"Worst Allied general of the war?" Topic

Another vote for Gamelin.

Hands down has to be General Gamelin, lost France in recourd time.

Montgomery always gets castigated got Arnhem, but gets no credit for Normandy……strange.
With the possible exception of Slim, he was the best British general of all and literally lightyears ahead of the best American or Russian.
When US TMP'ers stop basing their study of history on Hollywood, we'll finally have an end to the perpetual Monty-bashing – of course I really blame myself to always rising to the bait……….

Feet up now and anleiher do have a pretty good point. While the losses were of a different sort Gamelin did sort of cause the loss of the whole country pretty quick. I might give in to a call for a pretty much dead heat.

Nice monophagos… really nice.Hey I nominate Lee Marvin or Clint Eastwood for best allied general.Why? Because they are the only two I know from watching Hollywood movies..duh.
Books? No they are all written in English and I only understand American

When US TMP'ers stop basing their study of history on Hollywood, we'll finally have an end to the perpetual Monty-bashing

Holy non sequitur, Batman!

If I want to read good Monty-bashing, I do not need to read any American books or see any Hollywood movies. I can read plenty of British sources who bash Monty good and proper.

Gamelin. The man was gutless, a politician in uniform, and ignored his own intelligence people when they had the German battle plan in their paws.

His soldiers and ultimately his country paid the price for his incompetence.

Leland R. Erickson
Metal Express
metal-express.net

Overall it's Gamelin, without a doubt. However I've heard some interesting allegations about the state of his health. Only hearsay though…

Budenny was clearly out of his depth (maybe something about former cavalrymen with big moustaches…) but it's a fact that the South Western Direction only attracted the attention it did in September '41 because it was resisting the Axis invasion harder than either the Northern or Central Directions.

Timoshenko gets my vote on the Soviet side.

My vote is for B L Montgomery

Then you are an idiot…….

Wot?, another english-bashing thread?.

Is our ol' mate Inquisitor Thaken in reality Mel Gibson?.

Btw, and answering the question as others have wisely pointed, Gamelin.

My vote is for B L Montgomery

Oops your on the wrong topic…..

Benito Luigi Montgomeri was undoubtably the worst Axis general of the war.

I get why people hate Monty, a narrow, self centered, unattractive man if ever there was one; but incompetent? Well, no. He made some mistakes, but also won a lot of battles. Let's lot allow our dislike of the man affect our judgement of his talent. Even us dumb Americans read SOME books occasionally.

I see nothing redeeming in the following; Clark, Fredendall, Ritchie, Percival, Budenny, Gamelin, TImoshenko; completely out of their depth , all of them. I see little to choose between them, they all screwed the pooch as often and as thoroughly as their means allowed.

Gamelin and Mark Clark.

Montgomery was neither the worst nor the best. Certainly not incompetent, but hardly brilliant. On a scale of 1-10, perhaps a 7, which is about where I'd put Eisenhower. But when you have overwhelming material superiority you don't necessarily need someone who's brilliant but takes too many chances. You need someone who's reliable, dependable, competent, who will put that material superiority to good use. Both Monty and Ike could do that. But if and when you made a real break-through, it was nice to have an old hell-for-leather cavalryman like Patton to exploit it.

All this attempted defense of Montgomery is really a laugh. Look, I'll put this in simple, declarative sentences:

1. There was no reason for Market-Garden; it was a completely unnecessary gamble.

2. They KNEW Bittrich's panzer divisions were in the area; anybody who is going to send unsupported paratroopers up against armor is a little… attention-deficit disordered?

3. Monty overrode everybody and demanded to do it anyway.

Now, anyone ELSE who attempts to defend Montgomery without solidly answering each of the above will simply be ignored by me.

Chin chin, old chaps.

PS, also, please show me Patton doing anything similar? A caustic personality he was, but a better tactician than Monty by an order of magnitude.

Didn't Patton make some grand excursion to rescue a captive relative?

OK Inquistor I'll bite…..
(1) So why didn't Eisenhower cancel it? It's not as if the preceding airborne operations (basically MG on a lesser scale)weren't cancelled on a regular basis. It was a high risk operation, so what? By that token, D-Day itself wouldn't have occurred. And lest I be accused of callously throwing away lives, The ex-paras (WWII 1st & 6th AB, & from Suez in the 50's) I've known &/or heard interviewed have all felt that it was an achieveable operation.

(2) This old canard! Most of the armour that descended upon Arnhem was shipped in from elsewhere. There was very little armour in the area & most of what was there was sent south to fight XXX Corps. Read Marcel Zwartz' link or Robert Kershaw link for something more up to date & accurate than 'A Bridge Too Far'.

Had the ground troops been able to break through to Arnhem somewhere near to the schedule then there would have been little armour in Arnhem. It was the delay that enabled the Germans to bring in the armour. And the tanks that were ther were quite vulnerable to the AT weapons of 1AB, as their losses show.

(3) You'll find most of the pressure to launch MG came from the commander of First Airborne Army (Gen Bereton, USAAF) & from 'Boy' Browning. Montgomery did give Eisenhower the option to put the resources into a thrust by Patton or someone else if he preferred.

Patton's Lorraine campaign was hardly a model of military genius either, was it? He found it no easier to defeat an organised German defence than anyone else…….

In the course of the Lorraine Campaign, the tactics of the Third Army were modified considerably by reason of the terrain, the weather, and the nature of enemy resistance. The earlier drive across western France had seen the fortunate combination of a dashing armored commander, ground suited for tank action, and an almost complete demoralization and disorganization in the forces of the enemy. The subsequent German stand at the Moselle line benefited, it is true, from the logistical lag in Allied operations, but in its more important implication the re-establishment of an organized front typified the amazing powers of recuperation still possessed by the Wehrmacht throughout 1944. This revival of the will to resist is shown by the fact that the Third Army took only 10,000 more prisoners in the period 1 September to 20 December than it captured during the single month of August.
In contrast to the pursuit period, operations in Lorraine were characterized by prepared assaults to gain river crossings, battles to break out of shallow bridgeheads, and limited-objective attacks against well-organized positions. Occasionally the weather, the ground, and the tactical situation permitted a wide sweep and a fairly deep penetration, in the manner so common during the August drive. Occasionally, too, the Third Army made a co-ordinated attack on a broad front, reminiscent of attacks on a much larger scale in World War I. In general, and this was particularly true of the last weeks in Lorraine, separate attacks were made on relatively narrow fronts, aiming at the seizure of one or two points and concentrating every available weapon in support. This procedure cut losses but also took much time; in addition it permitted the weaker German artillery some measure of concentrated fire. In November and December, swampy ground, a limited road net, fogs rising from the river basins, and fewer hours of daylight all combined to slow the American advance….. The more the attack slowed down, the more obstacles the enemy could place in the path of the advance. Patton's dictum that "the flanks can take care of themselves" required considerable revision in the last weeks of the campaign. Bypassing the enemy and operating with open flanks had proved successful in periods of rapid advance, but as the Third Army neared the Sarre and the offensive slowed to an "infantry pace" any cavalier disregard for the flanks became the exception rather than the rule. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that the strength of the German forces opposing the Third Army did not, after September, allow counterattacks on any large scale. Therefore some "calculated risk" was possible up to the close of the campaign.

The fight for observation and ground was a conspicuous feature in the early days of the battle ….. resulted …… in part from the flair for choosing and defending terrain which seemed to mark most German formations and commanders. The resumption of the offensive after the October pause introduced a general change in which the fight was waged from village to village, …..Some advantages accrued to the American forces in this type of warfare. Villages could be readily encircled and the garrisons could be prevented from withdrawing to fight another day. The advance from village to village made it easier to keep supply routes open. ……..On the other hand, the task of mopping up such centers of resistance was of necessity a slow business in a populous region like the Lorraine plain………Furthermore, throughout this campaign the German on the defensive proved his ability to accomplish much with little; given the protection provided ……the German was capable of a delaying action out of all proportion to his numbers…….

The relation of armor to infantry altered perceptibly as the Lorraine Campaign progressed and tank going deteriorated. This change was indicated by attempts to convert antitank gunners and other armored division personnel to armored infantry, by numerous complaints that the armored division lacked an adequate complement of armored infantry …..by the rising proportion of casualties in the infantry organic to the armored division, and by the continuing demand from armored commanders for close support by the "doughs." Patton's tanks continued to prove their worth throughout the campaign in exploitation and as weapons giving mobility and shock effect. However, the mass and depth in which tanks could be employed constricted severely as the road nets dwindled ………Nor did the operations in Lorraine conclusively prove Patton's contention that armor could breach fortified positions constructed in depth. Although the Germans were seldom able to collect any sizable armored formation ….. the history of operations in Lorraine indicates the attraction of armor to armor. ……

From beginning to end of the Lorraine Campaign the Third Army had liberated or conquered approximately 5,000 square miles of enemy‑held territory. Tactically, the Lorraine operations of the Third Army had resulted in the loss to the enemy of three highly important defensive positions,….. The West Wall still stood in the path of a drive to the Rhine, but the Third Army had drastically reduced the German space for maneuver west of that river. Strategically, the Third Army campaign had resulted in the loss to the German war economy of the military production …….. Besides, the battle for Lorraine had forced the German high command to divert substantial forces from the defense of the Ruhr. This dispersion of enemy resources, especially armor, had been particularly telling in the early phases of the battle for the Aachen gateway. General Patton's persistent offensive during November and early December also had delayed the movement of key German divisions …… to the strategic reserve that was being assembled, trained, and re-equipped for employment in the December counteroffensive. It is true that this enemy counteroffensive worked to deflect General Patton's divisions short of the Rhine and brought the Lorraine Campaign to an abrupt conclusion. …. But the German forces had been so badly shattered in Lorraine that the Third Army was able to disengage on this front with relative ease as it turned to intervene in the battle of the Ardennes. link

Yes, SR – The Bittburg Raid. Didn't turn out well, did it! link

And FWIW Gamelin (or Gagamelin to the unkind) would get my vote, with a dishonourable mention to Percival, who had even written a (largely accurate) staff appreciation of the probable course of an invasion of Malaya. He ignored his own advice! link

In the light of such achievements it's pretty ridiculous to try to put the SUCCESSFUL generals such as Montgomery (& even Mark Clark) into a similar category. Montgomery had his shortcomings but it borders on the realms of the fantastic to do so. Or do you have a problem with there being a successful British general?

This old canard! Most of the armour that descended upon Arnhem was shipped in from elsewhere. There was very little armour in the area & most of what was there was sent south to fight XXX Corps. Read Marcel Zwartz' link or Robert Kershaw link for something more up to date & accurate than 'A Bridge Too Far'.

If I may add to your point I'd note that the reports from Netherlands native operatives were considered unreliable at best and many times dismissed by Allied Intelligence because of the big cockup of the SOE in 42 and 43 against the german intelligence, the known "Dutch affair".

Agreed, although by 1944 the damage had been repaired, at least from the Dutch viewpoint. There were definitely some failures on the part of Intelligence but ignorance of the presence of armour wasn't one of them.

FFS not this tedious load of cobblers about Goodwood and Arnhem AGAIN??!!!!

What my kinsman Huw said… Read and learn…

I'd also add (again) that the Dutch resistance had been deeply penetrated by Abwehr early in 1944, leading to the loss of a great many SOE agents in the Netherlands and the feeding of a lot of disinformation to the Allies. Consequently, the Allies barely believed a word of what came out of the Dutch Resistance.

Which is a good job, as the 'panzers at Arnhem' hoary old chestnut is a myth.

Anyway, back to the topic – Irwin takes some beating for the title of Worst Allied General:

1. During the First Arakan Campaign of 1942-43, he managed to pile nine brigades on to one divisional commander.

2. He constantly micro-managed from Army HQ, often issuing entirely contradictory orders.

3. When asked for a tank regiment, he released a half-squadron. He sidelined the intervening Corps commander, allowing his personal dislike of the man to interfere with his command.

4. XV Corps had spent the previous six months training for the 'indirect approach' – utilising air and sea movement. Irwin sent them straight up the middle!

5. Once it had all gone pear-shaped, he threw is teddies out of the cot and finally allowed the Corps Commander to take control of the battle, who managed to extricate the corps from a dreadful situation.

6. When it was all over, Irwin sacked the corps commander!

Cheers Mark!

Forgot about Irwin. Yes, he's up there too. Wasn't some idiot proposing to replace Slim with him at one point in time?

Huw R Davies 09 Feb 2010 3:00 a.m. PST

OK Inquistor I'll bite…..
(1) So why didn't Eisenhower cancel it?

A: Political pressure from the British, who desperately needed to look like they were still a world power. Besides, all your theory would prove is that Ike was equally stupid and irresponsible.

(2) This old canard! Most of the armour that descended upon Arnhem was shipped in from elsewhere.

A: Wrong. The 9th and 10th SS panzer divisions were both there for refit. BTW: "This old canard" evidently translates into "you have me completely beaten, so I'll simply rely on mantras to defeat you."

(3) You'll find most of the pressure to launch MG came from the commander of First Airborne Army (Gen Bereton, USAAF) & from 'Boy' Browning. Montgomery did give Eisenhower…

Okay, all I can do with the rest of this is claim sophistry, to keep my head from exploding from mounting BS pressure. Go on believing what you want to believe. Leave the uncomfortable facts to themselves.

Palafox "If I may add to your point I'd note that the reports from Netherlands native operatives were considered unreliable at best…"

Sure they were, by the very politicians who needed a victory. When we win, it's all about us. When we lose, it's all about the unreliable foreigners giving us bad intelligence… uh… and we know it must have been bad, therefore we didn't use it… or something…

R Mark Davies "Which is a good job, as the 'panzers at Arnhem' hoary old chestnut is a myth."

ROFLMAOOOOOOOOOOO!!!

Those mythical panzers that only the Dutch could see somehow ended up doing a lot of damage.

Oh Lord, this just keeps getting better.

Here's a nice little bite from World War 2 multimedia for the simply ignorant. For those who are willfully in denial, OTOH, well, I can't help much:

After destroying much of the Seventh and Fifteenth Armies at Falaise, Allied optimism was very high for ending the war in 1944. It seemed the entire German effort in the west had collapsed and was in retreat.

The Fall of Paris on August 25, 1944 ended the Normandy campaign, but the Allies were still dependent on the port of Cherbourg for supplies. This caused a reevaluation of the "broad front" strategy that Eisenhower followed, advancing everywhere, rather than Montgomery's advocacy for narrow thrusts through weak points in the German lines.

US Army General George S. Patton's Third Army, driving hard, had run off the French maps and were advancing on the German city of Aachen, the first German territory to come under attack. Hitler was determined to hold the city, but the Allies' increasing supply problems stopped Patton cold. He was sure that given more gas, he could advance on Berlin.

Montgomery was given authorization to try his narrow advance. Holland had been under German occupation for four years, and he believed that the German forces there were weak. If airborne units could land and hold key bridges, he could send a heavy armored force racing through Holland and sweep around to take Berlin before the end of the year.

The plan called Operation Market-Garden, for the largest airborne drop in military history. Three Allied divisions would be involved. The US Army 101st Airborne would drop on Eindhoven and take the canal crossings at Veghel. The US Army 82nd Airborne would land on bridges over the Maas and Waal Rivers. 60 miles behind the German lines, the British 1st Airborne, then later the Polish 1st Airborne Brigade, would be dropped on the Rhine bridges at Arnhem. This was the "Market" plan.

UK General Brian Horrocks, commanding the XXX Corps, would dash up these Allied-held river crossings to relieve the 1st Airborne in the "Garden" phase of the operation. Montgomery's planning did not take into account any of the lessons learned in Normandy, or even the German landings in Crete three years before.

Also, the Germans were beginning to stabilize their western forces. German paratroopers and SS panzer units were moved into Arnhem, and while British intelligence was aware of them, their presence was discounted. Also, for such a large operation, less time was taken than the Normandy landings.

The Airborne units had suffered heavily in the Normandy campaign, and were still reorganizing in their camps in England when the orders came down. They had returned in early August after forty days of fighting. Some 40% of their members would never leave the Normandy coast, resting in Allied cemeteries.

The reconstituted Allied airborne force of World War II was the greatest the world had ever seen, probably would ever see again. Highly motivated, superbly armed, they were confident they could do the job, if the XXX Corps could make the 60-mile dash to relieve the British 1st Airborne.

On the morning of September 17, 1944, the airborne landings began, and the Dutch population, confident that they were about to be liberated, watched from their rooftops. The Germans were even in awe of the force that was descending on them.

The same morning the XXX Corps began to advance. Working up a single road, the Germans poured fire down on the tanks and vehicles, and the assault was stalled almost as it began. Allied air support was inadequate, and the Germans recovered quickly.

The Airborne forces were able to accomplish their goals, except for the 82nd Airborne, which had to build a temporary bridge to get XXX Corps across. The Americans were shocked by the lack of urgency among the British armored corps, one officer saying that they "stopped for tea." As fellow paratroopers, they knew the British 1st Airborne could not hold out for long.

The "Red Devils" had dropped five miles from their target, and could only take the North side of the bridge. Worse, they had dropped on part of a Panzer division, and were beating back tank attacks from across the Rhine. Units were cut off, and the division commander, Major General "Roy" Urquart, was out of touch with his men for thirty-six critical hours.

The British 1st Airborne held on. They were supposed to be relieved on the fourth day, but after nine days the XXX Corps still did not relieve them. Casualties were mounting, and it became clear that even with additional troops landing in heavy fire south of the Rhine, the 1st Airborne was cut off.

On September 26, Montgomery ordered the 1st Airborne to break out of Arnhem and rejoin the Allied lines to the south. Out of 10,000 men dropped into Arnhem, only 2,300 came out. 1,400 were dead and over 6,000 were prisoners of war.

Operation Market-Garden had failed, and with it the opportunity to end the war in 1944. The Dutch population suffered the most, and the coming winter would see mass starvation of civilians.

Static operations would mark the next few months in Holland, until the capture of the port of Antwerp necessitated the clearing of the Albert Canal for Allied ships. In three month of heavy fighting, Canadian and British units fought a waterlogged campaign to clear Germans out. The first ship unloaded on December 11, 1944.

Five days later, the largest German offensive in the west stormed across Belgium and Luxembourg. General Patton wrote in his diary, "We can still lose this war."

It is interesting that I have never yet heard an American fail to admit to the deficiencies of Clark, and yet the fragile egos of certain nationalities seem to require them to bolster their heroes whether they were idiots or not.

Just my two farthings.

"Sure they were, by the very politicians who needed a victory."

I thought you were trying to prove how bad general Monty was, not how politicians interfered.

Kershaw and Zwarts are going to be upset that they wasted all that time in the German archives then….

Face it Inquistor, you don't like Montgomery, you don't like anyone putting up a counter-arguement & you resort to abuse when called on your statements.

Speaking of wrong, there are many inaccuracies in that piece you're quoting. Viz:

After destroying much of the Seventh and Fifteenth Armies at Falaise

Make that Seventh & elements of the Fifth Panzer Army. The Fifteenth was still largely North of the Seine in the Pas De Calais.

Also, for such a large operation, less time was taken than the Normandy landings.

A palpably absurd statement, or were they to sit round for 2 years? Planning for D-Day took around 2 years (& was knocked into shape by Montgomery BTW). By the same token, Pattons march to relieve Bastogne didn't take as long to plan as D-Day…….

The same morning the XXX Corps began to advance. Working up a single road

But had Bradley not filtered off supplies allocated to them then VIII & XIIIth Corps would also have been involved on a much broader front. Not quite the single road then.

Worse, they had dropped on part of a Panzer division, and were beating back tank attacks from across the Rhine.

So now it's back to part of a panzer division then. What happened to the rest of IISSPzKorp? The Germans across the river were mostly FlaK units & light recce vehicles. There weren't many amphibious tanks in the German OOB.

The Airborne forces were able to accomplish their goals, except for the 82nd Airborne, which had to build a temporary bridge to get XXX Corps across

and not forgetting the small matter of failing to capture the bridge at Nijmegan until Guards AD came up in support.

The Americans were shocked by the lack of urgency among the British armored corps, one officer saying that they "stopped for tea." As fellow paratroopers, they knew the British 1st Airborne could not hold out for long.

Lifted straight from Ryan & since shown to be an over simplification & misrepresentation of the facts.

Operation Market-Garden had failed, and with it the opportunity to end the war in 1944.

Clearly something that you don't think was worth achieving.

The Dutch population suffered the most, and the coming winter would see mass starvation of civilians

that would be the Germans starving the Dutch then……

Static operations would mark the next few months in Holland, until the capture of the port of Antwerp necessitated the clearing of the Albert Canal for Allied ships

Antwerp is in Belgium & was in Allied hands before MG started. The Albert Canal runs inland to Liege. Presumably the Scheldt Estuary & the rump of the Canal is what they really mean (West of Antwerp, not East!)

Now whether clearing the Scheldt Estuary was a better bet than MG is a valid discussion point, but you're not really interested in that are you?

Or is all this just BS to you too?

One Day etc. I'm happy to discuss Montgomery's shortcomings but I'd rather have a discussion based upon fact…..

A: Wrong. The 9th and 10th SS panzer divisions were both there for refit. BTW: "This old canard" evidently translates into "you have me completely beaten, so I'll simply rely on mantras to defeat you."

Notice the word refit from Thaken…

There was a reason the two divisions had moved into the area and that was to recover from the losses of Normandy. Both had been shipping various vehicles away to other units as ordered (indeed 9th SS took parts off their 251s so roving officers wouldnt try and appropiate them and send them off).

In short, both divisions were no where near their stated complements and were in a fragile state.

What compounded Allied planning is the fact both the 9th & 10th had indulged in anti-airborne exercises and were well versed in how to deal with such an event. The divisions had enough resources to curtail Allied operations and were able to then re-inforce their forces faster than the Allies.

Its all very easy to dismiss Market-Garden with HINDSIGHT but not so easy when you take it at face value.

If you want a real culprit to blame, then pick the English weather. Or Brereton for not allowing two lifts on Day 1.

Its a nice easy one to view with hindsight, but given the situation at the time, I doubt much else would have been done differently.

As an aside I recently read Rupert Fussels book on the US Army in Europe, and while being hugely insulting to the rest of the Allies (the Poles didn't fight hard and the Canadians were terrible troops), he makes an interesting point that Monty made the most of his outlandish claims to superiority to cover up the ULTRA intercepts he was using. Personally I think its likely rubbish (like much of his book) but it was an original concept for explaining Monty's modesty…

Good God… Where in your cut'n'pasted pile of inaccurate crap, so eloquently refuted by Huw, does it mention the oft-mentioned 'panzers at Arnhem'. You can 'ROFLMAO' and cut and paste rubbish all you like, but you haven't answered the question.

So come on then – list the panzer units (i.e. those with tanks) that fought in Arnhem and tell me where they came from.

The Dutch must have had bloody powerful binculars to have spotted them beforehand…

Just a few refutations that Huw missed:

There were no FJ at Arnhem – there were plenty of FJ at Valkenswaard, s'Hertogenbosch and the Reichswald, but not Arnhem.

9 SS had no panzers.

10 SS had a very few panzers (enough for two weak companies), but none of them fought at Arnhem – they were all shipped over the Neder-Rijn and fought on Bettuwe.

The 82nd Airborne did not build a bridge for XXX Corps. XXX Corps built its own bridge, within the 101st Airborne's zone of responsibility, at Zon.

Market-Garden, as Huw points out was a multi-corps operation (it also included US XIX Corps on the extreme right flank).

Huw,

The 'corps commander' mentioned was in fact, Slim! In the end, Slim was reinstated by the Viceroy, Irwin was sacked and Slim was eventually given his job.

IT said "Okay, all I can do with the rest of this is claim sophistry, to keep my head from exploding from mounting BS pressure. Go on believing what you want to believe. Leave the uncomfortable facts to themselves."

How mature of you… Do you mean 'uncomfortable facts' like these:

PzKp 'Mielke' – shipped in from Germany after the battle started

sPzKp 'Hummel' – shipped in from Germany after the battle started

StuG-Abt 280 – shipped in from Germany after tha battle started

PzKp 224 – based at Amsterdam and marched to Arnhem after the battle started

sPzAbt 506 – shipped in from Germany after the battle started.

SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 – near Arnhem – no tanks

SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 – approx 20 tanks & StuGs – some distance to the east of Arnhem. Did not fight at Arnhem.

Are those facts inconvenient enough for you? Now how about telling us about these panzer units that were in Arnhem before the battle that were reported by the Dutch Resistance…

As Huw said, I'll happily have a discussion about Monty's shortcomings, but let's base the discussion in FACTS shall we, instead of myth?

Monty was not a bad general and the suggestion that he was somehow the worst is laughable – particularly when you use myth, lies and propaganda to attack his reputation and particularly when there are the likes of Clark, Irwin, Percival and Brereton to compare him to.

He was not the best either, not by a pretty wide margin – the same applies to Patton.

Huw R Davies "Face it Inquistor, you don't like Montgomery,"

Gosh, how did that come out?

"you don't like anyone putting up a counter-arguement & you resort to abuse when called on your statements."

If I've been abusive, complain, but I don't think I have, so I imagine I'll dodge the DH bullet nicely on that count.

Called on my statements? Look, everything I have said is well known, and has been for the last 65 years, revisionist British historians notwithstanding. Monty screwed up ROYALLY (pun intended) with Market-Garden, cost a lot of lives on a totally needless adventure, gave the Germans time to assemble the Ardennes offensive, and quite frankly should have been shot and dumped in an unmarked grave along with Mark Clark for criminal negligence. He likely extended the war by 6 months with politically motivated nonsense.

My position clear enough?

Big P from GMG "Notice the word refit from Thaken…"

Cool! We'll pass this one on to Bill.

"In short, both divisions were no where near their stated complements and were in a fragile state."

Lol! Dude, a panzer division that is "no where near its stated complement" can still play merry Hell with an airborne division that is. Kinda like an elephant with a stomach ache is still going to have little trouble stepping on an ant.

R Mark Davies "Good God… Where in your cut'n'pasted pile of inaccurate crap, so eloquently refuted by Huw, does it mention the oft-mentioned 'panzers at Arnhem'. You can 'ROFLMAO' and cut and paste rubbish all you like, but you haven't answered the question."

Sigh. Unlike many TMP members, I do not feel compelled to answer again and again what history has already answered quite nicely. I'm bored. I'm going onto another forum to argue against the flat earthers. They have more compelling arguments.

Thaken, you are the , You start a thread, knowing full well how it will end up, you attack peoples information, but offer no links to back up your own. You happily trot the old myths and facts when they suit you. You dodge direct questions with abuse, then proclaim yourself to be 'bored' when the facts are closing in.

The whole world can only thank god that our ancestors got on with the horrible job at hand, and forged a lasting relationship between our two nations that you so seem to despise, you .

John

Lol! Dude, a panzer division that is "no where near its stated complement" can still play merry Hell with an airborne division that is. Kinda like an elephant with a stomach ache is still going to have little trouble stepping on an ant.

Sorry, I thought you may have actually known something about the battle for Arnhem and Market-Garden.

My apologies for trying to discourse with one so ignorant.

And well said John. Never let a man with a chip on his shoulder sour the relationship between Britain and the USA. Like all nations, they have their share of odd people.

I'd like to contribute something worthwhile to this thread, but Huw and RMD have admirably covered the facts which dear old Thaken is bored by, so the best I can come up with is "what a "….

Oh, and a panzer division with *no* panzers is what you might think of as an "infantry division" in all but name….

Never let the facts get in the way of a good old internet flame war……..

…….. Monty screwed up ROYALLY (pun intended) with Market-Garden, …… and quite frankly should have been shot and dumped in an unmarked grave along with Mark Clark for criminal negligence..

What a load of ! DH me if you like Bill but this is all an exercise in ing by someone who advocates murdering British & American soldiers…… Way to go Thaken. !

What was the topic again … ?

"What was the topic again … ?"

Well….I was trying to make the case that Gamelin was the perfect staff officer….

Ok I'm not trolling but have a legitimate question.
What stopped the rest of the British from reaching Frost on the bridge?

Ze Ghermans (in a bad Polish accent)….

They were able to establish a cordon between the DZ/LZ & the city itself. Some groups got through, notably Frost's battalion who followed the riverside route (Tiger?) but also some others including part of the Recce Squadron & a Royal Engineer detachment.

Ironically there was an SS training battalion in the area on the day of the landings, carrying out anti-paratroop training (Kraft et al). As chance would have it they were in the ideal spot to blunt the initial British push to Arnhem. By the time the British had reorganised, the German defenders had been reinforced. It wasn't helped by the need to deploy a full brigade of airlanding troops (stronger battalions than the paratroops) to cover the DZ/LZ for future lifts. Thanks to Gen Bereton for that decision.

Boy a boy. I'm a troll, a trolling idiot, and a euphemism for the male sexual organ.

Yep, I'm definitely the one who is immature here.

Yep, I'm definitely the one who is immature here.

Well you said it! Something we can all agree on I'm sure!
Still waiting for those references by the way!

Nah. I think I've entertained the toddlers enough for one day.