"Tiger/Panther maintainance requirements." Topic

Every time a tank thread pops up the amount of maintainance the Tiger and Panther tanks required is quoted, but does anyone have accurate figures of how much, if any, extra maintainance time a Tiger or Panther required over a Panzer III or IV? Or for that matter over allied tanks such as the T-34, M4 or Cromwell? Bearing in mind that some allied tanks had significant problems – such as the M4A4 where you had to remove the engine just to change the spark plugs. Also bearing in mind that a lot of maintainance time is devoted to repair of damage.
So is this true or is it just an urban myth?

The other part of this relates to availability statistics.

Jentz has some interesting details in his books regarding Panther, TigerII and Panzer IV availabilities which surprised me.

Jentz has some interesting details in his books regarding Panther, TigerII and Panzer IV availabilities which surprised me.

Don't leave us in suspense – what was it? :-)

According to French post-war analysis of the Panther, the final drive required replacing every 150 KM. Replacing it required that the engine be pulled. This process, start to finish, took one week. Pulling and replacing the engine of a gasoline M-4 could be done in a day.

The Panther's final drive was seriously under-designed, thanks to additional weight that was added as the vehicle was modified.

I would also refer you to "Sledgehammers," which discusses the maintenance woes of the VI and VIb.

Besides just logistics and supply (maybe these tanks had no more problems, but getting them on and off the battlefield contested by allied air power remains problematic) some of it would seem to be the level of training and initiative at the maintenance level.

I have heard references to the "culture" of maintenance in the various armies. The US had a high proportion of soldiers with mechanical skills and ingenuity from civilian life with experience working on cars, tractors, and in factories who could do field repairs much easier plus a culture of low level initiative. Whereas the German army relied on trained specialists and technicians and if a vehicle had a problem it had to be removed from the field and go through the comparatively less streamlined and more complicated German army maintenance system.

I can't remember where I read about the process compared between US and German, but it was amazing how even little things such as parts could become a real hassle in the German chain.

So maybe not the vehicle itself, but the way it was maintained.

I wish I remembered where I saw this reference though…that's gonna bug me.

Kind of funny how owning a Volkswagen compared to an American car today is very similar…(ok, well owning a Volkswagen and an American car of 20 years ago).

150 kilometers? Wow, that's short! 93 miles. That's like me driving from my hometown (York PA) to Philadelphia. Not very far at all…

That would be a nightmare with the distances involved on the Eastern Front.

Can't recall the name of the book, but there was a book written by the maintenance officer of an M4 company or battalion. He described battlefield damage, breakdowns, etc., quite extensively. Seems like a repairable M4 was only out of the fight for a day or two – even ones with battle damage. If it wasn't burnt out they'd change the turret if necessary, wash the blood and gore out of the thing, repaint it, patch holes – whatever needed to be done and have it back in the field within a few days at most, though some obviously took more time than others. I recall him mentioning having trouble with certain parts, but was finally able to get the supply chain moving when the division commander, IIRC, got involved.

"Don't leave us in suspense – what was it? :-)"

I'd have to pull Jentz off the shelf and see. Operational availability for even Tigers and Panthers could exceed 80% even in continuous combat, it just depended whether they could be recovered and/or rotated according to their correct maintanance schedule. One of the biggest complaints of Tiger crews was that they were kept in action far too long to complete their regular maintenance, so the tanks broke down. Then they had to use other Tigers to tow them out, and they broke down too under the strain.

Tigers needed their workshop companies to function effectively, in particular some specialised equipment (something called a platform crane? I've no idea what that was for). No workshop company and the whole battalion would be out of action in short order. Workshop company and proper maintenance, they could stay in action for weeks, especially as the incidence of catastrophic damage to Tigers was so low.

Comments apply to Tiger 1s only, the Rolls Royce of tanks, as Otto Carius described it.

Panthers were more prone to catastrophic (ie unrepairable) damage due to their thin side armour, as well as the tendency of earlier models to self immolate.

IIRC the Matilda II was also a pretty high maintenance vehicle and needed much care and attention to keep it in action.

Can't recall the name of the book, but there was a book written by the maintenance officer of an M4 company or battalion.

Perhaps you are referring to Death Traps by Belton Cooper?

Damon.

Sorry I did not go further as I do not have my Jentz to hand and prefer to work accuratly.

But if memory serves me correctly he states that the TigerII has simular availability to PzIV with Panther slightly less than the PanzerIV.

What surprised me, after hearing so many TigerII doom sayers, was the good availabilty of the Tiger II.

Jentz also states in one book that the TigerII final drive was different to that of the Panther as it was designed in the light of the problems encountered with the Panther.

According to Jentz Germany's Panther Tank p.140, the following datapoints:

1). Engine needs replacement every 1700-1800km
2). Transmission needs replacement every 1500km

One thing to think about in regards to the final drive is that French experiments may have occured on a very late model
Panther, so components may not have been constructed of as good materials. Regardless, the final drives (which IIRC should be connected to the transmission no the engine) were designed for a tank some 15t lighter.

Damon.

AERCDR

Actually you do not need to pull the Panther engine to change the final drive as these are at opposite ends of the tank.

But what has to be done is dissasemble the driver/radio operator area in the front of the tank and then separate drives and gearbox. The drives are then withdrawn from the sides of the tank [requiring removal of track and possible one road wheel].

Quite a long complicated task.

One episode of Tank Restorers showed this being done on a UK and Littlefield Panther.

Not an easy task!

>>> I would also refer you to "Sledgehammers," which discusses the maintenance woes of the VI and VIb.

Just so. Or Schneider's "Tigers in Combat II", which tracks Tiger-equipped units by daily action, so that you can "watch" the numbers of operational vehicles drop from near full strength to nil over a couple of days--over and over and over.

Allen

It would be interesting to know the reasons for the drops.

Enemy action, lack or supply [at that stage of the war] etc

Must put the book on my buy list

Just so. Or Schneider's "Tigers in Combat II", which tracks Tiger-equipped units by daily action, so that you can "watch" the numbers of operational vehicles drop from near full strength to nil over a couple of days--over and over and over.

Not unique to Tigers though Allen. The same applies to a Soviet tank brigade, most British tank units for much of the war, but particularly in France 1940 and the desert. Even post war British tanks were notoriously unreliable. I have a friend who was in REME in the 60's and 70's. Of a platoon of Centurions on exercise 2 of the 4 tanks would break down on the way to the start line. A third tank would break down on the start line leaving 1 tank to take part in the exercise. Chieftain was similar except they all broke down!

If it wasn't burnt out they'd change the turret if necessary, wash the blood and gore out of the thing, repaint it, patch holes – whatever needed to be done and have it back in the field within a few days at most,

Interesting! I was under the impression that a burnt out tank was a write off as the heat of the fire seriously weakend the armour.

I understand that interleaved road wheels on the Panther and Tiger, added to the complexity of repairs, I had enough trouble with my Airfix kits, let alone the real thing!

Yes if inner road wheel damaged then two outers have to be replaced to get to it.

Quite a lot of work

But by using this suspension system a very smooth ride and low ground pressure were achieved [I have seen it stated that the Panther ride was only bettered by modern hydro pneumatic suspensions on M1/LeopardII etc.

The good ride made for lower crew fatigue and better firing on the move [as no gun stabalisation].

However this is acheived with the corresponding large maintenance overhead in the event of damage etc

"It would be interesting to know the reasons for the drops."

Entries such as "Seven tanks sent to the rear for long-term maintenance" are illuminating.

Allen

I believe that the Panther got about half the gasoline mileage of a Pz IV (MPG/KPG). Presumably the Tigers were even worse.

"Seven tanks sent to the rear for long-term maintenance" is indeed interesting but do we know what type of maintenance?

This could be normal long term for any type of armoured vehicle in any Army of the period for the period/conditions the the vehicle had been operating under, or a type specific to the Panther caused by particular elements of the design.

I suspect unfortunately that such details are not easy to find.

<quote>Yes if inner road wheel damaged then two outers have to be replaced to get to it.

Quite a lot of work </quote>

Up to 5 if it's one of the inners. And if it's the Rasputitsa you've got to get the mud out from between those babies otherwise when nightfall comes and the mercury plummets you've got a 50 ton sled.

It's Tiger IIs but according to this account of their first commitment against the Red Army 50% broke down moving the three kilometres from where they got off the train to their assembly point.

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