"Prussia 1806-Reasons for the Collapse" Topic

"People, I just want to say, you know, can we all get along? Can we get along? Can we stop making it, making it horrible for the older people and the kids?…It's just not right. It's not right. It's not, it's not going to change anything. We'll, we'll get our justice….Please, we can get along here. We all can get along. I mean, we're all stuck here for a while. Let's try to work it out. Let's try to beat it. Let's try to beat it. Let's try to work it out."

It doesn't Barthold von Quistorp

Dear Barthold
It is interesting the dismissal of Peter Paret work. I have read most of his works and cannot see what you see. That is your right. Peter Paret conclusions mirror those that I can to independently in my book published last year on Prussian Infantry 1808-40 that had to explain why the Prussians were withing 6 years more than equal to the French in organisation and resiliance. Being the cutting edge of the Coalition Armies.

Stephen

YouTube link

'…that had to explain why the Prussians were withing 6 years more than equal to the French in organisation and resiliance. Being the cutting edge of the Coalition Armies.'

Stephen,

I'm afraid that would be a very difficult historic position to maintain. It's an interesting theory, but as the Prussian army didn't act as a unified force in 1813-1814, sweeping statements of that nature usually don't hold up under scrutiny.

Sincerely,
K

"…that had to explain why the Prussians were withing 6 years more than equal to the French in organisation and resiliance."

How about substituting Romans for Prussians and Carthaginians for the French… or Allied for Prussians and Germans for French?
Sweeping statements maybe, but weren`t these also situations where lessons were learnt and the pupils eventually exceeded their tutors?

Dear Kevin
Please read my two books upon the Prussian Army. The Prussian Army built upon and created a new form of warfare with the General Staff System.

The Prussians were defeated on a number of occassions and came back the next day to fight. The most famous occurence was Ligny then Wavre and Waterloo.

The articulation and tactics producing ultimately the universal soldier of later wars. The process was not finished in 1815 but was sufficient to defeat the Austrians and French in the 1860s.

Stephen

I do not think the "Prussians" were the innovators here, they were crushed by the French and had to learn their lessons the hard way. They rebuilt their army yes but was their new system and high command structure superior to the French? I do not think so. Some authors want us to believe that simply because they have an opinion based on someones else's opinion in the past but judging which system was superior is a useless exercise.

The Prussians learned from their mistakes as did the French, British and every other nation that ever took up arms and although they did not copy the French system they sure understood what went wrong by comparing their own system to that of the French. And remember, it was the Prussian king who pushed for many of these changes himself. Without his input I fear half of what was achieved would not have occurred.

As for the universal soldier, I do not think you can accredit this to the Prussians, this was an evolutionary process of all nations troops that continued to occur for another hundred years after Waterloo where soldiers were still categorized, especially in the German army right up until the fall of Berlin 1945.

I still do not think there is such a thing as a, "universal" soldier today. Some armies have Infantry that can do "every" job of a soldiers trade in a particular army yes, but there are many countries who's armies are still made up of categorized soldiery who do not know how the next category operates, their tactics, nor their weaponry.

It is the smaller armies of the world who are closer to this than any of the larger ones simply because they cannot afford to have specialist soldiers types who are utilized for particular roles. Therefore their soldiers have to be trained to fight in all kinds of roles and situations. I know this from my own personal experience.

As for the Prussians starting a trend towards a universal soldier? …not likely.

Shane

Universal soldier was a fantasy film, and that's about the scale of it.

Prussian army 1815
Jager, Guards, Landwher, reserve, Line, Fusilier,
US army 1990s
Seals, Rangers, Marines, Light, Airborne, Heavy, Infantry

Wonder why these armies persist in different nomenclatures (& organisation) if all soldiers are equally well trained and experienced in all facets
Because they dont operate in the bubble towers of 1960s sociologists perhaps?

Barthold – you are far too logical and penetrating, clearly you dont have a book to flog.

Even in the Australian army we have special categories for our soldiers:

SAS, Commandos, Clearance Divers, Infantry and Mechanized (Grunts), Airborne, Scouts (light sections of squads) and probably more I have forgotten about.

Nothing has changed in 200 years except the weapon delivery systems.

and…

The articulation and tactics producing ultimately the universal soldier of later wars. The process was not finished in 1815 but was sufficient to defeat the Austrians and French in the 1860s.

Sorry but that statement makes me cringe, it was the weaponry that won it for the Prussians, not the notion of some universal soldier…I would really like to see the evidence for this.

Shane

I agree with Shane and Jeff-the idea of a 'universal infantryman' is just plain inaccurate. It certainly wasn't true for the Prussians through 1871 and it was also incorrect for the Germans through 1945.

Regarding the Prussians, they learned from a disastrous defeat in 1806 which not only destroyed the Prussian Army, but the Prussian state as well. They were lucky that Napoleon didn't completely dismember what was left of the Prussian state or at the very least throw the Hohenzollerns out and replace them with another German ruling house.

The Prussian Army of the period, before and after 1806-1807 was not the best army in Europe. It wasn't even the best army among the allies. The engineer and artillery arms were poor and the general staff that Scharnhorst and his colleagues tried to build had severe growing pains and was only in the embryonic stage in 1815. The French general staff of Berthier and Napoleon was much superior and was the outstanding staff system of the period.

The Prussian/German General Staff was just another army staff and while it did well with a competent chief, such as von Molte the Elder, it had a fatal flaw, in that the operations section was the predominant section to the detriment of the other staff sections and the staff as a whole. Further, as the German General Staff, it never conducted a successful war, losing badly in both World Wars.

The Prussian reform period of 1807-1813 is very interesting, but it wasn't as comprehensive as that of the old French Royal Army from 1763 and into the late 1780s. They accomplished much more and set the basis for what the French achieved on the battlefield during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods.

A good book to take a look at for the development of the Gemran General Staff is by Walter Gorlitz, The History of the German General Staff. It's an excellent starting point and can lead to excellent research later. Another volume to read together with it is Gordon Craig's The Politics of the Prussian Army. Further excellent information on the Prussians of the Napoleonic period can be gained from The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform by Peter Paret, and Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 by William Shanahan.

If you can find them Curt Jany's Geschichte der Preussischen Armee, Volumes III and IV, which cover the years 1763-1914, are helpful as are Louis Malinowsky's and Robert Bonin's Geschichte der Branderburgisch-Preussischen Artillerie, 3 volumes, covers the artillery of the period. Jena to Eylau: The Disgrace and the Redemption of the Old Prussian Army by Colmar, Freiherr von der Goltz gives an interesting view of that period. Finally, Paul Pietsch's Formations und Uniformierungsgeschichte des Preussischen Heeres 1808-1914, Volume II is mostly about uniforms but it has a detailed chart on the organization of the Prussian artillery including their artillery train of the period.

Sincerely,
K

Dear Kevin
The universal infantryman is a concept where he could fight just as well in close as open order as you know very well. I have written upon this in my books and some of those listed above cover the subject. The Prussian General Staff system combined the abilities to produce an efficient whole. Blucher was an inspiration leader but it took Scharnhorst and Gneisnau to sort out the detail and orders.

Berthier's ability to comprehend the mind of Napoleon was remarkable. Alas Soult failed in 1815 and was in this position due to Berthier's defenistration. The staff work and the maps used by the French when you go outside that of Napoleon was as poor as the Coalition Allies.

The Prussian General Staff system regularised the position of the Chief of Staff and his assistance. This is what modern systems were based upon. It is interesting that the Prussian General Staff was victorious 1813-15 and each of the Armies were stongly influenced by them for strategy.

Wars won by the Prussian General Staff
– 1813-14
– 1815 100 Days
– 1848-51 First Schleswig War
– 1866 Austro-Prussian
– 1870 Franco-Prussian
– 1914 almost succeeded and failed as the original plan was diverted from the objective
– 1915 Galipolee
– 1916 Tannebaun and the destruction of the Russian Army
– 1918 USA finally has troops upon the Western Front and the tide turns. Armistice signed but no invasion of Germany and hence the impression of many nationalists that Germany was not defeated but betrayed.
– 1935 (Alsace and the Ruhr)
– 1936 (Sudatenland),
– 1938 (Austria)
– 1939 (Poland)
– 1940 (Norway)
– 1940 France and the Low Countries
– 1941 Russia until political interference of Hitler.
– 1942-5 Failure due to the remarkable recovery of Russia and the declaration of war on USA. Germany was out produced in arnaments. The production war was lost. The Battle of the Bulge was a brilliant and futile stroke.

That is am impressive list of successes. Only WWI and WWII was Prussia/Germany defeated. The system could be argued not to have failed but the circumstances over not having the resources to carry on.

WWI was caused by the inability of the German General Staff to consider a one front war and the weakness of the Austro-Hungarian Army. The cascade of treaties that some dated from 1815 caused the catrostrophy of 1914.

Stephen

Come on – you cannot compare Soult to Berthier, Soult was an independent commander and thrown into for Staff wark, a very badly chosen man – he would have been much better for other posts.
Why Napoleon did not chose one of the many fully trained staff officers is another mystery.
Berthier did not understand anything, read his own words about it, Napoleon told him what he had to do – full stop.

Dear von Winterfeldt
Soult had in the past been a chief of staff. I am not defending Napoleon's decisions. He choices in the late campaigns were poor and could only be explained as being poliical.

I do not know of many fully trained French staff officers at Army Level. Actually I cannot name any. They were not as thoroughly schooled as in Prussia.

I do not think you give Berthier enough credit. You may be correct but it does go against the wisdom handed down to us. Certainly interesting to ponder. If the most perfect pairing that France produced was a commander and her clerk. The Prussian System was of two equals.

Stephen

So the entire wars of 1813-14 and the campaign in Flanders was won by none other than the Prussian General Staff ????

c'mon Stephen, that is a huge bow to pull, and I have not even started to look into the others…

sorry, I do not agree at all, it was the Prussian ineptness at Ligney that lost them the battle and to make it worse blucher goes off charging like a 19 year old hussar at the end of the day….the only reason they stayed in the campaign at all was because of one man who held them all together. Wellington tried to give advice and was politely told to off. Prussian pride lost them that battle which is far from being brilliant staff work.

Ohh, and lets not go into the public relations with the Saxons just before Waterloo….now that was a brilliant piece of staff work.

Shane

also,

You are trying to convince us all that the German (Prussian) general staff is the basis for all staff work in militaries of today…then why is it that Napoleon's campaigns and his way of waging war with his own high command is taught in military academies all over the world for the past 200 years?? please tell me that.

Shane,

There must be a thought in there somewhere, I just can't find it. <:^{

Just a rant?

Big Al

typical of you isn't it, lol.

Ich möchte nur sagen, daß diese freche Kröte meine Bücher niemals gelesen hat! Es geht das Gerücht: der ewige Bärentreiber hat kein mehr Deutschfähigkeit, als eine ausgebildete Äffin.

Ich kann, aber, etwas nützliches vorschlagen:

link

mit wissenschaftlichen Grüße,

Curt Jany (gestorben)

"typical [sic] of you isn't it, lol."

picture

Steve, you are an outstanding member of society aren't you…

Man könnte auch sagen : Wer angibt hat mehr vom Leben

ahh, Barthold, you been on TMP for just 5 days, this could not be "the" Peter Hofschroer could it not?

It is amazing how when anyone criticizes anything to do with Prussia on this board that the same old antics of public ridicule and put down and insults by the same old people come out of the woodwork…

it goes to show the age of some people and the limit to their ability to associate with others in a non-aggressive, non-insulting way.

I only have pity for you and would suggest you seek help quickly.

"I only have pity for you and would suggest you seek help quickly."

Classic Hof! YOU ARE the 'HOF' – these are his words for sure! You have been found out!!!!!

I knew it all along. Shane, indeed.

Big Al

Steve, your family must be really proud of you

Curt Jany,

What books have you written would be most interested in reading one of them.

Wagram

"Steve, your family must be really proud of you [sic]"

<;^}

Wagram: all my books have been out of print for decades, ever since our beloved Kaiser packed up shop and left for Holland, sniff. There was a brief revival after my death, by those people whom we shall not dignify by using their names [suffice to say an Austrian was involved].

A universal soldier in this case being particular to fighting equally close formed as in a skirmish line armed with a musket / gezogene gewehr / round ball firing pointy thing.

Mmmm. So that explains why the Prussians perpetuated having Jagers and Fusiliers and designated troops for light work , reserves designated for formed assault and line battalions for the bit in between. Whereas if everyone was universal you think they would just have had 'soldier' battalions, and written 'whoever' in the Brigade regulations rather than specific types.

Perhaps its all just a difference of nomenclature where 'Universal' in one dictionary means 'somewhat capable, possibly, on the odd occasion' whereas another is much more limiting and says 'equally capable'.

Croak!

Are not speaking and reading different skills?

Zwei höchst zuverlässige Augenzeugen mögen uns hier den Gang des Gefechts selbst erzählen. Der eine berichtet: ‘Wir Jäger waren in einer debandirten Linie im Walde, so verdeckt, als möglich, aufgestellt. Nachdem wir hier ungefähr eine Stunde gestanden, rückte feindliche Infanterie an, die uns nicht gewahr wurde, weil wir in Stammlöchern, oder hinter Baumstämmen standen
=
Two most reliable eye-witnesses may tell us the course of combat here. The one reports: Wir hunters were in a debandirten line in the forest, then covers, as possible, set up. After we confessed approximately one hour here, hostile infantry moved forward, which did not become more aware of us, because we stood in master holes, or behind trunks.

The wonder of the internet.
Simples.

Hello McLaddie (Bill)

My criteria for the collapse is a little more basic and for the most part appears not to have been mentioned.

1. The French army is an extremely well trained veteran army using modern tactics and is well prepared for battle.

2. The Prussian army is basically untested with fewer veterans and not really prepared for battle.

3. In the twin battles the defenders generally are holding the high ground flanked with some good defensive terrain in places.

4. In both battles the attackers didn't always take full advantage of their superior numbers.

5. The French pursuit was a military classic, never allowing the Prussians to consolidate.

I realize there are a lot of other factors (pretty much all mentioned by you) at play, but I think these are the big five. If these could have been changed then the outcome might have been different.

Bill, what do you think? Did I nail it or is something else big missing, and I don't mean wooden blocks?

Best regards,

Glenn

Curt Jany

Obtaining out of print books is no problem would just like some information on there titles as I would like to read one or two of them. Of course if you do not wish to disclose this I perfectly understand.

Na gut. Zum Beispiel:

link

Bart,

Forgive them for they know not what they do.

Big Al

lol, good cop, bad cop routine eh?

So let me get this straight, because I do not agree with Stephen Summerfield and have an opinion you feel it is fine to insult and ridicule me on a public forum???

That really shows your immaturity, ignorance and a distinct lack of tolerance of other peoples rights to express themselves.

lol, you two should go on the road with this double act.

I am only sorry this thread, which up until now had been a very good and informative thread has been ruined by your intolerance of opinion and inability to discuss a topic without getting personal and insulting, I do pity you.

The most sincerest and kind regards
Shane

Ah, the red herring bus "Tarnich the Glory" out of Norwich is at sea. I don't see Cap'n Huff 'n Puff, but I see the first mate – Mini-Me-2, the Stouch brothers and the Wingers.

Any second now they will deploy their nets to dig into the bottom muck.

Sad really. <:^{

Lions and Tigers and Bears, OH My!

Big Al

boring mate, you need new material.

Dr. Summerfield,

"I do not know of many fully trained French staff officers at Army Level"

Would any of these three officers strike you as a good candidate ?

Le général de division comte Augustin-Daniel Belliard (1769 – 1832) was available for the Cent Jours – but was sent to command in the Moselle.
Le général de division Joseph-Augustin Fournier de Loysonville, marquis d'Aultane (dit "Daultane", 1759 – 1828) was also available – but was cashiered, nominally for having served under the first restoration, but more likely for having been a friend of Moreau.
Le général de division comte Armand-Charles Guilleminot (1774 – 1840) was usefully employed shepherding prince Jérôme during the Cent Jours – but might have been even more useful at the état-major général.

---------------------------------

Generallieutenant v. Quistorp,

"nobody in their right mind takes anything written by Paret seriously"

I have thought much the same – thank you for having the boldness to make the comment.

----------------------------------

V. Winterfeldt,

Auch ….
"Wer anderen eine Grube gräbt, fällt selbst hinein."
Nich wahr?

Chuvak

P.S. Can someone make WorldCat actually work and tell me which libraries or internet archives hold our "colleague's" book :
Die Kaiserlich Russisch-Deutsche Legion: ein Beitrag zur Preußischen Armee-Geschichte
Berlin : Heymann, 1860.
(A Russian, English or French edition would be fine also.)

I thought we had left all this childish name calling and accusations of insanity stuff behind? Or at least the idiots that had once propagated it on this forum had left.

@Chuvak

Eher – Einbildung ist auch eine Bildung

Joke aside, about trained staff officers, what is with Thiebault – wasn't he also available or did he stick with the Bourbons?

As for Quistorps Die Kaiserliche Russisch – Deutsche Legion, Berlin 1860, I am sure that Steve will come up with a library.
Quistorp was then Hauptmann im Königlich Preußischen 31. Infanterie Regiment.

Curt Jany,

Didn't realise your advanced years what with a book published in 1928!! Must take this into account when reading your messages at your age I am sure the mind must play tricks with you.

Wagram

ahh, the childishness continues

/yawn

Dear Chuvak
Thank you for pointing out a number of French staff officers but were they trained to the same extent as the Prussian General Staff or was this on the job training.

All I was trying to point out was a difference. The position and responsibility of the Chief of Staff in Prussia and the other states were different at this time. Our esteemed colleague pointed out that Berthier was just a clerk who took the orders dictated to him by Napoleon. I think he was slightly more than that.

Upon another matter, I was trying to point out that Prussian infantry was expected to fight in close order and when necessary in open order when necessary despite their designation. There are many occurences of Landwehr, Grenadiers and Musketeers doing so [See Summerfield (2009) Volume 2]. It was unfortunate shorthand that if people had read my books may have understood.

Infantry in the 1860s onwards fought in open rather than close order in the main due to the increased ability of small arms and rifling.

Stephen

As much as I know I am going to cop yet more abuse from the twins I feel the need to say this.

Stephen wrote:

It was unfortunate shorthand that if people had read my books may have understood.

Stephen, as much as I do respect you and the work you have done I will also admit I do not have any of your books yet so I cannot comment on their content. However, the world of Napoleonic knowledge did not begin with your first words in wet ink put down on paper…

There have been a mass of books and information over the years indicating that during the Napoleonic period it was not only trained light infantry that were ordered into extended or open order. I have read countless books that mention Grenadiers, Fusiliers, Musketeers, and so on operating in skirmish order. Please understand that we are not so ignorant as you might believe. Hell, even the Old Guard Grenadiers ran around in skirmish order from time to time.

regards,
Shane

Dear Dr. Summerfield,

"Thank you for pointing out a number of French staff officers but were they trained to the same extent as the Prussian General Staff"

Frankly, I do not know enough to answer – and hoped that you would offer a more informed opinion. The three French officers were listed because :
- they had performed the chef d'état-major function for large formations
- they performed in this role with merit and succes
- they enjoyed good relations with the marshalate, or at least had no marked antagonisms
- they were available for the Cent Jours

Chuvak

Dear Wagram -

Since my death, my productivity has decreased considerably, but I assure you that my mind is as sharp as ever.

mit wissenschaftlichen Grüße,

Curt Jany (gestorben)

Dear Chuvak
It is a discussion and I do not know the answer as hopefully I made clear. This difficulty as you know well is the nationalistic retoric especially when dealing with comparison of French and German subjects. These I have been unable to reconcile.

This brings us back to the reason for Soult being chosen as Cheif of Staff to Napoleon as you point out that there were better candidates to choose from.

Napoleon performed as well as he did despite the French Staff system. It was his ability. The Prussian General Staff was created to rely upon the strengths of two men that was considered better than one man.

It was the way the discussion was going that made me link and consider a comparison as I did.

Stephen

Dear Dr. Summerfield,

"This difficulty as you know well is the nationalistic retoric"

So very – and sadly – true.

The absence of this "difficulty" in your own works is as refreshing as your excellent research and dedication to accurate use of (usually contemporary) source materials.

Chuvak

Dear Chuvak
Thank you. Certainly it will be interesting to look into this further as it has intrigued me. Alas it is very subjective. I do not know of any formal staff training by the French. The Prussians instigated this in about 1803 and more formally in 1808.

Stephen

'The universal infantryman is a concept where he could fight just as well in close as open order as you know very well.'

Some Prussians undoubtedly could and the 42,000-man Prussian Army in 1813 was very well-trained. But with heavy casualties in the two spring battles replacements and landwehr drafted into the ranks did not have the same quality. Further, there was a realistic difference between the Prussian line and the different specialty troops in the army.

'The Prussian General Staff system combined the abilities to produce an efficient whole.'

Not during the Napoleonic period it didn't. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were laboring manfully to get the Prussian army brought up to date to be able to fight the French on something like even terms. The general staff was still in the embryonic stage from 1807-1815 and wouldn't grow up until the 1840s-1850s at the earliest. You really should check Gorlitz and Craig, as well as White at a minimum. Your ideas on the Prussian staff are incorrect at best.

'Blucher was an inspiration leader but it took Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to work out the details and orders.'

That is very similar to Napoleon's relationship with Berthier and the purpose of a staff in the first place. In fact, many of the Prussian general staff procedures are taken from the French model and Berthier as Scharnhorst had urged prior to 1806 (see White).

'Berthier's ability to comprehend the mind of Napoleon was remarkable. Alas Soult failed in 1815 and was in this position due to Berthier's defenistration.'

Berthier was not thrown out of a window. Some scholars believe that he committed suicide or that he fell by accident. I doubt that he threw himself out of a window either, as that was not part of his character and he had a young family to provide for. He probably accidentally fell.

Napoleon wanted a tough senior marshal as chief of staff and major general of Nord. Soult definitely was that. But he was also widely disliked and had only understudied Berthier briefly in 1813 before he was sent back to Spain to delay Wellington. The staff he assembled would have given Berthier apoplexy and did make Bailly de Monthion disgusted. He would have been the logical choice as he had replaced Berthier in 1813 and 1814 when the latter was ill and knew how to run a staff and be an army-level chief of staff.

'The staff work and the maps used by the French when you go outside that of Napoleon was as poor as the Coalition Allies.'

I don't agree. The French topographical engineers were first-rate and chiefs of staff during the Empire were carefully chosen and had to be compatible with their commanders. Do you know of any major staff muddlings or malfunctions during the period with which to illustrate your point?

'The Prussian General Staff system regularised the position of the Chief of Staff and his assistance.'

The French did this at least as early as 1795 when Berthier was chief of staff of the Armee des Alpes and he wrote his staff instructions dividing the staff into sections, each headed by an adjutant-general (later to be ranamed adjutants-commandants). These instructions were probably derived from the old Royal Staff Corps instructions on which Berthier probably worked. Bourcet 'from whom all modern staff functioning derives' established a French staff college in 1764, but that was later abolished as a cost-saving measure by the Minister of War. However, by a law passed by the national assembly on 29 October 1790 a staff corps was created which consisted of thirty staff officers, seventeen having the rank of colonel, and thirteen with the rank of lieutenant colonel. These were the new adjutants-general.

As stated by Thiebault in his 1800 staff manual, A general Etat-major is, as we have already observed, the central point of the grand operations of armies.

Berthier believed the chief of staff to be the central point for the headquarters, 'the headquarters pivot.' He needed to either see or sign everything that comes in and goes out of the headquarters. The staff itself had no set hours, as it is there to serve the commander and the good of the army as a whole. When work was finished, the staff could then rest. Above all, the commander should always be told the truth, no matter how unpleasant, and whatever the consequences. Something akin to the modern military maxim, 'bad news does not age well.'

'This is what modern systems were based upon.'

No, it isn't, at least for the United States, Great Britain, France and NATO. The current German General Staff, which is still in existence, now used the US organization. The staff model, especially for the duties and responsibilities of a chief of staff and for staff organization and functioning has Berthier and his staff for its model, as did the Prussian General Staff.

'It is interesting that the Prussian General Staff was victorious 1813-15 and each of the Armies were stongly influenced by them for strategy.'

Staffs are not victorious, armies are. The Prussian general staff was not only not responsible for the allied victory in 1813-1815, but was subordinate in the field to Schwarzenberg's Austrian general staff where the actual allied planning occurred.

And in the first paragraph of the English translation in 1801 of Thiebault's 1800 staff manual is the statement 'The great advantages which must manifestly result from a well-conducted etat-major or staff, are acknowledged in every country. France, however, seems alone to have entered fully into the system, and to have added the experiment of practice to the suggestion of theory.'

'Wars won by the Prussian General Staff
– 1813-14
– 1815 100 Days
– 1848-51 First Schleswig War
– 1866 Austro-Prussian
– 1870 Franco-Prussian
– 1914 almost succeeded and failed as the original plan was diverted from the objective
– 1915 Galipolee
– 1916 Tannebaun and the destruction of the Russian Army
– 1918 USA finally has troops upon the Western Front and the tide turns. Armistice signed but no invasion of Germany and hence the impression of many nationalists that Germany was not defeated but betrayed.
– 1935 (Alsace and the Ruhr)
– 1936 (Sudatenland),
– 1938 (Austria)
– 1939 (Poland)
– 1940 (Norway)
– 1940 France and the Low Countries
– 1941 Russia until political interference of Hitler.
– 1942-5 Failure due to the remarkable recovery of Russia and the declaration of war on USA. Germany was out produced in arnaments. The production war was lost. The Battle of the Bulge was a brilliant and futile stroke.'

1813-14: Prussia was part of a coalition and the Prussian army did not fight in it as a single entity. The major planning for the campaigns after Austria entered the war was done by the Austrian general staff under Schwarzenberg.

1815 100 Days: Prussian staff operations during this campaign were terrible. As stated in the Esposito/Elting Atlas remarking on Gneisenau is noteworthy: …his staff operations during the Waterloo campaign would have horrified contemporary US militia officers.' This is obviously, at least partially, in view of his attempting to lead the pursuit after Waterloo which was not as effective as Prussian/German legend would have it (chiefs of staff don't lead pursuits and get out of touch with their headquarters and commander). However, after Ligny and Blucher being incapacitated, Gneisenau did make the key strategic decision of the campaign-to retreat on Wavre instead of eastward.

Further, the Prussians were not the governing headquarters for the allies, Schwarzenberg's again were as he was allied CINC. So this was not a Prussian win, just as 1813-1814 was not, but an allied win.

1848-51 First Schleswig War: win
1866 Austro-Prussian: win
1870 Franco-Prussian: win

1914 almost succeeded and failed as the original plan was diverted from the objective:

'Almost' only counts in horseshoes, hand grenades, and nuclear weapons. The German failure in 1914 was a staff failure and hence an operational one. And 1914 wasn't a war, merely one campaign. Also it is part of War I-loss.
1915 Galipolee: War I-loss
1916 Tannebaun and the destruction of the Russian Army: War I-loss
1918 USA finally has troops upon the Western Front and the tide turns. Armistice signed but no invasion of Germany and hence the impression of many nationalists that Germany was not defeated but betrayed.: War I-loss.

1935 (Alsace and the Ruhr)
1936 (Sudatenland),
1938 (Austria)

The above three are not a war, but occupations of a neutral country, a coup if you like, but it wasn't war.

1939 (Poland): War II-loss
1940 (Norway): War II-loss
1940 France and the Low Countries: War II-loss
1941 Russia until political interference of Hitler.:War II-loss.
1942-5 'Failure due to the remarkable recovery of Russia and the declaration of war on USA. Germany was out produced in arnaments. The production war was lost.'

That's an oversimplification. The Germans began the war without being on a war footing, and that included the economy. The German army and air force were designed for short, violent wars and the staff and national government fought a two-front prolonged war as they did in War I. It was badly planned and badly managed. Further, the nation as a whole was destroyed and partitioned.

'The Battle of the Bulge was a brilliant and futile stroke': it was planned well, but executed badly, being held up too long by Bastogne and its garrison. Patton's relief of Bastogne signalled defeat for the Germans.

'That is am impressive list of successes. Only WWI and WWII was Prussia/Germany defeated. The system could be argued not to have failed but the circumstances over not having the resources to carry on.'

No, it isn't. You've listed events that weren't wars, listed campaigns as wars, and gave the Prussians credit for winning wars of which they were only partners in the coalition and their general staff was not the CINC's staff and was not responsible for the overall planning.

World Wars I and II were national disasters for Germany. The first led to depression, bankruptcy and Naziism and Hitler as well as the Holocaust. Further, the German officer corps disgraced itself by the Fuhrer oath in 1935. World War II led to the destruction and partition of the German state and if it wasn't for the United States and the establishment of NATO Germany would have disappeared from the map and may have gone completely communist.

A friend of mine told me in the 1999 Soccer World Cup when Germany defeated England, some of the German players were taunting the English players stating they had just beaten them in their national sport. One of the English players retorted that was OK-'we beat you in your national sport twice in this century.' I thought it appropriate and a great response. There was no reply from the German team.

Prussia won three small wars on their own under Bismark and then became Germany. As Germany they have never won a war. That is not a very good record at all.

Sincerely,
K

Self defenestration – a good use; also includes falling out a window. Sorry for being pedantic. <;^}

What does all of the post-period material have to do with the topic? Red herrings? <:^{