"Tactical differences between ACW & Napoleonic warfare" Topic

Firstly, let me apologise for my ignorance on this subject, i have recently been considering moving into either ACW or Napoleonic wargaming and got to wondering what (wargaming) differences their were between the 2 era's?

With only (roughly) 50 years between the 2 what are the major tactical differences? Other than the improved weaponry of the ACW i cant immediatly think of any (but this isnt in my field of knowledge), and whenever i have seen either period gamed they look remarkably similar in style of play and tactics!

<<<whenever i have seen either period gamed they look remarkably similar in style of play and tactics!>>>

I respectfully suggest that you haven't been looking closely enough :)

That half century makes a heck of a difference. So does the geography of Europe v the USA.

""<<<whenever i have seen either period gamed they look remarkably similar in style of play and tactics!>>>

I respectfully suggest that you haven't been looking closely enough :)""

Probably true, I have only got interested in this era fairly recently, and never paid too much attention to the details before.

Can you explain your "Geography" remark to a novice in more detail as im not following your train of thought?

IMHO Napoleonics are characterised by lines of men in pretty uniforms peppering the opposition with musket fire. ACW is the much the same but without the pretty uniforms.

One of the main differences is in the use of cavalry. In ACW games cavalry cannot charge infantry without being slaughtered. ACW Cavalry mostly functioned as scouts or fast infantry. They did not fight mounted too often. I like ACW a lot, but I find Napoleonics more tactically deep due to the potential uses of cavalry charges.

Steve

I know nothing of the Napoleonic wars and less of the ACW.

Was the size of the battles very different, I am assuming the ACW had smaller forces?

Actually if all you have seen are wargames then the 2 periods can look very similar on the table but that is often the fault of gamers who like to see every table inch covered in troops no matter what the period.

The manuals used for training the troops before and during the early part of the ACW were actually derived from those written not long after the Napoleonic wars so some similarity is bound to be there.

Dave's comment on the geography is very valid and this certainly caused a rapid development of modified, if not entirely new, tactical approaches to battle at all levels.

Europe was a well developed country with railways, roads, canals and generally good transport routes to keep your army supplied and to allow it to move about fairly quickly.

Much of the USA wasn't like that at all. Roads were poor and deteriorated rapidly, railways good but with limited capacity and poor facilities for handling large quantities of freight or troops and only existing on a limited number of routes. Navigable waterways there were a plenty but cargo facilities were very limited.

Also most European armies were semi-professional at there core – even if they were conscripted they had sound basic training (if rather unimaginative) and were with the colours for a fair number of years. US & CSA armies were initially volunteers, often poorly equipped and supplied and, in many cases, very poorly trained or prepared for the realities of warfare. They learned fast, as volunteer armies often do, but they had a lot to learn.

I'll let other people pick up on the specifics of tactics.

The late Paddy Griffith would argue that there are little if any tactical differences (in a practical sense) between the ACW and Napoleonic periods. Always a cause for much debate here and elsewhere (one in which I will not engage, because it is pointless).

Actually the first major use of Ironclad vessels was during the Crimean War. The French employed iron-clad batteries for bombardment of the coastal forts. It was from these that the concept of fully powered naval ironclads came.

The day of massed cavalry charges was already nearing its end by the time of Waterloo. Cavalry had to catch infantry at a disadvantage to be sure of success and it could be successful in doing that even into the 20th century – though with increasing rarity as time and armament progressed.

The ACW could be said to be the first 'industrial' war but that is debatable. Britain's industries kept the anti-Napoleon faction supplied in the eariler conflict. All nations had to pay attention to the industrial production of armaments even during the Napoleonic wars because armies had become so large.

As touched on before see Paddy Griffiths work and Brent Nosworthy. ACW was steeped in Napoleonic style fighting hence the dreadful casualties but many other factors played their part too. Certainly trenches, Ironclads, telegraph and tracked rail beds in use during the Crimean War just a few years before the ACW.

Nap Wars primarily used smooth bore muskets.
ACW had rifled muskets as the most common weapon. Then repeaters. Then Gatling guns.

Nap Wars had wooden sailing ships.
ACW had ironclads, steam power, and submarines.

Nap Wars used smooth bore artillery primarily.
ACW had rifled cannons as well as smooth bores.

Nap Wars used Cavalry as shock troops.
ACW used cavalry primarily as mounted infantry.

Nap Wars used foot power only to get around on land.
ACW had trains.

On the geography issue. The United States, especially at that time and where the ACW was fought, was more rugged and enclosed than Europe. Whereas Europe tended to have more open territory and farmland, the eastern US is characterized by lots of woods.

The impact this has is that while European armies relied a lot on battlefield cavalry, US cavalry played more of a supporting role….they weren't used as "shock" cavalry in the European manner.

Just one generalized example.

Hi

Virtually all the officers on both sides were schooled in nappy drill and tried to effect it without recognizing the change in both rifles and the artillery drill developed in the 1840s by Ringold.

This meant that "attacking in the same old way" got them shot down much worse.

Rocky

Both wars saw the firing line for shooting and volley fire or platoon fire was common. That was how the volume of fire was delivered.

Weapons, for the most part, were slow firing. As mentioned above, repeaters and machine guns were coming into vogue during the ACW.

Ships were initially wooden during the ACW though they were powered both by steam and sail. The Napoleonic wars saw only wooden sail driven ships.

Ranges during the ACW were longer and weapons were more accurate than the Napoleonic wars.

Cavalry during the Napoleonic wars was a shock weapon almost exclusively. During the ACW cavalry was employed bore like mounted light infantry. Both wars used cavalry for scouting.

Napoleonic wars used column primarily for maneuver and sometimes for close action. ACW maneuvered in column but as the formation reached firing distance, it formed a line. Close assaults were done in waves during the ACW.

Artillery would be considered to be heavy by the Napoleonic standards. Field artillery during the Napoleonic wars would be 6, 8 or 9 lbrs while during the ACW field artillery would be mostly 10 and 12 lbrs. The 10 lbrs would often be rifled giving them a significant accuracy advantage at longer ranges.

The square was the defense for infantry against cavalry during the Napoleonic wars. Firepower was the defense against the cavalry charge during the ACW.

Just some random observations and some are repeats of above.

John

Nappy offers a fascinating rock – paper – scissors relationship between infantry – cavalry – artillery. Increased accuracy and ranges in rifles and artillery pushed the usefulness of cavalry out of the formula, and the ACW generals spent years trying to figure out how to implement the thinking of Napoleon's wars in more modern times.

@The Red Baron,
For Paddy's thoughts behind his books about the comparison you ask about, see:
link
and his book on the subject:
'Battle in the Civil War: Generalship and Tactics in America 1861-65' by Paddy Griffith, illustrated by Peter Dennis, 1986: ISBN 1 86 9871 00 6
and then his more substantive:
'Rally Once Again' (Antony Bird and the Crowood Press, now out of print in the British edition: ISBN 0 946284 48 2). A slightly revised US edition of the latter was published by Yale University Press in 1989, under the new title of 'Battle Tactics of the Civil War' (ISBN 0 300 04247 7), and ISBN 1 85223222 6). I believe it is now in paperback, as well.

- Ned

From a gaming perspective, and gaming only, Naps allows you to decide the game with shock cavalry and the ACW doesn't. You're right in that there isn't a hell of a lot of difference when you look at an in progress game of Naps side by side with ACW. Unlike Napoleonic warfare the ACW involves two armies sharing the same origins and doctrine so there's even less difference between a US and CSA soldier than between a British and French soldier.

The two wars shared a lot of DNA, but the differences were significant especially as regards the geography of the battlefields, as noted above. In many ways the tactics of the ACW is an attempt to try and fit Napoleonic strategy and tactics to the American environment – and when that didn't work out as planned it's a great study of how two armies tried to adapt and innovate upon those tactics to fit their circumstances.

When starting any new period the one constant is personal interest. The ACW and Napoleonic wars are both similar and different and if you are considering starting either you will be faced with the task of both research into choosing organizing and buying your forces and scenery then actually building your set.

You should not and would not go into any period without prior thought. What will inspire you and keep you going will be personal interest. We all personalize our gaming so what do you want. Are you more excited watching Waterloo or Gettysburg ? Are you a Napoleon planning Austerlitz or a Robert E Lee trying to stop General Grant.

You should ask yourself other questions as well. What scale will your armies be and where can you buy them? What type of rules do you like a fast game or highly technical? What are your local gamers doing ? Will you have to build both armies ? If you can go to local cons and ask questions for both types and see if you can play a game or too. This will also show how rules work as well.

So your first trip should be to the library and get yourself some basic histories and guides to both and then see what inspires you?

An other inexpensive way of doing this would be to have a go at paper soldiers and simple rules . You can use actual cutouts of figures or tiles just to see how things start. A good site for this would be juniorgeneral.org

Above all have fun , enjoy yourself and remember it is a game

Napoleonic – 'rapid' smooth bore or 'slower' rifle muskets with better range.
ACW – Minie (expanding) bullet gave rate of fire of smooth bores AND better (?) range and accuracy of a rifle musket.

Add in percussion caps to decrease misfires/slight improvement in ROF (?) gives the infantry superior firepower.

– lines and skirmish screens of infantry can stop cavalry and harress gun lines.

Game wise.

ACW is infantry oriented, and shooting oriented, charges were few and far between, and mele even less. artillery was less effektive but still important.

Napoleoincs: Alot of shooting, but more charges, and more mele(probebly more then in reality) you also have more formations to think about, in ACW you have line of battle or march colum, in games, you problebly only gonna use line of battle, during the Napoleoinc wars, you had line of battle, square, sevral diffrent columns. so more to do.
Artillery was a battle winner
Also from 10-15% of the forces would be cavarly, and you have sevral types of it, light, dragoon and heavy. and each of those classes have sevral types of diffrent cavalry.
Just to name a few. Light cavarly had hussars, chassurs, light dragoons, Chevau-légers, landwehr cavalry ect.

While in the ACW you basicly only had mounted infantry. they looked more or less the same on both sides.

So if you want dozens or hundreds of diffrent uniforms to learn about and paint, so if you want to game a game, were a well timed charge of infantry or cavalry can win the day, you want lots of artillery that do alot of damage, lots of uniforms to paint, lots of formations to keep track of, then Napoleoincs is for you.

If you want simple(some might say boring) uniforms, a game dominated by one formation and almost only infantry, were you have to shoot your way though the enemy, but lovley terrain, then ACW is for you.

Or you could do like every smart person does, do them both.

Using the best mix of arms in each situation
versus
Coping with the enemy holding the key point being anything from raw conscripts with shotguns to veterans with repeating rifles.

Explaining why your entire Albuera rematch army is Imperial Guard versus explaining how the Louisiana Zouaves come to be an entire Corps at Gettysburg.

The historical differences are many, and most have already been listed. But here is a simple concept, you CAN play an ACW wargame like a Napoleonic battle, but the historical guys tried that early and it was not very effective, so they adapted and eventully gave up on the old ways! You could try to play a wargame with Napoleonic units using ACW terrain and tactics (later period) but I suggest that you would be frustrated by lack of open ground to manuver and deploy, fields of fire, and little or no role for Heavy Battle Cavalry. Also you would never have enough "real light infantry" to utilize the terrain adequately!

The fifty odd years between the wars saw incredible change and developements that had really profound effects when the shooting started in 1861. Many of the commanders and politicians had (like you describe yourself) limited knowledge of how these changes would drive events. They were not stupid or rigid, they were simply ignorant (like most of us are) , but most learned their lessons quickly!

First, American tactics tended to follow British practice, which was atypical even in Napoleonic times: 2-rank lines, 10-company battalions, more prone to use line than column, etc.

Second, all American cavalry could be classed as light or dragoons, no heavy cavalry. The fact that cavalry seldom played a large part in ACW battles is not so much a matter of doctrine or tactics however, as to two things: 1. Cavalry is expensive and takes a long time to train; therefore there was relatively little of it at first, and what there was was used mostly for scouting. 2. Most of the ACW was fought in very wooded country, which made it difficult to deploy large cavalry formations, and which put a premium on scouting. By 1863 large cavalry forces had been built up, and some campaigns were fought in more open country (Gettysburg; Sheridan in the Shenandoah) and cavalry became more useful on the battlefield. In most cases, however, it was used to hold flanks and protect wagons, etc.

Longer-ranged more accurate infantry weapons kept artillery from wheeling right up to canister range, so tended to be used more for long-range firing (shell and shrapnel) with doubtful accuracy, and for defense with canister. Again, the wooded nature of most battlefields in the ACW limited artillery's usefulness.

Therefore, large ACW battles were almost always dominated by the infantry. The interesting balance of infantry-cavalry-artillery is what makes Napoleonics more interesting.

To me, the interesting part of the ACW is not so much the battles as the campaigns -- that is where the strategy came into play. Some campaigns were won without a major battle ever being fought (Sherman's March to the Sea, for instance).

ACW battlefields tended to have a lot more obstructive terrain – woods, fenced-in fields, etc. You may see many ACW tables that consist of clear terrain with some woods, where for many battles should be the other way around. The default terrain should be woods with some large clearings.

Rifle muskets used by average troops had a marginally greater range than muskets. Between that and the terrain, cavalry rarely made effective shock charges against foot, though it did happen. ACW battles are infantry slogging matches punctuated by artillery, with cavalry an auxiliary force. If you see games where that isn't happening, no wonder you get it confused with Napoleonic.

Napoleonic battles have a delicate balance between infantry, cavalry and artillery.

As for size of armies, Union ACW forces might be as large as 130,000 and Confederates up to 90,000.

To MARKUP the first responder to the question: What a really unhelpful comment. RED BARON is asking for some help and then you don't bother to reply to his question! Sometimes I get disappointed by the lack of respect people pay on this forum.

To RED BARON: Glad that other people have had the decency to respond correctly to you asking for help.

As another newcomer to the idea, my first sarcastic comment about the difference between American Civil War and Napoleonics is the pretty uniforms, the spectacle.

Others have pointed out the tactical and terrain differences already.

One reason why you might see an ACW and Napoleonic wargame and think there is little difference is errors in the Napoleonic wargames for musket range. The maximum, fairly ineffective, range for the smoothbore musket should be the same as the lenght of a battalion in line.(100 to 150 yards) What I see in many Napoleonic rules, especially when a single stand is scaled to be a battalion or brigade, is that the range is 4 to 10X larger. This makes the wargame range and its affect on manavuer about the same as the ACW, which should not be. A second distorsion is that in the Napoleonic era, roundshot or large cannister far outranged musket fire, so you could advance cannon against infantry and shoot them up. In the ACW, the crew would be killed by the rifled muskets before they even deployed. If this difference is not in the rules used for the eras, then they wargame tactics might look a lot alike. Note that in the defense, the faster firing, heavier (mostly 12 pounder rather than 6 pounder) and more mobile ACW guns would be more powerful than their Napoleonic counterparts. At longer ranges, I think that the effect of ACW or Napoleonic artillery were basically similar. Shooting roundball at denser Napoleonic formations was similar in effect to shooting better shrapnel/explosive shell at thinner formations.

Red:

If there seems to be some question about how different tactics were between the Napoleonic wars and ACW, least for land warfare, it is at least partly because those on the ground at the time weren't sure if any existed, let alone what those differences might be. It is an interesting question.

And I am not surprised you couldn't see much difference in some ACW games from the Napoleonic rules systems. They are often based on each other, like Fire and Fury and Age of Eagles or built on a common game system like Volley and Bayonet or the Piquet supplements and variants.]

Here are some of the stated differences and why it was difficult to actually say if they are or not:

1. The Rifle's increased ranges: Several writers like Nosworthy have noted that at ranges over 200 yards, the rifle had to lob bullets to reach out t0 300 and 400 yards. Sharpshooters/snipers often relied on cartridge ammo for the Sharps rifle or a smaller caliber than the Enfield and Springfield. Add to this the limited line of sight for many battlefields because of terrain, and it became difficult to judge how much difference that greater range caused. Here is a manual for officers at the start of the war:

"Tactics for Officers of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery" L. v. Buckholtz. J.w. Randolph, Richmond, VA January 1861

The different kinds of fire are: by battalions, by half-battalions, by companies, by platoons, by half-platoons, by ranks and file. For instance in mass, if the distance be 200-250 paces [166-208 yards], in one minute can be fired two or three round, therefore at an advancing enemy can be fire four to five rounds. p.21

So, if they are talking about ranges of 200 yards at the beginning of the war, how much does that change? 300 yards was the recommended deployment range from the enemy during the Napoleonic wars.

General Emory Upton, in his 1875 book Infantry Tactics has the very same kinds of fire listed. He recommends target practice being done out to 400 yards. Only skirmishers and sharpshooters are expected to fire beyond that range. And remember, Upton is talking about the breech loading Springfield being used.

In fact, Upton's 1875 instructions on the "School of the Company", "Battalion" and "Brigade" read just like Casey's 1863 manual which is a copy and expansion of Hardee's 1858 book, which reads just like both Scott's manual of the 1840s, and the French Light Infantry manual of the 1830's and 1840's. And the majority of the French manual follows the intructions and forms of the French 1791 regulations.

2. The Rifle's increased accuracy: That same lobbing trait of the heavy minié ball made aiming difficult over more than 150 yards. It required training to be accurate with the weapon. Upton stressed this issue in his tactical treatises after the war. The Enfield and Springfield weapons with .57-8 caliber bullet were new weapons to most all soldiers, whether familiar with private rifles/smoothbores or not. Both sides continued to use volley fire because there was little aiming. Often times smoke was so thick soldiers couldn't aim. Read about the firefight between the Iron Brigade and the Stonewall Brigade before 2nd Manassas. They blazed away, causing serious damage, but didn't see each other after the first volley and didn't know how close they were to each other until they stopped firing. They were very close during the engagement and didn't know it.

As Don L. points out, the Americans deployed in lines in two ranks following the British practice which they had followed since the War of 1812 through the Mexican-American War. Nothing new there and not a response to changing tactics. As the old adege goes, "Armies prepare to fight the last war."

Even so, was the rifled musket a more deadly weapon? Overall, it's hard to tell. Below are the casualties incurred by armies in a sampling of battles as a percentage of their force. Obviously, they remain very similar between battles in the previous 150 years and the ACW.

Seven Years' War [winner/loser]

Kolin 22% / 43%
Leuthen 18% / 15%
Zorndorf 35% / 45%

Napoleonic Wars

Austerlitz 12% / 19%
Eylau 27% / 14%
Borodino 23% / 34%
Salamanca 10% / 28%
Waterloo 22% / 30% [approximate]

American Civil War

2nd Manassas 18% / 21%
Antietam 17% / 26%
Fredericksburg 7% / 11%
Gettysburg [3-day battle] 28% / 37%
Wilderness 23% / 18%
Shiloh 21% / 27%
Franklin 8% / 23%

It wasn't clear whether the rifle was *more* deadly. That is one reason that Burnside charges Mary's Heights at Fredericksburg, Lee has his Pickett's Charge a year later, and a year after that Grant has his Cold Harbor--twice.

After the ACW

Solferino 13% / 12 %
Sadowa 3% / 12%
Gravoltte 11% / 11%
Sedan 4% / 14%

As you can see, it seems that the casualties actually decreased in the second half of the 19th Century with the increased power of modern weapons. Numbers taken from those complied by Mark Hamblin.

3. The "changing role" of Cavalry. The American army never had a tradition of massed battle cavalry, or the use of Napoleonic cavalry tactics. It did have a tradition of frontier fighting in small units of horsemen. So…that is what you see in the Civil War, right from the start, particularly when infantry are charged by cavalry—small units, at 1st Manassas, at Gaines Mill, at Gettysburg. Not even Farnsworth charged with a full brigade of cavalry. There are damn few examples of ACW cavalry charging infantry for anyone to make the claim that the failure of cavalry against infantry during the ACW changed their role by 1865, let alone 1862—1863. Who "learned" this and how? Of course, the close terrain again had an impact on cavalry tactics. Only when there are divisions of cavalry do you see any massed charges, and it is, like Napoleonic times, more often reserved for cavalry vs cavalry combat, or to pursuit of broken enemy units, as seen at the end of the war.

4. Artillery ceases to be an effective offensive weapon: The idea that the role of artillery changed during the ACW is also hard to confirm because of the terrain. An effective offensive use of artillery requires a line of sight. The massed French artillery at Waterloo were ineffective for the same reason the Rebel gun line was on the third day of Gettysburg. Very little artillery was taken by the Union into the Wilderness in 1864 for the same reason. However, like Napoleonic wars, artillery could be effective on the defense when the enemy came close, or they had a line of sight, like Pegram's battery at 2nd Manassas. There are very few examples of artillery wheeling up to canister range and firing at infantry even during the Napoleonic era. There are examples of it being done in the Civil War. And like the Napoleonic period, artillery casualties were high, but a lot of damage is done to the targets.

There are any number of examples of artillery dominating the battlefield during most Civil War battles, particularly when it was massed…like the Napoleonic period.

After the Franco-Prussian war a German general wrote
The Influence of Firearms Upon Tactics translated from German by Capt. E.H. Wickham 1876

He praises the Artillery arm of the American Civil War armies, particularly the Union as 'extrodinary' in their mobility and effectiveness. He sees no particular change in tactics other than the range and mobility. He also notes that because rifled artillery at the time was ineffective against earthworks and with canister, large numbers of the 'older' smoothbores were retained.

5. The increased use of fortifications. The use of fortifications to defend strategic points, particularly by armies significantly inferior in strength to the enemy, was very Napoleonic. Was Wellington before his time when he built the extensive fortifications around Torres Vedras or the extensive sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Burgos? Or the Russians at Smolensk and Borodino?

Fortifications play an important role in the wars from 1756 to 1861. And extensive field works were often built by armies inferior to the enemy, such as the Russians at Poltava. It is something the Union often did, viewing their infantry inferior to the Rebels, such as Franklin. As strategic points like Atlanta, Vicksburg and Richmond had no permanent fortifications like the European cities, so they had to be built. Tunnel mines like Petersburg was not a new tactic.

Running through all of this is the American lack of experience and military traditions compared to Europe. Here is a British officer writing the same year of Upton's teatise, giving his conclusions on the ACW and the changes in tactics:

Minor Tactics by C. Clery, Captain of Light Infantry, Professor Sandhurst 1875

At the peace of 1815, the French system of tactics was that established in continental armies, and so it remained with slight modifications until rifle and breech-loading fire-arms called for material alterations in 1866. At that date the Prussians had so far advanced on the French formations that they substituted company columns for battalion columns. But the skirmish line was retained for the same purpose and of about the same strength as hitherto. The principle of action therefore remained the same, to shake the enemy by fire of the skirmishers, but to rely on the shock of masses for the real work of overthrowing him.

Breech-loading rifles first came prominently into notice in the campaign of 1866… the most striking result of their employment in 1866 was the immense power of fire developed in the attack.

Italics mine…

So, with all the techicalogical advances during the ACW, were there significant changes in tactics between the Napoleonic Wars and the Civil War? I'm not sure, and even ten years afterwards, contemporaries found it hard to decern exactly what was differences in the tactics were seen in the Civil War--particularly when you look at the training manuals and tactical treatises. longer ranges seem to be the real change while still using Napoleonic tactics.

Bill

Hi All

Thanks for all the info, you have given me a much clearer picture of the differences, particularly as regards the cavalry. From the replies it appears that (in general) ACW gaming is more limited than Nap gaming at the tactical level which has come as a bit of surprise to me, as is the realisation of the extant the US terrain played on the war.

Thanks again TMP'ers

Didn't the longer ranges and greater accuracies place a higher premium on concealment and cover in the ACW (on the attack & defense) than in the Napoleonic? (which the American countryside graciously provided) And wouldn't/didn't that have an effect on the employment of shock action? Likewise, smaller numbers of men could potentially have greater effect with the longer range weapons. I recall reading about James Longstreet plugging a brigade/division-sized gap in the line with 400 elite sharpshooters in 1865. I think tactics could be just as interesting in the ACW as the Napoleonic, if you do them differently.

Bill's (McLaddie) comments are spot on.

Some battles of the ACW did take on appearances of Napoleonic battles though, such as Antietam where Hooker brought up 36 guns to clear the cornfield with canister fire to precipitated an attack against Hood, and Union heavy artillery pounded the position from across Antietam Creek.

At both 2nd Bull Run and Antietam the Union made several attacks deployed in "double battle column" (regiments in 5 company fronts, 4 ranks deep).

Late in the war even deeper attacks where made. Hancock's attack at the Mule Shoe with his entire Second Corp was made on a half-mile front, some 40 ranks deep, reminiscent of the style of D'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.

At the Battle of Opequon (3rd Winchester) 2 Union Cavalry divisions made mounted attacks against the front and flanks of Rebel positions, driving them out of the Collier redoubt and breaking the line.

Pickett's Charge was a classic (though failed) Napoleonic style attack of massed infantry advancing over nearly a mile of open ground. A year later, Hood would make a similar attack at Franklin across nearly 2 miles of open ground!

Where the terrain was somewhat open, both sides did make attempts at Napoleonic type battles. The difference was that both sides where willing to maneuver and fight at places like Shiloh and the Wilderness in terrain that no Napoleonic army did and adapted tactics to those conditions. Visibility played a crucial role as commanders could rarely see just what was going on during a battle and had to often find the enemy before they could engage them effectively.

The Battle of New Orleans is a great example of Napoleonic tactics used in American type terrain against entrenched troops. This was more of a Civil War type battle then a typical Napoleonic battle, yet fought in 1814!

Kim

Remember that just a few years before the Civil war, you had propper(abit much smaller) Napoleoinc battles in Mexico with smoothbore muskets and old style cannon.
That was one of the problems, many manye ACW generals on both sides had seen service in the Mexican war, so they had not only been trained in Napoleonic tactics, but had infact fought with them.

It was kinda like you took a WW1 vertrain, then give them M249s M16s and miniguns, the guns were kinda the same, but not quite, but instead of having 70-80 years to adopt to new weapons and tactics, you only had 15

I think McLaddie's statistics speak for themselves--great post, BTW. Ranges were longer and accuracy better and yet the ACW was just as bloody as the Napoleonic wars, NOT more so. Shock action was employed, but differently. At 2nd Bull Run and Antietam the Rebs used concealment and cover to the umpteenth degree. McClellan rolled out his corps in piecemeal fashion telegraphing the blows in the open like in the days of Napoleon and got thrashed by a smaller, more mobile force which used concealment and cover to deceive the enemy. If anything, we should be calling the ACW Wellingtonic tactics minus heavy cavalry, plus greater infantry flexibility/mobility, range and accuracy. "Stonewall" saved the day at 1st Bull Run by being a year ahead of everyone else in implementing them. I think most ACW generals, even Mexican War vets, adapted their thinking and tactics to the new realities relatively quickly. Sure, it was linear tactics with similar rates of fire, i.e. the black powder era, but you may as well call it Frederick the Great tactics or Napoleonic III tactics. I really think the legacy that Napoleon the First conferred to the ACW was not at the tactical level, but at the operational level.

PS I recall reading in Sears' Landscape Turned Red that the first Yank brigade to get to the southern end of the Cornfield received the first volley from a Reb force which had been laying down behind cover "250 YARDS AWAY".

PSS The attack on the Mule Shue was predicated on early morning surprise and the concealment of early morning darkness/fog, IIRC and was facilitated by the withdrawal of the Reb artillery. D'Erlon went in midday after artillery preparation with no attempt at surprise and/or concealment.

Hi

Errr… overstating the weapon postion, guys.

The thing is that the nappy musket ranges start with massiver overstatement and then we conclusively "prove" that rifles were no better showing that a)spending all that money was a waste, and b)the shooters couldn't adjust.

Rather, it was the officers who ahd difficulty. In fact, as pointed out above, the "effective" range of napoleonic musket is overreached.

All the "range and estimation and ballistic" problems apply even WORSE to brown bess roundballs.

In reality, if your rules weren't making fudges for the good of the game, your divisional battles would be in effective melee range. 60m is a good range for smoothbore roundball, 100 an extreme. And the rules are at fault.

With ACW, for all the complaints, there are examples of the firefight starting at 500 yards, and the casualty bit reflects changes in the system. French column attacks? Thinning lines? Going to ground? And so on. The casualties as statistics are too simplistic a number.

Rocky

Bottom line most Civil War generals from West Point thought of warfare in Napoleonic terms. The major difference was that in Europe heavy cavalry was the pride of the aristocracy and was intended to be used decisively in combat and earn the glory for god, king and country. This is a very different mindset than America as a citizen of the Republic though the South had a certain cavalier attitude of aristocracy.

Granted there were technological improvements precussion caps, and minnie balls, rifled artillery but except for the last year of the war in grand strategic and grand tactical terms (deploying formed troops and skirmishing)except for the decisive use of heavy cavalry on the battlefield it was the same.

Actauly the myth of ACW battles beeing bloodier then a Napoleoinc one is quite intresting.
But pound for pound the Napoleoinc battles were blooder, Waterloo killed or wounded more people in 8 hours then Gettysburg did in 3 days.

PSS The attack on the Mule Shue was predicated on early morning surprise and the concealment of early morning darkness/fog, IIRC and was facilitated by the withdrawal of the Reb artillery. D'Erlon went in midday after artillery preparation with no attempt at surprise and/or concealment.

You are correct Bottom Dollar. My point was that use of infantry in mass as was done in the Napoleonic era was still done, albeit consideration for terrain and surprise was taken into account to make the attack more effective. Grant did repeat this same style of attack at Cold Harbor, though this time Lee was prepared and the results speak for themselves.

Also I'm not sure the Federals knew for certain that 20 artillery pieces where withdraw from the Mule Shoe since that attack was being prepared prior to that. Lee certainly had his guns in place at Cold Harbor when Grant attacked!

Thanks for the clarification.

Kim

My main point was, using shock action during the ACW was a whole new ballgame. Concealment, surprise and cover (aka protection) were at a much higher premium on the attack during the ACW than during the Napoleonic Wars AND the generals knew it sooner rather than later. That's what made it a step along the path to modern war. Any ACW unit that advanced to the attack in the open to a range or in a manner similar to the way they did it during the Napoleonic Wars (or like they show in the movies for that matter) got shot down pretty quick IMHO.

PS Kim I agree that the Feds didn't know the Reb artillery had been withdrawn, even though that withdrawal facilitated the attack. I would suggest that perhaps the effort at early morning concealment/surprise was to avoid the worst effects of that artillery. That it was withdrawn was a bonus so to speak.

Rocky Wrote:

Errr… overstating the weapon postion, guys.

The thing is that the nappy musket ranges start with massiver overstatement and then we conclusively "prove" that rifles were no better showing that a)spending all that money was a waste, and b)the shooters couldn't adjust.

Rocky;
Howdy. Hope you are enjoying your summer. I am actually getting to stay in one place this season [home].

Your comment is sort of overstating the positions posted here IMHO. There is no question that the rifled musket with its percussion cap was a far better weapon compared to the Napoleonic flintlock musket, in reliability, range and accuracy.

The question is how it changed or didn't change tactics during the ACW.

Rocky wrote:

Rather, it was the officers who ahd difficulty. In fact, as pointed out above, the "effective" range of napoleonic musket is overreached.

No doubt--officers did. They weren't particularly experienced with the new weapons, let alone warfare at the start--whatever they learned, it was on the ground running.

Where is the 'effective range' of smoothbore musket overreached in the posts? I don't see it. Oman alone mentions several occasions where the French formed troops, let alone skirmishers, opened fire at 200 and 250 yards. Absolutely not 'effective range', but they did it for some reason… such as drawing fire and thus pinning the enemy, and throwing up smoke.

The range of yards I mentioned was simply a quote from a book in 1861. Perhaps the officer was understating the ranges of the rifle?

Rocky wrote:

All the "range and estimation and ballistic" problems apply even WORSE to brown bess roundballs.

Yep, which is why they relied on volley fire. However, did the problems get that much better with the minie ball? The entire Civil War saw both sides employ volley fire with formed troops. If ten years after the war an innovative thinker like Upton is still talking volley fire by platoon, rank and file, company etc. in his treatise on tactics--were we just slow learners or all bad shots?

Rocky wrote:

In reality, if your rules weren't making fudges for the good of the game, your divisional battles would be in effective melee range. 60m is a good range for smoothbore roundball, 100 an extreme. And the rules are at fault.

I am sure that most all Napoleonic officers would agree that up to 100 yards was the effective range and rules are at fault if they show otherwise. I've seen that 'effective range' mentioned several times in contemporary writings and the ordinance tests seem to bear that out. Yet, as I said, Napoleonic firefights were opened at two times that range and certainly French skirmishers used smoothbores out that far. So, there is a difference between when fire is initiated and what constitutes 'effective range.'

Rocky wrote:

With ACW, for all the complaints, there are examples of the firefight starting at 500 yards, and the casualty bit reflects changes in the system. French column attacks? Thinning lines? Going to ground? And so on. The casualties as statistics are too simplistic a number.

What complaints? And I just pointed out that Napoleonic firefights in the Peninsula started at 250 yards, far beyond 'effective range', and certainly 500 yards is beyond the Rifle musket's 'effective range' as described by ACW officers.

And I agree. The statistics could be simplistic in any number of ways… For instance, different weapons could be causing different amounts of casualties in each period--where the rifle is now the primary killer in the ACW, but not in the Napoleonic period. What are you thinking about? If they are too simplistic, we still have a problem with Borodino's one day generating as many casualties percentage-wise as Gettysburg's three days. What do you feel that does or doesn't say?

There is no question that the rifled musket was a superior weapon. The question is did it change tactics during the ACW? Increased ranges are not a change in tactics. It dictates when things happen, but not necessarily what.

Going to ground, laying down to avoid being hit by skirmish AND artillery fire was an old behavior, even for Europeans. The British did it at Talavera [skirmish fire] all the way to Waterloo [artillery fire]. Fighting in cover, sniping and engaging in long-distance firefights were American traditions starting with the French and Indian Wars. The behaviors have historical continuity, and are unique enough American behaviors to be commented on by European writers in the 1860s and 1870s. It isn't necessarily a response to new weapons. It could be a response Americans had in combat before the ACW. Or it could be some shade of both…

If the increased accuracy and range of rifled weapons caused US soldiers to entrench, why didn't it cause Austrian, French and Prussian soldiers, at times with far better weapons, to entrench in a similar fashion with the same frequency from 1864-1870?

One reason might be that the Civil War was the longest war among industrialized combatants seen in the Nineteenth Century--longer than the Franco-Austrian, Austro-Prussian and Franco-Purssian Wars put together. Yet the tactics we see were very similar throughout the war, from the propensity to fortify such points as Fort Pillow, Richmond 1862 and several places during the Seven Days Battles, and then Corinth the same year. The same is true of basic infantry tactics.

Upton's successful divisional attack against trenches at Spotsylvania in 1864 used a formation he described as "columns at full distance." [In other words, several lines two ranks deep, one behind the other at about 75-150 yards apart, depending on the front of the columns.] Even what is seen now as an innovative response to frontal assaults against entrenched positions and rifled muskets is described then in terms of Napoleonic formations--and tactics. Columns were traditionall used to assault fortified points…

The French in 1859 were using infantry tactics very similar to those used by the Prussians a decade later in 1870--skirmishers supported by small columns. We now may feel that the lessons are obvious, and maybe they are, but I am not sure they were obvious to the majority of thinking men at the time. All Longstreet had to remember was Mary's Heights at Fredericksburg six months before to know that Pickett's Charge would fail. He didn't have to be 'ahead of his time' to realize that.

Prussian generals in 1870 quickly discovered that the French infantry with their Chassepot rifles could hit Prussian columns at 1000 yards.

The Prussian SOP was to deploy at 600 yards which meant they had to cross 400 yards in column under fire. The Prussians didn't change tactics, they just deployed further out…

In 1868 Upton predicted that all future wars would be fought between skirmishers. If you read Boguslawski's Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-1872, his descriptions of combat confirm Upton's prediction. But do you see the Prussians and French in 1914 changing their tactics to match this reality until after the Battle of the Marne?

I find the questions about tactics, and the effects new weapons have on them, fascinating, but not all that simple to answer with a definitive yes or no…

Bill H.

Check out this link from Simmons games, as he has a very interesting overview and compares Austerlitz and Gettysburg. I found it interesting in particular to th artillery differences and the officer casaulties.

link

He has a board game called Napoleon's Triumpth that I think it is excellent – I probably play more miniatures games than boardgames by far, however this may well be the best war game I have played bar none…..

Doing some reading unconnected to this discussion, I found some interesting information. Scharnhorst carried out tests comparing rifles and smoothbore muskets in 1812. You can see the results in the Appendices of Peter Paret's book on Yorck and The Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1813.

Obviously this is under perfect conditions, but two things stand out. The first is the ranges that Scharnhorst felt were applicable to a comparison, and then the comparison:

Hits our of 200 rounds fired at a large target
[column/company front sized]

yards 80 160 240 320
Northardt Musket 1805 145 97 56 67
New Prussian Musket 1809 153 113 70 42
Brown Bess 94 116 75 55

Hits out of 100 rounds Fired at a small target[man-sized]

yards 120 160 240
Prussian Musket 21 4
Prussian Rifle w/plaster
bullets [coated] 68 49 31

So, Scharhorst found that rifles could fire half as fast as a musket, but hit at 2 to 1 at 160 yards and 4 to 1 at 240 yards. In other words with half as many shots, a rifle equaled a musket for hits. Make that a rifled musket with a easy to load minie ball and you have the best of both worlds if the soldier is trained to aim.

And ranges out to 240 and 320 yards were important.

Bill

Well, shoot. Lets try that again. Nope, it simply refuses to cooperate…

Hits our of 200 rounds fired at a large target
[column/company front sized]

yards------------------80--160--240--320

Northardt Musket 1805----145---97---56---67
New Prussian Musket 1809-153--113---70---42
Brown Bess----------------94--116---75---55

Hits out of 100 rounds Fired at a small target[man-sized]

yards-----------120--160---240

Prussian Musket----------21-----4
Prussian Rifle------68---49----31
w/plaster bullets
[coated]

Of course, with the so-called Minie' ball a rifle could be loaded as fast as a smoothbore musket.

Just a comment on the ACW attack tactics discussed by several people above. What the ACW generals and tactiticans found was that a classic attack in line or a series of lines against an established and possibly dug-in or barrier protected line, was bloodly repulsed. Therefore, there was a lot of experimentation to find an alternative. There are not too many alternatives. A sudden rush by a dense column was tried numberous times, with spotty success only on lucky ocassions. The "horseshoe" at Spotsylvania was lucky because of it being a salient and the attack happening just before a withdrawal. Cold Harbour against a prepared enemy with interlocking fields of fire and defense in depth was not. Trench warefare with a lot of artillery and attrition was the final answer. The "experiments" should not be taken as demonstration of the "rule" that mass column attacks were a norm.

McLaddie
Hits our of 200 rounds fired at a large target
[column/company front sized]
yards--------------------80--160--240--320

Northardt Musket 1805----145---97---56---67
New Prussian Musket 1809-153--113---70---42
Brown Bess----------------94--116---75---55

I've seen these numbers before and I think they are suspect in even closely representing the actual capabilities of a smoothbore musket.

First off, the situation appeared to be to "sell" the new Prussian musket. (I've been around military suppliers and purchasers and they do stretch the truth a bit! Hmmm. "The new weapon is better than the old weapon and another nation's weapon is very poor by comparison!!!")

Second, the hit numbers must have been done by bench rest techinques after test shots.
yards…….80--160---240--320
% hits……71%--56%--35%---21%

At 100meters a typical smoothbore trajectory would fall by about 7 to 8 feet.( Field artillery and firepower By Jonathan B. A. Bailey p155) I don't think that in battle, anybody knew or cared about aiming and holding 4 to 5 man heights high above the target at 240 yards. An interesting article is by W.Illegal "The Accuracy Of Black
Powder Muskets" at link which presents charts on Brown Bess trajectory. (He centers the results on ca 900fps muzzle velocity, I believe that something like 1300fps would be better; however, the type of results and conclusions are not that much different. The roundball is a horrible ballistic shape and at quickly loses velocity from high velocities- thereafter the drag dimishes) The drop of the ball at 300 yards is 250" (@ 1000fps. So somehow the 21% hits at 320yards in the data above were done by aiming 21 feet above the target. Naw.

" if more attention were paid to the instruction of the recruit in this most essential qualification, and more time and ammunition devoted to target practice ; but, at the same time, every officer should be made to know something of projectiles in general, or he will, as at present, be incapable of instructing his men. I will venture to assert, that eight out of then of the soldiers of our regular regiments will aim in the same manner at an object at the distanced of 300 yards, as at one only 50. It must hence be evident that the greater part of those shots are lost or expended in vain ; indeed the calculation has been made, that only one shot our of 200 fired from muskets in the field takes effect, while one out of twenty from rifles is the average" cf napoleon-series.org --"Twenty-Five Years in the Rifle Brigade," William Blackwood, Edinburgh; and T. Cadell, London; 1833; pp.289-291

The smoothbore was effective at 30 to 70 yards. I can believe in shots on target of 50% there. Most of the time it was fired/misfired in smoke during uncontrolled firefights at targets 100+ yards away, on a different elevation with hit rates of less than a percent. That is why it took a man's weight in lead bullets to hit him.

The ACW rifled musket could be deadily at a much longer range. The projectile was a good ballistic shape with a high weight to cross-sectional area. So it carried well, was not slowed down by air resistance and retained a lot of energy to long range. Although it was fired at a lower muzzle velocity than a smoothbore (ca 900fps versus 1300fps)it carried better and dropped less at longer ranges. The rifled musket minie ball was "precise" in trajectory. Bt this, I mean that because of the rifling, spinning on axis, not-bouncing down the barrell, lack of variable windage, lack of delay in being fired and the use of sights, a typical solider could fire and hit the same place more repeatedly. At long range, there was a need to know the range accurately because the minie ball would be falling down quickly compared to the horizontal distance it traveled in the "danger zone". (e.g. you could hit the ground ahead of a target or behind him). Ranging shots could be used find the aiming point- or if the target was a column, it didn't matter as much.

cheers.

Hi

Mac, I think you are reading my posts "backwards". What I am saying is that the tactics didn't change! As above, people did give up,after a lot of casualties, the traditional "column to 50yards then fire".

It doesn't matter what range some example fired at, but the engagement range is different in my estimation. Historically, guns cause units to fail before contact by either stopping the advance, or actually breaking up. Morale being the issue.

Most rules play games with time and distance trying to account for how an advance can take an hour over a half mile. But the reason is the morale issue of being willing to advance into fire.

Further, most of us looking at battles are not sure where the fight involves smoothbore muskets and where rifles are involved.

So, my point was that everyone did the same drill but as the war advanced, the range at which troops responded got further out.

One example of going to ground, or entrenchment doesn't alter the point about how the selection of the choices started going to response at greater range and making a worse target at greater ranges and sooner.

Casualties at waterloo in 8 hours might be a case that suggests my point, but not the way presented above. One, numbers involved versus percentages. Second, as others have talked about terrain, I think the actual fire fights are just different. Devils Den with all the drama, doesn't actually involve that many people at any one time contrasted with pretty much any action at waterloo. The issue is coming to contact, not the actual danger.

As for european responses. Again, a lot of the issue involves the weapons. In this case, the early needle gun is relatively short range, and both it and the Lebel have their own unreliability issues making a direct comparison impossible in an academic way.

Rocky

Billsfan wrote:

I've seen these numbers before and I think they are suspect in even closely representing the actual capabilities of a smoothbore musket.

Billsfan:

I certainly wasn't suggesting they were close. I said they could be considered ideal under perfect conditions… And I am sure that Scharnhorst did too from his comments. I am sure any real results were much lower in real combat… Which would be true for rifled muskets too.

IIRC, Scharnhorst didn't use bench tests, but had groups of 100 soldiers firing all at once--but of course his tests were over a month, so he could have bench-tested them too.

What I posted the stats for two things:
1. The ranges that Scharnhorst felt were important to test for with both weapons--three times the considered 'effective range' of muskets and beyond the effective range of period rifles.

2. The relationship he found between the smoothbore and rifle in hits per shots and time between shots in loading.

Which actually suggests that a ACW Rifled Musket should be twice as effective as a Smoothbore.

The actual numbers are only useful for relationships. And while I agree that the military fudged tests then just as they do now, Schornhorst's tests also demonstrated that the old Prussian musket actually out-shot the new 1809 model.

Your comment about the smoothbore shots being unrealistic, "So somehow the 21% hits at 320yards in the data above were done by aiming 21 feet above the target. Naw." Why? If you can guage how high to fire the musket out to 320 yards, so could contemporaries. The question is whether they did it. I have read accounts of Napoleonic officers suggesting just that practice posted on TMP and the Napoleon Series.

The ACW soldiers had to aim 10+ feet above the target at 400 yards, but then, unlike the Napoleonic soldier, many had 'guidesights' or backsights.

You can find accounts of formed units firing at 400 and 600 yards, but in every case the backsights were used in unison [and they had the time for an officer to make an accurate calculation of the distance to do it or ranging shots to be watched which was a common practice of sharpshooters, but not regiments in the field.]

With the OR being on computer, it is possible to do a search of ranges. Nosworthy did one and found that the vast majority of fire fights *reportedly* ranged between 10 and 250 yards. And firefights out further were not only rare, but commented on as such. Again, regiment vs regiment or brigade vs brigade, not sharpshooters and skirmishers.

There are a lot of reasons for units opening fire at 250 yards or under. But the increased range of the rifle doesn't seem to have increased the range of engagement by much. Nosworthy discusses this in his book by the pretensious name "The Bloody Crucible of Couraage". The chapter 30 on Rifle Musket Effectiveness starting on p. 571

I am not arguing that the rifled musket wasn't deadlier. I agree with you. It was more accurate. That is what accuracy is: a 'precise' tragectory. The problem with the minie ball is because of the lower muzzle velocity, it did drop over longer ranges, so that like the smoothbore, to actually get it out to longer ranges, it had to be fired at a high trajectory, which made the 'danger zone' much smaller at greater ranges…that is why it was hard to aim at longer ranges, why adjustable sights became so necessary and why so many ACW soldiers talk about shots going overhead in actual firefights.

I am questioning whether that superiority translated into significatly different tactics.

When I say questioning, I mean just that. I am not sure what we know about the answer to that.

Bill H.

Rocky wrote:

Mac, I think you are reading my posts "backwards". What I am saying is that the tactics didn't change! As above, people did give up,after a lot of casualties, the traditional "column to 50yards then fire".

Rocky:
Oh. Well, it wouldn't be the first time I have read things sdrawkcab.

When you wrote:

With ACW, for all the complaints, there are examples of the firefight starting at 500 yards, and the casualty bit reflects changes in the system. French column attacks? Thinning lines? Going to ground? And so on. The casualties as statistics are too simplistic a number.

I guess I read it incorrectly--backwards.

It doesn't matter what range some example fired at, but the engagement range is different in my estimation. Historically, guns cause units to fail before contact by either stopping the advance, or actually breaking up. Morale being the issue.

Most rules play games with time and distance trying to account for how an advance can take an hour over a half mile. But the reason is the morale issue of being willing to advance into fire.

Okay. I agree. We're on the same page.

Bill

Here are some interesting account of battle:

1.Orders came: The second battalion was to advance in company columns, echeloned right in the direction of the village to our front. This was followed by an order to the companies to push the leading sections foward in a skirmish line. At this moment the sun began to break through the early morning fog and this was accompanies by murderous enemy fire. One of our batteries, whcih ahd been at readiness between the houses, galloped forward through enemy artillery fire, into a fire position amidst the fields of suger beet.

2. An infantry officer Briefed an artillery captain: "The French have establishe d themselves in the farm and the corpse. 1,200 metres right is an enemy battery. 500 metres forward of our position is the enemy front line. We must have support, or we cannot advance."

3. Enemy artillery fire increased noticeably, coming down from three sides. The French infantry attempted repeatedly to thrust against the village from the west and northwest, but they were beaten back by men of the 1st company… who had established themselves in orchards on the edge of the village. Two good examples of the confused situation then occured. A French higher staff arrived at full gallop on the his south of Meharicourt about 1,500 metres from us. The staff jumped down from their horses and started assempbing map tables. The party's entire attention seemed to be directed towards Maucourt and Chilly. Not of the officers seemed to realize that we had already occupied the village of to their flank. I assumed that a French cavalry division was about to advance and ordered the 5th company to prepare to fire volleys.

3. After a lengthy fire fight the lines of infantry stormed the wood, which was up to 500 metres deep, drove the enemy out and pushed on to its western edge. The battalions then regrouped for an attack on the woods which was 250-300 metres distant.

What I find interesting about these accounts is though they tactically read like something from the Napoleonic period or ACW, they are from accounts of German officers on the Somme in 1914. [From Jack Sheldon's book The German Army on the Somme 1914-1916 pp. 15-24

I would just like to point out that the difference between an effective small arms range of 100 yards and under versus 200 yards and over for a guy walking around on foot without an ounce of kevlar on or who isn't sitting in an armored fighting vehicle is a pretty big difference. How many steps does it take for the un-hit men trying to maintain a closed order formation to realize, "Hey, we've just been shot to "… 10 ? 15 ? 20 ? 30 ? 35 ? 40 ? 45 ? 50 steps/strides ?

Not to forget that both Yank and Reb were in love with 12 pd Napoleons, NOT TO BE FOUND DURING THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, which were spraying lethal doses of canister well beyond the range of a level aimed rifle-musket.

PS On a different, but closely related note, Winfield Scott himself said prior to the outbreak of hostilities(to paraphrase) rifled artillery is the end of massed cavalry charges for regular shock action.

But closed-order tactics during the ACW were the same as during the Napoleonic Wars? I don't think so.