"Greatest Allied general of the war" Topic

Certainly Slim for me. I'm amazed that Monty's self-aggrandisement still has the power to mesmerise!

Lots of great Allied generals out there, but my oldest son is named Gavin. That vote went in almost 17 years ago.

Full disclosure: I served in the 505th.

Who ever had Ikes job had to be a politician dismissing him for being good at it is klike dismissing Zhukov because he had lots of casualties. The Allies effort was not about winning stunning victorys, it was about winning the war. And they did that. Certainly the USSR did a lot of the fighting, but British and US convoys made much of that possible. No big long soviet advances without all those studebackers.

Now if the question had been best battlefield commander, then you shpould get a different set of answers.

Norman(Dutch)Cota. without him Omaha Beach would have been far more costly. He also advocated landing at night with elite infantry to pave the way for the rest of the landing.But was over ruled. Slim for his leadership and tactics in India and Burma.

Field Marshal, Sir William Slim

Certainly the USSR did a lot of the fighting, but British and US convoys made much of that possible. No big long soviet advances without all those studebackers.

Would this suggest nominating General Motors?

Can I push Harold Alexander again?
Held Dunkirk with the rear guard for a short but vital time.
Was Slim's boss in Burma and later Monty's in North Africa.
Commanded both Patton and Montgomery in Sicily.
Ended up on the still important but forgotten front of Italy.

In other words, in everything (east and west), from the beginning to the end, had to work with difficult subordinates andwas much loved by British troops.

After the war he was punished by being sent to Canada as Governor General .

Omar Bradley
Zhukov? I wouldn't have any of the Russians even in the top 10.

Konstantin Rokossovsky. Pulled from the Gulag in 1941, fitted with a set of metal teeth to replace the ones the NKVD knocked out of his head, and put in charge of a half-strength Mech Corps just in time for Barabarrossa. And, unlike most other Soviet Mech Corps of the time, manages to kick a fair amount of German butt with BT tanks. From then on he's in the thick of things all the way up to the end of the war.

The Germans thought him the best Soviet general. He was one of the few Soviet commanders who would tell Stalin to his face that he was wrong. Would probably be more famous is he weren't half Polish (and so politically suspect) and hadn't kept correcting Stalin.

Well as no one else came out with it overtly

Motors

shifting everything you can imagine and more on all fronts! (though through Opel, on both sides).

The best however, I'd vote for Slim, I like O'Conner as well, but his early capture I think robbed him of a real chance to shine (though the Germans had to take his boots from him as he tried escaping, twice, before they even got him out of Africa!)

I notice no one has named McArthur.

First Blitzkrieg Nomonhan August 1939 Zuhkov: Results destroyed the Japanese Army there (Reinforced 1st and 24th Divisions)

Who held the Germans in front of Moscow, Zhukov and then drove them back.

Who was the FIRST commander at Lenningrad, Zhukov.

Who held the Germans at Stalingrad and then drove them back, Zhukov.

Who was CinC at Kursk, Zhukov, and that was a bloody disaster for the Germans.

Who told off Stalin more then once and lived to talk about it, Zhukov.

Who was, and still is, referred to as the Soviet 'Master of Disaster' (sent where things were worst), Zhukov.

The truth is that when the Soviets had their backs to the wall the man they called on each time to pull their butts out of the fire was Zhukov. And the truth is he pulled it off each time when the odds were against him succeeding. The man got the job done.

To quote Napoleon, "I don't want good commanders I want lucky ones"

Where's the love for Chester Nimitz?

Slim. There are quite a few very good commanders mentioned but I doubt anyone did so much with so little while spending his men so carefully.

My heart gave (and freely gives) the nod to the Auk.

…but my brain must also acknowledge SLIM as the only other true candidate.

Alexander and Slim.
Patton was good, but a risky General.

Montgomery is the subject of much critique re Alemein. But the job of a general is to win. He refused to be bullied into an early attack, as Churchill had done time and time again to his predecessors. He insisted on building up a heavy superiority in men, machines, and stores. He was content to let Rommel waste his troops on the El Alemein defence line while building up and not get drawn into an offensive before his men were ready.

When he did launch the battle of El Alemein, he drove Rommel all the way back, never to return. His predecessors had taken off after the retreating Axis like hunters after a fox, and paid the penalty when the fox turned.

Monty didn't rush into pursuit until his forces were reassembled and everything ready to go with them. Because of the subsequent strength of his advance it was impossible for Rommel to form a new defensive position in the traditional areas, because his pursuers, although a little late getting started, were far too powerful.

I think all that was the sign of a good General. Arguably a cautious one. But as all his predecessors had been less cautious, perhaps his caution was exactly what was needed.

As for that famous bridge too far. He would have been the hero of the war had various things not gone wrong. The casualties to the airborne troops due to the things gone wrong, were heavy. But considering the massive losses by other generals when things went wrong, the losses were far less. I think he took the blame for what most others thought was going to work too….but then in hindsight, were suddenly full of wisdom that it was doomed to failure.

I didn't do a complete count, but Slim is riding high. Don't get me wrong, I'm a big Zhukov fan (one of my favorite pictures of myself is in front of his equestrian statue in front of the Kremlin).

In looking at the total picture, general, efficient use of resources, leadership, understanding of his men, vision, leads me to nod towards Slim.

I also don't think one can simply dismiss the other hard fighting leaders of the Red Army as "jealous generals." Zhukov was the greatest, but not the only giant.

Mserafin I had forgoten Rokossovsky and for that sin should have my teeth knocked out. Yes one of the best in any mans army and unusual among Soviet generals by being popular with the troops. However despite all this I nstill stick with Slim for my vote.

Fatman

Moko54,

I would politely suggest you to read history and locate Zukhov in november 1942… before saying gibberish…

Zhikov was not at Stalingrad but destroying the soviet army at Rzhev…

Kursk was a German tactical victory and you can't change it. Useless, ineffective and even bloody but not a disaster. The one who suffered a disaster even if not decisive were teh russians…

He did not save Leningrad, he insisted on costly, stupid and useless attack and to be quite honest he usually did exactly what the Man of Steel required even when it was pointless. He nbever objected to the offensives in spring 1942 even when they were clearly outside Soviet Army capability.

Also the first commander at Leningrad was Popov not Zukhov…

Zhukhov was an average, uninspired, calluos and downrioght dumb butcher. He won only when the correlation of forces was in his favor and even then taking higer casualities than Rokossovky or Koniev…

He did a good job at nomohan (but again look at the correlation of forces, I have wargamend and studied the campaing and decided that even agaisnt tarzan's chimp the Japanese would not have won), but hey, Budenny did a good job in the civil war…

"Kursk was a German tactical victory and you can't change it. Useless, ineffective and even bloody but not a disaster. The one who suffered a disaster even if not decisive were teh russians…"

Interesting perspective. I can't agree with you, as the battle plan went exactly as the Sov's planned, but still, it's different.

The strategic plan went exactly as palnned, not the battle itself.

There is a disconnection between strateg and tactics in Kursk. The soviet sustained more losses and they couldn't claim to have won. Manstein was pretty sure he would have been able to go forward.

but the entire thing is pointless. Kursk was a calculated risk on the part of the soviets and a gamble on the part of the germans. The soviet could afford to lose it (even if not to be completelty routed), the german had to get a spectacular victory.

To be quite honest I feel kursk greatness a bit pointless. It was not kursk the decision. It was immediatly after. Despite having taken a beating the Soviet actually go to the offensive. The germand were still in q uite good shape, but they were unable to stop the Soviets.

The problem of Kursk is that, albeit titanical the struggle is, it has almost no meaning beacuse bigger things were about to happens.

If Kursk would have been a disaster of massive proportion for the germans they would not have been in position to contest Kharkov or Kiev in the aftermath.

Kursk, despite post war soviet propaganda, didn't go as planned. But for once the first time the soviet were able to implement a sound theather strategy instead of pipe dreams like in 1942 with Mars/Zeus and Uranus/Jupiter. This makes an huge difference.

To be quite honest the soviet expected to be able to smash the germans spearheads at Kursk, still at lower level the Germans had the edge (prokhorovka).

In saying Kursk was a tactical victory I was talking of only kursk salient, not Orel offensive or the 4th Battle of Kharkov… there we go with impressive soviet victories.

Arrigo

Misunderstood………….

Popov led IN Stalingrad, Zhukov commanded the entire front that included Stalingrad, well north of the city, and down into the Caucusus

Sorry but the Kursk Battle goes well beyond the scope of the German offensive itself and must cover the planned Soviet counter-offensive. When looked at in this perspective, and no disrespect to Manstein, the German forces mustered for the offensive (Which was a substanial outlay for them) where gutted. From that point on the Germans were on the defensive in Russia and were never even close to getting the initiative back. THAT IS the definition of a bloody disaster.

I have written two articles on Nomonhan and designed a campaign game for the same using Command Decision. Unfortunately GW went under before it was published in Command Post. The July battles were pretty even fights with the Japanese doing pretty good south of the river, and getting within spitting distance of the Nomonhan bridge.

Their late July ersatz offensive was a joke, and the Japanese did do poorly. The Soviet August offensive was the first blitzkrieg in history using all the classic moves of that type of warfare, which is the point I was making, and Zhukov not only planned the operation but ran it. Whether the Japanese, or the Poles a few weeks later, or the French/British a year later, were capable of that type of warfare is irrelevant to the point being made.

I have often been frustrated by the 'belief' that Soviet commanders threw faceless hordes of bodies at the proud, brave Germanic soldiers.

One should do a study of the Soviet 'Operational Art' before one can comment effectively on just what constitutes a 'successful' Soviet offensive. In many ways they see a much bigger picture of how a campaign should go then western military thinkers. Often the clarity of their intent is so clear as to be almost unbelievable that the Germans couldn't see it. Just look at Manstein's 'back hand blow' then look at what the Soviet Army was doing all around his actions. The clarity of their purpose, or goal if you prefer, is almost frighting. (This will also explain what the SOVIETS mean when it comes to exactly whom is in charge, where, and when.)

No insults intented here, a study of the Soviet Operational Art is required reading for anyone whom wants to command Soviet troops effectively from WWII to the present day. It also makes a very good read/study for any student of Military History.

Official Records show that on many more then one occasion Zhukov DID buck Stalin and lived to talk about it. On two of these occasions Kruschev was present and stated so in his official records (Moscow 1941 both times Stalin was demanding an immediate attack and Zhukov refused saying his forces were not ready).

Moko,

no insult here, but can you explain how zukohv was commanding in Stalingrad and at the same time planning and directing Mars? Have oyu ever heard of Mars\Zeus? Or even that is a successful soviet undertaking?

alos the german forces involved in Kursk were not gutted, otherwise they would never been able to wage 4th Kharkov. I think that here we are still relying on hundreds of german tanks destroyed a Prokorovka.

All said ther eis no way the Japanese could have survived the correlation of forces in late july and august. Zukhov did a professional job there, but everything was in his favor.

Sadly I fear you lack a bit on history and also on soviet operational art…

Quote "no insult here, but can you explain how zukohv was commanding in Stalingrad and at the same time planning and directing Mars? Have oyu ever heard of Mars\Zeus? Or even that is a successful soviet undertaking?"

Zhukov was in command along the entire front, as I explained, and given responsibility as defined under Soviet command structure of the time. I never said he was commanding IN Stalingrad I said he was given command over the front that included Stalingrad. Yes I have heard of Mars/Zeus and Zhukov DID plan and run the operation, but still maintained responsibility over the rest of his command. Sometimes the life of a Soviet Marshal is a tough one.

Quote "alos the german forces involved in Kursk were not gutted, otherwise they would never been able to wage 4th Kharkov. I think that here we are still relying on hundreds of german tanks destroyed a Prokorovka."

The 4th Kharkov was a success, but a minor one, which only served to further deplete the battered German forces for no absolute gain (An important concept in the definition of the Soviet Operational Art). As I stated before one cannot just look at the Kursk offensive, but must also look at the Soviet counter-attack as part of the same whole. In the end the facts speak for themselves the Germans LOST the initiative on the Russian Front after Kursk and were never again in a position to get it back.

Quote "All said ther eis no way the Japanese could have survived the correlation of forces in late july and august. Zukhov did a professional job there, but everything was in his favor."

I didn't disagree and the Poles were stacked as badly in Sept 1939. Should one then be little the German accomplishments applying Blitzkrieg because of this fact?

Quote "Sadly I fear you lack a bit on history and also on soviet operational art…"

Neither, and sadly this comment wasn't needed in this discussion. Your desire to mention 4th Kharkov is a good example of the Soviet Operational Art. Cities, Towns, etc. are pointless in the Soviet mind IF they do not lead to the destruction of enemy forces. As at Stalingrad, if the Germans were willing to suffer losses to take a geographical point the Soviets would be more then willing to oblige them. In both operations if one looks beyond that geographical point the Soviets were having a field day out on the flanks while the Germans concentrated on the geographical objective. The Operational Art IS a big picture way of looking at war, in that case 4th Kharkov is small potatoes.

Heck the Soviets surrounded the German 6th Army almost by default. They should have stuck the Romanians, Hungarians, and Italians in the city instead. Maybe I will put together a definition of the Soviet Operational Art in another thread so we can discuss its good and bad points. Should be interesting and a lot of fun.

I think we are misunderstandin each other in points…

I was talking of Japanese in 1939 not pole (who despite the bad press were much better).

Also no one dispute the fact that Kursk was the last offensive made by the germans on the eastern front, but euqating kursk to a disaster shows pure ignorance. Also the feeble link to shift from kursk to the entire summer campaing seems to represent a little inability to grasp differences in names, maybe you wante to talk about the entire summer campaign before and slipped the name Kursk beacuse it is more known.

Sadly there are still some inexcusable errors in your reconstruction. Zukhov was not in command of the entire front. Stavka was and he was not the chief of Stavka. Stavka was a committee. He opposed Uranus/Saturn operation (quoted from Glantz book on Mars)that was more the brainchild of Vatutin and Vasilievsky. Zhukov never, I repeat NEVER, acted as the commander of the entire eastern front. Also beacuse the Soviet army has no such position.

The main sourtce for Zhukov opposition to Stalin is Zhukov memories and according to one of the two fundamental laws of historical critique "Nemo teste in re propria".

Also i want to point out, that until uranus was launched the soviet were not having a field day on the flanks. Rumanian, Italians and Hungarians were pretty much able to hold the line despite costly and repeated soviet failures ahem offensives.

But I doubt that at this point anlysis will change your interpretation… next time you will say that staiangrad flanks were indeed Leningrad and Persia…

Slim and Montgomery.
Raducci, why would you say Alexander was "punished" by being made Governor General of Canada – the pre-eminent Dominion? Come to Canada and say that, but make sure you've got good dental insurance as you'll soon be ting teeth……

Methinks Raducci was taking the proverbial when he made that statement…….

No next I am going to say that Zhukov was the premier of the USSR and Stalin a lowly front commander.

For the performance of the Italian 8th Army you will have too see my other post in another thread.

Your misunderstanding is Soviet command structure and how it, in conjunction with Soviet doctrine, is so much different then Western military establishments.

STAVKA is a much larger organization then the mere committee you have mentioned. Yes the head of that structure IS Stalin and his select group, much the same as Hitler and his immediate staff organization, but unlike OKH (I think I get them confused all the time) was a far larger organization within the Soviet command structure.

This layering DID put some Soviet Marshals in control of areas that covered multiple Fronts and Armies. Mostly this was done during the planning stages of an operation, or operations, to improve coordination of the coming offensive (Very important to the Operational Art as defined by the Soviets). After the planning stages the individual Marshals would then revert to control of their own forces.

Zhukov WAS in control over the planning stage of the Soviet Stalingrad counter-offensive whose front included Stalingrad, the Caucusus, and up to (If I remember) three to four hundred miles North of that city.

Since most of the people whom were around Stalin are now dead we do have to rely on second hand testimony. And more then one document, from various sources, has Zhukov talking back to Stalin.

Kursk Ok deails………….
Soviet Command at Kursk was as follows
Central Front Rokossovsky
Voronezh Front Vatutin
Steppe Front Konev
Bryansk Front Popov
West Front Sokolovsky
Reserve Front Koniev

STAVKA Deputy Supreme Commander Marshal Zhukov
STAVKA Chief of Staff Vasilevsky

This quickly shows that Zhukov was in control of the area from Kirov in the North to Chuguyev in the south, a front of over 400 miles in a straight line. And under his control was five fronts and twenty one Armies.

The German offensive began on July 5th. The Soviet counter-offensive started in the North on July 12th and in the south on August 3rd. The Northern attack reached the Hagen Line by August 23rd, and the South Gadyach on the Psel to Kotel'va to Kharkov line by the same date.

Enough detail?

Too many FACTS for you Arrigo?