if the army developed its battle formations with great rapidity." [That is, formed into line quickly.]

2. Second, direction and lateral movement extent of the attack must be accurately projected, since once set in motion the far-stretched lines could change only at the cost of time and order.

3. Finally, once the attack was launched it must move forward with little or no interruption; halting and engaging the enemy in a static, prolonged fire-fight—as Grawert's divisions was to do disastrously at Jena—went against the nature of the process."

In other words, prolonged fire-fights were not taught as doctrine in the Prussian army--against formed infantry or skirmishers, the later SYW or 1806. Advancing fire and a bayonet charge was.

Bill

Shane wrote:

seems that every quote thrown up here is misquoted, contextually incorrect or wrong for whatever reason in Bills eyes except his own. Bill, no offense but not everyone of these quotes can be wrong. These must be some truth to them and I do not believe they are "all" completely take out of context at all. Several reasons have been put up by not just me for reasons the Prussians lines may have failed to optimally utilized the 3rd rank. I think there has to be some truth in this regardless of your constant dismissal of them all.

Shane:

I haven't said or suggested that"all" quotes are completely taken out of context. There are any number that I have accepted without comment and/or agreed with. So, let's not go into extremes here. I am and have been more than willing to explain where and why I questioned particular quotes…each and every time I have done it.

Several reasons have been put up by not just me for reasons the Prussians lines may have failed to optimally utilized the 3rd rank. I think there has to be some truth in this regardless of your constant dismissal of them all.

I don't remember anyone saying that the Prussians did or were expected to "optimally" utilize the 3rd Rank. I thought the question was whether they did at all and that they didn't because they were "reluctant" to use them.

And yes, I agree. there are any number of well-know authors who insist that:

"In doctrine, however, the Prussian army was hopelessly outdated in its concepts. Everything was related to the days of Frederick the Great, and deviations from the Master's precepts were not countenanced." Chandler p. 454 of his Campaigns of Napoleon

Or how about John Elting in his fine Swords Around the Throne? He offered this summary of the Prussian defeat:

"That army marched away to Jena and Auerstadt, tried gallantly to fight its battle in Frederick's style: Stiff lines of musketeers trampling slowly forward or standing
in the open while Lannes' scarce-seen skirmishers used them for target practice… The rest was an increasingly despairing retreat, and disaster piled upon defeat." p. 517

Terrific. But as Hohenlohe's and Grawert's peformances were in direct violation of Frederick's precepts, that the majority of the Prussians didn't simply stand around getting shot up during the battle, and as such behavior was not in "Frederick's style", what does that explain?

Nothing.

And it doesn't matter how well-know they are as historians and authors. If the evaluation of the performance doesn't match the actual performance, why accept it?

Or how about Scott Bowden writing in "France and Prussia at War: 1806 Myths and Reality of Jena-Auerstadt: The Prussian Army", Empires, Eagles & Lions vol. 2, #1

With respect to villages, Prussian doctrine rarely – if ever – called for defense of build-up areas. When necessary,
they would storm enemy held villages and strong points which threatened their ordered lines of battles. However, when given the choice, Prussian arms did not opt for placement in any villages because such deployment would affect their offensive, firepower minded tactics. This is plainly demonstrated by Prince Louis' deployment at Saalfeld as well as General Tauentzien's abandonment of the village of Vierzehnheiligen at Jena."

Now does this explain why the Prussians defended 4 of the 5 towns on the battlefield? The one undefended: Krippendorf. The Prussians repulsed Lannes' first attemtpt to take Vierzehnheiligen, recaptured Issenstadt, and the single objective for Grawert was to take back Vierzehnheiligen. Line troops were used in every case. Tauenztien abandon Vierzehnheiligen because his troops had run out of ammo and Hohenlohe ordered him to retreat. In fact, defending V. the first time was after he'd received the order to withdraw behind Grawert's Division.

So, do you accept Bowden's explanation as 'the way it was' or question [dismiss] his quote, his 'explanation' of the Prussian behavior? Your call.

What I have been saying Shane is this: The only question is whether those quotes explain what actually happened and what the Prussians actually did during the battle.

You want to build a game system that reflects what the Prussians and Saxon's were actually capable of. Let's say you have a hundred quotes from respected authors saying the Prussians:

1. only deployed a few skirmishers, or
2. were reluctant to use their third rank, or
3. did nothing but stand around and volleyed at hidden French skirmishers because their doctrine left them helpless or they were at a loss to know what to do.

Now, what do you say if the actual battlefield performance of the Prussians and Saxons, the battle reports of their officers say something different--sometimes very different?

Just write it off as 100 quotes trumps what actual contemporaries saying what they did? It isn't a matter of calling 100 writers stupid or say they are lying. It is simply one of saying the quotes don't explain the events. Period.

I gave you two detailed examples of the Prussians actually using the 3rd Rank during Jena from the first two engagements in the battle. Does it seem to you that the Prussians were "reluctant" to do it? Why? Because they didn't uniformly do it, or do it in optimal fashion? When the French used several methods for deploying skirmishers, that is seen as 'flexible tactics', when the Prussians do it, it is reluctance? The Prussians were not all that good at skirmishing or willing to deploy entire line battalions as skirmishers, but lets stick to what they actually did.

I'll give it one more shot. I am simply pointing out that if you want to know what the Prussians were capable of and why they did what they did on the battlefield, you have to look at what they say they did…thensee if others' evaluation and explanations add anything to your understanding.

Bill

Bill,

I have already designed the statistics for the Prussian army which includes the ability to throw out their 3rd rankers; lets make that perfectly clear. If I was to re-fight Jena today the Prussian player can throw out the 3rd rankers from "every" musketeer, grenadier or Guard btln he wishes.

All I am saying is that their is a vast amount of historical evidence and educated opinion to say that in reality "on the day" they failed to optimally utilize this resource as it could have been.

But the point remains, "I still allow the use of the 3rd rank in my system". So I am trying to be accurate and historical.

Shane,

All I am saying is that their is a vast amount of historical evidence and educated opinion to say that in reality "on the day" they failed to optimally utilize this resource as it could have been.

There is a vast amount of educated opinion, I'll give you that. I thought the problem with our period is that there isn't a vast amount of historical evidence about the intricate details of Napoleonic battles to enable us to build detailed simulations with confidence? And, for us English-speakers, the historical evidence has mainly been based on British or French sources, especially secondary sources. I think it has been a really interesting few years, where new voices from the other armies that fought have been made available to us. If these voices slightly modify our perceptions of these armies, is that so unexpected?

Regards

I think Whirlwind is right.

"every quote thrown up here is misquoted, contextually incorrect or wrong"

Well, there is a certain common element – the anglophone author(s) selecting the quotes.

I can only note that for the army I play, the Russians, three quotes were put up.

Two were grossly out of context (they were about one miserable half-strength regiment in the descent on Holland in 1799) – and one of these was from someone who had never seen nor fought the Russians (Duhesme).

The third "quote" was from an English-language work published in 1982, amplified and re-told and sexed-up by a series of later anglophone authors quoting each other without even seeing the original source document. For this one, there is absolutely no context at all. Indeed, in the un-amplified version of the first publication, the Russians are not even mentioned!

So, nil out three for the Russians. Should I guess that the Austrian and Prussian "quotes" are somehow more useful?

What frustrates me is that you guys seem to totally and utterly dismiss any and all of the quotes provided as though the men who wrote them were either somehow incapable of getting it right? Does being an English speaking historian or author writing about non-English speaking armies automatically make you academically inept or poor that they cannot research a topic and be correct and historically accurate no matter what you write and how much time to devote to studying the evidence??? rubbish !! you guys are basically telling everyone here these guys were wrong, or worse, liars? what hogwash !!

I thought the problem with our period is that there isn't a vast amount of historical evidence about the intricate details of Napoleonic battles to enable us to build detailed simulations with confidence?

I do not agree with that, there is a plethora of books that drill right down into the nuts and bolts of a Napoleonic battle from authors such as, Nosworthy, Muir, Nafziger, Rothemberg, Dempsey and many others. These guys have provided very detailed accounts of the mechanics of a battle relating what happened, how it happened and the effects and so on. The Analysis of these guys cannot be denied, you would insult them by saying otherwise. These are the guys who have provided me with a dissection of the battles so that I could study their words and convert them into rules mechanics. This goes for many other designers out there.

I would rather not get into a debate over whether one rules mechanic is historically correct over another etc because the problem with game design is you have to build an "artificial" process to simulate reality. That in itself defeats the whole purpose. After all, we are just designing a game "based" on the period and how battles were fought. Other than going into the back yard and shooting each other with muskets your not going to simulate a battle…

And, for us English-speakers, the historical evidence has mainly been based on British or French sources, especially secondary sources.

And that is because wargaming is predominately an English speaking hobby. If your going to fight the Napoleonic period back 20-40 years you had to rely more so on secondary sources to study and use as a basis for your simulations and historical organisational and tactical doctrines of non-English speaking armies. Our fascination with wargaming is unheard of in many countries who have long and bloody histories of conflict. However, the hobby is spreading and entering markets in non-English speaking communities and beginning to flourish in one form or another.

I think it has been a really interesting few years, where new voices from the other armies that fought have been made available to us. If these voices slightly modify our perceptions of these armies, is that so unexpected?

The last decade, with the help of the Internet there has been a huge expansion of the hobby with the increasing interest from non-English speaking historians to spread the knowledge. I applaud this, that is why I am so passionate about gaining this knowledge. I am the last person to say this is a bad thing. I relish the input from German and Russian speaking historians and enthusiasts alike. I learn from them and have taken a great deal of the information into my system already. If you could see the shear size and volume of work I have put into it to ensure that each army is represented to a high level of historical accuracy you would know what I mean.

However, this does not stop me form having an opinion which seems to fly in the face of a few who seem to re-educate me to their way of thinking. Yes the Prussians had 3rd ranker's in 1806, yes there is evidence to suggest they were deployed. Nevertheless, there "IS" a vast number of reputable historians and authors over the years who seem to be saying very similar things about the Prussian army and its conduct in 1806. I can be easily dismissed here for believing what they tell me by a few here but the point is that these well respected and very knowledgeable men have put forth evidence to counter what a few are saying here and I tend to agree with them.

Sorry Bill, although it is easy to debate against me and dismiss my opinion you still have countless books on this campaign which tells us otherwise. I personally trust the evidence in those books than what you have tried to say here to sway my opinion. I doubt very much if you would be correct to assert everyone of those authors, "got it wrong".

Of course I am now open once again to personal dismissal simply because I am here every day while these authors are not, so go for it, dismiss away…

Bill,

You apparently haven't looked at the book, or not looked closely enough. The quotes that I used were in exact order from the book on page 165. They are the 4th-7th paragraphs on the page. So what you have stated in your posting on that matter is not only incorrect, it is disingenuous. And it also seems from some members of the forum that the term ‘taken out of context' is now the new strawman argument.

I took nothing out of context. The prompting comment in the thread was asking the question how did the idea that Grawert stood in the open and was shot to pieces.

Bressonet certainly supports it and his source material is quite good. There is more on the subject in the book, but I'm not going to quote all of it.

The artillery paragraph, to which you allude, is number 8 in sequence on the page and reads:

‘At the same time, the Prussian 12-pounder batteries were inflicting serious damage to the French artillery, but without forcing it to stop firing, even though several pieces were damaged and several caissons had exploded.'

In short, the Prussian counterbattery fire was ineffective as the French kept firing at the Prussian infantry. It didn't help Grawert. This also denotes a lack of both effective artillery doctrine on the part of the Prussians and lack of coordination with the Prussian infantry.

The Prussian target should have been the French infantry. Instead they wasted time and ammunition on counterbattery fire, which the French, British, and Austrian artillery doctrine were against (but not the Russian) by this time.

Further, the Prussians did not coordinate the actions of their skirmishers with those of the formed units. Merely deploying skirmishers, and in relatively small numbers, does not indicate coordination at any level.

As an added note, if you notice the map on page 172 you'll notice that Grawert's division is shown as being in line in the open, following the text.

Further, if you read the text in its entirety, you'll see that the French infantry, both line and light, operate under fire in a variety of formations depending on the situation (line, column, and open/skirmish formations). You don't see Prussian infantry units doing the same thing. That's the lack of flexibility that the Prussian infantry had. And that's the point of the exercise.

As a further demonstration of that issue, the comment by von der Goltz on the failure of the Prussians to take Vierzehnheilegen is precisely noted:

‘…we lacked the vigor necessary to take the first step. This way of fighting was neither in the tendencies nor in the habits of the Prussian people.'

That is a fitting epitaph of the Prussian army of 1806 and sums up 14 October 1806 quite nicely.

Bressonet's German sources include Hopfner's Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807, von der Goltz's Von Jena bis Preussich-Eylau and Von Rossbach bus Jena und Auerstadt, von Lettow-Vorbeck's Der Krieg von 1806-1807 and Scharnhorst's after action report of Auerstadt. Seems to me that Bressonet did very well on his sourcing as there is much primary material in those volumes.

K

Come on Shane, you are taking this really personally and I can't see why at all. All the quotations provided by Bill and justonemore and so don't render everything ever written by Nafziger, Nosworthy, Muir etc. redundant. What they do is add evidence to clarify some things that weren't necessarily at the centre of their expertise. Has any 'generalist' writer of Napoleonic History in English had a detailed knowledge of primary Russian sources, for example? Since the answer appears not, of course the picture is going to change when these sources come to enlighten the Anglophone world. There is no shame in that. Similar comments apply whenever anyone introduces a primary source that the secondary sources you or I read didn't or couldn't have knowledge of when they wrote their books.

Does being an English speaking historian or author writing about non-English speaking armies automatically make you academically inept or poor that they cannot research a topic and be correct and historically accurate no matter what you write and how much time to devote to studying the evidence?

It does make you a slave to the accuracy of the translations you are using or the accuracy of the secondary sources you are using if you cannot read the primary sources yourself.

These guys have provided very detailed accounts of the mechanics of a battle relating what happened, how it happened and the effects and so on. The Analysis of these guys cannot be denied, you would insult them by saying otherwise.

Surely the reverse is true – it would be almost inconceivable that they had got everything correct in wars lasting over 23 years involving millions of men speaking in several languages? I think all of them have made a decent stab at it, doesn't mean they were right about everything. Take Nafziger's theory about the reasons for the British adopting 2-deep line for example. Maj Snort has shown convincingly in his posts here on TMP that Nafziger cannot be simply correct on this. Does that invalidate everything Nafziger wrote? – of course not. Similarly on this thread, no amount of revisionism can reverse the outcome of Jena, it simply modifies exactly why we think the Prussians got routed. Similar comments apply to Radetky's quotation – the substance of the quotation isn't being challenged much, just the extent to which it can be meaningfully applied and if some secondary writers have put more weight on this one quotation than it can bear.

However, this does not stop me from having an opinion which seems to fly in the face of a few who seem to want to re-educate me to their way of thinking. Yes the Prussians had 3rd ranker's in 1806, yes there is evidence to suggest they were deployed. Nevertheless, there "IS" a vast number of reputable historians and authors over the years who seem to be saying very similar things about the Prussian army and its conduct in 1806. I can be easily dismissed here for believing what they tell me by a few here but the point is that these well respected and very knowledgeable men have put forth evidence to counter what a few are saying here and I tend to agree with them.

Surely the situation is the other way around – these well-respected and knowledgeable authors have written what they think happened and then some posters on TMP provide primary sources that disagree with the comments of those well-respected authors. If one doesn't know which primary sources or facts those well-respected authors are basing their statements on, it is impossible to defend their position effectively. For example, on another thread about skirmishing I mentioned the quotation from the very well-respected Paddy Griffith about French Light Infantry being no different in substance from French Line Infantry – I'm not really capable of defending that position because I'm not in a position to really know why he thought that – but why take it personally when knowledgeable posters come and show the evidence why they think that Dr Griffith's point of view on this matter is incorrect? It should just be an invitation for the historians who also champion this point of view to show the extent of their evidence, surely?

Regards

Or how about John Elting in his fine Swords Around the Throne? He offered this summary of the Prussian defeat:

"That army marched away to Jena and Auerstadt, tried gallantly to fight its battle in Frederick's style: Stiff lines of musketeers trampling slowly forward or standing
in the open while Lannes' scarce-seen skirmishers used them for target practice… The rest was an increasingly despairing retreat, and disaster piled upon defeat." p. 517

Terrific. But as Hohenlohe's and Grawert's peformances were in direct violation of Frederick's precepts, that the majority of the Prussians didn't simply stand around getting shot up during the battle, and as such behavior was not in "Frederick's style", what does that explain?

In actuality it is an excellent summary of 1806, especially if you had included the entire paragraph-it wasn't just about Jena and Auerstadt. Out of context, perhaps?

And what, exactly, were Frederick's 'precepts?' Frederick began his military career by running away from his first battle. He also believed in the bayonet until his infantry started getting shot to pieces on the battlefield and then he changed his mind to the 'usefulness' of firepower.

The overall point is that Col Elting, Maude (who admired the Prussian army), Petre, Paret, White, Craig, Shanahan, as well as Shane, are correct and you're wrong. Then you accuse people of taking material 'out of context' when you actually have done it here.

That isn't historical inquiry, it is nonsense and you're not establishing anything that supports your idea of what the Prussians did or didn't do. The 'traditional' view of what happened in 1806 is largely correct and not the revisionist nonsense that is currently being promulgated in various places.

By the way, the section in Chapter XXV of Swords on the Prussians is from the middle of page 516 to the top of page 521.

K

The recent shout out for Peter Hofschroer reminded me that he wrote an article touching on this very subject in Miniature Wargames #10 a long time ago, touching on this very subject.

I don't believe that the greater majority of the quotes being used were taken out of context as two members are complaining.

What those quotes do, as an aggregate, is paint a picture of how the armies fought and what they did. That can be combined with the armies' drill regulations to enlarge the picture.

And all of us should remember that all that we are doing is skimming the surface of the subjects being discussed. A very wise and helpful military historian told me that once, a long time ago.

K

And writing that has reminded me that Peter Hofschroer wrote a fair bit about Jena and skirmishing in Miniature Wargames around that time – try issues 18, 20, 23 and 24. Issue 18 is an account of the Battle of Jena – fascinating stuff. I'd say that article (on a very quick re-read) goes 50:50 – it supports a much greater flexibility in the Prussian infantry than some give it credit for; on the other hand, it does have Grawert effectively standing facing the village for two hours getting progressively torn apart by artillery and skirmisher fire.

Regards

10th Marines ….

"I took nothing out of context"
"I don't believe that the greater majority of the quotes being used were taken out of context"

Three quotes were offered by you about the Russians.
Two were actually only about the one half-strength jäger regiment in the 1799 landing in Holland. One was without any context at all – indeed you cannot even offer us the text of the original contemporary document, as you have never seen it. And this last one did not even name the Russians [!] when Rothenburg first published it in translation.

Is this quoting "in context" in your opinion?

Whirlwind, I am taking this personally because I have a voice and an opinion which is my right to exercise. The Internet is free and as long as I do not insult I can believe what I wish based on the evidence I have read and trust.

I get tired of some here who seem to think that if you do not agree with them you are rocking the boat. I get equally tired when some say that I am trying to force others to agree with me and that I do not allow them their own voice. So how bout some equality here, the shoe seems to be on the other foot right now? If you find it hard to allow me to voice my opinion or get frustrated that I will not change my mind then tough. I really do not give a you know what…

If I have to conform to what you or anyone else here tells me I have to conform to then I would not be true to myself and my beliefs. If I change my mind in the future I will be the first to let you know. But until then, just be respectful enough to understand my position, this is an open forum of individuals with there own beliefs, opinions and levels of enthusiasm for the period. Give me the privilege of having my own individuality based on my beliefs.

p.s. Didn't you email me recently to ask for a copy of my system? If it was you can't you see that I have treated the 1806 Prussians with the respect the deserve? I often say to my friends that I really like the 1806 Prussian arm and that my 1st army of choice if I did not play French would be Austrian. I have designed a system that is as loyal to each army as I could possibly make it. I know that the only way to create a true historical representation of each army is to play them all and design the system through play-testing each army. This is what I did. Several players have already noted to me just how more balanced each army is quality wise when facing each other. I designed the national characteristics and army abilities as faithfully as I could and did not penalize certain armies as some other designers have in the past. This was a very conscious decision of mine. If you play the 1806 Prussians in my system you would get a "very" realistic and satisfying feeling of them once the battle was over.

Shane

Re-reading it has reminded me what a cracking article it is. Buy it here: link

Anyway, the relevant bit is:

Lannes' skirmishers drove the Prussians out of Vierzehnheiligen and occupied it in force. The small wood was also taken. The French artillery bombardment grew in intensity and started to cause significant losses. The mist dispersed and as the French were concealed in the undulating countrvside, behind the villages and woods, they did not appear to be present in large numbers.

Thus at about 9.30am. Hohenlohe ordered the attack. The Prussian infantry formed up in echelons of two battalions from the left flank and drove back the entire French line until it came to Vierzehnheilingen where it came to a halt, receiving a rigorous fire from the hedges and gardens. The Prussians sent in their skirmishers, who were soon repelled. The lines then opened up with volley fire and then continued with independent fire. This firefight by troops standing in line in the open against an enemy skilfully using the available cover was clearly one-sided. To stand still when attacking was obviously in contradiction to all Prussian military principles and was not intended by Hohenlohe.
Why then was this attack not continued? The Prince's adjutant, Major von der Marwitz reported:
'No enemy were to be seen other than those right in front of us in Vierzehnheilingen and behind this village. So the Prince decided, seeing this as the very last effort needed, to send in a couple of battalions and have them take it with the bayonet when General Grawert rode up to him and congratulated him on winning the battle. The Prince declined the congratulations and told General Grawert of his decision to storm the village now. The latter requested that this should be delayed. He pointed at our half-ruined battalions that had been standing under continuous fire for two hours, at the single line with no reserve. For Tauentzien's and Dyhernn's s beaten troops could not be counted (on?), with so many gaps that they could hardly be called a formation, and concluded with the remark: "ln this position we can and must halt until General Ruechel arrives with his corps and then we can complete the victory …"

'Along the entire line one battalion volley followed another, with no effect in many places. The area around the entrance to the village was the scene of the most terrible slaughter and bloodletting' (von der Marwitz). The French artillery fire had an increasing effect on the closed lines. Their skirmishers dared to come nearer and nearer, shooting into the ranks and often selected the officers as their target.

(Peter Hofschroer in Miniature Wargames 18, p23-24)

Hope that is of interest

Regards

Now Whirlwind can you see my point?

My whole premise for my argument about the Prussians not utilizing their skirmishers optimally is right there written by PH. I also have those issues and did not think to re-look at them.

I continue to stand by my words, "the Prussians failed to optimally utilize their skirmishers at Jena and suffered for it.

It is not lies, it is not conjecture, it is not quotes taken out of context, it is not blind hyperbolic opinion. It is simply plain old gut feeling which was based on a hunch from my own extensive reading of which those Empire mags were apart of over the years.

The Prussians had the innovation and modernization there but failed to take full advantage of it. The proof is irrefutable. And that is why I called out for PH, I knew he would have the information and research done on this so I thank you for putting this forward.

Shane,

Yes, I did e-mail you recently, thank you very much for your help with that.

As for the other stuff, sure we all think what we think, fair enough. This thread just seems to be really upsetting you.

Regards

It upsets me because I don't like being told I am wrong when I know I am right….simple as that.

Yes I get excited on this forum at times but that is because I am very opinionated. I am passionate about the period and openly admit that. I get defensive when insulted, I openly admit that I seem to end up in most of the arguments but I really cannot stand being shouted down or worse, insulted because I have a viewpoint that others seem not to want to accept. Having your opinions continually analysed is a frustrating thing to go through, this is why many TMP'ers do not write here. I have had several TMP'ers email me personally who say that and praise me for having the balls to stand up to the "elitist" viewpoint often showing itself here.

If people don't like me here then, tough.

p.s that rant was not directed at you WW, just a frustrated kicking of a few stones…I enjoy arguing when I know I am right gets the blood flowing.

There is nothing wrong with putting up your opinion and the evidence backing it, but you must understand that there are significant problems and effects related to the kind of popular works hyou menmtion. Nosworthy for example only reads French and English – his comments come through a late 19th and mid-20th century prism, where the Napoleonic French were all conquering except when facing the British. As an example of the nonsense he proiduces, he mentions the supposed French flexibility at Marengo based on the 72e turning their rear rank round to face Austrian cavalry. This is nonsense in a tactical sense and has its origin in a piece of propaganda produced three months after the battle and translated by the same guy, who translated Petit in the following year.

Bowden was caught out trying to claim the use of many Russo-Austrian sources he had not been near, let alone been able to read and he is not alone in this. Rothenberg is interesting, but it is a product of a time when the Ruling theory/Received wisdom was to run down the Austrian army in a reaction to the more patriotic works around 1900. the Internet and cheap travel have made it much easier to access obscurer material – and even those, who have written books/articles in the 90s would acknowledge that the world moves on.

So, by all means mention a quote, but bear in mind that even they are often selected to prove the author's point and if the accessible material like Gallina's collection of the Austrian standing orders has been overlooked, then the quote may be suspect.

"Good luck to the guy trying to get £338.00 GBP GBP for a copy -maybe it's signed by General Howe himself…"

May be it is General Howe's own copy? lol

Third Rank Regulations

Shane:

You were asking after Peter Hofschroer. He wrote quite a bit about the 1806 Prussians and Jena in the old Courier, Empires, Eagles and Lions, and the Napoleonic magazine 1st Empire.

I have several articles I can send to you. Others are available on-line. If Mag-web ever comes back, there were scads of his old articles there.

As an example of information from his articles:

The use of the third rank

The section entitled: Regulations for the Third Rank in the 1812 regulations was based on those published by Prince Hohenlohe in 1803, which in turn were based on those published by the Duke of Brunswick in 1791. A modified form was issued in 1809. The 1812 third rank regulations were still in use in the Prussian army after 1850.

The 1812 introduction of this section makes it clear that the purpose of this training was to produce the "universal infantryman", that is a soldier capable of operating in both close and open order as opposed to the "specialist infantryman" of the previous century, that is a grenadier, a musketeer, a rifleman, etc.

The Regulations state:

The third rank fights here (when trying to delay an enemy line for a specific time-PAH), assuming that the enemy does not press forward in too great a strength, only partly deployed, using from 1/3 to at the very most 2/3 Of the total. If the entire third rank was to deploy without any reserve, it would soon use up all its ammunition. (p.100 of the 1812 regulations)

The skirmish platoons of the third rank also had to keep at least part if its men in close-order so that the skirmishers had a point to fall back on when rallying.
Peter Hofschroer Courier IV, #2

So, for a 1806 Prussian battalion of say 700 effectives, that would be 233 men in the third rank. Using 1/3 to 2/3 ratios, that would be 78 to 156 men, or for a 2 battalion Regiment, 156 to 312.

It is easy to see why an officer like Colonel von Kalckreuth of the Hohenlohe regiment might choose to go with volunteers, willing skirmishers, rather than the third rank. The Third Rank process described could actually limit the number of skirmishers he could send out or how his battalions would remain formed after the skirmishers were taken out. [that is, having to form up in two ranks instead of three.]

Bill

K:

Bressonet relies heavily on Hopfner. Open any page and he is referenced ten times as often as any other four sources. For instance. At the bottom of p. 165 that you quoted, there are five footnotes. Hopfner is listed four times, a French report once. The only other reference on the page is Goltz himself being quoted…another conclusion statement, not information about the battle itself. As you say:

As a further demonstration of that issue, the comment by von der Goltz on the failure of the Prussians to take Vierzehnheilegen is precisely noted:

‘…we lacked the vigor necessary to take the first step. This way of fighting was neither in the tendencies nor in the habits of the Prussian people.'

So, is that "a demonstration of the issue", or simply Goltz conclusion on what he sees as the demonstration?

Kevin, I think I would be better disposed to considering what you are quoting if you would not present an author's conclusion, and general ones at that, as actual evidence that something happened.

Really? "‘…we lacked the vigor necessary to take the first step." On what does Goltz base that conclusion? What 'first step' is that?'

The Prussians were certainly not a match for the French, but who exactly lacked the vigor? I might agree with Hohenlohe, but that's not what Goltz is saying.

I just gave some examples of Prussian troops, Hohenlohe and Hahn's battalion. They seem to have taken plenty of 'first steps' and showed more than a little vigor…as if those two illustrative terms 'vigor' and 'first steps' really identify something concrete.

The rest of the quotes are as I said, great quotes. They simply state what happened in Bressonet's words. Why you were providing them is not clear at all concerning the questions of Prussian actions.

About the artillery. I was commenting on the artillery firing on V., not the counter battery fire. The French thought the Prussian guns were effective. They say so in their reports. Want quotes? And no, that doesn't negate the conclusion about the outcome of the counterbattery fire.

About the sequence. Bressonet gives the setup for Grawert's advance in fine style on pp. 160-161.

And yes, I know the page 165 you copied from Bressonet. And the quote:

'Grawert's infantry responded to that terrible fire by first sending isolated tirailleurs to the front, then by battalion volleys and platoon fire, mostly without results; meanwhile, the French fire was causing such devastation that Sanitz's regiment recoiled a bit. Prince Hohenlohe, however, brought it back into the line.'

It is out of sequence… Sanitz's regiment recoiled before Grawert's regiment came up to the village and the Reason that Hohenlohe stopped the advance at first was to bring it back in line and resumed the advance and then the volleys etc.

That is according to the Prussians. So, what is Bressonet basing his narrative on? His reference is Hopfner, page 394 for that description. Hopfner gives the sequence I gave.

But so what? Why is that so important? Well, it could help explain why Hohenlohe hesitated, stopped the advance, showed a lack of 'vigor' and an unwillingness to take 'the first step' etc. etc. The difference between the demonstration and the conclusion on it.

Bill

have already designed the statistics for the Prussian army which includes the ability to throw out their 3rd rankers; lets make that perfectly clear. If I was to re-fight Jena today the Prussian player can throw out the 3rd rankers from "every" musketeer, grenadier or Guard btln he wishes.

All I am saying is that their is a vast amount of historical evidence and educated opinion to say that in reality "on the day" they failed to optimally utilize this resource as it could have been.

But the point remains, "I still allow the use of the 3rd rank in my system". So I am trying to be accurate and historical.

Shane:
Yes, I know you said that ages ago and have designed your game that way. So, I certainly wasn't commenting on that.

When you say the Prussians "failed to optimally utilize this resource as it could have been", I would say 'probably', because the Prussians failed to optimally unitlize any of their arms or tactics.

Even so, what do you see as an 'optimal' use? What happens if the optimal use of their line infantry included deploying skirmishers through volunteers or by platoons or companies instead of by the 3rd rank?

Do you see that as possible during Jena?

Bill

I have already designed the statistics for the Prussian army which includes the ability to throw out their 3rd rankers; lets make that perfectly clear. If I was to re-fight Jena today the Prussian player can throw out the 3rd rankers from "every" musketeer, grenadier or Guard btln he wishes.

All I am saying is that their is a vast amount of historical evidence and educated opinion to say that in reality "on the day" they failed to optimally utilize this resource as it could have been.

But the point remains, "I still allow the use of the 3rd rank in my system". So I am trying to be accurate and historical.

Shane:
Yes, I know you said that ages ago and have designed your game that way. So, I certainly wasn't commenting on that.

When you say the Prussians "failed to optimally utilize this resource as it could have been", I would say 'probably', because the Prussians failed to optimally unitlize any of their arms or tactics.

Even so, what do you see as an 'optimal' use? What happens if the optimal use of their line infantry included deploying skirmishers through volunteers or by platoons or companies instead of by the 3rd rank?

Do you see that as possible during Jena?

Bill

Reluctant Prussian Officers and Prussian Skirmishers.

The question of whether the Prussians were reluctant to deploy skirmishers or their third rank, or any other view of their attitudes concerning light infantry action has to be based on what they actually did.

Let's look at just one Prussian regiment, sitting in the middle of Grawert's line, along with one Grenadier battalion to the right of it, both which were certainly trained in the use of the third rank. And let's use the After-action report of their colonels along with Bressonet's narrative.

The Hohenlohe Regiment and the Hahn Grenadier battalion:

The first thing to know is the relative positions of the regiments as they advanced around ten-thirty by Bressonet's estimate.

Now the two battalions of the Hohenlohe regiment were on the right flank of the brigade, , so it was the regiments Hohenlohe, Stanitz, Zastrow, and Grawert right to left. Hohenlohe had the Sach and Hahn Grenadier battalions in its right, facing a small woods, Altenburg Holtzen, about 200 yards on a side. The Stanitz regiment was facing the gap between the Altenburg woods and Vierzehnheiligen. Opposite Stanitz sat Napoleon's 25-36 gun battery. Zastrow and Grawert faced Vierzehnheigligen itself.

The report of Colonel von Kalckreuth, commander of infantry Regiment Prince of Hohenlohe (No. 32) at Jena (found in Jany's "Gefechtausbildung", pp. 123ff.) It begins where Kalckreuth describes the advance:

Therefore after a short stop we were ordered to approach closer towards the enemy. Everybody stepped up again, a part of the regiment passed a small shrub, and there the advance moved en echelon, each battalion executed a small left turn of about 40 paces, and so the whole line advanced into cannon shot range against of the position of the enemy at the heights of Closewitz and stopped within enemy cannot shot, as now the echelons formed into line. [Straigthened out, as they had already deployed 1000 paces further back and weren't advancing in column… ;-j] During this advance the regiment already lost several dead and wounded through the enemy artillery.

Close in front of the position which the regiment had occupied, at the right hand of us stretched Isserstedt forest, and on the left a bit closer, another wood, which was strongly occupied by enemy voltigeurs. [The Altenburg] Our Schützen soon dislodged the enemy out of this small wood, but the Isserstedt forest couldn't be cleared completely from the enemy there it stretched to the position of the enemy.

This alone is quite a claim. Ney's elite battalions occupied the Altenburg and Isserstedt forest was actually facing Dyherrn's brigade more than a quarter mile away. I'll get back to this later.

The dense fog, which so far diminished our field of vision was dissolving; but unfortunately one realized with a bang of unhappy misfortune what was laying ahead of us there the events of the left wing had started to ran to our disadvantage. [He is talking about Stanitz regiment's recoiling next to him on his left and perhaps those facing Vierzehnheiligen.] The enemy strengthened his position, from which he dominated us completely with even more artillery with which he continued to shot at us to the utmost and did send still more re – enforcements of light troops forward. I could counter this enemy artillery fire with only my three regimental guns, which I placed as battery as advantageously as the terrain permitted. The 4th cannon had just been sent to Weimar to get repaired because of a broken axle.

Here the French artillery is given at least equal billing with their skirmishers in doing damage. Further in the report, [not quoted here] the colonel states the Schützen were sent out and then reinforced "several times" by volunteers during the following engagement, but this is where it done. Only one lieutenant is in charge of each battalion's 50 Schützen. The ‘officers' commanding the ‘skirmishers' would have included those sent out with the volunteers.

"The skirmishers of the regiment spurred on by those officers commanding them stopped the enemy light troops from advancing for a very long time although they were better protected everywhere by terrain which was most advantageous to them. It could not be otherwise, for in this standing battle which we had to endure for several hours, we had heavy losses of men due not only to the far more numerous enemy artillery but also due to the skirmish fire.

Here is evidence that the Prussians were not helpless before the French tirailleurs, nor standing around just volleying in response. You can see that Col. Kalckreuth describes the superiority of the French skirmishers, even while his troops keep them from advancing [getting closer].

His command isn't standing around volleying at the French because that's ‘the way to do win', nor does he express a complete loss as to what to do about the skirmishers. In point of fact, not only does his troops clear the small wood to his front of a large number of elite skirmishers, but also aids in clearing Isserstadt forest, which is about 600 yards away, which is actually in front of Dyherrn's brigade.

Again the French artillery is mentioned before any skirmishers But the Prussians certainly are being shot up. This is how the Prussian Colonel sees the tactical situation:

Despite that, the courage of the men was unshaken and if circumstances had allowed us to attack the enemy instead of waiting for his attack, then this courage would never have dissipated. In the meantime, the former did not occur, there came merely the order not to advance any further. This lack of movement gave everybody the opportunity to see the unfavorable turn of events and the disorder tearing the beaten left flank apart everywhere. [As experienced by Sanitz Regiment-BH] Also, the movement of the enemy cavalry which was beginning to go around our unprotected right flank and thus into our rear was drawing on the men's attention and causing despondency. . ." [The cavalry doesn't appear there until after 12 noon, so you can see the telescoping time here.] italics mine

So, first off, standing around waiting for the French to attack is not what the Colonel understood to be ‘the way to do it.' He expected the line to attack, which would certainly have been more in the line of "Frederickian doctrine". It also seems that the Sanitz regiment, facing the French artillery was being badly disordered, and weakening his regiment's resolve.

However, there is a major problem with this story. The Altenburg was occupied by Ney's Grenadier battalion and part of the 25th Legere Regiment—conservatively around 2 battalions, so somewhere around 800 to 1,000 of Ney's elite troops.
This clearing of the wood is described by Bressonet thus: p. 161 of Apogee

"In the meanwhile, the battalion of grenadiers occupying Altenburg's small wood, and the rest of the 25th Légère had stayed with great difficulty in front of Grawert's right flank battalions but finally began to retreat.

Bressonet never says how the Prussians made it difficult for the French in the woods, or why they ‘began to retreat.' [So was it a complete retreat?] How did maybe 400 Schutzen and volunteers do this? Even if you include the Schutzen from the Hahn and Sack Grenadier battalions, you still only come up with a number less than the minimum numbers of French holding the Altenburg.

What I would think is obvious is that the Prussians had more skirmishers deployed to ‘make it difficult' for the French.

All through Bressonet you see this kind of semantically biased use of words and a lack of explanation in his descriptions concerning skirmish actions. When the Prussians take the village of Issertadt from the French, it is said to be "re-occupied" by the Prussians, [p.161], but when the French re-take it, they "succeeded in taking control of Issertadt's village."[p. 163] The French are never driven out of Isserstadt forest, the Prussians simply ‘follow' the French, who stop at its edge. [p. 161]

In each case, it is not clear how many are involved or who are the opponents, or if there was even any fighting.
And of course, it isn't clear how many skirmishers Sanitz regiment deployed or what they did, not counting Dyherrn's and Cerrini's brigades. It is curious, because the French place a large number of troops in the Isserstadt forest by Bressonet's count, something better than ten battalions over the course of the battle, but all that Bressonet ever has them fight are two worn-out Fusilier battalions and two Jager companies and some Schutzen.

In his study, Bressonet is understandably focused on the French, so that is who gets the detailed descriptions and often the Prussian actions are glossed over. However, it does leave open a lot of questions.

Let's look at the Hahn Grenadier battalion's actions, to the right of Hohenlohe's regiment.

The quote below is taken from Peter Hofschröer's article Tactics of the Prussian and Saxon Armies in the 1806 Campaign in Miniature Wargames No. 8 [available on-line]

Grenadier Battalion Hahn (Report of its commander, Major von Hahn)
Earlier in his report, Hahn mentions sending off his skirmisher sections to deal with French skirmishers taking cover in bushes. The Prussians were defeated [the Schutzen were lost. BH] and later in the battle, Hahn finds himself needing to deploy a skirmish element, but no longer has his 'Schuetzen'. This was how he took countermeasures against the French 'tirailleurs':

"On the left flank, the enemy skirmishers were continually pressing forwards and I feared that they would force themselves into the large gap there was between me and the first battalion of Hohenlohe. To counteract this, I placed my 8th platoon, and then also my 7th in this gap …" [This would have been ¼ of the battalion, or 150 men and the gap would have been in front of the Altenburg woods. BH]

This is an example of necessity forcing line troops to be deployed to deal with enemy skirmishers.
Those historians and writers who state that Prussian tactics had not changed since the days of Frederick are clearly misinformed and stories of Prussian 'inflexibility' can be dismissed as an exaggeration. The Prussians did have light troops although they were not used as effectively as they could have been and more of them were needed.

Bill

Bill,

The way you presented it inferred that I had quoted out of context. And that is not correct. Perhaps you should be much more clear on your intent. As it is written it is incorrect and you should fix that error.

K

10th Marines ….

"The way you presented it inferred that I had quoted out of context"

He may have implied that you quoted out of context, and/or you might have inferred it. But I am saying it, as cearly as I can. I hope I am being "clear on my intent" : you quoted out of context and/or with no context at all.

You offered exactly three quotes about the Russians : Duhesme (who never saw them), Surtees (who once saw them disembarking from ships) and Radetzsky, or more accurately Rothenberg's translation of a quote attributed by him to Radetzky.

The first two were clearly out of context, the third has no context at all, as you have never even seen the original document. For this third, you (and some other anglophone authors) actually re-wrote the original translation of Rothenburg, to name the Russians where they were not named in the original.

Stating that you did not offer quotes out of context is incorrect and you should fix that error.

I would not be surprised if what you have offered us about other nationalities is equally defective and equally misleading. This is an example of your errors undermining your credibility. That is very bad. I am sure that you expect more of yourself, and that you would wish to be seen as credible, and not as a biased and ill-informed cheerleader.

That you have not corrected your errors when they are pointed out to you indicates to me that you intend to mislead. That is also very bad, as I expected more of you.

Shane:
In response to Whirlwind's quote of Hofschroer, are you thinking that the Prussians/Grawert should have attempted to take Vierzehnheilingen with skirmishers, or simply screened the infantry with skirmishers? I guess it would be good to note how towns were taken in the battle.

The French didn't take Vierzehnheilingen or Isserstadt or Luzeroda with skirmishers. They attacked with formed troops. Closewitz on the other hand was surrounded by forests, so skirmishers drove out the Prussians.

I imagine to have had skirmishers stand out in the open against the French [somewhere between 2 and 4 battalions depending on the time]who were under cover in the town wouldn't have done any good… they already proved that with the 200 schutzen they sent out. Having skirmishers out doesn't necessarily protect the formed troops behind. The Quatre Bras example demonstrates that.

And Grawert only had four line battalions and a half battalion of grenadiers to take the place. How many skirmishers do you think would have been effective in the situation? Or maybe optimal?

Bill

The way you presented it inferred that I had quoted out of context. And that is not correct. Perhaps you should be much more clear on your intent. As it is written it is incorrect and you should fix that error.

K:
Okay, be glad to. The error. I may have mistaken the context, or "implied' something I didn't mean to. I try to be direct, and I am glad to admit my errors. I do make them…

So I guess, first off, what was the context. That is, what point were you making in quoting that page?

Second, what exactly did I say that communicated that I was implying you were quoting out of context? By out-of-context, that would mean the evidence didn't support the point you were trying to make? Of course, that is my view, not yours, so you may have a different meaning. And of course, I may well have been thinking of other issues when reading your post.

Bill

O

This is an example of necessity forcing line troops to be deployed to deal with enemy skirmishers.
Those historians and writers who state that Prussian tactics had not changed since the days of Frederick are clearly misinformed and stories of Prussian 'inflexibility' can be dismissed as an exaggeration.

This tells me that the Prussians use of their 3rd rankers' was "forced" in that although they "could" do it, they were reluctant to deploy them unless absolutely, "necessary" and even then this might not have been acted upon as shown by Whirlwind's quote.

The Prussians did have light troops although they were not used as effectively as they could have been and more of them were needed

This sentance goes further to prove my point…

Shane:
In response to Whirlwind's quote of Hofschroer, are you thinking that the Prussians/Grawert should have attempted to take Vierzehnheilingen with skirmishers, or simply screened the infantry with skirmishers? I guess it would be good to note how towns were taken in the battle.

As you know, the Prussians did not defend built up areas in 1806 as part of their deployment with formed troops. However, skirmishers usually were ordered to do such duties. But it does not stop the Prussians from ordering their formed troops to attack. But it is not my job here to explain what the Prussians "should" have done. You are asking my advice for what reason? I suspect it is to draw me into another argument so you can attempt to bring me down?

The French didn't take Vierzehnheilingen or Isserstadt or Luzeroda with skirmishers. They attacked with formed troops. Closewitz on the other hand was surrounded by forests, so skirmishers drove out the Prussians.

point being? That is pretty much standard practice. Once taken it is skirmishers whom normally would garrision a built up area.

I imagine to have had skirmishers stand out in the open against the French [somewhere between 2 and 4 battalions depending on the time]who were under cover in the town wouldn't have done any good… they already proved that with the 200 schutzen they sent out. Having skirmishers out doesn't necessarily protect the formed troops behind. The Quatre Bras example demonstrates that.

Yes true, especially when you could have deployed much more than 200 schuetzen, …say another 675 3rd rankers???

And Grawert only had four line battalions and a half battalion of grenadiers to take the place. How many skirmishers do you think would have been effective in the situation? Or maybe optimal?

180 – Shuetzen
675 – 3rd Rankers'

But then this would have depleted his original strength of his 4.5 btlns from 2700 men down to 1875 men. A very noticeable loss of strength in formed ranks. Knowing this I feel he was reluctant to do so because it would have seriously weakened his line. So instead, his line remained at 2520 men strong (roughly), a much more solid line. The consequence of this was that the French skirmishers shot him up…as PH explains.

Bill, not matter what slant you try to put on this or what spin you wish to throw into this debate the fact remains that the Prussians did not use their skirmishers optimally because of the fear they had that doing so would weaken their main lines. They were already outnumbered by the French 1.5:1 or more and felt that weakening their btln lines would have hastened their defeat.

My opinion is that if "every" 3rd rank of "every" btln in the Prussian army was utilized optimally they would have been able to withstand the relentless advances by the French skirmishers but at a cost they could not bring themselves to make. That is to weaken their main lines. If they had the Prussian army would have been defeated even more quickly because the French lines were also advancing relentlessly.

You want me to see your point of view which you are adamant is correct. That's fine but I simply do not agree with you. Why can you not accept this and just let me be? It is though you are trying to educate me when I and others here do not agree with you. I get accused of forcing facts down others throats and being unreasonable but now there seems to be a deafening silence that the shoe is on the other foot.

I am not going to be forced to agree with you so that your ego can be stroked. No offense meant here, I simply will not accept your point of view that is all.

Shane

Can anyone find proof of the use of the 3rd rank at the battle of Jena for any of the Prussian army on that day? Actual quotes that mention the deployment of the 3rd rank, not the Jagers, Fusiliers or Schuetzen…

I want ot know how widespread it actually was…

Dave Hollins,

I can see your point of view and understand what you are saying. Others, including Kevin have issues with Nosworthy that has forced me to caution myself when discussing his work. However, I still maintain that his contributions to the study of the micro level of a Napoleonic battle had shed valuable light onto the subject, especially from the viewpoint of a game designer wishing to more realistically emulate this level of a battle.

As for the argument regarding Bowden's work I cannot comment other than to say that maybe his earlier work had huge errors in it that were made when he was younger. Not trying to defend him but you usually become more wise with age. I would argue that you would have older published work where later you found mistakes that you regret? I dare say Scott would feel the same. You only have to look at his latest offering on Davout to see his work is magnificent to say the least.

Also, I mentioned many other authors whom you did not comment on, Muir, Dempsy Gill etc. I take it you approve of their work? I know there is a huge gap between the availability and quality of historical publications of the German side of the wars but this is slowly being rectified with work done by authors such as yourself and PH amongst others. Yes there are those who feel PH's conclusions are "iffy" or whatever, I get that. But the point remains that this is only going to get better with time as others step up to the plate.

I intend to move onto the Austrians use of light troops now so that we can get a better grasp on their utilisation, I hope you can help here? This will really help us understand them much more clearly. I would like to start with the Revolutionary wars and their influence in battle against the French, then focus on Marango and Hohenlinden in particular then Ulm and so on. I really think that the Ulm campaign is interesting because of the smaller actions that took place.

p.s. and to put your mind at ease I have not preconceived notions regarding the use of light troops in the Austrian army. So rest assured my intentions are not to ambush you but to learn. Yes this might lead to further debate or argument but from me at least my mind is a blank and open on this subject.

Shane wrote:

Bill, not matter what slant you try to put on this or what spin you wish to throw into this debate the fact remains that the Prussians did not use their skirmishers optimally because of the fear they had that doing so would weaken their main lines.

Shane:
What 'spin' is this? What slant am I putting on it? I don't remember ever suggesting that the Prussians used anything optimally, let alone their skirmishers, third rank, or not.

I did say that I wasn't sure what the optimum use of Prussian skirmishers could be before Vierzehnheigligen, whether 180 schutzen or 855 with the third rankers. I gave you the reasons why I wasn't sure. Out in the open, they could have been just that many more targets.

My ego isn't on the line with that question either way. There have been a lot of conclusions about what the Prussians did and didn't do at Jena like your last one:

As you know, the Prussians did not defend built up areas in 1806 as part of their deployment with formed troops. However, skirmishers usually were ordered to do such duties.

And often like this one I have asked for clarification. Who did defend built up areas with formed troops? Wouldn't they desperse them as the French did in Vierzehnheilingen?

Or do you mean that Prussian line troops weren't used to defend built up areas?

If the latter, is it my "point of view" to provide evidence that the Prussians and Saxons did defend built-up areas with line troops? The Prussians did use line troops to defend built up areas at Jena. For instance, half the Herwart Grenadiers were in Closewitz defending the town. Bressonet notes this on p. 161. I can give you more examples from the battle.

So where is the slant in this? The spin?

My opinion is that if "every" 3rd rank of "every" btln in the Prussian army was utilized optimally they would have been able to withstand the relentless advances by the French skirmishers but at a cost they could not bring themselves to make. That is to weaken their main lines. If they had the Prussian army would have been defeated even more quickly because the French lines were also advancing relentlessly.

You are welcome to your opinion--and as what you've just said isn't provable, that is a great place to have an opinion. I happen to share your opinion if I understand you right: you believe the Prussians would have been defeated even faster if they had deployed every 3rd ranker. So, their decision not to was the better alternative?

You want me to see your point of view which you are adamant is correct. That's fine but I simply do not agree with you.

I know you don't agree with me, though I am not sure you know what my point of view is… You seem to think I disagreed with you when you insist that the Prussians didn't use their 3rd Rank optimally.

Here is my 'point-of-view:'

Forget all the pronouncements about what the Prussians' doctrine said they should or shouldn't do, thought or didn't think, never did or didn't know how to do, could have done or were reluctant to do.

How about just sticking to what the evidence from the battle shows they actually did, what they actually accomplished? Any conclusions should be based on that, right?

For instance, how did the Prussians 'make it difficult' for 1,000 elite troops from Ney's Corps in Altenburg Woods. How did the Prussians succeed in clearing them out? There were probably 1500 infantry in Hohenlohe's regiment,and another 1200 in Hahn and Sack's Grenadier battalions facing the woods. So 2700 infantry. Just to match the French numbers the Prussians would have had to send 37% of all their infantry against the woods. Certainly volley fire didn't extract them from the woods when it couldn't push back the French tirailleurs from the open ground. So how did they do it?

My ego isn't riding on that answer, but I am fascinated. I have reviewed a great many of the conclusions concerning the Prussian army and its abilities in past and current histories. They generally don't help explain how the Prussians might have done it--and many make declarations that deny the possibility that it could have happened at all--like a lot of other statements about what the Prussians did and didn't do at Jena.

Yet, according to the evidence, they did. If you see that as simply 'my point of view', there is not much more I can say.

Bill

The one thing I have learned here on TMP over the last five years is that the more vocal you are, the more opinionated you are or the more your beliefs are the more you are then open to scrutiny, and so it should be.

Not that that is a bad thing but you become open to judgement, by others whom do not agree with you. Your are called on your views and are thus forced to defend your ground or walk away. This is all part of debating which can get heated at times. If it gets too hot some would leave while others will stand their ground more ferociously even if wrong. It becomes a "saving face" exercise. This is something I openly admit I have done in the past. But I tell you again, I will not be swayed by your opinion or supposed irrefutable evidence or the dismissal of all other evidence put forward by others. I stand by my beliefs Bill and that is it.

But I will also say that you do not like it that I will not bow to your knowledge. But in this case my opinion is that you are wrong. You cannot prove the Prussians optimally utilized their 3rd rankers. But there is a depth of evidence to say they did not. It takes more in a man to say he is wrong or allow others a point of view than it does to convince otherwise. I hope you understand this and just let it be. But I know you cannot and will not allow someone else the last word so this argument will continue to be circular as you try to defend your position and dismiss mine.

So be it.

Shane wrote:

Can anyone find proof of the use of the 3rd rank at the battle of Jena for any of the Prussian army on that day? Actual quotes that mention the deployment of the 3rd rank, not the Jagers, Fusiliers or Schuetzen…

I want ot know how widespread it actually was…

Shane:
I gave you two examples, Zwieffel and Sanitz's Brigade.

Montbé, A. von. Die kursächsischen Truppen im Feldzuge 1806. Dresden. 1860. p. 260 [Zwieffel on the 13th and 14th deploying their 3rd rank.]

Jany S. Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee encore zum Jahre 1807, Dritter Band 1763 encores 1807, Berlin 1929 pp. 494 and 495 [the 3rd rank of Zwieffel and Sanitz's brigade are deployed. Also mentioned is Hohenlohe's use of volunteers re-inforcing the schutzen 'several times.']

Other than the Grawert, Zastrow and Sanitz regiments, there are a number of points in the battle where skirmishers were deployed or would have had to be deployed, but which method isn't known.

For instance, after eleven, Napoleon sends the 16th Legere to flank the Altenburg woods and the 44th Ligne is ordered to detach a company of voltigeurs to 'observe and cover them.' Bressonet p.173. Which Prussians occupy the woods at that time is not clear at all, but obviously the French were not ready to recapture them just yet.

Or when Heudelet's Division joins the French offensive around twelve, Neherhof's Saxon brigade is on the Schnecke, with Boguslawski's Fusiliers and Masars' and Kronhelm's cos of Jagers at the bottom of the Isserstadt valley. When the 7th Legere contacts them through the woods, a 'violent battle' begins. Belivalqua's battalion and Niesemeuschel's 2nd battalion of line troops move down move down to the same position to 'back' the skirmishers. So, how were they doing this?

Later, Niesemeuschel's and Belivalqua's battalions "unprotected evacuated the clumps of trees and quickly retreated , sweeping along in their retreat the jagers of Boguslawski's detachment." Bressonet pp. 183-184.

There are a great number of similar descriptions in Bressonet, tantalizing, but vague skrimish actions. What were two line battalions doing fighting ahead of Boguslawski's Jagers in clumbs of trees, so the Jagers could be swept along in the Battalions' retreat? Was this the third ranks of the battalions only or were the battalions totally committed skirmishing?

Not clear at all. Most narratives don't give much attention to skirmishing actions, let alone note how skirmishers were deployed or how many.

Bill

Hi Bill,

Your last line I can totally agree with. This is why I am so passionate about the subject.

Thank you for grouping those citations together, this helps me gain a clearer picture so that I can more accurately qualify and quantify what I need to do in my system. Please understand that as a game designer I cannot sit on the fence as someone else previous explained. I need quantification on things like this so that it is transformed into rules mechanics that players must adhere to. This is not always possible if the evidence is vague or non-existent but I am sure you understand my reasoning?

Shane

Bill,

You made the comment, I believe, that there wasn't evidence of Grawert standing in the open delivering volley fire against French infantry in covered and concealed positions. The material I quoted from Bressonet states exactly the opposite. That was the context it was in and how I quoted it.

K

Anglophone: consisting of or belonging to an English-speaking population especially in a country where two or more languages are spoken.

Now what was the point about 'Anglophone author(s) supposed to mean or more basic, what is your point?

K

10th Marines ….

The translation of the alleged quote from Radetzky was first published here :
Napoleon's Greatest Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army by Gunther Rothenberg (1982)

The alleged quote has then appeared or been referenced in various expanded forms in these four books, which either cite each other or the 1982 book by Rothenburg. It is in this process of creative re-quoting of Rothenburg that the Russians become specifically named.

The British Light Infantry Arm 1790-1815 by David Gates (1987)
Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon by Rory Muir (1988)
Redcoat: the British soldier in the age of horse and musket‎ by Richard Holmes (2002)
Once There Were Titans: Napoleon's Generals and Their Battles 1800-1815‎ by Kevin Kiley (2007)

These books are in the English language. None credit a translator. Thus we can conclude the Rothenburg, Gates, Muir, Holmes and Kiley are "belonging to an English-speaking population".

In the original translation offered by Rothenburg the Russians were not even named: "operations en tirailleure[sic] can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting." The identification of "we" in the original Radetzky document is not provided by Rothenburg. Rothenburg was himself writing about only the Austrians.

This can be compared to the later sexed-up expansions and inventive applications of the alleged quote, such as this drum-beating pro-French myth-spinning drivel from, for example, Kiley: "Radetzky observed that neither the Austrians nor the Russians understood fighting in open order and believed that skirmishers could be used in a very small, limited way. The conclusion that was reached was that the Austrians were not the equal of the French when fighting in open order."

You offered the quote here with reference to the Russians. You cited Muir here, whose re-casting of the alleged quote includes the Russians. But the Russians were not included in the first version, by Rothenburg, which Muir gives as his source.

Your failure to understand and provide the context for the quote that you offered here could not be more plain. The Russians were not even named in the original publication of the quote. Their inclusion was a later addition. If you had made even the most passing effort to offer the quote in context, you would have realized this. But, like the other two quotes you provided about the Russians, you offered the Radetzky "quote" out of context.

You offered three total quotes about the Russians. All three were very clearly out of context. Your repeated protests that you do not post out of context quotes are thus incorrect and you should fix that error.

Context:

1. The parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage that can throw light on its meaning.

2. The interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs.

'Out of Context'

'The practice of quoting out of context, sometimes referred to as "contextomy" or "quote mining", is a logical fallacy and a type of false attribution in which a passage is removed from its surrounding matter in such a way as to distort its intended meaning.'

'Arguments based on this fallacy typically take two forms. As a straw man argument, which is frequently found in politics, it involves quoting an opponent out of context in order to misrepresent their position (typically to make it seem more simplistic or extreme) in order to make it easier to refute. As an appeal to authority, it involves quoting an authority on the subject out of context, in order to misrepresent that authority as supporting some position.'

I submit that hasn't been done here and the accusation itself is either a form of an historic fallacy, or in itself a strawman argument.

K

The problem of this discussion is
only McLaddie and justonemore are willing to invest a lot of work in it, Shane, 10thM obviously are not able to read any German source about this topic.
Elting shows, in case his quote is correct, that he had not the slightest clue about the Prussian Army of 1806 otherwise he would not have written such an utter nonesense.
Shane in case you want to know – read German sources, otherwise you want to know – don't be offended when competent people come up with a lot of information you seemingly don't like to hear.

10th Marines ….

"The practice of quoting out of context …. a passage is removed from its surrounding matter in such a way as to distort its intended meaning. …. in order to misrepresent that authority as supporting some position."

Three quotes from you about Russians :

1. Duhesme : writng about the one half-strength jäger regiment in the descent on Holland in 1799 (which Duhesme had never seen) : offered here by you as informative about the general performance of Russian light infantry in the Napoleonic Wars

2. Surtees : writng about the one half-strength jäger regiment in the descent on Holland in 1799 (which Surtees had seen exactly once, marching past him after their landing) : offered here by you as informative about the general performance of Russian light infantry in the Napoleonic Wars

3. Radetzky (attributed) : quoted in translation by Rothenburg in a work about the Austrians, the original text does not name the Russians : offered here by you as informative about the general performance of Russian light infantry in the Napoleonic Wars

Thus you have quoted out of context three times, out a total of three comments about the Russians – 100% out of context. That is very bad – it is an error that you should fix.

===============================

Shane ….

I am comfortable in English, French, Russian and Spanish. My German is OK. I have passable reading comprehension in Dutch, Flemish, Italian, Portuguese and Catalans. I struggle more with Swedish, Finnish, Norwegian, Serbian, Polish and the various Baltic languages, but can usually get enough from a text by myself to know if I then need to get it properly translated.

It took a while to learn all these, as I grew up in an English and French speaking family.

Von Winterfeld is right – you are missing so much if you don't read the original sources in the original languages. I think you have as much or more passion for this history as I do. I eagerly suggest you learn the various languages and concentrate on the original sources. Also, you will actually save a lot of money – the original sources are usually either free or not-for-sale archive items.