"What makes a unit 'Elite'." Topic

So, what about the enlisted casualties?

'Unless the Old Guard officers were somehow hiding behind their men while the Line officers did not, the ratios should be the same, right ?'
'Or are you saying the Old Guard officers sent their enlisted men into combat, but stayed out of harm's way themselves ?'

First, you've got to be kidding. Second, what ratios should be the same, the officer to enlisted casualties? Since smart munitions hadn't been developed yet, I doubt that the infantry, artillerymen, and cavalrymen had a quota assigned to ensure the 'ratios' were maintained.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin,

You wrote : "the Old Guard casualties at Essling and Wagram were heavy"

I wrote : "Guard casulaties were not heavy compared to Line casulaties." and listed the officer casulaties of the Old Guard and those of the first four Line infantry regiments. By comparing these numbers, we see that officer casualties in the Old Guard at these two battles as a whole for all regiments were about on the scale of those for one regiment of Line infantry. Hence my comment.

You wrote : "And what about the enlisted casualties? The Old Guard infantry were under artillery fire, closing ranks as men fell and the mention of it in Coignet is quite graphic."

I wrote : "the ratios should be the same, right ?" Unless the Old Guard officers were hiding or something similar, each officer casualty should represent about the same number of enlisted casualties, whether in the Guard or the Line. For example, if there were 15 enlisted casulaties per officer casuality, then the 6 officer casualties of the grenadiers à pied at Essling (including Dorsenne) would imply something like 90 enlisted casualties, or 45 average per battalion or about 7.5% based on a starting strength of 1200 grenadiers. We can compare this to the 4e de ligne, with 30 officer casualties. Using the same ratio, this would imply 450 enlisted casulaties, or150 average per battalion or about 30% based on a starting strength of about 1500 fantassinsr ("enormous losses" as dscribed in 4e de ligne regimental history).

If you think that Guard enlisted casulaties were higher, then the ratio of enlisted to officer casualties must be higher in the Guard than in the Line, which implies that the Guard officers were somehow less exposed to casualties than the Line officers. I don't think this was true. I think the ratio of enlisted to officer casualties would be the same for both Guard and Line.

Taken as a one-to-one comparison between to 2 regiments at one battle, there could be room for variation : a lucky day for the Guard grenadier officers vs. an unlucky day for the 4e de ligne officers.
Looked at over the whole Old Guard compared to several line regiments over two battles, this variation will average out.
Hence my conclusion:
"Old Guard casulaties were not heavy compared to Line casulaties." – for both officers and enlisted ranks.

However, I do agree with you, Old Guard casualties at Essling and Wagram were heavy compared to tea parties at Fountainebleau, or compared to other battles where all the casualties were in the Line (and Young Guard) because Napoléon sought to preserve his Guard (and especially Old Guard infantry) to protect his Person and his Régime. At Essling and Wagram, "la Garde donne".

Chuvak

'Napoléon sought to preserve his Guard (and especially Old Guard infantry) to protect his Person and his Régime. At Essling and Wagram, "la Garde donne".'

That being the case, and undoubtedly you are forwarding an agenda that is attempting to be demeaning to a veteran outfit for whatever reason, then please explain the continued employment of Old Guard cavalry and artillery in the main battles of the Empire. Guard units, including Old Guard, were also sent into Spain when the Emperor was not present. The Guard was the army's reserve, and the Guard artillery after 1808 was the army's artillery reserve, and it was put into action when the Emperor, as army commander, believed it necessary.

As an abstract question, what are you trying to prove/demonstrate by your continued thumping on with the idea that the Old Guard infantry were nothing more than troops in existence to protect the Emperor? What is your agenda?

Sincerely,
K

I have to ask the same question, the casualties they suffered as a formation does not have anything to do with how elite they were…

"forwarding an agenda that is attempting to be demeaning to a veteran outfit for whatever reason"
I am attemtping to forward an agenda to be accurately describing the service of a unit of veterans for the reason of historical inquiry.
Also, it goes to "National Characteristics" in gaming. I can and buy and paint up gardes. But under what restrictions should I be able to activate and use them ?

"thumping on with the idea that the Old Guard infantry were nothing more than troops in existence to protect the Emperor"
I didn't say that. I said the Emperor used them as if this were true.

=======================

Sure, we can rank the amount of exposure to combat for various parts of the Guard.

Old Guard infantry – generally safe billet
Middle Guard infantry, Old Guard cavalry – used in combat, but used less than equivlent line units – increasingly used as the years went by
Young Guard, artillery & others – generally used much like line units

=======================

Why is Napoléon preserving the Guard infantry more than the other arms ?

It does not strike you as diferent from other nations that Napoléon chose to use these elite troops so little, to preserve them to protect his Person and is Régime?

Did British, Russian, Prussian or Austrian monarchs (or their leading generals – or the monarch and the generals counted together) need thousands of picked veterans to protect their Persons and their Régimes ?
Did British Prime Ministers even have bodyguards at all ? Did American Presidents ?

=======================

If you do not find the questions interesting, then nevermind.

Chuvak

ok Chuvak, all good points but it still has nothing to do with how elite they should be rated. You are only given reasons as to why they were established which has nothing to do with "how" elite to rate them. I cannot understand why you are posting this all here? Really it should have its own thread because it is a totally different subject I feel.

Shane, it is easy enough to review this thread and see that one poster stated the Guard maintained its elite status by only being committed to seal the victory, and another disagreeing. Chuvak proposed a simple test based on real data.

In wargaming terms, if the Guard's elite status is inversely proportion to how often they are committed, you would have to build some kind of mechanism to account for that. The old SPI boardgames often had a "Commit the Guard" rule where you could get a boost on your roll, but suffer severe consequences if you rolled poorly.

I think you are misunderstanding what some of us are saying. I cannot recall anyone questioning the Imp. Guard's elite status, but rather their effectiveness on the battlefield – that is actual, not hypothetical – when were they committed and what did they achieve?

'I am attemtping to forward an agenda to be accurately describing the service of a unit of veterans for the reason of historical inquiry.'

You've got to be kidding. Perhaps you should reread your postings and notice the mocking and condescending tone you use when you are disagreed with and terms you employ, such as 'bombastic,' to belittle what others have written. Nice try, though.

'"thumping on with the idea that the Old Guard infantry were nothing more than troops in existence to protect the Emperor"
I didn't say that. I said the Emperor used them as if this were true.'

And the difference, if any, is merely a matter of degree. And it has been brought up by you more than once.

'Old Guard infantry – generally safe billet
Middle Guard infantry, Old Guard cavalry – used in combat, but used less than equivlent line units – increasingly used as the years went by
Young Guard, artillery & others – generally used much like line units'

No billet is safe on a battlefield. The Guard was the army's reserve. And it seems to me that skilled veterans picked for the Guard had certainly paid their dues. If those in the Old Guard sought out service there in order to stay out of combat, that would be one thing; however, it is certainly true that they wanted to go into combat. If these facts are accepted, I don't see the point you're actually trying to get at other than to purposely denigrate the Old Guard and at the same time intimating that they were seeking a 'safe billet.' Otherwise, why go on about it?

'It does not strike you as diferent from other nations that Napoléon chose to use these elite troops so little, to preserve them to protect his Person and is Régime?'

If the Old Guard was not a combat unit, then I would agree with you. However, the purpose of them in combat was to act as the ultimate reserve of the Grande Armee. You appear to be overlooking this, or, again, what is your agenda? It isn't historical inquiry by any means.

'Did British, Russian, Prussian or Austrian monarchs (or their leading generals – or the monarch and the generals counted together) need thousands of picked veterans to protect their Persons and their Régimes?'

How large were the British, Russian, and Prussian Guards? Which of these monarchs throughout the period commanded armies in the field?

'Did British Prime Ministers even have bodyguards at all ? Did American Presidents?'

How many of these went into the field and commanded armies?

You're obfuscating the issue, though I do believe the original issue is more than clouded by now. Perhaps that was your intent?

Sincerely,
K

'I think you are misunderstanding what some of us are saying. I cannot recall anyone questioning the Imp. Guard's elite status, but rather their effectiveness on the battlefield – that is actual, not hypothetical – when were they committed and what did they achieve?'

When committed to combat, I don't recall the Guard having a major failure, except at Waterloo. The Guard was also a moral force on the battlefield and their presence could shake a commander's resolve, such as Wrede at Hanau in 1813 and the allied commanders, and their monarchs, at Dresden also in 1813.

I do believe that you and Chuvak are missing the point, and the emulation the Guard's existence gave the French army, as the Guard was open to any outstanding soldier, is either being ignored or very understated.

Sincerely,
K

NSN,

You are old enough to remmeber SPI ? Gee, I didn't know there was another dinosaur like me here.

=========================
Shane,

"it is a totally different subject I feel."
Yeah – you're right … or at least 67% right. I am sorry, I tend to rather let the conversation go along, without directly watching how close to the topic we are remaining.

Hre's the 33% "topic overlap"….

If we rate a unit "elite" based on selection of the members, morale, equipment, supply-state, etc. – then the Old Guard are aces.
If we rate a "elite" based on combat performance, then we have a problem of very little track record for the Old Gurd Infantry and limited track record for the Middle Guard infantry and Old Guard cavalry. Further, the track record we have is not "typical". The Line gets used all the time. The Guard gets used "on occassion" – so it is hard to tell if their performance is because of them or because the occasions were pre-selected to keep them safe and successful.

You described a process of being elite through experience as a unit (really a good paragrah as a whole – I will quote the start just to remind people):
"As these units proceed through this process their elite status increases over time and they become a toughened fighting unit that can endure the rigors of combat and campaigning, overcome any obstacle and perform feats of bravery and heroism that eventually is expected of them."
What happens if instead of starting wiht average troops and gaining elite capability as you describe, you start with selected troops and then shelter them (from combat, from privations on the march, etc.), especially as the average age of the men in the unit increases ?

Also, there is a lot of just plain fantasy that gets tossed out about the Garde – it has been this way since Napoléon own propaganda.
For example, Kevin says "heavy casualties at Essling and Wagram". But when we look at the numbers, their casulaties are light compared to the Line.
For example, Kevin says "a single grenadier battalion destroyed a Russian column at Eylau". But when we look at the original sources, the only place this is told to us is Napoléon's propaganda (and even there, other troops are involved).

It is whenuseful we rate elite troops, especially in history-intensive rules that try to capture or simulate many variables, to separate that which we can read in the sources from our assumptions or from fantasy and wishful thinking .

Chuvak

=========================

Kevin,

I think my use of "bombastic" to describe your words was fair and balanced in this case.

"it is certainly true that they wanted to go into combat."
Really – you think so ? I have never met a person that "wanted" to go into combat, after they saw it up close once or twice. Willing to go ? Yes. Wanting to go ? Nope.
"Let me at them Japs/Krauts/Reds/etc.!" is from comic books and such like. also often found in propaganda.

"the purpose of them in combat was to act as the ultimate reserve of the Grande Armee."
Actually, that is what you and many historians say. However, can we have a contemporary source (a staff manual, a instruction from Napoléon, etc.) that says this ? We can cite examples of requests for the Guard that were denied. Where, exactly, was the Old Guard used as "the ultimate reserve", except when the Person or the Régime of Napoléon was at stake? When were they used as "the ultimate reserve" of the Army to win a battle or campaign ?

Chuvak

'"the purpose of them in combat was to act as the ultimate reserve of the Grande Armee."'

What else were they present on the battlefield for?

'When were they used as "the ultimate reserve" of the Army to win a battle or campaign?'

Hanau and Ligny, to name two.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin,

Let's try this again, and see if you will answer the question (as opposed to asking about my opinions) :
You wrote : "'the purpose of them [the Old Guard] in combat was to act as the ultimate reserve of the Grande Armee."
I asked : please provide contemporary, in-period evidence (a staff manual, an instruction from Napoléon, etc.) that this was true.
Simple request.
I want to know if this idea that you have about the rôle of the Old Guard in combat was shared by Napoléon, or anyone else who was …. you know …. actually there with them in 1805-1815. We know what you think was the rôle of the Old Guard. Your opinion is, of course, extremely important – and I want to validate your right to have and express your opinion.
I just want to know who shared your opinion in …. you know …. the French army of 1805-1815.

The period of 1805 to 1815 is contemporary to the existence of the Imperial Old Guard. We call things that happened then "history" – they occurred in the "past", or "then".
You, me and our opinions are modern, and not contemporary to the existence of the Imperial Old Guard. Today is many years after 1805-1815. We call this the "present", or "now".

My question was about what people "then" thought was the rôle of the Old Guard in combat. I did not ask about what anyone "now" thinks was that rôle.
THEN vs. NOW – see the difference ?

====================

You give us two examples of the French Old Guard used as the "ultimate reserve of the Grand Armée".

Old Guard Officer Casualties
Hanau
grenadiers à pied : 1 wounded
chasseurs à pied : 1 killed, 11 wounded
grenadiers à cheval & dragons : 2 killed, 11 wounded
chasseurs à cheval & chevau-légers : 2 killed, 4 wounded
Total for 9 regiments : 5 killed, 27 wounded

Ligny
grenadiers à pied : 1 wounded
chasseurs à pied : none
grenadiers à cheval & dragons : 1 killed
chasseurs à cheval & chevau-légers : 5 wounded
Total for 8 regiments : 1 killed, 6 wounded

So, it appears that being employed in combat as the "ultimate reserve of the Grand Armée" is not exactly all that dangerous, even if such use is occurring in your examples.

Chuvak

I think you are misunderstanding what some of us are saying. I cannot recall anyone questioning the Imp. Guard's elite status, but rather their effectiveness on the battlefield – that is actual, not hypothetical – when were they committed and what did they achieve?

Hi nvr,

I do understand what is being said and I do see the angle Chuvak is coming from but I do not believe what he is proposing is correct nor relevant. I honestly do not think this has anything to do with it. I feel this is a totally different topic unto itself and does nothing to identify the OG's actual "effectiveness" at all. The entire formation was made up of "elite" individuals who as a formation were second to none. Even if their place in the army was relatively a more "safe" billet is irrelevant. What is important is that together as a formation they had no equal; this is why they are rated as elite. This has nothing to do with the hypothetical; it is plainly obvious that a formation full of individuals who have vast and extensive backgrounds in combat and who have bled from many wounds in the process are going to fight as a formation when banded together as an elite formation. The OG proved this when they were committed several times even when the numbers were against them. The mere presence of the OG was at times enough to force the enemy to retreat.

Maybe I do not understand what Chuey is trying to get across but I can see no valid argument for not seeing the OG for what they were, true combat veterans who had proven military records with a vast amount on individual experience that when combined into such a formation as the OG is hard to deny. Ok, so there use on average is less than that of the line, but that is irrelevant as far as I am concerned; they themselves "came" from the line in the first place… You cannot simply use casualty statistics to prove that somehow their true effectiveness in combat is wrong or ill conceived. I fail to see how this can honestly be used to justify his argument.

If you're talking about the YG then I would say yes, you might have a valid point, these troops were handpicked selected conscripts with virtually no prior war experience behind them. But they still performed wonders on the battlefield far beyond expectations at times. But then again they were thrown into every battle virtually from their inception. They gained notoriety through their exertions on the field. But does the OG have to prove themselves as "effective" fighting formations in the same way? No, I do not think so. The mere understanding of where they came from and how they got to where they were is proof enough of their capability and they proved this once they "did" get into combat and had to fight. The record of this is undeniable of their effectiveness.

Now, although I will probably get crucified for this I am going to say it anyway. If you take the analogy of football, soccer, rugby and league for example you have the following occur. First of all the young aspiring football player joins his local club, he plays with others of his age and rises up through the ranks year by year. As he progresses he sees many other players drop out, leave and so on but he continues, his skill at the game is beginning to show. Soon enough he is of age to join a senior team or even a county or state side, here he has already accumulated a great deal of experience and skill, he is now on show and is known for his ability. He is playing in teams with others of similar ability and skill; he is rising to the top. He sees many things; players still continue to leave through old age, injury, and even on rare occasions, death but he pushes on in his own career. Soon enough he has been picked to represent his state and eventually his nation.

Now he is at the top of his game, he is known nationwide and even internationally, he is seen as a super star. He is now playing at an elite level that is above and beyond anything he was involved in earlier in his career. He is surrounded by like minded and skilled individuals who also have an identified ability similar to his own. The only other teams of such vast experience, ability and skill are other national teams whom he plays against. If he and his national team play against lesser teams of ability it is understood that his team will win and will surely win and convincingly. The only way they could possibly lose is if his team go into the match feeling they are so good that they do not have to try so hard. These national teams do not play so much together during a season but when they are together they are playing as such an elite level and it is believed so by all who are involved and or watch it. He and his team mates still belong to lesser teams during their seasons but they unite together when a match is called for involving the nation's finest.
My point to this is that although the national teams might not play as many games when they do play together they seldom lose to lesser teams and usually walk away with unbeaten records, it is assumed that this will occur and if it does not then questions are asked as to motivation but this is very rare unless you are talking about national teams coming from nations who are not considered at the top level of the sport. Even though the individuals come from separate individual teams prior to playing for their nation they bring with them the certainty of ability and skill and vast experience. It is understood that as a unit, the national team full of proven individuals of experience and skill is going to perform at level of worthy of the elite level they are playing at. It then becomes a matter of them, as a team, playing to the expectations expected of them. This is not something you can prove with statistics other than the scoreboard, there is a great deal more in their dynamics going in as a team than mere points on the board.

As for statistics then in a military viewpoint the same is valid, you cannot explain a unit's effectiveness by "statistics" of officer casualties. This does not tell the full or even true story. In my line of work I use statistics every day. It is very easy to manipulate figures to show what it is you wish to show and conveniently reduce the impact they convey etc. There is a saying, "statistics do not lie". This is true; however, it is in the formulation of those statistics in the first place that can initiate their misuse and intended deception. Statistics can be manipulated in ways to easily convey a false or misleading picture or paint a misleading light on any subject.

In this situation with the OG Chuey has used officer casualty lists compared with selected line regiments to convey how much safer it was to be in the line as compared to the OG and yes, he has somewhat proven this conveniently. However, this does not tell the entire picture, he only shows a snapshot or window into the stats that give him the stats to make his point but it does nothing to prove effectiveness at all, it merely shows that the OG in particular battles were safer to be part of. This in itself proves nothing about the OG's eliteness at all. He states that there is little evidence to prove how elite the OG was based on their limited exposure to casualties but the "quantity" of times they were exposed is not the way to go about it, it is the "quality" of those encounters where they "were" exposed that should be looked at and this does not involve comparing them with their line counterparts but against the calibre of their foes. Chuey is going about it all wrong I am afraid.

If you look at the calibre of the foes they encountered and each situation they faced you will get a much more accurate account of their effectiveness and their status as elite. Chuey himself has already conceded that most of his argument is invalid with regards to the OG's effectiveness and elite level, he is trying to ascertain that the individual members of the OG were safer in their billets as guards than their line counterparts and for this I agree. However, it does not answer the question as to their true effectiveness, only the calibre of their enemies can answer this question if looked at statistically. The true worth of a hero (elite) is by the calibre of the foe he faces.

Proving that the OG is a safer, less dangerous billet does nothing to prove their eliteness level of effectiveness as a formation. All it proves is the individuals within have a higher chance of surviving the wars…I cannot see any other way to see it.

What I am explaining has nothing to do with fantasy, it is about revealing the truth and exposing the statistics you use as invalid and irrelevant. you need to look at the OG's combats and what occurred rather than throw out casualty stats, especially from combats where they were simply shelled and not engaged in combat. But I am sure the detractors here will cease small parts of my post and ride on them instead of looking at the overall validity of what I am saying.

Shane

Hi Shane,

In some ways I'm very reluctant to get involved in these threads but since you say

Maybe I do not understand what Chuey is trying to get across

I'm going to have a go:

Is a unit considered 'Elite' based on how it performed in a particular battle?

or

Is a unit considered 'Elite' based on a 'total body of work in the war'?

Chuvak's posts are an attempt to answer the OPs question. He is asking can the 'Elite' status of the Old Guard be justified on the basis of their 'total body of work in the war?' and saying that the statistics do not appear to bear out this assumption. He is not saying they are not elite – but rather, that if this is one's criterion you cannot call the Old Guard elite.

The difference between the OPs first proposition and second proposition is the reason for the intense debate about the grenadiers (of both sides!) at Eylau. If you judged from a single battle, the Old Guard's performance at Hanau (and those are reasonably heavy casualties for the OG Chasseurs, the ratio of dead to wounded suggesting some intense musketry or bayonet fighting) or Waterloo might make them elite alone – but Kevin is trying to show 'a continuous body of work' throughout the Napoleonic period. Chuvak's statistics are soley designed to dispute this.

Personally, I agree with you: if a corps of infantry is picked entirely from long-service veterans with good service records, I don't need them to be killed in large numbers – or in relation to Eylau, to kill in large numbers – to keep on rating them elite.

So you and I can relax, Chuvak isn't claiming they aren't elite – he is making a point about the criterion for claiming that certain units are elite, and incidentally providing lots of fascinating information – Thanks.

And I hope I haven't done an injustice to anyone's arguments in this post.

Regards

'Let's try this again, and see if you will answer the question (as opposed to asking about my opinions)'

Interesting that you are 'allowed' to ask questions, and demand answers, but won't answer returning questions. Interesting and not very helpful at all.

To find a 'founding document' would undoubtedly take quite some time going through Napoleon's memoirs. Sometimes, histoirically, there won't be a 'founding document.' That's where historical analysis comes in.

Here's Col Elting's conclusion, which I believe to be right on the money, from page 202 of Swords Around A Throne:

'Napoleon had favored a large Imperial Guard for several reasons. It was a hedge of swords about his new-built throne, the grim, unanswerable authority for his rule. It also was a hard military fact-a strong reserve of elite troops that could be committed at the decisive point and moment. Its mere appearance, as at Aspern-Essling and Krasny, could set overwhelming masses of enemy troops back on their heels, while enemy commanders sought inspiration and found only decision. The Guard developed a feeling of emulation throughout the French Army. With its higher pay, better rations, special privileges, and pride, the Guard was a natural magnet to pull young men into the Grande Armee.'

'The odd fact is tha tthe Old Guard infantry had plenty of hard marching but seldom actually fought. It was engaged at Marengo in 1800, at Aspern-Essling in 1809, and saw some minor fighting during the retreat from Russia. The men weren't happy about being spectators: When they had a chance to go in with the bayonet at Hanau, they made up for years of frustration. The Old Guard cavalry saw considerably more action; the Young Guard was raised to fight.'

Sincerely,
K

10th Marines 03 Apr 2010 8:24 a.m. PST
'The only professional and live-fire trained army in the Napoleonic Wars was the British.'
''That is an incorrect assessment. The French conducted live fire training throughout the period and had contests in the units to see who was the best shot. The Grande Armee of 1805, with almost three solid years of training together, were definitely a professional fighting force and were only composed of 43% combat veterans.''

As I've already pointed out – the French did not, in general conduct live-fire practice on campaign and in the Peninsula did not allocate shot for the purpose. I'm not sure why you insist on this point. Nor were they in any shape or form a 'professional' force. They were paid conscipts forced to fight. Please, compare this sensibly to other formations which were wholly voluntary, trained, professional in the modern sense of the word and had a core that had been with each other for up to 7 years. Yes, seven. How can you compare the two?

''All of the units of Old Guard were made up of veterans selected from line units. There was a very strict screening process, though sometimes standards were relaxed-for example when the 2d Regiments of Grenadiers a Pied and Chasseurs a Pied were formed in 1806, eight years of service were required. All, however, had to be combat veterans.''

Yes, but we were discussing Waterloo. During the 100 days, men were made up from other units mainly on the basis of a good report and height. In the Middle Guard, who were in the forefront of the debacle in front of Wellington's line, many did not even have the right uniform: they had hats missing, part uniforms from other uniforms. But if you can show that the same standards applied during the 100 days, then fair enough. I've seen no evidence they did.

''What 'special' training do you suggest an infantry unit of the period required? The French were trained according to the standards of the army at the time and whether or not there was time enough to be thorough. However, the veterans taken into the Old Guard units were already trained, so I don't see your point here''

I've already made this point in response to your request for evidence. 03 Apr 2010 12:42 p.m. PST I provided you with evidence of what training an infantry unit of the period required in relation to the British Army – since categegories of soldier are about comparison. When, or if you care to read it, then we might be assured you mean your comments seriously and I would welcome a discussion.

'The only 'elite' units in the modern sense, were those with special skills, like in the light infantry or the artillery.'
''That is an incorrect statement. Are you saying that infantry and cavalry units could not be 'elite?' That is absolute nonsense. The Grenadiers a Cheval, for example, being formed from the pick of the French heavy cavalry, were definitely an elite unit and their combat record supports it, as well as many other units in the armies''.

Being formed from 'the pick' of other units is the surest way to destroy cohesiveness, as the Americans found with the re-enforcements at Anzio in WW2. It is no surprise that the Middle Guard and elements of the Old facing the ridge line broke, routed and was (unlike other line formations in the French army attacking at the same moment) unable to re-form. In fact shouted 'Sauve Que Peut'.

I am suggesting, that there were formations of soldiers, which, instead of being mearly 'picked' from other conscripts for having acted obediently, had been actually trained over many years. And that if you look at real outcomes in real battles where they did well or did badly (refernce my post 03 Apr 2010 12:42 p.m. PST ) – you will find that these trained units did not break and run out of control, but if under pressure, maintained co-hesion and displayed a practical knowledge of drill and manouevre in advance of the French Guard. We are therefore entitled to be highly sceptical of any ranking chart that tries put the French Old, but especially Middle Guard, at its top.

Old Guard on the Waterloo ridge: ''They were outnumbered quite significantly''

And how so? I'm sorry – but this is just faulty. Aside from the fact that the French had two other attacks going in at the same time, any analysis of numbers (and they have been gone over here ad nauseum) remaining puts the Guard on the ridge at local equality or superiority of numbers. And these are fresh French units that have been lying on the grass all day, talking to their womenfolk, eating (there are eye-witnesses) facing:
British and Dutch soldiers who have spent the day under the shot of the Grand Battery, units down to strengths that in most wargame rules would result in automatic routs, units that had already, temporarily routed and come back and were surrounded by their own dead, all the commander's aides dead, many of the defending guns in that part out of commission……. It's difficult to know what more advantages the Guard could have had.

''Further, the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers a Pied left the battlefield in perfect order after acting as a rear guard and were left alone''.

We are entitled to compare them then, to the numerous formations in numerous losing armies (the Prussians just the day before for example) which, even though losing a battle, managed to retreat with whole divisions intact. Thus there is an argument implicit in your statement, that Prussian line should be ranked above the Old Guard! I only ask, in a conscript army, is not the whole 'Guard' idea, a matter of smoke and mirrors?

'' Green troops or recruits without a veteran cadre generally wouldn't do too well. Even well-trained recruits/conscripts with a veteran cadre are untried and unblooded, and may or may not perform as they should. If you're going to make such a bold and sweeping statement, you might want to back it up some and then have it lead into a discussion.''

Thank you. The results were pointed out to you at 03 Apr 2010 12:42 p.m. PST. Thank you for raising some intersting points.

If it features in an OSPREY ELITE title, duh!

If it wasn't elite it would've gone in a MEN-AT-ARMS title, woodenit?

re question of 'were the enemy impressed with the Garde Imperiale' I'm guessing the British Guards didn't adopt the bearskin after Waterloo because they thought the men they'd broken on the ridge of Mont St-Jean were pansies?