"Aimed Fire?" Topic

About trajectory….

A musket ball will not "climb" upwards. Gravity will always pull it downwards. If you discover a way to negate this, please send me the details, as I would like to patent this new, limitless energy source.

If you draw a straight line, projecting the line of the bore of the gun, the path of the musketball will always be dropping from this line. (Excepting if it comes out with a bad spin or last bounced off the bottom of the barrel bore.)
This is called the effect of gravity.

The outside of the barrel is thicker near the shooter and thinner near the end. Also, sights are farther from the center of the bore next to the shooter than then are at the open end of the barrel. Relative to this "line of sight", the musketball appears to rise and at some distance falls enought to intersect the "line of sight". This is sometimes called the "point blank range". Usually you want to aim at someone's chest when then are at this range. If they are closer, you hit them in the head. If they are farther away..

As the musketball continues to fly, it slows down quickly due to air resistance. A round ball is a terrible ballistic shape and loses a lot of energy pushing the air out of the way and sucking it behind it. The kinetic energy it has by virtue of its moving is related to its speed by KE=1/2 mass V x V. If it loses energy, it loses velocity. A musketball has a bad diameter to weight ratio compared to a streamlined bullet, which has extra weight in its tail (just so long as it keeps the pointy end pointed in the direction of travel.) Try throwing a ping pong ball.

Why talk about the velocity of the musketball? As it slows down, it takes longer to move down range. Gravity accelerates the ball downward. The effect is not a constant downwards movement with time but the distance moved downward is as the square of the time of flight.
D= 32 feet/sec x (seconds) x (second). So the path downward becomes much steeper and steeper with the distance traveled. What happens is that if you are aiming/pointing level to hit someone at 50 yards, you will hit the ground before hitting someone in the leg at 150 yards.

An example of the restrictions that the "danger space" has on fire is illustrated (for the much more ballisticly effecient Civil War mine bullet musket) at link

There was some discussion on another thread about the effect of gunpowder smoke on accuracy. Some of our shooter friends claim that on their personal experience it is not a factor. I disagree. There are some pictures of a reinactment: sonofausterlitz.blogspot.com/. Look at the results of a few rounds touched off by a company sized unit (?), and imagine the smoke from two brigades in a fire-fight for 2 hours. Of course, it would have no effect on accuracy (sic).

"The standard French target was 5 ˝ feet high"

I wonder whose face they were told to imagine on a target that small !

The Bourbons would have approved.

"Chouan,
You stated, "Is this what Elting thinks, or is this what the people he is discussing thought and did? If true, how do we know? Where are his references?

Now how would I know the answer to that? That's what Elting wrote. I thought he was a fairly well respected author so I quoted him. You can choose to believe him or not. BTW what are your sources to say he is wrong?"

I'm not saying that he's wrong, because I don't know. I'm saying that we don't know whether what he asserting is right or wrong because we don't know where his information comes from. Is it what he thinks is right? Is it what he knows is right? Is it something that he's made up to "prove" his opinion? We don't know. We can't know whether its his opinion or a fact. That, to me, makes him an unreliable source.

Chouan,
Thanks for the clarification. I can agree with your comments. In his bibliography for Chapter XXIV he lists 13 sources. Let me know if you think they are reliable or not.

Bottet, Maurice. Monographie de L'Arme a Feu Portative des Armees Francais de Terr et de Mer, de 1718 a Nos Jour.

Boudriot, Jean. Armes a feu Grancaises Modeles Regimentaires

Duane, William. A Military Dictionary

Hicks, James. French Military Weapons, 1717 ti 1938.

Glover Richard. Peninsular Preparation.

Mageraud, J. Armement de Equipement de L'Infantrie Francaise du XVI au XX Siecle.

Manuct, Albert. Artillery through the ages.

Miinistere de la Guerre (Chapter 12)

Peterson, Harold. The Treasury of the Gun.

An a couple of others

He also quotes De Brack

Rob

@1968billsfan
Thanks for the link to that blog.

A lot of smoke indeed and I understand modern day powder is supposed to be 'cleaner' than in the Napoleonic era.

Agree with you comments about its impact.

G'Day Rob,

These are all good sources, but the two following manuals validates that the French were taught to aim:

The Manuel d'Infanterie ou Decrets, Usages, Reseignemens, Propres Aux Sous-Officiers De Cette Arme du 1808

And

The Manuel d'Infanterie ou Decrets, Usages, Reseignemens, Propres Aux Sous-Officiers De Cette Arme du 1813

Best Regards,
Art

While Elting may have consulted many good sources, I have never been convinced about many of his conclusions.

Sadly, this is something that I see every year in student dissertations:(.

G'day Colin,

One reason why I do not want to write a book on the subject of Ligne de Science…

I would constantly making new additions to it…which of course makes me admire those who have been bold enough to write on the subject.

Best Regards
Art

3eme Ligne,

You mentioned being with the 64th Foot and participating in the Firelock match at Ft. Frederick.

We may be old comrades.

V/R

Joe

joewally1@cox.net

Art,
Thanks so much for the reference. Do you happen to know if there is a web site for these manuals? I spent a bit of time going through the website, "Histoire du consulate et du premier empire", but can't find them there. Thanks for your help.
Rob

Joe,
I was with the 64th foot from 1975 – 1987. I was the Major's Company located in Northern VA. Larry Bradbury was the captain of the company. What company were you with?
Rob

Colin,
I can't disagree with you. I have found a couple of errors in Elting's work. For the most part though I think he did a fairly good job for such a broad subject.
Rob

G'Day Rob,

Let me see if I can find the website…I'll do it when I get off work tonight…worst case…I can snail mail you the two manuals on disck…

Best Regards,
Art

3emeLigne,
There are a number of interesting downloads available on the following site:
austerlitz.org
Including the Infantry Manual, 1808 [Manuel d'infanterie, de 1808]
Go to the History section and documents for download.
The site can be translated to English – however, the downloads are typically in French [naturally].

npm

Ligniere,
Thanks for pointing me to that site. What a great site! I just completed downloading the 1808 manual. It will take me a while to digest this. My French is OK, but it would be alot faster in English :-) But, no complaints, mind you.

Art – thanks for the generous offer but its not necessary now. Off the top of your head do you happen to know the location in the 1808 manual that references aimed fire?

Thanks much guys

Rob

you will already find in the

Ordonnance du Roi
Pour Régler le Service Dans Les Places et Dans Les Quartier
du premier mars 1768

re printed several times such as mine at

Metz – 1792 at pages 175, 176 the powder and lead allowance for each regiment to use for life firing

Rob,

I was with the same group.

Please e-mail me at

joewally1@cox.net

v/r

Joe

G'Day Rob,

I'll have to look it up…let me finish working on a planche/plate which I am drawing up in regards to a bataillon de trios sur deux rangs…seems I have no talent at drawing diagrams ;-(

Look in the section that covers instructions for a sous-officier…I think that is where it can be found.

Best Regards,
Art

Demian is talking about Austrian infantry, other nations did practise target shooting, which however was a wasted effort when firing in rank and file as noted above.

I disagree with your reading of that passage von Winterfelt. Demian appears to be arguing for aimed fire. Smoke is always a problem, but it is "the pushing" for volume of fire en masse which feeds into the soldiers natural desire to fire more quickly and this in turns leads to disorder as mass volleys disintegrate into disjointed, uncoordinated and unaimed fire---even sometimes into the air for the sake of speed alone--in short a total loss of fire control. If aimed fire was taught, the soldier would be slower and more deliberate…. Better fire control. He's arguing for what the British did with their troops. Excellent passage.

Moreover, if you have fire control over your battalion, smoke may become less of a problem b/c a commander may be able to make the line wait for smoke to clear. In fact, this may have been one of the advantages of the British platoon fire. Instead of a massive volley of smoke at once, only portions of the line are generating smoke. As Demian is arguing with massed unaimed volleys fire control is quickly lost and everyone is firing as fast as they can whenever they want to, so there is no chance for smoke to clear.

Of course, a good breeze could help and if there were no breeze and the air was stifling and still it might not matter what you do, but remember what Wellington said to the painter about smoke…. It was not for nothing that he said that… the British had excellent fire control and could control their smoke generation. I've often come across things in my reading where I say to myself, well why didn't they keep firing or why did they stop firing ? Why didn't the other half of the line open up… when the enemy would've been in range… those sorts of things. One major reason might have been good fire control means a unit can regulate its smoke generation and a unit which can regulate its smoke generation means more accurate and therefore more effective fire.

I think this is what the French and Austrians were after fire control through training to aim … but they still couldn't match accuracy at range with the Brits…

After the 7YW most nations did recongnize that "aimed" fire was better than fast firing.
This is even reflected in the drill regulations, where after the shoot the French for example had to continue to point towards the target until the command to re-load was given.
The lack of fire control is evident in a lot of statements,usually when infantry started to fire, it would empty its cartridge box – no orders would go through.
For that reason attacks broke down, because infantry stopped and started to fire and became imobile.
the British seem to be the only who overcame the problem of fire control – one of their successfull tactics in the Peninsular war was to give some very few vollies and then counter attack.
In my view there was no accurary in volley firing – volley firing was aimed for moral effect instead of targetting.
The usual kind of fire, was however fire at will, or feu de bataille – and there also, as Demian points out, due to being ranged in close order – "aiming" as such was not possible.
Why the did this – or did not do this – is due to real life in battle, where a lot of reflections from the arm chair are just not working.

The Swiss regiments in French service were noted for their ability to shoot and their fire control. This was particularly noted during the Russian campaign of 1812, especially at the crossing of the Berezina.

Both the British and French used target practice to train their soldier in musketry.

Individual fire, or 'fire at will' was the most deadly and used the most ammunition.

Napoleon noted that 'the fire of skirmishers was best.'

K

Napoleon also noted 'Not tonight Josephine'

But I think we can agree that neither of them describe how he chose to fight his battles.

It does seem that with modern infantry fighting in skirmish order and modern reenactors being able to part a gnats chuff at 200 paces some assume that is the way musketeers should always have fought.
Oddly enough though that's exactly how they did fight at Pavia in 1525, there is just the odd 400 or so years in between to explain away.

Seems there are two possible explanations.

1/ Given the resources and technology available, and the terrain fought in – massed fire was the most effective battle survival tactic for infantry.
2/ Massed fire was a repressive creation of Royalty and continued by Aristocratic thick headed numbskull Generals incapable of perceiving the bleedin' obvious – such as Monteculli, Gustavus, Turenne, Marlborough, Eugene, Saxe, Frederick, Wolfe, Wellington, Napoleon, Scharnhorst,…, dunderheads the lot.

IMHO :>) #1 is the most likely.

Certainly mass fire was desired…as it is today. I think it is clear that aimed fire was considered and practiced by both light and line troops in various armies at various times. I am also sure that the combatants were well aware of the limitations of the smoothbore musket. Even so, there are enough examples of French Tirailleurs picking off officers at 100 and 150 yards to believe that aiming wasn't completely wasted on what was an admittedly imperfect weapon.

I think that we have to realize that:

1. Uniformity of training and performance was less likely during the Napoleonic period than today.

2. Some units were obviously better than others, and that included accuracy of fire. Different commanders had different views on the issue. Napoleon ordered that all troops be practiced in aimed fire just before the 1800 campaign in Italy. Does that mean they weren't before? Or just not during the brief peace before that?

3. We are talking about the Napoleonic wars, a twenty year period, an entire generation of soldiers. Things change and that includes various officers, armies and nations. Lieven goes into detail how different Russian armies during the 1812-14 campaigns were different in performance, even during the same year. We can all agree that Davout's corps was better than many French corps. Did he advocate aimed fire?

4. "Battle Fire" was quite common after a few controlled volleys. Most all nations talk about this. Battle fire being each soldier firing on his own…which could include aimed fire.

5. Smoke was a major factor in volley fire. What is the point of aiming if you can't see the enemy? For instance, several soldiers in Houghton's Brigade at Albuera mention only seeing the enemy briefly in holes in the smoke during the entire firefight.

Attempting to create a universal answer to this rather than an answer particular to a time, place, units and commanders is not really possible, nor instructive of what was happening.

Bill

Hi

Bill, grin, the "We don't know anything" idea?

Cool, "roll a 6 get a hit".

Who needs more rules than that?

Rocky

Bill, grin, the "We don't know anything" idea?

Rocky:

Ye Gods, Noooo! I wasn't suggesting any such thing. I was suggesting that we can't come up with a satisfactory 'one size fits all' answer to the question of aimed fire because the Napoleonic Military men didn't, even within the National armies.

The question should probably be answered in regards to time, commander, army etc. We can know those things if we have come up with the great sources and quotes on this thread…which support my conclusion that not everyone thought the same way about the issue at different places and times….

Bill

Baron de Marbot had some original views on both aimed fire and the 2 rank versus 3 rank controversy. The quote from "The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot" Volume 2 (page 177):

But in my opinion, the principle cause of our reverses, though one which has never been pointed out by any soldier who has written on the Peninsular war, was the immense superiority of the English infantry in accurate shooting, a superiority which arises from their frequent exercise at target, and in a great measure also from the formation in two ranks.

I know that a great many French officers deny that this latter cause is a true one, but experience has shown that soldiers confined between the first and third ranks nearly always fire in the air, and that the third rank cannot take their aim at an enemy who is hidden from them by the two ranks in front. It is asserted that the two ranks do not offer sufficient strength to resist cavalry, but the English infantry can in a moment form four deep to receive a charge, and our squadrons were never able to catch it in two ranks, though as soon as it has to fire it quickly resumes this formation.

Marbot's views of 2 ranks versus 3 ranks are very interesting in connention to aimed fire, where he says the third rank 'cannot take their aim.' In the mid 18th century most nations used 3 ranks with the front rank kneeling to fire. The more fluid tactics developed in the late 18th century (and in the British case the North America experience) led to all ranks standing, so the third rank could not fire safely. The French used the third rank as loaders or re-inforcements for the front two, but if Marbot is right (and he admits that many French officers did not agree with him) then the fire of the second rank was ineffective, which would lead to a battalion of 600 men only producing 200 useful [aimed] shots.

My thanks to Rod McArthur for the translation.

Bill

Just to stir the pot a little, 3emeLigne said "Aimed fire will always cause greater casulties than unaimed fire."
But this is not actually always the case. The size of the target has a big effect. A deep column will often take casualties in the following ranks from "inaccurate" fire intended for the front ranks. If the fire was very accurate, it is reasonable to expect that only men in the first rank would be hit.

This was recognised later in the 19th century by H. Rohne in "Musketry Instruction for Infantry" when he wrote:

"In war, the number of hits is not as important as the number of men put out of action. Concentration of fire is of little value, if only a single man is annihilated by a great number of hits produced by one volley.
A volley which produces only a few bullet hits, which spread themselves over a wider area and disable a greater number of men and horses, is more effective."

Hi

Ya, I took the statistical approach as is my normal want. Calculations of how many rounds on how big a target with adds for depth.

Might not be right, but…..better than guessing.

Rocky

Ya, I took the statistical approach as is my normal want. Calculations of how many rounds on how big a target with adds for depth.

Might not be right, but…..better than guessing.

Rocky:
I am not being snotty about this, but serious. If you don't know whether it is *right* or not, how can it possibly be better than guessing?

You make your calculations and then test whether the processes and results they create have any relation to historical events. That is done by simulators all the time with less viable stats than you have--and they can be far more certain than you appear to be. It all depends on how the calculations function vis a vie history. That is what you are attempting to model.

From previous posts I would imagine you know this. So, my question is "How do you determine whether the calculations and game mechanics 'work?'

Bill

It was present & fire…

The British Light Division was taught to present take aim and then fire, made a big difference.

Also shooting at a traget that isn't shooting back helps accuracy, shooting at a target thats shoots back is a different thing, but if your aiming and doing more damage than he is, and your friends either side are still standing and grinning at you , you are going to steady up and do better.

M

in my view you can only aim when you also are in the position to deterime the right point to pull the trigger.

if this is on command the aiming won't be that good.
if you are in rank and file elbow to elbow, men in front – at your side – aiming won't be so good.
when you have to rash loading – your aiming won't be that good.

in case you look at the potential of the musket – look at the Scharnhorst trails, there the soldiers were in one row – could take their time at loading and firing.

But this was totaly different in battle field conditions, hence the big discepancy between the results of those trials and reality.

Hi

As this approach was part of my "day job" for a long time, the question is not what you might think. My "might not be right" isn't that I have not satisfied myself with the approach, I am not.

I just accept that people come to the table with other biases than mine.

Years ago involving an analysis of a russian aircraft during the cold war, I was approached by the FBI to explain, and I had to get them to find an aero-engineer who "spoke the language" because they didn't even get the questions right!

My "testing" is backwards in some respects, sitting down with known maps, and doing time motion studies and looking at effects. The problem is that the data base is pretty small. I think, however, working out of a limited set of data points is better than just outright guessing. But I accept that it still might not be right.

So, on a continuum from complete guess, to "best numbers I have assuming them typical.

Rocky

von Winterfeldt wrote:

in case you look at the potential of the musket – look at the Scharnhorst trails, there the soldiers were in one row –could take their time at loading and firing.

But this was totaly different in battle field conditions, hence the big discepancy between the results of those trials and reality.

VW:
Not necessarily 'totally different'. Often skirmishers would stand in a single line and take their time loading and firing.

But that isn't all. While there would be an expected discrpancy between field test results and battlefield performance, they are related. One represents the optimum possibilities of musket fire. From that you can derive an optimum effect on a line of infantry or cavalry--which is what Scharnhorst and the Prussians were attempting to discover. I mean, they knew that battlefield performances would not be the same as a field test, but it does give them an upper end of performance to work from.

And of course, we know that battlefield performances did not match field tests because we have information to that effect. It all can be used to develop a performance curve, which then can be tested against actual events.

Rocky:
Yes, I thought that might be the case. From my experience, ALL simulation designers work from a 'limited set of data points'. The four methods I know in coming up with a provable simulation data base are [And you have mentioned two]

1. Developing a data base from as much data as possible, creating a rough line of performance under different circumstances and test it against known events to see if it can match and recreate them.

2. Guess at the nature of the data base and begin testing it against known events to see if it can match and recreate them, testing it against known events to see if it can match and recreate them.

3. Build a one-note data base from a single, detailed account, and then test it against known events to see if it can match and recreate them.

4. Use all three methods in combination and test it against known events to see if it can match and recreate them.

In other words, using the data we have to create a statistical 'norm' or typical and from there discover the different variations tied to different circumstances.

And again, testing it against known events to see if it can match and recreate them.

The only way we can say we are capturing anything 'real' is by methodically comparing our data/formulas to actual events. Without that testing, we never know. It is something I don't see many wargame designers do, which is why many battles/scenarios can't be recreated with any number of current rules sets. For instance, I know of four popular rules sets that do not allow units to move as far as their historical counterparts--at all--even with the scenarios provided with the rules sets.

I know I am preaching to the chior here, Rocky, so thanks for your patience. I just don't want folks to accept that 'guessing' is as good as it can get, or that we can't know whether our caculations are 'right' or not.

Not that you were saying either.

Bill

Hi

Well, errr..yes. I think in the ancients board I once did a long discussion on evolution of the Roman army and how, I was doing things like completely replaying things like the Phyrrus campaign to test the systems.

I did not rely, though I have them, the musket tests from the era. I observed that one issue where they were "optimum" rather than real was simply that a "company front" is not as solid target as the tests would have. Which lead, I don't remember reading any one contemporary with the tests thinking about his, calculating how much area was actually PEOPLE. Which, of course, feeds into the observation as to why skirmish lines are less vulnerable than two line, which are less vulnerable than three, which are less vulnerable than firing into a column.

But in one respect, I go back to my early days of wargaming. My mechanistic/scientific approach satisfies me. And while I have published my stuff in several areas, never Napoleonics, I am comfortable with the ethos I was presented with in my early days: that one should do rules that satisfy YOU, not worrying about the world.

My group and I have done, over the last 40 years, a lot of testing for our approaches, and it is only gravy that I was also working in the dupuy group.

Rocky

Rocky:

I also have a variety of field tests from the mid-1700s to 1830s. I have read and know that contemporary military men were aware of the company front vs actual hits issue, among others. I have no problem with a mechanistic/scientific approach to simulation design. I was thinking of the wider arena of simulation design and the methods developed over the last 40 years. I won't get into Dupuy's approach, only because his focus wasn't particularly simulation design.

Tis all.

Bill

hi

Well, my attitude was that if I started with the mechanical aspects, that would produce one hard fixed boundry.

We have had discussions, for instance, with "longbow as machinegun" and the like.

As for Dupuy….he did do sims. The group he started in WW2 is, in essence still around doing the sims that planned out our actions during and since WW2. The books are mostly reflecting his thinking on this at various times.

Rocky:
Well, all I am saying is that there are several methods for producing several 'hard, fixed boundaries' with the same information.

The problem with any simulation that deals with human behavior like a battle, mechanical data will only get you so far. There have been a whole raft of methods created in the last 40 years for mimicking that in a simulation.

I have heard that Dupuy did do simulations, but most all of the statistical work he did in his books focuses on creating data bases, identifying significant criteria in creating formula for predicting battle outcomes. I have never seen any of his simulation work published. He did create data bases FOR simulations like the CEM model and the Battle of the Ardennes.

Even the Dupuy Institute is all about "Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis", not simulations.

Personally, I thought Dupuy had many great things to say about data and combat comparisons. His data on historical events and such tended to be strong with current data. But it got pretty weak the farther he went into the past away from modern war. By the time he got to the early 19th Century, he was guessing most of the time. And the way he pushed around historical evidence, it was obvious that he wasn't a a stong historian.

One thing I have found in talking to military folks who have created simulations for military use is that they have access to something that many simulation designers don't:

Direct access to desired information about current combat practices and results, where they can ask and answer specific questions concerning what they are designing, and then once designed, can compare results of the simulation to actual events.

Many simulators don't have access to that kind of data, particularly when we are talking about historical events decades in the past, let alone hundreds of years. It is also the case that simulation designers often have to create functional simulations to test the feasibility of things that don't exist yet or understand things far removed from direct observation like galaxies and atoms, but have to be accurate to be of any value.

Those methods and concepts speak directly to the problems wargame designers have in recreating Napoleonic battles based on historical evidence. They have limited data and have to create simulations that can't be tested against the real thing. And yet, they want to know whether they actually are simulating that history or not.

All I am saying is that methods for doing just that have been developed and have been around for some time.

Bill

Hi

Which is why I say "your mileage may vary". I did what I did to satisfy ME.

As for the Dupuy, this is the basis internally as well for the wargame analysis we do constantly about threats around the world. I am sure you know the story abut the 32 naval game where some young Naval types predicted Pearl Harbor. Well, the groups does a lot of gaming to anticipate upcoming things. There is also a gaming group used at Ft.Levenworth where NG groups do training by simulation. All this was set up by the Dupuy's.

Rocky

Rocky:
I couldn't imagine anyone doing the hobby to satisfy anyone else… whatever the mileage. ;-)

Using simulations to predict outcomes has a long history, and it certainly is one of their main purposes today. The 32 Naval game reminds me of the billion dollar wargame the military played out with a Middle East scenario in 2000 with similar annoying results delivered by young military types.

Bill

Hi

Well, besides the government stuff, I have been in print for gaming since the 70s. And the most common comment is always "you ought to design rules that satisfy MY biases because you are an idiot and I just explained THE TRUTH" to you".

Rocky

Rocky:

Well, I wasn't suggesting that you satisfy my biases--if that is what you thought. I was saying that there are simulation methods for reaching what I perceived were your design goals [and biases, if that.]

That's all. I could have perceived wrong… Personally, if folks don't like a designers' historical/design biases in a wargame, they really need to design their own… It isn't the designers' job to satisfy someone else's biases

…that is, unless they are out to sell as many games as they can, in which case the first thing they would need to do is ignore their own biases…unless they felt their views where shared by the vast majority of gamers…Then you get into very murky mud. I know some designers like that…

Bill

Bill

…that is, unless they are out to sell as many games as they can, in which case the first thing they would need to do is ignore their own biases…unless they felt their views where shared by the vast majority of gamers…Then you get into very murky mud. I know some designers like that…

Surely not!

You leave me shocked and violated!

Grizzlymc:

I knew it was a risk, but I figured as you're an adult, being shocked and violated isn't anything new… ;-7

Hi

I was just trying to not be dogmatic about my approaches. I have had gamers when exposed to the sim concept explain I have no "soul"!

Grin.

You have not noticed, I expect, that I never post to what I consider "romantic" threads: national characteristics, best and worst commanders and such like.

Going over the above, I realized I had missed a point… SMOKE.

Smoke LOOKS worse from outside than it is from INSIDE the unit shooting. As for "seeing the target". As the target is usually a company of men, not the third private on the left, the smoke is where the target is, but no musket is so precise as to make "the third guy on the left" as a valid target.

Rocky

Smoke could be a problem – even when inside a unit. I experienced it when being part of a "big" unit of abut 60 doing fire at will in a humid weather with light drizzle – the battle was already over and we continued to load and shot because we could not see the opponent any longer – who already had marched off.