"Why was the Guard pants at Waterloo?" Topic

Hello Lord Hill!

I assume your list is based on the regiment, not the men.

Guard units are pretty much shock troops and only put into the battle line if needed. I would never expect them to be
number one.

I certainly hope your not suggesting the other 16 regiments
were better troops.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hello Supercilius Maximus!

Not sure why you seem to be hung up on militia being drafted into the guard. There were only two choices, raw
or militia. I think in most cases militia is probably the better choice.

Light infantry and rifles received different training to some extent. They were also committed to more actions so one might expect them to be high up on a regimental battle
list. Guards were shock troops, trained to deliver volleys.
They were only put into the line if needed. I would never expect to see them at the top of Lord Hill's list.

I certainly think other British units could have performed
just as well as the 1st. Guards. It's also possible that some may have not. My only point is they did a great job that certainly contributed to stopping some of the best soldiers in the French army.

Thanks for your comments.

Best regards,

Glenn

4th Cuirassier (BTW, I like your name),

At Plancenoit, which the Prussians batteries had set on fire, the Young Guard and the two battalions of Old Guard had already suffered many casualties at this point. They were terribly outnumbered by the Prussians (also, there was allied cavalry near by).

Earlier in the fight, the Old Guard retook Plancenoit at bayonet point. Even the Prussians had high praise for the Old Guard. The 2nd Silesian infantry history continued: "… Supported by Colonel von Funck's Pomeranian's [and other units], they stormed the churchyard. Here, a vicious, bloody and bitter battle took place. General Morand brought up the battalions of the Imperial Guard held in reserve behind Plancenoit. Two of them were sent into the village. Not fearing death, they pressed on, inspiring the Young Guard again. However, despite the great determination with which the French and particularly the Old Guard defended Plancenoit, all their efforts and heroic sacrifices could do nothing to halt the attacking Prussians."

The Old Guard battalions were not pushed away by the Prussian 18th Infantry regiment alone. The French Guard was facing overwhelming numbers.

The Old Guard were most certainly NOT PANTS.

Hello Bandit!

Thanks for your kind words.

You may very well be right. I hope not. Some of the petty issues aside I do think for some this has been a learning
experience. To bring out informative knowledge even in a
heated debate is not always a bad thing. There has been some good here even if it was never intended.

Regardless, good point.

Best regards,

Glenn

Glenn,

British guard units were not really used as shock troops in the Napoleonic Wars; generally, they were used just like any other line infantry. They were neither bigger, stronger men (as per the Russian guard)nor more experienced (as per the French guard). They were just another bunch of highly trained and disciplined soldiers who happened to have some rather more aristocratic officers than usual (which may not always have been a good thing!).

Colin

4th Cuirassier,

You really have misrepresented what happened to the two OG battalions in the fighting around Plancenoit. They were not defeated by one Prussian infantry regiment, but by a rather overwhelming force of Prussian infantry, artillery and cavalry. Even the Prussians acknowledged how well they fought.

By the way, dismissing the 18th Infantry Regiment as mere reservists is also rather misleading. The Prussian ex-reserve regiments consisted of men who had been fully trained and then discharged through the Krumper system or had been drafted and trained during the peace of 1814-15. Many of the men in the 18th had fought in the campaigns of 1813-14 as part of the 2nd corps. Most of the Prussian ex-reserve regiments in 1815 were probably as good as French line regiments.

Colin

However, by the time the MG were ordered in the British had been able to realign their front, this was thanks to being informed the French guard was coming. Wellington was ready and the MG were marching into a cauldron of fire for which they were inadequately prepared. They were doomed to lose but if you read in-depth the attack you will read how bravely they fought and how well they did. They even pushed the British guards and other allied formations back for a time. It is a credit to them that they performed so well against the odds.

Shane I realise that to challenge another persons heroes is a dangerous thing, but at the risk of incurring your wrath I think you over egg the pudding somewhat. You focus on all the difficulties that the Guard faced, but you fail to mention the desperate state many of the allied units were in. They had been shelled all day, many units had sufferd significant casualties and they had to endure repeated cavalry attacks, they were tired and low on ammunition and to top it all they then had to face an attack by supposedly the best infantry in Europe. Many armies before them had failed just that test and to their credit they didn't. To suggest that it was a forgone conclusion sitting safe behind your computer screen, 200 years later without having to face that attack yourself is an insult to the brave Brunswickers, Dutch, Belgians, Nassauers, Hanoverians, KGL and Brits that had to endure it. I'm darn sure it didn't seem like a forgone conclusion to them. I haven't read all that has been written on that action, but to me it reads like a desperate struggle with allied units being pushed back and then rallying and returning to the fray. Wellington was right to call it a close run thing.

I have to disagree with part of your reply which suggests British training and firepower had nothing to do with it. Do you then suggest that a few battalions of Austrian landwehr in the same situation would have pulled off the same result?

Old Bear,

No, not at all, Yes, the British firepower contributed but some people here previously seem to indicate this was why the attack failed, to me it is not. All the allied units in that line were capable of delivering firepower to stop the French attacks, not just the British is my point. This seems to be overlooked by several people. Also, you should know also that the Dutch/Belgians and other Germans also contributed greatly to the defeat of the French MG, this is my point, it was not just a British effort. I get sick of seeing people try to portray the defeat as solely contributable to the British guards and the 52nd.

There was much more to it than that is my point, not just British firepower.

As for the Landwehr comment, many of the Dutch/Belgian units were considered very poor or militia…if they could stand and fight off the French guard so could a Landwehr unit if the conditions were right, no matter how good the enemy formations were.

Shane

My point about sitting behind the safety of his computer 200 years later and ridicule the French….again was to highlight how niave his viewpoint really is…

Shane

Shane's post has left me a bit confused.

Surely the two battalion attack that forced the Allied line back was against Halkett with the 30th and 73rd, these were supported by Dutch units and the French pushed back.

The larger three battalion attack was stopped by the Guards and the 52nd and rather than forcing anyone back the 52nd enveloped MG arrayed against it?

The two French columns were out of supporting distance and there is no need to lump the two attacks together as each was fought off by different defending units.

Or have I got that bit the other way round?

The larger three battalion attack was stopped by the Guards and the 52nd and rather than forcing anyone back the 52nd enveloped MG arrayed against it?

Actually, the British guards were forced back in this attack, it was the flank fire of the 52nd that halted the MG's advance while the British guard retired.

My point about sitting behind the safety of his computer 200 years later and ridicule the French….again was to highlight how niave his viewpoint really is…

Maybe he didn't put it very well, but his question which boils down to just how good were the Guard at Waterloo is a valid one. IMHO not as good as they had been, but that probably goes for the French army as a whole and the allied army too.
The Guard performed well at Placenoit, but equally the Allies held Hougmont all day and were only forced out of La Haye Saint after they ran out of ammo against significant odds. I tend to agree with Babero's comment in his Waterloo book that there was no significant difference in skill at arms or courage between any of the participant nations that day.

Hi Fred, no worries at all, my wraith is not at you.

You may have missed my earlier point I made in paragraph 2 of my post:

The period from 6pm til 7pm was when the British had lost La Hay Sainte, their line was being pushed backwards and their front was beginning to crumble. The relentless pressures from the day's fighting and the current pressure being exerted during the crucial hour had primed the situation for the guard attack.

Maybe I should have elaborated a bit more, what I was saying was that the pressure exerted by the French on the allied line all day had caused great loss and hardship for all units in that line. Yes, the repeated French attacks and shelling was monumental in deteriorating the combat effectiveness of the allied units, I do not deny this at all.

What I am saying is that the window of opportunity for a successful French guard attack came and went between the hour of 6pm to 7pm. by the time the MG attacked Wellington had the time to re-align his forces (or what was left of them) to meet the attack. No matter how fresh the French guard were at this time the Allied line was ready for them and were able to unleash a cauldron of fire down on them. No unit would have been able to withstand that amount of incoming fire is my point.

Shane I realise that to challenge another persons heroes is a dangerous thing, but at the risk of incurring your wrath I think you over egg the pudding somewhat.

No, not at all, yes I admire the French, my family came from Holland, Belgium and France so why would I not admire them. But I am far from one eyed either. I do admire the British, I was born and bred in Australia where Queen and Empire was drilled into me. I grew up admiring the British and the red-coat, I had all the little red clad soldiers and read all the books as a child about the British, to me France was unknown. It was not until later that I realised (growing up) that my heritage was more aligned with the French or continent…

To suggest that it was a forgone conclusion sitting safe behind your computer screen, 200 years later without having to face that attack yourself is an insult to the brave Brunswickers, Dutch, Belgians, Nassauers, Hanoverians, KGL and Brits that had to endure it. I'm darn sure it didn't seem like a forgone conclusion to them.

And no, I never suggested that to them it was a forgone conclusion, to "us now" (me) with hindsight it was, but to them not so. But what I was affronted by (as always) is the bias, one-eyed view-point of particular posters who believe in superiority of their soldiers at the "expense" of their adversaries. I hardly think a British veteran of the Peninsula wars or Waterloo would agree with cacadores that the French guard were, "pants" as he so disrespectfully puts it, do yo?

I am not so much trying to defend my heroes as much as trying to re-balance the viewpoint that cacadores is trying to paint for everyone else. If he wants to portray the French as inferior, poorly led, poorly trained, inept, or any other choice words he uses then he should expect people to come out and defend them. After All, this is exactly what he wants, he s the boards just for this reason and everyone here knows it. Do you blame me and others here for pointing this out?

Shane

Maybe he didn't put it very well, but his question which boils down to just how good were the Guard at Waterloo is a valid one. IMHO not as good as they had been, but that probably goes for the French army as a whole and the allied army too.

I agree totally, the 3rd and 4th regiments IMHO were not as good as the first two by any stretch. I dare say the 1st and 2nd regiments of Grenadiers and Chasseurs were not to the same standard as the same regiments in previous years also but we will never really know for sure. But to call them, "pants" is downright insulting, disrespectful and was nothing more than an attempt by him to insight anger. He might possibly have had a valid point but it was the way he presented that point that bugs me, you can see that can't you? This was nothing more than a ing exercise for him, as usual.

If he attacked the Russian guards in the same way at Austerlitz I would respond equally as vigilantly against him as well…

Just had a look at the companion.

So the Guards advanced, felt threatened by the 4th chasseurs, and retreated to their start line, then advanced again.

Best of all possible worlds. Fracophiles can say they caused the Maitland's guards to retreat, while the Anglophiles cans say the MG never forced the guard back from the sunken road (the main line of resistance).

Now I must say that I found this statement a bit off putting:

"It has nothing to do with the supposed superiority of the British Infantry, their firepower or any other feat of arms they are given credit for. Sure they were well trained and fought well and were mostly veterans but they accounted for a mere 30% of the entire allied line that day! How funny it is to forget the contributions of all the other allied units that stood bravely and fought well on that day!"

As this is a discussion of the French Guard attack late in the day. The proportion of British troops *on this part of the line and engaged in this bit of the fighting* was well above the 30% given for the army as a whole.

Another unique feature for the wargamer is the very professional manner in which the British horse was managed. Controlled charges, etc. Probably all the fire eaters had already been killed off or unhorsed by then : )

Shane – very well said.

La Vieille Garde à pied, à Plancenoit ….

maréchal de camp baron Jean-Jacques-Germain Pelet-Clozeau, colonel-major du 2e régiment de chasseurs à pied de la garde
« Plante là ton aigle, Martin » – c'était le nom du porte-aigle.
« À moi, mes amis! Sauvons l'aigle ou mourons autour d'elle! »

-- 1er bataillon du 2e régiment de chasseurs à pied (18/563) – major Jacques Colomban, chef de bataillon
-- 2e bataillon du 2e régiment de grenadiers à pied (18/527) – major Juste Golzio, chef de bataillon

"Splendid defence of Planchenoit by the Guard"
from The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 by William Sibourne
link

Lets look at the events according to Atkins Companion and what he has to say:

Napoleon had tried for over 6 hours to punch through the Allied line and twice he had come within a whisker of doing so. La Hay Sainte has fallen; the Allied line is exhausted and pushed back. Units are on the brink of collapse. At this point in time an opportunity open on the ridge to exploit the success, Ney demands more men but the situation at Plancenoit worries Napoleon too much to release men. If the back door is shut behind the French all would be lost. The opportunity is lost and Wellington is able to shore up his line.

However, seeing the Prussians closing in Napoleon eventually decides to gamble one last attempt to pierce through the allied line in the hope of defeating Wellington before the situation becomes worse. Thus the Guard is called up, they are his last reserves. This is the very thing Napoleon in numerous battles forces on his enemies; to force them to commit their last reserves before he has…

Napoleon marches up with his guards, eight, later to be nine battalions of OG supported by at least one but possibly two Guard horse batteries. Their bands are blaring out marching music to all to ensure everyone knows they are coming. This is to embolden the morale of his army and to let them know the guard attack will surely finish off the enemy.

However, a French cuirassier colonel has crossed the ridge earlier crying that the French guard will be here shortly. It is not known for sure if this is what prompted Wellington to bring in his reserves and strengthening his line but this incident occurred about 30mins before the French Guard attack commenced.

The French attack has a first line of 5 battalions, all in SQUARE, not column. This is because the French commanders feared cavalry attack and did not want to be caught moving in column or line. This in itself is a major contributor to their failed attack, how on earth can 5 meagerly supported infantry squares expect to pierce the allied line regardless of the state of the defenders?

Only the 3rd and 4th regiments advanced to the attack, the Middle Guard as they are sometimes called. The remaining 4 battalions halt as reserves further back. At least one or two Guard horse batteries advance with the MG and actually begin to administer great execution upon the allied units they fired on.

Although the Allied batteries were dispersed, short of ammunition, torn apart and lacking gunners who were also exhausted they still managed to put up a credible fire upon the French guards. In particular the attack to Maitland's front was affected severely by the cannon fire before the British guards fired their first shots, as Atkins put it, "to bend under the stroke like corn in the wind".

It was cannon fire from both sides that had the greatest effect on the enemy. Constant short range canister fire devastated units on both sides before the battalions came to grips with muskets, especially for the Chasseurs. The Grenadiers to the right were also affected by the collapse of Donzelot's failed attack to their right. This and the sudden fire from the British of Halkett's brigade sealed the fate of the French guards.
Col Halkett himself later recorded he could not account for the flight of the MG. He stated the French guards fired first (poorly – he added), then he ordered his own men to fire a volley. When the smoke cleared the French had turned and ran. The combination of effective fire from Krahmer's guns, the volley from Halkett's men, the collapse of the Line units on the right and ineffective fire delivered while in SQUARE caused them to collapse and run. Two battalions, 1200 men could not cope with this no matter how good they were. The odds were stacked up well and truly against them in numbers. Incoming fire compared to outgoing fire, especially while in square assured eventual defeat and collapse.

As for the Chasseurs, they suffered severely from the incoming canister, shell and roundshot as they approached. Three 600 man battalions of the MG shrunk substantially according to Adkins before they even reached the slope. This was while in square and marching forward. The eventual fire of Maitland's guards still 1400 strong when it came knocked over more than 20% of those still standing. Adkins states that this was, "too much, even for these veterans", he also states that the previous artillery fire had cost them dearly. The guards charged and the MG, by then wavering, broke and ran. The guards were now over the ridge and exposed.

The 4th Chasseurs now closing in on their flank coupled with the confusion of orders caused the guards to retreat in disorder, which was not the first time in the wars a victorious unit was forced to quickly withdraw due to a new threat. Encouraged by the apparent confusion in the ranks of the British guards this battalion pushed on. The British guards hurriedly withdrew. This situation was remedied by the 52nd who advanced over the ridge, 1000 men strong and fired into the French crushing them…

Now, the whole purpose of this is to explain my point, yes the British (and allied) firepower contributed to the eventual collapse of the French guard attack but it was the allied "Artillery fire" that paved the way for this. Adkins explains this very clearly in his book. The time Wellington had before the attack allowed him time to get guns into firing positions, re-align them and bring up ammunition to reduce the French guard btlns (soften them up) before they hit the line waiting behind the ridge.

The French guards did not stand a chance, the incoming cannon fire was crushing, the subsequent musketry simply sealed their fate…especially seeing they came on in SQUARE…this was the worst formation they could have chosen, don't you think?

Shane

What I am saying is that the window of opportunity for a successful French guard attack came and went between the hour of 6pm to 7pm. by the time the MG attacked Wellington had the time to re-align his forces (or what was left of them) to meet the attack. No matter how fresh the French guard were at this time the Allied line was ready for them and were able to unleash a cauldron of fire down on them. No unit would have been able to withstand that amount of incoming fire is my point.

Well Shane you and I will have to agree to disagree on that point. I don't see it as quite as inevtable as that. I think the Guard attack came very close to succeeding and that had it been a bit better coordinated they may well have pulled it off. Had all 9 battalions been able to attack together I think they would have punched a hole through. Something went wrong and they attacked piecemeal and were defeated in detail. Whether it was poor leadership, the terrain or general fog of war is worthy of discussion.

Although the Allied batteries were dispersed, short of ammunition, torn apart and lacking gunners who were also exhausted they still managed to put up a credible fire upon the French guards. In particular the attack to Maitland's front was affected severely by the cannon fire before the British guards fired their first shots, as Atkins put it, "to bend under the stroke like corn in the wind".

I've got Adkins book and he only shows Krahmer's Dutch battery on his maps. As for the rest of the Allied artillery it was pretty roughly handled. This is what Mercer had to say about it after a French battery unlimbered 400 m from his left flank:-
"The rapidity and precision of the fire were quite appalling. Every shot almost took effect…..they [the guns] soon came together ina confused heap, the trails crossing each other…I sighed for my poor troop – it was already but a wreck."
Seems the French were well served by their guns. Adkins map shows at least 4 batteries or half batteries supporting the Guards attack and of course the grand battery would have been able to fire on the ridge in the early stages of the advance.

"But to call them "pants" is downright insulting, disrespectful and was nothing more than an attempt by him to insight anger… If he attacked the Russian guards in the same way at Austerlitz I would respond equally as vigilantly against him as well…"

I couldn't agree more with you, Shane.

These veterans deserve more respect: picture and picture

Siborne called the defense of Plancenoit "Splendid defense of Plancenoit by the Guard"… He got that right.

link

Thanks for the reminder, Chuvak.

Hi Fred,

to agree to disagree is great, it shows that people think differently when confronted with information.

one point though:

I've got Adkins book and he only shows Krahmer's Dutch battery on his maps. As for the rest of the Allied artillery it was pretty roughly handled.

Take another look at the maps, the allied battries are still there and firing, albeit much reduced. Adkin's explains this but also tells us they continued to fire and cause severe damage to the French guards, you cannot deny this surely? He goes on to explain that the French MG btlns were much reduced, shaken and in confusion before the musketry began. Being in Square did not help either.

The entire attack was doomed from the start, they might not have known it, but the fact that they were in square makes me think they knew more than we might give them credit for (or at least their officers did). If caught in line or column Wellington would have unleashed the cavalry and they would have been annihilated instead of broken.

However, the fact that they attacked an enemy prepared line while in square formation is sheer folly to say the least, this is why I say the attack was doomed to failure. Add the canister, shell and roundshot followed by the coupe de grace (spelling?) of musketry and they could not have possibly gained victory.

All that was missing were the grave diggers…to bury them…

Shane

Shane – another good post – thanks for writing what I was thinking, and upgrading the tone of this topic. You may (or may not) be interested in some of these finer points/details …

"possibly two Guard horse batteries"
yes, two – of which colonel Duchand led one in up close, and famously covered the later retreat …. the Emperor saw him advance so close that he was reported as saying something like – "What now? does Duchand desert?" (Duchand had left his family to join Napléon on Elba in his exile and was an ardent Bonapartiste) – when he saw what Duchand was really doing, the Emperor commented – Let him have 'Duchand does not desert' as his heraldic motto.

"a French cuirassier colonel has crossed"
s/b "capitaine de carabiniers à cheval" – it was Dubarrail. The restoration took good care of him despite (becasue of) his desertion. And his son rose to be a general and Minister of War.

"5 battalions, all in SQUARE, not column."
the French accounts usually say "carrés", and many/most of the British "columns" – but the 1/3rd grenadiers on the French right were ordered into square for sure (the battalion commander, major Guillemin, specifically noted this in a letter he wrote to describe the action) – the 1/3rd chasseirs and 2/3rd chasseurs may have come on in a single colonne serré par division, front of about 66 files and depth of about 24 ranks (here counting the file closers as a 3rd rank for each division – they were both too small to actually form in three ranks of soldats), and this might have looked quite "square-ish" as a usual French square of 6 pelotons formed square with two in the front/rear and one on each side – the 4th chasseurs could have formed in colonne serré par division in the usual 3 ranks of soldats, and presented a front of about the same 67 files and a depth (here counting the file closers as a 4th rank for each division)) of about 16 ranks, also somewhat "square-ish" looking

In any case, even if they were in colonnes serrés, if they stopped close to be enemy, they were lost -- the whole point in this specific case would have been to break the enemy line first, right ? But the first shots felled really all the leadership in the chasseurs, and lots of men, so they very likely to a least pause at that point.

"Grenadiers … Two battalions, 1200 men"
s/b ~1050 men

"Chasseurs … Three 600 man battalions of the MG"
actually, an odd thing was the difference in sizes : the battalions of the 1/3rd chasseurs and 2/3rd chasseurs were ~530 soldats each while the single (combined) battalion of the 4th chasseurs was ~810 men

Houssaye discusses these points in some detail, and several first hand accounts of the French officers were printed in La Sabretache in 1905. All available on google – but in French.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Fred – thank you , also, for help in "tone improvement" !
"Adkins map shows at least 4 batteries or half batteries"
For the French he is showing guns (canons & obusiers), I think. His note specifies the symbol for each battery for the British (due to space).
In any case, The French artillerie à cheval (garde & ligne) is a tough problem overall – as the French accounts are mostly from infantry officers and rather vaque about the guns. For example, Duchand is said to advance with "8 pièces" – which normally would mean 8 canons de 6-lvr. (the canons of 2 compagnies à cheval) and also said to advance with "une batterie complète" (that would be 4 x canons de 6-lvr. & 2 x obusiers). Personally, I think it was the latter, and specifically the compagnie of capitaine Marcel, as this unit was the most cut-up of the Guard horse artilery.

"the grand battery would have been able to fire on the ridge in the early stages of the advance"
Another problem. There appears to have been some sort of attempt at forward displacement of grand batterie, or at least the left half of the battery. Exactly who moved which guns, how much, when, under whose orders, etc. is still a rather open topic. I recall that the modern Belgian expert Bernard Coppens writes in some detail on the issue, but without a clear resolution.

Thank you Chuvak for correcting my numbers, again, you post the facts and they help to present the "real" picture of the battle.

Shane -

Really, I thank you. I have neither the skill nor time to write well, as you did. I do read this stuff pretty carefully in the original languages (and I play skirmish, so I look at each "person" when possible). I don't know about "facts", but I try to cross reference as much as possible états with serivce records, with memoires, etc.

These questions are really complex, as problems for historians and for rules writers. Reducing the tone of the discussion to simple one liners (La Garde was or was not "shirts" or "pants" or whatever), is not nearly as interesting to me as good careful thinking about the what we can get from the original sources and then include/exclude in our rules and games. So, again, thank you.

"Houssaye discusses these points in some detail, and several first hand accounts of the French officers were printed in La Sabretache in 1905. All available on google – but in French."

Here you go, Chuvak. :)

Waterloo – 1815 by Henry Houssaye in English: link

Various formats: link

Acceptez-vous tous mes remerciments, cher M. le Cuirassier !

Bien fort amicalement,
:-)

Again a discussion started well being poluted by attacks such as to redicule the French – and sitting behind a computer, such accusations are counter productive and don't add anything new to the topic.

I am suprised that nobody uses the above mentioned Carnets or the book by Bernard Coppens which are discussing the topic well and try to find an explanation why the attack failed.

The Allied line was in a desperate situation prooved by comments of Wellington himself.
So the attack had a chance of success, but it failed.

The French Guards as usual did not behave any better than the French line troops which don't alas have the propaganda of glory compared to the guards.

Salut v. Winterfeldt!

Well, one may suppose I did perhaps look at the works before mentioning them. Perhaps even I have read them a little. But, there are many open questions here, and I would not try to push my own personal conclusions too far at others.

"French Guards as usual"
But – it is not so usual : here la Vieille Garde à pied did fight. So, this was an unusual condition. Maybe it is also a difference that has an effect. For example, would the 9ème d'infanterie légère approach a deployed enemy in a formation such as colonne serré par division or en carré, and then halt within the range of the fire of the enemy? I do not think so.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen,
:-)

So, von Winterfeldt, you are saying the Old Guard were no better than ordinary line troops? In that case, you presumably agree with the notion of downgrading them on the wargaming table?

VW,

You fail to see that you yourself have poluted the thread with your own post which is designed to get a response isn't it?

Now that is counter-productive ;-p

p.s. To try to say that the French OG were no better than the Line is really strange. You might want to do some research on what made men qualify for entry into that formation.

Shane,

I tend to agree with you that the attack was doomed. The lack of numbers, the gaps between the battalions, the lack of effective support, the formations of the battalions and the relative strength of the Allied forces and position all add up to an impossible situation for the OG.

VW,

The OG were good troops; they were possibly not as good as in previous years (particularly the 3rd and 4th regiments were probably not up to the quality of the real OG), but they were still experienced soldiers who probably took huge pride in being part of an elite formation and were determined to uphold its traditions and reputation. However, when faced by overwhelming firepower in the wrong formation, there is only so much that any men can take.

Some of those who are overly critical of the behaviour of soldiers in action might like to try thinking themselves into their position and thinking about how they would react. Personally, I am sure that placed in the position of an OG soldier in the final moments of the final attack, my own reaction would be to run away as fast as I could!

Chuvak,

As to the attack being made in square, that is based on the accounts of the those senior officers who led the attack and survived. General Petit clearly and explicitly states that all the battalions were in square.

Colin

@Chuvak

The Guards had to obey orders, whoever ordred the tactical formation for the dit Moyen Garde, chose it for whatever reason.

The Guard did fight in 1812 (in the retreat, and as well in 1814).

Personally I cannot find anything extraordinary with the Guards – at least in the years of 1805 to 1809 – where any line infantry units in the Grande Armée was as good (if not better) than them.

As to the tactical formation of the dit Moyen Garde, there are contradictionary sources, I personally don't blieve in the square theory, there some of the units tried to deploy.

Also I agree that the Guards were good troops, but not invincible.

von Winterfeldt,

You wrote: "The French Guards as usual did not behave any better than the French line troops which don't alas have the propaganda of glory compared to the guards."

As usual? Really? They performed wonders between 1812 and 1814. Take a look at Berezina, the entire 1813 campaign (especially the battle of Dresden), the 1814 campaign in France against overwhelming numbers. Between 1805 and 1809, take a look at Eylau and Aspern-Essling.

They were not invincibles, there's no such thing. But they were excellent troops (the real elite).

Hello Colinjallen!

Yes, I know. It's the size of the British army. Most guard troops are intended to only be used as shock troops. The British having such a small army really can't afford to keep troops out of the line. Waterloo is a good example of this. What would have happened if Wellington did not put his best troops in the front line?

Best regards,

Glenn

Take another look at the maps, the allied battries are still there and firing, albeit much reduced. Adkin's explains this but also tells us they continued to fire and cause severe damage to the French guards, you cannot deny this surely?

Well Shane the evidence for that is mixed. Not everyone who was there thought so. Ensign Macready of the 30th Foot has this to say:-
"To my thinking no body of the French army could have passed our front so little molested as the Imperial Guard. When they passed where were the well served batteries that had thundered on…."
It seems that at least the batteries of Lloyd and Cleeves were caught in the middle of resupply when the attack came in. So those 2 batteries and Mercer's by his own account took no part in repulsing the Guard. Adkin has this to say about the British artillery:-
"By this time the Duke's batteries along this sector of the ridge had suffered severely. They had lost men and horses while numerous guns were disabled. The surviving detachments verged on collapse from exhaustion." Sounds like most of the batteries were in as bad a state as Mercer's.

He goes on to explain that the French MG btlns were much reduced, shaken and in confusion before the musketry began. Being in Square did not help either.

Again the evidence is mixed on that. It seems likely that the effect of Allied artillery fire was patchy across the front. Macready again on the attack of the 1/3rd and 4th Grenadiers:-
"…when a column [square] of the Imperial Guard…came over the ridge in splendid order. As they rose step by step before us, with their red epaulettes and crossbelts put on over their greatcoats, and topped by their high hairy caps and keeping time and their officers looking to their alignement…"
That certainly doesn't sound like a battalion seriously effected by artillery fire.
Halkett's comments sugest that the 1/3 & 4th Grenadiers suffered from artillery after they had started to retreat – getting the attentions of Krahmer's guns.
It seems only the 1/3 & 2/3 Chasseurs a Pied were subjected to sustained artillery fire, as they approached Maitland's position, (Krahmer again) but they still remained steady and continued the advance in good order.
The 4th Chasseurs were attacked by Colbourne's 52nd foot, but despite suffering severely from the first volley still stood and exchanged fire with the 52nd for several minutes causing over 150 casualties in the right wing of the regiment alone. Again doesn't sound like the actions of a battalion severely effected by artillery fire and on the verge of breaking.
Of course being in square would seriously degrade the attack and goes a long way to explaining why it failed. Why were they in square?
As for the French artillery support it did considerable damage – the Brunswickers in particular suffering quite severely and Halkett's brigade also suffering heavy casualties. The Guard horse artillery was handled in a skillfull, audacious and courageous manner.

Fred – thank you , also, for help in "tone improvement" !

My pleasure. This thread is turning into quite an interesting and informative one. :-)

Well in 1812 not a lot other troops were left at the Berezina, but the Suisse or the Baden troops or all others who fought there – were second to none to the Guard as well, only that due to propaganda of the usual superfical Napoleonic books those troops are forgotten.

In none of the Campaigns up to 1812 there was a real test for the Guard infantry and the line was in no ways inferior to them.

Later on – Napoleon did increase the Guard, notably the Young Guard to create his own corps which he could use tactically on the battle field as he wished.

I agree that then onwards the line units were not as good as they had been up to 1812.

VW, given that those who led the guard and survived state that they were in square, I think that there can be little doubt that they were.

The British sources tend to claim that they were in column, but that is what they expected them to be; they were looking at them through powder smoke, at a distance and in gathering gloom.

A

VW,

What is your evidence for the statement that pre 1812 French line regiments were at least as good as the guard. Statements like that really do need to be supported by evidence or they are merely assumptions.

VW,

"Well in 1812 not a lot other troops were left at the Berezina, but the Suisse or the Baden troops or all others who fought there – were second to none to the Guard as well, only that due to propaganda of the usual superfical Napoleonic books those troops are forgotten."

I agree. The Swiss fought as hard as the French Guard at Berezina, but the Guard really fought with great tenacity at Berezina.

"In none of the Campaigns up to 1812 there was a real test for the Guard infantry and the line was in no ways inferior to them."

We have to agree to disagree on this one. :)

The Guard (especially the Old Guard) was made up of especial veterans who had proved their valour in many campaigns (the best of the line troops).

@colinjallen

Look at the fighting records of any line unit in the Grand Armée from 1805 to 1812, they saw more action and covered themselves with glory in contrast to the Guard who were cavalry and artillery apart more or less sepctators.

I would prefer – let's say 14e de ligne, 18e de ligne or 32 de ligne – instead of any Old Guard unit.

Fred,

Yes, I have read that also, but you fail to also state the whole story:

page 393
"Although the gunfire brought to bear on the guard was less intense than earlier, Macready exaggerated somewhat". "He seems unaware of the excellent shooting of Krahmer's Belgian battery that had been rushed forward by Chasse".

page 396
"Maitland's men are lying down in four deep lines, invisible to the 3rd Chasseur squares. The cannons continue to take a fearful toll on the French"

and…

"The 1/3 and 2/3 Chasseurs suffer heavily from canister as they approach the crest"

"The 4th Chasseurs are also hard hit by gunfire but continue to advance as the other btlns rout".

page 397:
"The next guard units to hit the ridge were the 1/3 and 2/3 Chasseurs a Pied. Both had shrunk substantially as a result of the sustained, if less intense, cannon fire over their 750-metre approach". Nevertheless, they remained steady, still in square…" (this shows that batteries along the front were still firing as the French came on).

page 403"
Like the French, the Anglo-Allied artillery had endured a long, hard day. Losses had occured and some guns were disabled. By this time the Duke had brought up batteries from the rear, (Bull, Mercer, Sinclair and Bolton) and others from the flanks (Webber, Smith, Rogers and Ross). Chasse sent forward Krahmer's battery at the critical moment. At least twelve batteries would have been able to bring fire to bear on some of the attackers as they approached. The rate of fire would have been slowed by fatigue, and shortages of ammunition meant that it is unlikely that more than sixty guns or howitzers defended this 1,100-metre section of the ridge".

This is still more than ONE gun per fifty attacking French guardsmen….It is very clear that the Allied line had enough guns to ensure the French guards suffered severe losses by the time the British Infantry opened up with musketry fire…

Shane

Look at the fighting records of any line unit in the Grand Armée from 1805 to 1812, they saw more action and covered themselves with glory in contrast to the Guard who were cavalry and artillery apart more or less sepctators.

I would prefer – let's say 14e de ligne, 18e de ligne or 32 de ligne – instead of any Old Guard unit.

VW, what is it going to take to convince you of the criteria that a French Soldier had to reach in order to become part of the Old Guard? Have you even read information on this? do you even know what was expected as minimum service to reach this pinnacle of service for France?

These are not mere conscripts but an elite force made up of pure veterans of many years service and meticulously honorable and distinguished records. These men were hand picked best of the best. What more evidence do you need of their level of eliteness???

I am stunned you could actually believe your own words here.

Shane

page 393
"Although the gunfire brought to bear on the guard was less intense than earlier, Macready exaggerated somewhat". "He seems unaware of the excellent shooting of Krahmer's Belgian battery that had been rushed forward by Chasse".

Once again it is Krahmer's battery getting the credit. That seems to have done most of the damage to 1/2 and 1/3 Chasseurs.

"The 1/3 and 2/3 Chasseurs suffer heavily from canister as they approach the crest"

You mention the same 2 battalions I did which seem to be the only ones hit really hard by artillery.

Like the French, the Anglo-Allied artillery had endured a long, hard day. Losses had occured and some guns were disabled. By this time the Duke had brought up batteries from the rear, (Bull, Mercer, Sinclair and Bolton) and others from the flanks (Webber, Smith, Rogers and Ross). Chasse sent forward Krahmer's battery at the critical moment. At least twelve batteries would have been able to bring fire to bear on some of the attackers as they approached. The rate of fire would have been slowed by fatigue, and shortages of ammunition meant that it is unlikely that more than sixty guns or howitzers defended this 1,100-metre section of the ridge".

Mercers battery was already out of action according to his own account by the time the Guard were within cannister range. Just how many of the other guns were still in operation is a matter for conjecture. From the accounts I find no evidence that the 1/3 & 4th Grenadiers and the 4th Chasseurs were seriously disrupted by artillery fire prior to closing with the Allied infantry. In particular the performance of the 4th Chasseurs would suggest the opposite. Macready's account seems pretty clear that the 1/3 & 4th Grenadiers came on in good order and not seriously disrupted by artillery.

VW,

That does not make them "better"; it just shows that they saw more action.

So the Guard infantry were spectators at Aspern-Essling? That might just have come as news to them. Perhaps my research is wrong but I seem to remember something about the OG holding the French centre for a considerable time and the YG storming Essling.

Wasn't there also something about the OG counter-attacking the Russians after the destruction of Augerau's corps at Eylau?

Damn! I really should give up historical research; it throws up too many facts! Perhaps I should just take up making unsupported assumptions instead!

Colin

colinjallen

Here is the little that I know about the formation(s) used by the Moyenne Garde in their attack …

1. "Petit" was not one of the commanders of the 5 battalions dit Moyenne Garde which made the attack. The maréchal de camp baron Jean-Martin Pétit was colonel-major of the 1er régiment de grenadiers à pied. The Guard units that did not make the attack did remain en carré while in reserve. Although the maréchal de camp baron Pétit does specify that the Moyenne Garde stepped off toward La Haye-Sainte "par carrés en échelons" (their formation while standing in reserve), he does not relate any specifics about the formation(s) after that.
2. The formation "colonne serré par division" could be rather easily mistaken for "en carré" at any distance (see above for the description of what this would look like based on the sizes of the battalions)
3. There is no question for the 1er bataillon du 3e grenadiers. The commander, major Guillemin, reported that the Moyenne Garde advanced "en colonne par batallion" and that upon reaching the plateau,that his battalion was ordered en carré by maréchal de camp baron Poret de Morvan.
The lieutenant général comte Louis Friant went in with this unit, was wounded in the hand at the first shots, departed to report to Napoléon "Tout va bien" and then headed toward the on-coming Prussians.
The maréchal prince de la Moskowa Ney also accompanied this unit. His horse was killed beneath him, and then he stayed on foot among the grenadiers. He was executed under the restoration. His short relation of the events of the battle, in a letter dated 26 juin, does not specify the formation(s) employed.
4. For the bataillon combiné du 4e grenadiers, the commander, major Lafargue, was killed, but the maréchal de camp baron Harlet, although wounded by grapshot in the left thigh, did survive. Of the 6 generals and battalion commanders with the chasseurs, only maréchal de camp baron Henrion survived, although shot down early in the acition with a bullet in his left torso. Neither of these two surviving commanders left memoires of the action that I have found.
5. The capitaine adjudant-major Jean-Louis Prax of the 3e chasseurs specifies that all the battalions were "déployés en masse par batallion", and relates that the "têtes de colonne" were placed hors de combat upon meeting the Anglo-Allied line. This included himself, by the way. Interesting fellow, he managed to concieve a son with one Rebecca "dite Israëlite" in Poland in 1812. Denied service under the resoration, he later married, and rose to the rank of général.

link

Chuvak,

So, we have Petit stating that they went off in square and Guillemin stating that his battalion formed square. That looks rather like squares were used at the moment of the attack.

Harlet did not leave a memoir, but he did leave a report which also mentions that the battalion was "en carre".

Colin

Hello Glenn Pearce

I assume your list is based on the regiment, not the men.

No, my list is based on the men not the regiment.

I certainly hope your not suggesting the other 16 regiments were better troops.

Certainly not – I'm just stating there were 16 (or so) regiments with more battle experience.

All the best!

Lord Hill

I suspect that it's possible that the guard battalions, engaged in the final attack, adopted square formation simply because the French cavalry were in no position, following their earlier exertions against the allied line, to offer the necessary support to protect them from enemy cavalry counterattack.
The earlier attack of D'Erlon's corps had been quite effectively compromised by allied cavalry, essentially because of a failure to adopt square – or the opportunity to adopt square.
So the choice was made to advance in square for self protection, rather than relying on an inadequate French supporting cavalry force.

Colin, and Ligniere,

"That looks rather like squares were used at the moment of the attack."

It is one interpretation, certainly.
I think you will admit that the fact that the battalion on the far right of the French advance was not in square and then formed square does not tell us explicitly that the other battalions did exactly the same.
And that if Pétit saw them all step off in square, then the 1/3rd grenadiers did convert out of that formation during their movement to contact (even if only to re-adopt the square a little later).

I thought I recalled a report from Harlet, but could not find it. Could you quote it, provide a link or a reference?

Thanks to you both for an interesting discussion!
:-)

Hello Lord Hill!

Not exactly sure how your able to track the men.

Regiments are not static. The same men who start a campaign are not always the same ones who finish it. Some certainly do while others do not.

Regimental battle histories are just that, history. Past performance certainly indicates a unit is under the gun to maintain a certain standard. It's certainly no guarentee that it will perform any better then the unit beside it.

Since you were not stating that the other 16 units were better I don't see how your post has any bearing on my comments. So I assume they don't, and you were just giving us some information. If so thanks.

Best regards,

Glenn