"Cavalry vs Infantry: The missing factor" Topic

In the Waterloo camapaign there are several occasions recorded of infantry in line being ridden down by cavalry.

Sometimes this was due to explicit orders for the infantry to remain in line, on other occasions they were simply surprised by cavalry they couldn't see.

Hardly unique but just to simply illustrate a point.

In most rulesets I can think of, against all but the most wet behind the ears opponent and with a 20/20 birds eye vision over the battlefield these situations never occur on the tabeltop.

Is that reasonable or should an allowance be made in some way for this?

How do you currently handle this, if at all?

[EDIT]
Maybe I should clarify the point I am trying to make.

I am not really referring to whether it is reasonable that the infantry should get ridden down in such a situation or how a ruleset handles infantry when they are being rolled up.

What I am trying to get at here is that infantry simply won't get into a situation where they might be ridden down becuase of the above factors, maybe there is too much certainty in games though this uncertainty is beyond a simple dice throw to resolve.

In LaSalle, for instance, infantry in line that are attacked by cavalry get half dice. This means that they can still hold on, but there is a good chance that the cavalry will ride them down. I think it is reasonable to allow for this situation, especially if the rules (like LaSalle) permit the infantry to react by attempting to form square by passing a simple discipline test.

Malatesta agreed, I think most rulesets have reasonable mechanics for dealing with infantry when they are caught in line by cavalry.

The issue I wanted to address was more that those situations don't really arise under most rules or with most opponents.

You can see the 'hidden' cavalry, you are not so stupid as to move forward in line with cavalry sitting on your flanks.

There is maybe too much certainty.

Out tabletops are generally too flat but even if they werent we have an unatural birds eye view. Our 'commanders' are maybe too perfect even we as an army or brigade commanders know too much and are too effective and precise.

Though conversely would you want to play a set of rules that forced you to be as dumb as say the Prince Of Orange.

Depends on the rule set I guess.
I play Napoleons Legacy which is similar to Warmaster with regard to the command system. I could see how, with the cavalry player rolling good command rolls giving them extra commands, that a batallion in line could easily be caught out.

Also very hard to simulate the fog of war created by all that musket and cannon smoke billowing about obscuring sight lines. Add to that dead ground from rolling terrain and cavalry can sneak up on infantry.

In the rules I use we roll a die against the Infantry Brigade's morale. If the Brigade misses the morale roll, he is considered 'disordered' and fights at a signiicant disadvantage against the cavalry.

One approach would be a determination of threat. Infantry not allowed to form square unless they perceive cavalry as a threat.

If the player wishes to form square, check distances between cavalry and infantry, apply modifiers (in combat, bad terrain, bad visibility, distance, etc.), then roll to see if the infantry recognizes a cavalry threat. If so, they form square. If not, they won't form square with the assumption that troops on the ground don't recognize a cavalry threat.

Playing Black Powder at the moment and the possibility of big movement rates for the cavalry allow infantry to be caught a lot. Nap infantry have 'form square' special rule which means they form square when charged … but there is a small chance they will either not do it OR do it but be disordered meaning the cav will hit home… when the cav catch them in line without LOTS of support it tends to be all over for the infantry.

@Jamesonsafari
Exactly…

@Jagger2008
Yes I thought about something along those lines, I like the 'determination of threat' concept.

You could also extend that idea, like forcing a French unit to stop and deploy from column to line under certain circumstances.

@surferdude
Interesting.
I note you said 'allow .. a lot', does it actually happen a lot in practice or its just 'quite possible but unlikely' to happen in reality.

It can happen quite often in Piquet (classic, I mean), and has. The system is very polite to players, and always permits them enough rope to hang themselves, should that be their desire.

BX – can't qualify it personally – probably played around 20-25 games now (not all Naps though) and it's happened a few times, but then again it happened twice in a game. Cavalry can also charge shaken squares which is different to what was being asked as the squares are normally shaken by supporting fire etc.

But wouldn't like to put a figure on how many times it will happen – seems to fit in with my 'view' of naps which could of course be way out anyway – but we are having great fun!

Played through a 'test' of Lasalle this afto and it has a similar type of mechanism which worked as well … cav charge home and in the beginning of the next move before combat the infantry can test to form square (didn't fail in my little play through so can't say what would happen if it did).

Rich 'all this naps is keeping me away from what I should be doing' Jones

The issue I wanted to address was more that those situations don't really arise under most rules or with most opponents.

I should mention that LaSalle also gives a 50% penalty for infantry caught in square when attacked by other infantry--good combined arms tactics can win the day. If you have infantry in line and your opponent approaches with infantry and cavalry, he potentially can overrun your position.

The discipline test for changing formation once charged is also a good mechanic for creating a bit of the fog of war. (Many rules use this type of mechanic.) It's simple and avoids a lot of extra rules writing.

"Is that reasonable or should an allowance be made in some way for this?"

Depends on the rules, in higher level sets (where you don't generally bother with piffling little unit slike battalions), it is factored into the combat results.

For lower level sets, you need mechanisms to reduce the godlike ability of players to always position their units perfectly. These usually involve reducing player control, be they by random activation, piquet style impluses or some sort of written order system. Some players don't like these sorts of things.

One unbalanced thing that I see in all(?) Napoleonic ruleset is that the terrain and rules do not represent the many obstacles to the movement of formed bodies of horsemen. Calvary can pretty much move at full movement rates and charge anything they and the 300 foot tall general can see. If the age had steam/gas powered agricultural machinery that we are familiar with our entire lives, well okay, but that is not what was. Fields were fenced, ditched, diked, walled, enclosed by living fences. Fields were protected against cattle (and horse) sized animals. Fields were small and usually no longer than a comfortable pull of a plow by ox or horse. They could turn around and rest before the next furrel, not like a big tractor. Small woods were everywhere on the poorer soil (no convient lumber yards to shop in then). Streams were surrounded by useful plants, bushes and copperage or damed for fishponds and power or ditched to dry swampy land for crops.

Yet, our little lead horsemen can charge any and everywhere without ever going arse over teakettle. Ever see a rule where a charge into the unknown sent a bunch of dragoons into a 7 foot deep drainage ditch? I think in reality they had to pick their spots. In reality infantry had protection and time due to the terrain that we are too lazy to put on the tabletop and deal with.

Having said all that, there were also other areas that were much more open than we appreciate. I have seen a series of 1890 photographs of a rural area that I lived in in Maine (US) and was surprised by how open and clear of features it was. Now, there is some brush, and trees. I think that then any brush & trees were gladly cut for use and areas of grass were maintained for cutting hay (no automobiles!) and for pasture.

So I think that in Napoleonic times we also would see some areas very good and open for calvary, and large areas of poor, difficult and dangerous going for calvary. But not everywhere!!

In my own system Charging is NOT automatic, you need to pass a Charge roll derived from a table of modifiers which are based on a matrix of adversaries and their type. For example, you have to cross-reference the chargers compared to your target to get the base percentage chance. This is modified by situational factors to arrive at your Charge roll.

If you roll under and succeed then great but if you fail your chargers are in trouble. Any unit that fails to charge must move to within 150yds of the intended target and halt. So if you try to initiate a charge you'd had better ensure you have all the odds in your favour to get in going. If you halt in front of an enemy who can shoot you, your failed chargers are going to be in a world of hurt.

In the case of a Cavalry unit charging and enemy infantry unit in line the base chance is very high compared to if that infantry was in square etc. But it is not 100% assured your cavalry will charge unless your modifiers take you over. If you fail to charge an infantry line and have to halt within 150yds from them you can imagine the problem…

Also, if the charge is successful the target unit must pass a Morale check. If they fail they will become either:

Cautious
Shaken
Demoralized or
Routed

Now, if the enemy is cavalry and the target is an infantry unit in line the negative modifier for them to stand in line is -80%. This is a huge negative and usually ends in that infantry routing and being hacked down by the cavalry. However, sometimes you may gain certain situational factors such as secure flanks, rear support, experience etc that actually reduce the negative and allow the infantry to stand. If this happens (and it IS rare) the enemy cavalry now are the ones in trouble. If the line holds (good morale) the incoming defensive volley can devastate the cavalry collapsing their Elan causing their charge to grind to a halt in a subsequent morale check or even fall back as written above and even rout.

My system is all about Morale and its effects, rarely will two bodies clash face to face in melee. It usually ends with one side pursuing the other and hacking them down. But sometimes, just sometimes they do meet and the consequent mechanics of the system make for intense situations where things are in the balance such as this.

I think you will find most systems will do this anyway in one way or another depending on the scale. Incidentally, I do not force players to form square if confronted with cavalry like some systems do. I find this way too restrictive and inaccurate. There are many cases of Infantry facing cavalry in line for one reason or another, such as insufficient time to form square etc. Allowing the players the choice is I feel, what makes games more exciting because sometimes they take chances that can be pulled off. And when they do they are remembered and talked about for years.

Shane

A line of fresh veteran infantry in 3 ranks should be able to stand their ground against any cavalry charge so long as neither its flank nor rear is exposed (difficult to achieve if there are gaps in the line). For a double rank line it might be little more dicy (thats why on occasion the ranks would be doubled to 4). The advantage of the square is the elimination of flank and rear.

Rob

I'm with Rob. Lines could stand up to cavalry just fine – if there was no way around their flanks. But a battalion with open flanks in the open could have a problem. Perhaps that should be the factor that decides the question. If your infantry unit does not have flanks secured – it had best form square. Otherwise – some disadvantages flow.

BC

In my preferred set of rules Empire, infantry has two chances as the non phasing player. If approached by cavalry (not charging) you have options to try and form square. In the presence of combined arms tactics that might be a very bad idea. Similarly, if charged you have a percentage chance of forming square based on the distance the charge started and your training level. It seems to me to be an elegant solution to gameyness. Order chits as found in games like Johnny Reb for simultaneous movement is also a good way to "keep 'em honest."

As far as not enough terrain present that can be an issue. We were very big on cluttering up the battlefield and made things like fences, light woods, streams, etc. disordering terrain for cavalry. Plus the one I particularly liked when refereeing: put a marker on a terrain feature with a randomly generated effect on movement and cover. That way the road you are attempting to charge across turns out to be a sunken road. All assuming a meeting engagement or an attacker-defender game. So yes, I've seen it fairly recently.

In my rules, if cavalry catch infantry not in square the infantry are just dead. The infantry have a good chance of forming square though, if not already in that formation.

Cavalry charges work different in my rules. You don't just move them into contact with something and fight.

In almost every Napoleonic rules set I have seen, squarwes are at a big disadvantage against artillery. If you have a battery or two up with those cavalrymen the infantry is not so likely to automaticly go into square. If they do, then threaten with the cavalry, and thin them out a bit before you charge.

Interesting stuff.

As ever when Shane outlines his rules I find myself nodding in agreement, probably becuase we both have more interest in the micro rather than macro scale of tactics.

That said this isn't really what I am trying to get at.

As only 2 or 3 of the posts above seem to have 'got it' I am clearly at fault for not being able to articulate what I am really getting at, so to try and drag this topic back on target let me explain further.

Whether cavalry makes a charge or not, whether you manage to form square or not, whether you decide to receive the charge in line and survive or not are all really the next phase in the process.

What I am getting at is really adding some aspect of 'Fog Of War'.

If you have say a 3 Battalion attack to retake LHS you aren't going to send them up in line when you can plainly see a cavalry regiment on the tabletop waiting to take you in the flank, unless that is your a novice and think you can beat the odds. A seasoned veteran will figure out he is most likely to get ridden down and will form square before attacking or some other such tactic.

Equally the Guard won't sit there on the tabletop while the 52nd wheels on to their flank and then only decide to react after being fired on.

As Jamesonsafari put it "… very hard to simulate the fog of war created by all that musket and cannon smoke billowing about obscuring sight lines. Add to that dead ground from rolling terrain and cavalry can sneak up on infantry."

Jagger2008 hit the nail on the head when he remarked about "reaction to threat perception".

Currently our units are almost psychic in there ability to detect threats and react to them. Most of the topic so far has been about how to resolve 'what to do' once you have decided what it is you want to do, what I am talking about is the phase before you decide what you want to do. It is about maybe preventing you from even trying to do something because in reality you wouldn't yet have 'perceived the threat'.

At the moment you are back in 1815 with Army, Corps, Division, Brigade, Battalion commanders in a vulcan mind meld with access to sattelite imagery.

The idea is to put some shades on the all seeing eye, and frustrate your ability to command a unit.

It involves to some degree having a unit automatically DO something when it 'perceives a threat' or maybe to NOT DO something until it 'perceives a threat'.

This is above, beyond and before any existing resolution system.

You want to form square but the unit won't because it doesn't yet perceive the threat. A unit gets fired on and even though you don't want it to it stops, turns to face that threat and deploys instead of pushing on.

Whatever level you are gaming at we want frustrate your ability to control the levels below you by recognising the limited on the ground knowledge they would have had and then restricting the way they can act as a consequence.

Ahh,

I have seen situations where for example, a division of infantry is in column marching forward. Across the table seemingly miles away enemy heavy cavalry appear and begin to move forward to counter the threat, yet they are still so far away they could hardly be seen to be a possible threat.

However, the player, who, due to scale being 300ft tall can see them very clearly. Subsequently he orders his btlns into square and within a few moments in time he blocks the threat…

To this kind of situation even in a smaller situation I had no idea what to do. I had thought about it long and hard and came up with my own rules for sight distances in my own engineer rules which give you a distance where you can perceive a cavalry threat and react. Also, we use engagement ranges also for cavalry vs infantry. I also introduced a "Reaction Time" chart that forces a set amount of time to elapse before a unit can react to enemy actions. This chart is split into two sections, "New Sightings" and "Previously seen Enemy Sighting".

Reacting to a new (previously unseen) threat takes longer depending on the experience level of the unit at threat. We split our turns in 1/4's so the unit might lose several 1/4's before they can react and change formation. Also, a unit that has already perceived the threat (previously seen the enemy) may also have to react by 1/4's to a charge depending on experience of the unit with Veterans usually not needing any time to elapse before being able to begin forming square, which in itself takes time.

This system for us, works very well and keeps players honest because they realise that the threat could be very serious. Also, if you know your troops are of poor experience you soon understand in our system that having your troops in square already is a very good idea. But this also makes them vulnerable to other enemy action.

I enjoy seeing situations where a unit is caught with not enough time to form square suddenly get hit by a fast approaching enemy cavalry unit that proceeds to hack them down and run over them because the infantry unit did not have sufficient time to form square or failed a morale roll and ran anyway.

Also, in my system, a unit in the process of changing formation is considered "Unformed" during the elapsed time it takes. This increases the chance of the enemy charge succeeding to go ahead and also drops the morale of the enemy unit because they are unformed…I have seen this situation end very badly for infantry…

Shane

To add some more examples to illustrate the point, you move cavalry up into what we will say is dead ground, as soon as you get into charge range the enemy infantry form square ie the move before you even begin to charge.

Its not a question of bringing along artillery too punish the square its a question of how did they know to form square in the first place.

At Waterloo it was the Guards I think that stood up and opened fire at a range of 15yds, its recorded that the range was so close they didn't even bother to shoulder arms before they fired.

How is that going to happen on the tabletop?
I know exactly where the Foot Guards are becuase they are there on the table and I am not going to walk straight into them, I will deploy into line first.

But what if despite my ordering them to halt and deploy they carry on becuase they currently dont perceive a threat. Control at this point is probably limited to platooon level and there is little I can do (or should be able to do) to effect it.

You can apply that to any attack column approaching the ridge line with troops on the reverse slope.

Aren't (or can't) most of these situations be covered by the element of chance in games, namely the dice? I mean, isn't that the effort in games to offset the effects of the 300 foot general?

An orders and command point system can help. So the 52nd has been ordered up the hill while, on the other side of the field, the 19th, ordered to hold the ridge, is perfectly positioned to smash the enemy 57th.

But you only have enough command PIPs left to order one. And if you add in that units must follow orders until changed, unless you spend a PIP the 52nd is charging and the 19th is not…

Grande Armee removes a lot of your control over units whenever they are within 6" of the enemy. Essentially once you commit a unit to the line it is very hard to get it back out again.

There is a good discussion on this point in the recent Issue 20 of "Batlegames".

A number of points about adding the effects you are referring to:
So then, take this example of a surprise cavalry attack upon infantry:
1. An intital encounter or an ambush can be overseen and managed by an umpire.
2. A lot of rules have tests to see if a unit reacts in time; an "emergency" test to do things.
In this they have probably ruled out formation changes unless they are ordered by the divisonal general through the leading regulating brigade/battalion.
3. The formation commander`s reaction can be tested.
So can he see the threat – is there a line of sight?
4. Additionally, the initiatives of each unit commander or each unit`s reaction itself can be tested to the cavalry threat.
Can the cavalry be seen at the start of the turn maybe… if not, then perhaps it ought to be made more difficult to react?

@Shane
Yeah I like the idea of regarding troops as unformed whilst changing formation.

The delayed reaction is interesting, though I still think there is a need for something more explicit as well i.e. the idea that the unit will automatically carry out certain actions in some situations.

I was reading the other day about French infantry tending to fire at will rather than in volley which gave them a higher effective fire rate but made it very difficult to cease firing and get the unit moving again.

So combining this, as an example, if a unit is fired upon and brought to an involuntary halt (say through a reaction test/morale check) then it will automatically deploy to line and attempt to engage in a fire fight with the threat. Whilst deploying it is unformed and very susceptible to a charge, if it does fully deploy however it comes back under control and you can attempt to move it forward again.

Dear All,

I`m not sure about a 'determination of threat'
Cavalry always were a potential threat to infantry and generals tended to know if the enemy had cavalry or not and so therefore one could justify players decisons to form squares (or closed columns) and then advance. It is the generals who made the decisions re. enemy threats, and ordered certain battle arrays for their commands, not the units.

Again, it relates to c3, units should act according to orders and they would until they were surprised. At which point, if the infantry`s doctrine was linear, it was disasterous.

We have some confusion here because a lot of games rules do not have an orders system to mirror the reality… players are now in the habit of micromanaging battalions in grand formations; and the c2 methods of chits, pips, or points seem to reinforce the misguided notion that command and control was that decentralised and units could act freely.

Bravo Mr."X" for asking the question!

But on this other slightly different matter of deployment to line, you said:

"…if a unit is fired upon and brought to an involuntary halt… then it will automatically deploy to line and attempt to engage in a fire fight with the threat."

This apparently (deploying to line), was what French infantry were intended to do, but only once they had been staggered by the fire of the defending line of battle, and most columnar assaults were intended to be carried through in column.
We know from the many debates since the problems that the French had with doing so in the Peninsula and that this deployment was not automatically carried out, or often, the British-Allied counter-movement did not give them the opportunity.
I suspect that other armies would also attempt deployment from column if surprised. One, or two examples that I can easily recall is the Prussians at Ligny in Peter Hofschrorer`s books on the Waterloo campaign.

But you have in the Peninsula, many cases where the columns are at first "staggered", and then may be considered "unformed" if the counter-charge is made.

However, in my rules, because a French column would only be acting in accordance with its army`s doctrine, I have replaced these terms and states with a "disorder" if the formation change is not completed successfully.
Much depends on taste and how much you may want to break down the actions that constitute a combat as a whole, but that`s how I do it.

Just a few points, hope you find them useful,

Regards,

Mike.

Mike,
Some very good points, and I do agree with you to some extent.

I think it is somewhat debatable where control over the determination of formation lay, at Waterloo clearly Prince Of Orange made the determination rather than Wellington for the Hanoverians at several critical points and who ordered d'Erlon to attack in the formation he did is often debated as to whether it was Napoleon, Ney or d'Erlon but I will concede for the purpose of this discussion it effectively lay with a nominal 'force commander' to order the formation rather than an individual battalion.

That said it is also clear that it was decentralized to some extent in that individual units could and would change formation if a threat arose or circumstances changed subsequent to those orders i.e. it doesn't require the 'force commander' to tell a unit to form square if cavalry suddenly appeared or to deploy to line if infantry appeared unexpectedly the battalion commander would do this independently.

As you say the problem on the tabletop is (at least partialy) due to the ability of someone to micro manage all levels of an army during a game.

However I doubt any order and chit system alone is going to solve this however crafted.

As 'force' commander there is a huge difference between knowing the enemy have cavalry (we can assume for this discussion they always did) and knowing they are in the locale of an attack. You can extend this to infantry vs infantry attacks as well, there is a huge difference between knowing they are 'over there somewhere' and knowing they are precisely at a given point on the table.

The problem is that armed with that precise information a tabeltop 'force' commander can give orders to adopt formations or change formation that the 'real world' counter part would never have been able to do.

Prince Of Orange repeatedly manged to get his troop in line in the presence of cavalry, you can argue he was
a) stupid
b) suicidial
c) unware of their presecence at the precise location

I think you have to conclude it is (c)

You may argue that regardless it was his decicion to make and as such you as 'force commander' should decide just as he did but my point is that you are making decisions based on information he never had and this is leading to the critical events that shaped battles not occuring on the tabletop.

ScaleCreep has reminded me that I really talking about the 'fog of war' rather than specifically cav vs inf and this is true so taking your Penninsula war infantry vs infantry examples on the tabletop…
You as French commander know precisely where the 'reverse slope' is located and what forces lie there and you are not going to blindly plow into it as happened in history, you will use that knowledge to adopt the best formation at the last possible 'safe' moment, you may still be charged by the Brits simply becuase your opponent wants to do that but your aren't going to be surprised by that.

Actually I think this best illusrates how decentralized threat determination cna at least partial solve the issue but let me digress for a moment.

I dispute that it ever was the French 'intention' to carry through an attack in column, even in the Penninsula. I concede the problems they had and even that they may have not even have tried to deploy at times but I believe this can all be explained by 'threat determination'.

I believe it was there intention to move in column until shortly before contact with the enemy, thent o deploy into line, engage in a fire fight and then charge home.

I believe in the Penninsula despite orders to that effect, the unit commanders never reached the point where they would order the formation to deploy becuase that was determined not by a precise point but by threat determination i.e. you saw your proximity to the enemy.

Although it is very easy to sit the other side of the valley and see the brow of a ridge, as anyone knows when they stroll up the side of a hill with the slope curving away from you, the closer you get the harder it is to be sure where the brow is, its 20 feet in front, till you cross the 20 feet and see the slope curves away and its still 20 feet etc etc.

So the local battalion commander didn't order his troops to deploy when he should have, they then are completely surprised by the appearance of Brits and are given 2 volleys which drops the first few ranks this stops the column in its tracks, what I believe you refer to as 'staggering', they take heavy loses and a morale check stops them, thats what I call an 'involuntary stop'.
I believe the French next step would be to deploy in reaction to the threat but in the Penninsula at times there was insuffecient time before the Brits charged in for this to happen or to noticieable happen.

I agree totaly at this point the unit is effectively disordered, which is why it gets swept away.

'However, in my rules, because a French column would only be acting in accordance with its army`s doctrine, I have replaced these terms and states with a "disorder" if the formation change is not completed successfully.'

This where I am totaly in agreement with you.

The 'reaction' to a threat is I believe 100% bound to army doctrine i.e. it is not really in the hands of the tabletop 'force commander' at all and to take Shanes idea from this point until the Freanch have fully completed their 'reaction' they are disordered or unformed however you choose to label it (actually you can also add in his delay in reaction here as well).

This then gives you local 'determination of threat' with enforced or doctrine driven 'reaction to threat'.

This is not I hasten to add the complete Fog Of War system but it is (an attempt at) a solution to part of it…

Anyway being told I have to go to the gym more later if I get time…

Bravo,

"I doubt any order and chit system alone is going to solve this however crafted."

I think an orders system can solve it.

"…there is a huge difference between knowing the enemy have cavalry… and knowing they are in the locale of an attack. "

In reality, I don`t think there was much of an actual difference in these two points… the known prescence and potential danger of enemy cavalry was enough to encourage various divisonal commanders (on both sides) to order the column, square, and doubled line formations that they did at Waterloo.

"I dispute that it ever was the French 'intention' to carry through an attack in column, even in the Penninsula."

I think the advance of Girard`s divison at Albeura is an example of just this intention, coupled with an under-estimation of the resistance that the Spanish infnatry would put up. And there was not even an attempt in this advance to form a battle array, let alone deploy to line.
Engaging, that is to say firing on the Spanish with musketry was therefore considered unnecessary!

As for it being their doctrine… I`ll have to check with a friend who has the entire French Regs. If you can wait a while, I`ll get back to you – we could use the PM system.

However, you mention battalion commanders giving orders to deploy at "the right moment"… and so just few points here too:

1. Deployment was not meant to have been normally carried out in musketry range, unless covered by skirmishers or the troops were staggered.

2. If the French really had been decieved into thinking that the allied skirmisher screen in the Peninsula was the allied first line of battle proper (and this has been discussed recently on TMP), why then, did they not deploy once they were in sight of them… and the answer is that the intention actually was to carry through with the columnar assault afterall.
Officers would have known, once they had seen the allied skirmishers, that the main body was over the crest-line, because, after all French infantry divisions operated in a very similar fashion. They too used the skirmishing organisation of combined companies from the battalions in their divisons to screen the front and/or their flanks of their formations.

3. Again, the tendency is to think of individual unit actions, and what a battlion commander might do in tactical sitiuations. Where one should think first about the manoeuvre of grand-formations and the tactical doctrine of the armies involved.

Take care in the Gym!

Mike.

"I think the advance of Girard`s divison at Albeura is an example of just this intention, coupled with an under-estimation of the resistance that the Spanish infnatry would put up. And there was not even an attempt in this advance to form a battle array, let alone deploy to line.
Engaging, that is to say firing on the Spanish with musketry was therefore considered unnecessary!"

Yes agreed, I was originally going to write "(except where they considered they were attacking inferior troops)" but removed it for the sake of brevity .

But I only concede it as a form of 'overrun' where they considered the morale of the opposition to be so low they would run at the appearance of a French column which was not the case against say the Brits.

Talavera is a case where the British lines were visible to the French, but still the assaults were made in columns.
No deployments were made… apart from one and that may have been by French allied troops.

BravoX,
As I understand the issue, its as simple as using blinds. We play with alot of blinds, and only turn them over when requested and should the prerequisits be met. However, the blinds can be reinstated when a unit is out of anothers line of sight and "far enough away". This "return" to be a blind isnt typically as useful, but it does allow masking of formation changes.
If you want to create real chaos, let us forego blinds and utilize pure and simple mistakes: let the enemys commands be placed on the table in the correct spot, but let the "defending" general prior to the beginning of the game place stands of infantry where cavalry are and vice versa. Once the opposition is "nearby" or "in a position to spot/identify the enemy" then the units must be relocated to the right type and formation.
Heck you could even make a table for misidentification of troops modified by the abilities/characteristics of a general. (a cautious general could be informed by an umpire that the infantry command accross the valley was actually cavalry, in effect creating the cautious attribute).

Not everyone likes blinds and certainly on small battlefields they would not seem to be appropriate. I have read on this forum that people want to show all their painted troops, (ie what did I paint these for if all I am gonna do is push some cardboard or paper around?) but blinds can also be made from painted figures. You don't have to use only paper or cardboard. Instead, 2 or 3 painted figures overtop an enlarged base perhaps. To discourage misuse the blinds must come with some written description of the unit and formation.

Using blinds supplies you with much of what you are looking for. Perhaps this is a partial vehicle for modeling the tactical suprise you are wishing to discuss.

Shaman,
On blinds I agree on two points, yes they could solve part of the problem, but no one (including myself) likes them.

It may be that for certain aspects of the problem they are the only solution but I would regard them as solution of last resort, yes I know I want to have my cake and eat it .

But it is important to bear them in mind.

They are very useful when bringing on reinforcements to restrict the enemies knowledge of the size and composition of a force, no doubt.

Its a bit iffy whether they are of that much use in the center of the table even in a dead zone, the problem is you need to get them into the dead zone so everyone sees you bringing up 2 squadrons of cavalry which then vanish and become a chit so no one is really fooled.

One thing one could do and is something we do in WWII games sometimes (put a Panzer IV on the table no matter what)is to have the figures on the table but not the right ones … so the 'blind' is a unit of cav but only the owner knows what sort etc until they are 'revealed' …

"Talavera"
Interesting, worth looking at a bit closer.
I did a quick search online most accounts are superficial about formations and tactics though I did find this one:

"The French came on in three columns, each three battalions-strong, altogether numbering nearly 4,500 men from Ruffin's division. The most northerly of the columns, moving to the north of the Medellin, exchanged fire at long range with the 29th but went no farther. The other two columns, however, hit that part of the British line on the Medellin which was held by Stewart's and Tilson's brigades. As at Vimeiro the French attack was hampered by its formation and the outnumbered British brigades easily outgunned the French columns, sweeping them with fire and forcing them to a standstill. French attempts to deploy into line proved futile and impossible amidst the concentrated, controlled platoon fire from the 29th and 48th Regiments. After just a few minutes those at the back and in the middle of the French columns, unable to see what was happening up front but aware that something very unpleasant was happening to their comrades, decided not to wait and see for themselves but simply melted away to the rear, very few of them having fired any shot in anger. Ruffin's attack had ended in failure and his beaten battalions were pursued for a short distance across the Portina having suffered over a thousand casualties."

No references sited so make of it what you will.

The northern column exchanges fire but doesnt close, I wouldnt mind betting they deployed to line to exchange fire.

The other columns tried but didnt manage to deploy before they gave way.

This doesn't refer to Talevra directly but was something I came across a while back whihc made sense to me :) .
link

For commands at long distances, "blinds", or card markers would help. I think infantry and cavalry should all move at the same speed otherwise it would give their identity away.

While not a Napoleonics game, Infinity uses a lot of hidden-troop markers (assuming that the troops have the 'CH: Camo' ability). The rules specify that all markers move at the same speed, no matter the speed of the actual unit the marker represents.

Bravo,
I see you`ve added the Oman "column and line" thing into the mix…
Perhaps one should not think of French tactics as one-dimensional, and that in "encounter battles" (like Maida) they would manoeuvre in columns with the intention to deploy, or if the terrain allowed it (as at Austerlitz), they would deploy to line (or doubled lines) at some distance and then advance with the intention to engage.
I believe that this is another reason to re-introduce written orders into games.
Mike.

Well that was really only in respect of the question of whether the French would ever attack in column with no intention to deploy against other than inferior or shaken troops :).

Re:Rules
Agreed, actually I did agree with you before on the use of written orders it was only that I didn't think that just by themselves they would solve the problem.

A combination of written orders plus the automatic reaction to certain threats does I think look interesting.

How long did it take to form square? I saw some information recently that it only took 1-3 minutes. (I don't have the reference at hand). So failure was not likely due to a lack of time but due to a lack of discipline or organization strength or command attention.

billsfan,

"So failure was not likely due to a lack of time but due to a lack of discipline or organization strength or command attention."

Not quite so for Colborne`s brigade at Albuera – lack of command attention (suggestions to form column of the flank of the brigade was over-ridden) plus a lack of time due to weather and poor visiblity contributed to the brigade being ridden down.

Bravo,
Yes, agreed but only as long as those automatic reactions can be attributed to the commanders on the field rather than players in the game… and then taking account of the command structures that existed rather than artificial command distances or radii.

Our automatic reaction is based on time and troop experience which is modified by whether the enemy unit was previously seen or not. This results in a possible "delayed reaction time" the unit must endure before it can react to the new enemy action. During this time which can be from zero to an entire turn (based of 1/4 turn lumps) the unit cannot do anything other than follow what ever orders it had (we have written order sheets).

Once the reaction time has ellapsed the unit can then foe example form square etc which in itself takes even more time.

Many times I have witnessed units get hit (contacted) by the enemy before their reaction time has ellapsed and get crushed or react but was not able to form square in time and get hammered etc.

Also, this works for firing, a unit cannot proceed to fire at a previously unseen enemy unit until the appropriote amount of reaction time has ellapse. Many times this results in the firing unit unable to react and fire at the new target until the next turn.

Personally I and my group are so used to the "Reaction Tables" in our system I could not go back to playing rules systems that do not account for it. To us is is so natural and normal to understand that just because a new enemy unit suddenly presents itself as a fat juicy target does not always mean it can be fired at so quickly.

Reaction time is natural, normal and very realistic, it should be in every system that is scaled to the level of btln or lower. It is not so important at Brigade or Divisional level however, at these levels you might still introduce a reaction time period to countering enemy movements etc.

Shane

That`s just so Shane,
I have initiative tests which are based upon a general`s or a command`s ability to react. If they are not passed in the immediate turn then they may be later… but the reaction is neither automatic, nor is it guaranteed.

Ahh, well said Michael,

We also have Initiative ratings for every General officer in our system. Any command figure of Brigadier or higher has a rating which is probably (75%) of the time zero but the other 25% of the officers have a +1/4 or -1/4 Initiative rating.

What this means is that if that general is in direct personal command of the unit he has the ability to effect the time that unit takes to react to enemy action. For example, the Prince or Orange would have added a +1/4 onto the reaction time needed for the unit to react the the French Cuirassier charge…

Other officers might deduct a -1/4 from reaction, this means that the general is very experienced or quick minded as to be able to know what course of action to take or perceive a threat before it actually is a threat and thus reduce the reaction delay by 1/4 turn.

At Brigade/Division level I can see the same kind of initiative rules being used to react to enemy formation actions on the grand scale. We also do this through Order Activations which is indirectly related to his Initiative ability. A poor general will have a lower than normal CV (command value) rating thus his chance to activate orders has a higher chance to fail than other officers of the same army etc.

This is a very interesting and in depth topic, one in which I enjoy talking about.

Shane

Why did Napoleonic infantry feel the need to form square when their predecessors in the Seven Years War were capable of standing up to cavalry in line?
It's not as if there wasn't lots of heavy cavalry on SYW battlefields.
Clearly a square is essential if you don't have a solid line, but equally clearly, a line of steady infantry can see off cavalry without the need to form square. They did it many times on SYW battlefields.

Though just to be clear the 'automatic' reactions I have been talking are not meant to be actions that would of benefit to the player, they are meant as things that would disadvantage him, penalise him, slow him down and frustrate his 'perfect' plan. He is effectively losing direct control over his units for a period of time.

They would to some extent represent the natural reactions of the rank and file or junior officers be that as a result of training, doctrine, or just self preservation.

So the reaction to taking fire from a direction whilst advancing is to check the advance, the mass will slew round to face the threat and as the rear ranks compact up on the slowing or stopped front rank they will attempt to deploy out and the mass as a whole becomes unformed.

This would be, for arguments sake, counter to the player orders and wishes to continue straight ahead and charge.

With a unit that has been forced to halt, has become unformed and is engaging in a fire fight, the player would have little or no control over it, until it gradually regains order and as it does his ability to control the unit will recover.

So initially even though the unit will be deploying and firing the player has no control over it and would be unable to order an advance or direct the fire and can only look to try and reform his unit, as time goes on from the initial shock the unit will start to recover and his control starts to be restored, he would maybe have a greater chance of ordering a withdrawl than getting the unit to continue advancing but without further shock at some point his control will be restored.

So as well as reaction, we have a shock which freezes but dissipates with time.

Also the strength of the threat and whether it is new or not has a bearing, if say as a unit advances it takes light fire from a very visible walled enclosure on its flank, it will not have any impact or possibly it will cause the unit to drift away from that threat, but a new and strong threat cuases the unit to stop and turn. Either reaction is contrary to the players orders of just moving straight ahead.

So even with a Brigadiers initiative there will still be a period of time that the unit is beyond direct control, once control is restored it will no doubt react faster with the Brigadiers initiative but for a period of time he will be like Ney beating his horse in frustration.

With Veteran or raw troops the impact is the same, though no doubt with veteran troops control is restored faster than with raw recruits.

I can also see a defender using this to 'slow down' an attack whilst he orders up troops, and conversely the attacker finds his units frozen and can only watch as the enemy move his units whilst he waits for his units to 'unfreeze' hopefully before they get destroyed.