"Tactical differences between ACW & Napoleonic warfare" Topic

DJ,
Griffin's battery was badly positioned by his superior and was engaged against both infantry and artillery and was continually switching between targets when the confederates closed to 70 yards and let loose a deadly volley (not a firefight at 300 some yards). Even at that, both Griffin's and Rickett's batteries combined casualties were only 32 men (though they did lose lots of horse flesh and their command staff.)

Hey Jim, maybe its "Different tactics, same results" :)
At least we haven't stooped to the insanity of tactics of WWI!

Kim

Wasn't part of Griffin's woes the fact that it mistook the 33rd Virginia as Union? [They were wearing captured Union uniforms and according to the park archives at Bull Run, the 33rd did not carry a standard.

Bill

Staying with my view:

Canister was effective when it could be fired at massed troops at a low angle. This was zero to 250 yards for 2 oz. (musketball) sized shot and 350 to 500? yards for the fewer (27round?) large shot (up to 7 oz).

Smoothbore, roundball muskets could not lay down any sort of fire at even 150 yards. Rifled, minieball muskets could lay down a very effective fire at 250- 350 yards.

ACW units generally operated in a two rank, very loose formation. They made use of terrain, dips, any sort of obsacle and lay down whenever necessary. This made bouncing, horizontal canister round less effective. Not like Napoleonic times when standing, dense formations were necessary for unit control and cohesion. In the attack, ACW units would be denser and closing with the enemy generally over level open fields of fire (killing zones)chosen by the defender. In the defense, they would be behind something and taking advantage of any dip or rise in the ground to negate bouncing munitions. The attackers would be in the open. The defending batteries would be supported by infantry, likely in some cover and probably not even under fire from the attacking infantry untill very close range.

A characteristic of Napoleonic artillery is that it could be advanced beyond the infantry and put within 200 yards of a formation of infantry and proceed to shoot up the infantry in preperation to an attack. The could stand in the open, in an open field and be safe from smoothbore musket fire. Skirishers and calvary were typically used to prevent this, but if the attacker could get away with it, it worked well. In the ACW, a battery trying to do this would be taken under fire and wiped out. The infantry defenders could protect themselves against this type of attack. There are very few examples of such advanced in the ACW, unless it was in the confusion of a combined infantry/artillery melee. The fact that there are not examples of an isolated, bare-ashed battery being shot up, doesn not prove that it couldn't happen, it proves that no one was that dumn to attempt it.

So the relative ranges are what effected a change in the tactics. A 1.5 oz. aimed rifled cylindrical minieball outranged a 2 oz. unaimed roundball and had a higher density of fire than a 4 to 7 oz. large canisiter round. The "physics" of that took away an Napolionic offensive use of artillery. Artillery was less useful in preparing for attacks until the introduction of the quick-firing breechloader, with high explosives, recoil systems and communication to allow indirect fire.

Wasn't part of Griffin's woes the fact that it mistook the 33rd Virginia as Union?

Bill,

Yup. In fact it was his superior (Barry) who informed him they were Federal troops coming to his support!

Kim

ACW formations were not noticably looser than Napoleonic formations, still relying on the "touch of elbows", and have much smaller skirmisher contingents (upto 1 in 3 men deployed as skirmishers in Napoleons time).

With a few notable exceptions (the freakish occurance at Friedland for example) Napoleonic artillery could not advance to 200 yds and open fire. They would be shot to pieces and overrun. This aspect of the tactical mix did not change.

Low quality infantry (generally called "irregulars") have always taken cover under fire, that isn't new either. In doing so they sacrifice movement, and the battle becomes a static killing match.

The armies of the ACW had a lot more in common with the early Revolutionary armies than with Napoleon's.

Billsfan,

Canister was effective when it could be fired at massed troops at a low angle. This was zero to 250 yards for 2 oz. (musketball) sized shot and 350 to 500? yards for the fewer (27round?) large shot (up to 7 oz).

The standard canister round was the 27 round, .43 lb ea. Shot for a 12# Napoleon

Smoothbore, roundball muskets could not lay down any sort of fire at even 150 yards. Rifled, minieball muskets could lay down a very effective fire at 250- 350 yards.

Assuming a clear field of fire, yes

ACW units generally operated in a two rank, very loose formation. They made use of terrain, dips, any sort of obsacle and lay down whenever necessary.

Very loose formation? Standard spacing throughout the war was 24" per man. Look at the regimental markers at Gettysburg for the Union and you'll see that it was hardly loose order spacing. The Confederates at the Marye's Heights were not only shoulder to shoulder, but eventually 4 ranks deep. Long extended lines did occur in siege operations where there was fewer men to hold a front, and formations did have to loosen up to maneuver through dense woods, but this was done by men dropping back from their position in rank increasing the file depth until the position was reached, and then the files were closed back up.

The rest of your view is confusing. Are you talking about infantry attacking guns or guns being brought forward to try to canister infantry, or both?

For sure, guns defending (which is what I thought your original post was about) if supported well would usually drive back all but the strongest infantry attacks. As far as guns being rushed forward into the face of infantry in position to try to open on them directly with canister, I don't think anyone here has stated that in the ACW that was a valid tactic as you noted, the battery would be shot to pieces attempting that.

ACW artillery was not an offensive close range weapon unlike Napoleonic guns as you stated, but on the defensive, when well supported, attacking infantry was usually unable to take the position except by the strongest of attacks and high casualties taken.

This certainly was a major difference between ACW and Napoleonic Warfare.

Kim

KimRYoung wrote:

"The Confederates at the Marye's Heights were not only shoulder to shoulder, but eventually 4 ranks deep"

This was intentional, and was a pretty common assault formation called "double battle line". In effect the left wing (on paper) tucked in close behind the right wing to create what was supposed to be a double battle line, but usually merged into a 4 rank line.

The armies of the ACW had a lot more in common with the early Revolutionary armies than with Napoleon's.

Tiger, that's an excellent point. I've read comparisons to 7 Years War, but AWI is an even better comparison. And you are right on about the loose formations. That argument has been on my ACW "Mythbusters" list for years. Thanks.

Kim

"The Confederates at the Marye's Heights were not only shoulder to shoulder, but eventually 4 ranks deep"

This was intentional, and was a pretty common assault formation called "double battle line". In effect the left wing (on paper) tucked in close behind the right wing to create what was supposed to be a double battle line, but usually merged into a 4 rank line.

Right again Tiger,

In fact Hooker had his men in this formation for their inital attack on the Cornfield and many of Popes units used this at 2nd Bull Run. Thanks again.

Kim

The dense formations on the ACW just posted, were the type of formations that were tired in order to attack rifled musket and artillery defended lines. Yes, they were used. And yes there was usually a slaughter. Cold Harbour and Fredricksburg are examples of what happened. Remember at Fredricksburg that Pellam answered his superiors that " a chicken could not live on that plain, once we open up with the artillery" (or words to that effect). He had a level, gently downslope target zone, with crossfire and oblique fire at moderate ranges. The artillery was hidden up to the axles of the guns, well supported by infantry and not subject to counterfire. The infantry rose up at the last 100 yards and finished the issue with multiple (hidden and protected ranks) and reserves close at hand. What you did not see is the Union advancing their artillery to 200 yards of the Stone Wall, to soften up the defenders before the infantry march up and did the last 100 yard push. Will the proponents of "canister fire rules all!!!, please explain why the Union did not do what all'you think is so obvious?

Because the base of Marye's Heights is broken terrain inaccessible to artillery.

"Will the proponents of "canister fire rules all!!!, please explain why the Union did not do what all'you think is so obvious?"

The Feds got a couple of batteries up, Hazards 12 pds in particular, but there wasn't enough room with all the infantry brigades that were packed in, a canal 15 ft wide and only one good crossing point for artillery. No room, space or positions to prep the Reb line in advance and most of the Fed batteries across the river were out of effective range.

Just a FYI

The February 1862 issue of Atlantic Monthly has an article on p. 300 on The Use of the Rifle It is a fascinating analysis of the strengths of the rifle, it uses and effects on the current war. It's very clear on two things: It is a better weapon with a wide range of issues, and that with training, it can be deadly. It states at the end of the article:

… it will not be hard to find an able-bodied young man who will gladly take charge of a rifle, on the condition that he is to be the owner at the end of six months, if he can place ten successive shots in a circle a foot in diameter at two hundred yards.
"A word to the wise is enough." The word has been uttered in trumpet-tones from the Battlefields of the South. Let us prove that we are wise, by at once acting upon its suggestion.

Bill H.

I'm not an expert on ACW, but it sure sounds a lot like the Swedish-Russian war of 1808-1809. Infantry using skirmish tactics much more than in Central Europe, infantry possessing surprising amount of rifles, use of fortifications (useful because terrain made it too hard to just bypass them), total absence of heavy cavalry, cavalry used mainly for scouting (perhaps difficulty of providing enough supply for large cavalry formations was even more of an issue than closed terrain) and boring uniforms (Finnish units mostly in greys and Russians in their greens). All in all, I'd suggest that geography had more effect than 50 years of technological advancement.

Can't recall exactly where I read this, but I once read that the Roman Legions which were deployed to conquer Spain over the course of many years developed more open "loose order" infantry tactics. They were at a loss for traditional close order tactics when they got re-deployed many years later. Apparently, the indigenous "Celtic?" Spaniards had successfully adopted loose order tribal formations and tactics to the Iberian countryside and the Romans were forced to adapt.

Another interesting passage from a Napoleonic writer, a Light Infantry officer of some repute.

Pages 76 – 77 of Valentini's Kleinen Krieg published 1799.

"in §45 stated general rule that infantry should not fire at a longer distances then three hundred paces [250 yards], is not to be applied to the skirmishers, Schützen, and tirailleurs. [Schutzen are rifle armed.] These are forced, especially in small clashes and skirmishes, to deviate from it. Is the enemy approaching with skirmishers to our position, if he is pressing back our cavalry outposts and occupies terrain from which he can oversee our position at perhaps 500 [400 yards] paces from our skirmisher posts, it would be not commendable to leave him in peace and to wait until he perhaps will even approach closer 1) – What can be done against an enemy which, like the French in the Revolutionary War, fires at us from a distance of five- to six hundred paces, wounding people, when the ground does not allow a counterattack?"

1) Footnote by Valentini: "The author would not dare to give a general rule about the shooting ranges of a gun, if he would not have witnessed himself, that the greatest adversaries of long distance shooting were forced according to the circumstances to deviate form their premises. Also the reader will note that long distance shooting is not recommended as a general rule, but is only regarded necessary under the above mentioned circumstances."

Bill H.

67thtigers 13 Jul 2010 6:44 a.m. PST

67th tigers wrote:
"The Confederates at the Marye's Heights were not only shoulder to shoulder, but eventually 4 ranks deep"
This was intentional, and was a pretty common assault formation called "double battle line". In effect the left wing (on paper) tucked in close behind the right wing to create what was supposed to be a double battle line, but usually merged into a 4 rank line

Uh, The Confederates at Marye's Heights were defenders not attackers. They had no trouble being in a dense formation because they were behind the crest of a slope, in a sunken lane and behind a thick stone wall. They were no moving and the rear ranks were loading guns and handing them forward.

Many of the drill books that officers studied were slightly altered version of Napoleonic era drill books. They quickly found that the close order drill was for parades and not for combat. Take the example of the 1st Maine heavy artillery. PDF link They were a big regiment which spent the war up to the time of the Overland Campaign defending forts around Washington. They were well drilled in the dense Napoleonic formations.
You might check out how they fought at Harris's Farm and if they used different tactics thereafter.

link

link

Whenever I hear it repeated that the saber was not used in the ACW and that all cavalry was in fact mounted infantry, I must respond. The subject of "how Civil War cavalry fought" is very complex, and it is not accurate to characterize all Civil War cavalry as being mounted infantry, nor to assume that one kind of cavalry tactic was universally employed, nor to disparage saber tactics, nor to argue that cavalry tactics were the same at the beginning of the war as they were at its end.

Regarding all being Mounted infantry, just one example should suffice to upset that apple cart. By 1864, the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac was trained in saber tactics and in dismounted tactics (carbine armed), and used a combination of shock and fire to eventually dominate their Confederate opponents. In 1865, they were considered shock troops. At the Battle of 3rd Winchester, Sept. 19, 1864, saber charges by five brigades turned defeat into rout for Jubal Early's Valley army (after a day of a very hard fighting). Many witnesses wrote about this charge and say such things as, "Ten thousand troopers went forward on a charge with sabres gleaming…."Every man's saber was waving over his head, and with a savage yell, we swept down upon the trembling wretches." And so on. Saber tactics were also used extensively at Cedar Creek and in many cavalry vs cavalry battles at other places late in the war.

Stuart's cavalry was saber charge oriented from the beginning and right up until he was killed in 1864 at Yellow Tavern. His "core" brigades never adopted the rifle-musket for mounted and dismounted skirmishing and fire-fighting, but instead employed carbines throughout the war.

In the West, foot fighting and the use of rifles was more common throughout the war, but major battlefield successes against Rebel horse in 1863 were the result of saber charges. There were also Confederate regiments out West that were known as "Charging regiments" and were used in that fashion. One of these was the 8th Texas Cavalry (AKA Terry's Texas Rangers). The only difference was that the 8th charged with revolvers instead of sabers. Their first such charge was made at Woodsonville, KY in Dec, 1861, and their last charge (a success) was made at Bentonville, NC in 1865.

Respectfully Submitted.

Forget all the tactical differences, the biggest difference is painting the figures. ACW has the advantage of ease of painting due to less complex uniform designs, which theoretically should help you paint them faster. The problem lies in that you will surrender to the tedium after painting your 10th nearly identical Union infantry battalion!

Nappy's on the other hand offer a huge variety of uniforms, which have so many details to them that you'll go nuts trying to represent all of the facings, lace, and other frills that are completely lacking from ACW uniforms. You'll never finish them unless you have some help, either painting or psychological!

So, the choice is yours, boredom or insanity… :P

67thtigers 13 Jul 2010 6:44 a.m. PST

67th tigers wrote:
"The Confederates at the Marye's Heights were not only shoulder to shoulder, but eventually 4 ranks deep"
This was intentional, and was a pretty common assault formation called "double battle line". In effect the left wing (on paper) tucked in close behind the right wing to create what was supposed to be a double battle line, but usually merged into a 4 rank line

Uh, The Confederates at Marye's Heights were defenders not attackers. They had no trouble being in a dense formation because they were behind the crest of a slope, in a sunken lane and behind a thick stone wall. They were no moving and the rear ranks were loading guns and handing them forward

Pope employed units in Double-Battle Line to attack Jackson's position on Stony Ridge at 2nd Bull Run. Units in Doubleday's Div. also adopted this formation to attack through the Cornfield as did Richardson's Div. to attack Gordon in the Sunken Road at Antietam.

The Union employed this type formation for attacks as well as attacks by a Division in columns on a one brigade front, spaced in successive waves such as was done by Sedgwick at Antietam and the multi-Divisional assaults on the Maryes Heights at Fredericksburg.

Sedgwick also formed 3 heavy assault columns to successfully storm the the Maryes Heights during the Chancellorsville campaign in 1863 where Burnside had failed 5 months ago.

Attacks by heavy columns were in fact very common throughout the Civil War and would have been very familiar to any Napoleonic General.

Kim

People should take a look at Earl J. Hess' "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth." The muzzle-loading rifle had enormous advantages in the hands of troops who were properly trained in estimating ranges. Most ACW troops received only minimal firearms training, thus negating its value.
link

Somebody remarked on the greater damage inflicted by a minnie ball. The projectile, which is not a ball, is hollow. When fired it expands to grip the rifling. When it hits something hard, like bone, it expands even further. This creates a much bigger wound than would a solid round ball.

I don't think the minie' bullet was hollow; it just had a concave base, which caused the expansion into the rifling when the powder was ignited. Any lead bullet -- or ball -- will expand side-to-side, and flatten front-to-back, when it hits a solid object, such as bone -- perhaps even semi-solid, such as flesh.

Wow! There are a lot of knowledgable and smart folks on this site. I'm new here and impressed.

The Red Baron, since you are trying to decide whether to get into Napoleonics or American Civil War, let me encourage the Napoleonics because:
1. The greater variety of uniforms are so fun to research, paint, and present on a wargaming table.
2. The Napoleonic battlefields were typically smaller (i.e. Waterloo battlefield was approximately 3 miles by 1 mile) and fit nicely onto your wargaming table.
3. Lots of interestingly different flags.
4. It seems the combination of arms (infantry vs artillery vs cavalry) is clearer in Napoleonics yet relatively simple.
5. And finally, me being from Alabama…mumble-mumble…Damn Yankees!

God bless,
John

Please correct me if I am wrong, because most if not all muskets were cap and ball and not flintlocks during the ACW, would that not have increased the volume of fire delivered by your average infantryman i.e less missfires and quicker loading times?
All the best.
Ernesto

Early in the war many Confederates in the West were armed with flintlocks: most of the Rebel infantry at Mill Springs (Jan. 1862), and at the Fort Donelson field battle (Feb, 1862) were still flintlock armed. But the flintlock did about vanish entirely soon after, and you are correct that the percussion cap lock system was used throughout most of the war and was more efficient.

Also, better powder (at least for the Feds) and more anti-peronsel ammunition--buck & ball. I read somewhere that some military observers even gave it a more effective range --out to 150 yards--than smoothbores during the Napoleonic period, i.e. higher technical performance. Those same observers argued that it should be standard issue over the muzzleloading rife musket.

Hi

Buck and ball really only works close up with smoothbore.

The minie ball is actually a hollow base conical round with much more mass than a roundball. The interior and exterior ballistics mean that beyond 50 yards the minie is a LOT more effective in doing damage. The bad news is that the skirt expansion on the standard 60 grain load is unreliable. But in any situation, superior to smooth bore roundballs.

Cap ignition is a lot more reliable, how geeky do you want me to get here?

Anyway, I know about the sources insisting on the above flintlocks, but I believe the sources aren't quite complete. I THINK they were all actually cap conversions. Long story here, but that is the short version.

In my own stuff, I do have different tables for musket and rifled musket, but I could not verify enough evidence with actual flint in the field to justify going in that direction.

Rocky

It would actually take slightly longer to load a cap-and-ball musket/rifle than a flintlock because of the extra step of putting a cap on the nipple.

donlowry,

I've loaded both types, and the difference is negligable, since with a flintlock, you have to carefully pour out the powder and then close the frizzen. It takes around the same amount of time to do that as to reach into your cap box, and pull out a cap, and put it in place.

Interesting thing though is that the loading procedures are reversed. With a flintlock you prime first then load the powder and ball into the barrel, whereas with a percussion lock you load the ball and powder down the barrel, then put the cap on.

According to B. Nosworthy, G.L.Williard (Maj.US Army, Col. 125th NY) gave the smoothbore musket a "flat trajectory" out to 200 yards. Doesn't specify whether that was single ball or buck and ball.

Assuming the "buck" is only lethal out to a certain short range distance, how far was the "ball" lethal to---100 yards + ?

Also, wasn't the powder formula for small arms improved upon since the Napoleonic Wars ? Doesn't that have an effect on muzzle velocity, range, lethality, etc… even if only an extra score or so in yards ?

Hi

Errr. Hmm, where to start?

OK, round ball ballistics are crummy. One problem with a round ball in a rifle is that as it slows down it "flies" in rotation randomly following the rifling. Unpredictable.

Powder. Looking from the stand point of modern smokeless, "improvements" are very important. No so much with the very low pressures of black powder. The only real instance I know of with this issue is in the mexican army where unscrupulous suppliers were adding a lot inert clay and ash to the load.

Otherwise, a difference in 10% or more really doesn't do much. If one overcharges one mostly gets more flame and ash rather than burst breaches or extra velocity.

Rocky

So, to what approx. range (or band) in yardage do you think a roundball is lethal if fired as part of buck 'n' ball from a smoothbore musket circa 1860's ? Accuracy aside.

If you do the maths (as I once did: link ) then the smoothbore is moderately better at hitting within 200 yds, and it has much more kinetic energy until 150 yds (ish). Beyond this the rifle is much better.

I think it is safe to say the ACW rifled musket was a superior weapon, both in reliability and range. Accuracy too, if the soldiers were practiced in ranged aiming.

However, they often weren't, or had to be led as a regiment in ranged fire. Some examples of that have been given on this thread.

The other wrinkle had to do with intended tactics. The commander of the Irish Brigade in 1862 insisted on smoothbore muskets for his brigade with 'buck and ball'. At close range it was generally more effective than a minie ball. The commander, being an aggressive SOB, looking for close action, wanted weapons to match. There is some suggestion that at Antietam, he made the right choice.

The actual killing power of a musket ball compared to a minie ball can be debated, velocity vs weight, shape and spread pattern. I would go with the minie ball, but so what?
Do we see any difference in casualties or tactics between the Napoleonic and ACW? Not really.

Both sides used two rank deployments very much in keeping with British Napoleonic practics, including supporting lines. The Confederate I Corps attack on the second day of Gettysburg, formed having divisions with two brigades forward, supported by two brigades, all in two-rank formation. The very same formations were used by the British at Salamanca and Vittoria.

The idea that Napoleonic battles weren't as spread out as ACW battles is also somewhat of an exaggeration. Austerlitz had a wider battlefield frontage than Gettysburg with about the same size armies. Napoleon's small 1796 army fought all iits battles on fronts wider than similar sized ACW armies, like 1st Manassas, Shiloh, Corinth, etc. etc.

Waterloo and Borodino were slugging matches purposely dense--there were tactical reasons they chose the narrow fronts. Bautzen and Lutzen had huge frontages compared to any ACW battle if you look at the man/frontage ratios.

The question remains tactics. The same variety of tactics, from successive lines and columns, to supported skirmish lines were being used at the end of the war as the beginning.

The trench warfare always touted as the 'beginning of modern war' missed the fact that the examples are from sieges of Vicksburg, Richmond and Atlanta, carried out as traditional sieges--with large armies. The tactics, from mortars to digging advancing parallels were very much in keeping with Napoleonic methods.

We might as well argue that Bunker Hill and New Orleans represent the beginnings of 'modern trench warfare'. What I think they represent is a typical American tactical response when on the defensive…

Bill

Hi

Bill, I would offer that the issue isn't spread, but ground covered by a unit. Density goes down.

It seems to me more of a historical trend than anything, any renaissance battalion would be considered a column by nappy standards.

Similarly, in ACW, the casualties don't go up because people stop further out. The observation that Napoleonic buffs like to make is that units rarely close to bayonet range unless one side brakes. Well the same observation becomes true "in spades" in the ACW, except the point where they stop and just exchange fire is further out.

Now, in most RULES, I cannot address how this works for you.

Rocky

Rocky wrote:

Bill, I would offer that the issue isn't spread, but ground covered by a unit. Density goes down.

It seems to me more of a historical trend than anything, any renaissance battalion would be considered a column by nappy standards.

Hi Rocky:
Okay. So did the density go down? Was there a difference in the ground covered by a British battalion in line and a Union or Confederate regiment of the same strength? The Frontage for Pakenham's Division of four brigades in two lines at Salamanca had a wider front than Hood's or McLaw's divisions of similar strength [@6,000 men] on the second day of Gettysburg. Of course, every battle had variations, but I don't see any significant differences between the two wars in this regard.

Similarly, in ACW, the casualties don't go up because people stop further out. The observation that Napoleonic buffs like to make is that units rarely close to bayonet range unless one side brakes. Well the same observation becomes true "in spades" in the ACW, except the point where they stop and just exchange fire is further out.

That certainly is a possible explanation. The question is whether we actually see that happening: "they stop and just exchange fire further out."

Now, in most RULES, I cannot address how this works for you.

I am not sure what you mean. What many designers do is simply increase the range of the infantry and rifled artillery using Napoleonic rules [or generic rules…] Add some fire modifiers that put artillery and cavalry at a disadvantage and presto. It's addressed.

That may be the way to go. Simply use any Napoleonic rules and add greater ranges for rifled armed infantry and artillery, then leave it at that. Let the players figure the rest out. ;-7

The first step in addressing how it the rules work for me is to decide how it did work… Assuming that is what I want to represent with the rules.

That's what this discussion is all about, and I am still thinking about it. I do know it is impossible to sit on the fence when game design is all about representing conclusions. ;-j

Bill

Hi

Well, my approach was more some time ago actually looking not at men on battlefield, but actual ground covered by specific units. Which is how I cam to that conclusion.

Also, looking at battles, observing that marching at 2mph, all units in most rules would be racing across the board/battlefield, and did not. So, then I started looking at various places where one could invest the engagement range and found the distance idea.

Not any where original to me, but I was working with the Dupuy stuff out of curiosity. Trying to understand. I don't address rules because over the decades, I have seen too many systems for me to even attempt thinking about. Thus, I will discuss ideas and physics, but not how the rules reflect things.

Rocky

Rocky wrote:

Well, my approach was more some time ago actually looking not at men on battlefield, but actual ground covered by specific units. Which is how I cam to that conclusion.

Hi Rocky:
Okay, what are some of the specific unit comparisons you were thinking of here?

Also, looking at battles, observing that marching at 2mph, all units in most rules would be racing across the board/battlefield, and did not. So, then I started looking at various places where one could invest the engagement range and found the distance idea.

It's a good one, the distance idea, and one I have played with. However, most rules, both Napoleonic and ACW, do not let units move at anywhere close the possible/historic speeds of units. For most, it is downright impossible to recreate the actual movement of the historical units on a game table. For instance, with Fire and Fury, it takes the Confederate brigades in the Pickett's Charge scenario an hour/2 turns to cross the ground the original combatants covered in twenty minutes.

As units didn't move at maximum speed all over the battlefield all the time, designers simply limit movement to ahistorical extremes. The last three game rules I looked at all took the same course. The real design question is why units didn't move at maximum speed. You read some real jinky explanations for this from designers, everything from lost orders and order confusion to terrain. All of those did affect movement at times, but not everywhere all the time, sort of 25% off movement for general purposes--sort of silly when real units do far better moving around than most game units.

Not any where original to me, but I was working with the Dupuy stuff out of curiosity. Trying to understand. I don't address rules because over the decades, I have seen too many systems for me to even attempt thinking about. Thus, I will discuss ideas and physics, but not how the rules reflect things.

That's too bad, but understandable. For the most part, designers never provide near enough information to understand how the rules reflect things anyway. It is far more satisfying to stick with ideas and physics than play "guess what this rule represents."

Bill

tejak 21 Jul 2010 1:11 p.m. PST
People should take a look at Earl J. Hess' "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth." The muzzle-loading rifle had enormous advantages in the hands of troops who were properly trained in estimating ranges. Most ACW troops received only minimal firearms training, thus negating its value.
link
Somebody remarked on the greater damage inflicted by a minnie ball. The projectile, which is not a ball, is hollow. Comment: no it has a shallow curved base. it is not hollow When fired it expands to grip the rifling. When it hits something hard, like bone, it expands even further. This creates a much bigger wound than would a solid round ball.

In the ACW, I have read a lot of accounts of regiments being taken out at weekly or twice-a-week intervals for target practice, with recording of the hits by each soldier.

In Napoleonic times, I see French generals suggesting that new soldiers, who will be in battle in a few weeks, be given 3 rounds to fire so that they can decide which eye to sight their gun through. The hope was they they could follow instructions and properly "level" their weapon. …. Russian regulations required each soldier to have something like 5 blank rounds and 5 live round to fire for practice (with no feedback on the results). Per year. The Brits were the richest nation with an army which was seldom employed and they shot less practice round a year than a ACW unit shot in a month.

Conclusion: In the ACW, soldiers fired maybe a thousand times more practice round than Napoleonic soliders. Maybe the people in the 1860's learned something about their own times and from a study of the Napoleonic era…. maybe (sic) they were half as smart as today's armchair generals?

There is not much difference between a roundball 0.69 inch ball and a enlongeated .57 inch round once it splats into a body. The expansion of the minie ball within the barrel was on the order of a mm or so. It didn't change the effect on the target at all. Both minie and roundball deform once they hit a bone and spliter bones into internal sprapnel. They make a wide wound channel and cut a lot of blood vessels as well. Not much hydrostatic shock but not the ocassional thirty calibre through-hole either. A tumbling minie ball would make a massive wound, and tumbling .223 inch round would so the same. Neither victim would have much of a chance.

1968billsfan wrote:

In the ACW, I have read a lot of accounts of regiments being taken out at weekly or twice-a-week intervals for target practice, with recording of the hits by each soldier.

In Napoleonic times, I see French generals suggesting that new soldiers, who will be in battle in a few weeks, be given 3 rounds to fire so that they can decide which eye to sight their gun through. The hope was they they could follow instructions and properly "level" their weapon. …. Russian regulations required each soldier to have something like 5 blank rounds and 5 live round to fire for practice (with no feedback on the results). Per year. The Brits were the richest nation with an army which was seldom employed and they shot less practice round a year than a ACW unit shot in a month.

Conclusion: In the ACW, soldiers fired maybe a thousand times more practice round than Napoleonic soliders. Maybe the people in the 1860's learned something about their own times and from a study of the Napoleonic era…. maybe (sic) they were half as smart as today's armchair generals?

Billsfan:

I don't think a thousand more times, depending on a number of issues. Here are some:

1. Taking recruits out to fire three shots to discover which eye to shoot with is just that, three shots to find which eye they aim with, not the sum total of all fire practice they may receive as recruits or as members of a unit.

2. What kind of target practice has a lot to do with the issue. What kind of practice and the quality thereof they received…how many shots, target size and distance, individual shots, group practice? Regardless of individual skill, a unit would fire together in battle and that would be practiced too.

3. Smoke for a unit could quickly negate any possible aiming.

4. Exactly how much live fire practice a ACW soldier received compared to a Napoleonic French, British, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian troops is not something I have seen anyone document. I know for instance that the Prussians before 1806 and after enjoyed significantly different fire practice regimes. The British and Russians were quite different, besides the fact that the Russians, at times, had dozens of different models of muskets within even one regiment.

3. Like the Napoleonic nations, the Union and Confederate armies, East and West, year by year, did not have the equal training procedures, sometimes not even similar training procedures. Soooo…

The assumption that any ACW regiment had a thousand times more fire practice, let alone better, than any Napoleonic regiment is a very shakey proposition…

Bill

1968billsfan,

I've spent a lot of time reading around the ACW and have never come across any unit doing any kind of regular target practice, and when they do it was usually bad (such as the US Sharpshooters missing 5x5 foot targets at 200 yds nearly half the time).

The Union and Confederacy simply don't have the powder to do this. Throughout 1861 and 1862 and well into 1863 it was questionable whether the Union would simply run out of powder and be forced to concede by default. None was spared for target practice.

The British did fire regularly, trained their soldiers in the proper application of fire and it paid dividends on the battlefield. Frequently more than 1 in 20 shots actually hit a target vs maybe 1 in 200 for the Union troops. Of more import is the fact that the British shot at man shaped targets, and thus actually battle conditioned the troops (something no other nation was doing).

The Union never indulged in frippery like target practice on any useful scale, and their shooting remained poor.

There is not much difference between a roundball 0.69 inch ball and a enlongeated .57 inch round once it splats into a body. The expansion of the minie ball within the barrel was on the order of a mm or so. It didn't change the effect on the target at all. Both minie and roundball deform once they hit a bone and spliter bones into internal sprapnel. They make a wide wound channel and cut a lot of blood vessels as well. Not much hydrostatic shock but not the ocassional thirty calibre through-hole either. A tumbling minie ball would make a massive wound, and tumbling .223 inch round would so the same. Neither victim would have much of a chance.

Yes there is, as the simple fact that ca. 1 in 4 smoothbore hits resulted in a fatality compared with ca. 1 in 7-8 for a small bore (.54, .577 and .58) Minie bullet attests.

At typical combat ranges of the ACW (below 100 yds) the .69 musket ball carries a lot more kinetic energy. When it hits a limb it pierces, exiting. A Minie bullet was usually deflected by the bone resulting in a much less serious wound.

When a Minie bullet hits the torso it was often deflected by the ribs (generally breaking some) rather than piercing into the hollow organs like a .69 musket ball.

With a headshot, the Minie often lacks sufficient to pierce the skull, and is often deflected leaving the target merely concussed.

However, the .69 Minie of the converted muskets was lethal, much more lethal than a .69 round ball. The .705 Minie the British used in the Crimea would pierce several people.

As units didn't move at maximum speed all over the battlefield all the time, designers simply limit movement to ahistorical extremes. The last three game rules I looked at all took the same course. The real design question is why units didn't move at maximum speed. You read some real jinky explanations for this from designers, everything from lost orders and order confusion to terrain. All of those did affect movement at times, but not everywhere all the time, sort of 25% off movement for general purposes--sort of silly when real units do far better moving around than most game units.

Bill,

Your observation that Pickets Charge took only about 20 minutes to traverse the field is right on. The whole attack was pretty much over and done from start to finish in a little less then an hour.

What game rules don't take into account (and really neither do game players) is that although a unit on the march can make good time at about 2.5 mph during a march, that units quite simply are not always in motion all the time, not fighting all the time and sometimes not even envolved in the battle.

Gamers want their little soldiers to move as far as they can, as fast as they can, and fight as much as they can each and every turn they play.

Its not so much about delay's in getting orders to troops, but just time needed to get information as to just what the heck is going on during a battle to even make a decision as to what order to even give that is not ever represented in a game.

Look at how much "down time" there was during the second and third day of Gettysburg when there was no action at all for hours, then high intensity combat at specific points for short periods of time with only specific troops assigned to fight.

Translate that to a table top and every game player will have pretty much all his troops manuvering, fighting, reorganizing after a fight then throwing those same troops back into the fight from dawn to dusk all day.

This is why games are just that – games. All this over concern about ranges of weapons, killing power, accuracy and other such stuff is really a moot point in that some of the most important aspects of winning or losing a real battle are just conveniently ignored while we blather on about theoretical capabilities of a weapon like an episode of The Deadliest Warrior to determine who's the best, Napoleon or Lee? (I'm putting my money on Lee because of his superior side arm!)

Kim

Hi

I cannot cite what I was looking at 30 years ago on the density issue. I admit that I avoid napoleonics as a game like the plague…I have elsewhere explained why.

Working in the group, I wasn't thinking games but identifying factors. In my own game systems, I found it easy to get good results by giving normal movement, but having units not in total control of the gamer.

Taking fire, taking casualties all result in the likely hood of the unit stopping. Weather they go to ground, advance, stop to fire, or whatever is a performance reaction and not a choice of the gamer. My game solution that seems to work. That was a conclusion.

I see Gettysburg not as a "game" but a mini-campaign over several days. I have played it that way, but not as a two hour game…I don't like that level of abstraction.

"Your mileage may vary."

R

Rocky, interesting concepts.

1. What's the unit echelon you use in your ACW campaigns?

2. What needs to happen in order for a unit to be stopped/go to ground? Is there a certain number of casualties (percentage) that need to be inflicted or just any casualties?

3. Do you account for different kinds of reactions to different kinds of weapons fire/munitions from small arms and artillery ?

Jim

i67th Tigers wrote:

8billsfan,
I've spent a lot of time reading around the ACW and have never come across any unit doing any kind of regular target practice, and when they do it was usually bad (such as the US Sharpshooters missing 5x5 foot targets at 200 yds nearly half the time).
The Union and Confederacy simply don't have the powder to do this. Throughout 1861 and 1862 and well into 1863 it was questionable whether the Union would simply run out of powder and be forced to concede by default. None was spared for target practice.
The British did fire regularly, trained their soldiers in the proper application of fire and it paid dividends on the battlefield. Frequently more than 1 in 20 shots actually hit a target vs maybe 1 in 200 for the Union troops. Of more import is the fact that the British shot at man shaped targets, and thus actually battle conditioned the troops (something no other nation was doing).
The Union never indulged in frippery like target practice on any useful scale, and their shooting remained poor

I don't imderstand how you could claim an extensive reading in ACW history and not acknowledge that ACW units shot 100's or 1000's a round a year as practice. Please read any regimental history through the war (try particualriy the period before the overland campaign) and see if what you said makes any sense. Union troops often had the requirement to shoot 100 round a day in the direction of the Confed after that period. They didn't do target practice?

67th Tiger wrote:

Yes there is, as the simple fact that ca. 1 in 4 smoothbore hits resulted in a fatality compared with ca. 1 in 7-8 for a small bore (.54, .577 and .58) Minie bullet attests.
At typical combat ranges of the ACW (below 100 yds) the .69 musket ball carries a lot more kinetic energy. When it hits a limb it pierces, exiting. A Minie bullet was usually deflected by the bone resulting in a much less serious wound.
When a Minie bullet hits the torso it was often deflected by the ribs (generally breaking some) rather than piercing into the hollow organs like a .69 musket ball.
With a headshot, the Minie often lacks sufficient to pierce the skull, and is often deflected leaving the target merely concussed.
However, the .69 Minie of the converted muskets was lethal, much more lethal than a .69 round ball. The .705 Minie the British used in the Crimea would pierce several people.

1) I have never seen any data saying that 1 in 4 roundball hits caused a fatality compared to 1/7 for a minie ball. I think you are making this up. Please share your sources for this.

2) Your statement about … a .69 roundball goes thu a person, just leaving a hole, whereas a minieball hits a bone and deflects…. is nonesense. A round which misses anything hard and just leaves a in and out hole, is not likely to be deadly, unless it hits an big blood vessel or ultimately results in an infection. Anything that hits a bone is going to either shatter the bone and send the fragements around to make a giant wound, or travel a long way thu the body and make a long wound. At low velocities and for a sort lead shot (or a dumm-dumm), (less than 1250fps) it doesn't matter what the shape of the projectile is- most likely it is moving slow enough that it is not going to deflect from its own shock wave within the terminal trajectile (e.g. within the victim), and will plow thu and smash up any bone in its path.

3) there are a lot of reports of a minie ball just stunning a victim and not even breaking the skin. These reports, if you care to reseach a bit, are at extreme ranges,,, 400 and 700 yards. For comparison, the Brits used Owens guns against Japanese at less then 50 yards range with the target wearing a single cottom shirt. They worked well. In Korea they found that at 100 yards against targets wearing thick padded quilted jackets, that all they did was knock the soldier down for a few moments.

Hi

Wow, this wanders.

What I do in my own system. There are different levels of morale, and a different levels of experience and training. A war weary unit responds differently than a green or vet. As examples.

Anyway, the other issue to make life a pain for the gamer is that the game is focused on brigades with various regiments inside it of various sizes and levels.

The end result is that the commander finds his bre. becoming difficult to manage as some go to ground and some stand and some charge on the same morale roll.

R

68billsfan,

1. The killed/wounded ratios of the Napoleonic and American Civil Wars.

For example the number of killed per those hit in various major ACW battles is (Federal Army only, more complete data):

Bull Run: 1 in 3.1
Shiloh: 1 in 5.8
Williamsburg: 1 in 4.1
Seven Pines: 1 in 5.5
Mechanicsville: 1 in 5.2
Gaines Mill: 1 in 4.5
The rest of the Seven Days: 1 in 6.9
Cedar Mountain: 1 in 5.6
2nd Manassas: 1 in 5.9
Antietam: 1 in 5.5
Corinth: 1 in 6.2
Perryville: 1 in 4.4
Fredericksburg: 1 in 8.5 (!)
Chancellorsville: 1 in 7.1
Vicksburg: 1 in 6.1
Gettysburg: 1 in 5.6
Chickamauga: 1 in 6.9
Chattanooga: 1 in 7.3
Mine Run: 1 in 7.4
(after this even Federal numbers are unreliable)

Approximate average: 1 in 6 including the early "smoothbore" period (and a general trend towards less lethality as rifles became less common).

This compares to 1 in 4.3 for the sum of all British Army combat casualties 1793-1815.

As weapon muzzle velocities went down (such as with the adoption of the Minie) lethality went down.

2. The Minie at the muzzle is a soft lead projectile travelling at ca. 950fps (vs 1,500 fps for a .69 smoothbore) at the muzzle and 850fps at 100 yds (vs 1,000 fps for a .69 smoothbore).

For comparison, at 50 yds (a typical standup firefight range) the .69 has 40% more KE than the .577. What is really important is the velocity. Rounds entering the body above 1,100 fps cause a shockwave, those below just leave a wound tract. The .577 starts below this critical velocity, the .69 drops below it around 70 yds. .69 smoothbores at typical ACW firefight ranges caused temporary cavitation and general tissue damage, the .577 never did.

Thus it was noted that the Minie produced a lot of messy flesh wounds compared to the old ball.

3. This was common for centuries. It was usually caused by lack of proper loading or ramming.

Hi

i am unclear what the source of your information is.

Locally, they do hunt with muzzleloaders, and no one uses roundball because conicals are a much more successful kill.

Even weapons that never used conicals "in the day" use minie in hunting.

R