"Holger Herwig's "The Marne, 1914"" Topic

Howdy,

A useful reference (3 stars)

It is easy to write a positive review of a book, it is far more difficult to offer meaningful criticism. I had eagerly awaited Holger Herwig's new book, "The Marne, 1914," as there has been much recent research I hoped to see distilled in a comprehensive account of the campaign.

The book contains a more detailed overview of the German III Army operations on the Meuse and of the German VI Army operations in Lorraine and against Nancy than has been presented previously.

However, I found Herwig's writing style to be dense and his arguments hard to follow. In the prolog (on page xii), he argues the Marne Campaign to be the most decisive land battle since Waterloo. But in the epilogue (on page 319), he concludes, "the great tragedy of the Marne is that it was strategically indecisive." The thread connecting these two arguments is missing.

You don't always know what Herwig is arguing, but you do know what he argues against, but not always why.

Herwig dismisses recent controversy over the Schlieffen plan in one paragraph (on Page 40) that seems to boil down to, "everyone knows there was Schlieffen plan."

Herwig does not examine tactical actions or training for either side, nor does he look and low-level tactical action on the battlefield, but none-the-less dismisses assertions of the superiority of German tactical training and doctrine (on page 214). His dismissal is based on the failure of the German attacks around Nancy in Lorraine during September. Zuber had made the claim based on an evaluation of combat in the Ardennes during August.

Herwig presents casualty figures for the campaign (pages 315-316), but not in a format that allows an apples-to-apples comparison. Mosier, in the "Myth of the Great War," showed the Germans took two casualties for every five the Allies (Britain & France) took. Both argue that artillery ruled the Marne battlefields, but neither demonstrate how heavy artillery was effectively used during the maneuver battles of the Marne campaign. Remember, radios were not used tactically, and it is hard to string communication wire during a meeting engagement.

I disliked his recycling of the US Army WW1 Atlas maps – mapping prepared especially to support Herwig's text could have been useful and enlightening.

This book will be a useful reference on the Marne campaign, but for a good summary I recommend readers' go with Tyng's venerable, "The Campaign of the Marne, 1914" or Strachan's Volume I, "To Arms." Both are referenced extensively in Herwig's book.

Ponder on,

JAS

Sorry to hear that. The book is on its way. Herwig's book on Germany and the Great War was very good. His writing style does require close reading, but he packs a lot in to a paragraph. I'll still read it and see how I feel.

Thanks for the quick review.

Tyng and Mosier both have their critics as well. I did enjoy both (but not Mosier's attempt to do the same for WWII.)

I am reading it now and am enjoying it a lot, although I am only 50 pages into it. I don't read many books on WWI, but the opening campaign in the west has always been a fascinating subject to me. I like his writing style so far.

Thanks for that review. I'll still read the book of course. But I got to say the 'work' done in recent years by all 'historians' on the Marne Campaign is very partial and poorly written. It's embarrassing to compare their cheerleading to Tyng.

Zuber: Isn't he the dude who spent his military service in Germany and then stayed to get a degree? If memeory serves he claimed the German 1914 army was the best of all time after spending a lot of time translating *select* unit histories in the surviving archives. I strongly suspect he was highly selective in the unit histories he relied on and took the post-war (i.e. Weimar Republic turning to the Nazi Party) German story line hook, line, and sinker. His writing style is also disorganized and lacks any decent maps even though they would have been extremely helpful.

Mosier: Isn't he the MOVIE CRITIC turned historian because he could translate French? Did he think for a moment that what he was translating was the post-war work of bitter veterans? Didn't he claim the artillery of a 1914 German crops had many times the firepower (like a factor of 5 or 10) of a French corps?

If you read Zuber and Mosier and nothing else you wonder how it is possible the Germans were not goose-stepping through Paris in September.

Mosier's 'Myth' would have to be one of the worst histories of WWI ever. He vies with John Laffin for writing tunnel-visioned polemic that has neither understanding of historical objectivity nor rationality in the use of sources.
I enjoyed Herwig's The 'First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918', and this volume on the Marne is definitely on my wishlist. What references are cited regarding his dismissal of German tactical superiority – the evidence may be elsewhere?

Tyng's book is solid gold.

I thought Mosier's work was quite interesting when I first read it; I haven't given it a second read yet, or compared it to other materials.

Howdy,

As a historical miniatures gamer, I wish more military historians would write books similar to Zuber's "The Battle of the Frontiers, Ardennes 1914." That is books that take a look a regimental/brigade level tactical actions. Zuber selected the clash of the German IV & Vth Armies with the French Third & Fourth Armies on August 22nd, 1914. While he focused on the most decisive actions of the day: Neufchateau, Rossingol, and Ethe; he did not neglect the action at other locations. The book is a comprehensive look and the critical day in the Ardennes. The German unit histories showed these battles to be meeting engagements, not the French blindly attacking fortified Germans, as presented by others. Based on the day's events, he drew the broad conclusion that the German troops were significantly better trained than the French. I agree is writing style can be rough. His black line maps are similar to those used by George Marshall in "Infantry in Battle. I do wish he had consistently labelled the scale on each map. Given how the rest of the Battle of the Frontier went for the French, I certainly seems Zuber's conclusions were reasonable.

I found Zuber's arguments on the Schlieffen plan to be plausible, as well. Nobody else had looked at German war planning to the same level of detail.

Zuber's website: terencezuber.com

Zuber approach seems to be let's take a look at the details of these well-known events and see if the stories told match up. So far he has found significant discrepancies between the everybody knows version of the Marne campaign and what a detailed look a primary sources reveals.

I'm looking forward to his forthcoming book on BEF, "The Mons Myth." I understand it will be out in the spring 0f 2010.

As to Mosier, he asked the question why the differential in casualties. He cited Churchill's figures: In the opening campaigns of the war (Fall 1914), the Germans took 2 casualties for every 5 taken by the British and French. He concluded there were two factors to account for this: (1) a higher level of training, and (2) German use of heavy artillery (i.e., howitzers). Given the historical evolution of artillery larger howitzers in the 20th century – his argument seems reasonable.

I would think the ability to read French and German to be key requirements for a military historian examining the opening campaigns of the Grear War.

Which refernces do you find helpful for the histories of the Marne Campaign?

Ponder on,

JAS