"Skirmish Doctrine gathering " Topic

Due to severe command and control restrictions and complexities many nations seemed to follow a particular doctrine regarding just how many men would or could be thrown out of the entire btln establishment as skirmishers at any given time.

I would like to ask those in the know or anyone who might have the evidence that proves the tactical doctrine for each and every nation as to what numbers (strength) of a particular light infantry formation was legally thrown out as skirmishers at any given time so that it could be shared with all of us to provide a more realistic accountability of skirmisher tactics on the table-top.

Shane

Shane wrote:

I would like to ask those in the know or anyone who might have the evidence that proves the tactical doctrine for each and every nation as to what numbers (strength) of a particular light infantry formation was legally thrown out as skirmishers at any given time…

Shane:
I think you might be asking the wrong question, paricularly when limiting the question to light infantry formations and the word 'legally' on top of that.

I can show you evidence that 1. There wasn't a "limit" for both light and line in most all nations and 2. that SOPs may have been in place, but there was no 'legal' limit about it at all, quite the opposite. There was 'common practice', the needs of the moment, and what the troops could be expected to do to meet those needs. In meeting those needs of the moment, a general's interpretation of the situation and tools at hand varied, sometimes widely…

Bill

Hi Bill, yes you are probably right. I would then rephrase the question to ask what was the "common practice" of each nation.

Gentlemen,

I would suggest that not only doctrine, but how the use of skirmishers in myriad roles was done in the field.

For doctrinal publications you'll find much more on the allied side than on the French. The French had no army-level doctrinal publication. What they did was institutionalize the practice and it wasn't always done the same way. I would submit that they were much more flexible in their application than the allies were.

The French instituted the practice and then some commanders later wrote instructions for their command. The allies wrote the regulation and then trained their troops to that regulation-sometimes in lock-step on how to do it which doesn't lend itself to good skirmishing techniques.

K

Here are a few comments that might (or might not as the case may be) help:

Duhesme on Russian jagers:
'The skirmish lines that they occasionally tried to deploy in their front or flanks did not know how to pread out or to maintain proper direction. The majority of their NCOs are not capable of fending for themselves, and there are few who understand how to lead even a small patrol.'

William Surtees on the Russian Jagers (Surtees was a British light infantryman who observed the Russians in Holland in 1799):
'Their riflemen were shod with boots very much resembling those of our fisherman, coming up considerably higher than the knee; thus rendering them…incapable of celerity of movement, one of the chief requisites of a rifle corps.'

Summation of the Austrians by David Gates in The British Light Infantry Arm, page 21:
'Both the Prussian and Austrian regulations relating to their deployment gave them little opportunity for independent action in true light infantry style. The Austrian rear rank skirmishers, for example, were largely relegated to a purely defensive role. Their function was seen as one of protecting the line regiments from harassment by hostile tirailleurs, and they rarely ventured more than 300 yards from the parent force which retained a rigid grip on their activities by transmitting directions on the battalion drums.'

Scharnhorst's comment on the French:
'A lively regard for honor, for competition and distinctions, the ability to learn quickly and to adapt to changing conditions and circumstances make French soldiers better skirmishers than those of any other nation.'

de Jeney in The Partisan stated:
'The [light] infantry may be composed of men of all nations; but the…French…deserve the preference on account of their natural inclinations.'

Gates again, on page 27:
'…Duhesme wrote of the Russians that whilst 'they possess jager, we can assert that they have no true light infantry; their soldiers do not have sufficient aptitude for this service.' This view was evidently shared by General Radetzky of the Austrian service who, in the 1813 Leipzig campaign, was to issue a general order that 'fighting en tirailleur would be done only in a very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the maniere de tirailleur.'

Archduke Charles:
'One must always observe the principle that only a small portion of the troops may be employed as skirmishers while the main body remains as a reserve in close order to decide the issue.'

Archduke Charles, 1796:
'[Skirmishers] lacked strength…unless supported by a formed body of troops giving them drive, persistence, and steadiness. Regular, trained and solid infantry courageously advancing with closed ranks at a rapid pace, supported by its artillery, cannot be impeded by scattered skirmishers…It should close with the enemy as swiftly and in as good order as is possible, overthrow him and decide the battle.'

Scharnhorst 1811:
'The German tacticians still cannot rid themselves of the evolutions of Frederick the Great's autumn maneuvers. They made us forget war; everyone, even the English and French tacticians (not those natural soldiers who led armies in 1793 and 1794 and later) regarded them as the basis of higher tactics. Several competent men-Tempelhoff and others-continued to respect these tactics-turned-into-formalities when they commanded in the feild. It was generally believed that the mechanics of evolutions alone secured victory. Since people busied themselves primarily with the mathematical principles of fundamental tactics, these in turn became the basis of operations.'

A Prussian officer's comments from the 1790s:
'In the woods where the soldier breaks ranks and has no movements to carry out, but only to fire under cover of the trees, they are not only equal but superior to us; our men, accustomed to fighting shoulder to shoulder in the open field, found it difficult to adopt that seeming disorder which was yet necessary if they were not to be targets for the enemy.'

Scharnhorst, 1793-94:
'Probably never before has a greater number of light troops appeared on teh battlefield than among the ranks of the present French army, nor has military history ever been given more irrefutable examples of the essential value of such troops than during this war. If the campaigns are studied, one may be tempted to maintain that, at least on the French side, this is entirely a war of light troops: the Republic certainly owes most of her victories to her light infantry.'

Scharnhorst, 1811:
'…The French armies, compelled by the situation in which they found themselves and aided by their natural genius, had devised a system of tactics that permitted them to fight on open or broken ground, in open or close order, but this without their being aware of their system. In the Battle of Hondschoote, the actions at Dunkirk, Wervick, Tourcoing, the Battles of Mouscron and Wassigny, the atttacks on the Weissenberg Line-everywhere in the autumn of 1793 they won because of their open order and tirailleurs. In the spring of 1794, the Battles of Courtrai, Mouveaux and Fleurus, were won in the same manner. Decisive actions fought in close order were rare, though not unheard of-they occurred only when it was impossible to gain the objective through skirmishers.'

Baron Gross:
'The French, since the Revolution, have so successfully introduced such a new military system, that it becomes impossible to oppose them effectually, by any other mode than adopting one founded on similar principles. They send a number of riflemen in front of their line to annoy their adversary, and conceal behind them the different movements of their columns; nothing can be effected against this disposition, but by opposing light troops to light troops.'

John MacDonald:
'the fire of tirailleurs, and chasseurs, or marksmen is of the greatest importance. The French have derived prodifious advantages from athese descriptions, by unsteadying columns and lines, when deploying, previous to an action. These troops thrown out, cover and mask movements, while they annoy the enemy beyond all calculation.'

Sir Henry Bunbury remarking on the landing at Helder 1799:
'The enemy from the crests of the sand dunes kept up a constant and destructive fire, while he was himself sheltered by their folds from the guns of the British…The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was probably small: but the disadvantages under which the invaders fought necessarily exposed the three brigades…engaged to a serious loss of men; and a large proportion of the superior officers of the staff fell under the aim of the …riflemen. Two lieutenant colonels and about fifty men were killed on the spot: and LtCol Sir James Pulteney, five field officers and nearly 400 others were wounded.'

Foy on the French:
'The action would be opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his artillery by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcements to increase their overall effect. It was rare for any army to have placed its flanks in impregnable positions; in any case evey position presents natural loopholes which favor any attacker. Against such points the sharpshooters would concentrate their efforts, and elan and inspiration were not often lacking at such times amongst such troops. Once the chink in the enemy's armor had been revealed, it became the focal point for the main effort. The horse artillery would gallop up and open fire from close range with canister. Meanwhile, the attacking force would be moved up in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column( for it had little fire to offer), the cavalry in regiments and squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy bullets or cannon shot began to slacken, an officer, common soldier, or, often a Representative of the People, would start to chant the 'Victory Hymn…The soldiers would begin to move forward as the drums beat the charge…the sky would ring to a thousand battle cries constantly repeated: 'En avant! En avant! Vive la Republique!'

K

Awesome Kev that got the ball rolling,

This is the stuff that I am looking for. If all of this and more can be gathered on this thread then gamers have some solid stuff to work with to ensure improvements on their systems.

I would submit that they were much more flexible in their application than the allies were.

The French instituted the practice and then some commanders later wrote instructions for their command. The allies wrote the regulation and then trained their troops to that regulation-sometimes in lock-step on how to do it which doesn't lend itself to good skirmishing techniques.

Kevin:
If you mean by "more flexible" that every commander in the field was able to 'do his own thing', then I would submit that you are describing most all the armies in Europe. The idea that they trained their troops in 'lock-step' is WAY overstated.

What army and period are you talking about? I am confident that I can show you examples of variations and commanders 'doing their own thing' in a very flexible way, regardless of the period or nation…

Bill

Kevin,
These are pretty common quotes, and some do shed like on processes and specific skirmishing issues, like Duhesme's first quote, they also establish the often difficult task of making sense of antedotal quotes lifted out of context when trying to determine what they actually mean.

Duhesme on Russian jagers:
'The skirmish lines that they occasionally tried to deploy in their front or flanks did not know how to pread out or to maintain proper direction. The majority of their NCOs are not capable of fending for themselves, and there are few who understand how to lead even a small patrol.'

This has to be second hand information because Duhesme spend little time fighting the Russians and principly during the 1799 Swiss campaign. As there were very few Russian Jagers at that point. Suvorov actually had picked men from each regiment chosen as sharpshooters. They got to wear a green feather which Suvorov also wore to indicate their importance. So which Jagers he is speaking of is not clear.

William Surtees on the Russian Jagers (Surtees was a British light infantryman who observed the Russians in Holland in 1799):
'Their riflemen were shod with boots very much resembling those of our fisherman, coming up considerably higher than the knee; thus rendering them…incapable of celerity of movement, one of the chief requisites of a rifle corps.'

Robert Wilson, writing in 1807, having spent a year of campaigning with the Russians considered their Jagers very competent. Like Surtees comment, you don't know what specifics either opinion is based on… or whether the foot wear actually did keep them from doing well IN BATTLE.

Summation of the Austrians by David Gates in The British Light Infantry Arm, page 21:

'Both the Prussian and Austrian regulations relating to their deployment gave them little opportunity for independent action in true light infantry style. The Austrian rear rank skirmishers, for example, were largely relegated to a purely defensive role. Their function was seen as one of protecting the line regiments from harassment by hostile tirailleurs, and they rarely ventured more than 300 yards from the parent force which retained a rigid grip on their activities by transmitting directions on the battalion drums.'

This is interesting, but what do you do with all the examples of the Austrians NOT doing this? We don't even know what point in a twenty year period he is speaking of…I can give many examples of the Austrians not behaving this way on a large scale starting with Coberg in 1794.

Scharnhorst's comment on the French:

'A lively regard for honor, for competition and distinctions, the ability to learn quickly and to adapt to changing conditions and circumstances make French soldiers better skirmishers than those of any other nation.'

What is interesting is that his praise of the French skirmishers, at least where quoted by Paret, applies to activities outside of the battlefield in the le petite guerre.

de Jeney in The Partisan stated:
'The [light] infantry may be composed of men of all nations; but the…French…deserve the preference on account of their natural inclinations.'

This is supporting the idea that the Frenchmen somehow possessed a natureal inclination for skirmishing based on National characteristics… a very popular view among military men. That is why the British started raising foreign troops as skirmishers 1792-1800. Those Germans and French had that natural inclination… So the Lowenstein Chasseurs, Chasseurs Britannique and Corsican Rangers were the light infantry of choice for the British.

Gates again, on page 27:
'…Duhesme wrote of the Russians that whilst 'they possess jager, we can assert that they have no true light infantry; their soldiers do not have sufficient aptitude for this service.'

Same issues, and same questions of where, when and how he came to that conclusion…

This view was evidently shared by General Radetzky of the Austrian service who, in the 1813 Leipzig campaign, was to issue a general order that 'fighting en tirailleur would be done only in a very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the maniere de tirailleur.'

There is a very interesting TMP post concerning this quote by Frayer. Hunting it down, he found that Radetazky was referring to very specific troops in the Army of Bohemia rather than a general statement [And it wasn't an order] about all Austrian infantry. This isn't surprising when we find Radetzsky deploying whole battalions of line troops as skirmishers during the 1809 campaigns AND 1813 battles. In fact Radetzsky commits whole Grenadier battalions to skirmishing in 1813, probably to make up for the lack of practiced skirmishers he is speaking of.

Archduke Charles:
'One must always observe the principle that only a small portion of the troops may be employed as skirmishers while the main body remains as a reserve in close order to decide the issue.'

Archduke Charles, 1796:
'[Skirmishers] lacked strength…unless supported by a formed body of troops giving them drive, persistence, and steadiness. Regular, trained and solid infantry courageously advancing with closed ranks at a rapid pace, supported by its artillery, cannot be impeded by scattered skirmishers…It should close with the enemy as swiftly and in as good order as is possible, overthrow him and decide the battle.'

These instructions and comments from 1796 specifically references Coberg's use of his entire third rank of his army in skirmishing in Holland in 1794, which was a generally successful practice. Charles is cautioning against a general move towards such large scale skirmishing in the face of similar French practices. Nor is this the last missive to that point.

We find General Zack, Melas' chief of staff issuing not one, but two orders only weeks apart telling battalion commanders NOT to deploy too many skirmishers, for the very same reason that Charles gives. Yet, we see Mack issuing the same caution in 1805 and Scwartzenburg in 1813 issuing the very same instructions.

It seems that battalion commanders, far from being rigid in their deployments, were deploying more LINE INFANTRY skimrishers than those commanders felt were necessary…

Scharnhorst 1811:

Yes, the poor Prussians were formally in la-la land. And yet, the Prussians did skirmish during the period Scharnhorst is commenting on…At Jena, 1 in every 4 infantrymen, light and line, skirmished during the battle.

A Prussian officer's comments from the 1790s:
'In the woods where the soldier breaks ranks and has no movements to carry out, but only to fire under cover of the trees, they are not only equal but superior to us; our men, accustomed to fighting shoulder to shoulder in the open field, found it difficult to adopt that seeming disorder which was yet necessary if they were not to be targets for the enemy.'

The officer says "our men, accustomed to fighting shoulder to shoulder in the open field, found it difficult to adopt that seeming disorder which was yet necessary if they were not to be targets for the enemy."

This is written thirteen years before Jena. Even then the Prussians knew that it was "necessary" to skirmish if their men weren't to be just targets. What we find is that the Prussians fought in two ranks during their two years fighting in the Revolutionary wars, using the third rank as a reserve and skirmishers. Even Scharnhorst comments on this. The Duke of Brunswick wrote the instructions for using the 3 rank in 1792, and just happened to be the commander of the Prussian forces. We see the Austrians and British do the very same thing during this period.

Scharnhorst, 1793-94:
'Probably never before has a greater number of light troops appeared on the battlefield than among the ranks of the present French army, nor has military history ever been given more irrefutable examples of the essential value of such troops than during this war. If the campaigns are studied, one may be tempted to maintain that, at least on the French side, this is entirely a war of light troops: the Republic certainly owes most of her victories to her light infantry.

This is certainly what I have argued for. The French superiority was experience and the willingness to deploy a lot of skirmishers, far more than the Allies.

Then again, these French tactics came and went while the Prussians fought the French. French General Saint-Cyr commented on these masses of ill-trained troops:

"We have had success in 1793, with a war of tirailleurs. This novelty…first caused great success. But our enemy finally understood the weakness and the vices of this system. By 1794 it was all over. All that was gained from untrained troops á la débandage was now contrary to their initial success." [Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, p. 267]

Scharnhorst, 1811:
'…The French armies, compelled by the situation in which they found themselves and aided by their natural genius, had devised a system of tactics that permitted them to fight on open or broken ground, in open or close order, but this without their being aware of their system. In the Battle of Hondschoote, the actions at Dunkirk, Wervick, Tourcoing, the Battles of Mouscron and Wassigny, the atttacks on the Weissenberg Line-everywhere in the autumn of 1793 they won because of their open order and tirailleurs. In the spring of 1794, the Battles of Courtrai, Mouveaux and Fleurus, were won in the same manner. Decisive actions fought in close order were rare, though not unheard of-they occurred only when it was impossible to gain the objective through skirmishers.'

Again, the novelty of those tactics were shortlived according to St. Cyr. Scharnhorst is arguing for change within the Prussian military and overstates the French successes of the time.
Historican T.C.W. Blanning points out:

"Yet in fact the campaigns of 1792, 1793 and 1794 . . . were anything but constant, being rather a bewildering zigzag of success and failure and close-run things. The revolutionaries won at Valmy, but lost at Neerwinden, won at Jemappes, but lost at Mainz, won at Fleurus but lost at Kaiserslautern. (three times)" Blanning, T.C.W. The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802 p. 119]

Baron Gross:
'The French, since the Revolution, have so successfully introduced such a new military system, that it becomes impossible to oppose them effectually, by any other mode than adopting one founded on similar principles. They send a number of riflemen in front of their line to annoy their adversary, and conceal behind them the different movements of their columns; nothing can be effected against this disposition, but by opposing light troops to light troops.'

Again, what period is he speaking of? Somehow Suvorov pulled it off in 1799. The Russians are looking at the French skirmishers of 1813 and considering them inferior to their own because of their bunching together and deploying too many. This is from The Tactics of the Russain Army during the Napoleonic Wars.

John MacDonald:
'the fire of tirailleurs, and chasseurs, or marksmen is of the greatest importance. The French have derived prodifious advantages from these descriptions, by unsteadying columns and lines, when deploying, previous to an action. These troops thrown out, cover and mask movements, while they annoy the enemy beyond all calculation.'

This is written when…1803? And again, a generalization… quite true in many respects, but how does that help in understanding twenty years of skirmish warfare? Particularly when the Allies are attempting to do the same, when the British seem to be doing far better than the French…

Sir Henry Bunbury remarking on the landing at Helder 1799:
'The enemy from the crests of the sand dunes kept up a constant and destructive fire, while he was himself sheltered by their folds from the guns of the British…The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was probably small: but the disadvantages under which the invaders fought necessarily exposed the three brigades…engaged to a serious loss of men; and a large proportion of the superior officers of the staff fell under the aim of the …riflemen. Two lieutenant colonels and about fifty men were killed on the spot: and LtCol Sir James Pulteney, five field officers and nearly 400 others were wounded.'

Yes, and Bunbury also describes how the British reorganized to meet the French skirmishers… and their successes and failures in that. That ONE instance at Helder did impress the British. Such incidents moved the Duke of York to push for British skirmish formations.

Foy on the French:
'The action would be opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his artillery by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcements to increase their overall effect… I cut the non-skirmishing points

Context, context, context. It is a must for sussing out any real information. Again, Foy above is speaking of a specific period and French practices. It is interesting that French sent out a general, not 'minutely-regulated' skirmisher formation. Then in 1810 at Bussaco, Pelet mourns the lack of that regulated system of skirmishing after the failure of Ney's division, where most of his two brigades deploy as skirmishers in 'a general' way.

Context and time period are important. Who is talking about what in which year? Things changed over the twenty years of the war.

Bill H.

Indeed – quotes do not prove anything, although this is a good one from Duhesme in the Low Countries fighting the Austrians:

"These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their intrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order; they, in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men."

What this quote does however flag up is the overall strategic approach – from Jemappes onwards, the French locked themselves into an offensive posture (and their artillery accentuated this with the longer effective range -ie: first bounce at zero elevation). Consequently, with the rise of offensive warfare, which is praised, you get the critique above from Gates – which mysteriously then overlooks the quote from Charles about "Regular, trained and solid infantry courageously advancing" which implies the skirmishers are also advancing!

Look at the French on the defensive and their record is much worse, notably against Charles in 1796. Consequently, the deficiency in their method lays is its inherent lack of flexibility, esp on the defensive.

Just to respond to this as I have in another thread.

Although quotes by individual eyewitnesses might not prove the rule they do open a window into the past and enlighten us as to the world these men witnessed and lived through. Without their words passed down to us we would not be able to imagine what happened in the first place.

I know many of their statements can be taken out of context, broad sweeping and focused on a particular situation that might not be entirely accurate on the broader picture but they are words written by men who experienced what we have not. You have to take a certain amount caution in reading these passages but on the whole, historical books could not be written without them that allow us to interpret their words and imagine their experiences and make educated judgements based on the facts as they saw them.

However, I would not for a second wholly dismiss them either. As I said, we need these records in order to pass judgement and create a more balanced picture of their world. This is exactly what this forum (TMP) is here for. I base my own rules system on the passages I read written by these men and form interpretations authors make of their words as well. I do this to reach a level of accuracy that I personally deem my personal goal of my system. I will feed of these statements with much enthusiasm and weigh up their validity in comparison to other quotes and statements of the same period. I make adjustments as I see fit and at times re-adjust back if I feel the need.

Historical research of the Napoleonic period is based on these statements left to us and I treasure them. I will not dismiss them nor be sceptical about them. I will however be swayed only by proof that keeps coming from various sources which seems to be adding to an already building truth. This is why I will take the words of an eyewitness over ANY historian or person with an opinion living today. I will make my own mind up based on their recollections and not those of others living today who might feel the right dismiss them.

No offense intended here to anyone, this is just my belief and why I look at the period as I do.

Shane

The use of 3rd Rankers in the Prussian and Austrian armies (Nafziger – "Napoleon's Dresden Campaign" p 266):

"Sometimes entire battalion would deploy in skirmish order. In 1813 at Dennewitz two Prussian batteries coordinated their action with III/4th Reserve Infantry "completely deployed as skirmishers"

Brossier 1800:

"Austrian attacks in 1792 were always accompanied by a cloud of skirmishers".

General Duhesme (Nafziger – "Imperial Bayonets"):

"in truth, by the end of 1793, it can be said that the French armies had nothing but light infantry."

Bill wrote:

"Context, context, context. It is a must for sussing out any real information."

Bill,

I couldn't agree more strongly on this point. All of the quotes provided by 10th Marines are lifted straight from Gates' "The British Light Infantry Arm" and therefore are all out of context.

Shane:
I wouldn't dismiss any of the quotes. all of them can be informative.

I only suggest that to understand them, to be able to use them in any meaningful way, the context and support need to be in place. I can't count the number of times the Radeszky's quote has been used to "prove" that even the Austrian generals believed the Austrians couldn't skirmish at all.

Bill

What is the definition of 'out of context'? The chapter in Gates study about the different methods, or not, of how the nations' armies skirmished/fought in open order are quite relevant and support the author's point that the European armies were definitely behind the French in that method of fighting. Hence, the quotes used support that contention. So, how is that out of context?

K

Bill,

In what 'context', then, should Radetzky's comment be taken? EVery time I've used it the comment was in context and used to illustrate the problems the Austrian and the Russians were having fighting in open order against the French. Is there more to add?

K

10th Marines,

These quotes are out of context because you have not read them in their proper place in the original works. Bill has commented on most of them, but just to give another example:

The quote attributed to Henry Bunbury is being used to show the superiority of FRENCH tirailleurs. Those dots … that appear are where large chunks of the original passage have been removed for some reason. When those missing pieces are put back in, the passage reads quite differently and Bunbury doesn't say that this was a contest of skirmishers at all. Also it wasn't a contest against French troops, but Dutch. The second gap in Gates' rendition of Bunbury occurs in this sentence:

"fell under the aim of the … riflemen"

The missing word … is "Dutch". Why would Gates miss this out?

Aside from the tactical situation prevailing at the time of the quote, the accuracy of the quotes from later authors also depends on their knowledge of the subject. I expect Gates looked at the 1807 Austrian reg and decided that it represented practoice – hence the comments about distances etc. It is in fact a training manual and like many things, the training will cover the basics, butv adaptation will happen in practice. Indeed, von Ense talks about IR19 deploying a single company from his battalion – much like a French voltigeur company – but the reg uses the third rank.

MS,

If the original meaning is there, then the material isn't out of context. The questions you ask about why the author kept this in or left that out is another subject-and one that you should ask him.

K

10th Marines,

It seems quite obvious to me why particular words and sentences have been left out.

Before you start quoting, it would be advisable to check these sources out for yourself.

Perhaps you shouldn't be so suspicious of other people's motives, if that is what you're hinting at.

Again, if you have a question, contact the author. Generally speaking, but not always, authors and historians are more than happy to hear from you and to help.

K

K wrote:

What is the definition of 'out of context'?

When Radeszky is quoted as evidence that he thought ALL Austrian infantry did not understand skirmishing for the entire twenty years of Napoleonic warfare.

When IN CONTEXT Radeszky is actually talking about particular units in the Army of Bohemia in 1813.

What happens in the military history community too often is that one author throws up a quote as evidence for something, it is then used by twenty other writers and then scores of wargamers, but why it was said and in reference to what is forgotten. Because of that the quote is used to support conclusions they actually can't.

This kind of thing happens all the time, in many different ways. Just recently Major S. opened my eyes to a quote that Harman used in Volume IX of

A History of the Peninsular War

. Harman gives the quote in such a way that it looks like Craufurd is writing his opinion on skirmishing. In fact, it was a quote from Pelet, a French officer. BIG DIFFERENCE.

Context: Archduke Charles is writing in 1796 to keep Austrian officers from deploying too many skirmishers, not suggesting that it is unnecessary or that Austrians can't do it.

Context: When Dusheme and others say that the Russian Jagers can't skirmish, or are very poor at it, what those men saw and when they saw it is the necessary context to understand what they are saying, and whether they are just passing on hearsay.

Context. The historical situation and why a quote was said is very important to understanding what was said.

That isn't a reason to dismiss all those quotes. It is simply the reason that you can't take them on face value when quoted without a context.

Bill

Bill

K. wrote:

The chapter in Gates study about the different methods, or not, of how the nations' armies skirmished/fought in open order are quite relevant and support the author's point that the European armies were definitely behind the French in that method of fighting.

Kevin:
Okay, lets look at what Gates says concerning the Austrians and the look at the context.

The British Light Infantry Arm. on page 27 Gates writes that Duhesme stated 'the Russians have no true light infantry" and do not have "sufficient aptitude for this service." He then writes:

This view was evidently shared by General Radetzky of the Austrian service, who, in the 1813 Leipzig campaign, was to issue a general order that "fighting en tirailleur should be done only in a very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the maniere de tirailleur.

Indeed, in the view of the success of their light troops in former years, this issue had troubled the Habsburg forces ever since 1792, when General Klein had been puzzled by the3 fact that the untrained Grenzer of the Seven Years' War had proved 'far better light infantry than the present regulated and drilled Grenzer. This led one German officer to deduce that 'too much drill' had made the Austrians poor skirmishers. General Radetzky, however, remained persuaded that they simply did not 'understand this kind of fighting', whilst the Austrian Army's official history of the period concluded that "it was not realized that the soldier, unless possessing a natural aptitude for skirmishing, must be carefully trained for independent action.'

First he quotes Duhesme's opinions on the Russian Jagers, from a book he wrote between 1803 and 1809. From all that I can tell, Duhesme never fought against the Russians until 1814, so at what point did he get his information and from whom? What experience with the Russian Jagers produced these conclusions?

Then he quotes Radetzky. It was not an order, the source he references, but a recommendation about particular troops in the Army of Bohemia. It is a comment made in 1813, though Gates is building a case concerning the Austrians for the entire Napoleonic period.

Then he quotes Klein about Habsburg forces 'ever since 1792', when Klein is actually commenting several years after the 1800 decision by the Austrians to treat the Grenzers as regular infantry because they had revolted/mutinied the year before. They were destroyed as light infantry.

The Austrians concluded the Grenzers couldn't be trusted as light infantry. Yet, Gates presents this as though it applies to the entire Austrian Army and not just the Grenzers by quoting a Prussian officer, von Muffling, writing in 1810, saying the Grenzer problem 'led' von Muffling to conclude that too much drill had made Austrians 'poor skirmishers.'

Then he says "General Radetzky, however, remained persuaded that they simply did not understand this kind of fighting" …remained persuaded? Gates is quoting the very same reference as before from 1813. That is out of context to suggest he 'remained persuaded' from one comment at one point in time. But it gets worse.

The official army history that Gates refers to is the Krieg 1809, and by not identifying the date, but saying 'of the period' takes it way out of context.

What the Austrian Army is saying in that passage is that they have come to realize that light infantry needs to be carefully trained, and it isn't 'natural appitude' can't be depended on.

The Austrians in 1809 are admitting to a prejudice that the British, Russians and Prussians harbored from the 1700s into the Napoleonic wars that the best light infantry were those nations that had an aptitude for it. The British hired and raised foreign troops for their basic light infantry needs from 1792 to 1800 based on that mistaken notion. For a long time it was believed, and the French pushed the idea, that Frenchmen were enjoyed a 'natural aptitude' for skirmishing. It took a while for the Allied nations to realize that training and not innate talents were what made light infantry effective.

If Gates had bothered to read the Krieg 1809 passage as part of a larger explanation provided, he would have seen that the Austrians were justifying Charles' push for trained light infantry and explaining why until 1807-1809 they hadn't 'carefully trained' light infantry forces.

When you look at who is actually speaking and why they are saying what they are saying, Gates' two paragraphs make no sense at all as evidence for his conclusions about Austrian light infantry.

It is annoying that he then quotes Charles and Melas's Chief-of-Staff Zach on page 29 to prove that "even light infantry units were not to be employed in this manner", even though Zach specifically refers to "Regular, trained and solid infantry" in the quote. In other words, not light infantry.

Both Archduke Charles in 1796 and Zach in 1800,[who feels the need to issue his directives TWICE in a two week period], are telling their officers not to deploy too much line infantry as skirmishers because it weakens the 'formed body of troops' and both insist that 'only a few tirailleurs are necessary to screen the front.'

Now these explanations would be totally unnecessary if Austrian line infantry officers weren't deploying waht Charles and Melas though were too many skirmishers… In context, they were issued requests to keep skirmishing down to a minimum…

Charles specifically references Colberg's large scale skirmishing with the third line of his line infantry, and Zach to the Austrians deploying large numbers of skirmishers in the heavily cultivated Po Valley of northern Italy.

We see the very same cautions given to Russian Line infantry officers in the 1812 "Day of Battle" instructions and from Schwartzenburg to the Austrians in 1813… where he specifically tells them that it isn't necessary to deploy entire battalions as skirmishers. Which is interesting because Radeszky does that very thing both in 1809 and 1813…

The case that Gates is trying to build, the picture of Austrian light infantry practices he wants to prove falls apart when the context of the quotes he gives as evidence is known

Context.

Bill

Indeed – quotes do not prove anything

Oh, but there's going to be some petard-hoisting in the future with that little quote [irony, yes] banked.

amen

Bookmark the page, Shane. I have a feeling it may become one of the most quoted threads on TMP in the future thanks to that little gem.

Writing in 1792, Klein is part of a debate about what to do with the Grenzer, who had been regularised in 1769 and would be separated off again in 1798. He was really talking about theior performance in the last Turkish war, where they had suffered heavy casualties – so much so that few battalions were fielded before 1796. Also, when he talks about their performance, he is talking about "der kleine Krieg" (small war) not the skirmishing asociated with units immediately in front of a formed line. Their raiding and outpost work had not been up to scratch. There was no rebellion – just minor trouble stirred up by a few Orthodox priests among the Orthodox troops (Wallach and Serbs). 1769 had seen much greater formalisation of the army, while the 1798 decision was a move back to their old ways.

Dave:
Yes, agreed, is is a discussion about the small war and not the battlefield. However I think that Gates quotes Klein in writings after 1792…the schriftgut Miliatrgrenze, F/30 'Gedanken uber Eigenschaften and Widmung der Militar Grenzer' or "Thoughts on the characteristics and dedication of the Military border guards"; The 'dedication' of the Grenz were a major issue. And again, Klein, unlike Gates, is focused specficially on the Grenz, not ALL Austrian line and light infantry.

Bill

Duhesme on Russian jägers, not taken out of context ….

"Au reste, quoiqu'à l'imitation des autres armées européennes, [les Russes] aient des corps de chasseurs à pied, on peut assurer qu'ils n'ont point d'infanterie légère; les soldats ont trop peu d'intelligence pour ce métier. Les pelotons de tirailleurs qu'ils voulurent quelquefois jeter sur leur flanc ou en avant d'eux, ne surent ni s'étendre ni se diriger. La plupart de leurs sous-officiers ne sont pas en état de s'orienter, et il eu est peu qui puissent se tirer de la plus petite découverte. Leurs cosaques se gardent assez bien; ils montrent dans les escarmouches de l'intelligence; mais suivant le génie des troupes légères ils influent peu dans les batailles. Le triste résultat de l'expédition de Hollande dut aussi détromper les Anglais de l'opinion avantageuse qu'ils avaient prise de leurs auxiliaires, et donna de nouveaux titres à la supériorité que l'infanterie française s'est acquise dans cette guerre, et que les Russes semblaient être venus lui ravir."

"And finally, although in imitation of other European armies [the Russians] have corps of foot chasseurs, one can say that they have no light infantry; the soldiers have too little intelligence for this vocation. The platoons of skirmishers that they will sometimes through out on their flanks or to their front know neither how to spread out nor how to order themselves. The majority of their under-officers are not able to direct them, and there are few [under-officers] who can lead them on even the smallest reconnaisance. Their cossacks do rather well; they show intelligence in skirmishes – but as is typical for light troops, they have little impact during battles. The sad result of the Holland expedition should thus undeceive the English of the positive opinion that have of their auxiliaries, and give new proof of the superiority that the French infantry earned during that war, and which the Russians seem to have come to admire."

Essai sur l'infanterie légère
lieutenant-général comte Guillaume-Philibert Duhesme (Mercurey en Bourgogne 1776 – Genappe 1815)
Paris : L. G. Michaud, 1814
link
pages 161-162

Duhesme's comments are in the context of the campaign of 1799, and most specifially the Anglo-Russian descent on Holland. He himself made the campaign of 1799 under Championnet in south Italy – and so he did not face the Russians himself in 1799. He was under Augereau in 1805 and back in south Italy in 1806, then Spain and Catalonia from 1808, recalled in 1810 in disgrace (accused of a long list of abuses and misdeeds). So, prior to writing his essay, he had no first-hand experience with the Russian army. Not surprisingly, out of his whole "Essai" of some 500 pages, Duhesme makes only the quoted mention of the Russians.

Among the Russian forces in Holland, there were exactly two understrength jäger battalions, some 700 men of the Sutgof (or "Suthoff") Jägers. Indeed their performance was not up to the Russians' own standards. In punishment for their lack of success in Holland, the regiment was disbanded upon their return to Russia, and general-major Ivan Efimovich Sutgof was sent to command the army garrison troops at the Ruotsinsalmi naval base off the Finnish coast.

Dusheme was not too out of date when he wrote "corps de chasseurs à pied … point d'infanterie légère". It was only from the beginning of 1797 that the Russians' various regional jüger "corps" were formed into more regular battalions – Sutgof's battalion coming from the Finland region. The order to form a two-battalion regiment was given over the summer of 1797. The unit shipped out for Holland, well short of complete in men and training, in October 1798.

===================================

William Surtees on the Russian jägers, not taken out of context ….

Twenty-five years in the Rifle Brigade
William Surtees
Edinburgh : William Blackwood, 1833
link
pages 8-9

He is talking about Russian troops that just landed marching past him. While strange tall "wader" boots have never been the standard field footwear of Russian infantry, it is not too strange that the jägers might have waded ashore to provide cover for the rest of the landing. Also, as Sutees himself repeatedly reports (on the next several pages), the bridges and dikes were all broken by the French and many canals were over-flowing – making for mud that was knee deep and more and for many requirements for fording.
In any case, he does not report ever seeing any Russians at any other time. So, if the Russian jägers ever took off their supposed waders, Surtees would never have known.

===================================

Comment :

It is absurd to proffer these two little snippets about the 700 amphibious Finns of Sutgof in early 1799 – snippets of extremely dubious quality when examined in context – as any sort of "evidence" about the Russian jägers or Russian skirmishing during the Napoleonic wars.

I can't so easily comment on the other snippets from 10th Marines, but I could imagine that they are equally useless when actually viewed in context, as opposed to being cherry-picked and quoted out-of-context.

"Frayer" – who appears to have had his account locked for his transgressions – posted this about a year ago regarding Radetzky ….

==================================

Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon,‎ by Rory Muir (1988), page 51

"By 1813 the Austrians had virtually given up, believing that the great bulk of their infantry lacked the training and aptitude needed for the the role. As Radetzky observed in September 1813, 'fighting en tirailleure [skirmishing] should be done only in a very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the manière de tirailleur.'"


This passage in Muir is footnoted as follows:

"Quoted in Gunther E. Rothenberg, Napoleon's Greatest Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army (London, Batsford, 1982), p.184. Austria had, of course, lost her traditional source of light infantry when Napoleon annexed Croatia (part of the Illyrian Provinces) in 1809."

In Rothenberg (page 111 in later edition, page 184 in the first edition), the text reads:
"Rigidly controlled and regimented, the Austrian skirmishers rarely were the equal to the French. Some observers blamed this on national aptitude. The able Radetzky, probably the best young general to come out of these wars, observed ruefully that 'operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting.' A German officer, on the other hand, argued that it was not national character but 'too much drill' that made the Austrians less effective skirmishers than the French."

Only the parts in bold are the Radetzky material. The rest is not. Incidentally, "en tirailleure" is mangled French. It should be "en tirailleur". Also, "manière de tirailleur" is not actually idiomatic French. It appears only in these English-language books, as far as I know.

The British Light Infantry Arm 1790-1815, by David Gates (1987) has the version as per Muir (who himself cites Rothenburg, who has the other version). Redcoat: the British soldier in the age of horse and musket‎ by Richard Holmes (2002) also has this version. Both spell "tirailleur" correctly, though Muir and Rothenburg do not.

Once There Were Titans: Napoleon's Generals and Their Battles 1800-1815‎ by Kevin Kiley (2007) offered a paraphrase that expanded the quote attributed to Radetzky with an assertion of his "belief" and "the conclusion". 
"The Austrian General Radetzky observed that neither the Austrians nor the Russians understood fighting in open order and believed that skirmishers could be used in a very small, limited way. The conclusion that was reached was that the Austrians were not the equal of the French when fighting in open order."

All these trace to a citation something like "KAV Alte Feldakten 1813 Deutschland Hauptarmee F/10 436b". I can find no prior citation of this source prior to the anglophone authors listed above – first in 1982 or 1987. Since they have substantially different versions, I assume both Gates and Rothenburg saw the text in the original language.

"KAV" is a little odd. Better would be something like "Österreichisches Staatsarchiv / Kriegsarchiv Wien", but these are all written by anglophones who call the place "Vienna". For a document in September, one would have expected "Faszikel IX" (not "F/10", as they are monthly and should use Roman numerals), but perhaps the piece was filed by date of receipt, or lumped in with Leipzig documents, or some such. The number "436b" tells us that it was about the 437th document of the month under the given heading. Specifically, the "b" should indicate that the document was inserted in the sequence sometime after the original transfer of documents from the war ministry to the archives. Good "Germanic" organization skills!

In any case, the Radetzky quote is from a General Staff document (that's what's in those document files), from the staff of the Army of Bohemia. It was not an analytical comment, not a summary judgment voiced in retrospect, not a considered opinion, not a part of a staff history, nor anything similar. I have no idea what the original document said, not least because it is quoted in two different versions. The Gates version looks much more plausible to me, although it appeared in print some 5 years after the Rothenburg version. Still unless we have the original (in German? in French for the benefit of the Russians?), we really have no idea of the exact meaning (or of who mangled the French language). What we do know is that it applied (only) to the Army of Bohemia just before Leipzig.

What we also do know is the size of the "specialist" light infantry of the Army of Bohemia, which amounted overall to 317 battalions, 167 squadrons and 72 batteries outside of the Russian/Prussian Guard.


With the Austrian divisions :

-- 5 Austrian Jager battalions

-- 10 Grenz battalions


With the Graf Vitgenshteyn :

-- 16 Russian Jager battalions (all still in the process of rebuilding with conscripts after the 1812 and early 1813 campaign)

-- 1 Prussian Schützen battalion (equivalent)


Total of 32 battalions, or about 10% of the infantry.

The specialist light infantry arm was clearly very understrength (and mostly raw recruits for the Russians). The usual Russian ratio was 33% light infantry. So, whatever Radetzky wrote, it was aimed mostly at the use of recently re-built, rather ill-trained conscript "heavy" "line" infantry units in the skirmishing role. There is no general comment being made, no comparison to the French, no element of national characteristics that can obviously and clearly taken as Radetzky's meaning (re-read the text in bold above), unless one has already decided (in advance) that this is what you wish he had said.

The Russians understood the problem and played along. The Graf Raevskiy detached whole Grenadier regiments (experienced, selected men) from the Reserve to act as skirmishers and help make up a more typical ratio. Assumedly Radetzky approved, right ?

==================================

So, again, we have 10th Marines quoting cherry-picked little snippets out of context to show some alleged French superiority. Monsieur, I believe your petard is waiting …..

I have no idea who you are but you are also trying to make a case against Kevin for some unknown personal reason. I, and others see right through the reason for your posts.

You stated:

"So, whatever Radetzky wrote,"

But the point is that he DID write about it as it was obviously a concern of his. And as far as I am aware, Radetzky was a brilliant commander and judge of all things military at the time in the Austrian army.

it was aimed mostly at the use of recently re-built, rather ill-trained conscript "heavy" "line" infantry units in the skirmishing role.

And your point is? of course it was aimed at the ill-trained conscript heavy infantry. The "specialists" Light infantry arm in the Austrian army was so small that it is hardly likely that his comments were aimed at them now was it? He eye-witnessed the ability of the 3rd ranker's and other "non-specialist" light infantry at the time and passed a judgement that was not complementary, so what? At least it provides us an insight from one of their own best commanders on an army that had such a small specialist light infantry arm and their less than superior attempts to increase their ability.

There is no general comment being made,

huh? how did you come up with that comment, of course it was a general comment, it is so broad sweeping that you would need a bulldozer to remove the debris of that very clear and concise statement about his own army.

The obvious point in all of this is that the Austrian army was a long way behind in the training and deployment of light troops all the way throughout the Napoleonic wars. They did not perform these types of duties anywhere as proficiently as the French in either experience, training or numbers. Radetsky identified this problem and spoke out about it. Why does the debate have to always deteriorate to a ing contest about national superiority? Radetsky made comments about his own army which were made as he saw it. He obviously wanted the army to improve in this kind of combat style and made comments to the fact.

So, again, we have 10th Marines quoting cherry-picked little snippets out of context to show some alleged French superiority. Monsieur, I believe your petard is waiting …..

Look whomever you are, your last couple of posts are nothing more than to aim and fire at another poster in an attempt to destroy his credibility. That sucks and is typical of the group I have seen who seem to click together as often as you do to undermine comments of those you dislike. Lift your game please and keep the debate at an amicable level of discussion and not "cherry pick" other posters for the sake of brow beating or points scoring. All Kevin did was place quotes up on this thread for others to pass judgement on. All you have done is pass judgement on Kevin. And for what reason?

Just because your opinions above are now published on this forum does not in any way make them suddenly valid and the truth and untouchable. Your purposely singled Kevin out to lower his credibility to increase yours. Your words are just like anyone else's here, words, comments and opinions put forth for judgement by others.

Shane

Why can's posters look at things more objectively and not get so defensive when another poster writes something that in any way places their favourite army (or nation) in a bad light? This really es me off and people have to start leaving their boxing gloves at the door when they enter a debate. The whole point of this thread was to gather information that has been past down through history for our privilege to use. I never intended this thread as a ing contest !!!

Discussion and debate, YES!… personal attacks and insults were NOT my intention here!!!

And if your wondering why I defend Kevin so much, it is because I never see him perosnally attack other posters. He might argue against what someone says but he NEVER brings it to a personal level unlike you guys do. I have more respect for those good traits in Kevin then what I can find in the bunch of you who seem to have nothing more than a great personal vendetta against his person that is more important to you than serious debate. I get so sick and tired of it as does many other posters her.

"he DID write about it as it was obviously a concern of his"
Actually you don't know what he wrote. All you have seen is some various English translations of a few of his words taken out of context. And then some comments about "what this means" written by modern authors. You deceive yourself if you think this really is a sound basis for forming an impression of Radetzky's general opinion on the matter. I just went through 200+ pages of manuscripts from him about the 1813 campaign. Not a single word about light infantry skills or tactics.

"it is so broad sweeping that you would need a bulldozer to remove the debris of that very clear and concise statement about his own army."
Actually no. What he is alleged to have written, after translation to English, is :
fighting en tirailleure should be done only in a very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the manière de tirailleur
or
operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting

SIDENOTE : both of these versions are ultimately footnoted to the same archive document by the various anglophone authors who quote each other. Both versions cannot be correct translations, as only one mentions the Russians.

The comment by v. Radetz, if you assume he wrote something like what is reported in English, can only surely apply to some set of sub-units of the Army of Bohemia in September 1813, as that is where he was serving and that is to whom he was writing. We don't even know if it applied to all sub-units of that force.

If you want to broaden the application of the comment – to all Austrians and all Russians, in all years, etc., etc. – this would be your creation. Several quoted anglophone authors have built a similar creation out of the quote. But there is no broad application of the comment inherent in it – this has to be added on later if you want to have it.

"Look whomever you are"
Please be civil.

"your last couple of posts are nothing more than to aim and fire at another poster in an attempt to destroy his credibility."
If my posts allow the members here to judge for themselves the credibility of 10th Marines, then I am pleased.

"personal attacks and insults were NOT my intention here"
Then why do you lecture me for providing the context for the 3 quotes from 10th Marines? Why I am not allowed the opinion that these 3 quotes are cherry-picked and out of context, and that to draw broad conclusions from them is absurd? Who appointed you sheriif here?

If you want to broaden the application of the comment – to all Austrians and all Russians, in all years, etc., etc. – this would be your creation.

NO, that is not my intention or creation at all. In fact, I take the stance that it was previous wars against Austria and other European nations as well as their experience in North America which highlighted to the French the need to expand their skirmisher ability. I take the view that the French emulated the German nations who had specialized skirmisher (jager) units. I also take the stance that in the Revolutionary wars that the lack of experience and ability of the French line infantry led to them being deployed endebande for much of the wars until they could perform normal battlefield formations. Their experience that was built up in this period fighting nations such as Austria enabled them to refine and improve their light infantry capability as a result.

I completely understand that France (like any nation learning war) learns from its adversaries and France was no exception. Just as nations like Austria and Prussia had to also learn through innovation and emulation.

In my own system I have rated the Austrian Jager btlns as "Elite" with a skill very high as with Schuetzen and other similar units as in the Prussian army etc. I also rate French Voltiguers (of the more experienced regiments) as superior as well. Even in the Russian army I have rated their Jagers from experienced regiments as superior. All of this is dependant on their training, length of service and experience and in this all nations have skirmishers of high quality in my system. I do not create things out of mis-quotes of out of context statements at all. I take the stance that EVERY nation of the period was more than capable of fielding superior and inferior troops of every description.

Then why do you lecture me for providing the context for the 3 quotes from 10th Marines? Why I am not allowed the opinion that these 3 quotes are cherry-picked and out of context, and that to draw broad conclusions from them is absurd? Who appointed you sheriif here?

I have not told you you cannot post here at all. All I have said is that I am ed off that people seem to use Kevin's posts as a means to attack him. He did not offer opinion here, all he did was put forth quotes and left it at that. He did not pass judgement on the quotes he offered at all. He placed them here without comment, it was you who took those quotes as a reason to attack him unjustly and threw in the petard comment to boot.

If you want to know why I am angry? it is because I did not want this thread to be just another facade for posters such as yourself to attack others. It was not my intention for this to occur and because I put up this thread I feel I have the right to ask for such restraints…If you wish to ignore my plea then fine, go ahead and ruin yet another thread that had the best of intentions before you ruined it!!

" I take the stance that it was previous wars against Austria and other European nations as well as their experience in North America which highlighted to the French the need ….."
In a general sense, your conclusions as summarized in the remainder of this post, are rather similar to mine on the overall question.

======================

"all he [10th Marines] did was put forth quotes and left it at that"
This was not a neutral or balanced group of quotes.

He put forth selected, cherry-picked out-of-context quotes (or alleged quotes, or translations of alleged quotes) that all tended to establish a single point of view.

I knew something of the context of 3 of the quotes. I shared this context. I then drew my conclusion.

I don't think I have done anything "unjustly". I feel I am fully justified in my conclusion – both on the basis that all men are entitled to their own opinions and based on the specifics that I posted. I hope other members will now be able to draw their own conclusions.

I don't see why this should have "ruined it!!" for you.
We each give our few pieces of information. We each offer our conclusion(s). Is it only "OK" if my conclusion aligns with yours? Should my account be locked now for insufficient agreement with Shane or 10th Marines?

"I have not told you you cannot post here at all."
Should I be thanking you for your restraint? Are you implying that you are considering doing this, but holding back while you lecture me over and over? Is this some kind of threat or something? Are you, really, the sheriff here?

"If you want to know why I am angry?"
Actually, I never asked about your emotional state. I don't know you – and, frankly, don't ….. well, you know ….. don't care about your feelings.

We each give our few pieces of information. We each offer our conclusion(s). Is it only "OK" if my conclusion aligns with yours?

As long as you debate amicably and not fire off torpedoes at others I see no problem at all.

Should my account be locked now for insufficient agreement with Shane or 10th Marines?

ahh of course, lets go down this track. Obviously your going to take this to a whole new lower level aren't you?

It is not your posts that I have an issue with, nor your conclusions. It is the way you went about it, your tone. Your whole purpose for posting was not to debate but a facade to attack Kevin personally. And now that I am defending him I am going to suffer for it.

you can always identify the underlying tone and purpose of a posters posts by skipping the body of his post and going right to the last paragraph for it is here that you really get the measure of the intent of the post…and you sir were blatantly transparent with your intent.

"not fire off torpedoes at others I see no problem at all."

I never qualified on torpedoes. Only light weapons, and the Stinger mounted on a kind of pedestal.
:-)

Shane, that was 5 posts and 1500 words about me and my tone. That would be about 6 pages of text! And you just skipped over the actual information I offered, and just looked at my conclusions to measure my "tone"!

Is that really how you want to interact with a new member here? Is that the typical welcome one can expect here?

Ugh!

One observation, if I may –

In the Revolution and early Empire periods, the French had a considerable advantage at skirmishing, as well as foraging, because their soldiers were fighting to overthrow the oppression that they, themselves, had endured under the monarchy, and which the revolution had removed.

They were therefore more trustworthy, and less likely to desert or shirk duty when unsupervised.

Especially in the Revolutionary period, they were quite sloppy and undisciplined in their skirmishing tactics, but they were there in such swarms that it did not matter that much.

Once the army became better organized and trained, their skirmishing became more institutionalized.

But after 1809, or certainly after 1812, the overall quality of French recruits declined, as did their faith in what they were fighting for. So they were less trustworthy when not supervised, and less skilled than their predecessors.

Meanwhile, the allies were developing specialist skirmishing units, and some training for the rank-and-file third rankers. Also, the Prussians (at least) were becoming a more nationalized force, so THEIR troops were now more trustworthy – fighting for an oppressive monarchy! They must have really hated Nappy!

Anyway, that's my amateur impression from what I've read over the years.

No wargamers or animals were harmed in the production of this post.

In a general sense, your conclusions as summarized in the remainder of this post, are rather similar to mine on the overall question

OK, then can we try to debate the questions without directly aim at fellow posters for putting forth quotes. Debate the quote and not the poster? That is all I ask.

Thanks Widowson,

You may have given us the slap we needed.

I would agree with your conclusions indeed. Especially in regards to trustworthiness and duty to the crown. This seems to me to be a very valid point.

Personally I feel that the French civil war in the Vendee was also a very important factor in the experience of French soldiers at the time. This guerrilla style war provided a great deal of "on the job" training and experience for French soldiers and officers who took away with them new ideas and abilities in the art of skirmish combat that they may not have understood previously.

This could be the singular most important factor for the rise of skirmish combat for the French. But I in no way understate the experience the French gained in fighting against the Austrians from 1794-1800 in the many actions they fought also. The Austrians too at this time fought well in skirmish combat as is historically noted. However, it seems that they did not learn the lessons of this kind of combat as readily as the French did. It is just the impression I walk away with.

Shane

Shane, that was 5 posts and 1500 words about me and my tone. That would be about 6 pages of text! And you just skipped over the actual information I offered, and just looked at my conclusions to measure my "tone"!

Is that really how you want to interact with a new member here? Is that the typical welcome one can expect here?

Don't panic mate, I read your entire post, trust me. None of this would have occured if you had stuck to attacking the information and not the poster…

And I have a sneaking suspicion your not so new as you want us to believe.

Widowson,

Actually, only the British managed the real trick – have all the light infantry duties done well and with few men relative to the size of the total force.

The French went early to the "use a lot of men" approach, perhaps out of necessity. They regularized it, more or less, later – but the approach was the same.

The Russians rather eagerly adopted this method also under Alexander – and even used more men than the French (33% of their total infantry were jägers in 1812-1815).

The Austrians and the Prussians were much slower to move from the concept of a few specialists to field larger numbers of light infantry. They felt compelled in this by the weight of numbers that French could and did send out as light infantry. Their specialists were just not enough. And since they were beaten rather often in the various campaigns, there was a natural set of questions asked about what changes could be made to improve things.

But the British were the real experts, in my opinion, as their few specialists did seem to suffice. But, save Waterloo, the British were not fighting the best of the French, so my opinion is held more from my general impressions than from good evidence.

I like to look at the formations from the stand point of the division.

When you look at each army at this level you get a better perspective of each army's attention to importance of skirmishers.

The French often had one Legere regiment in each division to provide the typical skirmisher duties alongside the voltiguer companies of the Ligne regiments. On top of this the Ligne regiments could skirmish when called on but this ability declined from after the mid empire.

A typical Russian division had three brigades from 1812 onwards with one brigade made up of two Jager regiments. This means that the division had at least 1/3 of its number as specialized skirmishers. On top of this the Musketeer regiments had light platoons assigned to each btln as well and there is evidence that musketeers could and did skirmish as well.

The British as we all know had typically 3 brigades (or more) with a light company from each line btln joined together to act as light cover for each brigade. On top of this were rifle detachments who were specialized in this kind of warfare. What always bugs me is why they insisted on placing all of the "supposid" specialized light regiments into a special division? I see no real reason for this other than to have an elite formation made up of the best units which in my opinion detracted from the overall "potential" eliteness the other divisions could have gained form their inclusion.

With some trepidation, but:

Even if you take Radetzky's quote as him specifically referring just to the Austrian troops within the Army of Bohemia in 1813, is it not a valid analytical jump to say that although Radetzky was only referring to Austrian infantry in this particular army at this time we have no evidence that:

a. This Austrian Army was substantailly different from others of its time (1813) – i.e. we shouldn't expect anything different from, say, the Austrian Army of Italy.

b. The composition and tactics of the Austrian Army in 1812, or even 1809, were so different from that of 1813 [i.e. no 1812 French-type disaster that would change the quality and composition of its Army] i.e. we can't see why the Austrian infantry would be noticeably better at skirmishing in these years either.

Although as you say this quote shold properly only apply to one Austrian Army in one certain area, without further first-hand evidence (and taking into account the value of that first-hand evidence obviously), surely we are only left with these comparative tools?

I'm certainly not even mildly knowledgeable about the details of the Hapsburg Army so maybe there are substantial reasons to think that the performance of its skirmishers in this particular year and theatre were abnormally low – but may we not here those reasons?

Regards

well said Whirlwind

Whirlwind,

I will let others answer with regard to the Austrians. Indeed, if forum pseudos are correct, a real expert on Austria is part of this thread.

In one of the two "alternate" versions (translations?) of the v. Radetz quote, the Russians are mentioned. Not mentioned in the other.

For the Russians, in late 1813 there were really less than raw conscript units, save for a few surviviors of 1812 and the Spring 1813 campaign. The 1812 levies had been triggered early as part of the late 1811 special levies. The normal transit time allowed for moving recruits from the Russian interior to the west of Russia was 9 months. The early 1813 levies had not even this amount of time to get to the front near Leipzig.

Their numbers were also low. The ratio of Russian jägers was supposed to be 1/3 of overall infantry. Although more plentiful than the Austrians, the Russian light infantry was still well less than 20% of Russian infantry (and the overall ratio was, as noted above, on the order of 10%). Hence the Graf Raevskiy sent grenadiers from the reserve to make up the numbers in the skirmish chains.

Also, save again for a few survivors and a handful of special units, none of the Russian jägers of 1813 would be rifle-armed or from the traditional recruiting territories (such as Courland and Finland) were there were a goodly number of foresters and gamekeepers and a "tradition" of weapon use and jäger service. Indeed, even the production of regular Model 1808 Russian muskets was by now over pressed – captured, repaired and old arsenal models were being issued.

So, although it might be argued by some (not me, by the way) that Russian doctrine and "skills" had improved reckoning 1799 to 1805 to 1807 to 1812, the new human material of late 1813 was likely the worst trained and prepared of the entire period. They were few in number and "pre-exhausted" by being quick-marched thousands of kilometers. They received virtually no training except "on the job".

Lastly, the Russian tactical/operational supply system placed great emphasis on regimental "non-combatant" specialists supported by an army-level train that linked to fixed depots in western (and southern) Russia. The specialists were decimated in the prior campaigns and could not easily be replaced from conscripts. The depots had been largely used or destroyed and ended at the old Russian border in any case. The supply system was thus required to operate beyond its designed range and often had to rely on local "requisitions" – activities it was not trained or organized to perform.

To scale the problem ….
Some of the better Russian light infantry units in 1813 were actually opolchenie (militia). Examples here include the 17th and 18th Cohorts of Saint-Petersburg Militia (actually mostly forest dwellers, not Petrburg urbanites: Finn-Urgic and Veps people from Karelia plus Mari-El and Permiac people of old Vologda province), the Courland and Lithuanian Volunteer Rifles, and the volunteers raised on the Tver region appanage properties of HIH Grand Duchess Yekaterina Pavlovna. These units had to be retained when the bulk of the opolchenie had been sent home.

Overall, the Russians light infantry actually gave a pretty good account of themselves in late 1813, "under the circumstances".

A footnote ….
The question of regional ethnic "aptitude" avoided entirely …. there was still a regional and social status diffference between various parts of Russia. The typical agricultural serf had never touched a firearm or any other mechanical device invented after about 1400 AD – these would form the vast bulk of army units. The rural residents of the northern forest areas were almost hunter-gatherers – they typically were less represented in army conscription as they were rather harder to locate and lived in areas of very low population density. The Cossack, Bashkir, Teptyar and similar peoples in the south and east were under treaty or contract obligation to provide defense of the border regions and thus learned the use of arms and "la petite guerre" literally from infancy – but they were exempt from regular army conscription. The few urban or factory serfs were also often exempted from conscription, because they were "necessary for national production" (i.e. they were being exploited for a good profit by someone important).

There are two things you must bear in mind about Radetzky and this quote: 1) He considered himself a great reformer, who would overhaul the army – consequently, like all such people, he writes in a rather negative way about the current state of anything he wishes to reform. 2) The origin of this quote in English is solely Rothenberg, but has been copied and expanded from there – the other authors and quoters have done no research of their own, otheriwse we would see more material. Rothenberg was a follower of Rauchensteiner and both are reacting to the more poatriotic material about Charles and the army in general (Rauchensteiner got his PhD with a thesis on Hiller, of of the key opponents of Charles). They are always looking for the black material.

The Austrian commanders are always asking for more light infantry – Freikorps in the First Coalition, German mercenries in the Second, Jaeger in 1805 & 09, then more Freikorps in 1813. However these are light infantry and not the skirmish line in front of a formed unit. These lights did not need the training or kit to fight in broken ground, so the regualrs tended to look down on them. In contrast, the 1807 reg is a training manual in "how to skirmish", which has then been taken by Gates and others to imply that the Austrian infantry could not skirmish.

So if Radetsky was a reformer then I do not blame him for being rather negative. This is probably a good thing for initiating change and improvement in an army.

I agree with Whirlwind in that Radetsky could have had a poor opinion of the army he fought for due to this very nature which made him say such things about them. His agenda may have been to inform those that mattered that reform was essential thus overstating the severity of the problem would bring about action. This could have been what has made historians jump on such remarks and take them slightly (or greatly) out of context.

Also, it is interesting to see that the Russian army of 1813 as justonemore explains is worse than it was in previous campaigns.

I have read books that tell you that the Russians of 1813 were small in number (very depleted btlns) but made up of toughened veterans. This may have been true to some degree early on but the dilution of the ranks over a period of months must have impacted negatively on this due to the fact that the new recruits were poorly trained. Not too different from the French it seems then.

I have also read that the Austrians of 1813 were made up of many new recruits? Their rank and file being mostly fresh new soldiers put in uniform. If this is true it would have also had a negative impact on trying to not just train the men how to form line, column and square but also how to skirmish? This could be a reason why their skirmish arm never seemed to reach the same level as the other two equal allies?

"what has made historians jump on such remarks and take them slightly (or greatly) out of context."

I tend to agree with you.

But remember, we don't even know for sure that this particular comment was one that arose from v. Radetz's proposals for reform. It could be only applicable to the particular moment in the Army of Bohemia – maybe he is saying "We should 'right now', in the upcoming battle, reduce skirmishing because the recent arrivals are not yet trained for it. We will train them after the battle and next month we will be back to normal skirmishing."

This reading we know to be 100% applicable for the Russians. And we know what the Graf Raevskiy did for an immediate fix with grenadiers from the Reserve and that the usual regimental depot training was re-created in the field throughout that autumn.

This is not proof of the "narrow" reading of the quote. It is only an indication that such a narrow reading is a possibility that we should not ignore. We really need to see the whole document, in the original language, to even have a idea of the real meaning of the quote.

Right now, we really just don't know, since only Rothenberg, according to Mr. Hollins (and I believe him), actually saw the document – and Rothenberg only gave us of a few words in translation from it. The other anglophone historians who have used it are just copy/paste and even then managed to embellish the quote with their own re-translations and re-phrasings and additional remarks and conclusions.

==============================

"I have read books that tell you that the Russians of 1813 were small in number (very depleted btlns) but made up of toughened veterans."

The vastly depleted, toughened veterans idea is perfect for Spring 1813. It is the Autumn campaign that saw the influx of the hasty early 1813 levies, while the number of veterans would have continued to dwindle due to the losses and wastage of active service.

The French were getting into some problems of merely getting their conscription to deliver the target numbers. The population was beginning to avoid service rather more aggressively, and there had been many prior call-ups.

The Russians had no such problem. They had enough people and conscription was not really resisted or avoided. For them it was a time/speed/distance problem of moving the conscripts to the front – combined with the usual issue of trying to get an agricultural serf to learn the basic "mechanical" skills needed to be a soldier. This latter issue was not nearly so great in the case of a French peasant or townsman.

Also, there was a special Russian element in the time/speed/distance equation. The agricultural serf was literally (and permanently) changing his social status. He was no longer ever going to be a serf. He was now, and his children would be, soldier class. The new status had completely new social relations and socio-cultural norms and values. The usual 9 months of transit and 3+ of training in the regimental depot allowed the new conscript some time to adjust. The early 1813 levies, the ones quick-marched to the front, did not have 1/2 this much time, and could be thought of as being under atypical "psychological" pressure – as well as the more "physical" pressure arising from the long marches, the disease-ridden large troop concentrations and the over-pressed supply system.