"Why Two Ranks?" Topic

Just an observation. Regardless of whether a unit either, British or French, was formed in 2 and 3 ranks as a general deployment, they seem to practice similar methods in dealing with frontage of elements below the battalion level. The idea is to have the elements of equal frontage regardless of the number of ranks. Very important when going through maneuvers and evolutions on the battlefield. The French handled it a bit differently than the British, but the idea was the same.

The administrative sub – element of battalion was were the 6 or 8 companies (depending on the timframe). The operational level of the elements were the 6 or 8 Peletons. The strenght of each Peleton was checked periodically. If the strengths among the Peleton differed, soldiers were transfered to ensure that each Peleton was of equal strength. However, I they still remained on the roster of the parent company.

Rob

Good Day "CS"

If I may quote you on this…

"When Wellington ordered his army to fight exclusively in 2 deep line in 1808, the battalions were at full strength and he outnumbered the French at both Rolica and Vimiero"

Please show me the order that states this…

As for you posting that mentions:

"The relevant passage is in Wellington's supplementary dispatches, from a general order issued at Lavos, 3rd August 1808:

"The order of battle of the army is to be two deep, and as follows, beginning with the right:-
Major-General Ferguson's brigade.
Brigadier Catlin Craufurd's ditto.
Brigadier-General Fane's ditto on the left.."

You then mention:

"Wellington's general order has been interpretted as an instruction for 2 rank line by many authorities, including recently both Howie Muir and Rory Muir. I just can't see that "2 deep" refers to the number of lines."

I must presuppose you were present when I was in this debate on VLB.

And I was told that I had to produce evidence that 2 deep was used to mean something other than two ranks…well I have…and it's not even a mute point for me anymore…of course it could be nothing more than a "red herring" on my part ;-)

I suggest that members start reading up on various instructions of the British drawing out the order of battle that is part of the instructions for setting up a camp. For this is precisely what Wellington's general orders that were issued at Lavos…on the 3rd August 1808 were referring to…even Wellington knew that in a mission statement…when referring to a grand body of troops…you do not throw in an article on minor tactics…it is addressed in the sequence that explains the minor tactics of a battalion or small body of troops…at least I give him credit for knowing this…

Best Regards,
Art

Art wrote:

"I must presuppose you were present when I was in this debate on VLB."

Art,

I don't even know what VLB is, so the answer is no, I was not present.

I am interested in your interpretation of "2 deep" as used in Wellington's Lavos General Order, but please show where this expression is used elsewhere in period British military terminology to signify 2 separate lines rather than depth of files.

In other of Wellington's Orders of Battle, he uses the term lines:

7th August 1808:
"The foregoing will be the general formation of brigades in one line."

8th May 1809:
"These wings will be formed into two or more lines, as circumstances may require.."

18th June 1809:
"The divisions will stand in one or more lines, in respect to each other, as will be ordered at the time."

The terminology in these 3 orders is quite different from that issued at Lavos.

This forum is known for members that belong to VLB and the Napoleon Series Discussion group who post various messages under a nom de plum…and you admitted to conversing with me on a forum…then perhaps a lesser known forum…of which is of no importance.

Those who are members of these two forums…or any other forum…and are here to present their opinion and try to help those who need it…or seek information…I applaud their posting.

As for the others who need to use a nom de plum…I find it as nothing more than someone who is attempting to stroke their own ego…why else the nom de plum…if they can't stand up to their own opinion…

Of course this forum allows for those to post using a nom de plum…therefore it's their right to do so…

Military terms are infamous for having more than one meaning. I gave you an avenue to further your research…your retort was…"please show where"…

No I don't think so…time for you to open up the books and do your own research…or continue on and be that self proclaimed Napoleonic sage of all knowledge…I don't have time for your postings anymore…

What?

I have never admitted to "conversing with you on a forum".

I asked "please show where" because in my research on the British army, I have never come across this phrase used in the context that you suggest. I hoped that you could give a reference.

As for nom de plums, you presume that I know who you are, artpdn (which, I presume, is a nom be plum, or at least not your actual name). I don't, and if you assume that I should know, then it speaks volumes about you own ego. In fact I don't know anyone else on this forum, or on any other forum, so why do you need to know my real name, which you would not recognise, to have a discussion?

This thread was, I thought, very good natured prior to your last post. I believe it is possible to have a strong opinion without being rude.

Perhaps you disagree?

Please stop talking in riddles and add a contribution.

Thanks

Captain Snort

Folks have noted, correctly so, that a key advantage of 3 ranks is that the soldiers in that third rank can fill in when casulties occur in the first two ranks. There is another advantage which tends to get overlooked. The mustket can be a tricky machine at times and misfires were quite commmon. Misfires can result from any of a number of causes (dull, loose or broken flint; insufficient prime; clogged touch hole, etc). In many of these cases, the soldier would best be served by stepping out of line to fix the problem. This is because the musket is a long, unwieldly piece and would have to be cradled in the left arm to fix any of the aforementioned problems without banging his neighbors to the side and rear. For example in the case of a broken flint, the soldier would need to first cradle the the musket, pull out his tool from the cartrige box along with a spare flint, unscrew the upper jaw of the hammer, then carefully position the new flint while tightening the jaw.

The Reglement du 1792 specifcally refers to the third rank passing loaded muskets to the second when firing indepently (Charge à Volonté). It would be logical therefore to assume he also fixed problems with muskets. I know in the French Army, the 3 men of the file were trained to work together as a team.

Rob

I was going to post this earlier, but after the recent accusations I wondered whether to bother, but as I am indeed the "self proclaimed [British] Napoleonic Sage of all knowledge" I couldn't hold back any longer. So here, not to "try to help those who need it", but purely for the purposes of "stroking my own ego", is a little of the research that I have carried out. Hopefully it will address some of the doubts about how prevelant the use of two deep actually was in the British army.

Also note that in the interests of my ego, I have been promoted.

In ‘The History and Actual State of the Military Force of Great Britain', written by Charles Dupin and translated by an anonymous British officer in 1822, Dupin wrote:

"Notwithstanding the precision of the orders here quoted [the 1792 Regulations], the British Infantry in many circumstances*, manoeuvre and engage in two ranks. So slight an order of formation, which appears demanded by the numerical weakness of English regiments can only be justified by the excellence of their fire. This excellence may be ascribed to three causes; the frequency and the perfection of their exercise, and the goodness of their ammunition."

The translating officer corrected Dupin in a footnote:

"*The author might have stated not only ‘in many circumstances', but, under all circumstances: For we believe it would be difficult to give an exception to the custom of forming two deep in our service during the Peninsula War. Yet it is incorrect to ascribe it, as he proceeds to do as arising from the numerical weakness of battalions, which had very commonly (actually in the field) from 600 to 800 bayonets, a strength quite sufficient for a formation in three ranks, had such been thought desirable."

An anonymous field officer wrote about the subject in the United Services Journal:

"But had the General [Dundas] seen this point, the necessity of the 3rd rank satisfactorily settled, – that the British infantry had gone through the glorious war of the Peninsula without the third rank, and that it had been repeatedly proved, that in two ranks our troops could either make or repel a charge of bayonets, he, too, would have preferred the two-deep formation. He would have seen that in the British infantry, the third rank was not essential. The experience that has satisfactorily proved that the British infantry may adopt the formation two deep as its fighting order, is not by the French deemed a sufficient test to justify its inclusion in that army. They are of the opinion that there are special reasons why we might so form our troops, which do not apply to their service. In our army, the question, however, has been set at rest, and almost forgotten."

An officer of the 97th Regiment wrote in 1814:

"The forming of 3 deep an army in the field is at present quite abolished."

The above is, I think, pretty strong evidence that two deep had been used as standard throughout the Peninsula, but what of other campaigns? Information is a bit sketchy, but what there is again points to two deep being used. A couple of examples are presented below, I know of others, but more research is needed:

The same officer of the 97th wrote of an earlier campaign:

"An instance of this kind happened in the memorable action of 21st March 1801, between the British and French forces in Egypt…the General ordered the rear rank to face about, and to direct its fire upon the enemy cavalry in our rear, the front rank continuing to fire on the enemy in its front….our infantry was formed two deep."

Finally, an officer of the 1st Regiment recalled the surrender of the French garrison at Flushing in 1809 during the Walcheren expedition, speaking as if two deep was accepted normality:

"They (the French) were halted and formed into line three deep. This formation, I afterwards found, was the general practice of the French army, whilst we continued at two deep; and Wellington afterwards proved to them that ours was the most convenient method, and consequently the best."

Also, it is interesting again to note the consistency of the word "deep" in these quotes to signify depth of files. This, as far as I am aware, is the sole meaning of this word in British Napoleonic terminology – it was not used to signify the amount of separate lines.

Best regards

Major Snort

Just for reference the 28th Foot in Egypt was fighting in two ranks. Attacked in the rear by French cavalry it reverse the rear rank and drove of the attackers.

The Regiment, later the Gloucstershire Regiment, had the honour of wearing a cap badge at the frount and rear of the headgear in commemorations:

glosters.org/bbadge.htm

Dupin (English), Vol 2, p. 145:

link

Also, see:

An anonymous field officer wrote about the subject in the United Services Journal:

link

An officer of the 97th Regiment wrote in 1814:

link

The same officer of the 97th wrote of an earlier campaign:

link

Finally, an officer of the 1st Regiment recalled …:

link
link

Here's a challenge for you Big Al.

Can you track down a readable online version of Lord Moira's 1793 instructions for the use of two deep line, as found in "The Campaign in Flanders of 1793-1795: Journal of Lieutenant Charles Stewart, 28th Foot"?

Thanks,

Major Snort

Re: de Fonseca:

1825 edition:

link

1846 edition:

link

MS,

Big Al can only find the article:

"The Campaign in Flanders of 1793-1795: Journal of Lieutenant Charles Stewart, 28th Foot", edited by Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Grazebrook, OBE, MC, in the "Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research", Vol 29 (1951), no 117, pp 2-17.

Which is available on-line.

I doubt it is complete! <:^{

Big Al

Thanks anyway,

I can only achieve "snippet view" and the 2-deep comment is out of sight.

Perhaps someone here has access to a copy and can post the order for 2 deep?

so as a conclusion, Major Snort, your summary answer to the OP would run along the lines…

'Originally forced into a two deep line due to manpower shortages in the United States, India and elsewhere, Wellington and other British commanders came to the conclusion that there was at worst no disadvantage in this formation as their normal depth on the field of battle.

Acccordingly, this was carried into the Penninsualr campaign,( and even stipulated in orders in some early battles, least more junior officers 'revert' to the text book three deep line) and the perferred formation for all British infantry.

Due to the general shortage of numbers as the campaign progressed, and to interpretations of drill books and manuals of the period by later writers, it has genreally been assumed that this manpower shortage was the sole resaon for the British two deep line throughout the Penninsular; but closer evaluation of recorded orders and usage has suggested quite clearly that this was in fact a conscious choice by the Duke from the outset of his peninsular campaigning.'

would that make a fair summary of the case presented so far?

Keraunos,

I think that is a fair summary.

It is difficult to say exactly whether two deep was an accepted standard in the field prior to the Peninsula in Europe, although from the sketchy evidence available it probably was. As an example of the lack of evidence, although most secondary sources have the British in 2 ranks at Maida, I don't think I have ever seen a primary source stating this.

I don't know enough about the earlier campaigns in America or India to determine whether the 2 deep line used there was an enforced decision or a tactical choice, although I would guess that the combination of 2 ranks with "loose files" in America was tactical.

Two deep in the Peninsula was almost certainly a tactical choice and I think that unfortunately many people have been led astray by the work of Nafziger, whose reasoning can be proved wrong by just studying the Regulations and period works on British drill.

At the end of the day this is only my opinion, but much of the reasoning and sources used are presented in this thread, so there is an avenue there for anyone interested to follow, and then make their own minds up.

MS,

I have secured the "The Campaign in Flanders of 1793-1795: Journal of Lieutenant Charles Stewart, 28th Foot" article. I do not find a copy of "Lord Moira's 1793 instructions" therein.

I can send you a copy of the article, if desired.

Big Al

Big Al,

I would appreciate a copy of the article very much.

I can be contacted via my servant:

mark_hambleton@yahoo.com

Thanks

Major Snort

A thing to consider is the consequence of NOT having the third rank, after suffering some casulties or attrition of men (or weapons). Is it a simplification to wonder if the British refused to get engaged in lenghty firefights and settled their close combats by a quick violent charge or short range volley and charge? Veteran soldiers with a lot of training could perhaps function in this manner- moreso than contenental armies who were always being rebuilt. A 2-rank line of battle would seriously weaken in a prolonged firefight as every hit would take out a firer. With a 3 rank formation, not so.

With regard to whether the British formed 2 ranks as a result of losses and understrengt units… The argument might hold for some periods and nationalities, but may not be the SOLE and only reason for doing so. I think that the commander had to balance the brittleness of his units (2 ranks) against the length of the line of battle he could utilize. For the British, the veteran troops, style of small tactics and smaller army sizes lead to 2 ranks.

The Prussian fusiliers of 1788 established already two ranks as their tactical formation – it just seemed to suit their tacitcs best.

to put a wargaming context on all this …

Ive alsways found the two vs three rank thing a bit over represented in wargames rules. Even highly simplified basing systems seem to insist on differences for the british two rank line!

The only strong view ive had is on is casualty markers, as apposed to base removal. This is because Ive always figured the batttalion would do its best to keep its frontage, at expense of depth.

I guess this brings up the question of what to do in a two rank situation. Lets imagine a small british battalion or a german battalion whos third rank was "lost" skrimishing.

I assume casualties inflicted on a two rank formation WOULD reduce frontage. You cant have a line which is 1 rank deep in parts ?

I'm a bit confused as to where the idea started that during the Napoleonic Wars the British used 2-deep line because either their armies were smaller or their battalions were smaller or they used it for smaller than average battalions – did it originate in 'Imperial Bayonets'?

Regards

Blucher,
I think its reasonable to assume that only a part of the rear rank of an Austrian or Prussian battalion would have deployed as skirmishers [not fully 33% of the unit] – the remainder would have acted to 'fill-in' the gaps formed in the front and center ranks during a firefight, until they were depleted or exhausted.

I'm not entirely sure about this, but it may also be the case that the 'third/rear-rank' skirmishers didn't operate independently of the battalion throughout an engagement, as would be the case of a French Voltigeur or British Light company. As the pressure on the skirmish line became more intense, it is entirely possible that the skirmishers would fall back to reform in the rear rank as before. The skirmishing role being a temporary duty and not an independent duty, the idea being that they were expected to reform on the battalion when the protective skirmish role had been fulfilled.

It's my opinion that if a battalion was ever reduced to one rank in depth, its limit as a practical combat formation had been reached and even surpassed – in that situation it wouldn't be long before they broke for the rear, assuming they even reached that point of loss. I'm sure there were situations that a unit fought, at least partially, in single rank, but these would have been exceptional, and undoubtedly short lived.

npm

When in three ranks, the third rank to to fill the csualties to maintain the frontage of at least two ranks.
When in two ranks the line of two ranks was maintained by shrinking in frontage.
It was always the aim to stay at mininmal two ranks deep, however reading Zmohdikovs work about the Russian tactics, an example when a unit was only one rank is cited as well.
But as general rule – two ranks minimum – would be fit – in my opinion.

The British went to two ranks and half arm intervals after the 1776 episodes in America, when the were reinforced in 1777 the whole army adopted this formation, dramatically cutting down casualties and increasing fire power.

It was also the time the Light companies (light Bobs)took on the woodsmen and won.

Thanks, for the discussion. I learned a lot. Never quite thought of what the practical differences could mean between 2 and 3 ranks.

Here is what Dundas has to say about the British use of 2 ranks long before Wellington.

Principles of military movements: chiefly applied to infantry. 1788

By Sir David Dundas

pages 51-52

Formation on two ranks…

The Method almost universally adopted in our infantry, and in ours only, of forming two deep, and at open files, deserves the most serious consideration. It was not produced by the experience of the German war [SYW], but by that of the first American.[Revolution] The desultory service there carried on by small bodies of men, and the then deficiency of movement, and want of flexibility in our solid battalions, made us run into the other extreme, and first introduced it as proper for that country; review appearance continued it; and the new military modes, brought into fashion by the light infantry, have tended to make it the prevalent order of the service.

Many respectable officers are satisfied of its propriety; but it seems necessary to consider its operations and consequences, when extended to larger bodies than the single battalion.

Its advantages are said to be,

That as infantry seldom or never shock with bayonets, all formations on. a great depth are unnecessary.

That as sire now decides; the more men that are thus usefully J "border employed, the better. of formation

[i.e. no cavalry to consider and more men on the firing line]

That the fire of a third rank is thrown away, and more incommodes the front rank, than it does the enemy.

That at close files, men have not the use of their arms; and are apt to crowd, double, and get into confusion, when under the enemy's fire.

But it must be recollected,

That if these reasons are good with respect to two ranks, some os them operate in favour of a single rank. That though infantry Reasons do seldom mix with bayonets, yet it would more frequently happen if two ranks were opposed to three, and the consequence ought then to be doubtful. That rank firing, or reserving the fire of the third rank, obviates the inconvenience complained of.

That no general could manage, or position contain a considerable army formed in this manner; even one of twenty thousand men, would occupy five miles in front. That the great science and object of movement being to act with superiority on certain points; it is never the intention of an able commander to have all his men at the fame time in action; he means by skill and manœuvre to attack a partial part, and to bring the many to act against the few; this cannot be accomplished at open files and two deep.

That the experience of other services, does not show the inconveniences we complain of, such as to induce them to adopt our methods, and to give up the fire of the third rank. That the third rank serves to fill up the vacancies made in the others in action; without it the battalion would soon be in a single rank. That most of our calculations' seem to be for the attack and pursuit of a timid enemy, but not for defence if vigorously assailed.

That a first line thus formed, would undoubtedly give way; and if once pierced, there are few instances of an action re-established by the efforts of a second line. That it is better to have one substantial and compact line to prevent the mischief, than several redoubled and thin ones to endeavour to repair it. That no such order could in any shape oppose the attack of a determined cavalry.

That in all other services, they adhere to the old mode of files touching; and each soldier is impressed with a religious observance of never relinquishing the touch os his neighbour: by this the idea of the necessity of order, mutual support and effort, is strongly felt and observed. The inconvenience of very close files chiefly operates when the line is marching in front, which will never take place for any great distance, as all considerable changes of position are made on a reduced front, by division marchings or filings, in column or echellon.

That it cannot be doubted, when a battalion is arrived at its object of attack, at close files; that both its impulse and quantity of fire, in the same extent of front, is greater, than when the files are more open; and at any time, it is more eligible to have a division obliged to fall out of the line and double, than to have openings in it, where the enemy must certainly penetrate.

The perfect and correct march of a battalion or line formed at open files, -seems impossible; because its principal guidance, the touch of the files, is gone. Each man is necessarily employed to preserve a required distance from his neighbour; he is obliged to turn his head for that purpose, this distorts his body, a constant opening and closing takes place, the whole move loose and unconnected. If this must necessarily happen in the regulating battalion, its influence on a line may be easily imagined, and also the condition in which it will arrive near an enemy; …

As a Consequence

at close files, if his dressing and line are chiefly determined by the touch, if the eyes alone are glanced towards the center, if the figure of each individual is full to the front, if the whole move square along their just lines without crowding, at an uniform and cadenced step which habit has given, will, at every instant of movement or attack, be firm, united, and animated with that fense of his own superiority, which perfect order, and due consistence will always give.

On the whole therefore, the old ideas of firmness, compactness, and mutual support, should be restored and held sacred; the formation in three ranks and at close files but without crowding, should be adhered to, as the fundamental order, on which the The formabattalion mould at all times form and march; and the other, in ranks and at two ranks and at open files, should be regarded only as an occa- Xemcierlcd. sional exception that may be made from it, where an extended and covered front is to be occupied, or where an irregular enemy, who deals only in sire, is to be opposed.

This is twenty years ten years before the start of the French wars. Dundas will re-write his Principles to become the British Army's first official regulations, calling for 3 rank line formations. Didn't work out that way, but it did force such generals as Wellington to issue general orders every once in a while to maintain the preferred 2 ranks. ;-j

Notice that the reasons for the 2 ranks that Dundas lists, inadequate numbers of men are among them.

Bill

Sounds to me like no one "really" used the 3rd rank during the Napoleonic Wars except to provide clean muskets and flints, fill major gaps in the line and to make sure that no one ran away without being officially identified before they did so :)

IIRC the Austrians had to stipulate eventually that not more than 1/32 of a line battalion should be used as skirmishers. If they had to set an upper bound,it suggests more were being taken out of the lines for this purposes and that the brass wanted this practice to stop.

I have to say I cannot think of a way to represent, on a tabletop, the peeling-away of the third rank to skirmish.

4th Cuirassier:

I don't remember any stipulation like 1/32 or when that might have been made, but the Austrians did believe they had a problem with too many skirmishers being deployed.

I don't think that representing the use of the 3rd rank needs to be all that problematical. It is an issue of numbers…how many were being deployed. The two characteristics would be:

1. The battalions would keep their frontage, unlike the deployment of companies and
2. The infantry would be line troops

So, in game terms there would have to be someway of showing the loss of men to skirmishing without removing stands and that they are line infantry and not specialists.

Bill

Sounds to me like no one "really" used the 3rd rank during the Napoleonic Wars except to provide clean muskets and flints, fill major gaps in the line and to make sure that no one ran away without being officially identified before they did so :)

BD:

It is hard to say. Ney, St. Clair and Marmont all spoke against the use of the third rank…claiming among other things that the first two ranks often suffered from friendly fire. Certainly most all armies deployed in three ranks as the norm. The French Legere, the Prussian Fusiliers and Russian Jagers formed in two ranks, but that was simply to speed up the process of deploying skirmishers. The French National Guard always formed in two ranks.

Whether the third rank did or did not participate in volley fire was, I think, determined by the particular commanders and army SOPs and the time period during the twenty years of war--opinions varied and uniformity of practice was not something always seen, even between army corps and brigades, let alone different theatres of campaign.

Bill

Bill,

Good points,

Jim

The British use of two ranks seems to have been a particular response to battalion attack columns.

Is there anything in the Peninsular military history which identifies how elite or 1st line French battalion attack columns responded or could respond to a British two rank line? Any particular battles that might be worth taking a look at ? Any examples of a two rank line being defeated ?

The British use of 2 deep line stemmed from the irregular warfare experienced in America and India rather than as a response to battalion column attacks.

It is important to note that in the passage from Principles of Military Movements quoted by Bill above, Dundas is not only criticising the use of 2 deep, but also of "loose files". "Loose files" had been used by the British in the French and Indian War and the AWI and was obviously completely unsuitable for the majority of actions that would be fought in Europe.

Troops formed this open formation by leaving a gap of around 18" between each file resulting in a very dispersed line. Not only were the files loose, but gaps were also left between companies.

Although the British seem to have continued to use 2 deep throughout the Napoleonic era despite the 1792 regulations, they didn't employ loose files and the formations were tightened up considerably, each file occupying around 21" with elbows lightly touching his neighbouring files to either side. Gaps between companies were also eliminated resulting in a solid, if thin, line.

"Loose files", could that also be called an open order line ?

I would argue Wellington preferred the 2 rank close order line for a tactical, rather than a historical reason.

I think I'm beginning to understand why Napoleonics are so fascinating :)

Are there any rulesets that take into account the difference between a 2 rank volley and a 3 rank volley ?

For instance, a 3 rank volley could be specifically ordered up and perhaps it would contain inherent risks?

Also, are there any rulesets which allow the player to modify formations to attempt to gain a tactical advantage ? For instance, a ruleset which makes the distinction between a battalion attack column "closed" or at "full distance" ?

If a unit was well closed up and locked on, firing from three ranks was not a problem. Yes, the front rank was supposed to kneel. There are always exceptions to the rules. At Fontenoy, the British infantry halved their files and fought from a six deep line. In this case I don't know if they fired the first two or three ranks in their volleys.

Also, the front rank often held their fire as a reserve firing.

I know my example dates from the 18th century. But it does show a variation.

In the case of the French I think it was the fire of the skirmishers that was meant to do the most damage. Siborne repeatedly mentions their fire in his work on Waterloo.

v/r

Joe

Lessons learnt from the American Revoulution….cut down on the casualties received.

Although I might agree with Art that 'MajorSnort' is perhaps mistaken with his interpretation of source for the British Army in two ranks, there are other documents which support his general view.
Orders to the revamped Portuguese in 1810 explicitly required two ranks for all infantry when disciplined and in the presence of the enemy. Since everything else about the Portuguese revamp followed British Army practice it would be strange if that was also not the case.

We could also point toward the Duke of Yorks (friend of Dundas) directive well prior to Wellingtons command that two ranks was acceptable at review and inspection in Britain. Since these inspections were to decide if the unit was fit for combat then it seems tacit agreement that current circumstances of expected combat made two ranks feasible.

Use of loose two ranks was quite simply 'fit for purpose' in chasing away unruly mobs posing as troops in the broken terrain of the Americas (:>) Close order 3 ranks was 'fit for purpose' in facing down formed cavalry in Europe.

For myself, I would say that as Brigade command became more sophisticated and protection against cavalry more reliant on squares formed from column, particularly where cavalry was less of a threat, then the need for 3 ranks was considerably lessened. It was not just the British who did this, either temporarily, case by case, or long term.

The Bavarian Line were (AFAIK) the only nations troops to have the two rank fixed for all circumstance in formalised additions to their regulations during Napoleonic times. (1804 Wrede)

Not that anyone else was particularly rigid as evidenced by the Austrians 1786 directive in their infantry regulations on use of two ranks when terrain and circumstance were suitable. Considerably used in the early Belgian campaigns.

Jeff Lewis

--------------------------------------------------------
For those interested in detail -:

1560/1477 Verissimo Antonio Ferreira da Costa – Analyse das ordens do dia de Beresford Lisboa 1820
p200-201
Quartel General de Formos d'Algodres 28 de Maio de 1810

1786 Dienst und Execierreglement die sammliche K.K.infanterie Frankfurth und Leipzig 1786
578-583 Aus dreien Glieden zwei zu formiren

Bottom Dollar – yes, the old Bruce Quarrie rules had separate fire table for two and three rank lines.

Jeff wrote:

Although I might agree with Art that 'MajorSnort' is perhaps mistaken with his interpretation of source for the British Army in two ranks

Jeff,

I presume that you are referring to the interpretation of the Lavos General Order issued by Wellington? If so I never meant to suggest that this order represents some sort of transition point from 3 deep to 2 deep in the British army as I am sure that the formation was in common usage prior to this. I merely used it as an example to illustrate that low battalion strength was not the reason for 2 deep deployment, as the units in this campaign were at or near full strength.

I think Art was suggesting that the phrase "2 deep" was not a reference to the depth of files at all. If he is correct then this is the only instance I have ever seen where the phrase doesn't signify depth of files.

@ McLaddie

Oops, sorry, mistyped – the proportion I remember was 1/3, not 1/32…

Yes you are on the money re how to represent this. The trouble is that I have figures based 3 abreast on 40mm wide bases. If I were to deem the rear rank to have peeled away to skirmish, then strictly speaking, with a 30-figure battalion, there ought to be two per 40mm base, i.e. ten stands of two with another 10 out front skirmishing. Short of having a duplicated unit I can't see how to accomplish this. A British unit would indeed be two figures per 40mm base but it would look like that all the time so would be OK.

This has only come up recently as an issue because previously I always played with 1815 French versus 1815 British. I had a few 1815 Prussians as well but hadn't heard of the third rank thing at that time. I'm now building 1805 Austrians and French so the issue starts to assume a greater importance. I could perhaps cop out and over-endow the Austrians with Grenzers but it would feel like a bit of a cheat.

Thanks, Cerdic !

Lastly, I'll note that if many of the British battalions had to deploy in ranks of 4 against the Imperial Guard attack at Waterloo, the Guard must have been very close behind the departing French cavalry. The intention being to try and catch the British formations still in square. I wonder if any of the British commanders had a slight flutter in the stomach at the one ! :)

BD:

There was a lot of stray cavalry wandering over the battlefield at the time of the Guard attack, both French and British. That is why the Guard formed their hollow squares… because of the cavalry threat. The British had to go to four ranks to form square, so cavalry was also the reason they went to four ranks.

Two ranks, three ranks, or four or six, was all provided for in the field manuals of the day, and had been since the SYW. The various depths all had their purposes, and every army used them as they saw fit. The British were quite capable of fighting in three ranks as the Prussians, French, Austrians, and Russians were in 2 ranks. It all had to do with what they saw as the most practical for their purposes, often at the moment rather than some army-wide 'johnny-one-note' approach to the issue.

Bill

Bill,

There wasn't a commander on either side at Waterloo that didn't know the difference between stray cavalry and un-stray cavalry.

Ah, yes, perhaps Wellington's heart itself skipped a beat. Napoleon nearly caught him. "It was a close run thing" as he said.

Jim

jreffsayshi wrote:

"The Bavarian Line were (AFAIK) the only nations troops to have the two rank fixed for all circumstance in formalised additions to their regulations during Napoleonic times. (1804 Wrede)"

I wasn't aware of this and haven't seen it elsewhere. I wonder is it is true, then why haven't I seen it mentioned in any of the hundreds of rule-sets and historical accounts I have written. Maybe it just slipped thu the cracks of recording, or maybe it is an inaccurate account that was written in the past and ignored. I have bought a big bunch of Bavarian 15mm's and before I paint them, I want to settle up what really happened. I'm not doubting the jeff.. read what he read and thanks for the idea. Does anyone else have input on this??? My favoriate, in-progress, CLS-like rules base by the company, with a front stand of something like 4files/2ranks and a rear rank of a combination of 4 files/1rank and 2X 2files/1rank (for example). This would change entirely how I buy/fill-in, paint and mount the corn-flower blue guys.

Gill wrote it in his "With eagles to glory" or possible in "1809 thunder on the danube"

The Bavarians experimented with two ranks between 1806 and 1809, but were back in three ranks before the Danube campaign – I think I read this in Gill's "with Eagles to Glory" book. So if your Bavarians are for the campaigns of 1809 or later, they would have been in three ranks.

npm

here wasn't a commander on either side at Waterloo that didn't know the difference between stray cavalry and un-stray cavalry.

I would hope so. Even so, there was a lot of cavalry around. And that is what cavalry did. Created threats.

Bill