"Why was the Guard pants at Waterloo?" Topic

Cacadores,

How on earth are your numbers confirmed? For example, you are now trying to use a theoretical French front rank strength as opposed to a reduced British front rank strength.

Taking the French as being in 3 ranks per company, and assuming that they were in company columns (usual for 4 company battalions) or in squares, that gives a total strength of 12 ranks x 700 = 8400 men; for 9 battalions, that is 933 men per OG battalion, which is well over the actual strengths!

If we take the actual 5 battalions that made the attack, the approximate front rank strength (assuming 600 men per battalion (probably too high) and all battalions in company columns or squares), is (600x5)\12 = 250. Even taking your British front rank strength of 1000 (which is not actually supported by anything), this now leaves the French front rank outnumbered by 4:1.

Turning to the British strength, the following starting strengths seem about right:

Maitland 2000
Halkett 2200
Adam 3000
Total: 7200

If in 4 ranks, strength per rank = 1800. To get this down to 1000, would require 44% losses (including Guards detachments), which is far too high!
However, some accounts seem to indicate that Adam's Brigade (certainly the 52nd) were in 2 ranks.

To this, we should probably add the Netherlands troops who joined in when Halkett's units were broken; they would total at least 2500 more men.

So, we now have 5 French battalions attacking at front rank odds of at least 1:4. Failing in that hardly makes them "pants".

"I always wondered if the deviation of the Guard battalions had something to do with the carnage left over from the cavalry charges in the same space earlier.

I've often thought about this though have never seen any written source to confirm or deny it. Any of you chaps out there have any corroborative information?"

As I mentioned earlier, one theory about why the Garde battalions deviated was due to the near-simultaneous deaths of the two brigadiers leading them. These were the guy who were supposed to keep the battalions oriented in the same direction, when they went so did their sense of direction.

My source on this is an old article in Empires, Eagles and Lions, that I might be able to dig up if anyone is so interested.

Mserafin,

I have yet to come across anything in original documents or memoirs that explains much of what happened in the final attack, including the choice of the attack route. I have now come to the conclusion that there is no definitive answer to this.

What with D'Erlon's previous attack and the Guard attack later in the day I can only conclude that the French greatly underestimated Allied fighting ability, numbers, or both.

Giving the cavalry charge a pass here as false belief in Allied withdrawl.

Fog of war and all that but "superior" commanders ought to have taken that into account.

Bad day for Nappy and his boys.

Perhaps the plan had been a desperate attempt to spread them out and see if some of the defending units would buckle at the least of an infantry attack by the Guard. If any of them found a weak point, the remaining four battalions could be sent to that point to exploit it.

malcolmmccallum 13 Nov 2009 1:15 p.m. PST

Re: number of guard battalions?

''So, Cacadores theory is that the 9 battalions of Guard was ordered to advance''.

Nine, yes – and all with drummers beating the charge. Luckily for posterity thirteen generals marched along with the 9-battalion advance so we don't have to theorise. We might speculate on why some like to forget the second Guard line marching (some 2-300 yards behind the first) :-)

Re: colinjallen's request for Guard frontages

colinjallen 13 Nov 2009 1:33 p.m. PST
''you are now trying to use a theoretical French front rank strength……''

Yeeeees. And thank you for your more civilised response. You obviously just forgot that it was you asked me to provide it:

colinjallen 13 Nov 2009 1:32 a.m. PST
''if you are doing that, and it is nonsense to do so, then you should only count the front rank of the involved OG units.''

Or involved British units, which would reduce the British score. You can't have it both ways! You also counted this wrongly:

''If we take the actual 5 battalions that made the attack, the approximate front rank strength (assuming 600 men per battalion (probably too high) and all battalions in company columns or squares), is (600x5)\12 = 250''

You asked for this figure. The Guard were not in straightforward columns. Actually I assumed a lower figure for Guard battalions: 500. In close column of grand divisions, this gives a frontage different to the one you used of between 75 – 80 men per battalion.

Re: British strength

''Turning to the British, the following starting strengths seem about right:
Maitland 2000
Halkett 2200
Adam 3000
Total: 7200''
….If in 4 ranks, strength per rank = 1800. To get this down to 1000, would require 44% losses (including Guards detachments), which is far too high!''

Is it? The 27th (for comparison, on the other side) suffered 53% casualties. Since the British had suffered all day, and the French Guard attack so fleeting, it's more accurate take the final day's returns and estimate the losses in the last action.

Let's compare (a) your figures (which assume no previous losses) with (b) the final roll call:

Brigade..(a) down to (b)
__________________________
Maitland 2000 down to 1000
Halkett 2200 down to 5-600
Adam 3000 down to 2000
__________________________
Total: 7200 down to 3600.

So add your figures and you get 50% casualties. The fact is, those figures for the British front line are devastating which tally with Sibourne's reports. You make a large mistake to suggest the Guard alone were responsible. If you don't believe the final roll, you can investigate the real names of individual soldiers yourself at Kew, company by company or read Siborne's source material.

Working back to their estimated strengths before the Guard attack, a figure of 4000 for their total strengh is reasonable. Your mistake was to forget the final roll, colinjallen. But if you have any primary sourse that contradicts this, then please share it :-).

Re: Final moments of the Grenadier Guard's attack

''To this, we should probably add the Netherlands troops who joined in when Halkett's units were broken''

Yes. But perhaps you mistake the significance? When Halkett's brigade became disordered they left a huge gap which the 1/3 Guard Grenadiers just stared at. Why? You don't win a battle by sitting there. If the Prince of Orange had time to organise Kruse's charge with a reserve force then why didn't the Guard just steam in? Or even walk in. Why?

And then Orange's Dutch broke too. And left another huge gap. Again. This was THE moment to be brave. And still the Guard sat there. Why?

Eventually, two Guard squares advanced to the gap covered by….what? The only men left were the few hundred stunned and reeling reminants of the 'broken' (colinjallen's words) and mostly officer-less Halkett brigade. How come they waited for another Dutch reserve to organise and come up? Why do so many independant eye-witnesses report being 'astonished' by the Guard fleeing?

The Guard were pants, perhaps? :-)

@ Battleeditor
A joke explained is no joke at all. But regardless I was consciously making a joke about "The Queen's English": a phrase I have heard before.
But thankyou for your kind advice.
I have, alas, no knowledge of your Brighton.
Please to give the boys there my regards. 87))

I always thought that "Napoleonic Discussion" was for deranged name calling, while "Napoleonic History" was for scholarly discussion.
Cacadores has cleverly posted in both!

I think you''ll find that it is "Scholarly name calling" for the later, OFM. An exercise wasted on us unwashed from the discussion page. :oP
Max

Cleverly?

…and a historian, or scholar can not be deranged ?

LOL. There's been one or two deranged ones here in the past.

Cacadores, I give up on you! You now want to have the 5 OG battalions in a formation that they were not using.

Enjoy your ing!

So back to the usual:

The British and Allies won Waterloo and my sources are better than yours vs the French nearly won Waterloo and our sources are better than yours, groups.

That the result on the day was an allied victory will probably be the only certain fact from the 18th June 1815, no-one can realy dispute that. Anything else will result in the usual arguments with our sources always better than yours,

Tally Ho!

Cacadores,
I never have heard that Orange's dutch broke when the guard attacked, what is Your source for this?

even the British guards were forced to retreat in the face of the French guards at one point. The 52nd advanced on their flank to halt the French advance which caused their ultimate demise.

<<Turning to the British strength, the following starting strengths seem about right:

Maitland 2000>>

No, it doesn't. At QB and Waterloo combined the 1st Guards lost 181 dead (including 7 officers) and 853 wounded, for a total of 1,034 – approximately 50% of their strength at the start of the campaign. Both battalions suffered heavily at QB, probably 400 and possibly up to 500 casualties in total.
PDF link

Take away the 200+ men of the light companies and you are well below 1,500 at the start of 18th June.

Col Sgt Charles Wood recorded that, on 18 June, the French artillery raked the regiment's lines throughout the afternoon, with entire files being carried away to the rear wounded and the men "bunching" to the point where they were 8-10 deep. At the same time, enemy skirmishers came close enough to loot and strip the body of a dead officer.

Given the ineffectual response of the Middle Guard battalion facing them, it seems unlikely that a huge part of Maitland's loss on that day occurred in the final attack, so Cacadores' estimate of about 1,000 would be much closer than yours.

Supercilius,

I stated "starting strengths"; the two battalions of the 1st Guards indeed took losses at QB and Waterloo; those losses affect their strengths in action; they do not alter the "starting strengths".

As to their casualties, these are recorded as 15 officers and 472 men K&W at Waterloo for the two battalions, and a share of the alleged 30 officers and 500 men K&W by the Guards Division at QB. This does not quite equal your claims for the casualties.

Crikey, what a lot of fist shaking and handbags. Is it not just conceivable that, as I suggested what seems so very long ago, that the British were just too damned good at shooting? Regardless of which French guard units attacked, they were up against the best drilled firers probably in the world at the time. As for the 52nd flanking them, maybe they simply didn't see it coming until it was too late. They were after all rather distracted to their front.

As for the route of the attack, I fell off the pavement this morning outside my own house. This is a place I'm extremely familiar with and I still managed to have enough other things to do that I went wrong. There are any number of decent raesons that the attack could have veered off or slowed down, the most obvious being that on one of the smallest battlefields of the era there was an enormous amount of carnage.

The account from Anatomy of Glory has five battalion advancing in echelon, leading with the right.

"Between the road and and the top of Hougoumont were ranged eight solid battalions of Germans and Hanoverian, and two of terrified Brunswickers. Lying flat in the rye fields behind them were four ranks of English Guards under Maitland, and Adam's foot brigade. At the top of the ridge were more units, looking like phantoms in the dusk. On the down slope, behind the guards, Chasse joined six squares of his Belgo-Dutch division and, supported by the remains of 20 regiments and 40 squadrons, posted batteries.

"This mass was waiting to be attacked by 15,000 French of whom 6,500 (including 1,500 horse) were the Guard."

In talking of the advance of the 3rd Grenadiers and 4th Grenadiers on the right, Lachouque describes

"They joined forces and, climbing over the dead, the debris, and the remains of a hedge, pushed back four of the Duke of Brunswick's and Sir Colin Halkett's battalions. Though wounded in the hand, Friant went to tell the Emperor that all was well."

"At that moment Napoleon was forming up the last three Old Guard battalions which had reached the valley in front of La Haie Sainte. Just then Chasse opened fire with one battery and 'launched six battalions with fixed bayonets' against the two French grenadier battalions whose remnants were pushed back down the slope."

Meanwhile, the attack on the left went in (also without skirmishers) in column into heavy cannonade. The ground here was easy and clear of obstacles. They knocked out a battery on their right and were starting to push back the British 30th and 73rd Foot.

"Suddenly the command rang out: 'Stand up, Guards!' At 30 paces, 1,500 English Guards under Maitland and 1,200 infantry of Adam's Brigade sprang up before them in the rye. At 'Fire!' Michel, Cardinal, and Angelet fell with 20 officers and 200 men. The rest wavered, hesitated, and then fell back to Hougoumont under cover of Belcourt's small rear-guard, the solitary battalion of of the 4th Chasseurs under Henrion, and a few cavalry.

"A murderous firefight took place before the orchard at Hougoumont; then, attacked in front by Adam and Maitland, on the flank by the King's German Legion, and behind by more Hanoverians, the chasseurs were crushed and practically annihilated. Malet and Agnes were both killed. The action did not last twenty minutes."

The three Old Guard battalions covered the retreat of the Middle Guard but now, panic at the retreat had spread through the army and that had become infectuous. The British and Prussians go forward with cheers and the French are crying 'Treason', 'The Gods have departed', and 'Save yourself!'

What a great read, Thanks Malcolmmcallam.

Shane,
if you were referring to my question, AFAIK the dutch came from reserve position and attacked the flank.
But always eager to learn more

"As for the route of the attack"
I seem to recall reading an article about Salford University doing some hitech detailed topographical study of the battlefield a few years back including 'undoing' the impact of the 'mound' and coming to the conclusion that the natural curvature of the terrain in this sector most probably accounted for the drift.

Though I couldnt find anything about it when a googled just now, so maybe my mind is faulty.

If Anatomy of Glory is to be believed, Friant, with only two battalions working together on the right, went back to report that all was well.

That suggests that there was no drift and that their positioning was according to plan.

A good source

La Belle Alliance (1)

L'Attaque de la Moyenne Garde
Waterloo 1815

Les Carnets de la Campagne Nr. 7

Bruxelles 2005

Anglo-allied artillery on the ridge by the end of that battle may have had a lot to do with the outcome… If they really had been "pants" they wouldn`t have got quite so close… earlier in the day a French brigade had tried to get behind Hougomont but was driven back by the artillery fire.

colin,

<<I stated "starting strengths"; the two battalions of the
1st Guards indeed took losses at QB and Waterloo; those losses affect their strengths in action; they do not alter the "starting strengths".>>

Indeed you did. However, I assumed this was a typo on your part, since their "starting strength" at dawn on June 16 is surely irrelevant to how many were left to oppose the final attack of La Garde at 7.30pm on 18 June, which was the point being made by Cacadores.

<<As to their casualties, these are recorded as 15 officers and 472 men K&W at Waterloo for the two battalions, and a share of the alleged 30 officers and 500 men K&W by the Guards Division at QB. This does not quite equal your claims for the casualties.>>

Byng's brigade saw much less action at QB than Maitland's, so the bulk of the losses would have fallen on the latter, but your point is taken. Perhaps a mid-point between your figure and Cacadores' number is nearer the truth; however, one would still also need to factor in the morale impact of a 25% loss from the brigade, compared to the relative freshness of the Garde battalion(s) opposing it.

Supecilius,

Indeed one should need to factor that in; however, one also needs to factor in the following:

1. The OG attack was badly mishandled, leaving a few units in the front line (5) to launch what were virtually individual battalion-level attacks on numerically superior, well positioned and generally well led units.

2. The attack of the 52nd into the left flank of the OG attack was probably the biggest single factor in the repulse of the OG. Already heavily engaged to their front, the shock of a flank attack, particularly from what must have looked like an enormous force (the 52nd was the strongest unit on the field), would have been enough to break most units.

3. The OG units in the attack had fought at Ligny 48 hours before and had taken significant casualties in that battle.

Looking at other aspects, the question of the British Guard's morale is of interest; it does seem that British units were more able to take punishment than most (except possibly the Russians), as exemplified by the way that the units at Albuera stood despite terrible losses.

Given the short time for which the British Guard units were actually engaged at QB, the casualty figures given by Ensign Short must be regarded as dubious, especially as they do not seem to be reflected in the returns, unless many of those wounded at QB were lightly wounded and able to return to the ranks by the 18th.

IMO, the OG attack failed because it was made too late, with too small a force, at the wrong point of the line, was not properly supported, and was badly led and coordinated. It also happened to come up against possibly the "hardest" infantry of the period, troops who, as Marechal Soult commented, did not know how to run away.

The OG at Waterloo were not "pants" (horrible expression); they were misused and placed in a position where success was virtually impossible.

Also, the units that actually made the attack were almost certainly not up to the quality of the "real" OG; they were recently constituted regiments which lost most of their senior officers during the assault.

By the way, I term them Old Guard because that is officially what they were in 1815; the Middle Guard was not reconstituted for the campaign. However, many referred to the 3rd and 4th regiments as Middle Guard.

Colin

Cacadores, so the retreat which you mentioned hadn't any influence on the attack of the french guard battalions at all !

Supercilius Maximus

Re: How strong was the British line when the Guard advanced?

''one would still also need to factor in the morale impact of a 25% loss from the brigade, compared to the relative freshness of the Garde battalion(s) opposing it.''

There is lots more evidence about the strength of the British front line which halted the Guard: too much to reproduce here. Out of interest, here is some of the evidence relating to Halkett's brigade (before which stopped two Guard battalions) and in particular the 73rd Foot.

2nd/73rd Foot, C. Halkett's brigade, 3rd Div (Count von Alten).
The 2nd/73rd Foot fought in the Battle of Quatre Bras two days before Waterloo. They lost 53 men killed and wounded.

To deduce the chronology of Halkett's and the 73rd's accumulating losses, notes on eye-witness evidence has been devided into three latter periods of the battle.

1) French Cavalry Attacks

'The troops are much thinned' (Fitzroy Somerset)
The Guards were moved left to bolster Halkett.
Wellington shelters in the 73rd's square.
The squares looked 'little' (Wheatly)

2) Ney's cavalry and infantry attack around La Haye Saint.

Halkett, 'My lord, we are dreadfully cut up, can you you relieve us for a little while?'
Wellington, 'Impossible'.
Halkett, Very well my lord, we'll stand till the last man falls'.
73rd charged by French Cavalry 11 times and bombarded by French artillery.
Ney, seeing the British centre crumbling asks Bonaparte for more troops (Kurte).
Troops cry 'Are we to be massacred here?' (Frazer)
Halkett's brigade start stepping back.
(other references: Gronov, Powel, Leeke, Brette-Jones, Macready).

3) The French Guard Attack begins

Colours of the 73rd 'completely riddled and almost separated from the staff' (Pte Morris).
73rd's colours sent back to Brussels.
Halkett's brigade practically without officers, Halkett shot in face.
(Eye-witnesses from the 73rd: Sgt Tom Morris, Pte Morris, Sgt. Burton).
The Guard halts and waits while Halkett's brigade disordered, retreats, rallies.
They 'would have annialated our brigade!' (Ensign Macready).
Two Guard battalions eventually attack the just rallied Halkett's brigade, are fired on by them, then break up and flee.
Halkett's men think it's a 'ruse' (Kelly).

4) Casualties

Starting strength of the 73rd: 550
Final roll: 70
(Sgt Tom Morris, Kelly, Macready)
Losses suffered in battle by 73rd: 87.27%

Final returns (after runaways return) give losses of 6 officers and 225 men killed and wounded, = 58% casualties. Presumably, the runaways were lost during the time Halkett's brigade ran back to the shlter of the hedge before they were rallied. This is before the last Imperial Guard attack.

Old Bear! Hurrah for a breath of sanity!! :)

CORRECTION TO ABOVE. Replace last paragraph with:

Losses suffered in battle by 73rd: 87.27%

Final returns (after runaways return) give losses of 6 officers and 225 men killed and wounded, = 42% casualties. Presumably, the runaways were lost during the time Halkett's brigade ran back to the shelter of the hedge before they were rallied. This is before the last Imperial Guard attack.

Duc de Limbourg 15 Nov 2009 5:42 a.m. PST
''Cacadores, so the retreat which you mentioned hadn't any influence on the attack of the french guard battalions at all !''

Did you mean the Halkett btigade's retreat or not? If so, I guess that's the surprise: the two French Guard battalions failed to take the open opportunity, were defeated by the fire of a particulary thin brigade and ended up running.

lieutenant général comte Louis Friant, colonel en premier des grenadiers à pied de la garde (blessé à la main)
- maréchal de camp baron Paul-Jean-Baptiste Poret de Morvan, colonel-major du 3e grenadiers à pied de la garde
- 1er bataillon du 3e grenadiers (17/565) – major Jean-Claude-Vincent Guillemin, chef de bataillon

- maréchal de camp baron Louis Harlet, colonel-major du 4e régiment de grenadiers à pied de la garde (blessé)
- bataillon combiné du 4e grendiers (27/493) – major Pierre Lafargue, chef de bataillon (blessé mortellement)

le maréchal prince de la Moskowa, Michel Ney
- lieutenant général comte Claude-Etienne Michel, colonel en second des chasseurs à pied de la garde (tué)
- 1er bataillon du 3e chasseurs (17/531) – major Claude Cardinal, chef de bataillon (blessé mortellement)

- maréchal de camp chevalier Antoine-Anselme Malet, colonel-major du 3e régiment de chasseurs à pied de la garde (blessé mortellement)
- 2e bataillon du 3e chasseurs (17/531) – major Angelet, chef de bataillon (blessé mortellement)

- maréchal de camp baron Christophe-François Henrion, colonel-major du 4e régiment de chasseurs à pied de la garde (blessé d'un coup de feu au côté gauche)
- 1er et 2e bataillons combinés du 4e chasseurs (30/811) – major Agnès, chef de bataillon (blessé mortellement) & chef de bataillon à la suite Louis-Marie-Charles-Philippe Hurault de Sorbée (blessé)

colonel baron Jean-Baptiste (dit "Auguste") Duchand de Saucey, commandant l'artillerie à cheval de la garde
- 4e [?] compagnie d'artillerie à cheval de la garde (4/91) – capitaine Antoine Mancel (blessé)
- 10e [?] compagnie du escadron du train d'artillerie de la garde (2/75) – lieutenant [?]
- 4 canons de 6-lvr. & 2 obusiers de 5½ pounces

Pour l'infanterie, 8 pelotons par bataillon, formés sur 2 rangs (le 4ème de chasseurs sur 3 rangs) – soit en colonne serré par division, soit pour la face d'un carré :
1er bataillon du 3e grenadiers – 70 files
bataillon combiné du 4e grenadiers – 61 files
1er bataillon du 3e chasseurs – 66 files
2e bataillon du 3e chasseurs – 66 files
bataillon combiné du 4e chasseurs – 67 files

Pantalons bleus.

Mserafin and Colin;

"I always wondered if the deviation of the Guard battalions had something to do with the carnage left over from the cavalry charges in the same space earlier.

More to do with the nature of the ground itself, which offers an approach route to the centre of the allied position, that for a significant proportion of the advance sees you in or at least partially in, dead ground.

DB

Hi Dave,

The terrain did indeed have an effect; however, my main area of wonder is why the 5 attacking battalions ended up so dispersed. They were far further apart than was needed for deployment purposes, to the point that they were unable to provide mutual support.

Regards,

Colin

colinjallen,

No apology then?

…….

Anyway, the defenders' front line which the Imperial Guard attacked was 1000 yards across. With a frontage of about 75 to 80 men per battalion, there was certainly room to have more French battalions in their front line.

The battalions had 13 generals with them: that's quite a fair number: it would lead one to expect that the Guard did indeed go where they were meant to go.

Tactics of the Guard attack

We can speculate that the plan was neo-Marlburian: that the first five Middle Guard battalions were to go up to the British line, halt and return fire to soften up the British (which is what they tried to do). Evidence for that is that dispite the 'cockpit' bowl-shaped nature of the terrain, they were indeed very widely spaced apart, at least to start with. The second rank of mainly Old Guard was to halt behind the first and wait (evidence for that is that they were in square – a formation you'd adopt if you thought that the length of time you'd be hanging about might invite a cavalry attack). They would then go forward through the gaps between the first rank battalions to hit the weakened British. The plan went awry when the front rank simply couldn't take the fire, no matter from how few men, broke up and ran. The surprise is why the second rank of mainly Old Guard didn't go in anyway?

The logical conclusion is that they all lost their nerve. But if there's another explanation, I'd love to hear it.

Cacadores,

You wrote on your initial post: "There's no question that some elements of the Guard behaved well: the Young Guard briefly repulsed the Prussians from Plancenoit. On the retreat, while the whole army seemed to have broken up, much of the second line Guard retreated in order, until they too, eventualy dissolved."

I would like to make some comments on your post.

The Young Guard and two battalions of the Old Guard (the real Old Guard) fought like lions at Plancenoit. Two battalions of the Old Guard were dispatched to Plancenoit. Against overwhelming numbers, they retook the village from the Prussians and waited for the next Prussian onslaught. They defended the church and cemetery to the very last and were the last to leave Plancenoit.

I just read a interesting article written by Peter Hofschröer. The article was originally published in the June 2002 issue of Military History magazine and it's called "Waterloo – Prussian assault on Plancenoit".

Excerpts from the article:

The history of the 2nd Silesian regiment [Prussian regiment] described the fight: "… Once Duhesme's Division of the Young Guard had got into Plancenoit, it immediately took up positions in the houses and particularly behind the churchyard wall.
Taking no notice of the heavy canister and musket fire, the 16th [Prussian Brigade] advanced up to the churchyard. Here, hit by murderous fire and attacked by the French reserves [French Guard] with such force, it was forced to withdraw. It rallied outside the village and went over to the attack immediately. In this second assault, the two musketeer battalions of the 2nd Silesian regiment took part. However, the French also beat off this attack."
According to the 15th regiment history: "… Our regiment, along with four battalions of the 16th brigade (from the 2nd Silesian infantry regiment and the 1st Pomeranian Landwehr regiment) undertook the second assault on the village. The 1st Silesian Landwehr regiment remained in reserve. The enemy resisted with great determination, but the village was recaptured and a large number of enemy guardsmen were either killed or captured in the close combat.
However, we could not hold onto the village this time either. Napoleon sent two battalions of Old Guard under general Morand from his reserves to Plancenoit. Two of their battalions along with the Young Guard and the remaining troops in the village took control of it again, forcing our men to withdrawn."

The 2nd Silesian infantry history continued: "… Supported by Colonel von Funck's Pomeranian's [and other units], they stormed the churchyard. Here, a vicious, bloody and bitter battle took place. General Morand brought up the battalions of the Imperial Guard held in reserve behind Plancenoit. Two of them were sent into the village. Not fearing death, they pressed on, inspiring the Young Guard again. However, despite the great determination with which the French and particularly the Old Guard defended Plancenoit, all their efforts and heroic sacrifices could do nothing to halt the attacking Prussians."

According to historian Barbero: "… the Prussians maddened by the stubborn defense the French put up [at Plancenoit], were not always disposed to take prisoners."

Four battalions (three battalions of the Old Guard and one of the "Middle Guard") covered the French retreat and one of them was decimated in the process.

The French army fled to the rear where stood the four battalions of the French Guard as a reserve: II/1st Chasseurs, II/2nd Chasseurs with Cambronne, II/2nd Grenadiers and II/3rd Grenadiers.
Cambronne's battalion suffered heavy casualties. The II/3rd Grenadiers suffered enormous casualties. Despite being attacked by British cavalry, German infantry and surrounded and shelled with grapeshot, the II/3rd Grenadiers square was never broken. When they reached La Belle Alliance their regular square had shrunk to a tiny triangle.

The "Middle Guard" fought well at Ligny. At Waterloo, the Middle Guard attack was a last desperate attempt and a badly coordinated one. Of course, the Anglo-Allied units deserve praise on a job very well done.

The French Guard fought bravely and suffered heavy casualties at Waterloo. Here's the proof:

French Imperial Guard casualties at Waterloo

OLD GUARD……….18th June……26th June…….%loss

1st Grenadiers……1,280…………644………….50

2nd Grenadiers……1,090…………374………….66

1st Chasseurs…….1,307…………588………….55

2nd Chasseurs…….1,163…………375………….68

TOTAL……………4,840…………1,981………..59

MIDDLE GUARD

3rd Grenadiers……1,164…………201………….84

4th Grenadiers……520…………..100………….83

3rd Chasseurs…….1,602…………165………….85

4th Chasseurs…….841…………..244………….71

TOTAL……………4,I27…………710………….82

YOUNG GUARD

1st Voltigeures…….1,219…………196………….84

3nd Voltigeures…….967…………..146………….87

1st Tirailleures……1,109…………92…………..92

3rd Tirailleures……988…………..164………….84

TOTAL……………..4,283…………598………….86

OVERALL ………….13,250…………3,289………..75
TOTALS

In 1815, Napoleon's Imperial Guard was a fine fighting machine, although not as good as their predecessors, but they still performed very well.

I think those brave men deserve more respect. That's my humble opinion.

Hello Cacadores!

I've spent a number of years looking at the French Guard in general and have also taken a very close look at Waterloo.
So perhaps my comments might be of some value to you.

The French Guard at Plancenoit (both Young & Old) performed
wonders. It's a miracle that any of them survived. All formations so badly destroyed will dissolve. The entire command structure is gone. The survivors did rally which clearly confirms their dedication.

The first and only wave of French Middle Guard was in square
and only halted when they came under heavy artillery fire. I have no knowledge of any gap been seen by the 1/3rd Grenadiers. Halkets Brigade was always directly to their front. The combined effect from Halkets muskets in line and the artillery on their right flank cause them to give way.

The 1/3rd Chassuers suffers pretty much the same fate, only they get the surprise volley from the British Guards, who were unseen because they were lying down.

Yes certainly the fire fight would have been brief. Line vs.
square is pretty much a no brainer. Also keep in mind the British guns are constantly firing at the squares.

I've not done the actual numbers but I think at the actual point of contact the numbers on both sides are probably pretty close. The big difference is the crack 52nd wheeling it's huge force in line into the French flank.

You should not underestimate the resolve of the allied line. Yes some of these troops had been under fire and had reorginized. I think to some extend this probably boosted their morale.

Artillery support was not gone, in fact it was reinforced by
Krahmer's battery.

Maitland's Brigade was composed of British Guards possibly the best units in the British army. To suggest that these troops would in someway under perform at a critical moment I think is certainly doing them an injustice.

The 4th Chassuers was a combined unit that had suffered greatly in the previous battles. They were also the ones who were attacked in flank by the big 52nd. in line. They were also under fire from their front. Amazingly they were the last square to retreat.

One key element that appears to contradict your entire statement is the Allied line was not battery-less.

Without any question the French Guard at Waterloo performed amazingly. Under the prevailing circumstances I don't think any troops in the Napoleonic era could have done any better.

I also don't think you asked the right question. The real question should have been "How was Wellington able to stop
the best troops in the French army?".

Best regards,

Glenn

The cowardly Dutch running in all directions on every occassion gave them an undue confidence which evaporated under the steely lip and ferocious musketry of the British tommie and that's why they get +6 in all firefights?

(But seeing as it was 'a close run thing' possibly it was the Prussians turning up to play)

What, anglocentrisms appearing in Napoleonic discussions now?!? This could start a bad trend ;)

The Guard were not pants at Waterloo. They were, however, culottes. And certainly not sans culottes.

*heading back to the popcorn vendor*

<<Maitland's Brigade was composed of British Guards possibly the best units in the British army. To suggest that these troops would in someway under perform at a critical moment I think is certainly doing them an injustice.>>

The First Foot Guards included drafts of militia, brought in to raise them up to full strength just prior to leaving for Belgium and the Foot Guards in general recruited from the population at large, not by drawing experienced men from the line, as Napoleon's Garde did. Whilst they did not perform badly, there were better units in Wellington's army at Waterloo.

Hello Supercilius Maximus!

I think you may have overlooked a critical word in my statement "possibly". Your statement "Whilst they did not perform badly" clearly indicates they at least did their job. I think they performed extremely well and lived up to their guard title.

The drafting of miltia into regular units is a common practice as is the recruitment from the general population.
Napoleon certainly was able to ensure he got top quality troops into his guard but this does not mean the British
Guards were not able to perform well.

I'm not sure how you can say "there were better units in
Wellington's army at Waterloo". Every unit is unique and their situations are all different. There certainly were units that I think could have done the same job. This is kind of like a kids game, my dad can beat up your dad, etc. Even if there were better units in Wellington's army it has no bearing on Cacadores original statement.

The bottom line here is Maitland's men were put to the test
and they performed extremely well.

Best regards,

Glenn

Wellington had 23 British infantry regiments in the field at Waterloo.

In terms of battle experience (and this is quatifiable, it's not guess work) the 1st Foot Guards come in at 17th on that list.

But they still did pretty well didn't they?

:)

First of all I think the OP does the Young Guard a diservice, they were very useful on the right flank, and exchanged territory they lost to the Prussians many times, pants infantry does not retake ground

The British infantry in 1815 was supreme in its fire discipline and as another poster mentioned, the very strong, very competant 52nd (a large battalion of around a thousand muskets), was fresh.
Perhaps the one thing that hasn't been mentioned is the mentality of the British infantry, for years they had been itching for a crack at the French guard, whereas Nappy may have sent the guard in hoping that there reputation would sweep all before it I think the Brits would have seen this as all the more reason to dig their heels in.

One major point is being missed here, the French MG were defeated because they were ordered in at the wrong time.

The period from 6pm til 7pm was when the British had lost La Hay Sainte, their line was being pushed backwards and their front was beginning to crumble. The relentless pressures from the day's fighting and the current pressure being exerted during the crucial hour had primed the situation for the guard attack.

However, by the time the MG were ordered in the British had been able to realign their front, this was thanks to being informed the French guard was coming. Wellington was ready and the MG were marching into a cauldron of fire for which they were inadequately prepared. They were doomed to lose but if you read in-depth the attack you will read how bravely they fought and how well they did. They even pushed the British guards and other allied formations back for a time. It is a credit to them that they performed so well against the odds.

This attack was indeed a last gamble by Napoleon to pierce the British line before being overwhelmed by the Prussians. If the MG had won and Napoleon had pulled it off the British would have been pushed back allowing Napoleon time and space to deal with Blucher. The attempt however failed because it WAS a gamble and pretty much an ad-hoc desperate attempt to fix a deteriorating situation which if committed to just 1 hour previously could have won the battle.

It failed and history is history, the French guard were not, "pants" (whatever that is) they fought well, they were tough men led by tough officers who were put into a desperate situation which in war games terms could be likened to needing a "6" on a D6 on the last roll of a game to win the battle, anything below a 6 means defeat…

It has nothing to do with the supposed superiority of the British Infantry, their firepower or any other feat of arms they are given credit for. Sure they were well trained and fought well and were mostly veterans but they accounted for a mere 30% of the entire allied line that day! How funny it is to forget the contributions of all the other allied units that stood bravely and fought well on that day!

It is an affront to their memory to spurt out how superior the British were when these allies have just as much right to the honour of that day. And to then bag the French guard as somehow poor and not up to the task to face the British is just as equally an affront to their memory and an insult to the French nation who to this day who hold their reputation high.

This makes me sick that someone can be so judgemental of a nations fighting men who fought and died for their country on that day. Comfortable behind his computer with hindsight of 200 years and no bullets flying at him and pass judgement for no other reason other than to merely incite responses like mine and those of others who are equally insulted by his words.

I think this whole thread is a deliberate attempt to incite friction and to elicit angry responses. Giving credability to the notion that the French guard were not guard is total nonsense and is nothing more than a deliberate attempt to incite drama and the person responsible is now DH'd as he usually is once he begins these arguments.

Shane

Glenn,

The point about the militia is that, as you rightly say, most LINE units were regularly brought up to strength in that way. You would not normally expect household troops to absorb militia units.

I would have thought most of the light infantry/rifle units at Waterloo would have been better trained/experienced than the 1st Guards (and hence most likely at the top of Lord Hill's "experience" list). Having studied the composite Brigade of Guards that served in the AWI in some detail, warts and all, I do think people – and I appreciate you may be speaking from a position of above-average knowledgeable here – sometimes get carried away with the name and don't always look at the reputations of other units, or consider the weaknesses of "household" units to the same degree as is done with the Line.

Speaking as someone who has never (knowingly) been shot at – even by other TMP members! – they did, as you say, perform as required.

The British guards at this period were probably no better trained and no more experienced than many other British regiments. However, what they did have (and still have to this day) was an esprit de corps that could carry them through bad situations.

However, I suspect that many other British units at Waterloo also had this, some (for example the 52nd) possibly to a greater extent than the guards.

Colin (who has been shot at, albeit by aircraft)

Shane,

I have to disagree with part of your reply which suggests British training and firepower had nothing to do with it. Do you then suggest that a few battalions of Austrian landwher in the same situation would have pulled off the same result? And before you ask, I have been shot at on three occasions, not that I feel this has anything remotely to do with my right to an opinion, although I don't believe you were getting at me when you wrote that.

Oh, and i think the French guard were most certainly NOT pants, FWIW, and that against most troops they might well have still carried the day.

IIRC, there were 9 battalions of Guard available but only 6 went forward, two of which were so depleted they merged to form one unit. This is where the idea of there being 5 battalions comes from.

FWIW.

Anyway – the best argument for the Guard being pants at Waterloo is not IMHO the attack against Wellington. It's the fact that the OG sent to hold the Plancenoit line after the Young Guard were wiped out was flanked and routed by a battalion of Prussian reserve infantry – the 18th if I'm not mistaken.

That's embarrassing.

Glenn,

Very nice post, I appreciated reading it. I only want to point out one thing, had the original poster followed your given suggestion:

"I also don't think you asked the right question. The real question should have been 'How was Wellington able to stop
the best troops in the French army?'."

He would not have successfully spawned an argument. You see, ing is an art that requires a distinct lack of diplomacy and rational reasoning.

Cheers,

The Bandit