"British seiges" Topic

Dear Kevin
Thank you for your compliments. I have read all of the suggested reading and these are the conclusions that I have made from them. In addition I have now almost completely finished redrawing the ordnance of most of the combatant countries. These will be published by NGA Archive over the next few years.

Then empirical comparison and investigation of the scientific aspects of this subject needs a precise language. I am sorry that you do not understand that. It is each to their own.

Stephen

Using the infantry to do the donkey work meant fewer mouths to feed on campaign, so it maybe wasn't completely daft.

@SR: back on the topic! Bless you!!

I think we need to remember that the average infantryman would have been no stranger to fairly mindless labouring work, provided he was properly directed.
A few engineer officers and a handful of artificers/sappers would surely suffice to supervise hundreds of infantrymen with shovels.
Also, there would have been a leavening of civilian miners in the ranks as well.

So, again, I think it comes down to the higher direction of a seige and the tools needed for the job (including seige guns).

And if they could hand the planning of the siege over to a gunner, how hard could it be?

lol

Dear SR
The training of the engineer and artilleryman had not diverged at this time as explained in the new introduction to Adye (1813 rp 2010) Bombardier and Pocket Gunner, Ken Trotman.

Many Royal Artillery Officers were successfully employed in engineering work.

Much of siege work was digging of ditches and parallels. These required the supervision and surveying but that is only a few officers. The rest as you are stated are infantrymen as it had been since the 17th century at least.

Stephen

I thought Kevin had challenged this viewpoint, Stephen?
You are. of course, eloquent as ever.

And?

Raducci,

If Stephen means for the British, I have no problem. It isn't so for the French as I have posted and documented. I do believe that Stephen is talking about the British.

Sincerely,
K

History of the Corps of Royal Engineers. 1889-:

Vol. 1:
link link

Vol 2:
link link

The history of the Corps of Royal Sappers and Miners. 1855:

Vol 1:
link link

Vol 2:
link link

"and?"
Cosa?

I found the following in Sir John Jones Journal of Sieges written during the Peninsular War, 1811-1814.

On pages 343-344:

'At the period of commencing the preparations for these sieges, the establishment of the engineers' department in the Peninsula was as underneath.

Engineers:
LtCol: 1
Captains: 10
Lieutenants: 12
Draftsman: 1

RM Artificers:
Sergeants: 3
Corporals: 3
Privates: 13

Field Train:
Asst Commissary: 1
Clerk: 1
Conductor: 1

Public Animals:
Horses: 0
Mules: 6
Carts: 0

To account for the extreme insufficiency of the above establishment it may be observed that, from the termination of the war of the Succession till the war of the French Revolution, England never put forth her strength as a great military power; but, happy in her insular situation, and confident in her naval supremacy, so utterly neglected her army, that, on the commencement of hostilities in 1793, her infantry, cavalry, and field artillery, were defective in almost every branch of their organization.

The first operations of the war made the defects of those arms apparent; and, from that moment, neither expense nor trouble was spared to improve their composition, equipment, drill, discipline, and tactics, till they each attained a very high degree of perfection. unluckily, however, for the engineers' branch, the only great siege in which the British were employed was carried on by the Austrian siege establishment, wich prevented the deficiencies of that arm becoming evident, except to the engineers themselves. May were the representations made at different times by various officers, urging the necessity for an improved organization of that service, and the instruction of the officers and men in siege duties, but in vain; and in 1811 the seige establishment of the empire was as imperfect and as uninstructed as in 1793.'

On pages xvii-xviii, entitled 'Preliminary Observations' it is noted that 'the army in Spain was unattended by a single sapper or miner till late in 1813.'

Letter from Lord Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, 11 February 1812 (page 224):

'While on the subject of the artillery, I would beg to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adding to the Engineers' establishment a corps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake anything like a siege for want of assistance of this description. There is no French corps d'armee which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners. But we are obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege.'

Sincerely,
K

Rad,

Cosė fan tutte!

Big Al

More completely, Cosė fan tutte, ossia La scuola degli amanti
Si, Big Al on TMP many do, unfortunately. Not a lot of love in this thread though.

@ Kevin. Well found, sir! And thankyou.

Rad,

You're very much welcome. I should have looked there in the first place. I have ordered an interesting book on the artillery curriculum at Woolwich, dated 1801. Now I have to find one on the total curriculum and see what the engineers studied, and if, in fact, it was the same as the artillerymen.

Sincerely,
K

Rad,

Well, I always feel 'warm and fuzzy' when you exchange posts with me. <;^}

Big Al

Dear Kevin
It was only with the establishment of the Royal Engineers College at Chatham was there a specialist education for the engineers apart from the Royal Engineers. I am sure I have covered this in the various books I have written.

I have a truncated version of curriculum in 1809 with the set books. Certainly it would be interesting to look at.

Stephen

Here's some more from Wellington on the subject after the costly assaults on Badajoz in 1812. This excerpt is taken from Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, Volume V, pages 255-256:

'Wellington himself, in a document-a letter to Lord Liverpool-that long escaped notice, and did not get printed in its right place in the ninth volume of Dispatches, made a commentary on the perilous nature of the struggle and the greatness of the losses which must not be suppressed. He ascribed them to the deficiencies in the engineering department. 'The capture of Badajoz affords as strong an instance of the gallantry of our troops as has ever been displayed. But I greatly hope that I shall never again be the instrument of putting them to such a test as they were put to last night. I assure your lordship that it is quite impossible to carry fortified places by vive force without incurring grave loss and being exposed to the chance of failure, unless the army should be provided with a sufficient trained corps of sappers and miners…The consequnces of being so unprovided with the people necessary to approach a regularly fortified place are, first, that out engineers, though well-educated and brave, have never turned their minds to the mode of conducting a regular siege, as it is useless to think of that which, in our service, it is impossible to perform. They think they have done their duty when they have constructed a battery, with a secure communication to it, which can breach the place. Secondly, these breaches have to be carried by vive force at an infinite sacrifice of officers and soldiers…These great losses could be avoided, and, in my opinion, time gained in every siege, if we had properly trained people to carry it on. I declare that I have never seen breaches more practicable in themselves than the three in the walls of Badajoz, and the fortress must have surrendered with these breaches open, if I had been able to 'approach' the place. But when I had made the third breach, on the evening of the 6th, I could do no more. I was then obliged to storm or to give the business up; and when I ordered the assault I was certain that I should lose our best officers and men. It is a cruel situation for any person to be placed in, and I earnestly request your lordship to have a corps of sappers and miners formed without loss of time.''

'The extraordinary fact that no trained corps of sappers and miners existed at this time was the fault neither of Wellington nor of the Liverpool ministry, but of the professional advisors of the cabinets that had borne office ever since the great French War broke out. The need had been as obvious during the seiges of 1793-1794 in Flanders as in 1812. That the Liverpool ministry could see the point, and wished to do their duty, was shown by the fact that they at once proceeded to turn six companies of the existing corps of 'Royal Military Artificers' into sappers. On April 23, less than three weeks after Badajoz fell, a warrant was issued for instructing the whole corps in military field works. On August 4 their name was changed from 'Royal Military Artificers' to 'Royal Sappers and Miners.' The transformation was much too late for the siege of Burgos, but by 1813 the companies were beginning to join the Peninsular Army, and at San Sebastien they were well to the front. An end was made to the system hitherto prevailing, by which the troops which should have formed the rank and file of the Royal Engineers were treated as skilled mechanics, mainly valuable for building and carpentering work at home stations.'

Napier had some comments on the British engineer situation also:

'To the discredit of the English government, no army was ever so ill provided [with engineers]…The engineer officers were exceedingly zealous…but the ablest trembled when reflecting upon their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service…the best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner…The sieges carried on in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the commonest resources of their art were denied to the engineers.-History of the War in the Peninsula and South of France, Volume III, p. 525-526.

In summary, it is correct to conclude that the Royal Engineers did not have the proper enlisted engineer troops required for proper field operations until 1813, and it wasn't until after the slaughter at Badajoz that the Royal Sappers and Miners were formed and organized. Further, the Royal Engineer Officers were not educated and trained propely for siege operations and were inferior to their French counterparts, as was the Royal Engineers as a whole, and it took the Royal Engineers almost twenty years to at least attempt to catch up with the French engineer arm by finally adding engineer troops to the branch. Further, it is definite by the evidence offered that the education of the Royal Engineer officer was inferior to that of his French counterpart, especially when it came to conducting siege operations, of which the engineer should be the duty expert.

Sincerely,
K

"A missing letter from the Duke of Wellington" Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume XXIV, Issue 8498, 19 October 1889, Page 5:

link

Originally published in "The Athenaeum" (London), No. 3209
17 April 1889.

Well Kevin. That seems to seal the issue.
I know Napier could be ascerbic too but he was there and this seems conclusive.

Rad,

It surely does for me also. Finding accurate source material is always a lot of fun and very satisfying. Intrestingly, one of the sidenotes that I found is that there was always more than one British engineer officer at the sieges, so I would suppose that it takes more than one engineer to plan and run a siege. There was always more than one French engineer officer present also.

Sincerely,
K