"Skirmish Doctrine gathering " Topic

Justonemore:

Actually, only the British managed the real trick – have all the light infantry duties done well and with few men relative to the size of the total force.

The French went early to the "use a lot of men" approach, perhaps out of necessity. They regularized it, more or less, later – but the approach was the same.

J:
I agree that the French did use lots of skirmishers, but what makes you think that the British didn't, or at least less than the French…and were successful in doing so?

Bill

I am very curious as to why the Austrians used Grenadiers as a "stop gap" light infantry. My only explanation for this is because maybe:

1/ They were mostly in the reserve sitting in the second or third line so bringing them forward as light troops was ideal in that the main front battle line was not depleted?

2/ That they had possibly (on average) more experience in each individual thus better suited to the role as light troops who would keep their cool under such dangerous conditions?

I have read that the French would at times (when the need arose) throw out Grenadiers even in the Old Guard I have read this. This would have been more so because of a lack of integral light troops I gather.

Radetzky's quote is found in documents from the Army of Bohemia, made in 1813. Radetzky is the Chief-of-Staff, not a commander of a army or corps. He is editoralizing and reommending a course of action regarding a specific situation, not a conclusion regarding all Russian and Austrian troops for the entire war. Here is part of what Frayer wrote on the TMP page October of last year.

Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon,‎ by Rory Muir (1988), page 51

"By 1813 the Austrians had virtually given up, believing that the great bulk of their infantry lacked the training and aptitude needed for the the role. As Radetzky observed in September 1813, 'fighting en tirailleure [skirmishing] should be done only in a very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the manière de tirailleur.'" [actual quote]

This passage in Muir is footnoted as follows:

"Quoted in Gunther E. Rothenberg, Napoleon's Greatest Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army (London, Batsford, 1982), p.184. Austria had, of course, lost her traditional source of light infantry when Napoleon annexed Croatia (part of the Illyrian Provinces) in 1809."

In Rothenberg (page 111 in later edition, page 184 in the first edition), the text reads: "Rigidly controlled and regimented, the Austrian skirmishers rarely were the equal to the French. Some observers blamed this on national aptitude. The able Radetzky, probably the best young general to come out of these wars, observed ruefully that ''operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting.'

A German officer, on the other hand, argued that it was not national character but 'too much drill' that made the Austrians less effective skirmishers than the French."
Only the parts in bold are the Radetzky material. The rest is not. Incidentally, "en tirailleure" is mangled French. It should be "en tirailleur". Also, "manière de tirailleur" is not actually idiomatic French. It appears only in these English-language books, as far as I know.

The British Light Infantry Arm 1790-1815, by David Gates (1987) has the version as per Muir (who himself cites Rothenburg, who has the other version). Redcoat: the British soldier in the age of horse and musket‎ by Richard Holmes (2002) also has this version. Both spell "tirailleur" correctly, though Muir and Rothenburg do not.

Once There Were Titans: Napoleon's Generals and Their Battles 1800-1815‎ by Kevin Kiley (2007) offered a paraphrase that expanded the quote attributed to Radetzky with an assertion of his "belief" and "the conclusion".
"The Austrian General Radetzky observed that neither the Austrians nor the Russians understood fighting in open order and believed that skirmishers could be used in a very small, limited way. The conclusion that was reached was that the Austrians were not the equal of the French when fighting in open order."

All these trace to a citation something like "KAV Alte Feldakten 1813 Deutschland Hauptarmee F/10 436b". I can find no prior citation of this source prior to the anglophone authors listed above – first in 1982 or 1987 (depending on which version you are looking at). Since they have substantially different versions, I assume both Gates and Rothenburg saw the text in the original language.

"KAV" is a little odd. Better would be something like "Österreichisches Staatsarchiv / Kriegsarchiv Wien", but these are all written by anglophones who call the place "Vienna". For a document in September, one would have expected "Faszikel IX" (not "F/10", as they are monthly and should use Roman numerals), but perhaps the piece was filed by date of receipt, or lumped in with Leipzig documents, or some such. The number "436b" tells us that it was about the 437th document of the month under the given heading.

Specifically, the "b" should indicate that the document was inserted in the sequence sometime after the original transfer of documents from the war ministry to the archives. Good "Germanic" organization skills!

In any case, the Radetzky quote is from a General Staff Order (that's what's in those document files), from the staff of the Army of Bohemia.

It was not an analytical comment, not a summary judgment voiced in retrospect, not a considered opinion, not a part of a staff history, nor anything similar. I have no idea what the original document said, not least because it is quoted in two different versions. The Gates version looks much more plausible to me, although it appeared in print some 5 years after the Rothenburg version. Still unless we have the original (in German? in French for the benefit of the Russians?), we really have no idea of the exact meaning (or of who mangled the French language).

What we do know is that it applied (only) to the Army of Bohemia just before Leipzig.

What we also do know is the size of the "specialist" light infantry of the Army of Bohemia, which amounted overall to 317 battalions, 167 squadrons and 72 batteries outside of the Russian/Prussian Guard.
With the Austrian divisions -
-- 5 Austrian Jager battalions
-- 10 Grenz battalions
With the Graf Vitgenshteyn -
-- 16 Russian Jager battalions (all still in the process of rebuilding with conscripts after the 1812 and early 1813 campaign)
-- 1 Prussian Schützen battalion (equivalent)
Total of 32 battalions, or about 10% of the infantry
The specialist light infantry arm was clearly very understrength (and mostly raw recruits for the Russians). The usual Russian ratio was 33% light infantry. So,

whatever Radetzky ordered, it was aimed mostly at the use of recently re-built, rather ill-trained conscript "heavy" "line" infantry units in the skirmishing role. There is no general comment being made, no comparison to the French, no element of national characteristics that can obviously and clearly taken as Radetzky's meaning (re-read the text in bold above), unless one has already decided (in advance) that this is what you wish he had said.

The Russians understood the problem and played along. The Graf Raevskiy detached whole Grenadier regiments (experienced, selected men) from the Reserve to act as skirmishers and help make up a more typical ratio. Assumedly Radetzky approved, right?

I think it is obvious how a quote can be passed around without the original context being considered or even known.

Bill H.

Shane wrote:

I am very curious as to why the Austrians used Grenadiers as a "stop gap" light infantry. My only explanation for this is because maybe:

1/ They were mostly in the reserve sitting in the second or third line so bringing them forward as light troops was ideal in that the main front battle line was not depleted?

2/ That they had possibly (on average) more experience in each individual thus better suited to the role as light troops who would keep their cool under such dangerous conditions?

Shane:
those could be reasons certainly. During the wars ALL nations used grenadiers as skirmishers when it suited their needs.

I have read that the French would at times (when the need arose) throw out Grenadiers even in the Old Guard I have read this. This would have been more so because of a lack of integral light troops I gather.

Possibly, or it could be a dozen other situational reasons, including committing the Guard to tip the balance in a skirmish the very same way they were used to secure a victory in close-formation engagements.

The British committed their regular center companies of their Guard to skirmishing in the Peninsula and even at Waterloo around the Hougomount. The Russians committed all three battalions of the Pavolski Grenadier [Guard] Regiment to skirmishing in woods the entire day at Lutzen. Of course the Austrians committed grenadiers to skirmishing just as the French did. It was common practice before the Napoleonic Wars. Frederick the Great does it at Lobositz against the Austrian Croats on his left flank.

Everyone skirmished at one time or another, Militia, volunteers and Frei companies, regular line troops, light troops, grenadiers, guard units, even dragoons.

It is just a matter of who was making the decision, who were available, and how well they did once committed. And this is true from 1792 to 1815. Obviously, the efforts to increase and maintain light specialist troops says that trained, experienced light infantry men were the soldiers of choice, often following the following progression of committment: Lights, Grenadiers, Line, and militia.

This kind of decision is what Radesky is making in 1813. Because of the level of ability among the new soldiers in the Army of Bohemia, he is chosing to use grenadiers. A tactical choice, just as it was a tactical choice to have Moscow Militia skirmish at Borodino, or the 8 companies at Quatre Bras. This idea that somehow certain troops were never asked to skirmish if skirmishers were needed just isn't borne out by the evidence.

Bill

This idea that somehow certain troops were never asked to skirmish if skirmishers were needed just isn't borne out by the evidence.

I do agree, if he has a firearm, two feet and a heart beat he can skirmish, there is no question about it. However, his effectiveness at being thrown out into such a dangerous undertaking is the real question. Certainly early armies of the period had a much less overall ability and understanding to skirmish than mid to late period. Every nation went through an evolution and reform which is typical of the evolutionary process of any progressive state.

My contention is that pre 1800 the individual ability or effectiveness of army's to skirmish was either non-existent or poor to adequate to good dependant on many circumstances facing a particular army. This even drills down to the individual general in charge and his like or dislike for skirmishing. Those soldiers that had commanders who had a dislike or distaste for such warfare were put at a disadvantage when confronted by an enemy who had a commander who had a liking for skirmisher combat or doctrine that enabled the training for it and visa versa.

I personally feel that French regiments sent to Spain when fresh and new had major problems with guerrilla combat and skirmish combat. It took time, effort and lots of mistakes before a regiment in Spain became competent in such combat. I also think that when these regiments marched back to central Europe they were a cut above the rest for their efforts. Now of course this does not mean armies in central Europe had no idea regarding skirmish combat but the level of "on the job" training in which these regiments had to survive really honed their skills. I see Spain as a continuous training group for all the combatants involved. A revolving door for gaining experience, experimenting and evolving combat skills for all involved.

This was not so the case for armies facing each other in central Europe where it could be years before called upon to fight again. And even then the combatants were more so fresh new conscripts in all armies anyway. 1812 was a great training ground for all forces involved but by the end of that campaign most of the men involved were dead. 1813 resulted in mass conscription on all sides and reforming fresh units. The black hole of skill, training and experience must have been hugely apparent for the commanders involved and it shows in their reports.

However, the campaigns of 1813-14 did result in the eventual honing of skills in these men in the end. Those that survived could only learn and adapt through building experience.

Basically I break up the ability to skirmish in armies as follows:

Traditionally Trained Army's – These are army's trained on the Prussian or Fredrekian style of warfare. Linear tactics with specialized units forming the main skirmisher forces such as, Jagers, Schuetzen and Fusiliers. Non-specialized skirmishers are the 3rd rankers, flankers and any other formations known to have skirmished.

Revolutionary Trained Army's – These are the reformed or Columnar style army's which see the attack column and clouds of skirmishers (amongst other tactics) as the key influence-rs of their tactical make-up. specialized skirmishers in this category are, Carabiniers, Voltiguers, Chasseurs, Light btlns and so on. The non-specialized light troops tend to be, Grenadiers, centre companies and any and all conscripts etc. Their level of ability to skirmish depends on their experience, training and doctrine but every soldier in these army's can skirmish to one degree or another. However, the non-specialized skirmishers with little or no training will be usually very poor at it and suffer negatives in game mechanics such as morale reductions etc.

Shane

Dave,

I understand your points about Radetzky's motives and 'angle' – and the same with Rothenberg. But even when we discount for this, on reading it we must ask ourselves:

1. Was he completely wrong or is there at least an element of truth in what he said?

2. If there is an element of truth in it, how much?

3. How far can we feel – in lieu of further sources – that we may apply his comment to other Austrian forces?

Perhaps you feel confident enough to have a stab at these?

Regards

justonemore,

Thanks for your comments on the 'Russian' aspect. IIRC a thread a while ago went into the question of the skirmishing ability of Russian infantrymen – I'm going to find it at the weekend and compare it with your comments.

Regards

I am not sure that Rothenberg has seen the original docs – many of his citations are taken from Staff Histories and other major works from the the late 19th century. The Staff Histories were written at a time after Austria had receiving a severe beating from Prussia, Radetzky was something close to God (personally, I think the guy was able, but rather fond of himself – he is average alongside Schmitt and Mayer; R's behaviour in 1800 was a disgrace). The Prussians loved total war and aggressive approaches, which the historians also attributed to N, hence the critiques of Austrian inadequacies in our era. I haven't checked this quote, but it may well come from the printed works.

There is also an element of "I won, despite inadequate tools" – Leipzig was won by army management, not local tactics. It is what we would call "spin" these days laying the ground.

However, it is certainly true that Russia aside, Austrian troops had only spent 7 months on campaign between Xmas 1800 and August 1813. As we all know, if you work with people over some time, you become more effective and you don't need so much control/direction to work together. Skirmishing is hard for new troops, because they do have that experience and the confidence it brings, which would be equally true of the army in Italy. There werecprobably elements in the post-Charles army pressing for more "French" tactics and this could be a conservative R trying to rein them in, much as the orders had to go out in 1794 about only a 1/3 skirmishing.

I suspect it would need a good study of the tactics used in the Liberation War campaigns to see how the army performed, but whether there is enough material, I do not know.

Shane wrote:

My contention is that pre 1800 the individual ability or effectiveness of army's to skirmish was either non-existent or poor to adequate to good dependant on many circumstances facing a particular army. This even drills down to the individual general in charge and his like or dislike for skirmishing. Those soldiers that had commanders who had a dislike or distaste for such warfare were put at a disadvantage when confronted by an enemy who had a commander who had a liking for skirmisher combat or doctrine that enabled the training for it and visa versa.

Shane:
When you say "effectiveness of army's to skirmish was either non-existent or poor to adequate to good dependant on many circumstances facing a particular army", I can agree with the idea that there was a range of abilities among different units.

However, the idea that there were units where skirmishing was 'non-existent' doesn't work from what I have seen. It is like saying a unit's ability to form line was non-existent. Know of any examples where a general decided that an ability to skirmish was 'non-existent'? Even Radezsky doesn't say that, but rather only a few skirmishers should be thrown out. The unit's lack of experience and training could certainly curtail its ability to be effective, but 'non-existent?'

Then again, there is the problem with the pre-Napoleonic and Napoleonic armies viewing skirmish combat as something done by poorer, undisciplined troops. The volunteers and Friecorps, the Cossacks and Grenz.

My view is that all troops could skirmish, just as all troops on the battlefield could form column and line… or what good were they…why have them on the field at all? Even the untrained Russian Moskow Militia skirmishes at Borodino and does decent service until it runs out of ammo.
Supposedly that is why the French first turned to mass skirmishing, because they couldn't do anything else, being mostly untrained… So how can there be units that have a 'non-existent' ability to skirmish?

How about some battalions that couldn't even form line from column, let alone anything else? Here is the solution to that connudrum by an officer with two such battalions, formed of a motley crew of POWs, raw recruits and volunteers. You may have seen this. From the history of the Legion du Nord, first formed a little before this incident.

Skirmishing during the combat at Dirschau on 23rd February 1807.

In October 1806, Lazare-Claude Coqueugniot became major and commander of the newly formed 1. Légion du Nord, whose four battalions were raised mainly from Poles amongst the Prussian prisoners of war. He writes about the combat at Dirschau (today Tczew in Poland, south of Danzig) on 23rd February 1807:

I could not maneuver my troops by column, nor deploy them, because my troop knew nothing and [chef de bataillon and commander of the 2nd batallion] Roumette was probably the only officer who knew something about maneuvers. I brought together the officers of the 2nd Battalion to inform that I intended to throw the whole battalion forward in skirmish order towards the front of the enemy line, which appeared to be patiently waiting for us.

I directed them to explain to their troops that, when a soldier was going to fire, he should move forward 20 paces [12,9 m] and then to get between two furrows to reload his musket, fire, and continue to advance in the same manner. After this, upon a musket shot, which I had indicated as the signal for movement, the companies scattered as they ran forward. Their fire was heavy and the skirmishers continuously advanced.

After a half-hour I saw, by the clearing of the smoke, that the enemy was maneuvering by platoon. The cavalry wished to charge, but I opposed it. I advanced the mounted troops, with four companies of the 3rd Battalion. This movement fired the audacity of the skirmishers, who threw themselves against the enemy. The enemy withdrew, in disorder, to return to the village, abandoning its [four] cannons, which the skirmishers captured.

This passage is an extract from the English translation of Coqueugniot's history of the Légion du Nord, done by George Nafziger and published in the Nafziger Collection with the title "The Légion du Nord, 1806-1808, Memoir of Major Coqueugniot.". The French version, "Histoire de la Légion du Nord 1806-1808. Memoire de L.C. Coqueugniot, Major.", has been republished in 1992 by Bernard Coppens in the Editions Bernard Coppens.

If any unit is a candidate for a 'non-skirmisher' based on training and experience, that is it, but they successfully skirmish anyway.

Bill

Wonderful discussion folks. I do enjoy your quotes and your arguments.

However, not only is there sufficient evidence, but it doesn't take a Rocket scientist to determine that ANY unit could skirmish. Many units did skirmish. Some units were proficient at skirmishing.

The Napoleonic Wars covered what? About 20 years.

In those 20 years how many of you feel that a given unit managed to attain and maintain exactly the same level of proficiency? Such a position is silly. Based on experience, losses, leadership (which died, retired and transferred) a unit's effectiveness would vary.

Certainly a unit's propensity to skirmish, and ability to skirmish would also vary. I think you cannot discount the prejudices of the immediate commander and higher command when considering this matter.

For my part, I think rules should be less restrictive on the 'ability' of a unit to engage in skirmish formations/tactics and perhaps focus more on the units 'skirmishing proficiency'. Then let the cards fall where they may on the battle field.

Certainly if a commander chooses to skirmish an entire unit that is not proficient in skirmishing, he is going to play hob trying to reform or maneuver that unit. You may want your rules to reflect this if you want to get into this kind of detail.

Well thanks again for all the discussion.

Bill,

I appreciate your response but you seem to have focused in on a single word in my post. "non-existent". I never said that units could not skirmish at all. My words were that their ability or effectiveness was that:

of army's to skirmish was either non-existent or poor to adequate to good dependant on many circumstances facing a particular army. This even drills down to the individual general in charge and his like or dislike for skirmishing. Those soldiers that had commanders who had a dislike or distaste for such warfare were put at a disadvantage when confronted by an enemy who had a commander who had a liking for skirmisher combat or doctrine that enabled the training for it and visa versa.

You have taken what I have said out of context. Of course all troops could skirmish, I have already stated this previously. My meaning is that their ability or effectiveness was (at times) curtailed by their own commanders dislike for that style of combat. For example, the Prussians of 1806 had the use of the 3rd ranker's at their disposal but several regiments failed to use them. The officers did not detach them at all. They were either not confident in this kind of combat or saw no valid reason for their deployment. So the unit's ability to detach them was non-existent therefore their effectiveness as skirmishers was non-existent, not that they physically could not skirmish. That's not what I meant. I will remember to chose my words more carefully next time.

Shane:
If I have taken it out of context, it wouldn't be the first time I have done something like that.

It appeared that when you said: "of army's to skirmish was either non-existent or poor to adequate to good," that you were stating an heirarchy of

good
adequate
poor
non-existent

I had no problem with the top three, so of course, I didn't focus on those. ;-7

For example, the Prussians of 1806 had the use of the 3rd ranker's at their disposal but several regiments failed to use them. The officers did not detach them at all.

Well, I think this is still a johnny one-note view of skirmish practices. For instance, Hohenlohe wrote instructions on the use of 3rd rank for skirmishing in 1803 and the regiments in his inspectorate practiced it.

However, at Jena, the colonel of Hohenlohe's own regiment deployed several groups of volunteers to support his schutzen [probably 240 or more men] and then later two companies as skirmishers to cover his flank.[another 400 or so] A conservative count makes that about 25% of his entire two battalions…but he didn't deploy the third rank. And his regiment was in the middle of the Prussian line.

I think you will find that most of the Prussian/Saxon regiments did deploy skirmishers apart from their schutzen at Jena. And if a regiment's commander decided not to… that doesn't necessarily mean it had anything to do with the officers' confidence in the ability of their battalions…lots of other battle circumstances could lead to that decision. Again that is assuming that it was actually the regimental colonel and not the brigade commander deciding when and how skirmishers were deployed. Which in at least two instances was the case.

Like the British or the French etc. etc., the Prussians before and after used a variety of methods in deploying skirmishers, not just one way.

Bill H.

that doesn't necessarily mean it had anything to do with the officers' confidence in the ability of their battalions…lots of other battle circumstances could lead to that decision. Again that is assuming that it was actually the regimental colonel and not the brigade commander deciding when and how skirmishers were deployed. Which in at least two instances was the case.

Bill,

Of course, that goes without saying. The reason not to deploy skirmishers could be for other reasons also. But it seems you agree that there were cases where the 3rd rankers were not deployed in 1806? You obviously have read this somewhere also?

I have actually read somewhere that several regiments failed to deploy them in the 1806 campaign even when they were integrally part of the btlns. I cannot find the passages right now but they do exist.

just two passages I have found already :

General Scharnhorst

"The physical ability and high intelligence of the common man enables the French to profit from all advantages offered by the terrain and the general situation, while the phlegmatic Germans … form on open ground and do nothing but what their officer orders them to do."

This is Scharnhorst explaining that the Germans were phlegmatic and did not really understand the use of light troops. Thus the understanding of the use of terrain, cover and protection. They were so used to fighting in linear formations that they took this into the open when skirmishing. The specialized Jagers and Schutzen would be an entirely different story I have no doubt. But I am guessing he is speaking about the use of the 3rd rank here.

von Freytag-Loringhoven,

"The Prussian infantry at one time took the Frederician maxim of marching boldly upon the enemy too literally, and insisted that skirmishing is the mark of a coward." They were wrong, skirmishing required energy, stamina, imagination and initiative.

Now this guy is pulling no punches. He is telling it like it is. That the Prussian use of and adherence to linear tactics went so far as to mark skirmishing as a cowardly way to conduct warfare in an age of honour and glory. It was not until the later reforms and a crushing campaign defeat in 1806 that they were shocked into understanding the advantages that light infantry gave the French.

Yes the Prussians had light troops, yes they used them but they did not like this style of warfare early on (overall) and no attempt was made to improve or match the French on the battlefields in 1806. They were caught with their pants down in this campaign when it comes to the utilization of light troops. Many factors come into play here, honour and the thought that skirmishing is cowardly. Lack of experience in training Prussian officers, lack of skill in the men because of that, outnumbered 2:1 and even outmoded reliance on linear tactics to win the day.

At Jena they were outnumbered 2:1 so the number of French light troops must have been overwhelming. I would think that this could be one very important reason why the Prussians did not match the French in light troops and those that did were completely out-matched in numbers.

Even PH in his Osprey book on Prussian Light Infantry on page 5 explains that by 1806 on the battlefields of Jena and Auerstadt there was less need for the deployment of light troops because the terrain on these fields was so open thus making them vulnerable.

I am not advocating that the Prussians were lousy at skirmishing or that they could not. In Fact I am saying they were ahead in the race but in 1806 there were many factors that minimized the their deployment and use.

I am going to try to search for the quotes that explained the failure of certain Prussian regiments to deploy skirmishers at Jena.

Shane

Shane:
You have raised several issues here that could be related, but are different and require individual responses:

1. The two quotes you give speak of the character of the Germans, and the "The physical ability and high intelligence of the common man enables the French…" Are the Germans less intelligent or physically able?

2. The German attitude towards skirmishing. That they insist on following orders and see skirmishing as a cowardly behavior.

3. Regardless of what others say are the abilities or prejudices of the Prussians, what they actually did at Jena and Auerstadt is what is telling.

4. "on the battlefields of Jena and Auerstadt there was less need for the deployment of light troops because the terrain on these fields was so open thus making them vulnerable."

I can't speak to the terrain of Auerstadt, but the battlefield of Jena was definitely NOT open, and Peter H. should have known that. Even Napoleon makes the conjested nature of the terrain central to his battle plans at Jena. Clauswitz, in his study of the battle, points that out as vital issue in the battle.

I'll have to tackle each one of those points separately.

Bill

Bill,

I don't think they are saying that the Prussians lacked intelligence. They are stating what they see and it has nothing to do with making them look stupid or cowardly. It is a declaration of the mentality of the time and how they saw things. This has a lot to do with their current understanding and experience in skirmish combat at that time.

Let me make this perfectly clear. I am in NO way declaring that the French were smart and the Prussians were dumb. Nor am I declaring that the French were brave and the Prussians cowards.

I personally am not saying the Prussians were anything but brave soldiers. They fought according to how they were trained and their beliefs. If "von Freytag-Loringhoven" says that fighting as skirmishers is the mark of a coward or Scharnhorst is saying they were intellectually incapable of such a style of warfare at the time then this is probably just how they saw them and their assessment on them at the time.

History is full of situations where an army with all of the right resources, weaponry and equipment was defeated by an army they felt they were better than. The Prussians of 1806 (especially the higher rank officers) felt that the French could not defeat the might of Prussia. Even Tzar Alexander was confident that Prussia might be able to do what they failed to do a year earlier. This army had all of the boxes ticked such as tradition, honor & glory, will to fight, bravery, even skirmish ability but did not utilize these resources effectively. They were like a world champion fighter who seeing his opponent as a young rookie waved away the threats he might pose. When the punches came thick and fast the champion fighter had no answer, he was punch drunk and inevitably would lose. The Prussian army was not a poor army, it had all the right stuff and could have easily fought the French to at least a standstill or even defeat them if given the chance. The problem was the commanders did not exhibit enough caution to be wary of its opponent, they were cocky. They failed to utilize their resources efficiently and got beaten. This included the use of skirmishers.

We all know how the Prussians had an extensive number of men capable of skirmish tactical use. Jagers, Schuetzen, Fusiliers and 3rd Ranker's etc but in 1806 their use was not so great. The were outfought and defeated by their French counterparts and quotes from various Prussian eyewitnesses as above give credibility to this. PH in his Osprey book actually admits that by 1806 the Prussians lacked the experience and know-how when it comes to skirmisher use in 1806 and gives the reason for their lack of ability to the differential between both the French and Prussian skirmisher ability.

I am merely pointing out that the French had a propensity towards skirmishing that increased with time which by 1806 was at its pinnacle of expertise. On the other hand, the Prussians, also very capable of skirmish tactics and actually probably ahead of the utilization of specialized skirmish infantry in the use of their Jagers etc were still behind in the utilization of numbers and overall acceptance of skirmisher tactics. The use of the quotes are to back up my point that the Prussians did not see skirmishing at the same level of honor and nor did they have the same experience and ability as the French in 1806. PH himself says this in the very same book. And I do believe he does know a great deal about the Prussian army.

As for the battlefield of Jena I will have to disagree there. The Prussians had hoped to engage the French before they could debouch from the forests but failed. The French were worried of being caught if the Prussians acted quickly. However, the French did manage to push forward into the more open ground and continued to push the Prussians back throughout the battle over open ground.

The region between the towns of Kleinromstedt, Isserstedt, Altengom and Lutzeroda is VERY open other than the woods between Isserstedt and Lutzeroda. And when the fighting falls back to Grossromstedt it is even more open. sorry but I do not agree with you on this.

Is it a joke that the "germans" ddi see skirmishing as a cowardly behaviour? It must be so – and a bad one as well.

All major powers in Germany – had skirmishers from the start of the Napoleonic wars, the French learned it from the Austrians, numerous regulations and how to use skirmishers and light infantry were written in German and not at least German skirmishers did very well in the AWI (Hessian Jäger).

To insist on following order – must be true for all armies – also in Napoleon's.

Schlieffen quoting on Hohenlohe's men facing French skirmishers are Jena:

"The French infantry hidden in the fields and behind hedges and walls, directed…accurate fire at the Prussian and Saxon battalions, lined up like practice targets that couldn't be missed, that by the numbers, from left to right, fired one ineffective volley after another"

Where are the Prussian light troops? This is clear proof to me that Hohenlohe's lines were in fact void of skirmishers of his own and thus open to French skirmisher fire and mown down like skittles. Their only response was to open their own coordinated volley's that proved to ineffectual against an enemy they could not clearly see. And they continued to do so regardless.

Why? we know they had their own light troops, Jagers, Fusiliers, schuetzen and even 3rd ranker's so why no mention of them countering the French?

Peter Paret goes on to say:

"Clearly Hohenlohe should not have attacked. But once his lines faced infantry in open order, the prevailing doctrine, as Schieffen notes, left the Prussian lines helpless"

I will tell you why they failed. Not that they lacked the ability to counter the French light troops for it is clear the Prussians had the men trained as lights to do it. But their deployment and utilization was not appreciated by senior commanders who were still deeply embedded with linear style warfare from 30 years previously and saw no real advantage in their utilization and thus they failed to counter the French as they should have.

The senior Prussian officers of 1806 were the exact same men who 30 years earlier were junior officers under Frederick. They still had deeply impressed memories of how battles were fought in those days and had felt that that was the winning formula thirty years ago so why should it fail now against such an upstart like Napoleon. We will do the job that the Russians and Austrians could not do!! we will show them.

This arrogance destroyed an army that was in my opinion MORE than capable of defeating the French in 1806 provided it was utilized efficiently. It was not, simple as that.

I am setting myself up here I know and I am going to be seen as a Prussian hater and a one eyed admirer of France but that is not me. I see what I read from these eyewitnesses and read into it the real truth of the situation. I do not see the average French soldier as superior to a Prussian, an Austrian or Russian or any other for that matter. It is what is done with him that matters to me. And in 1806 it was obvious that not enough was done with the Prussian soldier who could have accounted form himself MUCH better given half a chance.

You can dissect my posts any way you wish. You can take my words in any context you wish put a play on those words but the truth remains. Those quotes tell a story no one here can refute. The Prusisans failed to use their light troops as they should have been used. They were forced (one way or another) to fight French skirmishers will controlled, ordered linear style volleys that could not cope with the way the French came at them with their own skirmishers.

You only have to look at the reforms of 1808 to see what the Prussians saw as the reasons for their defeat by the way their army reformed. For example, from 1808 onwards a single Fuslier btln was attached to each Musketeer regiment. Why? well the reasons are obvious. and this is but one change.

Shane

Shane:
During the Revolution, the French preached "The New Man", free of the aristocracy. One of the hallmarks of this New Man, self-possessed and intelligent, was a new form of warfare: Skirmishing. It was propaganda, but the French worked very hard to link the their style of warfare, particularly 1792-1796, as a social/cultural result, not simply a military methodology. As many military men already believed that light infantry skill was innate, generated by particular cultures, it was easy to buy that the French just had this ‘physical ability and high intelligence'. The British also believed it. It is why they formed French and German light infantry battalions at first, 1972-1800 before turning to training British natives. Even then a German wrote their light infantry manual and a Frenchman in German service wrote the treatise they used to supplement it according to Gates.

So here is what you quote General Scharnhorst says: [when?]

"The physical ability and high intelligence of the common man enables the French to profit from all advantages offered by the terrain and the general situation, while the phlegmatic Germans … form on open ground and do nothing but what their officer orders them to do."

Here is what Lt. Moyle Sherer, 34th Foot at Vitoria with O'Callaghan's Brigade of Hills' Division writes:

Not a soul …was in the village, but a wood a few hundred yards to its left, and the ravines above it, were filled with French light infantry. I, with my company, was soon engaged in smart skirmishing among the ravines, and lost about eleven men, killed and wounded, out of thirty-eight. The English don not skirmish so well as the Germans or the French; and it is really hard work to make them preserve their proper extended order, cover themselves, wand not throw away their fire; and in the performance of this duty, an officer is, I think, far more exposed than in the line fighting.

Italics are mine. Even after five years of Peninsular Warfare and the victory at Vitoria, Sherer can still feel the French and Germans are better at skirmishing. As Gates says:

p. 85 "If the composition fo units is taken as an indicator, then the view that Germans made better light infantry, especially riflemen, than any other troops prevailed in the British service. Virtually all of the formations armed with rifles—the Brunswick Jagers, the fifth battalion of the 60th and the light battalions of the King's German Legion—were composed of Germans and the majority of the Army's light troops in general were not actually British.

You quote von Freytag-Loringhoven:

"The Prussian infantry at one time took the Frederickian maxim of marching boldly upon the enemy too literally, and insisted that skirmishing is the mark of a coward." They were wrong, skirmishing required energy, stamina, imagination and initiative.

Let me provide examples of the British acting the same way, being as stupid as any Prussian and not particularly good at skirmishing—including the belief that the French were far better at it than the British…and these are only a few of the quotes I can find along those lines:

After Egypt 1801, Lt. General William Stewart wrote:

Mohamedan troops…certainly take their positions and cover their persons…with a degree of intelligence and alertness that we are perpetually endeavouring to teach and drive into our soldiers' brains, and generally in vain…our officers would be indifferent whether it was hill or hollow that they were in or on; and our men would stand erect and expose their whole persons in the most useless manner.

Lt. John Blakiston, 43rd Light Infantry:

Certainly I never saw such skirmishers as the 95th…They could do the work much better and with infinitely less loss than any of our best Light troops. They possessed an individual boldness, a mutual understanding and a quickness of the eye in taking advantage of the ground, which taken altogether, I never saw equaled. They were in fact, as much superior to the French Voltigeurs as the latter were to our skirmishers in general. As our regiment was often employed in supporting them, I think I am fairly well qualified to speak of their merits. [Italics mine]

How about across the war years:

Captain John Patterson, 50th Foot

He notes that at Vimerio alone, the skirmishing troops of the 50th and then 43rd regiments were "very much cut up, being, while employed in skirmishing considerably exposed."

Edward Costello of the 95th Rifles at the Battle of Fuentes de Orñoro reports that the 85th Light Infantry was "very roughly handled by the enemy. This was, he explained, "the first time since their arrival in the …[Peninsula], that they had been engaged." Exposed "with their conspicuous red dresses, to the old trained French tirailleurs, suffered… severely."

He goes on to tell of witnessing a clash between French Voltigeurs and the 79th Highlanders finding "the place strewn about with their bodies. Poor fellows! They had not been used to skirmishing, and instead of occupying the houses in the neighbourhood, and firing from the windows, they had exposed themselves [to the French voltigeurs] by firing by sections."

In 1810, this situation hadn't changed much, though Lt. General Thomas Graham has good things to say about Costello's and Blakiston's units in writing the Adjutant-General:

"It must be allow'd by all, that the system of modern warfare requires a much larger proportion of light troops, or at least men, acquainted with the true principles of acting as such than formerly and that in point of fact we possess none that deserve to be so class'd. as so instructed except those British Regt's formerly in our friend Sir. J. Moore's Brigade at Shorncliffe…& some of the German Corps. Let anyone belonging to this army speak to this fact, & say, whether there is any comparison whatever between the Batt'ns of Crawford's Lt. Div. & any other British Batt'ns. In point of instruction, as exemplify'd in practice before the Enemy. We have other Brit. Batt'ns called Light Infantry that know no more of the matter than my gallant friends of the Guards here, & consequently expose themselves improperly & unnecessarily to be knocked in the head when they & ought to be under cover. [italics Graham's]

Sadly, things don't improve with three year more experience, particularly for the Guards, who Graham says are ignorant of skirmishing in 1810. Lt. John Blakiston, 43rd Light Infantry recalls in his account of the Battle of the Nive in 1813:

The brigade of guards was on this occasion brought forward to bear the brunt of the action during which their light companies received a dreadful mauling form the French voltigeurs. The great John Bulls had no notion of screening themselves from the fire of their more cautious adversaries, and suffered accordingly.

At the end of his book on the British light infantry, Gates says this:

p. 174 However, whatever they may have lacked in skill, the British light infantry made up for it by their weight of numbers. In one battle after another they succeeded in containing the attacks of French voltigeurs…

This is the very same claim authors made concerning the French skirmishers in the Revolutionary wars… General John Money in 1799 said:

"I know that it is to this new system of bringing more Irregulars into the field than their opponents, that the French owe chiefly their success.

What does this prove? Not much if you want to say that the above quotes prove the British didn't, couldn't or failed to skirmish effectively during the Peninsular wars. What do the above quotes prove?

1. That you can't determine whether a nation's infantry will or can skirmish by referencing a few general quotes of criticism.

2. That the level and consistency of infantry's ability to skirmish in an army can vary widely, and at times the experienced gained by the army in general is not necessarily seen in individual units—at all.

3. That because of the two points above, the experience of individuals can be radically different from the general impression of events over a long period of time or across several battles…or even one battle.

4. That the quality of the light infantry may have more, or even less impact on battles than many seem to think…particularly if the British are held up as the example of successful skirmishing tactics.

So, that are the first two points. Now to look at the Battle of Jena.

Bill

OK Bill, keep in mind through my response that I do respect you here, however,

For a start, I have read all of those quotes at one time or another during my own research of the period over the years.

However, you wrote:

That you can't determine whether a nation's infantry will or can skirmish by referencing a few general quotes of criticism.

But hang on, I notice that nearly all of your posts that you write seem to be filled with quotes like these to prove your point on one topic or another. But as soon as I provide a few quotes to prove my own opinions you discount them as proof of nothing? Bill, you are the biggest quote'r I have seen on this forum by far! Sorry mate but you cannot be serious?
For a start you have to research eyewitness accounts to find out from those who were there just what happened, how, why, who, what and when. This is the main focus of academic reseach of history, especially of war where it is the memoirs of the men which provide such insight. If you get enough quotes that say the same or similar thing then you are building a picture. All I have done is throw a few that I have found onto the thread in the short time of less than 24 hours. If you would like I will keep hunting until I have enough to write a book if you like but I don't need to, others have done this already. The latest is Peter Paret, if you have not read his book I suggest you might wish to. I am a little insulted that you would actually take this line of criticism when your proliferation of quote use is enormous compared to what I have provide but it seems your allowed to quote as you wish and whatever you say must stand but if anyone else does it is nothing but generalization and out of context.

My god Bill, you have a person here who is so well known by the name of Scharnhorst actually admitting the issues withing the Prussian army in skirmishing and you will not accept it but instead drag out so many unrelated quotes just to try to convince everyone I am wrong? re-read Scharnhorst's, Schlieffen's and Paret's words. They wrote them for a reason, they were obviously not lying and had very real concerns regarding the Prussian army's performance. Even the Prussian King was critical of the use of skirmishers and pushed for their improvements. Why can't you take that for what it is worth and what they are trying to tell you?

Trying to discount me by doing what you have done to discredit me and not the words of the men who actually said them is shooting the messenger. I could find every quote there is to prove my point (of which I know there are many) and you would still not be convinced. I am more convinced you would simply prefer to re-quote my words to argue with me anyway?

Bill, from now on whenever you drag quotes onto this forum I will remember these words and use them against you. You are being hypocritical and I mean no disrespect. You cannot throw quotes all over the board to prove your points then when someone else does it tell them it proves nothing.

you can't determine whether a nation's infantry will or can skirmish by referencing a few general quotes of criticism

Yes you can if they are said by a number of prominent men who witnessed them especially if they are talking in an overall point of view of a campaign. Not if they are talking about individual units because individual units abilities fluctuate over time, you of all people should know this?

The Prussian army in 1806 was engaged in 4 serious actions over a three day period in which their army was totally defeated. I have already explained my reasons and opinions why and they are backed up by evidence which I have already shown. Even the great PH was used in making my mind up as to why they were defeated and I agree with him. I could spend the next three months and waste my time hunting down every eyewitness account, memoir and article or book that proves they failed to utilize their vast capability of skirmishers but I am not going to do that. Like I already said, several others have already done this already and there is no need. But if Scharnhorst himself amongst other prominent Prussian officers why they failed to use them then are you going to tell me and everyone else reading all of this that they were wrong, that what they witnessed and wrote about was incorrect? that their words prove nothing? were you there to refute them?

Bill, c'mon, be sensible about this.

Shane,

I think Bill was just pointing out that when Scharnhorst says that the Germans cannot skirmish, many British witnesses clearly thought that the Germans (and French) could both skirmish well. Now, Scharnhorst may have been using German when really meaning Prussian (it sounds odd to me him doing this but it may not have been abnormal at the time – I'm not a historian or German speaker).

Of course, British quotations praising the skirmishing abilities of Germans do not absolve any Prussian skirmishing problems in 1806. Similarly, the success of the 95th (and IIRC Englishmen were present in 5/60 as well)shows that it wasn't English birth or 'character' that got in the way of skirmishing.

Frankly I'm beginning to think that Kevin Kiley's idea that the French had really got the hang of skirmishing/improvised fighting within the 'culture' of the infantry (NOT 'in the blood' of Frenchmen) has more going for it than I first thought (I know that sentence is written awfully but he puts it much better himself). After all, Radetzky, although I take full cognisance of the issues Dave Hollins had mentioned with regard to his comment, was comparing the Austrians with the French of 1813 – about as raw as a French Army got.

Of course, it is also possible that for various reasons, Allied witnesses were more critical of their own light infantry than they should have been and overestimated the French skill relative to their own.

Regards

Shane wrote:

Bill, you are the biggest quote'r I have seen on this forum by far! Sorry mate but you cannot be serious?

Shane:
Guilty as charged. It isn't that you're providing quotes. Not at all. More power to you. It is the conclusions that you come to apparently based on those two quotes:

It was not until the later reforms and a crushing campaign defeat in 1806 that they were shocked into understanding the advantages that light infantry gave the French.

Yes the Prussians had light troops, yes they used them but they did not like this style of warfare early on (overall) and no attempt was made to improve or match the French on the battlefields in 1806.

I would think, based on the quotes I provided, and using the same application you do with the Prussian quotes, anyone would conclude that the British troops, light companies or regulars weren't much good at skirmishing, that the French were much better, save the 95th. Also clear is the fact that some units NEVER do seem to 'get it', like the Guards' light companies and the 79th… even possibly the 43rd and other Light Division troops, and that the KGL lights were seen as better than the British by the British Lights themselves.

Actually, I don't think I or you can come to those conclusions without more investigation, let alone be safe in assuming that ALL British light troops are crap because an experienced eneral like Graham says so, any more than we are able to conclude how bad the Prussians were or what they did at Jena from comments by Scharnhorst or von Freytag-Loringhoven.

That is my point.

We absolutely need the quotes and the history if we are going to understand what happened to any reasonable degree. We just have to be careful what we do with the quotes.

Bill

I don't think they are saying that the Prussians lacked intelligence. They are stating what they see and it has nothing to do with making them look stupid or cowardly. It is a declaration of the mentality of the time and how they saw things. This has a lot to do with their current understanding and experience in skirmish combat at that time.

Let me make this perfectly clear. I am in NO way declaring that the French were smart and the Prussians were dumb. Nor am I declaring that the French were brave and the Prussians cowards.

Shane:

I wasn't suggesting that was your opinion. It is clear that it is Scharnhorst's view. He is drawing a distinct contrast between the physical abilities and intelligence of the French and the Prussian soldier. He is very articulate about that difference in a number of his writings. Paret in his book on the Prussian Reforms discusses this at some length.

As for seeing skirmishing as cowardly…There were any number of British officers who felt the same way, let alone the other Nations. Colonel Landmann in his "Recollections" pp219-222 relates an incident during the Battle of Vimeiro where he sees a French voltigeur hiding, taking aim at him, an officer on horseback. He tells a nearby rifleman of the 60th to shoot him before he gets Landmann. The rifleman refuses because he has an French officer all picked out and that target offers better possibilities of loot. Landmann calls both the French and the 60th 'rascals' for hiding and sneaking about, only out for gain.

Other British officers see that 'taking cover' as cowardly, which is why several of the quotes I give have the British standing about skirmishing. They know about taking cover…they just see it as 'unmanly.'

I'll get back to you on the Jena questions.

Bill

He believes that the solution to the problem is to change who is being recruited and how the army rewards that intelligence, gives it scope within the army.

In fact, for the Prussians, the belief was that the entire Prussian culture had to change before the Prussians would have men produced who would be competent skirmishers.

This view was seen by the Prussians in a number of quarters as advocating Revolution on the scale of the French Revolution. Clauswitz was chastized for this very thing and joined the Russians--among other 'crimes'. Scharnhorst was more circumspect in that opinion.

Shane wrote:

My god Bill, you have a person here who is so well known by the name of Scharnhorst actually admitting the issues withing the Prussian army in skirmishing and you will not accept it but instead drag out so many unrelated quotes just to try to convince everyone I am wrong? re-read Scharnhorst's, Schlieffen's and Paret's words. They wrote them for a reason, they were obviously not lying and had very real concerns regarding the Prussian army's performance.

Shane:
It was never my intention to convince anyone that you were wrong. And yes, Scharnhorst and Schlieffen wrote them for a reason--probably more than one reason. The question is what reason? Who were they trying to convince, and to what end?

Even the Prussian King was critical of the use of skirmishers and pushed for their improvements. Why can't you take that for what it is worth and what they are trying to tell you?

Shane, certainly the Prussian skirmishers needed to improve, and it is interesting to see the ideas of how the Prussians thought they should improve before and after 1806. [Short answer: The recommendations and reform efforts were nearly identical… the post-1806 reforms were far more successful.]

And I want to take Scharnhorst's and everyone's comments 'for what they are worth.' The question is "what are they worth?" What are they worth if they don't match or explain what Prussian skirmishers did at Jena?

I will show you what I mean. That isn't a suggestion that I am ignoring or discounting what an officer like Scharnhorst was saying. It is too obvious that he did. The question is "do you and I know?"

And trying to convince anyone you are wrong in saying the Prussian skirmishing ability was wanting at Jena. I am saying this: Men who state that the Prussians were inferior skirmishers isn't a good basis on which to determine what Prussian skirmishers did or didn't do at Jena. Generalizations at that level don't explain anything.

Trying to discount me by doing what you have done to discredit me and not the words of the men who actually said them is shooting the messenger. I could find every quote there is to prove my point (of which I know there are many) and you would still not be convinced. I am more convinced you would simply prefer to re-quote my words to argue with me anyway?

I am not trying to discredit you at all. Nor was I trying to shoot the messenger. I was trying to show that a case could be built that most all British skirmishers were crap too, based on their own words, yet it is obvious that they were certainly successful all the same.

So, if that is so, how do you resolve the apparent disconnect between the two? The same disconnect is quite possible between the Prussian observations and the actual peformance of the Prussians. In fact, that is what I have found to be the case. Does that mean the Prussian skirmishers were anywhere as good as the French? No. What it means is:

1. What men like Scharnhorst and other Prussians are saying as criticisms doesn't explain or describe what actually happened. The two aren't necessarily connected, whether the criticisms are generally true or not.

2. Finding out what actually happened helps clarify what Scharnhorst and others were actually saying. And often, it isn't what we first thought.

That is it, Shane. I am still on point with Jena. I just wanted to provide a similar set of quotes from the British about the British skirmish capabilities to demonstrate how those quotes don't necessarily describe what or how well the British performed on the battlefield in general or the level of overall skill demonstrated, even when all the events are true… The same applies to all the quotes you and I have seen about the Prussians.

Bill

Whirlwind wrote:

Of course, it is also possible that for various reasons, Allied witnesses were more critical of their own light infantry than they should have been and overestimated the French skill relative to their own.

True. This could also be true for any number of Scharnhorst's criticisms of the Prussian military. He [and others]were trying desparately to move an enertia-bound military and civil beauracracy to reform, before and after 1806. Overstating the critical nature of the problems is a classic method for doing just that.

Bill

Okie, it seems we both have a different agenda here. I personally am not trying to analyse the ability and skill of individual skirmisher units as compared to each other right now. I am trying to identify how they were used or to be more clear, how often they were used in 1806. This is my focus right at this point. Your perspective seems to be more about their skill level and quality as skirmishers compared to each other.

I have found many quotes and eyewitness accounts that says that the prussians could skirmish, they were highly skilled at it and had specialized units for it. However, the history on 1806 tells us otherwise that they were underutilized. In plain English, forgotten about and left in the ranks of the linear formations overall. Yes these jagers, schuetzen, fusiliers, and 3rd rankers were there but I have strong doubts that the "nonspecialist" light troops were thrown out at all or if they were, in very low numbers.

I put this down to the senior officers overall repulsion of light tactics and propensity to take their glorious histories, tactical know-how, skills and command style that they received under Frederick over 30 years earlier into a modern battle. They had the men capable of skirmishing right under their noses but did not use them.

That is the purpose of the quotes I have used to prove this point. This is a macro (external) level issue. Not that they were poor skirmishers, that is not my aim.

In my analysis of the Prussian army of 1806, the Prussian army did not fail their commanders, thier commanders failed the army…

Whirlwind wrote:

Of course, it is also possible that for various reasons, Allied witnesses were more critical of their own light infantry than they should have been and overestimated the French skill relative to their own.

Hi mate, you are very correct. I have already eluded to this earlier in a previous post. You cannot initiate change without overstating the faults, issues and problems you are trying to fix. This is especially true when the culture is resistant to change. If the culture breeds a behavior that is resistant to change there is a propensity for change managers to have to resort to overstating the issues to bring about initiation to change. This is true in business and the military.

Before WWII men were still flying bi-planes, a type of aircraft that had changed little in the preceding 20 years from the end of WWI. By the end of WWII only 6 years later we had, Jet aircraft, ICBM's, nuclear weapons and an array of other technological innovations. War and the need to keep up causes fear that drives or motivates people to integrate change into their systems.

The feeling of fear is a great motivator. In business a new innovation or new entrant into the market generates fear of the loss of competitive advantage. This is just as true from a military perspective with mush higher stakes involved than the loss of market share or the bottom line in the annual financial reports. Peoples live are at stake.

The great destruction and collapse of the Prussian army in 1806 was not caused by the ill use or non-use of their skirmishers but that (in my opinion) had a great deal to do with it. But there were a number of issues that became apparent in the post-mortem of that campaign. The Prussian high-command, and the King in particular should be commended for the action they took to bring around change in the Prussian army. By 1813 it might not have been as professional as it was in 1806 but the innovations both created and copied and improved on created an army that was highly flexible, capable of rapid recovery and able to cope with changing situations. This was not possible with how the army was in 1806.

The men I have used to quote from are just a few of the minds of the time who new what it would take to change the army and they succeeded. The Prussian army of 1813 was utilized to its optimum best in those later campaigns. The training and experience in that army may have been lower overall but they made up for that in flexibility and capability to adapt. The senior minds in command in 1813 would not let the faults found in 1806 identified by Schlieffen, Scharnhorst or von Freytag-Loringhoven amongst many others re-occur in the army of 1813. It is true this army had its own faults but it did not collapse after three days of campaigning after serious defeat.

If you look at the campaign of 1807 where a small untouched Prussian force was able to continue the war on its own away from the hands of the senior commanders of the main army you can see that the Prussian army of 1806 was far from a poor army if used well. The Prussians conduct in this campaign along side the Russians was truly outstanding and worthy of itself. They were lucky the likes of the senior commanders of the main army were nowhere near them.

Shane wrote:

Okie, it seems we both have a different agenda here. I personally am not trying to analyse the ability and skill of individual skirmisher units as compared to each other right now. I am trying to identify how they were used or to be more clear, how often they were used in 1806. This is my focus right at this point. Your perspective seems to be more about their skill level and quality as skirmishers compared to each other.

I have found many quotes and eyewitness accounts that says that the prussians could skirmish, they were highly skilled at it and had specialized units for it. However, the history on 1806 tells us otherwise that they were underutilized.

In plain English, forgotten about and left in the ranks of the linear formations overall.

Shane:

Actually that is what I am focused on. And yes there are many quotes that say the Prussians were awful, that they didn't have enough skirmishers, that they stood around in formed lines and got shot to pieces and never even used their skirmishers. the question is whether they explain what happened… They don't.

I was also saying that the quotes, far from being 'untrue' or that someone was lying, were written to a particular audience with particular purposes in mind.

Radeszky wasn't making some judgement about all Russian and Austrian infantry for the entire twenty years of war. He was making a technical recommendation about particular troops in the Army of Bohemia in September of 1813 to other officers in that army. Scharnhorst is writing to other Prussian officers in an effort to convince them of the need for and the type of skirmishers he has in mind. Context shapes what you can and can not conclude from those quotes. I can't reasonably use Radeszky's quote to prove that Austrians never knew how to skirmish…he isn't saying that.

Scharnhorst is saying the mind set of the Prussian soldier is an impediment to effective skirmishing, that the French do it better. He isn't saying that Prussians can't and don't skirmish or refuse to skirmish etc.

Let's look at Jena.

Bill

Shane:
Okay, I am going to do this in four parts simply to keep down on the length of a post: Tauentzien's engagement at the beginning of the battle, Holtzendorfs. Then Garwert's Division and the battle for Isserstadt Woods.

You've raised the issue:

However, the history on 1806 tells us otherwise that they were underutilized. In plain English, forgotten about and left in the ranks of the linear formations overall. Yes these jagers, schuetzen, fusiliers, and 3rd rankers were there but I have strong doubts that the "nonspecialist" light troops were thrown out at all or if they were, in very low numbers.

That is a reasonable conclusion from the quotes you mention. The question is how many Prussian & Saxon skirmishers were actually used where and when against how many French skirmishers. I am using Petre, Bressonet, Maude, the Battle Reports of both the Saxons and Prussians here. While I can provide the sources, I didn't want to footnote everything, so if you want a reference, I'll get it. I am being conservative here, keeping guessing to a minimum. For instance, the Prussians authorized an increase in the Schützen from 10 to 20 at some point after 1803, but it is unclear whether the change was ever implemented because of the lack of rifles.

I have accounts of the Zweiffel regiment deploying its 3rd rank. I don't have anything similar about the other line and grenadier battalions. They may have done so, but here I am going to assume from a lack of evidence that they didn't.

So I am figuring 50 Schützen per battalion for the Prussians, but the Saxons had four musketeer companies and one grenadier company per battalion following the Prussian company organization. Of course, the grenadier companies were combined into grenadier battalions. So a Saxon line or grenadier battalion had 40 Schützen.

Jena, October 14th, 6:30 am

At the beginning of the battle, Major General Tauentzien faced the two divisions of Lannes corps across a front of about 5000 yards. Only 1200 to 1400 yards of that was open terrain. The rest, covering both flanks, was woods and villages. Both the Prussians and Napoleon himself estimated that only four battalions could deploy across the gap between Closewitz and Luzteroda.

Tauentzien had under his command almost 16 battalions of infantry, the Regiments Rechten, Zweiffel and Maximilian [2 btns each], attached battalions ½ Herwarth Grenadiers, von Winkel Grenadiers, Four Jager companies under Valentini and Werner, the Fusilier Battalions Pelet, Rosen and Ericksen, along with Cerrini's Saxon Grenadier battalions, Thiollaz, Metzach, Hundt, Lecoc, and Lichenhayr. The approximate numbers are:

Tauentzien's corps

4120 musketeers [6 btns]
1650 Fusiliers [3 btns]
680 Jägers [4 co.s]
4395 Grenadiers [6 ½ btns]

10,845 infantry Total [2330 light infantry or 21% of the total]

500 Schützen at 40 per line and grenadier battalion
455 3rd Rankers from the Zweiffel regiment of two btns
335 Grenadiers from ½ Herwarth battalion

1,290 Total line infantry deployed as skirmishers

IN ALL, 3,620 infantry deployed as skirmishers or 33% of Tauentzien's total force.

The Saxon Army history states that all the third rankers in Zweiffel's regiment were deployed on both the 13th and 14th as skirmishers, which is why it is called ‘weak' in several narratives. It is also one of the first regiments to give way in the morning. [Only two regiments do this during the battle, Sanitz being the other. Both Zweiffel and Sanitz just happen to be facing the French 25-36 gun grand battery at the time…]

Herwarth's Grenadiers were deployed in the woods West of Closewitz in conjunction with Pelet's Fusiliers. All the Schutzen of the Grenadiers were deployed because they are reported defending the small woods southeast of Luzteroda, "white figures of the grenadiers moving from tree to tree".

The skirmishers from the Lichenhayr battalion are reported firing on the French battery positioned on the flank the Lichenhayr battalion's location nearly 1000 yards away, so the Schützen did move around.

The Jagers and Fusiliers were deployed in the villages and woods on the flank of the Prussian position.

However, if just the 500 Schützen had defended the 1400 yards of open ground between Luzteroda and Closewitz, that is 5 yards between each skirmisher file, or about the same spread as a British extended line. The Schützen did not practice retaining supports according to their instructions. Their parent line battalion was supposed to do that. That there were at least another 455 line troops from Zweiffel's two battalions means that the Prussians could have had a skirmisher file of two standing every 3 yards across the Prussian front.

There really wouldn't have been much point in deploying any more skirmishers in the open.

The French complicate their skirmish count because Lannes employed an ‘elite' composite battalion with the 17th Legere regiment. This was probably made of all the Grenadier companies in the 34th and 40th Line regiments, but whether they skirmished or not is the question. That would add some 600 men to the French equation.

Lannes' French 5th Corps of two divisions

27 infantry btns or about 18,935 infantry [5 btns or 3,5o5 light infantry or 18%]

22 light companies at @78 men each for 1,710 voltigeurs from line regiments

Total possible skirmish force without center companies or grenadiers:

5,216 men or 27% of the total available infantry.

Lannes could deploy about 1.4 times as many skirmishers as the Prussians with just the light infantry and voltigeurs companies. This is not counting the two other divisions that joined the contest around 8:30 am:

St. Hilaire's Division [6 btns/2 lt. btns] 7,785 infantry [1,946 lt. infantry]

Desjardin's Division [6 btns/4 lt. btns] 9750 infantry [3900 lt. infantry]

1,296 voltigeurs from the line regiments

Total possible skirmish force from the two divisions without center companies or grenadiers: 7,142 men or 40% of the total available infantry.

Conclusions:
Tauentzien's force deployed about the same percentage of light and line troops in skirmisher operations as Lannes' Corps probably did. It is obvious that they tried to match the numbers of enemy skirmishers they were facing. The Saxon/Prussian force deployed 34% of all their infantry as skirmishers. That is not ‘underutilizing' their light capabilities.

However, Tauentzien was outnumbered 2:1 on the outset and then more than 4:1 with St. Hilaire's and Desjardin's divisions joining the battle. That his forces held for two hours and were able to not only mount counterattacks after 9 am, and then repulse Lannes first attempt to capture Vierzehnheiligen is surprising on the face of it.

The Prussians did have a thick morning fog that held up Lannes, along with restricted terrain that channeled and misdirected the French attacks. Even so, the Prussian light infantry proved competent enough and if the line skirmishers were ill-prepared, Tauentzien wasn't afraid to deploy them.

Of course, Tauentzien was heavy with light infantry, actually having more than Lannes as a percentage of his forces. His was the 'advanced guard' and so we would expect to see more light troops.

Do we continue to see this same willingness to commit a third of the infantry to skirmishing in the later stages of the battle? The short answer? Yes.

Bill

Skirmishing isn't the issue-how you employ them and coordinate them with the units in formation is the issue. That's where the Prussians fall apart-they didn't do it too well, with the possible exception of the battalions that had been trained 'in the French manner.' It might be better if the problem was approached viewing it from a much larger perspective. Talking about skirmishing by company or battalion solves nothing and proves nothing. Talking about infantry doctrine and practice might.

The problem the British, Russians, Austrians, and Prussians had with the new French tactical system is that as of 1792 no one, except for the French, had attempted to integrate regular light infantry with regular line infantry in formation on the battlefield. Prior to that, up to and including the Seven Years' War, light infantry, including the Grenz, were used for ‘the little war' (la petite guerre) that was not part of fighting with regular troops on the battlefield. There were a few exceptions such as the French Grassins emplaced along a woodline at Fontenoy and shooting up the Brigade of the Ingoldsby and the Prussians employing skirmishing at the Battle of Lobositz in 1756 to drive Croat units from the Lobosch hill. These, though, were exceptions and were not the norm.

‘Mesnil Durand, Joly de Maizeroy and de Saxe were among the authorities who called for a closer working of regular and skirmishing tactics. Marshal Broglie did something to put this notion into practical effect when he assumed his command in western Germany in 1760. He upgraded the grenadiers, established a company of chasseurs in each battalion of the line…'

‘Broglie and his fellows encountered much opposition from conservative circles, but in his officially approved Regulation of 1764 he was able to explain how regulars could be employed in skirmish order to prepare the way for columns of attack. The seeds had been sown. A light company was formed in every battalion of English infantry in 1771-1772, by when military Europe was being conditioned to accept that regular troops could be used in ways that had once been the preserve of the Croats and the free corps.'
-Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 278-279.

Taken further, it was de Broglie who held the first training maneuver at Metz in the 1770s and later in Normandy to test and practice troops in columns being supported by regular troops in open order acting as skirmishers. This developed into the tactical system/doctrine that would deploy entire units as skirmishers as a maneuver unit in support of troops in either line or column in the attack which acted as the fire support unit so that the troops in column could close with and attack the enemy. And, if light infantry were not available, then line infantry would deploy in open order as the support unit. These were skirmisher swarms, not chains, and many times French commanders would deploy their front line of battalions in open order as a heavy skirmish line to engage the enemy in a firefight, being backed up by formed units in battalion columns that would either back up the first line or feed it with more troops in open order to continue the firefight. I have not seen any other army of the period do the same thing on such a scale.

Consulting the following works the only conclusion that can be reached is that the French tactical system, if properly used, was not effectively countered by the tactics of any of the Grande Armee's enemies, save the British, who developed their own employment of light infantry.

-Napoleon's Great Adversary by Gunther Rothenberg
-The Military Border in Croatia by Gunther Rothenberg
-The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White
-Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform by Peter Paret
-Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret
-The British Light Infantry Arm by David Gates
-Russia Against Napoleon by Dominic Lieven
-Swords Around A Throne by John Elting
-The Background of Napoleonic Warfare by Robert Quimby
-Napoleon's Apogee: Pascal Bressonet's Tactical Studies by Scott Bowden
-Napoleon's Finest: Davout and his 3rd Corps by Scott Bowden

However, that same system came very close to defeat at Waterloo from a numerical inferior French army as 16,000 troops had to be employed to stop the Prussians. And after the French cavalry attacks French infantry resorted to large skirmisher swarms attacking the allied line that had to stay deployed in squares because of the close artillery support the French had and that French cavalry units also supported the French infantry, riding down any allied unit deployed in line, as what happened to Ompteda's KGL command amply testifies.

The issue is not having enough light infantry units, having excellent light infantry units, or having more skirmishers on the ground than your opponent. The issue is integrating the tactical operations of the light troops, or line troops if that is the case, in open or skirmish order with those of the troops in line. As late as 1808 the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians couldn't or wouldn't do this. The Prussian Jager Regiment was an excellent outfit in 1806. It was broken up and attached out to separate commands. That negated the unit's excellence and it was improperly employed. All of these three nations' armies also had specialist light infantry units to employ on light infantry missions. They were not integrated to support the line infantry on the battlefield, a lesson the French learned and exploited in 1760 and it took them years to perfect it. The allies had to have their ears beaten down around their socks before they may have understood what the French were doing and why their lines and units were being shot to pieces. And it didn't matter if the light infantry were armed with muskets or rifles-it was how they were trained and deployed and coordinated with other units.

The French developed the entire package after their disastrous defeat in the Seven Years' War. Light troops were regularized, a general staff developed, as were permanent divisions. Tactics were experimented with for the express purpose of beating the Prussians the next time out. And if you study Jena and how the French actually fought, you'll see coordination between light cavalry, artillery (horse and foot) and infantry, both line and light, that was mutually supporting and relentless in their attacks and those attacks were coordinated at the lowest level. The French infantry that faced Grawert were in open order in large units and were under cover. Grawert was shot to pieces and no amount of revisionist breast beating can change that-it is too well documented.

I find it amazing that some folks here criticize one or two people for using quotations but then do it themselves. The personal attacks if you disagree with someone are absolutely ridiculous. What should be done here is learning and exchanging ideas and not getting personal with some of the members of the forum. When that is done the only thing that is being accomplished by those who denigrate others and their contributions is display ignorance on a very large scale, and in fact those who do that are conceding the argument. Instead of attacking people for what they say and attempting to gain an advantage that way, why not cooperate and find out even more information?

K

As a short follow up, it is interesting to take a look at and compare the French reform effort after 1763 and a losing effort in a war and the Prussian one from 1807-1813 after a losing effort in a war. Both of the reform movements have similarities, but the French one was much longer, didn't really have anything to do with governmental reform (that would come later in another effort at 'reform') and was much more thorough and complete than the Prussian one.

The major difference between the two was that the French were looking for something new, and the Prussians were trying to catch up with the latest effort in military reform/revolution. Both were reforming for one reason: the French to beat the Prussians the next time out and the Prussians to beat the French the next time out. Both succeeded in their reform efforts, but the French military reform movement is generally ignored overall while the Prussian one is touted as both highly successful and complete, which it was not.

Interesting, anyways.

K

Kevin wrote:

Skirmishing isn't the issue-how you employ them and coordinate them with the units in formation is the issue.

Kevin:
The question that I was addressing is how many Prussian infantry were deployed as skirmishers, so I agree skirmishing in general OR how skirmishers are employ effectively weren't the issues I was addressing.

That's where the Prussians fall apart-they didn't do it too well, with the possible exception of the battalions that had been trained 'in the French manner.' It might be better if the problem was approached viewing it from a much larger perspective. Talking about skirmishing by company or battalion solves nothing and proves nothing. Talking about infantry doctrine and practice might.

I AM viewing the larger perspective: We are talking about the total numbers of skirmishers employed by the Prussians during the battle of Jena. That is done by counting how many companies, 3rd ranks and volunteers etc. were reported deployed during the battle.

What it 'proves' Kevin, is providing an answer to the only question asked: How many skirmishers did the Prussians actually deploy at Jena? That is the only question here. As to how well the Prussians skirmish, set up some criteria for Jena and lets see how they stack up.

Speaking of infantry doctrine and your comment:

The problem the British, Russians, Austrians, and Prussians had with the new French tactical system is that as of 1792 no one, except for the French, had attempted to integrate regular light infantry with regular line infantry in formation on the battlefield.

Kevin, this is simply not true: "as of 1792 no one, except for the French, had attempted to integrate regular light infantry with regular line infantry."

Ignoring for a moment the British efforts with light infantry during the American Revolution, the Prussians did do just that before 1792. First of all, in 1775 the Prussians established schutzen/sharpshooters with their line regiments AND made it a requirement that ANY soldier becoming an NCO must have served with the schutzen at some point. How's that for an attempt at 'integration'? Paret describes this in his book on Yorck.

It is often forgotten that the Prussian 1789 Reglément for the line regiments was provided with a special section specifically for the battalion Schützen:

It states "All of those assigned to skirmisher duty were always to fight in this mode", and for the first time some provision was made for skirmishers fighting in relationship to the line battalions in closed order.

This section states the role for the Schutzen--fighting in liaison with their battalion. For example, it says:

When a regiment or a battalion moves forward to take a position, the tirailleurs [the Schützen and their supports] can deploy ahead of their unit, then move forward head of their battalions to cause by their fire a certain damage in
the enemy's ranks and to disorder it before the arrival of the battalion. But when one or more battalions come within musket range of the enemy, the tirailleurs must fall back on each side and follow the battalion or regiment and hence can protect the flanks.

That sounds like an attempt at integration to me, Kevin, and we are talking 1789, three years before before 1792…

Kevin wrote:

Consulting the following works the only conclusion that can be reached is that the French tactical system, if properly used, was not effectively countered by the tactics of any of the Grande Armee's enemies, save the British, who developed their own employment of light infantry.

Kevin, I find it continually surprising that when I write about what the Prussians did at Jena, you feel you must repeat the above litany and drop the names of authors that you agree with as though somehow I am arguing that the Prussians outfought or were somehow as good at skirmishing as the French. I don't know why. I have never suggested anything of the sort.

However, you need to be careful who you list. It only confuses your argument. At the end his extensive study of Jena and Auerstadt, Bressonet concluded:

The basic tactic used by the Prussian was therefore good enough to measure up to the French. As we have said in the beginning, there must not have been considerable differences between the two elementary tactics for the two armies to be almost at equilibrium.

Almost all the military historicans are mistaken in stating that there were wide differences between the French and Prussian tactics, and in saying that the former used an order of columns preceded by tirailleurs, while the Prussians still used linear order…

Therefore, if it is completely false to state that there were in 1806 two absolutely different tactics, it would also be incorrect to say that the French and Prussians had the same tactics.

We can both agree that the French won the battle and were tactically superior to the Prussians--how far superior is a matter of conjecture. So you don't have to be concerned that I attempting to deny the Grande Armee's tactical superiority or somehow wanting to deflate their accomplishments in any way. I'm not.

Now, I'd like to get back to talking about what the Prussians actually did at Jena in the way of deploying skirmishers.

Bill

Two things:

First, skirmishing and the numbers employed are not the issue. How skirmishers in general and light infantry in particular were employed with troops in formation is the main issue. You cannot discuss the one without the other. Merely 'counting heads' and talking about who skirmished with whom doesn't reach any valid conclusion to the issue at hand. How the armies employed their troops in open or skimish order is the issue. If that isn't addressed, the argument is circular and reaches no conclusion.

The Prussians did not train to coordinate their light infantry with the troops in line and in formation. A few units did, according to Clausewitz, train in the French manner', but they were few and far between. The French did and did it from long practice. The French also employed entire units in open order to form their main battle line, the troops firing at will. And their line and light infantry were comfortable fighting in formation, open order, in villages or not, and behind cover if available. The Prussians couldn't do that on an army-wide level.

Some Prussians, such as Scharnhorst, recognized this and worked to fix it. That was one of the main issues for the reform movement after the destruction of the old Prussian army in 1806. Further, the Prussians had to write a manual to show them how to skirmish, and the French didn't. The local instructions came after the practice was developed and institutionalized in the army as a normal practice.

Second, I didn't list books 'that I agree with.' I listed books that address the subject and do it quite effectively. If you don't want to take advantage of them, that's up to you. You have criticized people for using quotes to support their position and then do it yourself. I really don't understand that approach, but you are free to do as you like. However, I don't believe you're addressing the issue here and are merely repeating material that you've done for quite some time with no resolution or obvious conclusion except that you keep stressing the fact that the Prussians had and used skirmishers. So what? The bottom line is that the Prussians did not employ them effectively, didn't coordinate infantry and artillery, though they had plenty of ordnance on the battlefield, and didn't concentrate their army to fight. They were outgeneraled, out-hussled, out-fought, and their tactics and coordination of the different arms were very poor, on two battles on the same day. With over a two-to-one superiority in numbers at Auerstadt, they could't defeat one French corps with their main army. And that's the bottom line.

Now if you would merely like to discuss how the Prussians employed skirmishers in 1806 please be my guest. I'll help you along if you wish as a summation: 'Not very well.' And, yes, that's dismissive.

K

Circulated from about 1778 as a draft. Ordered and used from 1783 with the Bug jägers, various grenadiers and other units on campaign in the south. Issued as general order to all the Russian infantry in 1786.
link
link

Sample illustration – does the evolution look "familiar" ?
picture

Now, the Russian calendar was a little different from the French one, but the difference was like 10 days, not 10 years.

Looking at this with a fact-based approach, it really does not look like the French have much claim to some great new innovation of 1792 in the area of light infantry tactics – unless using massive clouds of troops so raw that they don't really know how to form counts as an "innovation".

<sarcasm>

Please note, I offer this information without making any comment at all about any other poster. I hope my friendly, supportive and affirming "tone" is clear in electronic form.

Every word written by any other poster is 100% correct. If actual facts seem at first to be at variance with the bold assertions of a poster, the facts are irrelevant and the poster should be deemed correct.

So, let's look at this with a faith- or myth-based approach ….

The French were the best – really aces. Should be +3 on all die rolls. It was just bad weather/luck/treason or some such that ever caused them a problem. Won every battle, or at least should have. Amazing innovators in all military arts – notably including the area of light infantry,

</sarcasm>

Writing or having instructions or regulations available does not mean they will be implemented, let alone observed. Commanders farther away from their superiors will generally do as they want or believe that is best, unless they are a thorough pedant. Others will ignore the regulations completely.

You have to balance what any regulation stated with evidence from the soldiers who were there and actually used the regulations, or not, and what actually happened on the battlefield. A battlefield is neither a parade deck nor a drill field. St. Cyr was said to have hated the the French 1791 Reglement, as did Duhesme while Lannes and Massena, expert drill masters, used it with great success on the battlefield, Lannes conducting the very difficult passage of lines under fire at Jena.

The French, especially regimental commanders, would ignore, for example Imperial Decrees as to eagles and uniforms, especially uniforms for their heads of column, as well as for their elite companies and perhaps for uniforms in general. Therefore, you see regiments after 1808 carrying more than one eagle; bearskins for elite companies still appearing in 1814 (such as the 46th Ligne); fusilier and chasseur companies still having two crossbelts and the briquet as well as epaulets.

And as there were no army-wide regulations for skirmishing, only some local ones, it must be inferred that French skirmishing techniques were institutionalized from practice and long use-and that did not originate in 1792, but in the experiments conducted by Marshal de Broglie in the late 1770s at Metz and in Normandy. The French practice for the employment of skirmishers and large units in open order, grande bandes if you like, was not in the Reglement of Aout 1791. And the practice of maneuvering large numbers of troops in open order and forming the first line in a thick skirmish line was common practice for French commanders, especially the more tactically skilled ones through 1815, with conscripts or fully trained and experienced troops.

As for the Russians, their experience was very different. Manuals, regulations, and orders had to be written for the Russian troops to be trained in open order. Jager regiments had very few rifled weapons, and after 1809 they were abolished. Up to 1812 the French were definitely superior to the Russians in fighting in open order especially in broken or built-up terrain. Some Russian commanders would not train their troops to fight in open order, while some did. Barclay de Tolly, probably the best of the Russian generals, reportedly didn't like to have too many infantrymen in open order or deployed as skirmishers (he agreed with the Archduke Charles in that respect).

From 1812 on, the Russian jagers got better at it, and sometimes jager battalions and regiments were deployed in open order. Sometimes they were just as good as the French in this type of fighting, but how proficient were they in coordinating their jagers in open order with their troops in closed formations? That is the key to understanding the new tactical system the French introduced over the period 1763-1792 and then perfected it. Skirmishing in large or small numbers is a job for skilled troops, not replacements, yet many times in 1813 the French conscripts outfought their veteran opponents in ‘help-yourself' fighting, as in the Great Garden at Dresden in August 1813. One Russian commander, though, believed that after Bautzen in May 1813 the Russians had reached equality with their French opponents as skirmishers (Radetzky disagreed on that point).

K

As the calender was brought up, which is a significan point because if you were allied with the Russians during the Napoleonic period you had to be aware that there was an eleven-day difference between the Western or Christian calender, also known as the Gregorian calender after the pope who developed it in the 16th century, and the older, less accurate Julian calender still used by the Russians.

The Austrians either were not aware of this problem in 1805 or they ignored it which caused them problems.

Also, there is no 'French calender.' At least I have not been able to find one.

The Russians and the Greeks apparently did not adopt the Gregorian calender until the 20th century which by that time there was a 13-day difference in the Gregorian and Julian calenders.

K

Shane:

Okay, a few points about the last Jena post. The first is that I only included those numbers that I could verify.

I don't know whether Tauentzien's other Saxon regiments deployed their third rank, only the one Zweiffel. The second is that I miscounted the Schützen. I am assuming that the part of the Herwarth Grenadier battalion would have kept their Schützen, so the count is 480 and not 500. Also the Fusilier battalions Ruhle and Rabenau were with Hohenlohe, but I haven't found what they did or where they went in the battle, some 1230 light infantry. Some claim they did not participate, but I haven't found anything concrete. Lastly, a 1810 German map of the battle shows the Frederick August regiment sitting far out in front of Tauentzien's line. I have not found any reference to that, but I find it very odd…

Jena 10 am

Holtzendorf had approximately 2500 infantry in four Saxon battalions under Sanitz, the Losthin, Graf Dohna, Borcke Grenadier battalions, and a ‘Volunteer' battalion of 400 under Friewilligen Major Lessel. Friewilligen is "Volunteer", so the battalion was either a group of Saxon volunteers formed from other regiments or actual volunteers outside the army formed for service like the Austrian Freicorps.

If he only deployed his Schützen, that is probably no more than 160 men, assuming Lessel's battalion added 40 skirmishers.

The first contact Holtzendorf has with St. Hilaire's division is when French Tirailleurs emerge from the Heilgen Holtz. [Holtz=woods]

St. Hilaire's Division [6 btns/2 lt. btns] 7,785 infantry total, of that 1,946 Legere infantry.

If all the voltigeurs companies, legere and ligne were deployed, that would be about 800 men. [Lanne's battalions were smaller than Soult's because of his 5th Corps contest at Saalfeld.

If some were off to the west/left flank covering Pelet's Fusiliers and Valentini's Jagers in the Pfarr Holtz, he probably had some 600 to push through.

Holtzendorf's response is to deploy more skirmishers, which clear the forest of the French Tirailleurs. Chandler notes this. Bressonet says "The French tirailleurs gave in, and recoiled up to the Loh Holz," which is some 200 yards behind the Heilgen Hotz.

Here is where it gets interesting. Bressonet says that the Prussians deployed the 3rd rank of Borke's Grenadier battalion, some 235 men. Add this to the 160 Schützen possible, and you have 396 Prussian skirmishers clearing the woods of @600 French skirmishers. Even assuming both sides had 400 men, it is hard to believe that an equal number of Prussian skirmishers could push out the better, more experienced French. As Kevin points out, the Prussians/Saxons weren't any good at skirmishing. Any lack of skirmisher quality would have to be made up by quantity to actually succeed in clearing the woods of the French.

Well, I have two accounts that say that Sanitz deployed more than Borke's 3rd rank. Only Hopner reports that, who Bressonet relies on almost exclusively in many places. Jany, quoting the Saxon Official history states the entire third rank of Sanitz's Brigade deployed as skirmishers. That is now 1000 men. The other account mentions the volunteer battalion being completely deployed.

IF the volunteer battalion was made up of Saxon Grenadiers, or following the Prussian mandate of 1805 where the 3rd rank was used to form a light battalion, all three deployments could be true—Borke, the entire 3rd Rank and the volunteer battalion. It isn't clear.

That Sanitz, a Prussian, was commanding the Saxon Brigade only complicates things. Hohenlohe did ask the Saxons for Volunteers on the 13th of October, so this may also be the source of Lessel's corps.

Regardless of who actually deployed, the most reasonable assumption here would be that a greater number of Prussians were necessary to clear the Heilgen Holtz of their French counterparts.

Of course, in response to the Prussians success, the French deployed more skirmishers and drove the Saxons back out. As Holtzendorf was facing nearly 8,000 French infantry with 2,522 infantry, the outcome is not surprising.

If we believe the Saxon Official history, Holtzendorf deployed more than 43% of his infantry as skirmishers. To simplymatch the French numbers, the Saxons would have had to deploy 31%.

When we get to Garwert and the fight for the Issertadt forest, we run into similar problems. The French reporting being driven back by Prussian skirmishers in woods and towns, but few if any authors explain how that could happen or how the Prussians do it. For instance, the French, by their own reports, deploy over 9,000 men in several brigades in the Issertadt forest. Around 10 am when Garwert arrives, the French report being nearly driven out of it entirely, but most authors say only two retreating Fusilier battalions and two Jäger companies were ever in the forest, some 1500 men, not counting their losses around Lutzeroda.

I'll get into that in the next stages of the battle.

Bill

Kevin wrote:

First, skirmishing and the numbers employed are not the issue.

Kevin:

Maybe it's not the issue for you, but It's the question Shane raised and I'll answer it if I want to.[Sung to "It's my party and I'll Cry if I want to"]

Second, I didn't list books 'that I agree with.' I listed books that address the subject and do it quite effectively. If you don't want to take advantage of them, that's up to you. You have criticized people for using quotes to support their position and then do it yourself.

Kevin, I haven't criticized people for using quotes. I commend the practice. I have given you two example of where those people you list have failed to address the subject 'quite effectively' [Gates] and one that you list who seems to disagree with your views on the tactical differences between the Prussians and French [Bressonet]

You seem to be quoting people and listing them in support of your points in a largely uncritical way, even when they disagree with your assertions. If I am being critical, it is of your use of them, not that you are providing quotes.

For instance, you say

One Russian commander, though, believed that after Bautzen in May 1813 the Russians had reached equality with their French opponents as skirmishers (Radetzky disagreed on that point).

No Kevin, Radetzky didn't disagree on that point, if you are still referring to the one 1813 Radetzky quote.

The two generals were referring to two differnt armies in two different conditions at two different times. The Russian commander was talking about the Russian Main Army in May having fought two battles against the French with different troops.

Radetzky was referring to the Army of Bohemia, newly formed with Austrian and Russian recruits, many having yet to see battle at all.

You can't juxtapose those two quotes and conclude they disagree on the same point--because they weren't referencing the same things--for the same reasons.

Make sure the men you quote are really taking about the same thing before you have them disagreeing on it.

You have to balance what any regulation stated with evidence from the soldiers who were there and actually used the regulations, or not, and what actually happened on the battlefield.

Have I suggested anything different? I am looking at what actually happened on the battlefield--Jena specifically. I am focused on how many skirmishers were deployed, which will shed some light on where the regulations were being followed…but that isn't what I am attempting to establish. Again, I am focused on just how many were deployed--period. We can see what we might be able to conclude from that once we have all the numbers. Maybe nothing. Who knows?

However, the numbers of skirmishers deployed DOES have something to do with tactics, how they are used and why.

For me, it is started as an effort to explain how the poorly trained Prussian infantry, so inferior to the French tactically, did what both sides report they did on October 14th.

That's it, Kevin. Whether the Prussians were well trained, had regulations or not, were crap compared to the French tirailleur or cared about their mothers doesn't signify here. It is just a matter of determining what the Prussians actually did in deploying skirmishers.

I quoted the Schutzen instructions to show that there were attempts before 1792 to coordinate light and line troop operations that you said didn't exist. I never said anything about whether they were followed seventeen years later or that my numbers proved they were…

The Prussians did not train to coordinate their light infantry with the troops in line and in formation.

Kevin, think about this for a moment. The Prussians have written instructions to coordinate their light infantry with troops of the line. The French don't have anything like it until individual units like the 10th Legere put instructions together. The Prussian regiments are doing this same thing, writing of instructions for individual units, the Fusiliers, the Jagers, even entire inspectorates, all before 1806.

But of course, the Prussians aren't training to any of those.

The Prussians, those monolithic, "everyone must do the same thing" mindless followers of Frederickian regulations don't train to the written regulations issued by the King, or the ones they write up themselves. Hmmm.

The French however, who have no light infantry regulations, don't need them, but do train to the line regulations when they feel it's useful.

So, if I understand you right, the Prussians had regulations for coordinating light and line infantry, but didn't use them, while the French didn't have any regulations addressing that issue, but

it must be inferred that French skirmishing techniques were institutionalized from practice and long use-and that did not originate in 1792

How would you 'infer that?' By their battlefield performance perhaps?

Bill

Posting on TMP takes practice: YouTube link

However, that same system came very close to defeat at Waterloo from a numerical inferior French army as 16,000 troops had to be employed to stop the Prussians. And after the French cavalry attacks French infantry resorted to large skirmisher swarms attacking the allied line that had to stay deployed in squares because of the close artillery support the French had and that French cavalry units also supported the French infantry, riding down any allied unit deployed in line, as what happened to Ompteda's KGL command amply testifies.

No. The French lost two battles of Waterloo. They lost the battle Napoleon wanted to fight against the Allied Army alone, with superior numbers, using the tactics they desired – massed infantry attacks and massed cavalry charges. Having failed totally to achieve any success at all in their battle, they were then utterly routed in the battle the Allied and Prussian armies wanted to fight. If during the closing stages of battle they fought in 'skirmisher swarms' – and as you know, this has been contested on TMP by Major Snort – this was because they had failed in their tactics of choice. Hardly a glowing reference for the French tactical system – although their courage was clearly first-rate.

Regards

"So, if I understand you right, the Prussians had regulations for coordinating light and line infantry, but didn't use them"
And for the Russians, according 10th Marines …. having had regulations for co-ordinating light and line infantry for over 20 years – regulations which they used to good effect against Persians, Turks, Swedes, Poles and various Native peoples – the Russians then stopped using them.

=================================

Regarding v. Radetz ….

We (including 10th Marines, who proffers this snippet as if it makes some useful point) do not have the original text. If, as Dave Hollns noted, all the secondary/tertiary uses of the quote derive form Rothenberg's translation (first published 1982), then it is not clear that the Russians are even included in the statement. It says "we", according to Rothenburg. Since we do not know the addessee, or even have the full text, we have no idea who Radetzky meant as "we". Substituting "the Austrians and the Russians" for Rothenburg's "we" is a later secondary/tertiary author's creation. For all we know, Radetzky might have been writing to the commander of a single detachment, regiment or even battalion!

I think it would be only fair to ask 10th Marines : please provide the full text of the original documents from whch you offer quotes, and in the original languages.

Otherwise, it is far too easy to think that you (and the other anglophone authors you have quoted on this subject) really have no idea what the contemporary writers were saying and are just quoting them out-of-context with more interest in making your "points" than actually providing information to us.

=================================

NSN :
So funny!
:-)

I found the material on the Russians from the two volume work Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars by Alexander Zhmodikov and Yurii Zhmodikov. Much of the source material for this work is from Russian sources. I have found it very useful.

Unfortunately I can't post anything in Russian because my keyboard does not have a Cyrillic option.

K

"I found the material on the Russians from the two volume work Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars by Alexander Zhmodikov and Yurii Zhmodikov"

I repeat myself, it appears:
"Please provide the full text of the original documents from whch you offer quotes, and in the original languages.

I think your Cyrillic keyboard "problem" will not apply – the book is in English. If your secondary source's text has footnotes, the idea of "full text" includes the footnotes.

It appears that you have no familiarity with any original source material, but are relying on repeating the work of various secondary (or tertiary?) sources that you have accessed in translation and offered here out of context. This is a generally poor method of historical enquiry in my opinion. I believe that the members here want and deserve better information and better methods of investigation and discussion.

Assuming you are using a Windows operating system published some time in the last 13 years or so , you actually do have the ability to input text in the Cyrillic alphabet.
support.microsoft.com/kb/292246
link
link
link

Your "explanation" for not offering quotes in context and with enough information to let us decide if the quotes are really pertinent is, sadly, quite weak.

One hopes that you would know how to communicate better in a internationalized context, and using modern communication tools. If you do not, it is either gross laziness, or a willful desire to score "points" instead of communicating useful information. I think we can all expect better of each other here, do you not agree?

Все клавиатуры имеют кириллицы вариант.

I found the material on the Russians from the two volume work Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars by Alexander Zhmodikov and Yurii Zhmodikov. Much of the source material for this work is from Russian sources. I have found it very useful.

Unfortunately I can't post anything in Russian because my keyboard does not have a Cyrillic option.

Kevin may be making a joke, guys… The two Zhmodikov's book is available in English. I don't why he can't reference Zhmodikov's book without having to translate the author's sources…

But as nvrsaynvr says, there is a translation app. available from Google.

Bill

Kevin is actually saying he used Zh. & Zh.'s bibliography to find interesting Russian sources.

Not sure what assertions he is supporting with them. Maybe that's where he learned the difference in the two calendars was 11 during the Napoleonic era…

;-)

BTW google translate is excellent, but it's the Unicode -> HTML that cinches the deal.

Thanks for once again hijacking a good thread just to personally attack another contributor. This is so typical of you lot. You all disgust me. Chuvak, I thought you at least were above this kind of thing.

And of course I will not be personally attacked for daring to speak? I am ing done with this thread!!

I don't mention the instructions for the service of foot cossacks and various Balkan or Greek native troops that date back, in various forms, to the 17th century.

I don't mention the battalion instructions for jägers by генерал-фельдмаршал граф Румянцев-Задунайский Пётр Александрович / general-fieldmarshal graf Pyotr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev-Zadunayskiy of 1761.

I also don't mention the regimental instructions for jägers or pandurs by генерал-майор Миллер Александр Иванович / general-major Aleksandr Ivanonvich Miller of 1773.

Why? Because I don't like to offer secondary or tertiary information, esepcially if it is in translation.

But, since 1783 is ten years before 1793 on every calendar, the example actually offered (in full, in the original language, with illustrating plates, with explanatory notes about the drafting and use of the document) is sufficient, I should think.

This is a good example of providing only relevant and verifiable in context source information.

"Chuvak, I thought you at least were above this kind of thing"

If you call me "chuvak", then I can respond :
Hey, "mate", there is no personal attack in asking for relevant, complete, in context quotes – in the language that the quote's author used. That's just good historic method. Nothing more.