"What makes a unit 'Elite'." Topic

Skarper, when i started designing wargames back in the 1970s, a number of rules had at least four levels of troop traing ratings and some five.
The four levels were levy/raw/Green/Untrained + regular trained + veterans with extensive combat experience + Elite with superior traing, battle experience and top grade equipment

The five Levels were the same as those plus a Superior or Guard level.

See, I never rate highland battalions as elite. or light infantry battalions. To me they are just regular line units with interesting unifroms (former) or line troops trained for skirmishing (the latter)

To me, British Elite units for the Napoleonic would be Guards, Rifles and Life Guards. I would think that units such as the 40th, 45th, 88th and 92nd would be given SOMETHING to indicate they are above average but not Elite status.

Now wether that bonus makes them stronger than an elite is debatable I reckon. I'm inclined to say veteran line units were rather better than elite units in many respects.

And I reckon this would be true for other armies aswell. Old Guard I suppose are a bit special in that they are Elite AND veteran.

Using statistics can be a useful tool. Unfortunately, anyone can make statistics say exactly waht they want them to say. And using statistics to compare officer casualties between the Guard and Line leaves out the human element.

What would have to be taken into consideration is the time in service, both line and Guard, that each officer had served, how many times he had been wounded, and how many of his comrades in the Line before he was selected for the Guard were killed or wounded.

Officers selected for the Guard were combat veterans. When new Guard formations were created, they were cadred by veterans. When enlisted men were selected for Old Guard units, they were veterans, and they were also selected from time to time to cadre new units, such as in the Young Guard.

For example, when the velites were converted into the two fusilier units, their officers and NCOs came from the Old Guard. Unless some digging is done into the officers' service records, then the statistical 'study' provided in this thread is meaningless.

As an example of one officer who was brought into the Guard early on, Colonel Dorsenne, came from the 61st Ligne, had been wounded in action four times, and had served on the Rhine, in Italy, and in Egypt. He was an officer of 'high valor and many wounds, fair, honest, and so hard that the toughest veterans jumped to please him.' Elzear Blaze was amazed that Dorsenne could turn his back on incoming artillery fire both to set an example and to dress ranks as men fell. Blaze himself tried it and couldn't keep himself from looking behind him for incoming artillery rounds.

I digress. The bottom line is the officers and men who went into the Old Guard, in any branch, were already tested combat veterans and they also had perfect service records. Seems to me that they had already proven themselves and were definitely elite troops.

'At Tilsit, in a review for the sovereigns, Tsar Alexander, while viewing the Old Guard pass in review, asked Marshal Ney where were the men who had given the Guardsmen such terrible scars [they were visible on the Guardsmens' faces]. Ney's reply was blunt and succinct: 'Sire, they are all dead.'

Henry Lachouque made an interesting comment on the Imperial Guard in The Anatomy of Glory: 'Only mediocre men are embarrassed by the presence of an elite.'

Sincerely,
K

nicely put Kevin

'The only professional and live-fire trained army in the Napoleonic Wars was the British.'

That is an incorrect assessment. The French conducted live fire training throughout the period and had contests in the units to see who was the best shot. The Grande Armee of 1805, with almost three solid years of training together, were definitely a professional fighting force and were only composed of 43% combat veterans.

So, here, your theory is very incorrect. And for the British, the only theater where they were uniformly successful during the period was in Spain and Portugal. Most of their operations in other theaters were abject failures, and Wellington's veterans got a rude awakening in North America in 1814-1815 at Plattsburg, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Even when they won, fighting mostly American militia at Bladensburg and North Point, they still suffered more casualties.

'So although the French Guard, for example, regarded itself as 'elite', at Waterloo at least, large parts of it had simply been lifted out of other units, placed into un-cohesive units and paraded without any special training at all.'

All of the units of Old Guard were made up of veterans selected from line units. There was a very strict screening process, though sometimes standards were relaxed-for example when the 2d Regiments of Grenadiers a Pied and Chasseurs a Pied were formed in 1806, eight years of service were required. All, however, had to be combat veterans.

What 'special' training do you suggest an infantry unit of the period required? The French were trained according to the standards of the army at the time and whether or not there was time enough to be thorough. However, the veterans taken into the Old Guard units were already trained, so I don't see your point here.

It should also be noted that the Guard doubled as a military school and in 1811 that was formalized in the Battalion of Instruction at Fontainebleu, which was actually three battalions to train Guard fusiliers as sergeants and picked Young Guardsmen as corporals. Upon graduation these men would be used to cadre new line regiments. The training cadre were 'the pick' of the Old Guard and from the military school at St. Cyr. The school itself was administered by the Old Guard. The curriculum included infantry and artillery drill, fencing, writing, grammar, arithmetic, fortification, as well as garrison and field duty. The most literate of the students were taught army administration.

'The only 'elite' units in the modern sense, were those with special skills, like in the light infantry or the artillery.'

That is an incorrect statement. Are you saying that infantry and cavalry units could not be 'elite?' That is absolute nonsense. The Grenadiers a Cheval, for example, being formed from the pick of the French heavy cavalry, were definitely an elite unit and their combat record supports it, as well as many other units in the armies.

'Especially as WW2 evidence showed that veteran troops were more often likely to shy away from danger – as the Middle Guard did on the main ridge at Waterloo.'

This has been gone over before and I would recommend that you look up the other threads on this forum. However, to be brief, the five Old Guard battalions that made the assault were committed individually, not in mass (with the exception of two battalions that linked up during the attack) and the fighting on the ridge was savage, the five battalions suffering very heavy casualties before being driven back. They were outnumbered quite significantly and were not supported as they should have been. Another Guard episode that should be looked at in the same battle is the two battalion Old Guard assault against fourteen Prussian battalions in Plancenoit earlier in the afternoon. The Old Guard went in with the bayonet and drove the Prussians out of the village, inflicting close to 3,000 casualties on them. They were supported by a resurgent Young Guard, some of whom still held the Plancenoit cemetery. Further, the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers a Pied left the battlefield in perfect order after acting as a rear guard and were left alone.

'However, the most important attribute of a strong unit in a face-to face fight is the ability not to run or to carry on going forward when casualties are dropping. There's a strong case to make, that the best performing units in that respect are generally composed of green troops, freshly trained, placed within units with strong traditions. Both the Young Guard and early war British green-jackets fitted some of those categoeies.'

Interesting thesis, and very worthy of discussion. However, could you, or can you, support this idea with any solid evidence? Green troops or recruits without a veteran cadre generally wouldn't do too well. Even well-trained recruits/conscripts with a veteran cadre are untried and unblooded, and may or may not perform as they should. If you're going to make such a bold and sweeping statement, you might want to back it up some and then have it lead into a discussion.

Sincerely,
K

K,

"anyone can make statistics say exactly waht they want them to say."
Question 1. Since I provided not one word of commentary when posting the Old and Middle Guard officer casualty data, what exactly is your comment supposed to mean ? Is this just a personal attack ?

The question raised at that point in the discussion was the accuracy of this statement :
"barring Wateloo, the Old Guard were never committed except when it was essentially certain that they would carry the day,"

I thought that comparing the casualty data was a useful way to measure both the frequency with which the Old and Middle Guard were commiteed, and the degree of risk or intensity of combat when they were employed.

To be fair in testing the original statement, one might also report the data excluding Waterloo.

Officer Casulaties 1805-1815 – with Waterloo
3 Old Guard régiments : average 40 officers per régiment
2 Middle Guard régiments : average 88 officers per régiment
8 Line régiments (Nos. 1-4 de ligne & légère) : average 220 officers per régiment
-- A French officer was about 5.5 times more likely to be a casualty in the Army compared to the Old Guard.
-- A French officer was about 2.5 times more likely to be a casualty in the Army compared to the Middle Guard.

Officer Casulaties 1805-1815 – without Waterloo
3 Old Guard régiments : average 30 officers per régiment
2 Middle Guard régiments : average 71 officers per régiment
8 Line régiments (Nos. 1-4 de ligne & légère) : average 205 officers per régiment
-- A French officer was about 6.8 times more likely to be a casualty in the Army compared to the Old Guard.
-- A French officer was over 2.9 times more likely to be a casualty in the Army compared to the Middle Guard.

Question 2. Why or how does this "leave[] out the human element" ?
Question 3. Can you please supply an alternate method to test the given hypothesis in a value neutral way – that is, some other form of neutral measurement or analyis ?

Sincerely,
C

10th Marines
'' When enlisted men were selected for Old Guard units, they were veterans………The bottom line is the officers and men who went into the Old Guard, in any branch, were already tested combat veterans and they also had perfect service records. Seems to me that they had already proven themselves and were definitely elite troops.''

Just not for Waterloo. As I pointed out, 'good behaviour and height' were the only criteria that I can find. The Old Guard was a mess at Waterloo – a lot of them didn't even have proper uniform – many had been lifted from other units and had had very little chance to drill together.

'' can you, support this idea with any solid evidence? Green troops or recruits without a veteran cadre generally wouldn't do too well….''

The best sources are Allied from WW2. The British did combat analysis from the Normandy breakouts and found that 'veteran' units were less likely to go forward than green units. Marshal, a US historian of the Pacific war is also a good starting point. He got similar results – finding in addition that only 15-20% of men actually fired their weapon. The experience of less veteran units attacking up the slopes in the Pyrenees reveals a similar result. Or we can compare the failiure of the Old Guard on the main ridge at Waterloo with d-Erlon's men who tried it and then came back for more. Difficult as the latter is to pin down statistically, it's a good idea to look at the WW2 analysis.

''What 'special' training do you suggest an infantry unit of the period required?''

Assuming that's a genuine question from someone who doesn't know (and a slightly surprising question):
A good start is to look at Packenham's attack at Salamanca (oblique line formation changes), Crauford's extracation at Fuentes de Onoro (moving squares, evolving square-line-square in movement and temporary half company squares), skirmishers at Vitoria (brigade then divisional skirmish evolutions) Beresford's advance at Toulouse (divisional line of march and fire) and the 95th's advance up the slopes of Tarbes, France (in what appears to be open order line, open order and line with independant fire).

''The French conducted live fire training throughout the period and had contests in the units to see who was the best shot''

Not in the Peninsular. By and large the French did not expend ball on campaign outside of battles. On the exceptional occasions there was any practice, they used inferior ball and their skirmishers didn't even use targets. Nor did their officers practise, unlike in British greenjacket units.

''So, here, your theory is very incorrect''.

''Very incorrect'' as opposed to just ''incorrect''? LOL. Just read a book on French ordanance procuremnent on campaign if you want the facts. It's up to you if you want to believe 'theories'. Or read:

Chuvak
Good analysis.

'Just not for Waterloo. As I pointed out, 'good behaviour and height' were the only criteria that I can find.'

Then I would suggest that you look just a little harder. Mauduit is a good source and you might also try Lachouque. And as Nord was heavily a veteran army, I would submit that the Guard was chosen, especially in the infantry, of veterans. You might also want to take a look at St. Hilaire and Fallou.

'Not in the Peninsular. By and large the French did not expend ball on campaign outside of battles. On the exceptional occasions there was any practice, they used inferior ball and their skirmishers didn't even use targets. Nor did their officers practise, unlike in British greenjacket units.'

Do you have a source? Where does it say that French skirmishers didn't use targets, except for the British and Portuguese as well as Spanish, of course.

'Just read a book on French ordanance procuremnent on campaign if you want the facts.'

Do you have any suggestions? And to what 'facts' are you alluding? You haven't provided any as yet.

'It's up to you if you want to believe 'theories'. Or read:'

Read what? You have provided no references only incorrect opinions that you haven't supported. You might want to read Ken Alder's Engineering the Revolution for arms procurement on the French side.

Sincerely,
K

'Since I provided not one word of commentary when posting the Old and Middle Guard officer casualty data, what exactly is your comment supposed to mean ? Is this just a personal attack ?'

It means that your information and analysis is skewed and incomplete. You've done nothing constructive with what you 'compiled' and it is meaningless. That isn't a personal attack. If you want examples of personal attacks, see some of the nonsense you've said to me 'personally.'

Do you have any experience in compiling and presenting statistics?

Sincerely,
K

'Nor did their officers practise…'

Nor did their officers practice what? How to command and lead? How to run a company, battalion, or regiment?

Again, what are your sources.

Sincerely,
K

ah, Napoleonic's forums, they never change…. munch munch munch….better than WWF!

See, I never rate highland battalions as elite. or light infantry battalions. To me they are just regular line units with interesting unifroms (former) or line troops trained for skirmishing (the latter)

Same here, the problem with Highlanders is from Bruce Quarrie's rules. He decided that Highlanders should be given a higher melee rating than normal line units. Because of this I noticed players in my own group way back in the 80's thus thought of Highlanders as a ready made, "elite" formation in their armies and treated them as such. You have to be careful with this type of thing.

I would agree that certain light infantry formations can be considered elite such as the greenjackets and several other light infantry units from various nations. Even the French considered their own Legere regiments as elite for many years. The term is much in the eye of the beholder and what one might claim as elite could be mediocre in another's…

To answer the original question there were many units that were given distinctions or titles because of recognition of brave or beyond the call of duty acts on the battlefield. The British for example gave the title of, "Royal" to many regiments for outstanding performances while the Russians gave a distinction (forgot the name of it?) that was worn on the helmets or head gear of the men in the regiments for recognition of outstanding bravery. Other armies also did this in one form or another. The French gave titles to such regiments like, "one against ten", and so on for recognised acts of distinction. The British also did this.

These were distinctions given to normal line regiments that stuck with that regiment giving it a boost in the elite rankings as seen in the eyes of those of that army. However, to the enemy these distinctions were often not understood let alone known about so when met on the field there was no moral response to be seen or noticed. They were simply, "the enemy". So when in the thick of battle their enemies fought them unknowingly like any other enemy formation and did not consider them, "elite" as such. And often they were overcome or defeated just as easily as any other normal formation.

In situations like this a wargame rules designer must be careful about how he fits these units into his elite structure. If units like this are given too high a grading they can distort the truth and cause an imbalance to the whole. These types of units may be given certain advantages such as a heightened morale etc but I would not go much further than this. Often however, these units are also veteran and for this should be rated higher anyway in whatever ratings the system allows. But to rate these units as outright elite is often very wrong.

A said earlier, Elite units are often made up of formations that have fought together for long periods of time or trained together for long periods not just given an elite status for a single event that often was awarded years earlier.

As for the French Old Guard one might look much deeper into their organisation and system of entry into that formation before making an opinion that they were not elite. These men were hand-picked veterans who met a stringent criteria of entry coupled with many years of experience. You did not enter the Old Guard as a recruit. Formations like this are elite because they are wholly made up of elite individuals who already have vast experience, individual acts of bravery to back them up and a confidence that cannot be denied. Even in 1815.

To say they they were not is to be ignorant of their design. Yes the 3rd and 4th regiments were not so in 1815, this is recorded truth, the time to form them in 1815 was lacking and not much could be done to fix their many problems before war began. However, the 1st and 2nd regiments were true elite made up of men who had vast years of experience from previous campaigns and individual war records to back them. To lump them in the same calibre as the newer regiments is totally wrong and ignorant. One merely has to "read" to understand this truth.

It is sadly typical that people make assumptions and opinions here on TMP without backing what they say with evidence. What is worse is they cannot seem to want to admit to the clear evidence to the contrary and go on perpetuating their lies and ill truths. Every army had their elite forces but not every elite force was the equal of those recognised in another army.

The title of "elite" is very subjective and directly related to the overall calibre of the rest of the army in which they fight. The elite in one army might be no better than well trained or just mediocre in another, it really is a sticky topic which is hard to quantify solidly and comparatively between armies but much easier to quantify within the context of the army in which the elite are recognised.

Shane

Shane,

Excellent points, including that of the Old Guard in 1815. The term 'elite' was not a term that meant the same thing in every army.

Sincerely,
K

Now come on K, you're multi-posting again and writing strangenesses: (how can an opinion be 'incorrect'? how can anyone ''prove'' a negative? since when were the French a
professional army???! and why demand sources when you've provided none yourself?).

Let's start again: if you're new to Napoleonics, interested in the subject and want to learn about the period then there are a lot of people here happy to help you. Have a look at the tactics described (you can find them described in any good book on the Peninsula, or I can suggest sources if you prefer :-)):

A good start is to look at Packenham's attack at Salamanca (oblique line formation changes), Crauford's extracation at Fuentes de Onoro (moving squares, evolving square-line-square in movement and temporary half company squares), skirmishers at Vitoria (brigade then divisional skirmish evolutions) Beresford's advance at Toulouse (divisional line of march and fire) and the 95th's advance up the slopes of Tarbes, France (in what appears to be open order line, open order and line with independant fire).

If you'd like to do that then come back and tell us what you think, I'll genuinely look forward to hearing about your impressions. Based on facts :-)

Not in the Peninsular.

I implore you to please provide evidence of this?

By and large the French did not expend ball on campaign outside of battles.

Once again, please provide the evidence for his?

On the exceptional occasions there was any practice, they used inferior ball and their skirmishers didn't even use targets.

Are you so sure about this? I would love to be directed to your source of information as the the validity of this statement…

Nor did their officers practise,

proof? also, can you provide evidence that British officers "did" "practice" ?

It is easy to make statements as pass them off as fact hoping you will not get called on them. I fear this is the case here.

K,

Since you find comparing the officer casualties "meaningless", perhaps you could offer a better method to compare the frequency and degree of risk or intensity of combat for the Old and Middle Guard vs. Army infantry units. I am sorry if comparing the casualty statistics does not please you. I am sure you can provide a better technique. Indeed, you have completely ignored my thrid question (above). Allow me to repeat it for you, in case you missed it :

Question 3. Can you please supply an alternate method to test the given hypothesis in a value neutral way – that is, some other form of neutral measurement or analyis ?

So far, it looks like being in the French Old Guard infantry was a pretty effective way to avoid getting hurt in combat during the Napoleonic Wars – perhaps safer than the streets of Paris! To take you up on the suggestion to not "leave[] out the human element", let's look at the personal specifics :

In the 1er grenadiers – 2 officers lost their lives in combat :
…. lieutenant Labarrière, killed at Eylau
…. lieutenant en 1er de Montqueron : mortally wounded at Leipzig
Not counting 4 officers assigned out of the Old Guard :
…. lieutenant en 1er de Couÿba-Villeneuve – carried à la suite to the 1er grenadiers, but assigned to the 1er tirailleurs – mortally wounded at Essling (listed by Martinien in the 1er grenadiers)
…. chef de bataillon Pierre Lafargue : assigned to the 3e grenadiers – mortally wounded at Waterloo (listed by Martinien in the 1er grenadiers)
…. lieutenant Lacroix : assigned to the fusiliers-grenadiers – assassinated in the Madrid uprising in May 1808 (listed by Martinien in the 1er grenadiers)
…. capitaine Louis Epailly : assigned to the flanqueurs-grenadiers, disappeared in Paris in March 1814 possibly as the result of enemy action – presumed dead and stricken from the list of the corps of grenadiers as of 30 March (listed by Martinien in the 1er grenadiers)

In the 2e grenadiers – 2 officers lost their lives in combat :
…. lieutenant en 2e Viaux : wounded at Troyes on 6 March 1814 and evacuated to Paris – he led 20 convalescing gardes to their death in a last stand at Montmarte on 30 March, reportedly taking many Prussians with them
…. capitaine Louis Cretté : killled at Plancenoit (battle of Waterloo) – he was in close combat with a Prussian sergeant, whom the capitaine Cretté wounded in the right shoulder with with his sabre – nonetheless the Prussian shot him in the heart

In the 1er chasseurs – 2 officers lost their lives in combat :
…. lieutenant Dorival : killed at Essling
…. lieutenant adjudant-major Pierre-Maurice Morel : mortally wounded at Waterloo

In the 2e chasseurs – 5 officers lost their lives in combat :
…. colonel-major le baron Jean-Baptiste Deshayes : killed by a head shot at Dresden when he went out to watch the Young Guard's sortie
…. chef de bataillon le chevlaier Jean-Antoine-Louis Pioch (dit "Puech") : killed by artillery at Dresden
…. lieutenant en 2e David Guibal : killed at Hanau
…. colonel-major le baron Antoine-Jean-Laurent Mallet : mortally wounded by artillery at Montmirail in 1814
…. lieutenant en 2e Pierre Beaudiffier : mortally wounded while visiting an advanced post near Château-Thierry in mid-February 1814 – evacuated to Paris, where he died on 29 March

So, we have 4 French Old Guard régiments, for a deacde of wars, and they lose ….
… 8 officers lost in combat fighting with their régiments
… 4 officers lost while assigned outside of the Old Guard (1 mortally wounded at Essling, 1 assassinated in Madrid, 1 that disappeared in Paris, 1 mortally wounded at Waterloo)
… 3 lost while on a "personal" mission (1 "last stand" of convalescents, 1 watching another unit's attack, 1 on a visit to an advanced post)

I think this establishes from the "human element" the exact same impression as is made by the statistics that you find "meaningless". In both cases, it appears that a billet in the French Old Guard infantry was really a comparatively very safe one. But, perhaps if you could provide a different method to perform the analysis, then a different conclusion might be drawn.

Sincerely,
C

Chuvak,

Although I applaud your research here I must say that you might miss the whole context as to why the Old Guard were formed.

They were indeed a fighting body of men but they were also a bodyguard foremost. Napoleon wanted a body of men who were proven veterans of honour to protect his person and embody the pride and strength of a nation. They were not meant for combat as such on a daily basis and thus were not used in combat unless it was absolutely nessessary. This is recorded fact.

Stating that because they lost much less men compared to the rest of the army is very mute. The Russian guard, Prussian guard etc were in the exact same boat here. The only guard that was not considered so precious were the British foot guards. The point is, you "had" to be of proven quality via a criteria checklist to even be considered entry into the Old Guard and even when part of this formation you could end up back in the line as a higher rank anyway. The Guard was as Kevin explained, a revolving door of opportunity.

I do not think the Russian and Prussian guards were like this. Once there you stayed until too old or crippled to remain or dead.

You cannot deny that the criteria for entry into the Old Guard was of the highest quality. You had to be a proven "hero" first and a veteran to boot. If you have an entire formation of proven veteran heroes you have a formation of a high elite status. Surely you must be able to see this?

Shane

Despite elan and bravado ,any unit that believes it is elite is not.

Chuvak,

Unless you include the service, wounds, and survivability of the officers that were selected to go into the Old Guard, then your statistics are meaningless because they have left out a significant proportion of data. I've provided one for you, so you have a start and an example-and Dorsenne later died because of the head wound he received at Essling while he and his Old Guard stood and took the bombardment of almost 200 Austrian guns. The Guard took their losses, could not shoot back, and closed ranks as men fell. There is an excellent account of this action in Coignet.

There is also an excellent account of the Old Guard infantry being committed to action at Hanau in 1813 in the introduction of the Greenhill edition of The Anatomy of Glory. Interestingly, the Chasseurs a Pied are committed to action, as a regiment, in open/skirmish order as they were light infantry and the Grenadiers go into action in line. The information is taken from Napoleon et Les Allies sur le Rhin by Lefebvre de Behaine.

You might want to take a look at the introduction of this edition of The Anatomy of Glory. It's by Col Elting and it is quite instructive. You might also find out about the 'quick bayonet work' that one of the Old Guard battalions got in at Eylau in 1807, led by Dorsenne, as they annihilated a Russian column of grenadiers.

Again, if you want statistical analysis, then do it correctly. You are overlooking the careers of the officers, and their service and wounds, before they were accepted into the Guard. You can't get that material on line, you have to dig. If you ever find that information then maybe you can get a true picture of the veterans that made up the Old Guard infantry regiments, and they were few and far between-usually only two, sometimes four, and in 1815 there were eight.

Sincerely,
K

Shane,

"The Russian guard, Prussian guard etc were in the exact same boat here."
Not true for Russians. Used like any Army units of same type. Normal combat employment, although often the force that was last committed. Same for "Grenadiers". Typical casualties. The four Russian Guard line infantry regiments each had more officer casulaties at Borodino alone, than the combined 4 régiments of the French Old Guard suffered in total over a decade of wars.

"The Guard was as Kevin explained, a revolving door of opportunity. "
I am very dubious about this statement as pertains to the officers. If you look at the lists year to year, once in the Garde, especially the Old Guard, the officers very rarely went back to the Army. In fact, if you (or Kevin) think otherwise – that there was a constant stream of Old Guard officers into the ligne – then please list a couple of dozen named examples, excluding those promoted to command echelons like colonel and général de brigade. I think you will have alot of trouble finding even 24 examples of the door revolving.

I am also dubious about Old Guard NCO's and gardes routinely going to the line. Some cycling after commissioning or promotion to sous-officier did occur. Also from Guard vélites. But the typical result, as far as I can tell, would be once in the Old Guard infantry, always in the Guard.

The pattern in both cases : staying in the Guard unless/until a promotion to a new "status" (to a command echelon, to being an officier, to being a sous-officier). Then the promotion might in a minority of cases be to the ligne.

The use of the Old Guard infantry as a training ground is often asserted, but I really have seen no proof at all.

Also, I never once – here or elsewhere – made the least comment about the French Old Guard infantry not being elite. My comment here is that the Old Guard infantry was a very safe place to be for a French officer to be assigned.

=====================================

Kevin,

"the 'quick bayonet work' that one of the Old Guard battalions got in at Eylau in 1807, led by Dorsenne, as they annihilated a Russian column of grenadiers."
Utter fantasy, I think – and an often repeated one. I am sure that you wish this to have actually occurred.
Perhaps you could find a few witness reports to this amazing feat of arms to share with us? Or, perhaps you can't …. let's see what you've got ?

"if you want statistical analysis, then do it correctly. You are overlooking the careers of the officers, and their service and wounds, before they were accepted into the Guard."
Do I understand you as saying that the safe billets in the Old Guard must be statistically analyzed to include the casualty experience of the officers in other units ?
But, when they were in other units, they were not in the Old Guard. See, we are talking about the use of the Old Guard infantry. If we measure the casualties of other units, then we would be talking about the use of …. the other units. We are comparing IN the Old Guard infantry to NOT IN these régimets.
IN vs. OUT – get it now ?

Why is it so hard for you to accept Shane's good summary :
"a fighting body of men but they were also a bodyguard foremost. Napoleon wanted a body of men who were proven veterans of honour to protect his person and embody the pride and strength of a nation. They were not meant for combat as such on a daily basis"
- bodyguard
- protect his person
- embody the pride and strength of a nation
- not meant for combat on a daily basis

I know this sounds like some ceremonial guard that could not fight. But that is not what is being said. Instead, we have Napoléon conserving a Guard that could have fought, and likely quite well, because of the other functions it performed with respect to his person and régime.

I will give you the comte Lepaige (Dorsenne). He did serve 3 years after Essling, and died after a failed trepanantion. But, with a long delay, he may be said to have died of his wound.

OK, the would be 9 TOTAL French Old Guard infantry officers who died from fightng with their regiments. Four well-sized elite regiments, a decade of wars and …. 9 officers lost. That's safety. That's being conserved to support the person of the Head of State and his régime.

Sincerely,
C

'Since you find comparing the officer casualties "meaningless", perhaps you could offer a better method to compare the frequency and degree of risk or intensity of combat for the Old and Middle Guard vs. Army infantry units.'

I already did and you choose not to use it. That's fine, but your model says nothing and I seriously doubt your accuracy.

'I am sure you can provide a better technique. Indeed, you have completely ignored my thrid question (above). Allow me to repeat it for you, in case you missed it :
Question 3. Can you please supply an alternate method to test the given hypothesis in a value neutral way – that is, some other form of neutral measurement or analyis?'

Again, I neither missed it or ignored it. I gave you an alternative method which you have chosen not to use.

'So far, it looks like being in the French Old Guard infantry was a pretty effective way to avoid getting hurt in combat during the Napoleonic Wars – perhaps safer than the streets of Paris!'

'I think this establishes from the "human element" the exact same impression as is made by the statistics that you find "meaningless". In both cases, it appears that a billet in the French Old Guard infantry was really a comparatively very safe one. But, perhaps if you could provide a different method to perform the analysis, then a different conclusion might be drawn.'

So, your conclusion is that the Old Guard officers were in a 'safe billet?' You are leaving out what they did to get there. That is part of the data and how many of their comrades were killed while they were in the line, which they survived? Further, how many wounds did each officer have when inducted into the Guard. The Old Guard infnatry was intended to be the ultimate army reserve and they didn't like it too much when they were not given the opportunity to fight. And if you're going to include the Old and Middle Guard regiments, then you have a total of eleven regiments to draw from, another error on your part. There were five Grenadier and four Chasseur regiments during the Guard's existence plus the two fusilier regiments who were Middle Guard. So, in the final tally you have eight Old Guard and three Middle Guard regiments to choose from and the 3d (Dutch) Grenadiers suffered very heavy casualties in Russia and the two fusilier regiments were readily engaged when needed, especially in 1809 and in 1812-1814. The Old Guard regiments were committed to action in Russia on the retreat, at Hanau, in 1814, especially at Montmirail, and again at Ligny (where they delivered the decisive assault against Blucher's center) and at Waterloo. I would submit that your research has fallen a little short.

'Not true for Russians. Used like any Army units of same type. Normal combat employment, although often the force that was last committed. Same for "Grenadiers". Typical casualties. The four Russian Guard line infantry regiments each had more officer casulaties at Borodino alone, than the combined 4 régiments of the French Old Guard suffered in total over a decade of wars.'

The Russian Guard was never in the same class as the Imperial Guard. From 1805-1807 their total prior experience almost without exception was as parade troops. They were not a collection of veterans. As to Borodino, most of their casualties were from French massed artillery fire (and the Russian artillery was definitely outshot and outfought-see Lieven for this material as well as Zhmodikov). The Russian infantry both Guard and line were held in the open and were perfect targets for the French gunners. Their casualties were very heavy. That was a definite error by the Russian commanders. On the other hand, French units not engaged were held undercover and didn't suffer from Russian artillery fire as badly, if at all.

'"The Guard was as Kevin explained, a revolving door of opportunity. "
I am very dubious about this statement as pertains to the officers. If you look at the lists year to year, once in the Garde, especially the Old Guard, the officers very rarely went back to the Army. In fact, if you (or Kevin) think otherwise – that there was a constant stream of Old Guard officers into the ligne – then please list a couple of dozen named examples, excluding those promoted to command echelons like colonel and général de brigade. I think you will have alot of trouble finding even 24 examples of the door revolving.'

Old Guard cadres, officers and NCOs were used to command new Young Guard regiments of which there were eventually thirty-eight. You might want to include this in your 'statistical analysis.'

'I am also dubious about Old Guard NCO's and gardes routinely going to the line. Some cycling after commissioning or promotion to sous-officier did occur. Also from Guard vélites. But the typical result, as far as I can tell, would be once in the Old Guard infantry, always in the Guard.'

That is incorrect. You might want to take a look at both Elting and Lachouque. The Old Guard was used to cadre new Young Guard units.

'The use of the Old Guard infantry as a training ground is often asserted, but I really have seen no proof at all.'

Then I suggest you research the Battalion of Fontainebleu. Material has been given to you or posted on this forum. Do you habitually ignore information that is counter to what you personally believe? That isn't following the precept of historical inquiry.

'Also, I never once – here or elsewhere – made the least comment about the French Old Guard infantry not being elite. My comment here is that the Old Guard infantry was a very safe place to be for a French officer to be assigned.'

Perhaps not, but you certainly allude to it in a very condescending manner. And I don't believe that officers selected for the Guard believed it to be a 'very safe place' especially if they were being employed as cadre for Young Guard units going into Spain from 1809-1812.

'"the 'quick bayonet work' that one of the Old Guard battalions got in at Eylau in 1807, led by Dorsenne, as they annihilated a Russian column of grenadiers."
Utter fantasy, I think – and an often repeated one. I am sure that you wish this to have actually occurred.
Perhaps you could find a few witness reports to this amazing feat of arms to share with us? Or, perhaps you can't …. let's see what you've got?'

I've answered this on your 'other' thread. The action took place, too many people saw it. If it hadn't happened it would have come out later.

'Do I understand you as saying that the safe billets in the Old Guard must be statistically analyzed to include the casualty experience of the officers in other units ?
But, when they were in other units, they were not in the Old Guard. See, we are talking about the use of the Old Guard infantry. If we measure the casualties of other units, then we would be talking about the use of …. the other units. We are comparing IN the Old Guard infantry to NOT IN these régimets.
IN vs. OUT – get it now?'

I understand completely what you are saying. And I'm saying that you are wrong in your methodology. If you were comparing line units to line units, you might have a point. But you are comparing apples to oranges, historically speaking, and in that 'analysis' what you have done is both pointless and meaningless.

'Why is it so hard for you to accept Shane's good summary :
"a fighting body of men but they were also a bodyguard foremost. Napoleon wanted a body of men who were proven veterans of honour to protect his person and embody the pride and strength of a nation. They were not meant for combat as such on a daily basis"'

I agree with Shane and have already said so. It is you I don't agree with. You have taken Shane out of context in this instant, exactly what you've accused others of doing. That is hypocrasy. You've done that in the drill and artillery threads and you've erred consistently. Shane and I agree and what you're attempting to do is nonsense and completely incorrect.

'I know this sounds like some ceremonial guard that could not fight. But that is not what is being said. Instead, we have Napoléon conserving a Guard that could have fought, and likely quite well, because of the other functions it performed with respect to his person and régime.'

Those are your words and interpretations, not Shane's.

There were 51 regiments of Guard infantry, the Middle and Young Guard regiments being cadred by Old Guard officers and NCOs. For a valid casualty assesement to compare with the line, you have to include all 51 units, not 'cherry-pick' the ones you intend to denigrate, which I believe might be your purpose here. You are very pro-Russian which puts bias into your 'work.' What you've accused me of doing is what you're guilty of yourself. And that is where you fail.

Sincerely,
K

Hi Chuvak,

I really have to agree with Kevin here, I feel you did take my words out of context to a degree. I never said the French Old Guard were merely ceremonial troops, they might have paraded at every ceremony and event possible but this was usually between wars when there was not much else to do other than train.

I see the Guard as Napoleons way of skimming the cream from the Line, proven veterans and hero's who have been taken out on a regular basis to strengthen the Guard. These men were all proven individuals toughened by years of experience and combat, the books I have read speak of their many scars etc. Even the Tzar Alexander asked about these scares asking what happened to the men who did them. The reply he god was that they were all dead…

Napoleon was smart, instead of slowly losing all of these tough veterans and hero's over time if they remained in the Line the act of skimming them periodically allowed them to live longer lives and eventually fight again when the need arose and tough tasks were asked of them. They "were" a complete fighting body of men but Napoleon did not want to waste them in battle as would be the fate of lesser guards and the line. However, when called upon to fight they covered themselves with a great deal of glory that cannot be matched as far as I am concerned. Their fighting reputation is legendary and not just because the bulletin's said so, they fought in some of the most dangerous and costly affairs in which they performed wonders on the field. You only have to read to find this is so.

To be perfectly honest, I cannot understand why there is a need to debate the eliteness of such a formation when there is so much proof of their prowess?

Regards,
Shane

Kevin,

We have been discussing the French Old Guard infantry. Four regiments – a decade of war – 9 officers lost from combat with their regiments (including Dorsenne). Being Dutch, even in the Old Guard, was not a safe billet. The Middle Guard was middle-safe : more dangerous than the Old Guard and less dangerous than the Line.

"Old Guard cadres, officers and NCOs were used to command new Young Guard regiments of which there were eventually thirty-eight. …. The Old Guard was used to cadre new Young Guard units."
The question was about the existence of a "revolving door" into the Line.
Tne Young Guard is part of the Guard. It is IN the Guard.
The Line is not part of the Guard. It is OUT of the Guard.
IN vs. OUT – get it now ?

"There were 51 regiments of Guard infantry, the Middle and Young Guard regiments being cadred by Old Guard officers and NCOs. For a valid casualty assesement to compare with the line, you have to include all 51 units"
No, I don't actually.
I see some significant differences between Napoléon's orgainzation and use of the French Old Guard, the "Dutch" Old Guard, the Middle Guard and the Young Guard. Also differences between the infantry, cavalry and artillery of the Guard. Also differences between the Italian and Imperial Guards. I have been talking here about the French Old Guard infantry.
However, it may be argued that there was some additional risk the attached to being a French Old Guard infantry officer, besides combat with your regiment. I have listed the 4 additonal officers lost while assigned out from a French Old Guard infantry regiment. Those 4 would inculde 1 assassinated in Madrid at the start of the rising, and 1 that just disappeared in Paris. Only 2 of the 4 additional officers were lost while fighting with units to which they were assigned. That's it – 2.
So, even considering the possibility of being tapped for some other assignment, being a French Old Guard infantry officer was a really safe billet.

"you intend to denigrate"
I am sorry if factual information such as casualty data strikes you as denigration. Are you saying it is denigrating to look at how French Old Guard infantry offiers lost thier lives ? All I am doing here is putting up the statistics and the bios. If you think I have mis-counted or something, please offer specific corrections. If you think the data is meaningless, then don't read it.

============

Shane,

"I never said the French Old Guard were merely ceremonial troops"
I know, look at what I wrote :
"I know this sounds like some ceremonial guard that could not fight. But that is not what is being said."

"However, when called upon to fight they covered themselves with a great deal of glory that cannot be matched as far as I am concerned. Their fighting reputation is legendary and not just because the bulletin's said so, they fought in some of the most dangerous and costly affairs in which they performed wonders on the field."
If I may, please – remember that I was talking only about the French Old Guard infantry. The amount of fighting that they did and its intensity or cost was really low compared to other units. I think you realize this. That's in the numbers.
As to "glory" and getting covered with it – well that is more subjective. Unless one really looks deeply at the original sources, it is hard to know the glory from the propaganda. And even then, there is still some subjectivity involved, especially when talking about French Guard units.

There is so much just plain "noise" in Napoleonic history, it is sometimes really difficult to see a clear picture. There are so many secondary accounts that form a network of self-reinforcement and cross-citation, few with any different original sources. Then everybody has to come to some "conclusion" or insight or summary. And these last can be far less than objective.

One thing I have learned, there is nothing better than reading the original sources in the original languages. It really changes your point of view sometimes. Then I can make up my own mind without so much "noise" from writers telling me what to think. This "let me make up my own mind" attitude may be more appealing because I am American – but I thnk it is typical in Australia also.

And again, I do not even question the elite status of the Old Guard. If someone wants to debate it, I would likely be their opponent. You can ask Dave Hollins how I react when I see an anti-French bias, or a "sexed-up" narrative as he would call it, in an historian's treatment of the French Guard.

Chuvak

Navy Seals=Elite

Somali pirates=Less than elite.

:)

What were the officer casualties in the US Navy Seals like over the past 20 years compared to those in the regular US army units?

yeah, I have to agree Malcolm

The citing of French Old guard officer casualties has to be taken into perspective. Looking at the "total" Guard officer casualties from a corps of men numbering only a very small total of the entire army does not give one a true sense of comparison. If however, you draw the officer casualties from the line from a comparative number of men (equal) sized formation you will bet a much better indication of the true safety of being in the guard. But this of course must be taken as a snap shot from the entire wars, 1804-15.

Statistics is a pursuit that can be manipulated to show whatever you wish it to show provided you leave out certain factors which can and do distort the truth.

Shane

I just thought that was a gimme comparison?

:O

Shane,

I think I did my statistics chart just like you say it should be done. If it is done wrongly, please correct it. I posted links to where I got the data.

I compared regiment to regiment.

Do you think that the average size of the officer roster of an Old or Middle Guard regiment was smaller than a Line regiment ?
- the Guard were generally kept near full strength
- the Guard had fewer combats, so the officer billets were not so often empt pending arrival of a replacment
- the Guard had an extra officer per compagnie
- the Guard had more officers à la suite
- the Guard had fewer away without leave, missing, sick, straggling, etc. – so the officers were actually there to get hurt more often
- the Guard officers assigned to other duties, such as Young Guard, are often reported as casualties in their "home" regiment.
Overall, I think any factor for size would favor the Line.

As to duration, I picked units that existed through the whole period in all cases. I had to combine two records when the Middle Guard had name changes, but I labelled it as such.

I selected more Line units so that the result would be more likley representative on a per regiment basis.

I selected as many Guard units as I could that had a full existence over the duration of the wars.

I dont see what more I could do to make an apples to apples comparison.

But, if you dont think the stats are good, just redo them better, please, and show a better result. Put in all the factors you think should be there and explain them to us. It would be interesting to see another man's "take" on the analysis – as opposed to just hearing that they dont like the result.

Chuey

Hi Chuvak,

No, your work is fine, you obviously are very knowledgeable, my problem is that you are comparing a formation that was usually only ever around 3-4,000 men strong. The rest of the French army was more than 3-400,000 men strong at any one given point in time and probably much more than that at times.

What I am saying is that if you take the entire French army (just infantry if you like) and calculate the average officer losses for the entire army and then ratio it down to a comparative number to the Old Guard you would get a much more meaningful picture. However, I still do not think this is worth the effort because the results will mean nothing in the scheme of things. As Kevin said, the Old Guard were not men that suddenly appeared as Guards, they were "all" former soldiers from all over the French army who had long and tough careers before they adorned the guard uniform.

These men had to prove themselves through combat in line formations long before the relative safety of the Guard. For me, entry into these formations was a gift from Napoleon for meritorious service above and beyond the call of duty. This did not mean they no longer had to fight, history and records prove this, they fought increasingly as a formation as the wars progressed and suffered for it. All the while, men in these guard formations were coming and going for one reason or another.

Shane

Shane,

There were about 100 French ligne infantry reigments that existed over the whole Empire – and about 25 légère. I took 4 of each. The first 4 because they were at the top of the lists. I am really sure it is a sufficent sample. But if you want to check, just scan down the pages that I inked as a source. You will see the next 6 line and légère – easy to tell that the averages really wont change by including more line regiments.

WIth a few exceptions, no one "appeared" in the Old Guard. The exceptions are :
- the first inductees transferred from the garde à pied du directoire (not at all elite) and the guides à pied (somewhat elite) who stayed in until the Empire
- a very few relatives of dignataries before the advent of the Middle Guard (and these tended to go on the staff of the Guard, which staff was later formally removed from some of the Old Guard distinctions).

But the issue is not what happened with these officers before they entered the Old Guard – but instead what happened after.
Also the issue is not what they were capable of doing, but what Napoléon allowed them to do …. and why he made that choice.

:-)
Chuey

There were 127 ligne and 36 legere regiments by 1814. There were 90 and 27 when Napoleon began, and had consolidated the Directory's 110 ligne demi-brigades and 30 legere demi-briages to get those numbers.

Sincerely,
K

On top of that the Old Guard Regiments had only two btlns each while the average Ligne and Legere regiment had anywhere from 3-4 to 5-6 btlns at any time during the wars. If you factor this in to the number crunching you get to see just how insignificant the Old Guard numbers really were…

At its peak I think the Old Guard numbered around 11 btlns? give or take one or two.

The peak of the French regular army numbered around say, 600-700 btlns, that is a huge difference…

This means the Old Guard was no more than around 1.5% of the entire French army and probably closer to 1% depending on the year and factoring in Middle and Young Guard into the numbers. They were basically the "top" 1% of the French Imperial Army, the creme de la creme. (however the French spell that). This is much different than some of the other major powers where their supposed "elite" guards formations number closer to 5-10% of their total army.

When you look at it in that perspective you can see that one persons idea of elite is different from another's…

This is why Napoleon selected men to also become Middle and Young Guard and rated them as such with a natural progression upwards into the Old Guard as men were retired, maimed, killed or whatever. He could have just called every Guard btln Old Guard if he wanted but he also knew that this formation had to be the best and this is why their numbers never swelled to grand proportions as in other armies far beyond what could be reasonably considered, "elite"…

Shane

With respect to the Russian Guard, a look at the Borodino OB you can find on line shows a lot of the adjutants and aides coming from the Guard. I think it's a safe guess these were the sons of the nobility, with a Guard commission and a staff assignment. Still, it does not support the assertion (based on??) that the Russian Guard was a insular institution.

This conversation would be a whole lot more pleasant if some people could understand the difference between an elite unit and an effective fighting force. There is no question the Old Guard was the 'best' of the Grande Armée. This seems to lead some to beleive they would fight invincibly if they had to. Well, they had to in the later years and it didn't always work out… Of course that's true for other nation's elites as well…

I think Shane has a good point about the regt size. A quick look at Hourtoulle on Borodino suggests roughly 20 officers per battalion. In 1812 the line regts were quite inflated. So one would have to find the average TOE over the decade. Still, I think that won't change the numbers more than 50% and there is even more disparity in the number of fatalities.

NSN,

"the average TOE over the decade"
you mean number of battalions, right ?

typically for ligne :
3 bataillons per régiment 1805-1808 : ~90 total officers
4 bataillons per régiment 1809-1811 : ~80 total officers
5 bataillons per régiment 1812 : ~100 total officers
3 bataillons per régiment 1813-1815 : ~65 total officers

overall average ~80 officers/regiment at full TOE.
compared to ~50 officers/regiment for Old Guard.

if you think that ligne units were typically at ~2/3 of authorized stregth or less, then no correction or a correction in the other direction.

if you thnk that ligne units were typically at ~5/6 of authorized strenth, then :
overall average ~67 officers/regiment at ~5/6 TOE.
compared to ~50 officers/regiment for Old Guard.
ratio : 1.33
factor the Old Guard losses x 1.33

so, for example, the 9 total fatal officer casualties fighting with their regiments for 4 regiments for over a decade of wars should be "interpreted" as 12.

it does not amount to much difference, eh ? It's a safe, safe, safe billet.
Think of these four reigments commited in a well-supported attack at Talavera or Essling, at Borodino, at Waterloo ….

for me, average ligne strength at 2/3 TOE seemed about reasonable – higher at the start of campaigns, lower near the end, near "0" occassionally …. so I did't bother trying explain factoring the basic numerical results

Chuey

'This seems to lead some to beleive they would fight invincibly if they had to. Well, they had to in the later years and it didn't always work out… '

The 1st Regiment of Grenadiers a Pied forming two battalion squares as a rear guard at Waterloo's ending and then marching off the field in perfect order (and the Prussian 'pursuit' definitely staying away from them) tends to disagree with your statement. Of course, they were the 'Old of the Old.'

Then you have Pelet's two battalions in Plancenoit bayonetting their way out at the bitter end, saving their eagle, and withdrawing to the south, again being left alone by the Prussians…

The comment by a Guardsman to Colonel Dorsenne is very accurate 'This time there were too many…'

Sincerely,
K

'Still, it does not support the assertion (based on??) that the Russian Guard was a insular institution.'

That may or may not be a correct assumption based on what I've read in Levin, who uses a Guard regiment for a quick study in personnel.

Be that as it may, the Russian Guard was never the combat organization that the Imperial Guard was and was initially nothing but a parade ground outfit (1805-1807). Their cavalry was ruined by Senarmont at Friedland and definitely beaten by the French Guard Cavalry at Austerlitz. However, their artillery arm did become an artillery school of sorts as the Russian artillery arm steadily improved from 1800-1815.

Sincerely,
K

Elite leadership creates elite troops and elite troops ignore bad leaders.

I'm afraid that not only makes no sense, but is wrong.

Despite elan and bravado ,any unit that believes it is elite is not.

I'd love to know where you uncovered this juicy morsel of information. Is it perhaps based on personal experience?

Chuvak – yes that's what I'd work out on the back of an envelope. I would guess that cadre numbers might be more stable than men, but as you keep refining the process the percentages won't change as much. Wonder if the fatalities/casualties numbers are just variance, better care, or different reporting standards…?

Kevin, I just don't think I could ever match you mastery of irony so I won't even try to address that Waterloo example. ;)

The Leib Guard had a combat record almost a century old, and in 1805 had accesss to veterans of the Turkish and Polish campaigns a decade earlier. The newly organized Imperial Guard had some combat record in its previous forms, and access to veterans of 1795-1801. So an edge to the Old Guard, but hardly a justfication of "parade ground troops" which seems kind of schoolyard and oddly emotive for events of two centuries remove.

The L.G. was committed to combat and did take casualties (as Chuvak noted more at Borodino than the Old Guard suffered in a decade).

The Old Guard, as Shane noted, were a personal body guard of the Emperor/C-in-C Napoleon. Their role was handle disasters like the Retreat from Moscow, not storm the Central Redoubt. Infantry combat was just too attritional to risk such an elite unit.

They were certainly good soldiers. Hypothetically they might well have kicked butt. Historically, they just didn't.

And as far as it matters in this forum, you just have to make sure you rules set doesn't allow them to cruise about the table like a Tiger tank – or be used at all…

'The L.G. was committed to combat and did take casualties (as Chuvak noted more at Borodino than the Old Guard suffered in a decade).'

And the reason for that was given-they were held under artillery fire and not under cover-see Lieven. That bit of hyperbole by Chuvak is just a little over the top-the Old Guard casualties at Essling and Wagram were heavy-see Coignet.

'The Old Guard, as Shane noted, were a personal body guard of the Emperor/C-in-C Napoleon. Their role was handle disasters like the Retreat from Moscow, not storm the Central Redoubt. Infantry combat was just too attritional to risk such an elite unit.'

The Old Guard, as was the Imperial Guard as a whole, the reserve of the army in combat. Old Guard cavalry and artillery units were committed to combat quite readily. The Old Guard infantry regiments, there were always two, sometimes four, and at most, eight (and that only in 1815) were committed to combat if necessary. Their attack at Hanau in 1813 threw their opponents into the River Kinzig; they were the main, decisive assault against Blucher at Ligny in 1815. And the two battalion, bayonets only assault against 14 Prussian battalions in Plancenoit was definitely attritional infantry combat.

The Guard was a bodyguard, but it was also a combat unit and was used as such if necessary.

'Hypothetically they might well have kicked butt. Historically, they just didn't.'

That statement is grossly incorrect, as has been shown here.

Sincerely,
K

Hi guys,

I kind of think some of you are really trying to take my words out of context or focusing only on part of what I say.

Yes, the Old Guard were a bodyguard of the Emperor, Napoleon had this fascination with the ancient world and felt the need to emulate or even surpass his hero's. One way to do this was to create his own Guard to protect himself as head of state. However, the military man in him also wished that this body of men were also functional, that meant they had to also be capable of fighting, not just chocolate or toy soldiers.

so Napoleon put in place structure and rigorous processes to ensure only the best men were chosen for such a formation and that they had to be proven combat veterans that had obtained hero status in their former units. One of his typical actions was to ask the colonel of a regiment of the line, "who is the bravest man in the regiment" or "bring forward the 10 most brave men in your regiment". These inquiries of Napoleon were not just for formality, they had a purpose, it allowed him to identify the best of the men in the line so that they could be hand picked for entry into his Old Guard provided they passed the criteria checklist first.

This force were the elite of the elite of the French army and anyone who tries to tell me they were just ceremonial troops does not fully understand them. So when my words are taken out of context it does erk me. I also stated they were proven combat veterans and heroes who were formed into a formation second to none which represented the pride of France. They were also a formation that could and did defeat every force they ever came up against even in the setting of the sun at Waterloo…

They "were" a fighting formation but Napoleon felt them too precious to expose needlessly to combat as he freely committed the line. However, they "did" fight and they had to more so as the years progressed and each time they were committed they fought as guard of their calibre should fight, and this is, well.

To be honest, I cannot understand why we are going over such a topic, the guard were elite in every aspect of the word. They still invoke ideas of bravery and eliteness today when spoken about. You cannot have such a formation as this which is 100% full of proven combat veterans of which over half of them had received the converted legion d'honour and been exposed to years of service and campaigning for a minimum of I think, 8 years etc without realising you are speaking about elite soldiers…

So what if being in the Old Guard is relatively safe compared to being a normal soldier as part of the line? What keeps being forgotten here is the years it took these men and the dangers and near death situations they faced year in and year out as part of the line prior to entry into the Old Guard. And on top of that they still find themselves having to continue campaigning year in and year out and facing an increasing number of battles in which they too have to keep fighting before it is all over.

I feel that if just one of these men were alive today you might find yourself at the wrong end of his bayonet if you told him he was just a ceremonial toy soldier belonging to a formation that is "safe"…..especially from us who have no idea what they really had to go through to get there.

Shane

"the Old Guard casualties at Essling and Wagram were heavy"
Compared to what ? Tea parties at Fountainebleau ?
Guard casulaties were not heavy compared to Line casulaties.

Old Guard officer casualties at Essling:
- grenadiers à pied : 1 dead, 4 wounded
- chaseurs à pied : 1 dead, 6 wounded
- grenadiers à cheval : none
- dragons : none
- chasseurs à cheval : none
- cheveau-légers polonais : 1 dead, 2 wounded
- artillerie & train : 2 wounded
Total Old Guard : 5 dead, 14 wounded

Compare :
1er ligne : not present
2e de ligne : 2 dead, 2 wounded
3e de ligne : 4 dead, 24 wounded
4e de ligne : 3 dead, 27 wounded

==================================

Old Guard officer casualties at Wagram:
- grenadiers à pied : 1 wounded
- chaseurs à pied : none
- grenadiers à cheval : none
- dragons : none
- chasseurs à cheval : 4 dead, 10 wounded
- cheveau-légers polonais : 2 dead, 11 wounded
- artillerie & train : 8 dead, 16 wounded
Total Old Guard : 14 dead, 38 wounded

Compare :
1er de ligne : 1 dead, 11 wounded
2e de ligne : 5 dead, 11 wounded
3e de ligne : 2 dead, 18 wounded
4e de ligne : 15 dead, 29 wounded

==================================

Shane,

I would happily tell a French Old Guard infantry officer that he had a safe billet – and he would agree.
But that does not make him "just a ceremonial toy soldier". That was Napoléon's doing, to the extent it happened, reflecting Napoléon's decision to protect his Person and his Régime.

Chuvak

ok Chuey, I am too burnt out on this one now anyway.

'"the Old Guard casualties at Essling and Wagram were heavy"
Compared to what ? Tea parties at Fountainebleau ?
Guard casulaties were not heavy compared to Line casulaties.'

And what about the enlisted casualties? The Old Guard infantry were under artillery fire, closing ranks as men fell and the mention of it in Coignet is quite graphic. Both your hyperbole and sarcasm are noteworthy, but again you miss the point and I don't believe you actually understand what you're attempting to talk about.

Sincerely,
K

Hello quidveritas!

In Napoleonics just about every unit that is not a line unit or lower (militia, etc.) is elite. French dragoons and most light dragoons, most uhlans, Austrian grenzers, Russian jagers are also not considered elite. Some people consider line units as elite based on their battle history. A better discription would probably be to call them "crack". Regardless once the reputation is established it's pretty hard to lose it.

Hope this helps.

Best regards,

Glenn

Glenn,

I'd always thought of French Dragoons being almost the litmus test of 'Bog Standard' in Napoleonic cavlary terms. I wouldn't even rate them as crack. The same goes for light dragoons and uhlans. All of these are just line units, apart from the occasional exception.

Okie, then consider the Peninsula Dragoon division that came up to central Europe (France) to fight in the 1814 campaign. They were seen by the rest of the army as "elite"…

This is a very touchy subject and one that will force strong debate.

Kevin,

"And what about the enlisted casualties?"

Unless the Old Guard officers were somehow hiding behind their men while the Line officers did not, the ratios should be the same, right ?

Or are you saying the Old Guard officers sent their enlisted men into combat, but stayed out of harm's way themselves ?

Chuvak