"Waterloo: French at Hougoumont" Topic

I have had a number of messages through the 1815 website asking me for information on the French troops engaged at Hougoumont, and in particular those of the 6th Division under the command of Prince Jérôme. Prior to the release of the book on the 3rd Foot Guards, which covers the events at Hougoumont and provides details of the various divisions in the Comte Reille's Corps d'Armée, including aides-de-camp and adjoints, I am happy to confirm that the 1st Brigade of the 6th Division, commanded by Baron Bauduin, was composed of the 1er Régiment Léger and the 3e Régiment de Ligne. Examination of the extant records held at the Château de Vincennes confirms that the brigade had been composed of the 1er and 2e Régiments Léger, but on the 10th June an order issued by the Chief of Staff, Baron Pamphile-Lacroix (held in carton C15/34) stated: 'His Imperial Majesty Prince Jérôme has arrived at Avesnes in order to take command of the 6th Infantry Division, and will replace Lieutenant-Général Rottembourg, who will move to other functions. Lieutenant-Général Girard has taken command of the 7th Infantry Division. The 2e Régiment Léger of the 6th Division is transferred to the 5th, and is to be replaced by the 3e Régiment de Ligne from that division. The 3rd and 5th Cavalry Divisions have left the 2nd Corps and have been transferred to the 3rd Corps, under the orders of Comte Exelmans. The 4th Division becomes the 2nd and has been augmented by a regiment under the orders of Lieutenant-Général Piré, who has arrived with the army corps.' The fact that the 2e Régiment formed the vanguard of the 5th Infantry Division (Bachelu) was confirmed in a number of contemporary reports, not least that by Comte Reille, and the published memoirs of Colonel Trefcon. I am happy to provide more information on this or any other subject relating to the combat at Hougoumont, providing that the information does not conflict with the publication of the forthcoming book. John Franklin

For those of you who don't know the 1815 website can be found at 1815.ltd.uk. Comte Reille's reports and various other French items can be found in the archive, and translated and typeset copies of the complete returns for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps d'Armée (dated 10th June 1815) will be added in the next few weeks.John Franklin

Yes, in answer to your question I am happy to confirm that Prince Jérôme, who held the rank of Lieutenant-Général (a royalist rank which was used during the campaign instead of Général de Division), had an incredible six aides-de-camp (while Comte Reille who commanded the corps only had four), being: Maréchal-de-camp Baron Wolff, Colonels de Gayl, Phuld and de Bergues, Chef-de-bataillon Hamel and Capitaine Bourdon de Vatry. I hope that this is of some assistance.

John

interesting thread relating to the audacious,impetuous

and hotheaded Jerome………..or was he?

he fought well bravely and with great verve at Quatre

Bras and in my opionion has been much maligned in 1815.

Despite being wounded in both battles he earned Napoleons

respect to such an extent he was brought to his side

and as i understand from his letters to his wife

he was given command of the rear-guard………..

A question for you are the unit strenghts quoted by

Scott Bowden correct not withstanding the "swopping around

of units". i wonder what Jerome thought as he would have

only wanted premier units under his command as befitted

his status

regards

Ged ( gerard)

gjm.figurines.co.uk/

Ged, You raise an interesting point, which I acknowledge. The performance of Jérôme during the campaign was at best mixed. He led the division with courage and was wounded at Les Quatre Bras, but clearly his involvement at Waterloo and his disregard of the orders he had received from the corps commander, Comte Reille, meant that large numbers of troops became embroiled in the struggle at Hougoumont without a specific order to do so. However, at the end of the battle, when the French army was fleeing, Napoleon placed Jérôme in command over and above other superior officer, including Soult. This fact is confirmed in a contemporary letter written by Comte Guilleminot, which forms part of the 1815 Limited archive. Guilleminot describes the decision as 'a notorious fact' and continues to outline the events at the conclusion of the battle, where he was engaged in repelling an attck by the Allied cavalry on the French rearguard. It should be noted that Jérôme did an excellent job is reforming the troops along the northern French border, although by then the political situation had become such that there was no need for him to remain with the army. All fascinating stuff, which has never been published before in English. Comte Guilleminot was a most excellent staff officer, as his record confirms, and his being placed as the second-in-command of the 6th Division says a great deal. In short, he was the man to command, while Jérôme was the figurehead. Unfortunately, whatever the composition of the division, it appears obvious that Jérôme was determined to attain glory and status for his charge at all costs. Now, if we really want to talk about someone with an agenda, why not pick Comte Vandamme! John

John

thanks for that…………For me i belive Jerome had a

lot of "making up " to do in Napoleons eyes with the

debacle in Russia and the ignominy of being placed under

Davouts command ,being run out of his kingdom…

to be told "you have done well" at Waterloo by Napoleon

and to have conducted the rearguard to safety closed

a final chapter with a degree of a competance and verve

must have been a massive achievment too him.

As for Vandamme the incorrigible looter and superb

General of Division but as yet not a marshall i wonder

what his real agenda was apart form the blue baton with

gilt eagles in his Knapsack!!

Davouts job??

probably Grouchy………….

regards

Ged

gjm.figurines.co.uk/
Nga Archive

Ged, Comte Vandamme was determined to gain the baton and resented the fact that Grouchy had received his. As for Davout, his position was a political one, and by stating this I am not saying that he was not a worthy appointment with the Armée du Nord; far from it! He was trusted by Napoleon and was therefore given the task of retaining power while Napoleon waged war. The political machinations were the overriding factor in many of the appointments, a point touched upon by a only small number of historians. Yes, the military aspects of the campaign were those we all try to analyse and understand, but the political instability of Napoleon's reign, and the manner in which he was trying to secure his authority was the main reason that Davout was left in Paris. John

John

i agree political considerations form a necessary part

of any in depth discussion pertaining to the French

Military hierachy…….Dominique-Rene Vandamme may have

shot his bolt as it were with his disasterous manoeuvre

at Kulm in 1813 not to mention his abrupt,abrasive

and explosive temper. He had a serious rival in General

Gerard who i greatly admire whose own aspiratons were

of a more worthy nature ,and was tactically as good if

not better then Vandamme.

too put things in a nutshell it was do or die in 1815

for all the Generals as this coloured their political

aspiratons im sure as they must have known they could

not take on ALL of the Allied Armies again and win!!

i agree Davout was the only choice in "holding the fort"

in Paris………….god knows what he thought

regards

Ged

gjm.figurines.co.uk/

Nga Archive

Ged, The final capitulation of the French army (the Armée de Nord had by then been renamed Armée de la Loire) and the terms on which King Louis XVIII presecribed the cessation of hostilities left Davout in an impossible position. He eventually recommended that all officers sign an oath swearing allegiance to the King, which of course meant they had two choices: sign up or seek sanctuary in another country. Many sought to leave, but the vast majority lost faith in Davout and swore an oath. Naturally, the soldiers didn't take kindly to this, and the outcome was that the French army was impotent and powerless. Just he way the Allies wanted it!

Just to confirm to those people who have contaced me through the 1815 Limited website about the French information I had stated would be within the on-line archive in April or May 2010: these details will be added in the next few weeks, but the translations has been 'on hold' while the Hanoverian Correspondence book has been completed.

Secondly, the initial post remains, in that the 2é Régiment Léger formed part of Bauduin's 5th Division, not the 6th Division, as stated in Scott Bowden's book. I understand how the error could have been made by Mr. Bowden and his researchers (I have even seen some of the notes the latter made at the Château de Vincennes as they left them in the files), but the translation he provided in his otherwise excellent book of the order dated 10th June 1815 is incorrect. This is confirmed by the other extant returns, as noted above.

I will certainly make more information available in the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards book which is due for publication shortly, and am willing to share some of these details prior to its availability, if required. John

'Yes, the military aspects of the campaign were those we all try to analyse and understand, but the political instability of Napoleon's reign, and the manner in which he was trying to secure his authority was the main reason that Davout was left in Paris. John'

That is absolutely correct as is the statement that few have touched on it. Col Elting pointed that fact out in Swords but most authors and historians merely state that Davout was 'wasted' in Paris.

It should also be noted that Davout is the man responsible for getting the French army ready for an offensive campaign.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin,

You are absolutely correct about Davout, and his papers make interesting reading. I have been fortunate enough to see a number of additional items which were not published, as my friend Pierre de Wit, who I consider to be 'the' authority on the 1815 campaign, has shared various items with me. The period after the offensive and the formation and subsequent capitulation of the French armée de la Loire is without doubt the greatest area of political intrigue. The French officers certainly wanted to fight with honour against the Allies as they entered their country, but in the end it was Davout who made them yield to the will of the provisional government. There are a number of very interestig accounts of this phase of the campaign, and perhaps that from August-Louis Pétiét, one of Maréchal Soult's aides-de-camp, which was made available to me by Nicole Gotteri, is the most enlightening. John

Pétiét, Auguste-Louis; Nicole Gotteri editor. Souvenirs historiques, militaires et particuliers, 1784-1815: mémoires d'un hussard de l'Empire, aide de camp du maréchal Soult. Paris: S.P.M., 1996. 522 pages. Series: Volume 23 of Kronos.

Indeed,

Nicole, who was the head archivist at the Archive Nationale de France for many years, amassed a great many papers on Pétiét, including the extant family manuscripts, copies of which she shared with me. All of her books on the period are well researched and include lots of material outside of the purely military sphere e.g. there is a detailed insight into the political situation. John

So we have agreed on the exchange of the 2nd legere for the 3rd ligne via the 10 June letter, right? I've seen this in a number of OBs.

What is less known, to me, is the info about the cavalry in the same letter (above).

"The 3rd and 5th Cavalry Divisions have left the 2nd Corps and have been transferred to the 3rd Corps, under the orders of Comte Exelmans. The 4th Division becomes the 2nd and has been augmented by a regiment under the orders of Lieutenant-Général Piré, who has arrived with the army corps."

Can anybody 'translate' this? My OBs show Excelmans to be in command of the 2nd Cav Corps, consisting of the 9th and 10th Cavalry Divisions (All dragoons). And "The 4th Division becomes the 2nd"? What the heck does that mean?

Widowson,

Yes, the 2é Léger exchanged with the 3é de Ligne on the 10th June. Then, cavalry division which was originally called the th Cavalry Division, following the appointment of Comte Piré to the commnd, had the title (number) chaged and was simply called the 2nd Cavalry division thereafter. John

Why would one number the cavalry divisions, and leave the 2nd empty? And which units filled in as the "new" 4th division? What had they been numbered before?

Dear Widowson,

I have just returned from a very long day's research and will have to refer to my papers (I have copies of almost all of the returns of the period) to answer several of your questions. What I can say is that the order of the 10th June was issued by the Chief of Staff of the French 2nd Corps, Joseph-François Pamphile-Lacroix, as a direct consequence of orders he had received. He did not need to know the reason for the changes, merely to instigate them.I have provided a translation of the said order he issued I know this appears obvious, but a point worth noting. John