"British seiges" Topic

It is a perception that the British were not the most expert at conducting seiges in the Napoleonic era.
From my limited reading, even seiges in India or in the Low Countries seem to have a slap-dash feel about them as opposed to the scientifically conducted affairs of other nations. Certainly in the Peninsula, British seiges are notorious.
Are their solid reasons for this?

Wellington was impatient at this sort of thing

Yes. For strategic reasons they didn't have time to bring up siege artillery, open a breach etc, etc.

Jones. Journals of sieges carried on by the army under the duke of Wellington, in Spain, between the years 1811 and 1814. 2nd edition. 2 vols. 1827:

Vol 1:
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Vol 2:
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1846 edition in 3 vols:

Vol 1:
link
Vol 2:
link
Vol 3:
link

Seringapatam seems to have been done OK.

Wasn't some of the problem in the Peninsula a lack of sufficient siege cannon?

Lake. Journals of the Sieges of the Madras Army, in the Years 1817, 1818, and 1819. 1825.

link

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Dear Raducci
There was a step change in the perception of sieges. Napoleon avoided them and only conducted a few of them apart from the Toulon experience.

Wellington was in a difficult position. He needed to quickly take the places that dominated the road network in Spain before he was outnumbered. This was always a race against time. He also did not want to give the French the means to take the Portuguese forts by giving them a siege train.

It is interesting looking at the facts rather than Wellington as a politician blaming everybody else. The Royal Engineers had as many engineer officers as the French Army despite the latter having many more fortresses and other works.

Wellington had a siege train that he decided not to commit until 1813.

In the 18th century, the defender could surrender with honours of arms once the breach was practical. Napoleon stated that he would guillotine the commander who surrender in this manner. The cost of life on both sides would be large.

The personnel present from the Royal Engineers and Artillery were consisistent dating back to the 1796 sieges and blocks, Copenhagen (1801 & 1807) then into the Peninsular.

The lack of equipment was a problem. Also the expertise being spread among the RE,RA and Staff Corps. Certainly an area that interests me greatly to find facts rather than supposition.

Stephen

The late Dr Gordon Bond's book 'The Grand Expedition' does a very good job covering the British invasion of the Low Countries prior to 1813.

The longer the siege the greater the chance of something going wrong with your plans, supplies, disease, sorties, reinforcements, weather , etc.

You know, Dr. Summerfield, as always, raises interesting points – the Napoleanic Wars were much more about strategic maneuver than some of the previous conflicts, in which sieges figured more prominently – plus, Napoleon usually got what he wanted without a siege – I mean, for all the times he marched into Vienna, he besieged it exactly never

To be fair to the Brits, I suspect the expertise in staging sieges seen in the early 18th century may not have been as widespread even among other nations during the Napoleanic Wars

A narrative of the campaign in India which terminated the war with Tippoo Sultan, in 1792: with maps and plans illustrative of the subject, and a view of Seringapatam.

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Narrative of the operations of the British army in India, from the 21st April to the 16th July, 1791; with a particular account of the action on the 15th of May, near Seringapatam.

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Good summary, Summerfield!

Sorry Stephen couldn't resist it! :o)

I think the key point was the time factor.

Wellington was always outnumbered strategically and had to bank on the French not being able to concentrate against him. Hanging around to conduct sieges of places he could not allow to sit on his supply lines was a high risk activity.

Things were done it what may have not been the ideal way. Wellington new the risks in both staying and not taking the places concerned. These cost him and the Army dear.

Witness his reported emotional response to the carnage at Badajoz, where he lost more British troops than in most of his field actions.

Dear Trajanus
Thank you for a new pun upon my name. I have heard many but not that one.

It is certainly an area that I need to revisit. I have touched upon it in two of my introductions to reprints over the last year. It needs to be fully developed the interaction of the different arms that somehow Wellington despite the infighting won.

It is interesting that New Orleans was a defended position and the British Generals attacked using similar tactics. This was only the first attack. No artillery to speak of had been used. It was not an open battle but an assault upon a defended position. Something that I find so strange has been missed by many historians. The losses in taking the Great Redoubt at Borodino we could be comparable.

Time was as ever a problem for wellington as you have stated. Even the best of sieges taking the Vauban rules took 45 days. Wellington neither had the respources in guns, enigineers, men and material to undertake this type of siege.

In addition we are playing under different rules. The defender does not surrender. This brings out the other area. Once a defender refuses to surrender after a practical breach then there would be no quarter. This "law of war" dates back to Medieval Times. The problem as ever for Wellington was the populous were Spanish and technically friendly. Yes there was horendous carnage at Badajoz and Cuidad Rodrigo. Alas we forget upon the French hand in this for not surrendering let alone their attocities in the sieges of 1808.

This is as ever a difficult area but we need to be in the minds of the person of 1808 and not 2009. There are different moral codes thankfully. It is foolish to impose morality of today upon that of 200 years ago.

Stephen

I was just reading about this in Elting's "Swords Around a Throne."

Elting points out that Wellington had a few engineering officers in his army, but NO trained enlisted engineers, genie, whatever you wanna call them.

Every French division typically had a company of engineers attached, and then an additional company in corps reserve. The British had no such thing. So Wellington didn't even have the right specialist troops to conduct a siege in the first place.

Elting further points out an example of how this took effect. Siege parallels were trenches dug at an angle to the enemy fortification line, so that the trench advanced toward the objective without exposing itself to artillery. So the French defenders at Bajados observed a British engineer officer marking out the intended course of a trench with tape. The wiley French sent a man out to move the tape, and the resulting trench advanced directly into the muzzles of a French artillery battery.

This could be a problem.

The problem in Spain was not so much any shortage of siege pieces, but rather the shortage of transport animals to move them. Both sides were regularly leaving part of their field artillery in depot because of transport shortages. How could you expect them to cut that (or the commisary train) even further to maintain an adequate siege train?

Dear Widowson
You only need one Royal Engineer to plan the siege. The seniority is something missed by the rank orientated American authors. Elting did not understand the difference between the Genie and Engineer in the French Army.

British practice was little different from continental practice. The lack of a labour force was in part solved in 1811.

Dear rmaker
You are correct over the problems of transport. Again missed by many 20th century authors. Alas the Rivers and lack of canals in Spain caused a great deal of problems. The lack of horses meant that there was a greater reliance upon the oxen and mule trains. This meant that the average speed of these trains over level ground was only 1 mph rather than 3-4 mph for horse drawn vehicles. A march was barely 10 miles compared to over 20 mph for a horse drawn vehicles.

Another thing to remember that a 24-pdr would shoot the equivalent of its weight in shot and powder each day. That is at least three wagons of shot per day. The problems with the early sieges were the use of Portuguese guns that were cast in the 1650s. The siege artillery was that short. Peasants were paid to pick up shot that could be re-used. Even in the later sieges the number of guns were very small and not the 100+ pieces as prescribed by Vauban.

Remember that at least one RHA battery had to give up its horses for the Pontoon train in 1813.

The turnover in horses for the British Army was every 6 months in the Peninsular. As the number of horses in the Army had to be resupplied again within 6 months. The lack of suitable fodder etc… was a problem.

It is this boring subject of Logistics again that is so poorly considered by the car driver of today. Horses soon loose their conformation with a day without water or fodder. This would take at least a week without work to get back. You can drive a man with the statement there is food and drink at the end of the week.

The advantage of oxen was that if they were no longer of service they could be eaten.

It is with amazement that Wellington did as well as he did. There was so much against him especially dealing with four different systems at least within one country. The Royal Army (Infantry and Cavalry), the Treasury (Staff Corps and Train), Royal Navy and Board of Ordnance (Artillery, Engineers and Supply of Ammunition). This was compounded by the Portuguese and Spanish Army and commisariat.

Stephen

Steven,

'You only need one Royal Engineer to plan the siege.'

Do you have a reference for this? That may be true, but he has to be trained and skilled in siege work to be able to plan and execute one. Further, he has to be senior enough in rank to be listened to by his superiors.

'Elting did not understand the difference between the Genie and Engineer in the French Army.'

Could you explain this, please? My French/English military dictionary defines 'Engineer' as 'ingenieur, officier du Genie, soldat du genie, sapeur.'

'British practice was little different from continental practice. The lack of a labour force was in part solved in 1811.'

The British problem, engineer wise, was that their corps of engineer officers were not trained in conducting sieges and had little experience with it. Further, they had no enlisted engineer troops such as the French had (combat engineers and miners, along with pioneer (construction) troops. Further, the French also had a highly trained corps of topographical engineers. The French gave their Corps of Engineers enlisted troops (sapeurs du genie, mineurs, and ouvrieres-combat engineers, miners, and artificers, respectively) in October 1793. The British didn't do that until 1811-1813.

Sincerely,
K

Remarkable really that the British in the Peninsula, for all their ineptitude, inexperience, and lack of suitable personnel managed to capture as many heavily defended French strongholds as they did.
In a Napoleonic league table of fortresses captured against resistance of any determination- I wonder how the various nations compare?

Tangentially to this, it always strikes me as a pity that the Napoleonic wars haven't yet been given the full Mel Gibson historical treatment.
Perhaps this could be it then- a remake of the Pride and the Passion. Mel as a US Navy officer teaming up with the French and Spanish to capture the psychopathic Duke of Wellington's main stronghold at Badajoz and help free Spain from occupation by the hated English.
That's got to be box office gold dust….

'There was a step change in the perception of sieges. Napoleon avoided them and only conducted a few of them apart from the Toulon experience.'

Warfare had changed. If you look at Napoleon's Maxims, you can see the importance he put on fortresses. When the French units were deploying into Spain for the second invasion after Baylen, the French divisions had a much higher percentage of engineer troops. Napoleon also believed that without fortifications offensive warfare was not possible (See Janis Langins excellent Conserving the Enlightenment: French Military Engineering from Vauban to the Revolution on the development of the French engineer arm).

'The Royal Engineers had as many engineer officers as the French Army despite the latter having many more fortresses and other works.'

Do you have the relative numbers of both engineer arms for comparison, and, if not, do you have a reference?

'It is interesting that New Orleans was a defended position and the British Generals attacked using similar tactics. This was only the first attack. No artillery to speak of had been used. It was not an open battle but an assault upon a defended position.'

There was only one British assault on Jackson's defensive position at New Orleans. There was an artillery fight on 1 January, which the British lost although they had more ordnance than the Americans did. There was also an American night attack on the British camp before the artillery fight.

'Napoleon stated that he would guillotine the commander who surrender in this manner.'

Do you have a reference for this supposed statement?

'Alas we forget upon the French hand in this for not surrendering let alone their attocities in the sieges of 1808.'

What about Spanish atrocities and their 'failure' to surrender when it was all but over. Their resistance during French sieges has been described as 'fanatical.'

Sincerely,
K

At the second seige of Badajoz, there were 21 engineer officers and 25 rank and file of the Royal military artificers (whose job, I would suppose, would be to lead and direct working parties of volunteer infantrymen).
This seems a fair number so Kevin's point about some gaps in their training seems valid.
Wellington's chief gunner, the very able Dickson, an artilleryman seems to have had a say in the conduct of the seige as well. Using a gunner might be a sign that the engineers were not as capable as they might be?
@ seneffe. I hope you do not think I was having a cheap shot at the British. I think such nationalistic forays to be laughable. We are not discussing the victorious Peninsula war but the British conduct of seiges there and elsewhere.
Badajoz, Cuidad Roderigo and San sebastian were all exceptionally costly and ended in an assault.
Even Wellington bemoaned his high losses.
Poor and improvised equipment, lack of time and inferior training of their engineers all seem plausible reasons.

Dear Raducci
The Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer officers were education at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich on the same course. I have written upon the subject in the introduction to Adye (1813) that will be published by Ken Trotmann next year.

Certainly they received the best scientific education available in Britain at the time. Now how that compared to France is a debate I wish not to enter as it becomes rather subjective. The course during the Napoleonic Wars was run by a former lecturer from a French Military School that had been expelled by the forward thinking Jacobins who also guilotined one of the greatest French Chemists Lavoisier who did so much to improve the quality of the Gunpowder.

To go back to the point. At this time there were no difference in training between the gunner and the engineer. The best cadets often took up posts in the Royal Engineers.

The lack of formal training in the Royal Engineers were only remedied in the later period by setting up a specialist school in Chatham in c1811.

The achievements of the Royal Engineers has been much misunderstood. The first suspension bridges, Torres Vedras etc..

Just a comment upon the French Sieges of Sagagoza etc.. The French considered them rebels so would give them no quarter. The war in the Peninsular was a hard war. The French had treacherously taken over the government. It was also one of the unfortunate series of civil wars that engulfed Spain into the 20th century.

I would agree with
1. Lack of time.
2. Lack of suitable guns and equipment
3. Logistical problems in supplying the ammunition
4. Tactical problems of Wellington being outnumbered and trying to perform a siege in a limited time before the French could concentrate against him.
5. Wellington knew nothing of the technical trades of Engineering and Ordnance. He was the most disasterous Major General of Ordnance. He destroyed the good work of the Board of Ordnance and contributed to the initial poor performance in the Crimea. Under him each battery was reduced to 2 guns with barely enough horses to move one gun. It is educational to read Hime upon the subject.

I would not agree with the inferior training of the engineers. If you have not got the tools then what can you do. People have taken Wellington's excuses at face value rather than looked at them. He said that an 18-pdr is an 18-pdr. Well it is not. Different countries have different calibres. Dickson was using Russian 18-pdrs that had a larger calibre than British so the shot did not have the muzzle velocity to break the walls due to the high windage.

It is interesting that the Sabot upon which the ball was straped had a bigger influence upon the muzzle velocity than the simple windage of the ball to the bore.

The high losses are laid at the feet of Wellington who was told that the breaches were not sufficient. It is the time factor.

Stephen

'The Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer officers were education at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich on the same course…Certainly they received the best scientific education available in Britain at the time. Now how that compared to France is a debate I wish not to enter as it becomes rather subjective.'

No, it isn't. Either the education covered the necessary training or it didn't. You can find that out by looking at the curriculum and how it was taught. That is not subjective but objective. And the results for the period are quite clear-the French engineer arm was excellently trained and could operate and conduct the full range of engineer problems competently. The British could not. The French turned the engineer arm into a combat arm in 1793. It took the British almost twenty years to catch up. By 1789 the French engineers and their artillery arms had a world-class reputation, no matter what has been posted to the contrary. It was French engineers that established the American engineer arm in the War of the Revolution (1775-1783). The French had the best technical schools in Europe and the British and Austrians modeled their technical schools on the French model.

Besides Langins book already mentioned, there are other excellent books on the subject that can be looked at for engineering material on the French. Ken Alder's Engineering the Revolution is very helpful for artillery and Jean-Denis Lepage has two volumes out that may be helpful: Vauban and the French Military under Louis XIV and French Fortifications 1715-1815. Further, Frederick Artz' The Development of Technical Education in France 1500-1800 is full of useful information. There are two books by Belidor that are very useful: Oeuvres Diverses De M. Belidor: Concernant l'Artillerie et le Genie and La Science des Ingenieurs. You might also want to take a look at the chapter on British bridging operations in the book Insode Wellington's Peninsular Army 1808-1814 by Rory Muir, Robert Burnham, Howie Muir, and Ron McGuigan. I have found it to be very helpful.

'To go back to the point. At this time there were no difference in training between the gunner and the engineer. The best cadets often took up posts in the Royal Engineers.'

The French had tried that once and it didn't work. Separate training was better as the two 'savant' arms had different missions and skills that they had to have to function properly. That's why they set up the engineer school at Mezieres to properly educate and train engineer officers. The curriculum was split between classroom work and practical training/application. The engineers and artillery had to work together, but the training was somewhat different though in places complimentary.

'The lack of formal training in the Royal Engineers were only remedied in the later period by setting up a specialist school in Chatham in c1811.'

There is the issue-the Royal Engineer officers were not well-trained in the planning and conduct of sieges.

'The achievements of the Royal Engineers has been much misunderstood. The first suspension bridges, Torres Vedras etc.'

No, they haven't. The discussion is about sieges, not about constructing defensive works. If you'd like to widen the discussion to include other engineering projects we can do that, but the topic here is sieges, and the bottom line is the British had problems in Spain conducting sieges because of the lack of trained, qualified engineers to conduct sieges properly. Because of that Wellington had to resort to costly infantry assaults to take the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and San Sebastien.

Sincerely,
K

Stephen, as was mentioned earlier, a lack of seige experience amongst British engineers is a valid point worth considering.
Undoubtedly, creating fortifications and building bridges are things that could have been attempted on home soil, whereas conducting a seige needed to wait until demand in wartime.
The French and the Prussians (see the conclusion to the 1815 campaign) show proficiency.The British do not.
Although it is hard to quantify the spirit of British amatuerism, which could be a virtue in the cavalry or infantry, perhaps it permeates the technical corps with less felicitous results?
I would also emphasize the point that this may be one of several factors influencing poorly conducted seiges.Let's not trivialize our arguments by putting undue emphasis on aspects in order to win debating points.
I would look askance at your casual dismissal of Wellington's views on the matter. He was indeed a harsh task master but never without substance.

For all the criticism that Wellington has come in for in the past fifteen years or so the big picture on him is being largely overlooked.

The bottom line on Wellington is that he was a great captain, one of the best commanders that Britain ever produced, and he did much more than his assigned duty.

While Spain and Portugal were secondary theaters of war and Wellington's army was small compared to other armies in the field during the period it became an expert army and Wellington, his subordinate commanders and staff were able to deftly combine the British, Portuguese, and assorted German units into an effective fighting force.

Further, Wellington developed his own army staff and while tailored to his army it is one of the unsung innovations and developments attributable to Wellington alone that is largely overlooked.

Wellington is probably a type of junior Marlborough in skill and practice, Marlborough probably being the best British independent commander in military history. Both Montgomery and Slim are of that lineage also.

Wellington, as Raducci succinctly states, was a harsh taskmaster, but generally speaking good commanders are. Both Napoleon and Turenne were, as was Davout, Soult, and Lannes as well as Suchet. While Wellington himself considered the Archduke Charles to be the best allied commander, I would have to go with Wellington.

And whether or not Wellington understood artillery and engineering, he certainly knew how to employ them and understood that his artillery was precious and there wasn't much of it. He is superior to Frederick in that case, as Frederick never understood artillery or engineers and those arms under his command, and well after (to at least 1816) were never developed as they should have been.

Sincerely,
K

"Wellington is probably a type of junior Marlborough in skill and practice, Marlborough probably being the best British independent commander in military history. Both Montgomery and Slim are of that lineage also."

Montgomery? An independent commander? Of Marlborough's lineage?
A mediocrity at best, and a purely political appointment. I was told by an officer who served under him "He only fought one battle in which he could have lost, and he very nearly lost it."

<<By 1789 the French engineers and their artillery arms had a world-class reputation, no matter what has been posted to the contrary.>>

I would suggest a close call with the Austrians, but quite possibly you are right.

<<It was French engineers that established the American engineer arm in the War of the Revolution (1775-1783).>>

The AWI is an excellent example for this discussion; if there was one area where the Continental Army bested their enemy, this was it – and the fact that the modern-day US Army Corps of Engineers undertakes major civil construction projects is testimony to its pedigree (btw, didn't some of the French "volunteers" map out the origins of Washington, DC?). During this war, the British were still using mostly "assistant" engineers – ie infantry officers who could draw a bit and do some maths.

<<It is a perception that the British were not the most expert at conducting seiges in the Napoleonic era.>>

I'm just trying to think of any European army, other than those of Great Britain and France, which actually conducted any major sieges (or at least more than one) during this period. Could it be that it was simply lack of practice?

Dear Max
The Russians, Austrians, Turks, Prussians, and Spanish conducted sieges. Now we are back to what is meant by major. Certainly there were a number in the Revolutionary period.

Most were blockades rather than sieges in the conventional C18th sense which is where differences in opinions come in over the conduct of so-called sieges in the Peninsular. It is upon definition and purpose.

Frederick the Great understood very well the artillery and engineering. Alas Duffy did not understand this in his first edition of Frederick the Great's Army and only partially remidied it. It is good to look at the writings of Frederick II and especially his maxims. These foreshadowed the "revolution" of the Napoleonic Wars. Prussian Ordnance was among the most advanced in the mid 18th century. The problem was that it cost so much and the Prussians lost so much of it in the first couple of years of the 7YW. The innovations were remarkable enough to have an unknown French Artilleryman study it and make a copy of the M1754 guns with chambers. Alas I cannot recall what happened to him…….

Ah yes he joined the Austrian Artillery because he had fallen out with Marshal de Saxe etc… It is interesting that the data given in de Scheele is pre 7YW for both Austrian and Prussian ordnance.

If you wish to learn more upon the Royal Engineers then contact the Royal Engineers museum. Certainly a very interesting place that puts a great deal into context of the rumour and supposition.

Stephen

Please Stephen tell me the "unkown French artilleryman" you refer to is not Gribeauval.
Could I politely indicate sarcasm does not further a discussion?
You generally seem a knowledgeable and helpful character and I think snideness should be beneath you.
If we are to discuss a possible shortcoming of British arms (amongst so many triumphs) let us seek the truth fearlessly.
For example: possible avenues could include, did the British learn "bad habits" from attacking relatively easy native fortifications?
Is there a possible problem with the administration of the technical corps who were a law unto themselves, in the British army?
Is there a continuing flaw in the Crimea with the abortive assaults on the Redan?
Let's keep this discussion positive.

'Frederick the Great understood very well the artillery and engineering.'

No, he didn't. He was neither a trained artilleryman nor a trained engineer. He also treated the personnel, especially the officers of those two arms terribly. Further Prussia had no artillery school until 1791 and no unified artillery system until 1816. Of the five major powers in the Napoleonic period, the Prussians had the least advanced artillery arm.

Duffy covers that subject adequately in both editions of his work on the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great.

The Prussian artillery was very advanced in the 1740s when von Holtzman came up with his new innovations, such as the ammunition box on the limber and the screw quoin. The latter was copied by Lichtenstein for his new system in the 1750s as well as the Prussian standardized gun calibers. Austrian gun carriages were very similar to the Prussian also.

The new and efficient Austrian artillery arm was a surprise to the Prussians in 1756.

Gribeauval had inspected the Prussian artillery in the early 1750s and brought back blue prints and had one built and tested. He did the same with the Austrian field artillery after the Seven Years' War. Gribeauval, who was a school-trained artilleryman and not an engineer as is sometimes incorrectly reported, was seconded to Austria at the beginning of the Seven Years' War because Austria did not have enough school-trained senior artillery officers to go round.

He was promoted for merit in the Austrian service to general officer rank, was completely familiar with the Austrian artillery system, both strengths and weaknesses, and is duly recognized as one of the greatest artillerymen of the period, if not in military history. His artillery reforms when he returned to France after the war were much more comprehensive and sweeping than anything the Prussians and Austrians did. There were only two things that he didn't cover-militarizing the artillery train and establishing a French horse artillery arm. He was asked about that by a subordinate and his reply was that they had accomplished enough for the time being.

Sincerely,
K

I'm still with Elting on this. Without trained enlisted personel, there is no way an army can conduct a siege as well as an army that DOES have trained personel.

It has nothing to do with national brilliance. It's just a matter of resources and priorities.

I agree with you and Col Elting. It's also a function of training and doctrine. In the savant arms the French had institutionalized excellence, and that started with them in the 17th century. They opened their first artillery school at Douai in 1679.

Sincerely,
K

Dear Raducci
It is English humour. I know I should refrain from it. Gribeauval was a great manager. He was an artilleryman and engineer. At this time there was not a difference in education between artillery and engineers. He survived remarkably in the politics of France.

Now having written upon the education of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, then I can see this. I had taken at face value someone else's concepts but I have now investigated this.

The Gribeauval system was a pragmatic one and what could be achieved despite the system.

Dear Widowson
Yes trained enlisted personnel is better to conduct a siege but I do not know of a country at the time who had this. The French did not employ them. They could not take Cadiz.

Dear Kevin
Thank you for your comments. Have a happy Christmas.

Stephen

Stephen,

And a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to you, too.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'Yes trained enlisted personnel is better to conduct a siege but I do not know of a country at the time who had this. The French did not employ them. They could not take Cadiz.'

Stephen,

The French corps of engineers consisted entirely of officers until 23 October 1793 when Carnot had them coverted from a staff organization to a combat arm. The miners were then transferred from the artillery to the engineers (these engineer troops had been under the cognizance of the artillery until this date and were sometimes commanded by an artilleryman instead of an engineer officer, which was not a good practice).

Twelve battalions of sapeurs du genie (combat engineers) were formed by this order. The next year two companies of balloon troops (aierstatiers) were added to the engineer arm.

Between 1800 and 1804 the engineers were reorganized which included a headquarters 'section' of 384 officers, including three generals of division and six generals of brigade. There were five battalions of sapeurs du genie and nine of miners. Additionally there were 340 quasi-military 'gardes' who were responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of various permanent fortifications.

In 1806 the train du genie was formed which was modeled on the artillery train. By 1811 the engineer train had six war companies and a depot company.

In 1808 the miners were formed into two five-company battalions and in 1809 both battalions were given a depot company. In 1813 there was an additional company per battalion. A veteran company was also formed in 1813.

A company of sapeurs-ouvriers was formed in 1811 to work in the arsenal at Metz.

Two additional sapeur battalions were formed in 1811 of four companies each. One was Dutch and the other Italian. A Spanish battalion was added in 1812.

Schools for miners and sappers were opened at Metz and Alessandria in 1803 and 1809, respectively.

As additional engineer troops, battalions of sailors, especially in 1809, were mustered for service with the field armies.

The divisions that went into Spain in the second invasion in 1808 had engineer units assigned for the prospective sieges and other missions.

In conclusion, there had been engineer enlisted men in the French army long before the Revolution, but had been assigned to the artillery arm. With the Revolution that changed and from 1793 on the French engineer arm ceased to be merely a staff organization of officers and was converted into an effective combat arm of highly trained troops who could besiege enemy fortresses, build bridges, and defend fortified positions as well as design and build field fortifications.

Sincerely,
K

'Gribeauval was a great manager. He was an artilleryman and engineer.'

No, Gribeauval was a school-trained artillery officer. He was a graduate of the La Fere artillery school, which did not train engineer officers.

'At this time there was not a difference in education between artillery and engineers.'

The French experimented with identical curriculums for artillery and engineer officers from 1755 to 1757. It was deemed unsatisfactory and the older system, of educating the artillery and engineers differently based on their respective arms, was resumed. In 1755 Louis XV's Minister of War the Comte d'Argenson rebaptized the artillery combined now with the Corps Royal du Genie as the Royal Corps of Artillery and Military Engineering in a bureaucratic move to make them both easier to administer. Education for officers of both corps was to be identical. This led to major confusion within the new corps which was made worse by the outbreak of war in 1756. The old system was revived after 18 months (see Janis Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment, page 93).

Further the engineering school at Mezieres had been founded in 1748 and had been producing engineers with a different curriculum to that of the artillery schools.

'The Gribeauval system was a pragmatic one and what could be achieved despite the system.'

The Gribeauval System was the most comprehensive and modern artillery system in Europe when it was developed. It was developed because of the failure of the old Valliere artillery system and was principally designed as a field artillery system to support a war of maneuver. It was designed to fight the next war and was developed in conjunction with the other French reformers who were revamping the French army doctrinally, tactically, administratively, and organizationally. It was a more thorough reform movement than the highly-touted and later Prussian military reform movement after 1806.

The Gribeauval System was indeed practical in nature-it was also innovative in the development of new material, much more modern than the British, Russian, Austrian, and Prussian artillery arms of the period. And what is usually overlooked is that an artillery system not only covers material, but also organization, training, doctrine, tactics, education and curriculum, as well as command and control. All of these elements were embedded in the Gribeauval System and that cannot be said or demonstrated by the other artillery systems developed by either the Austrians or the Prussians, not later by the British and the Russians. Through 1815 the French had the best artillery arm of any of the major combatants of the period and this was clearly demonstrated on many fields.

Sincerely,
K

"… an artillery system not only covers material, but also organization, training, doctrine, tactics, education and curriculum, as well as command and control."

You left off the uniforms and their colour! This is hogwash! An 'artillery system' only covers the material. Any fool knows that.

Kev, you are guilding the horse droppings here. <:^{

'You left off the uniforms and their colour! This is hogwash! An 'artillery system' only covers the material. Any fool knows that.'

No, you're incorrect. If you study the French reformers, and I've given enough references to cover that aspect, you would clearly see what Gribeauval was actually trying to do. His reforms covered every aspect of the artillery arm and his emphasis was on the creation of a French field artillery. That was done to facilitate a war of manuever which is covered in both Guibert and du Teil. An excellent summary of du Teil is contained in Quimy's The Background of Napoleonic Warfare.

The French artillery arm underwent a sea change of reforms during the period 1765-1789, and the inclusion of educational changes, doctrinal changes, as well as the establishment of a viable and up-to-date field artillery established a system that could not only engage in modern wars of maneuver but to become, in du Teil's words, 'that the great improvement which had been carried out in the artillery enabled it to take its place as a fully independent arm' and that the 'changes made in the French artillery were not due to mere imitation but were the result of tactical requirements.'

You might further want to consult Howard Rosen's excellent The Systeme Gribeauval: A Study of technological development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France which makes the case of what an artillery system was during the period. Gribeauval was one of the 'makers of systems.'

What you're erroneously calling an artillery system is, in modern parlance, a weapons system, which has to do with the weapons and ordnance itself-not with the entire package. You can also review the Austrian Lichtenstein System which also included organizational and educational changes along with the ordnance and ancillary vehicles.

The uniform changes are part of the organizational changes, so I actually included that without particularly naming it. Sorry that you couldn't figure that one out on your own.

Sincerely,
K

Again, you are incorrect.

As you are well aware, I have all of the materials you mentioned and have read them. I have had the late Quimby's work for well over 50 years.

Again, Kev, you are guilding the horse droppings here. <:^{

And, bye the bye, your insistance upon a 'unified artillery system' is also hogwash! One could have several artillery systems going at the same time – there is NOTHING WRONG with that.

Again, you are incorrect – nothing new there. <:^{

Dear Steven
Eloquent as ever. The Gribeauval Ordnance System like most pragmatic systems contained the work of previous generations.

Regimental guns were the M1757 and M1775 4-pdr Swedish Guns. These are referred to in Duturbie.

M1760 Valliere Siege guns as shown by de Scheele. The M1775 Valliere Siege guns were accepted into the French Army when Gribeauval was not in office.

The Coastal Artillery were not Gribeauval designs as he had no juridiction over them.

The Valliere Limber and the Siege artillery had changed little except modernisation of the wheels.

M1757 1-pdr Rostaing gun.

It was making the best of what the French had due to the financial problems stemming from the 7YW and their support of the fledgling US.

This makes the British Ordnance seemingly organised and straight forward.

Stephen

'your insistance upon a 'unified artillery system' is also hogwash!'

This merely demonstrates that you either haven't read the appropriate publications and books and/or that you don't understand them or artillery in general.

'I have all of the materials you mentioned and have read them. I have had the late Quimby's work for well over 50 years.'

Then you have learned nothing and clearly understand even less. Perhaps that is why you have to resort to snide, condescinding comments and being rude and sarcastic when you disagree with anyone instead of engaging in any type of discussion.

Sincerely,
K

'The Gribeauval Ordnance System like most pragmatic systems contained the work of previous generations.'

All systems, artillery or not, do. Gribeauval stated that himself. It is an evolutionary process. Some of them, such as the Gribeauval System, also contain new and noteworthy inventions/developments.

Again, there are no M---- anything in the manuals or the histories. Using modern designation nomenclature is not only inaccurate for early artillery systems and innovations, it is also confusing. It is also highly inaccurate and doesn't help anyone in research or understanding. There were only four artillery systems in France between 1732 and 1827: Valliere, Gribeauval, AN XI, and Vallee. Any and all modifications to a particular still belong to that system. Employing nomenclature that is inaccurate for the period is not the product of historical research and inquiry.

Sincerely,
K

Dear Kevin
The Modelle system is an accepted nomenclature as you know well to define the precise modifications in France. It has been shortened and anglicised. This is the accepted nomenclature of the Royal Armouries and in Germany.

Can you explain where the Swedish guns, Manson guns, Rostaing sit? These are not Valliere the Elder designs.

Stephen

Stephen

'The Modelle system is an accepted nomenclature as you know well to define the precise modifications in France. It has been shortened and anglicised. This is the accepted nomenclature of the Royal Armouries and in Germany.'

Not during the period we're discussing unless you have a reference for it. The 'M' terminology (meaning model or mark) was not employed with the French or anyone else's ordnance of the period. It is a twentieth century development and is also used in the United States and is used currently. If you have a publication of the period which uses it I would certainly like to see it. If not, then it shouldn't be used as it is inaccurate.

The other ordnance does not belong to any one system. They are additions or adoptions and should be classed as such. If they were used in addition to the system being discussed and were not abolished I would submit they are also part of that system. Instead of trying to categorize 18th and early 19th century ordnance with modern nomenclatrue, I would suggest placing it where it belongs and calling it what it is, not what you'd wish it to be.

Sincerely,
K

"Perhaps that is why you have to resort to snide, condescinding comments and being rude and sarcastic when you disagree with anyone instead of engaging in any type of discussion."

Do I hear the diesels starting to roar as the red herring bus "Tarnich the Glory", out of Norwich, prepares to go to sea?

Kev, it is hard to engage a parrot in a discussion! <:^{

Polly want a cracker?

Dear Kevin
"The other ordnance does not belong to any one system. They are additions or adoptions and should be classed as such."

They were all part of your much vaunted Gribeauval System that was not referred to as such in his lifetime as far as I am aware. It was only termed in Victorian times it seems. I have never seen reference. Therefore we should not be calling it the Gribeauval System.

Now I have listened and the Royal Armouries plus other European scholars have used the terminology whether Modelle or M??? Interesting that it is used by the Musee de L'Armee. So I will continue to use it and this is not to annoy you but as an attempt to be precise which is so important.

There were three changes in the elevating system of the Gribeauval Howitzer. How would you define the difference in a short form. There were three different forms of the Long Siege pieces in use that were in use in the 1780s. There were four different Swedish gun tubes etc….

This makes no scientific sense. Ordnance can be measured, drawn and weighed therefore these are facts not supposition. I have now drawn three different versions of the Field Artillery of the Gribeauval System.
Stephen

Stephen,

Absolutely! It makes perfect sense to do so. Nothing wrong with your doing it that way. As you say, it clarifies discussion.

Kev, seems to pick and choose his terms – remember 'optics' – without regard to period use. But God help anyone else who does so!

I recall a statement by William H. Muir III regarding Kev defending 'positions'. I will try to find it and re-post here. It was quite telling and poignant

Steve

Gentlemen none of your suppositions or conclusions have been supported by any citations from any sources at all. You are not using any type of historical inquiry to support what you believe is correct. It's interesting, but it isn't history.

Sincerely,
K

Oh, please ….

Enough of the twaddle, already!

LOL

You state:

"Gribeauval had inspected the Prussian artillery in the early 1750s and brought back blue prints [sic] and had one built and tested."

Yet, the blueprint, a cyanotype process, was developed by the British astronomer John Herschel in 1842.

Your material should be used with extreme caution, as it is clearly unreliable. <;^}

'Yet, the blueprint, a cyanotype process, was developed by the British astronomer John Herschel in 1842.'

You are exactly correct. I should have used the proper term, which is in the manuals. Gribeauval brought back plans of both the Prussian and Austrian field pieces in order to construct them to test.

Sincerely,
K

'They were all part of your much vaunted Gribeauval System that was not referred to as such in his lifetime as far as I am aware. It was only termed in Victorian times it seems. I have never seen reference. Therefore we should not be calling it the Gribeauval System.'

It isn't my Gribeauval System. The material I have found is based on historical inquiry and research. However, renaming material on your own without a solid basis in fact and historical inquiry is incorrect and adds to the confusion about period artillery systems and you haven't helped in that respect.

'So I will continue to use it and this is not to annoy you but as an attempt to be precise which is so important.'

You can do as you wish, but it is still incorrect. I object to your manner of labelling as there is no basis for it in fact and essentially it is incorrect.

'This makes no scientific sense. Ordnance can be measured, drawn and weighed therefore these are facts not supposition. I have now drawn three different versions of the Field Artillery of the Gribeauval System.'

It is still a version of the Gribeauval System, just as the improvements and changes to the Lichtenstein System is still the Lichtenstein System. History is not a science-it is an art and it is supposed to be based on solid research and historic fact, and you cannot back up your labelling system with historic facts.

Yes ordnance can be weighed, etc., but that does not change the basic fact that you are attempting to employ a system of nomenclature that is 20th century and not used during the period. Again, it just adds to the confusion that has been on the forums from at least 2002. It began with Gribeauval being named an engineer, when he was not, and went from there. It isn't a good idea at all.

Continuing long and short-term errors is not what we're supposed to be doing. Incorrect information has been given on this thread alone on the Gribeauval System, French engineer education and organization, as well as British engineering information, all of which had to be corrected because it shouldn't be allowed to stand uncorrected. You may believe you're exploring the issue 'scientifically' but you're not providing correct information on any of the subjects that I just mentioned. As another poster brought up, you're very good at scoring debate points and you're very bright, but I don't believe that you're investigating the military art and science from the perspective of either a practitioner or a student of history. Some military history cannot be quantified as in a laboratory or with the scientific method. It has to be judged from a people viewpoint, for that is who wages war-people and not machines. I've given you reference material that I have found helpful. If you don't care to use it then you are selling yourself and your readers short. I do respect what you're trying to do, but I believe you're going about the process incorrectly.

Sincerely,
K