"First Volleys, assumptions and second thoughts." Topic

I've always assumed (assumed because I have no recollection of reading anything to support it) that a Battalion waiting in line would hands down get the first volley in on an advancing opponent. Don't know where i got this idea from but it does make some practical sense.
On the other hand I also expect an adequately trained Battalion, once again standing ready in line, to be able to hold fire and unleash a crashing last minute volley against enemy trying to close.
Whats given me second thoughts is the realization that possibly these actions could be mutually exclusive.
To illustrate my point.
Blue in column is advancing against white who is in line.
Blue closes then halts and forms line. It this point it could be readying to engage in a fire fight or preparing to advance then charge.
Blue closes to effective musket range.
Now if white opens fire it would surly reduce its chance to fire that late volley that will halt a charging enemy.
On the other hand if it holds fire then Blue who has the intention of engaging in a musketry dual has the opportunity to halt dress ranks and fire.
So the wargamers point. Do non phasing/moving units get the first shot?
Whats every ones view. Has anyone read of any situations that address this.
regards
Max

The stationary unit has the option of shooting or waiting. The moving unit shows its hand by halting.

Hi Max,

Yep, you hit upon a rarely represented conundrum of minor tactics. To my knowledge, the rules "From Valmy to Waterloo" are the only set to address this directly, as they had a table for Fire Control that you rolled on to receive a charge. If you had a high rating, and weren't disorganized or set upon by pesky skirmishers tempting you to open fire needlessly, then you had a good chance at a bonus. On the other hand, poorly trained troops etc. might actually get a penalty to closing fire (ragged volley at long range).

Most rules address the issue indirectly, rolling it up into the randomness of the dice for the fire effect.

On a broader level, the game of volley "chicken" is harder to model in games. As you say, in most cases when an attacker advances into range and deploys into line there is no penalty to the defender for simply opening up fire on their turn, and then also getting a closing shot the next turn when the enemy charges. This typical double-whammy makes it very hard to approach in column and deploy into line and then assess the situation, in more historical fashion. Rules that allow multiple actions for better led or luckier troops in one turn might be able to model this better, as the attacker may have more options and the defender won't be able to rely on a scheduled sequence.

It might be interesting to build in the actual decision-making process, with staggered bonuses for close and final fires. If a defending unit got, for example, +1 at close range and a further +1 for closing fire IF it had not already fired, then you might get this:

1. Attacker moves into range and deploys.
2. Defender faces choice of either firing now at +1, or waiting and firing at +2 if the enemy charges.
3. If it turns out the attacker is going to charge, then waiting would be the better option … but if he intends to stand and volley, then firing first would be.

That system seems like it would work in abstract, but it would require the following from a set of rules:

1. The ability of the defender to "opportunity fire" on an enemy approaching within range.
2. A big enough difference between +1 and +2 (whatever those actually translate into in your rules) to make the decision a meaningful one.

If you wanted to add a further level of detail, you could have the additional "+1 for final fire" be a random fire control effect, perhaps ranging from +0 to +2, making waiting a better option for better troops but a trickier one for lesser troops.

Hey, that actually sounds more or less workable!

By the way, can I guess that you are looking at Black Powder? ;)

Cheers,

Christopher

Christopher

If a column attempts to deploy into line within effective musketry range of the enemy, and not covered by skirmishers, it deserves to suffer :o) As I understand it, it was the use of skirmishers to cover the column's advance and deployment (or immediate charge if appropriate) which made the tactic viable. This is what VtW models; and you have to go down to this level to do it properly.

Your example asks what would happen if blue or white got off the first volley. But a major design flaw in wargame rules is that they don't handle volleys individually i.e. one at a time. Modern rules tend to lump several rounds of fire into a single turn – combat is abstracted and not modelled. Some old rulesets did the blow-by-blow version and computer games like Empire Total War model it volley by volley.

VtW models a combination of both the fire discipline (holding fire to 100 – 50 yards) and also skirmish effect at disrupting this.

its a great mechanism. As is the firefght at 100 yards abstraction rule.

I am pretty sure veterans advancing would expect to beat any line which fired at 200 yards, would be hopeful if the fire came at 100 yards, and would amost certainly never allow themselves to face a first volley at 50 yards since it signalled determined troops who knew their job.

I think I got that from Noseworthy, or Muir.

infantry engagements are all about morale, not about shooting and casualties. its about who breaks first, not about who shoots down the last man. good rules reflect this.

Your example involves player choices which did not apply on a real battlefield.

"Blue closes then halts and forms line. At this point it could be readying to engage in a fire fight or preparing to advance then charge."

Columns were intended to assault the enemy; if Blue had intended to charge (which must have been the case if it was formed in column) why has it halted and formed line?

Blue is only likey be halted if White has held its position and as Keraunos has said, it is essentially about comparative morale.

" To my knowledge, the rules "From Valmy to Waterloo" are the only set to address this directly"

"In The Grand Manner" have had this for…?…what? about 30 years?

@advocate – you're assuming that the column is deploying within range close enough to do real damage, and that they defending unit can deliver a controlled volley. That was often pretty rare. The column could deploy at 200 yards and be safe but tempt the unit to fire, it could even deploy at 100 yards and be relatively safe against poor fire. Sure, if it marched up to say 50-75 yards then it was probably going to get smacked, again unless the defender failed to deliver a good volley. Also, the column could deploy at say 150 yards and then do a "quick 50 yards and volley" etc. which might leave the enemy wrong-footed. It took well-trained troops and junior officers with a good eye for the ground, but it could be done.

@MichaelCollinsHimself – the assumption that columns were simply intended to be used to assault is wrong. They *could* be used to assault, and as time went on and troop quality declined they were more often used to assault, but their primary purpose was to cross the battlefield quickly and once their to decide whether to deploy (in fact the standard tactic for much of the wars) or go straight in. With the reforming of the French battalion structure in 1809 and the creation of the Column of Assault, its stationary middle companies was actually intended (in theory) to provide fire while the rest of the battalion deployed to either side, so obviously the tactic was common discussion and practice even then.

@christot – Thanks – "To my knowledge" has been expanded. ;) I'm afraid ITGM was before my time.

In general, the whole Peninsular Mythology has painted an erroneous view of French column tactics, which sadly has sometimes been carried over to the Napoleonic Wars in their proper sense.

However, the more interesting point is how to translate this into a meaningful and enjoyable tabletop mechanic. A quick alternating series of decisions by both players seems the best way, with details depending on the rules in question.

Cheers,

Christopher

I played with this issue a lot but came to the conslusion that its too much effort to get right on the table top. Better to abstract it.

The problem is you end up giving the player too many choices. I assume most decent commands knew how vital it was to time their fire. The problem is getting their men to do it. So why would a player choose to open fire early? You might as well assume that you want to fire at close range. It then just comes down to a morale test to see whether they do it. So now do you bother rolloing shooting dice as well. If so why not just include the morale test into the shooting roll? Game turns are usually pretty long even in petit tactical.

So lets assume you want a fire disipline test plus the shooting roll, say x2 dice if close range. Its probably not going to complicate things too much with a simple 1v1 but what about all the complex, multi battalion combats with added terrain, cavalry on flanks etc?

In conclusion, while I find this stuff fascinating to read about, I think ill stick to higher level decision making for my war gaming.

I always thought it was quite simple to model if you forget about all the shooting to kill nonsense, and go straight for the morale checks to resolve the encounter.

attacking unit A, defending unit B

unit B tests in the face of unit A's attack. if it fails, it recoils and the attack suceeds.

If B passes – (i.e. they are holding their fire) Unit A tests. If A fails, its attack fails, and it recoils.

If A passes, both units are locked in a firefight at @100 yards, at which point not much more will happen except a bit more degradation of the units each turn, or until something else intervenes in the combat.

simples.

then you just use a few simple modifiers for external factors – multiple opponents, terrain, unit quality etc – and perhaps something contained within the amount by which the test is passed or failed to determine the state of the unit (i.e. casualties, order), so no need to a new die roll their either.

I've always thought the wargamer obsession with a single "first volley" was misplaced, since the huge majority of cases involve a unit opening fire by platoons, and thus we're not speaking of a single volley, but rather simply a decision to begin shooting at X-range.

Second, as with so many of these supposed problems for game design, the issue is one of literal scale. Unless your turn scale is something minuscule like "1 Turn Equals One Minute," then I can't fathom why we bother with this at all. Most games have something like a 10, 15, or 20 minute imagined "turn," and thus "One turn of shooting" is enough for disciplined troops to blast away the entire contents of their cartridge boxes. The first turn that a unit shoots isn't its "first volley." It's its first, second, third, fourth, fifth…. through twenty-third volleys.

Third, this elastic time applies to the target unit, too. In most cases, 1-3 minutes should suffice for any change of formation change. So again unless your rules use a tiny increment of time-scale, then there's really no "game moment" in which the attacker is stuck. There is more than enough time for him to advance in whatever formation, change into whatever formation, shoot back, and do or don't assault.

That system seems like it would work in abstract, but it would require the following from a set of rules:

1. The ability of the defender to "opportunity fire" on an enemy approaching within range.
2. A big enough difference between +1 and +2 (whatever those actually translate into in your rules) to make the decision a meaningful one.

If you wanted to add a further level of detail, you could have the additional "+1 for final fire" be a random fire control effect, perhaps ranging from +0 to +2, making waiting a better option for better troops but a trickier one for lesser troops.

That's how Piquet works.
Opportunity fire on an advancing enemy is taken to be at a range that is dependant on the quality of the shooters. The attackers can stop and fire at any range they fancy but risk getting thumped by an opportunity volley if they march right up to point blank range.

"I always thought it was quite simple to model if you forget about all the shooting to kill nonsense, and go straight for the morale checks to resolve the encounter."

LFS is the only napoleonic game ive played with a single roll to resolve combats like this. I think they call it a "combat roll" rather than a morale test.

I think your idea sounds fine. You just lumping a lot of factors together but pointing out that "holding fire" is one of, or the biggest, factor in it.

My problem with LFS one in a way asthetic. You moved your units into contact with the enemy, made the combat rolls, then recoiled etc. This was purely for the mechanics of the game. You wernt ACTUALLY charging into contact. THe problem is that it just felt that way and didnt end up looking right to me.

The rules I use have a firing sequence which partially
takes into account moving versus stationary.

Stationary artillery fires, then stationary infantry,
then moving artillery, and moving infantry last.
Casualties taken from a standing unit's fire by a
moving unit do not return fire (i.e., the affected
'hit' units would shoot at reduced effect IF a casualty
were taken).

Chris Hughes' rules use a die roll to determine at which
point of a charge a unit receiving the charge fires
(point-blank, mid-range, long range) with the die roll
modified by troop quality. I've always liked that
aspect of his games (as well as the other aspects, of
course !)

similar to ITGM: (could be that is where Mr Hughes got the idea?)
All skirmishers fire
All artillery fires
stationary infantry fires
moving infantry fires.
(All casualties accrue throughout the turn, so kills inflicted by skirmishers won't get to fire etc)
Any infantry subject to a "charge"/move to contact etc (call it what you will) rolls a single D10. high quality infantry have a very high chance of delivering an close/effective volley, lower class troops have little (or no) chance of firing at close range. The range the fire is deemed to take place at has no bearing on where the figures on the table actually are.
pretty simple.

This is modeled in Legacy of Glory for lower quality troops only. Low-quality (depending on your rules 2nd class line or conscripts or similar) have to pass a unit quality test when deployed in line if they wish to fire at assaulting infantry. If they fail they get no shot as they are assumed to have fired too early to have a telling affect.

My understanding is that (at least prior to the French Revolutionary Wars) a widely held belief was that the battalion that held it's fire to the 'last possible moment' "won" either attacking or defending. Furthermore, the officers had only a modest control on fire, that is, a defending unit awaiting an attack wants to hold it's fire till ordered, but some panicky grunt shoots, then another, then a few more, then the whole unit goes off. The same sort of thing happens on the attack: the officers want to carry the attack to the enemy, but some soldiers stop to shoot, then more, then the unit bogs down. The point is that it is not a command decision, but a morale decision, so the player should not get the choice. I agree with Keraunos and the checks he listed. My home brewed rules use this. If you're gaming with fewer units, the extra die rolls are not oppressive, and make for interesting results.

@Christopher,
I do not believe that French columns were used with a "wait and see" approach; deciding what to do once they were engaged – rather, this particular luxury of having time to think whilst being shot at is one that can only be enjoyed by wargamers!

The problem with a "wait and see" tactic (if it existed) is that in deploying, the impetus was lost and the tendency was to stop and fire.

Out-shooting an enemy was possible but only if the enemy line was weakened. Attempts to do this were deliberate and French forces did advance in line and doubled line in 1805 at Austerlitz. In particular Vandamme`s troops advanced in line to engage IR23 at Stare Vihnorady being in better shape and with more ammunition they caused the Austrians to collapse and rout.

It`s true, columns were not simply or only intended for assault, but columns (associated with skirmisher screens) were the best method of assault, deploying to line was not always a part of the plan, or of the doctrine. That they were only originally intended for rapid movement prior to deployment is also an assumption which does not fit in with the all the events.

The second thought is that only partial deployment was attempted when "typically" French columns were staggered by steady British or allied lines; not a complete line formation change but only the deployment of third rankers from the leading companies.

The "column of attack", formed on the centre was dropped in 1808 in favour of the "column of divisions" the control of which was greater in deployment and was preferred in earlier stages of deployment too from the march. You`ll find no mention of columns of attack if you check this in Article 7 of the Imperial Decree of 1808.

In my view this question is a matter of a combination of several factors all working together or against each other depending on where you are coming from, the most important of which is formation "Resolve" or morale. Other factors that come into play are Timing, Command control, Experience, Tactical Doctrine, Training, Discipline and certain situational factors, added to this are, Formation types, Weather conditions and a myriad of other factors that can affect the outcome.

Resolve is simply, morale; the ability to continue fighting while under duress. Resolve is actually a combination of several other important factors already mentioned, such as, Command control, Experience, Tactical Doctrine, Training and Discipline. All of these factors combine to give a formation a level of Resolve with which it will go into battle with. The morale of a unit therefore is the number one factor of importance; once the resolve of a formation dissolves it no longer capable of fighting and will eventually collapse and disintegrate. Once this occurs the formation will break and flood towards the read or surrender if the situation is serious enough.

Therefore formation commanders must make every effort to assure their men are commanded to an optimal level to guarantee the best chance of prolonging their survivability on the battlefield. This encompasses reading and understanding situations which alter on a battlefield and act quickly to shifting and changing situations to ensure that the men under their care are formed into the best possible formations they can be in to counter any threat. This is dependent on orders and to adaptation to changing situations and circumstances occurring around them in as "timely" a manner as possible. If just any one of these factors that make up a formation's Resolve is compromised and not remedied quickly enough the formation is at risk of losing its resolve to the point of collapse.

These factors are to an extent controllable, however, the intensity of enemy action or the suddenness of enemy actions can often cause severe and equally sudden reductions in formation resolve which can lead to an uncontrollable collapse that is unavoidable. These situations however, are usually fairly rare and often related directly to weather conditions, terrain features or poor prior command and control decisions or failure to account for sudden events. There are many recorded cases of such situations in the history books which clearly show that certain situations can combine to result in the sudden lowering of formation resolve beyond breaking point and eventual collapse.

Most eventualities that occur on a battlefield however are often perceived and monitored through Command Control prior to their actual inevitable impact depending on proximity (distance) and steps or actions taken to lessen the impact or avoid them altogether. However, decisions are often made to risk the impact if the threat is perceived to be low or typical; however, it is when the enemy commits to an unexpected action that often leads to a kind of sudden shock on a formation if the impact is intense enough. Typical battlefield combat and attrition may occur over several hours slowly reducing the strength of a formation slowly lowering its Resolve to continue but sudden occurrences which happen quickly and unexpectedly will greatly impact on a formation's resolve almost instantly resulting in the total collapse of the formation which no Command and Control expedients cannot hope to stem. Often, the rate of casualties suffered can be severe which compounds the issue.

Another major factor to take into account is "Timing". This is the all important critical factor which will effect resolve of both sides depending on what each formation plans to do and when they decide to do it. The longer the point of decision takes to commence the more it eats away at formation resolve. Timing is a part of "Command Control", it is the formation officers who decide on what plan to follow and when to commence it. Their decision and the timing of their decisions become critical especially if they do not fully know what the enemy plans are. If the enemy shows his hand more quickly and gets the jump the consequences can be catastrophic, provided the enemy made the correct decision, however, if the enemy makes a poor decision or acts too soon then the opponent will probably gain the upper hand provided they react quickly enough to activate their own plan or action. As stated in the paragraph above, proximity and timing are everything when it comes to providing the optimal chance for a formation to survive and maintain the best possible chance of preserving their resolve to fight on.

Other Factors that affect decisions come into play such as, experience, tactical doctrine, training, discipline and so on. Formations (and commanders) with a great deal of experience from previous encounters are going to know what will happen and how a situation will unfold, they have seen it all before. However, in the case of veterans this can be good and bad, good because they will be ready but bad because they know the carnage that can come from the event. Tactical doctrine is also very important because if a formation is trained to perform a particular action when a situation arises they can go into an automated state where the mechanicians of the drill they are ordered to perform kicks in over the effects of morale thus lengthening their resolve unless the effects of that enemy action are particularly prolific. Once a formation becomes completely used to performing a particular drill or manoeuvre it can be a great advantage over the enemy it encounters. Basically, the drill is so second nature to them that it nullifies outside surrounding situational factors to a degree that allows them an advantage over an enemy that may not use the same tactical doctrine or a less effective one.

Training and Discipline is also very important because without it all of the other factors mentioned above are useless or less effective. If a formation is poorly trained and disciplined it stands little chance of maintaining sufficient resolve to stand up to against an enemy which has a higher level of Training and Discipline. Training in itself and the abundance of it will contribute greatly to a formation's ability to deal out death and destruction to their enemy faster than that dealt out to them. The ability to load and fire rapidly or change formation faster than your enemy or even manoeuvrer unexpectedly against an enemy formation unable to counter them quickly enough is often the difference between winning and losing an engagement. It is also through prolonged and intense Training that a formation's Discipline increases their ability to continue to carry out orders under duress and the stress of battle automatically and over a longer period of time before emotion gains enough of a hold to provide the chance that their resolve will suffer and begin to lower.

As for the situation described here I have read time and time again how French columnar formations under volley fire at close proximity try to carry out formation change orders from column to line and fail. The column remains a column and eventually the death and destruction suffered to the forward companies causes the rest of the formation to collapse and break. This occurrence is all too common but often forgotten in rules systems or not accounted for. Often the level of play is one which is fought above the level of individual minor tactical formations but many systems do fight at this level but fail to account for this phenomenon. The player can simply change formation in his turn while under volley fire and thus commence a static volley fire exchange on equal terms often coming out on top as much as he might fail.

However, the reality of the situation historically was much different. Without going into the depth of tactical doctrine of the French or any other nation for that matter the prevailing truth is still relevant for any formation no matter what colour uniform they wear. That is that a column under volley fire suffering sufficient casualties on its front ranks (companies) is going to affect the morale of the companies behind often resulting in them ignoring Command Control decisions to change formation to line because their natural survival instinct kicks in overriding their resolve to follow orders. This often leads to eventual collapse and rout. The officers and nco's can hit the men as hard as they like with the flat of their swords or shout until they grow hoarse but the men are so incensed by the carnage that although they might not decide to run they feel that salvation and survival at that moment is only found by hiding behind the forward companies. Once this situation occurs the formation is doomed.

From the perspective of the Line they want to deliver enough firepower to stop the enemy column, destroy it and force it to break. In order to achieve this effectively the Line must unite all of the relevant factors stated above in their favour to optimise their chances of success. The Column however, has usually got at least two options, to rapidly advance to contact hoping the enemy Line's resolve will collapse or push through the incoming musketry to achieve the same purpose or two; to reach a point where they can deploy into Line and commence musketry fire of their own.

This brings me to my next point, the mere fact that a formation has arrived at this point is because Tactical Doctrine has been followed through the issue of orders via Command Control to form the men in columns, advance to close proximity and suffer accordingly. When his pattern of events occurs and the enemy action is intense enough the formation thus ordered to engage the enemy in Line is often doomed to fail. Astute commanders, (not just British ones) realised this and fought in such a way as to ensure that if this situation occurred in their front they would know how to counter it to bring about the desired result; the crushing of the enemy column through firepower and a quick bayonet charge. In order to bring this about the officers, through optimal Command Control increased through good formational Training and Discipline, had to combine "timing" as well to ensure the best possible change of prevailing over the enemy formation. Timed volleys that are directed at an enemy formation floundering or not in a optimal formation to counter them on equal ground often is all that is needed to reduce the resolve of the enemy sufficiently enough to order the inevitable bayonet charge to finish them off.

Therefore, the attacking formation presenting itself in column as ordered via Command Control in accordance to Tactical Doctrines often finds itself in a kind of ambush that they cannot get out of which often results in the lowering of their resolve and eventual collapse. This situation often resolves itself fairly quickly ending in the result described above. However, if the column is of sufficient resolve due to sufficient Training and Discipline and Experience the result can often be delayed, often for extended periods of time as at Albuera as an example. These situations when they occur often result in prolonged fire fights of horrific proportions and carnage that the opponent Line formation suffers as severely as their enemy. When this happens the chance of ordering a bayonet charge against the enemy is a hard as the column formation trying to form line, under duress the men simply will not do it. The survival instinct of the men involved prevails over abeyance to direct orders, training and discipline. Simply put, the men make individual judgements that tell them that if they do as ordered they will surely die. Braver men in the formation may attempt to follow orders but eventually even they understand the futility of the order and halt or withdraw back into what is seen as the relative safety of the formation.

Unless some outside factors or new occurrences happen these situations slowly grind on until one side's resolve to fight on is reduced to a level lower than their adversary's and they withdraw. Strangely, these situations, despite the carnage and casualty rates end in one side withdrawing away still facing the enemy while the other halts exhausted just happy to let them go. The casualties suffered by a formation in this situation might be twice or triple that overall of situations where the impact was short, sharp and sudden which broke the formation. But when these casualties are suffered over a prolonged period of time a formations resolve can remain intact only gradually reducing as time ticks over and casualties mount.

Basically put a combination of Resolve, Command Control, Timing, Experience, Tactical Doctrine, Training, Discipline and Situational Factors such as, Formation types, Weather conditions and several other factors that can affect the outcome of such an event. But what is important to note is that once the column's proximity closes to within engagement range of the enemy and they do not have sufficient resolve to close to contact they will eventually lose out provided the enemy Line's resolve has not failed first. Once caught like this a column should find it almost impossible to change formation.

In our games we portray this very succinctly and accurately within the mechanics of our system. Each unit has its own Morale (resolve), Command Control, Training and Discipline rating parameters which it must work within and function but also Tactical Doctrine comes into play. Our system has each turn sub-divided into 4 equal ¼ turns that provide the "Time" function I have spoken about which fits the mechanics for volley firing in our games with accurate ¼ turn movement allowances coinciding with the musketry rules that provide the players with the ability to manoeuvrer and fire during the ¼ turn intervals as ordered.

Now, most rules systems these days shun this level of detail and consequently abstract it in simple dice rolls, this is fine, especially if you are playing grand battles upwards of 50,000 men per side. However, with our system the mechanics are aimed and focused towards the smaller battles and engagement or sections or grander battles. They are designed to allow the players to get into the finer detail of minor tactical situations coordinating fire and movement tactics alongside the more grand scenarios. The level of detail microscopes down to a level where individual volleys are depicted and their timing; a player can decide, by observing the developing situation, analyse the preferred course of action he chooses and commit himself to a course of action through timing of his volleys against the actions of his enemy.

Once committed to an action both players reveal their intentions (orders) and through a time ordered sequential series of moves and firing resolve each combat. This level of play results in many cliff-hanger situations where the consequence of one side's decisions often impacts greatly on the others. You can chose to Advance for half a turn then deliver volley's for the second half, or Advance ¾ of a turn to deliver a single volley or simply hold and fire from your present location or try to change formation and so on, all this while the enemy is committing to his own actions. If you get the timing right and the proximity perfect you can end up crushing the resolve of your enemy in a single turn's firing but if you fail, the same can happen to you. Time and Proximity are the key factors in our system and if you become good at judging them while coordinating your troops through their Command control, Morale, Tactical doctrine, Training and Discipline limitations you will do well. But mastering it is not as easy as it sounds; I have been playing it myself for over 20 years now and still get caught in poor judgement decisions which result in the collapse of my formations.

Regards,
Shane

"The Column however, has usually got at least two options, to rapidly advance to contact hoping the enemy Line's resolve will collapse or push through the incoming musketry to achieve the same purpose or two; to reach a point where they can deploy into Line and commence musketry fire of their own."

I think that statement is correct. I also find most wargamers go for option 1 if rules allow :)

Opinion seems to be split on TMP as to which was the most common in the french army. I tend to beleive that the choice was made based simply on their relative advtanage. ie "columns dont break through steady lines" If you had the advtange, why slow down the attack by giving fire?

If on the other hand your facing a steady line then I would suggest its too risky to go for option 1. If it doesnt work then your likely to fall back in poot order. Taking option two is the safer option I would suggest in that if it doesnt work you will have a good chance of falling back and having another go.

One last point is what level of command makes the choice? Im sure it could vary. I suppose whoever gives the order for the specific attack may suggest the method based on urgency, terrain etc.

Third, this elastic time applies to the target unit, too. In most cases, 1-3 minutes should suffice for any change of formation change. So again unless your rules use a tiny increment of time-scale, then there's really no "game moment" in which the attacker is stuck. There is more than enough time for him to advance in whatever formation, change into whatever formation, shoot back, and do or don't assault.

Not true. It takes more than 5 minutes for a company to change from Column-of-platoons to Platoons-in-Line when you have to keep in step. It's about a 10-minute evolution for current troops straight out of boot camp (the only place we still practice such maneuvers) to do so in a 3-company battalion (roughly 360 rifles, not counting the brass needed to give orders).

Chrisot – I don't know where Chris got his idea. We've
been playing those rules for a very long time (I want to
say almost twenty years). It is quite possible that
the idea came from ITGM, since Peter's son had a shop
about an hour's drive from here and we visited it
at times.

The 'stationary fires, then movers fire' idea I first
found in Larry Brom's Franco-Prussian rules, _Chassepot
and Needlegun_, played back in the late 70's/early
80's.

Another option for defenders in line on noting the attackers halt and deploy would be to advane a short distance themselves and observe their reaction. They are still going to be in a better position to shoot, or choose not to, and they could throw out the attackers' timing.

Thats a a good point. Especially if the attacker is shooting at an ineffective range. Rather than return fire at this long distance it may make sense to close in and show them how its done properly.

aye true, that is called, intimidation.

The whole event is psychological between both opponents, it is a matter of mind over mater. Both sides will try to use mater (actions) to overcome their enemy's mind (resolve) and force the issue into their favour, whatever that takes…

Obvious action and counter action will only lead to prolonging the affair, it is a sudden unexpected action that is needed to place the enemy in a situation where their resolve is undermined. This forces them to halt their own action and react which, if unexpected and sudden enough often leads to a rapid crumbling of their resolve to the point of collapse.

This is exactly what Wellington did in Spain and several other commanders who understood what to do and when. If you get the proximity and timing perfect you cannot lose, provided the enemy is surprised enough.

As players in our tabletop battles we do this to each other all the time, until the other guy catches on and next time is ready for it.

Shane

since this is posted on two separate boards,

its probably worth noting that while technologically little separated the weapons of the 7YW from the Napoleonic period – notably ramrods of metal – tactically they had completely altered.

the 18th century was much more about 'toe to toe' shoot outs and volume of shot in fixed time period.

the Napoleonic period was much more about speed of execution in the attack, and a point of assault.
concentrated point of assault.

this has a huge impact on the way the troops are trained and expected to deliver those volleys.

withholding fire is very much more a Napoleonic idea.

Advancing to maximum effective range and then shooting it out is much more Frederican.

and at the start of the 18th century, you have regiments offering the first fire to their opponent, once in their alloted place (although, they were guards regiments, and it only happened once).

Shane, you have some interesting thoughts there as always mate.

The old Quarrie rules included a morale modifier along the lines of "Defenders first opened fire at --- yards", where the fewer the yards' range, the higher the morale penalty.

We adapted this in our group so that it applied to when the attackers first received fire, too. This was on the basis of the Bugeaud observation that fire reserved till the last minute was going to be very unpleasant when it finally did come.

It turned charges into a game of chicken. Or as you've sort of put it, it pits one side's Resolve against the other's.

How it played was that the attacker declared his charge and then said to the defender, "OK, when are you going to fire?" Defender muses for a few seconds and says "Er…thirty yards."

Attackers are moved to thirty yards away and defenders test morale. If they stand, which is quite a feat given that they're losing 5 off their morale at this point (-2 if British or veteran – good old Bruce!), they loose a volley into the attackers at 30 yards' range. The attackers then test morale in the light of this, with a morale penalty from the losses and a further penalty to reflect the "shock and awe" of hundreds of muskets going off literally in your face.

If they charge, they charge. If they spontaneously halt, they can try to deploy and return the fire or whatever. But they're halted at thirty yards' range from an intact line, and they're getting further incoming volleys all the while.

This rule tweak enables the defender to intimidate the attacker, up to a point, by withholding his fire until point-blank range. Crucially, it only works if the defending troops are steady enough to make it work. The defenders have to stand before they can fire. Only then are the attackers forced to test their own morale.

Interestingly, it tended to encourage defending players to hold their fire. If you halted an enemy attack when it was still 120 yards away, well, good I suppose, but you weren't going to take that unit completely out of the fight very quickly with musketry from 120 yards' range. You wanted it stopped right in front of you, so could take it apart at point blank range, then countercharge it when it starts to waver.

This rule also encouraged attackers to deploy into line before closing. Your best result was to absorb the volley and charge home, but your second best result, if brought to a screeching halt by it, was to win the resulting point-blank firefight. You had no chance of doing so in column against a line, and you didn't want to be deploying (i.e. unformed) under fire for very long if at all, so you had better be in line already when you get there.

The drawback was that you could actually set it up and establish by experiment in advance of the game what range your boys could be trusted to fire at. This is perhaps still OK though, because it is no more information than the unit's officers would have had. All it told you, anyway, was that your guys would run away at short range unless you secured their flanks and kept them out of the way of skirmisher and artillery fire.

All these appeared to us to be quite realistic "forcings" towards plausible tactical choices.

G'day mate,

Well said, I got to admit, Bruce Quarrie is a wargaming god for me, he taught me all I know in my early days of wargaming. I remember so many battles using the rules you have just stated. If only his mechanics, or mechanics like them were part of every system on the market today accuracy of minor tactical situations portrayed on the table top would be much more historically correct.

The system I developed is based in part on BQ's rules I do admit, his way of doing things really struck a cord with me. Later on I started playing Voltiguer by David Milward because I preferred a D100 as opposed to D6 etc. I pretty much tried to combine the best of both systems in what I did during the early to mid 80's but by the late 80's the system had developed in its own direction so much so that they could stand alone as a separate system. This is because I added in my own research into the mix and designed many sections of my system from scratch, basically throwing out much of what I had. I wanted my own style instead of a hybrid system.

As for the concept you speak about and explain so well I have to admit I made sure in the system I developed that I would ensure that I portrayed the exact same thing, only with different mechanics. In our games the defending Line formation had to take a morale check against the attacking column as per most systems. However, the player has the choice to try to hold fire until the enemy is under 100yds but with an extra -10% off their morale, or they can really take a risk and try to hold fire until the enemy is less than 50yds away but with a -20% on their morale check.

If they pass they can commence fire at virtually point blank range causing much more casualties on the column and break their resolve (morale check) suddenly and quickly. If they do not then the enemy column pushes through and the line will most probably collapse.

From the Column's point of view, if they have elected to advance to the attack they have to roll to actually do so in the form of a charge roll, which in itself is a less than probable occurrence. Things can really bring this chance down if not careful and if they fail they must halt at 150yds range from the enemy and try to either deploy, engage in a protracted and dangerous firefight or try to re-commence the attack again next turn, (this is much harder to do because once the resolve to charge fails it becomes hard to re-ignite that again).

If the charge does go ahead however, the onus for resolve switches to the defending Line who now must make that morale check as described earlier. As explained, they can try to push their luck by holding fire to close range but this in itself reduces their resolve thus making the morale check harder to pass. If they do pass, they can be seen as having the resolve to stand steady and deliver fire into the oncoming column and if the fire is held to point blank range this will have disastrous effects on the enemy column who's resolve must again be tested. But now, with heavy casualties will be at a great disadvantage.

In our system we have a kind of double hit on a unit's morale for fire effects. Each 10% casualties suffered on the unit's overall strength will reduce its morale by -10%. Also, for each 10% casualties suffered to the front rank (facing rank) of the target another -10% is deducted. Now, if that units started with say 80% morale (resolve) as a typical trained unit it might gain between 10-40% through modifiers for formation, command, flank and rear support, it it even has any. But if it has already suffered losses a -10% will reduce this back downwards per each 10% losses.

What makes this situation worse is that if the enemy Line fired and caused severe frontal casualties on the column their resolve will also be reduced by another -10% per 10% losses to their front rank…This is where the term, "the column was shot to pieces" is warranted. If the column has 4 figures in the front rank (4x40=160men) that means that for every 16 men lost to the fire another 10% is taken from their resolve. I have seen situations where almost the entire front rank has been taken out which would reduce the column morale by upwards of 80-100%. This is extreme but when it happens the column cannot survive it let alone try to deploy into line itself. They are simply crushed and broken.

Most of the time however, depending on the situation and providing that there is more than one column attacking to share the incoming casualties the losses to their front ranks might be reduced to 20-40%. Still severe but not enough to assure collapse. If the column(s) survive their subsequent morale checks they can return fire (disordered usually), re-try to charge (very hard) or try to deploy (not likely). This often leads to protracted firefights if the defending line has not been able to initiate their own bayonet charge successfully.

Shane

Shane, this is very interesting stuff. I am rebuilding my Nappies after a lengthy hiatus (they were all stolen in a house move in 1995). The major difference is that this time it's 1805 French and Austrians rather than 1815 French and British.

I have been using the pause to rethink and tweak the rules. I am definitely going to nick your idea of reducing the effect of canister at very close range, and I also like the simplicity of your short/medium/long range setup, rather than the fiddly intervals in old Bruce.

In your volley and charge approach above I see you are adopting a consistent approach. Top man. There was a thread some months back where artillery was discussed and one of the points that emerged was that what really brought formations up short was when people were being cut down all around you and you were obviously next. Even though the overall loss wasn't necessarily that severe, it just needed the front rank to start backing away for unit cohesion to break. So if the front rank gets blown away the unit's morale collapses (and who can blame them frankly).

Your post has made me think whether there is sense in modifying the effect of losses on morale such that, if the men in the unit can't see them happening, they bother you less.

Bruce's rules don't model street fighting very well and I need to look at this area anyway. If you look at the Landshut action in 1809, you had close range street fighting through houses, gardens and what not. Both sides tolerated extraordinary losses, likewise Aspern and Essling, and I wonder if this was because units dispersed among buildings paid more attention to what was going on around them and less to what was happening to the unit as a whole. If a battalion was occupying four buildings and one got taken out, the remainder might well fight on, whereas if they lost a quarter of their number advancing against a line, they'd break because clearly it was their turn next.

Incidentally, how do you model units firing across their own frontage? An Austrian battalion of 30 figures is about 36cm wide in 28mm. If a French battalion column is 24 figures they will be less than 10cm wide. At 100 yards' distance (10cm), the middle of the line will be firing straight ahead at 100 yards' range, but the ends of the line will be firing at a range of 160 yards and at an angle of about 38 degrees to the rest of the line, i.e. pretty much across it.

This must have been impossible. We know the British addressed it by wheeling the ends of the line. What did others do? If a column stopped and tried to deploy, wouldn't it then have drawn more fire as its frontage lengthened to either side in front of an already-deployed, already-loaded enemy line?

Hi mate,

Please forgive me quoting you in reply but it makes the job easier for me.

Shane, this is very interesting stuff. I am rebuilding my Nappies after a lengthy hiatus (they were all stolen in a house move in 1995). The major difference is that this time it's 1805 French and Austrians rather than 1815 French and British.

Ahh, I like the sound of that, I personally prefer those earlier battles, and there is something about the period of 1805-1807 I really like. My brother likes the Russians of that period because of the btln make-ups while I guess I like the French simply because they beat everyone.

I have been using the pause to rethink and tweak the rules. I am definitely going to nick your idea of reducing the effect of canister at very close range, and I also like the simplicity of your short/medium/long range setup, rather than the fiddly intervals in old Bruce.

Yeah, that is exactly why I went to this set-up. The research I did confirmed to me that the blast radius of canister was much narrower at close range thus therefore non-casualty intervals occurred, especially when the cannons would be at least 10 or more feet apart. The modification on resulting casualties although reduced (slightly) is oversighted due to the increased pressure (reductions) to the target's morale as you know.

As for musketry ranges I also had the same problem with BQ's system, although we enjoyed his system, the ambiguity that resulted from trying to measure exact ranges as he wrote them often led to disagreement and so on. So a more simply setup of just three categories suited our design perfectly. And allowing the defender to choose to try to hold fire until a particular range took out even more ambiguity…

In your volley and charge approach above I see you are adopting a consistent approach. Top man. There was a thread some months back where artillery was discussed and one of the points that emerged was that what really brought formations up short was when people were being cut down all around you and you were obviously next. Even though the overall loss wasn't necessarily that severe, it just needed the front rank to start backing away for unit cohesion to break. So if the front rank gets blown away the unit's morale collapses (and who can blame them frankly).

Aye, if you design game mechanics around shock and suddenness you get more realistic results to your games I feel. Our group certainly feels that way. I have players who have joined us who played many systems but once they joined us decided only after one or two games to build or re-base their armies to my system and play permanently in our group. Luckily I based my own system to the metric equivalent to Empire, a system very popular in Australia when I designed my rules.

Your post has made me think whether there is sense in modifying the effect of losses on morale such that, if the men in the unit can't see them happening, they bother you less.

Yes, this is what we do also.

Bruce's rules don't model street fighting very well and I need to look at this area anyway. If you look at the Landshut action in 1809, you had close range street fighting through houses, gardens and what not. Both sides tolerated extraordinary losses, likewise Aspern and Essling, and I wonder if this was because units dispersed among buildings paid more attention to what was going on around them and less to what was happening to the unit as a whole. If a battalion was occupying four buildings and one got taken out, the remainder might well fight on, whereas if they lost a quarter of their number advancing against a line, they'd break because clearly it was their turn next.

Yeah, BQ's rules were very vague on this. We have designed our own to accommodate street fighting to an extent but it is an area of my system I am not entirely happy with even now. It is so easy to design 10 distinct and different rules mechanics to portray this kind of fighting and not be happy with any of them. One thing I do feel, is that every time I read about built up area fighting I read that the area could have changed hands upwards of six times in a single day!!

At first I could not understand why but then it hit me, because the units were so dispersed there was no overall command structure for each btln so groups of men would be commanded simply by officers or nco's in their group. The Chain of Command (Command Control) would thus be severely hampered in controlling the men and keeping them at their posts once things got hot. Now, if you add to this the idea that troops occupying buildings like small bastions would feel secure and hold out for long periods of time unaided.

But this is usually the opposite; if a group of men saw an enemy unit flanking them and it looked like they could be cut off the pressure on them to retreat and abandon their positions would increase. If they felt threatened that they would be cut off they are more likely to leg it if they can. We give a +20 Morale modifier for troops defending buildings but this is negated if an enemy unit is seen advancing and on their flank or rear. Incidentally, we say that each building becomes its own bastion and only those inside count for morale purposes for losses. If a btln is split up between buildings, each portion fights as a separate unit for morale and losses until reunited.

Incidentally, how do you model units firing across their own frontage? An Austrian battalion of 30 figures is about 36cm wide in 28mm. If a French battalion column is 24 figures they will be less than 10cm wide. At 100 yards' distance (10cm), the middle of the line will be firing straight ahead at 100 yards' range, but the ends of the line will be firing at a range of 160 yards and at an angle of about 38 degrees to the rest of the line, i.e. pretty much across it.

Ahh that is a tricky question and one that does make players think. We allow a 45 degree fire arc for light infantry but only a 22.5 degree arc for close order formations. There are two questions you have to ask first, what is the distance and what is the number of troops (figures) in the shorter formation?

With the distance question, the longer the distance to the target the more firers you can get on each flank to add into the number of figurers eligible to fire. So, point blank range you would be lucky to get one single extra figure firing from each flank (2 extra figures total), effective range this might be 2 extra figures per flank (4 extra figures total) and at long range (101-150yds) an extra 3 figures per flank (6 extra figures total) and at ranges between (151-200yds) an extra 4 figures per flank (8 extra figures total). This sounds protracted or complex but in reality it is very simple and cuts out a great deal of argument. And yes, if the enemy line bends inwards it can probably fire every figure it has into the shorter target frontage but to do this they are placing themselves at an extraordinary risk…

Now, as for the number of troops in the shorter unit's frontage, this becomes the base number of figures that the longer formation can fire with which the extra flank figures are added. It is that simple.

As for the bending in of a unit so that the flanks become exposed so that they can get all muskets to bare this does raise the question of range, in our games you would measure the extreme flank range and add the closest point range (middle of the line) and divide by 2. The resulting range would then become the range your troops use to shoot from. If this means a longer or closer range for all, so be it. We don't push the issue and accept this formula as set in stone. As for the degree of bend bing so great as to arc so much that their own men could be hit I must say I have never encountered that situation before, it is presumed that if the enemy is in front of the firer they will direct fire on them. Again, we do not worry about stray shots hitting own formations in this situation, we presume the fire control of the officers would prevent that (tongue in cheek here).

This must have been impossible. We know the British addressed it by wheeling the ends of the line. What did others do?

I dare say they would have done the exact same thing?

If a column stopped and tried to deploy, wouldn't it then have drawn more fire as its frontage lengthened to either side in front of an already-deployed, already-loaded enemy line?

Yes, I am sure they would, those troops in the line that could not meet the 22.5 degree arc limitations in our system would suddenly have a target once the formation change is made. However, in our system, a column trying to deploy under fire is a very dangerous proposition to undertake and seldom achieved. Basically, in our rules the column would probably already be unformed due to previous incoming fire that halted them and an unformed formation in our system cannot change formation to another formation type full-stop. They would have to reform first then attempt to change. This takes time and while it is trying to do this the enemy line is peppering them to pieces even more so. Add to this the morale drop for losses, the morale drop for being unformed and the CV (command value) losses they might of incurred through the loss of officers and nco's the column almost becomes a stranded sinking ship with no hope of stemming the inflow of water that eventually sinks it. Outside factors are mostly the only way to rescue the battered column at this point.

As a side point, in our system a unit that suffers 10% casualties or more to its "front rank" in a single turn automatically becomes unformed. So you can see that in our games, becoming unformed is easy, once unformed you cannot change formation so trying to reform so as to change formation becomes difficult. This really stops players doing as they please, when they please etc.

Regards,
Shane

Shane, interesting stuff you have there, some thoughts grouped by topic.

Street fighting

Your thinking seems to be going broadly the same way as mine on this. I had been pondering a change to the reference tactical unit in street fights such that a unit in a village becomes "elements" of 4, 5 or 6 figures, whatever its nominal organisation. This would turn one large unit (a battalion) into 4 to 6 new smaller formations, so there would be a need to streamline things like fire and morale.

Where I struggle with this is in how to represent the enemy outside the buildings. Do I break them into elements too? If so, what happens if they attack a farm and its barn and get repulsed from only the barn?

I had the same problem with woods BTW. Where does a wood start and end?

Your mechanism of treating houses as units sounds excellent, but how do you reconcile the deemed houses to the actual model buildings you are using? The Airfix La Haye Sainte has the footprint of a Napoleonic village, which is why it was never used entire in any of our games.

Artillery

Until the relevant thread, I'd never considered that cones of fire from individual guns might result in the effects reducing at close range. Last night I reread the violent bits of Mercer's account of Waterloo. What a gold mine that man is. He mentions what he calls "the old artillery proverb: the closer you are, the safer you are" – which is what your hypothesis about canister predicts, in fact.

He also describes meeting two cavalry attacks in different ways. In one, he kept them under continuous fire throughout their approach and eventually they'd had enough of it and fell back.

In the other, he waited till they were 60 yards away, then let them have it – and one salvo repulsed them. In this second instance he describes the oncoming cavalry as so numerous that the rear formations were still coming down the French side of the valley as the front ranks were breasting it on Wellington's side 60 yards to his front. Clearly there were too many before him for him to rely on repulse-by-carnage, so he went for shock and awe instead.

Line fire

We used the median range too, but this raised the question of whether the ends of a line could really bear at all. It also gave rise to gamesmanship, because at certain ranges, having the middle 2/3rds of the line firing could actually inflict more casualties per the casualty table than having all of it fire but at a consequently slightly longer range.

On the whole, the issue receded when we introduced the chicken element. If you waited till very close range, yes the ends of the line couldn't bear, but then neither did it really matter. What sent the enemy back wasn't the morale penalty from the losses from the short range volley, but the morale penalty from getting it at such short range.

Street fighting

Your thinking seems to be going broadly the same way as mine on this. I had been pondering a change to the reference tactical unit in street fights such that a unit in a village becomes "elements" of 4, 5 or 6 figures, whatever its nominal organisation. This would turn one large unit (a battalion) into 4 to 6 new smaller formations, so there would be a need to streamline things like fire and morale.

Aye, in our games a single model building represents either a single heavily fortified bastion or a group of buildings in a village or a block of buildings in a town or city. This allows us to fight battles with the concept that taking a building is actually taking a group of buildings. The gaps on the table between buildings are the roads etc between groups or blocks of buildings. Most of the time a single btln can occupy a single building but not always, many times the footprint of the model will only allow so many figures to occupy a single model building. When this occurs you have to make the choice as to how many figures will occupy the building and how many will remain outside or in another building. The trick is, that you have to keep track as to how many figures began to defend the dwelling and all future morale considerations are taken from this number as the baseline. Effectively the btln has broken up with several companies in one building and the rest in another etc. They fight separately, move separately and take morale rolls separately.

Where I struggle with this is in how to represent the enemy outside the buildings. Do I break them into elements too? If so, what happens if they attack a farm and its barn and get repulsed from only the barn? I had the same problem with woods BTW. Where does a wood start and end?

We had a game recently where this happened, a btln of 20 figures could only fit 8 of them into the building, the rest formed a line beside the building to face the advancing enemy. This meant that the figures inside and outside of the building became temporarily, separate entities even though they were side by side. What happened next was that the 12 figures outside the building were quickly broken and routed away, the 8 figures inside were not affected. However, at the end of that turn the sub-unit inside the building had to take what we call a, "subsequent morale check" as part of the system for seeing a friendly unit break and rout, i.e: the other part their btln. This resulted in them also losing resolve; they became demoralised and were forced to withdraw as well. The player who suffered this setback thought is strange at first but then understood that because the sub-unit outside was still considered attached to the other sub-unit inside because they were right next to them at first did not mean that they were forced to break with them but the shock of seeing the rest of the btln swept away like that sunk their resolve to hold on. This was also because the btln had suffered many casualties and thus was already pre-weakened and susceptible to lowered resolve.

As for the attackers in this kind of situation we would have made that melee one single larger fight. The overall outcome meaning that either the entire attacking unit is repulsed or if they did well enough combined then they jointly repulse the defender out of both dwellings.

Your mechanism of treating houses as units sounds excellent, but how do you reconcile the deemed houses to the actual model buildings you are using? The Airfix La Haye Sainte has the footprint of a Napoleonic village, which is why it was never used entire in any of our games.

We also have our own La Hay Sainte made out of balsa wood, it is not as large as the old Airfix model but it is laid out exactly as the real one with several buildings attached together. We have used it many times and treat each building in that model as separate buildings so this forces the attacker to commit to attacking each one in turn or simultaneously to try to take them. Incidentally, we use this model to represent larger bastions, fortified manor-houses etc. When players see it on the field they know right away, "this is going to be a tough nut to crack". Planning how to attack it becomes a major operation in itself becoming a battle within a battle at times. I know this because the last time we used it I was the dope who had to attack it and I failed because the 95th Rifles and Portuguese Cacadores assigned to defend it fought very well, my Voltiguers were repulsed several times. I had to bring up entire Grenadier btlns and even then I could not take the entire model.

Artillery

until the relevant thread, I'd never considered that cones of fire from individual guns might result in the effects reducing at close range. Last night I reread the violent bits of Mercer's account of Waterloo. What a gold mine that man is. He mentions what he calls "the old artillery proverb: the closer you are, the safer you are" – which is what your hypothesis about canister predicts, in fact. He also describes meeting two cavalry attacks in different ways. In one, he kept them under continuous fire throughout their approach and eventually they'd had enough of it and fell back.
In the other, he waited till they were 60 yards away, then let them have it – and one salvo repulsed them. In this second instance he describes the oncoming cavalry as so numerous that the rear formations were still coming down the French side of the valley as the front ranks were breasting it on Wellington's side 60 yards to his front. Clearly there were too many before him for him to rely on repulse-by-carnage, so he went for shock and awe instead.

Yeah, it was a revelation for me once I began to understand the concept of artillery canister cones and gaps at close ranges. The actual cones are much narrower than people think until you get to particular ranges of between 100 to 300yds depending on the calibre of the guns. Books I have read often state that optimal canister range was between 150-250yds range because this is the range where the cones of each gun along the gun line begins to overlap. This becomes the ideal killing zone where no one in the enemy formation's front ranks are safe. Once you get closer than this (under this range group) you start to see gaps between the cones where enemy troops are much safer and only stray shots etc can hit them (outer cone shots). This is because the canister groupings are much closer. The poor individuals inside the cone groupings are going to get hit more often but not more men in total. However, even though the level of casualties at these closer ranges decreases the level of fear in the advancing enemy increases.

Example: At Effective canister range say 250yds you might score just over 20% casualties on the enemy front rank of figures. In our system this means -20% to morale and also a -20% to Morale for being struck by canister fire at that range and another -10% because they have lost more than 10% to their front rank and are therefore now unformed. So this equals a total of -50% Morale.

If however the same unit was fired at by canister at say 100yds or less (point blank range) then the casualties might be lower, say 15% to the front rank which equates to only a -10% to Morale but now they are much closer to the enemy guns and thus the fear factor increases to -30% for being struck by canister, add to this the -10% for being unformed and what have you got? -50% Morale.

So in this situation Mercer's explanation of how he could hold off enemy cavalry attacks in two ways, both equally as effective as the other rings true in our rules mechanics.

Line fire

We used the median range too, but this raised the question of whether the ends of a line could really bear at all. It also gave rise to gamesmanship, because at certain ranges, having the middle 2/3rds of the line firing could actually inflict more casualties per the casualty table than having all of it fire but at a consequently slightly longer range.

I hear ya there, in our games we would announce rules modifications or changes or situational occurrences before a battle was played if we felt things had to change. This made the rulings clear to everyone and stamped out the gamesmanship situations one by one. Every time an suss situation arose we made a ruling on it between games and quashed it quickly by majority vote.

On the whole, the issue receded when we introduced the chicken element. If you waited till very close range, yes the ends of the line couldn't bear, but then neither did it really matter. What sent the enemy back wasn't the morale penalty from the losses from the short range volley, but the morale penalty from getting it at such short range.

There ya go, your ruling in this situation was made effective and set in stone thus stopping gamey players in their tracks and forcing them to use the system not to look for loopholes but to look for legitimate advantages to win their battles. I also tend to try to get players to search the combat charts and understand them to look for factors which lower their chances and increase their chances of success, doing this helps to guide them towards using legitimate factors as against trying to game the system.

Shane

Thanks everyone for your views and opinions. I found it enjoyable as well as informative. Looks like the consensus is that while the stationary defender will probably still have benefit of the first volley the wargame effect is negated by the fact that most of our rules cover a period of at least 5 mins if not 20 mins and so can include alot of shooting.
regards
Max