"A question about British Artillery at Waterloo." Topic

It's true that when Marshal Ney launch his final atack to the British , the red thin line can massed only 24 guns at all to repel this atack?.

And if that was true… the rest of the artillery pieces were all destroyed or without ammunition? (or maybe without artillerist?)

I asked this because it seems to me a very little amount of british artillery pieces.

By the way, Ney had the exactly same amount to used to support his atack.

Thanks in advance for your comments.
Amicalement
Armand

Adkin reckons that there about 90 guns facing Ney's first attack and that there were still about 60 guns available between LHS and Hougoumont to fire on the final attack of the Guard.

Where do you get 24 guns from?

PK.

Sounds about right if you are refering to the allied left flank.

The Allied artillery was quite spread across the front, no grand batteries, and of course they had a lot less than the french to start with.

If you are looking at the area immediately around La Haie Sainte then 24 ish guns would be about right – you had around 4 batteries in this particular area (Ross, Rogers, Whinyates, Bijleveld).

A lot of allied batteries were positioned to support the allied right flank from the Genappe roa to Hougoumont (at least 12 batteries ) as this is where Welligton thought the main danger was.

There was only 7 batteries deployed on the allied left flank from the road/sandpit to Papelotte and 2 of these were moved over behind hougoumont at around midday and 1 was way out on the flank past papelotte.

That left 4 batteries totaling at most 28 guns…

The problem wasn't the number of Allied guns available (although a large number had been destroyed by the French fire), but the lack of ammunition. Many of the Allied batteries had been forced to leave the front line to replenish their ammunition stock. Sandham and Cleeves had retired, although they rejoined to participate in the geeral advance, and Brevet Major Sympher's battery had joined the line and maintained a strong fire against the Garde Impériale. However, one of the most crucil additions to the position was the battery commanded by Captain Krahmer de Bichin, which was attached to Chassé's 3rd Netherlands Division. Chassé himself had ridden forward to enquire why there was no fire from artillery on the plateau, and was informed that they had completely run out of ammunition. He observed the approach of the Moyenne Garde (with whom he had served) and immediately ordered the artillery of his division to move forward, but that commanded by Captain Lux was trapped on the road close to the farm of Mont St. Jean when a wagon overturned. It was the sustained fire of Kramer de Bichin, as well as that of Sympher's battery which were the most crucial Alied artillery elements in repelling the attack by the Garde Impériale. May I state that both Chassé's account (part of which you may read in Hobby news if you click the link and open the PDF, which also shows an new picture of Chassé asking why the Allied troops had stopped firing) and Sympher's unpublished account form part of the study I am publishing through 1815 Limited. If I can be of any further assistance please let me know. John P.S. I wouldn't pay too much attention to the information in the Waterloo Companion by Mark Adkin!