"The Russians afraid of Napoleon at the Beressina?" Topic

'There was never a better opportunity to force the surrender of an army in the open field. Napoleon had to rely for the most part upon the reputation of his arms; and he made use here of an asset he had been accumulating for a long time…Because the enemy was afraid of him and his Guard, no one dared face him. Napoleon capitalized on this phychological effect and with its assistance worked his way out of one of the worst situations in which a general was ever caught. Of course this phychological force was not all he had. He was still supported by his own brilliant strength of character and the perless military virtues of his army, not yet destroyed by the greatest of trials. Once out of the trap, Napoleon said to his staff: 'You see how one can slip away under the very nose of the enemy.' Napoleon in this action not only preserved his military honor; he actually enhanced it."
(Von Clausewitz)

So, Kutusov has afraid and didn't press the french with enought force.

Amicalement
Armand

From most of the books that I have read, (not first source) the Russian Army was in as bad a condition as the French Army.

Robert Henry

Who won the campaign? Who won the war? There is no arguing with success.

That is either a mangled or partial quote and/or a poor translation. It is missing a fair amount of what was in the original.

Here is what v. Clauswitz actually wrote –
link

Why exactly we should think v. Clauswitz could read minds is a point open to debate. But at least let's be sure of whose mind he was reading and what he thought he saw.

He is accusing graf Vitgenstein and admiral Chichagov of being impressed by the morale impact of the Garde fighting under Napoléon in person at the Berezina, as Kutuzov had been at Krasnyy / Krasnoë. He is not commenting about Kutuzov at the Berezina.

The word used is "gefürchtet". This is not really "was afraid of", in the sense of the English text you gave – like "The little boy was afraid of the dark." If is more like "feared" – "He feared that the other man would get the promotion". Or it is like "dreaded" – "He dreaded going to work each day because he hated his job." At least that's my understanding of the usage in that era. Happy to be corrected, of course.

Now, attacking the French Vieille Garde under Napoléon's personal orders is something that I think could be reasonably "dreaded", esepcially if you have a rather tired and much destroyed bunch of line infantry and cossacks as your attack force. This is especially reasonable in the case of Krasnyy, where Kutuzov decided to receive an attack by the Garde when he saw it deploy as opposed to continue with his own planned attack in that sector. Krasnyy was a fluid, moving engagement over several days, where the Russians mostly did attack and where the French (and especially the Italians) suffered huge losses.

As for the Berezina, Chichagov's performance on the west bank of the river was deeply regretted. He was, in essence, drummed out the service and exiled. Vitgenstein, on the east bank, came up as fast as he could (leaving half his guns to double up the teams because the roads were so poor), and attacked IX Corps to good effect, with a force mostly reduced to guns, Cossacks, opolchenie and converged and depot "remnants".

The Berezina was a great French victory. They lost 50,000 or 60,000 men or more to the Russians losses of about 10,000. But, most of the French losses were stragglers, and so don't count when measuring victory. Some few shattered survivors did escape at the Berezina, as did the Emperor and the marshalate. There were 6500 men who could be counted in the ranks on 2 December, out of over 500,000 who started the campaign. And hence the Berezina was a French victory.

Frayer

Dreaded would be the right translation in this context.

Why should the Russians be afraid of the debris od the Grande Armée.

In my view Kutusov had the right strategy, why waist precious soldiers, let the winter and the cossacks finish the enemy off.

The Russians had no fear whatsoever to fight constantly against the French in 1805, 1806 / 07, 1812 – 1814.

I disagree that the Berezina was a French victory – in case one could rally 60 000 stragglers in East Prussia and get 30 000 back in the ranks, that would have been a vital asset for the spring campaign of 1813

v. Winterfeldt,

Thank you for the confirmation on the meaning of the word.

I was being sarcastic to call the Berezina a French victory.

In general, anyone using a "Fabian strategy" or "asymmetrical" form of warfare is often labeled "afraid" by their opponents propaganda. The more the unconventional method succeeds, the louder are the shouts of "coward", "afraid", or "bandits" or perhaps "terrorists", etc.

Frayer

Wasn't the entire 1813-14 Allied strategy based on their fear of Napoleon the commander?

TW.

I think it fair to say Napoleon's reputation held many of his opponents in awe.
If Berezina wasnt a French victory, it could hardly be called a Russian one.
I think it reasonable to say if the situation was reversed and Napoleon had the Russians trapped like that, the campaign would have ended there.

Well, there is also the theory that Kutusov did not want to completely defeat the French because he thought it would lead to an imbalance in Europe and Britian becoming too powerful.

I have to say that Frayer's post was rather superb.

Frayer –

I tend to agree with you, but the Russinas are my favorite army in this period so I admit some degree of bias. I think one would be hard pressed to prove that the Russians were afraid of the French in the sense that it is common;y understood. They gave Nappy all he wanted on many occasions and it's hard to argue with the end result

ColonelToffeeApple
Thank you very much for your most kind comments!!
One blushes.

:-)

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I have trouble with "in awe", "afraid of", etc.

First, I don't see it in any of the contemporary sources. These phrases and similar, seem to arise in French sources after the era and from there make their way into English language works. This reinforces the concept of the steady Anglo-Scots-Irish professionals of the British Army in Iberia and in 1815 – who clearly held no awe or fear of the French or Napoléon or the Devil himself – being somehow a cut above the Continentals. And Wellington a cut above any Continental general. So these descriptions are "comfortable" for later French and English historians, who use and re-use these terms. And we read their works, since they are the easiest to read and most available. But it all seems to arise after the era itself.

Second, even as a post facto judgment, it seems a little strained, at least in my opinion.

Each of the Continental Allies had lost major battles to Napoléon. Two had made humiliating peace treaties with him. All three had had there capitals captured. The Russians were perhaps less "humiliated", but had been compelled to destroy their own country in the path of the French Army. Napoléon was clearly the "greatest captain" of his age – and perhaps in all history – a judgment that was already gaining some currency even in his life time. The Continental Allies had only rather raw conscripts and militia volunteers to face him, plus a few surviving veterans. Austria and Prussia had no money.
In early 1813 the French Empire controlled modern France, Belgium, the Netherlands, modern western Germany, Denmark + Norway, Italy, Switzerland (by contract), Illyria, major islands in the Mediterranean, Catalonia and the northeast half of Spain. They had in these areas, for the era, a modern and efficient administration or occupation and had held these territories for some years.
In contrast, parts of the Allied territories had just been liberated, occupied or just were recently joined not-too-willingly (Prussia, Poland, Sweden + Finland).

So, of course the Austrians, Prussians and Russians were impressed by Napoléon and concerned about his skill and that of the French army in 1813. Why would they not be? How could they reasonably judge the French as opponents that were easy to beat in 1813? Did this amount to "being afraid of", or "being in awe of"? I doubt it. They did not hesitate to drive him back to Paris and to abdication and exile. And the eastern European conscripts, the Cossack and Native cavalry, and the Landwehr militia and Russian opolchenie fought rather well – even if they were not Anglo-Scots-Irish professionals.

Frayer

P.S. – disclosure for bias assessment : I am an American of Anglo-Scots-Breton ethnicity or cultural heritage. I have been playing Russians, but am now working up some French for 1815.

The French Empire didn't controle Denmark-Norway.

Perhaps only Denmark. The Swedes had liberated Norway. <;^}

I like being wrong – it helps to learn new things!

"The Swedes had liberated Norway."
Our time frame here was early 1813.
I "thought" that the Russians only assented to the Treaty of Stockholm (which provided for Swedish acquisition of Norway without Allied interfeence) on 23 April 1813. But that the attempt to "liberate" Norway did not progress until late in the year, as the Allies wanted to the Swedes to actually go fight the French – with the Treaty of Kiel settlement only in mid-January 1814
What did I miss ?

"The French Empire didn't controle Denmark-Norway."
Well, OK. But theyb were mutually bound in alliance (renewed in July 1813). Denmark-Norway was actively in the fight against the Allies at least through July 1812 at Lyngør. The Allies could not recruit there. And Denmark-Norway could have attracted some Allied attention away from the French in 1813. Right?

So, what don't I understand, please ? This part of the war is a real problem for me, as I can only see it in German, French, English, Russian, etc. – I lack the "local" languages.

Thanks in advance,
Frayer

An alliance yes, but that's not the same as being controlled by the French, and an alliance that was forced upon us by the unprovoked attack by the British in 1807.

Denmark had been asked to send troops to Russia in 1812 but had convinced Napoleon that Danish troops were better employed in maintaining order in north Germany.

When the insurrections happened in Germany following the 1812 defeat Danish troops had helped liberate Hamburg from French occupation.

Denmark also tried to join the Coalition in 1813 but British hostility and that we had to transfer Norway to Sweden made that impossible, so we renewed the alliance with France.

Norway wasn't liberated as the Swedes had to take it by arms from the Norwegians in 1814.

Ironsides,

<;^}

I know:)

Takk skal du ha! :-)

To go back to the *question* and leave the pettiness behind; Kutusov pledged to drive the French from Russia. He could say that he did it. The French were leaving, why risk both troops and the potential for a "bottom of the ninth" heroics on the part of the French when they were already doing what you wanted? I've never read any references for orders from his ruler to wipe out the French.

Kutusov, a war-weary man who shortly thereafter would die, saw his duty and did it. Isn't that enough?

Simon Boulton 24 Oct 2009 4:08 a.m. PST
Well, there is also the theory that Kutusov did not want to completely defeat the French because he thought it would lead to an imbalance in Europe and Britian becoming too powerful.

This is a very good point. Why would the Russians, defeat and capture Napoleon with their last resources in order to deliver all the loot and territory of Europe to those who were not fighting? Why leave Poland, Galacia, bases in the Med. to be snapped up by others, while Russia caught their breathe and rebuilt and repositioned their armies? I'm sure the British would be happy to fight Napoleon to the last Russian soldier.

The Russians had the French trapped at the Berezina with one army on the opposite bank under Tshitshagov and just having destroyed the bridge at Borisov. Two other Russian armies were closing in on the French from the east-Wittgenstein's and Kutusov's.

The French cavalry found the crossing site at Studenka and Oudinot engaged in a deception operation to get the Russians away from that point on the river. I have two of Oudinot's sketches of his recce of the river line. Tshitshagov was fooled and withdrew most of his troops to around Borisov.

The French crossing was expertly organized and executed. Eble commanded the troops, mostly from the 1st Pontonnier Battalion, that built the two bridges. He was reinforced with both engineers and sailors. He would lose 90% of his pontonniers because of cold and exposure. But the bridges were built and repaired when they broke.

Combat troops were sent across first and formed to hold the bridgehead. While they defeated Tshitshagov, the rest of the army crossed behind them. Victor formed the rear guard and kept Wittgenstein from crowding in on the withdrawal. Both Tshitshagov and Wittgenstein were defeated. Kutusov never showed up. Since he had been defeated at Borodino and Maloyaroslavets it is quite likely that he didn't want to face Napoleon again. One French enlisted man did remark that if the situation was reversed, not one Russian would have escaped.

Clausewitz was correct in his assessment of the situation. The Berezina was a French victory and Kutusov failed to support his fellow Russian commanders. Like the greater majority of Russian military operations during the campaign, they failed.

Sincerely,
K

Question for a military history masters exaim:

Would the Russian Empire have been better off if they had captured Napoleon at Berezina, or had decided to let him and his destroyed remains go back to France to serve as a nucleas of a weakened French army to fight Russia's rivals for the spoils of the French Empire?

I don't think there is any question about it.

Would there have been Russian troops in Paris if they had killed Napoleon?

Do you think the Russians could not have posted the escape roads with Cossacks?

Would the Prussians or Austrians or Germans let Russian troops cross their teritory if Napoleon was dead?

Isn't warefare "politics carried out by other means" rather than an exercise for soldiers?

"One French enlisted man did remark that if the situation was reversed, not one Russian would have escaped."

What a wonderfully arrogant comment.

I suppose a Russian enlisted man could say it was good thing Nappy was leading the French rather than the Russians so that the Russians didn't get caught in a mess like that in the first place.

"defeated at … Maloyaroslavets"
OK, we "know" the Russians lost at Borodino because they "yielded the field of honor to their foe" or some such expression. But how do we measure it so that they also lose Maloyaroslavets? They held their positions, protected Kaluga, Tula and the road south. The French retreated after the battle, Napoléon himself quick marched ahead with Garde to be the first to supposed safety at Smolensk, and drawing out the French forces over 60kms. Both sides had about equal casualties – for which there would be replacements only for the Russians. But the Russians "lost" this battle? Really?

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"it is quite likely that he [Kutuzov] didn't want to face Napoleon again"

-- Are you mind reading at a remove of 197 years, or is this just your (wishful?) thinking, or is there some actual contemporary source for this being in any way "likely" ?
-- You do realize that Kutuzov lost the French after Maloyaroslavets until the end of October. He thought they would seek another way south and west, instead of going back over the wasted line of their summer advance. After Platov found them, they French were chased down were attacked in regular fashion then and savaged at Vyasma and Krasyy, in addition to their being generally savaged by Cossacks, Native cavalry, hussar detachments and partizans. Then were are at the end of November at the Berezina. What more was Kutuzov supposed to do, call in airstrikes?

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"closing in on the French from the east-Wittgenstein's and Kutusov's. … Kutusov never showed up. … Kutusov failed to support his fellow Russian commanders"

We do realize that Kutuzov started farther from Studenka than Vitgenstein, that they were on the east bank of the river, and that Vitgenstein managed to bag about 60,000 French, including all but handful of the the rather fresh IX Corps under Victor. So –
-- Exactly what "support" did Kutuzov fail to provide?
-- What was he supposed to do on the east bank that Vitgenstein wasn't doing?
-- Why would this proposed "support" to Vitgenstein have been better generalship than letting his men eat, build fires and rest for 36 hours, dismounting the heavy cavalry remnants and sending them back to recruit, combining regiments, integrating recruits, etc.?

Frayer

Frayer, my friend,

Broad sweeping statements are much easier to make when one lacks the necessary facts! <;^}

Big Al

'and that Vitgenstein managed to bag about 60,000 French'

Where did you come up with that figure?

Sincerely,
K

'and that Vitgenstein managed to bag about 60,000 French'

Per Nafziger, in English even, pages 317 and 325:
IX Corps before the Berezina : 12,200
IX Corps after the Berezina : 2,000
thus, we calculate :
IX losses at the Berezina : 10,200
He calls the chapter "Nightmare at the Berezina" – since the Russians failed so miserably, do you think he meant them or the French were having a nightmare?

For stragglers, Britten-Austin swagged it at 50,000 cut off. His chapter is called "Holocaust at the Berezina" – but again, since Napoléon and the French did so very very well, he was likely referring to the Russians having a holocaust, right ?

If you think the number of dead and captured (and almost all dead later) French is lower, I will be happy to agree with you. Anyway, the bulk were just stragglers, not glorious nor following their brilliant and perfectly trained officers to yet another victory. So they don't count, right?

OK, your question was answered. Perhaps you could now please have the goodness to answer my questions?

Frayer

Big Al,

"Broad sweeping statements are much easier to make when one lacks the necessary facts!"

Well, yes.
But everyone is entitled to an opinion. And to voice that opinion. My questions sought to bring out the basis for the opinions of "10th Marines". Whether that basis is factual and/or well-sourced OR a series of reasonable conclusions OR made up without factual basis and instead biased and plain wrong – this we can only see once we have an idea from whence the broad statements come.

Yours in firm research, and friendship,
Frayer

I can well believe that the French consoled themselves with the belief that some of them survived because the Russians were scared of them. No doubt many medals were presented and titles conferred.

And the French Victory Parade – don't forget that little bit! <;^}

Big Al

"Broad sweeping statements are much easier to make when one lacks the necessary facts!"

Would you mind explaining which were the 'broad and sweeping statements' that were in my summary of the Berezina fighting?

Sincerely,
K

Dear "10th Marines",

I won't remind you again, as it would seem to be pestering you and not polite. But since you are still active on this thread, perhaps you forgot about them, and perhaps you will now care to answer the questions I posed to you about your own comments:

1. "[Russians] defeated at … Maloyaroslavets"
- How do you calculate or assess the results of Maloyaroslavets so that it counts as a French victory ?

2. "it is quite likely that he [Kutuzov] didn't want to face Napoleon again"
- Is this just your own opinion, or is there some actual contemporary source for this being in any way "likely" ?

3. "closing in on the French from the east-Wittgenstein's and Kutusov's. … Kutusov never showed up. … Kutusov failed to support his fellow Russian commanders"
- What "support" did Kutuzov fail to provide, or what was he supposed to do on the east bank that Vitgenstein wasn't doing?
-- Why would this proposed "support" to Vitgenstein have been better generalship than letting his men eat, build fires and rest for 36 hours, reorganizing his diminished command, etc. ?

Again, I do not wish to be impolite. But, your comments are extremely strange to me, or even actually counter-factual. So getting at the basis for your comments might be quite instructive – assuming that there is indeed a basis for them and that your comments are not merely formed from bias and/or a lack of any actual knowledge of the topic.

Thanks in advance,

Frayer

And the French Victory Parade – don't forget that little bit! <;^}

picture

Big Al

I found the speculation about "Russia"* not wishing to destroy the Grande Armee totally, for reasons of wider politics, to be most interesting. (Boulton, 24th; 1968billsfan 25th, above) At Leipsig, was there not sufficient numbers in the Allied Army to have surrounded Napoleon's forces completely, rather than offer the inviting escape to the West? Again, might this legitimately be taken as a concern to preserve a balance of power in Europe rather than causing the humbling of France as a power, to the presumable advantage of Prussia and maybe Austria (on land)?

* "Russia"; I follow E M Remarque's position in "All Quiet" (that is, a forest in France didn't insult a mountain in Germany, as Tjaden or Katzinsky or someone says; the sequence ends with them all agreeing that politicians should be given clubs and allowed set about one another).

No, no – that's the 1813 Victory Parade!
Note the rags are Bardin regulation rags, and one guy has actually something to eat in his hat – as opposed to only having his hat to eat.

Here we have the 1812 version -
picture
picture

Frayer

Dear Frayer
Certainly it is interesting reading the list of victories by the French in 1812. Borodino won because the Russians decided that they had done what they needed to do. Kutusov did not want to fight but was forced to do so. The losses on both sides were about the same. The poor logistic state of the Grande Armee meant that it was a strategic defeat and the empty capture of Moscow. As has been argued before Napoleon should have encamped in Smolensk region rather than endanger his army as he did.

Maloyaroslavets was a defeat by almost every measure you can use.

Kutuzov and the Russian just failed at Berezina to destroy the Grande Armee completely by the heroics of creating a bridge from almost nothing. I believe that Eble was ordered by Napoleon to detroy his pontoons etc… earlier in the campaign. Was that looking ahead and sensible being that there were so many rivers to cross.

My two books on the Russian Cossacks and Opolchenie capture a little of the state of the pursuing Russian Army that suffered from a lack of replacements as the depot battalions had already been combined into "grenadier" battalions. Only Opolchenie were available after Borodino. It takes time to train recruits and move them. As stated before the Cossack Pulks were down to lower than a Sotnia (20% strength).

Even in 1813, the Russian Army suffered as Brigades were often at less than Regimental strength. The Russians had too many guns for their numbers so attached their guns to Allied formations.

Being an Englishman, we still "celebrate" Dunkirk, Corunna, Crete, Galipoli, St Nazaire, Copenhagen etc …. as great victories where the British Army were rescued by the Royal Navy. These were strategic defeats and some tactical ones as well. This goes with the tradition of spin upon that ignore the facts.

Stephen

Stephen,

Never, never use 'pulk' – that is Polish NOT Russian. It is 'polk' and always will be!

I will forgive you this once. <;^}

BIG Al

Both Digby Smith in Napoleon against Russia and Dominic Lieven in his Russia Against Napoleon tell the story of the British Military liaison to the Russians complaining to Kutuzov that he hadn't done enough to capture Napoleon at Berezina, and Kutuzov replying, "Why should I want to capture him? Who would that benefit?" Kutuzov goes on to suggest that only Britain would benefit which was not in Russia's interest.

While I don't have either book with me, I can say that I thought it 1. Sounded like something that Kutuzov might say to a foreign critic, but 2. Too pat to be entirely believable and reveals far more than any Russian would normally lay out of their motives…

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Love having German speakers available to translate what isn't available to the rest of the group. Thank you Frayer and vW.

Bill H.

Here is a better translation of Clausewitz's remarks on the Berezina situation and the fighting that went on there. It is from the Greenhill 1992 edition of The Campaign of 1812 in Russia by Clausewitz:

'Chance certainly somewhat favored Bonaparte in his discovery near Borisov of a place so favorable for the passage as Studenka; but it was his reputation which chiefly saved him, and he traded in this instance on a capital amassed long before. Wittgenstein and Tshitshagov were both afraid of him here, as Kutusov had been afraid of him at Krasny, of him, of his army, of his Guard. No one chose to be defeated by him. Kutusov believed he could obtain his end without that risk: Wittgenstein was reluctant to impair the glory he had acquired, Tshitshagov to undergo a second check.'

'Bonaparte was endowed with his moral strength when he thus extricated himself from one of the worst situations in which a general ever found himself. This moral power, however, was not all: the strength of his intellect, and the military virtues of his army, which not even its calamities could quite subdue, were destined here to show themselves once more in their full luster. After he had overcome all the difficulties of this perilous moment, Bonaparte said to those about him, 'Vous voyez comme on passe sous la barbe de l'enemi.'

'Bonaparte had here entirely saved his old honor and acquired new, but the result was still a stride towards the utter destruction of his army. We know how much of it reached Kovno, and that the Berezina contributed the last blow towards this result. Besides himself, his principal generals, and a couple of thousand officers, he brought away nothing of the whole army worth mentioning. When therefore we speak of his bringing the difficult retreat to a stand, the expression is but a name, and this is the case with the individual incidents of the retreat. Eugene escaped by a detour at Krasny, but with half his troops. Ney escaped likewise by a greater circuit, with 600 men out of 6000 (as his secretary relates). Nominally the Russians had failed in cutting off their enemy; Eugene, Ney, at Krasny, Bonaparte at the Berezina; but nevertheless they had cut off considerable masses. This holds still more true of the campaign as a whole. The Russians seldom head the French; when they do they let them through. The French are everywhere victorious; but look to the end of the account, the French army has ceased to exist, and, with the exception of the capture of Bonaparte and his principal lieutenants, the campaign has the most complete result conceivable. Should the Russian army be denied all merit for this? That were gross injustice.'-pages 211-212.

Clausewitz also comments that there were about 10,000 prisoners taken at the Berezina, not 60,000 'bagged' and part of that was Partenoux's division. He also comments that between Tarutino and Vilna Kutusov's command shrank from 110,000 to about 40,000 because of combat losses, sick and those suffering from the weather.

Sincerely,
K

@10th Marines

Right then – I see a response ot my questions below. Thanks.

If you want to note 10,000 prisoners in the fighting, and not count the dead or the stragglers, be my guest.

"everywhere victorious …, the French army has ceased to exist"
Asymmetrical warfare is just so gosh-darn counter-intuitive, isn't it?

<shrug> – ^ – </shrug>

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@Bill H.

Here is what Wilson attributes to Kutuzov (page 234):
"I am by no means sure that the total destruction of the Emperor Napoléon and his army would be such a benefit to the world; his succession would not fall to Russia or any other continental power, but to that which already commands the sea, and whose domination would then be intolerable."
link

Some comments.
1. The supposed quote from Kutuzov is attributed to a discussion after Malojarslavets in October 1812 – not at the Berezina at the end of November.
2. The original words of Kutuzov, if he spoke directly to Wilson, would have been in French – the text we read in English being the product of Kutuzov's and Wilson's capability in that language.
3. Wilson was quite hostile to Kutuzov – as you can see by reading the linked book. Two rather "operatic" examples of rather unlikely quotes -
-- Wilson attributes these words to Cossack scouts, upon finding French horses still shod (page 255 of the linked book) : "God has made Napoléon forget the there was a winter in our country. In spite of Kutuzov, the enemy's bones shall remain in Russia." One finds it hard to believe Cossack troopers would be talking to Wilson at all (he being a general, a non-believer, a foreigner, and not speaking Russian are some immediate problems), let alone taking the opportunity to complain about a Russian Marshal's tactics!
-- Kutuzov is reported (page 273) as replying via an aide to a request to attack made by Beningsen with "Je m'en-foutre." If the auto-censor is multi-lingual, that should show with a bunch of ******. Marshals do not often curse – especially like that – at generals through aides.
4. The supposed quote was reported to have been said in a large staff meeting of general officers – but was not reported by any other attendee to my knowledge.

While the notion that Kutuzov was perhaps concerned about post-war British hegemony seems quite reasonable, the specific testimony of Wilson on how this effected operations at the end of 1812 seems much less creditable to me.

Frayer

The auto-censor does not have French! Good to know.

:-)

Frayer

‘OK, your question was answered. Perhaps you could now please have the goodness to answer my questions?'

Frayer,

You need to be patient. Questions need to be researched and it takes a little time. I also have to go to work and it does get busy when you teach. Please don't put yourself in the position of 'demanding' things from other members. Good things come to those who wait. ;-)

‘They lost 50,000 or 60,000 men or more to the Russians losses of about 10,000.'

This figure is grossly inaccurate. It isn't in Nafziger, Britten-Austin (unless I missed it), Clausewitz, or Tarle. The straggler losses, which count civilians as well as troops that could or would not get back into the ranks was around 8-10,000. In that total Clausewitz also includes Partenoux's division of Victor's corps. Combat losses are listed as approximately 12,000 for the French and at least 15,000 for the Russians (See page 21 of Napoleon's campaign in Russia II, Department of Military Art and Engineering, History of the Military Art-Notes for the Course). There is no way to calculate how many of either army were lost through desertion, the cold, and other causes. What is a fact is that both the French and Russian armies gradually disintegrated because of the weather after the Berezina crossing and the battle there (see the Esposito/Elting Atlas or if you have access to it Fabry's account of the campaign).
The number of stragglers accompanying the Grande Armee at the Berezina might have numbered 40,000. Many got over the bridges between the formed troops but about 10,000 refused to cross and were taken by the Russians (which had to be unpleasant at best). Interestingly most of the army's artillery escaped, only four or five guns being lost during the crossing. French artillery support during the operation was excellent.

‘He [Nafziger] calls the chapter "Nightmare at the Berezina" – since the Russians failed so miserably, do you think he meant them or the French were having a nightmare?'

I would suggest that it was a ‘nightmare' for both armies having to fight and bivouac in the open during a Russian winter.

‘For stragglers, Britten-Austin swagged it at 50,000 cut off. His chapter is called "Holocaust at the Berezina" – but again, since Napoléon and the French did so very very well, he was likely referring to the Russians having a holocaust, right ?'

Britten-Austin has five chapters on the Berezina, not just one. They are entitled ‘How Ever Shall We Get Through', ‘Two Fragile Bridges', ‘Partonneaux Surrenders', ‘Holocaust at the Berezina', and ‘Two Prisoners.' You forgot to list the other four.
The French did very well at the Berezina. They should have been defeated and caught, but outfought two Russian armies and executed an assault river crossing, with an accompanying deception operation by Oudinot, on a defended river line, building two trestle bridges under fire. Oudinot and Ney fought an exemplary action against Tshitshagov at one to three odds in the Russians' favor and defeated him. Victor protected the bridgehead from the east bank, using a reverse-slope defense and thoroughly defeated Wittgenstein. The bridges were protected and all the formed troops, with the exception of Partonneaux's division, got across and escaped. The French also inflicted more combat losses than they incurred, the Swiss regiments defending the shoulder of the bridgehead particularly distinguishing themselves, not giving a foot of ground, suffering 80% casualties and not losing any eagles. All of this material is in Britten-Austin among other sources.

‘Are you mind reading at a remove of 197 years, or is this just your (wishful?) thinking, or is there some actual contemporary source for this being in any way "likely" ?'

It's in Clausewitz' study of the campaign.

‘If you think the number of dead and captured (and almost all dead later) French is lower, I will be happy to agree with you. Anyway, the bulk were just stragglers, not glorious nor following their brilliant and perfectly trained officers to yet another victory. So they don't count, right?'

Your sarcasm, and inaccuracies, are noted. The numbers have been provided.

'OK, we "know" the Russians lost at Borodino because they "yielded the field of honor to their foe" or some such expression. But how do we measure it so that they also lose Maloyaroslavets? They held their positions, protected Kaluga, Tula and the road south. The French retreated after the battle, Napoléon himself quick marched ahead with Garde to be the first to supposed safety at Smolensk, and drawing out the French forces over 60kms. Both sides had about equal casualties – for which there would be replacements only for the Russians. But the Russians "lost" this battle?' Really?

You're leaving out some interesting material. However, the Russians lost at Borodino because they were outfought and were forced out of a strong defensive position, had few reserves left available at the end of the day, and the French artillery dominated the field and Napoleon had 30,000 fresh troops available. He was prepared to continue the next day-Kutusov could not as his losses were much heavier than the French (45,000 Russians to between 28,000 and 31,000 French). Kutusov did report to the Tsar that he had won ‘another glorious victory.'
Maloyaroslavets was a French tactical victory. Kutusov retired two miles after his army failed against Eugene. Napoleon did retreat after the action, but so did the Russians, who retired to Kaluga. Napoleon made a serious strategical error here and it is doubtful had he advanced instead of retired that Kutusov would have fought him again-at least not alone.

‘You do realize that Kutuzov lost the French after Maloyaroslavets until the end of October. He thought they would seek another way south and west, instead of going back over the wasted line of their summer advance. After Platov found them, they French were chased down were attacked in regular fashion then and savaged at Vyasma and Krasyy, in addition to their being generally savaged by Cossacks, Native cavalry, hussar detachments and partizans. Then were are at the end of November at the Berezina.'

And the Russians lost again at Vyasma and Krasny…

‘What more was Kutuzov supposed to do, call in airstrikes?'

Give us a break-that is just silly. Kutuzov should have pressed ahead to support his fellow army commanders. He sat idle for four days and continually got lost in his own country and lost contact with the French despite his great superiority in light cavalry. That demonstrates a lack of strategic and command ability.

‘We do realize that Kutuzov started farther from Studenka than Vitgenstein, that they were on the east bank of the river,'

So what? I do believe that the Grande Armee had to travel further to get to the Berezina than Kutusov did. At best, it was the same distance. The fact is that Kutusov got lost, was outfought at Krasny and Vyasma by the French, and failed to come to grips at the Berezina in support of Wittgenstein and Tshitshagov. That doesn't say much for Kutusov's dedication, ability, or character.

‘and that Vitgenstein managed to bag about 60,000 French, including all but handful of the the rather fresh IX Corps under Victor.'

Wittgenstein ‘bagged' no such number. He did capture Partonneaux's division of Victor's corps, but was defeated by Victor. Wittgenstein also policed up the stragglers after Eble burned the bridges, but it was nowhere near 60,000. The total, including Partonneaux, was between 8-10,000, most of them noncombatants which were undoubtedly released to the tender care of the Cossacks…

'Exactly what "support" did Kutuzov fail to provide?'

See above.

'Why would this proposed "support" to Vitgenstein have been better generalship than letting his men eat, build fires and rest for 36 hours, dismounting the heavy cavalry remnants and sending them back to recruit, combining regiments, integrating recruits, etc.?'

Finished the war so that it didn't continue into 1813? Complete the victory with the French knocked out completely, thus saving lives and treasure that were expended for the next two years? There are myriad reasons whey Kutusov failed at the Berezina by allowing the French to leave Russia as victors.

Sincerely,
Kevin

All from Nafziger :

Before Krasnyy :
Stragglers : 30,000 (page 302)
Main Army : 41,500 , excluding II Corps and IX Corps not joined (page 305)

After the "victory" at Krasnyy :
Main Army : 18,850, excluding II Corps and IX Corps (page 317) – losses of 22,650 since before Krasnyy, some no doubt straggling and not yet dead
II Corps and IX Corps : 23,300 (page 317)

After the "victory" at the Berezina :
Remaining French : 7,000 (page 325)

Before the two "victories", total including stragglers and II Corps and IX Corps : 30,000 + 41,500 + 23,300 = 94,800

French losses : 94,800 – 7,000 = 87,800

Frayer

Frayer,

Those aren't the losses at the Berezina. It also takes into account the losses afterwards as in who straggled, walked off, died of exposure.

I would suggest you take a look at Clausewitz, Tarle, Britten-Austin (who quotes losses from other sources in his notes) and not just use one source.

Sincerely,
Kevin

10th Marines wrote : "Since he had been defeated at Borodino and Maloyaroslavets it is quite likely that he [Kutuzov] didn't want to face Napoleon again [at the Berezina]."

Frayer asks : "Is this just your own opinion, or is there some actual contemporary source for this being in any way "likely" ?"

10th Marines answers : "It's in Clausewitz' study of the campaign."

Clauswitz wrote : "Kutusov had been "afraid of" [or "dreaded", according to our native speaker v. Winterfeld] him at Krasny" "Kutusov believed he could obtain his end without that risk"

So, it's not in v. Clauswitz.
The first comment of v. Clauswitz on Kutuzov has to do with Krasnyy, not the Berezina. At Krasnyy, Kutuzov called off an attack by his remnants on the Old Guard and chose to stand on the defensive when he saw them forming to attack.
The second comment of v. Clauswitz proposes that Kutuzov thought he could win without risk.

Von Clauswitz says nothing about "not wanting to face" Napoleon at the Berezina "[s]ince he had been defeated at Borodino and Maloyaroslavets".

========================================
"Those aren't the losses at the Berezina. It also takes into account the losses afterwards as in who straggled, walked off, died of exposure."
The last count was dated 2 December. As an état, it would be reporting the count taken on the 1st of the month, at dawn muster typically. So the "afterwards" is some 44 hours from when the bridge was blown.
But yes, the total of losses includes those "who straggled, walked off, died of exposure". This is because these troops were … hmmmm … lost ("losses" = "number of troops lost").

"I would suggest you take a look at …"
That's patronizing – argumentum ad hominem is really not too good for supporting an opinion, especially with a well-informed group such as contribute here.

And yes, I have read the works you suggest, including Тарле Евгений Викторович. We have a nice first edition of his key work on 1812 and some of his research notes. It was written under extreme government pressure, upon his return from a concentration camp. A number of his relatives, academicians and officers, were still in detention. Several were executed. The work is colored by the Stalinist need for "academic propaganda" on several points.
By the way, he is my wife's great-uncle.

Frayer

Frayer,

You live in Liechtenstein I notice, you do not know Hofschroer by any chance do you?

'…when the bridge was blown.'

The bridge wasn't blown, the bridges were burned by Eble (there were two-one for cavalry and vehicles and one for foot troops).

'That's patronizing…'

No, it isn't-it is advice. You have made too many errors in fact in your postings which I have pointed out to you. You can accept them or not. However, your characterization of the Berezina fighting, especially the losses, is incorrect, somewhat grossly so. I am familiar with Tarle's situation as an historian and what his handicaps were. That being the case, he did quite well in his history of the campaign.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Shane,

Nice try, but Hof lives in Austria.

Kev,

"No, it isn't-it is advice." Yeh, sure, ya betcha. If you had been provided similar "advice" it WOULD BE patronizing.

Just one man's opinion, of course. <:^I

Big Al