"Why Two Ranks?" Topic

Can anyone tell me the reason(s) why British infantry usually deployed in two rank lines please? I've been discussing this with some friends and everyone seems to have their own theory so I thought I'd ask on here to get some clarification. I've been told it was a development from the AWI, it allowed all muskets to fire in a volley whereas the third rank of a three deep line had to fire independently and that it allowed usually outnumbered Brits to extend their formations. I've discounted the 'because they could!' reply which argued the British did it to show off their superior discipline over other nations, so this will probably be the answer I get now!

Thanks in advance.

they did not have enough men to cover the width expected of them.
so they moved the third rank into the first two ranks.

Also the Brits tended to be faster at reloading.

It was the red uniforms with white cross belts; inspired awe in opponents …….like modern day Spartans they were……

Two ranks can always fire. A third rank can only fire if the unit remains stationary and the first rank kneels. They thought the third rank was a waste of man power.

Keraunos, Black Tower
By this argument the Prussians should have done the same, and sooner. They could fire quickly, and tended to be outnumbered too, so could have used the extra frontage. And Fred was prepared to innovate. So why did the Prussians not do likewise?

Frederick temporarily used two man lines late in the SYW when lack man power was becoming an issue, but he quickly returned to the traditional 3 rank line.

I can only assume that 3 ranks was deemed to be a more solid and trustworthy formation proof against cavalry (and shirkers who might attempt to slink away during the fight). There are numerous SYW era examples of the third rank facing about to fire at cavalry attacking the battalion from the rear direction. This might not be as effective with only 2 ranks.

Also the Prussian musket drill called for the ranks to take a half step to the right so that all three ranks could "lock on" to the target and fire at once (by platoons, that is)

I have no opinion on whether the brits were faster or slower at reloading.

But they were always short of men, and it was standard doctrine to extend the line with the third rank whennumbers were dramatically short.

From looking at Austrian drill it seems that they generally fought in two ranks when in line, using the third rank to skirmish and extend the line. The three rank formation does appear to have been used in assault though. A regiment even charged a cavalry unit in three ranks if I remember correctly…

I would agree with what was said above in terms of advantages gained in efficiency of rate and volume of fire. DAF makes a good point as well. The Austrians tended to put their "softest" men in the 2nd rank sandwiched between their "betters" of the 1st and 3rd rank. I know next to nothing about British drill or tactics; did they have a significant advantage in this area that would allow them to ditch the 3rd rank and apply their own tactical playbook?

As mentioned if you have ever participated in a drill firing in 2 ranks it's difficult enough. For the third rank to fire it would require the front rank to kneel… to avoid blowing the front ranker's heads off. Time would be consumed commanding the front rank to kneel from the get go. Two ranks are an asset to speedy maneuver as kneeling the front rank is unnecessary in the first place. With 3 ranks there would be unavailable time consumed in getting the front rank to hear the command to stand up(and be willing.. sorry but I like it here just fine) in preparation of moving the ranks forward to exploit a gap/morale failure or initiating a charge.

Not so sure that a third rank in a charge would be anything but an impediment to the first 2 ranks on top of it all though I get the mass effect thing. I know the idea of two ranks with spikie things pointed at my back running full bore over uneven ground might be be more unnerving to me than an enemy to the front.

Pure guesswork here from simple speculation.

The reason was not enough men to fill up three ranks. If the unit was at full strength, no doubt they would have used three ranks. Simple as that.

mjc

"The reason was not enough men to fill up three ranks. If the unit was at full strength, no doubt they would have used three ranks. Simple as that."

This is almost certainly not the reason.

When Wellington ordered his army to fight exclusively in 2 deep line in 1808, the battalions were at full strength and he outnumbered the French at both Rolica and Vimiero.

There is nothing in the British regulations forcing understrength units to use 2 deep line, although it was recommended in peacetime, when battalions were maintained at a very low strength, so that officers could get used to manoeuvering with longer battalion frontages. Battalions with as few as 300 men could form 3 deep line and comply with the minimum requirements for subunit frontage.

The choice to fight 2 deep, which was not exclusive to Wellington and had been ordered occasionally at least as early as 1793 in Europe, was a tactical one. The British found that they could normally handle the French while deployed in 2 ranks, so why bother with 3?

Hmm, I like the need to defend against cavalry whilst in line as the reason why Fred revered to three lines. I've always assumed that in general 18th C armies had battalions deployed very close together. As I understand it the Napoleonic battalions were rather more spread out, so needed more protection against cavalry. The British solution was either to form square (as other nationalities did). Incidentally, how many ranks did a French square have? I know the British used four, aand presumably this was easier to form from a two-deep line. Did other nationalities do the same?

I think a lot of battalions of all nations would have end up in 2 deep on campaign when the units got smaller and smaller.

I'm with the anti-cavalry viewpoint. The British regulations specified 3 ranks, but those regulations were not enforced. My view is that this was a result of a lack of mounted opponents, both in America and in Spain. The two-rank firing line was much more efficient and gave maximum firepower. Remember, the British rarely fielded large armies by continental standards. They needed every advantage they could manage.

As a result, the British were forced to deploy in double line to form square, while the French and other 3-rank armies could use a single line on the side of a square.

I'm not familiar with Austrian practice, but their anti-cav formation was not a proper square, but a "masse." It's different.

Thanks for the replies. Interesting to hear various viewpoints. If only Wellington had thought of us wargamers and written that infantry will deploy in two ranks henceforth because…!

Thanks again.

Swedes/Finns also used two ranks during napoleonic wars.

@Shootmenow
Nafziger's book 'Imperial Bayonets' [Two versus three rank chapter] is somewhat enlightening on the subject – though not fully. In this book Nafziger states [my comments are in parenthesis]:
"The British regulations, specifically directed that the infantry be organized in three ranks. But also directed that if the company strength fell below a specific strength the third rank was to be incorporated into the front rank to maintain its frontage [this was the same for a majority of European Nations, including the French]…….. A battalion with 660 men could meet the requirements of the minimum frontage of 20 files per company and three full ranks [the additional 60 men are file closers, musicians and officers]. By the same analysis, if the strength fell to 400 men the battalion would absolutely have to be in two ranks if it were to maintain the minimum frontage." It seems to be a matter of minimum frontage and maintaining volume of fire. Nafziger goes on to point our that the unit strengths evidenced during the Peninsular campaigns essentially forced the British units to adopt two ranks, because they were below the minimum strengths to form in the regulated three-rank formation. Nafziger concludes, 'It is, therefore, highly debatable if the British chose the two-deep formation for the avowed purposes of increasing fire power.'

The following is taken from Matthew Spring's book 'With Zeal and Bayonet's Only', in his discussion of the two-rank order with open files [18" between files – which is very different to the close order two-rank line] which the British employed typically during the AWI period. Here Spring quotes from David Dundas, Principles of Military Movement:
'The very small proportion of cavalry employed in the American wars, has much tended to introduce the present loose and irregular system of our infantry. Had they seen and been accustomed to the rapid movements of good cavalry, they would have felt the necessity of more substantial order, of moving with concert and circumspection, and of being at every instant in a situation to form and repel a vigorous attack'. Dundas was a strong proponent of the three-rank formation – particularly in the European theater. He's suggesting that the use of the two-rank [open] order in difficult terrain, with limited opportunity for cavalry was practical, but not so in Europe, where terrain was more open and cavalry in enormous quantities. For Dundas the third rank was a source of replenishment for the first two ranks to maintain frontage. Most regulations understood that the third rank was not suitable for fire action – they could load weapons, and plug gaps, but employing their muskets could cause as much damage to their own men as the enemy.

In support of the regulation three-ranks, Wellington himself wrote, in a letter dated 20th November 1833, the following:
"The rear rank of the cavalry does not strengthen the front rank, as the centre and rear ranks do the front rank of the infantry".
This letter appeared in 'Cavalry it's History and Tactic's' written by Nolan [of Balaclava fame], and first published in 1853, and seems to suggest that Wellington considered the norm for infantry to be front, center and rear, or three-ranks. He was forced to adopt, and authorize the use of two-ranks [and elect to stand on the reverse slope], because his units were under-strength and only capable of forming in two-ranks, in accordance with the requirements of British Army Regulations.

npm

Ligniere,

Please read the British Rules and Regulations, rather than Nafziger's muddled interpretation of them.

As I stated above, British battalions with as few as 300 rank and file could form 3 deep and comply with the regulations. The proposal in the regulations for understrength units was a reduction in the amount of sections per company, not a reduction in ranks.

Also see the comments on Wellington's first camapign in Portugal. The units weren't understrength, and the French were outnumbered, so 2 deep was not necessary, yet it was ordered as the standard formation.

brings more rifles to bear.

Captain Snort,
Where would I find the comments you refer to on Wellington's first campaign in Portugal. I'd love to read those.
Thanks

npm

This is the relevant section from the regulations:

"Each company forms two subdivisions, and also four sections. But as the sections should never be less than five files, it will happen, when the companies are weak, that they can only form three sections, or even two sections."

Five files in three ranks = 15 men.

Two sections per company = 30 men.

Ten companies per battalion = 300 men.

Elsewhere in the regulations, 4 files per section is deemed acceptable.

Captain Snort,
That's correct but you omit an important section – the full text reads:

"Each company forms two subdivisions, and also four sections. But as the sections should never be less than five files, it will happen, when the companies are weak, that they can only (for the purposes of march) form three sections, or even two sections"

The statement in parenthesis is very important, and seems to suggest that the reduction in sub-sections was not regulated for anything other than purposes of march.

The regulations do discuss adoption of two-ranks from three and vice versa, so the battalions would have be accustomed to this. However, it seems to make sense that if the battalion is under-strength then to maintain the volume of fire it would expand it's frontage by bringing the third rank into the first and second ranks.

The last paragraph of Part III of the regulations, referring to the preceding rules and regulations pertaining to the evolutions of the battalion:
"With a very few obvious alterations, these general rules take place when a company or battalion is permitted or ordered to form in two ranks only – which may often be done for the purposes of exercise and movement on a more considerable front"

npm

Ligniere

This is an interesting point, but the companies would only ever need to form sections "for the purposes of the march".

The march is described in S79 and refers to movements in cadence on a battlefield, not in road columns approaching the field.

I'm not sure that the phrase in brackets holds that much significance.

Regarding your other point about Wellington's comments, I was referring to my own comments in a previous post about his general order to the army in Portugal in 1808. If the reason for 2 deep was low battalion strength, or low army strength, which I dispute, then why was it necessary to form 2 deep in 1808?

Captain Snort,
I have downloaded a copy of Wellington's Dispatches and General Orders and have found no reference to instructing the infantry to form in two-ranks. The only reference to unit organization, that I see, relates to the light companies and rifle companies of a brigade being united when opposed to the enemy – and that dates to May 2009. Can you shed any further light on your reference to his general order issued prior to the engagements at Vimeiro or Rolica to form in two ranks – this is obviously an important document.

Thanks

npm

Ligniere,

The relevant passage is in Wellington's supplementary dispatches, from a general order issued at Lavos, 3rd August 1808:

"The order of battle of the army is to be two deep, and as follows, beginning with the right:-
Major-General Ferguson's brigade.
Brigadier Catlin Craufurd's ditto.
Brigadier-General Fane's ditto on the left.."

Captain Snort,
My interpretation of that would be for the army to be in two lines – not two-ranks. But that's only my interpretation.
Thank you for the info

npm

Ligniere,

I think that is unlikely. The phrase two deep (also three deep and four deep) was invariably a reference to the depth of files within a battalion and I have never seen this term applied to multiple lines one behind the other in any British Napoleonic-era literature. Period terminology for one battalion behind another was "two lines".

Actually there are many reference to units at Waterloo forming up 4 deep rather than 2 deep even towards the end of day when they should have been theorectically very thinned out.

But wasn't the four deep line a direct result of the repeated cavalry charges the previous hours? A four deep line offers some protection from cavalry while only presenting artillery with a four deep target instead of an eight. Assuming some of the battalions had the strength to form a doubled line square.

I've seen no reference to British units deployed four deep at the start of the battle.

No the formations were not simply a result of repeated cavalry charges.

Also Major de Lacy Evans writes of d'Erlons inital attack at the start of the battle, "Sir Denis Pack … ordered 4-deep [line] to be formed and closed in to the centre. The Regiment, which was then within about 20 yards of the column, fired a volley into them. The enemy on reaching the hedge at the side of the road had ordered arms, and were in the act of shouldering them when they received the volley from the 92nd."

Regardless of whether they were deployed 4 deep at the start or not the main point I was really making was to not simply assume that British units were always deployed in a 2 deep line when facing the French.

I remember reading something written by a British infantry officer at Waterloo – McCready(?) – stating that due to a mauling from French cavalry at Qatre Bras, the men in his battalion had to be placed 4 deep at Waterloo to keep them steady. I don't know at what stage of the battle this was but I remember him saying something like 'it would have required a higher authority than God himself to order them to form up less deep'.

Sorry to sound so vague but I read this quite a long time ago, though it made an impression as it was the first time I had heard of the British forming Line so deep.

Perhaps someone may have the full reference or more detail?

Anyway, thanks again as I've really enjoyed the info being posted here.

Captain Snort,
Sorry been busy all weekend…..
I wish Wellesley had added the word 'line' or 'ranks', so it could have read either: "two [lines] deep" or "two [ranks] deep" – because clearly it's still open to interpretation – it certainly isn't definitive.

A lot, in my opinion, rides on the definition of what Wellesley meant by 'Order of Battle' – I have to admit I'm not wholly convinced that he was referring to the individual battalions, and how they should deploy for battle. I think it's equally as reasonable to read that he's referring to the brigades [or higher formations], that form the order of battle, and that they shall be deployed two deep. What I mean to say is that, Wellesley is not addressing the regimental/battalion commanders, but he's addressing his brigade commanders, and how their higher level formation should be disposed on the battlefield.

npm

@ BravoX,
The British Army Rules and Regulations, 1807 refers to the fourth rank/Supernumerary rank – which would be occupied by the file closers of a three rank formation.
For example in Part III:
Formation of the battalion at close-order: Ranks are at the distance of one pace, except the fourth or supernumerary rank, which has three paces.
and
Uses of the fourth or supernumerary rank: The fourth rank is at three paces distance when halted, or marching in line. – When marching in column, it must close up to the distance of the other ranks. – The essential use of the fourth rank is to keep the others closed up to the front during the attack, and to prevent any break beginning in the rear. On this important service, too many officers and non-commissioned officers cannot be employed.

Of course, this fourth or supernumerary rank is very sparse, being only composed of officers and sergeants, not required elsewhere in the formation – but it was referred to as the 'fourth' rank by regulation.

I believe [I know I read it somewhere] that during peacetime, battalions would parade in two ranks and would, when space was limited, form the two battalion wings one behind the other, which would effectively result in a four rank formation. In peacetime two ranks was used because the unit would not be at full establishment. So theoretically, perhaps this could also have been the formation referred to in some of the primary accounts, but used in combat.

npm

Ligniere,

Wellington's general order has been interpretted as an instruction for 2 rank line by many authorities, including recently both Howie Muir and Rory Muir. I just can't see that "2 deep" refers to the number of lines.

Regarding your latest post, you seem to be suggesting that the British army fought 3 deep in battle and that reference to 4 deep line includes the file closers. The British at Waterloo, and throughout the Peninsula, fought 2 deep. At Waterloo the 4 deep line, a compromise formation in which to receive both cavalry and infantry was formed in 2 different ways. Maitland and Halkett split their squares half way across the rear face and wheeled up the sides forming an irregular line with the companies out of their proper order, some being split half on one flank and half on the other. The 52nd of Adam's brigade formed the left subdivision of each company behind the right subdivision. There is also a reference for Adam's brigade stating that the the battalions formed one wing behind the other. Either way, the fact that all these troops ended up 4 deep is sufficient proof that they had originally been deployed 2 deep.

Similar evidence is available for 1808. The 29th, when threatened with cavalry at Vimiero, formed 4 deep. Again this is a good indication that the original formation was 2 deep.

Captain Snort,
No, you misunderstand me – I'm not suggesting that the British habitually formed three deep. Clearly they could and would adopt two ranks, as this is referred to in many personal accounts.

My contention is that the regulations, not only of the European powers, but Britain also, stated that the line was three-deep. And as was the case in all armies, when strengths were so reduced by attrition or combat, two-rank was the favored and/or acceptable formation. However, due to combat losses a majority of the British found themselves, for the purposes of maintaining their effective frontages, forming in two ranks.

At Waterloo, the 52nd of Adams brigade was the largest formation in the British organization, and was composed of elements of both the 1st and 2nd battalions – one of the battalions had been stationed in the low countries since 1813, and had fought during that the 1814 campaign, and was amalgamated into the other battalion upon it's arrival in 1815. The regulations state that the light infantry [and other corps that perform the duties of light infantry] should be formed in two ranks – and with the size of the unit is would have made much practical sense, to the commanding officer, to have organized the 52nd to operate as two separate 'wings'. Assuming the unit had 1,002 rank and file, in two ranks that's 501 times 22 inches or 306 yards [408 paces] – that's serious frontage, but split into two autonomous or semi-autonomous wings, the unit[s] become much more manageable.

The thing about primary sources [in my opinion] is that they tend to document or highlight the exception, rather than the norm. So a source would write, we formed in two-ranks – not because it was the norm, but because, on that day, it was the exception. The author of the evidence that the 29th at Vimeiro was four deep – was probably writing that the battalion received cavalry in line, and not in square, as the exception, and not the norm. And that the four rank line [three ranks with a supernumerary fourth rank] performed adequately for the purpose.

I fully accept and believe that British infantry deployed in two-ranks [the light infantry was expected to according to the regulations], but I don't ascribe to the view that they did on every occasion. Particularly if their strength was such that they could have adopted the regulation three ranks. Without the third rank to absorb casualties, the two rank formation was particularly brittle, and vulnerable [particularly to cavalry]. I personally believe that Wellington's tactic of forming his troops on the reverse slope [and lying down] was primarily the result of being in two-ranks and used to protect his units from normal combat attrition.

I realize we are both entrenched in our opinions – and only a time machine will probably shake either of our faiths – but it's certainly fun to debate.

npm

Ligniere,

It's certainly fun to debate, and hopefully learn in the process.

To back up your point, please show me some references to large British battalions using 3 deep line in the Peninsula, or a reference to a British battalion having to form 2 deep because it had insufficient men to form 3 deep.

Regarding the 29th at Vimiero, the battalion formed 4 deep having previously advanced "in line". Clearly 4 deep is a different formation and not just merely an inclusion of the file closers. If this were the case then the 2 deep line would actually be referred to as 3 deep.

Captain Snort,
That's my point about primary sources recounting the exception rather than the norm. There wasn't much point for the diarist to write that they were in the regulation three ranks – but it did have purpose to include, we were formed in two ranks. That's something to write home about.

And I return to the letter by Wellington, written in 1833, where he clearly refers to the infantry as being in three ranks, rear, center and front. The 1816 amendments to the British regulations didn't change the text of the 1807 regulations to read "The company is formed two deep". If it had become the accepted norm to form in two deep, why didn't the regulations, that governed the formations and drill of the troops, reflect that obvious position.

I'll be honest, in my forty years of reading Napoleonic literature – and I'll admit, primarily, secondary and tertiary source material at that – I have never, explicitly, to my knowledge, come across an account that wrote that a unit was deployed in three or two ranks. I've probably focused on the wrong sources, and I will endeavor to read as many primary sources as possible. It seems to be accepted common knowledge that the British deployed in two-ranks, and that has been used to somehow describe why they were so successful against the French.

I first began doubting the 'dogma' of two ranks, based upon reading Nafziger and Muir, and coupling this with wargaming research for various British Napoleonic battles, when I tried to factor in unit frontage with actual terrain limitations. The length of a two rank line seemed to be prohibitive in a number of situations. I'll follow up with some analysis.

Regarding the 29th at Vimeiro – if they were already in line, when threatened by cavalry, why did they elect to alter their formation to 'double line', by deploying one wing in front of the other – if they were going to change formation, wouldn't it have made more sense to form square.

npm

Captain Snort,
Using Fortescue's map of Talavera:

picture

It's clear from this map that Sherbrooke's 1st Division occupied an approximate frontage of one kilometer for the eight battalions. That's about 1,100 yards.

Taking Sherbrooke's strength as 5,910 all ranks, then deducting the light companies [who would have been detached], and introducing a minimum 10 yard interval between each battalion, and using 22" per file, the frontages would have been:

Two ranks: 1,560 yards
Three ranks: 1,100 yards

Assuming that the four largest units [those over 660 men strength – 998, 1047, 804 and 731 men] would have adopted three rank, whilst the remaining four [506, 657, 610 and 557] would have adopted two ranks, we achieve a frontage of 1,300 yards.

This analysis seems to suggest that, if Fortescue's map is correct, Sherbrooke would have been closer to three ranks than two ranks. Obviously the map is not precise, but if the battalions were in two ranks they would have occupied a front 143% the length shown on the map, whilst if they had been in three-ranks, they would have extended to the limits precisely described by the map.

npm

Ligniere,

Regarding the 29th at Vimiero, the reason for 4 deep and not square was because of a combined French threat, exactly the same situation as Waterloo:

"We were then halted, and as the enemy appeared to have gone completely off, our men were allowed to stand at ease. While resting in this manner we suddenly observed a column of the enemy, which, it seems, had suddenly concealed in a village on the opposite heights, make a dash down as if they meant to attack us, while a body of cavalry at the same time appeared on our right flank, threatening to turn and attack us in that flank. We were instantly ordered to form four deep, which formation afforded the advantage of showing a front to meet the enemy in line, and at the same time of sufficient strength to resist cavalry."

Regarding your evidence for Talavera, I think that you are on thin ice when relying on a map such as this. I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of Fortescue's groundscale, although his map of Salamanca has been shown to be innaccurate in this regard, but how does Fortescue know exactly where Sherbrooke's line actually started and finished?

On my copy of Fortescue's map, the division takes up 23mm. To cover the 2 deep frontage that I think they would have taken up, when taking into account losses from the previous evening and those not counted as rank and file (1450 yards), they need to take up 28mm. This would be possible even on Fortescue's map.

The Portuguese were issued a general order in 1810 to form in 2 ranks when on campaign. The Netherlands army was issued a similar general order in 1815. The assumption must be that the British were doing the same thing. There is no doubt that 2 deep was standard at Waterloo and I can see no evidence for anything different in the Peninsula. If British battalions had switched between 2 deep and 3 deep dependant on battalion strength, or the length of position to be occupied, I am sure that there would be more references to the actual depth of line used. As it is, there are only references to 2 deep line, or 4 deep line, which is formed from 2 deep.

keep it up chaps, thoroughly enjoying this one.

just to chip in a distraction though.

Leuthen was, according to the Duffy I was reading over breakfast this morning, the first battle when the Austrians deployed in 3 not 4 ranks
this is ascribed in part to shortages in numbers and also to a desire to string out their line to 'block' an expected attempt by Frederick to come around their flank (boy did that work).

which is nice to know, I thought.

Captain Snort,
The diarist's account of the 29th at Vimeiro doesn't read very believably. If the cavalry were on their flank, there's even more reason to have formed square – it seems, from the account, that they formed double line [four ranks] to confront the infantry to their front, not the cavalry to their flank. The 29th [Worcester's Regimental] site is very informative [the roll call is very sobering, check out Rolica and Albuera – and WWI is simply shocking].
link
link

The account of the 29th at Vimeiro [Vimiera] is unfortunately not as descriptive about formations, but still makes an interesting read.

In Rene Chartrand's Osprey book related to the battle, his description reads:
"behind the hill were three British Brigades formed in battle order of two lines: the first line with Ferguson's Brigade with the 36th, 40th and 71st Regiments, and the 82nd from Nightingall's Brigade; the second line having the 6th and 32nd of Bowe's Brigade and the 29th from Nightingall's". That sounds suspiciously like the General Order of 3rd August "The order of battle of the army is to be two deep". Chartrand also gives a strength for the 29th at Vimeiro as 616 all ranks. That's interesting because using my argument, that once a company fell below the minimum 20 files, it would extend its frontage by eliminating the third rank and reducing to two ranks, then the minimum 20 files represents a battalion of 660 all ranks [600 rank and file and 60 Officers, NCO's and musicians]. So if the 29th had a strength of 616 men, it would have logically been in two ranks – so that makes sense. It even supports your argument that they formed in four ranks as protection against the cavalry on their flank.

Regarding Talavera, I checked the map in Oman, and that too, shows the length of Sherbrooke's line as 1 kilometer, or 1,100 yards. Oman and Fortescue indicate that Campbell's brigade was deployed between the Guards and the redoubt – so that sets the limits of the right of Sherbrooke's line. If we then run the line out to to 1,560 yards in two ranks, that extends the KGL in front of the Medellin. That doesn't make sense, as they would have been directly ahead of Tilson and Stewart, and would have been attacked by Villatte and not Lapisse, as was actually the case. If they were in two ranks, the line was simply too long for the position.

npm

Ligniere wrote:

"That's interesting because using my argument, that once a company fell below the minimum 20 files, it would extend its frontage by eliminating the third rank and reducing to two ranks, then the minimum 20 files represents a battalion of 660 all ranks"

Ligniere,

As posted above, the remedy for low strength companies was a reduction in sections, not ranks. This is repeated at least 3 times in the Rules and Regulations. The first is quoted above and would allow for battalions with as few as 300 rank and file to form 3 deep. The second is in the section entitled 'Formation of the Battalion':

"The eight battalion companies will compose four grand divisions; eight companies or platoons, sixteen subdivisions, thirty-two sections, when sufficiently strong to be divided; otherwise twenty-four, for the purposes of march."

The third is in S.178:

"Unless the companies are above 16 file they cannot be divided into 4 sections: If therefore they are under 16 file and told off in 3 sections, the column will march at the distance of a section, and in forming the square, the 2 outward sections will wheel up, but the 3rd one will stand fast, and afterwards by dividing itself to right and left, will form a 4th rank to the others…."

This shows that Dundas still expected companies with reduced strength to form 3 ranks. This last quote from the regulations also should remove any doubts about that phrase "for the purposes of march". Here Dundas is showing how companies that could not form 4 sections would actually manouevre. It also seems to show, contrary to the other statements about 5 files being the minimum per section, that 4 files per section was the point of change, and 16 files is the transition point between 3 and 4 sections per company, although the description is slightly misleading. 17 files can form 4 sections, 15 files can only form 3, but what happens if the company consists of exactly 16 files?

This point is actually explained with more clarity in Baron von Antonio Lopez Suasso Diaz De Fonseca's 'The Theory of Infantry Movements'. Despite the name, Fonseca served as a Captain in the British army during the Napoleonic Wars and wrote several books on drill:

"The battalion, when formed in line, besides its natural division into companies, consists of two half battalions or wings, and of 4 or 5 grand divisions which are each composed of 2 companies or platoons: the latter are again divided into 2 subdivisions, and the subdivisions, where strength admits, into 2 sections; but as, for the purposes of march, it is ordered that sections should never be under 5 files, the company can frequently form but 3 of them, and even merely 2 when its front is reduced to 10 files; in the latter case it is obvious, that a subdivision and a section become the same thing."

There is no reference anywhere to the company having to form 20 files. The section is the governing subunit, and lack of strength resulted in a reduction in sections. As Fonseca was writing from experience, this should be sufficient proof that 10 files per company was acceptable.

I could post many referenced examples of the British using 2 deep line, but not one of them using 3 deep in the field. As you think that reference to 2 deep line is mentioned in memoirs because it was perhaps an exception to the norm, there is no point in me doing this. What we need are general statements referring to 2 ranks from those who were in a position to have such knowledge. This, from Fonseca's work will do for a start:

"In the Peninsular War, the army under the Duke of Wellington fought constantly in 2 ranks; but this cannot be adduced against the inefficiency of a third, as his Grace found the troops so formed when he took the command."

Fonseca seems to be in favour of a third rank in his book, so if he was aware of this formation being used in the Peninsula, he would surely have said so.

Then there is James Shaw Kennedy's description of frontage for the benefit of non-military readers:

"Consequently, when British infantry occupy, in two lines, that is in 4 ranks [ie each line 2 deep], a field of battle extending one mile in front, 11,200 men are required."

There is no mention of the possibility of 3 ranks at all.

There are plenty of myths about the British army that need to be dispelled, but the idea that they formed 2 ranks in the Peninsula and at Waterloo is not, on current evidence, one of them. You have not yet provided any evidence for 3 deep in the field at all.

Captain Snort,
I'm not saying that the British during the Peninsular and at Waterloo didn't form in two-ranks – obviously they did – I accept that. What I'm trying to reason is why they did this [pretty obvious, they were under-strength], how they did this in respect to the regulations [again, pretty obvious, the regulations tell them how to do it], and whether it is reasonable to believe, that on some occasions, when at or close to full establishment strength, they could have formed in three ranks. This in accordance with the published regulations – not only by reference to the 1807 manual, but also to that of 1816.

I understand that you suggest that two rank had nothing to do with combat strength, and that it was simply adopted following the issuance of General Orders. But why issue that order? I can understand it for battalions that are well below establishment strength [at or below 2/3 strength]. But, for a battalion at or close to full establishment strength, if formed in two ranks the frontage would be excessive, the command and control would be difficult, and maneuvering the unit in line would have been problematic. Whilst the advantages seem to be minimal.

Clearly, my life work may be to find the 'exceptional' quote from the diarist of [for example] the 2/24th Foot at Talavera [strength 841 officers and other ranks] who writes definitively that his regiment was formed in three ranks, with a supernumerary rank of junior officers and sergeants. [Personally, I was fairly awestruck when I read the letter from Wellington that refers to three ranks]. But until that time, I gracefully bow out of this thread – it's been enjoyable and enlightening.

npm

Ligniere,

I agree that the discussion has been both enjoyable and enlightening. It is good to discuss the subject with someone who obviously has an equal passion.

I think that it illustrates that although we can produce many references to support our different arguments, there is still so much that we don't know about the subject and hopefully further research will perhaps clear up some of these grey areas.

Best regards

CMH

thanks to both of you from the neutrals

Question, there the India pattern musket was relativly short in contrast to the usual fire arms of other nations, could the British armed with that musket actually form in three ranks, or fire with three ranks.
The muzzle of the muskets' third rank must surpass the front rank.

von Winterfeldt,

This is a very interesting question. When the Rules and Regulations were written in 1792, the standard infantry musket was the Short Land Pattern with a 42-inch barrel. Dundas states in the Regulations:

"The fire of 3 ranks standing is hardly with our present arms to be required; especially if the ground is broken, and that the soldiers are loaded with their knapsacks."

The phrase "with our present arms" is, I presume, a reference to the length of musket, which was 4 inches shorter than earlier patterns. Fire in 3 ranks was allowed, however, if the front rank knelt.

From this, the logical conclusion would be that the even shorter India Pattern musket with a 39-inch barrel, (the standard musket throughout the Napoleonic wars except for Guards and Light Infantry) would make the process even more difficult, but there are a few indications that fire with 3 ranks standing was still possible.

Firstly there is de Fonseca, who was an advocate of 3 ranks:

"Nor can the difficulty attending the operation of firing in 3 ranks standing, be alleged, as an objection against it, since, provided troops have been carefully instructed, and properly trained to it, the first discharges will be regularly performed."

Note that 2 volleys was the maximum that Fonseca considered practical from this formation.

Secondly there is the following from David Harding's meticulously researched 'Small Arms of the East India Company':

"References to the centre and rear ranks in Smith's inspection reports of 1771 show that firing was still conducted in 3 ranks. If the men were taught to lock up close to each other in accordance with the 1764 Regulations, the [East India] Company's short 39-inch barrel could be used safely in 3 ranks, even with all 3 standing."

Note that the EIC had used muskets with 39-inch barrels since 1760 as standard, the one generally now known as the "India Pattern" being introduced in 1771. Also note that the army in India must have changed to 2 ranks shortly after Smith's reports, as in 1794, Abercromby imposed the use of the 1792 Regulations with one exception: "As the only deviation from the Regulations now adopted, that the army in India continue to form two deep, the officers and sergeants not posted in the ranks forming a supernumerary rank; the corps will, however, occasionally practice their exercise and movement 3 deep."

As an aside, also note Abercromby's use of the word "deep" in the above passage. As in all other Napoleonic-era descriptions, it refers to depth of files, not the amount of lines, which is why I am convinced that Wellington's 1808 General Order is a reference to line 2 ranks deep.

Thirdly there is an account that illustrates the dangers of fire in three ranks, even when not under enemy fire. John Green of the 68th Regiment recalled an occasion when his regiment practised the fire of 3 ranks. Presumably, by the injury sustained by the front-rank man, with all ranks standing:

"On one occasion, we were firing 3 deep, and one of the rear rank men, not looking well along his piece to see if he was clear of his front-rank man, fired, and carried away two fingers and part of the hand of the poor fellow."

Note that the regiment were not on active service and were still in England at the time, so this is not a reference to 3 deep in battle. This was after the 68th's conversion to light infantry and they were armed with "Japanned muskets with double sights" which is obviously a reference to the New Land Pattern Light Infantry Musket, which had a barrel 39 inches long, the same as the India Pattern.

Captain Snort

Thank you for the references and interesting discussion.
The French used also for their infantry at Cylon – Cipayé – two ranks only.

In the Napoleonic wars most nations – even when ranged in three ranks – fired with the two front ranks only and abolished for the first rank to kneel down.

There was a big ongoing discussion of the use of the third rank – there it usually did not fire in a fire fight.
Advocates for three ranks fielded the arguments that the thrid rank formed a reserve and would replace casualties in the first two ranks so a unit could maintain its usual frontage, or the third rank could be used as skirmishers without shriniking the frontage and also could form ad hoc reserve units (as the Austrians did very often in the Revolutionary Wars).