"Prussia 1806-Reasons for the Collapse" Topic

Shane, there's a good discussion going on, and the one poster doing more than anyone to make it personal is, well, yourself. Okay, there's Wagram's concern about reenactor membership, but I figure that's some old animosity…

Shane:
Yes, I can see how my comments might be taken that way. And I certainly will make clear that I don't consider Kevin blind in any respect and certainly apologize to Kevin for any offense given. Not my intention. I am pretty blatant when I mean to give offense…

Now, if Kevin will just realize that I am not suggesting any equality between Prussian and French tactics, that I accept whole-heartedly that the French were superior in every way, but feel neither 'explains' how they won or what the Prussians actually did in response--all will be well.

Shane, when did you reform?

Bill

Mike,

I don't agree with Lynn's comment/conclusion that "All the major elements of the infantry tactics associated with Napoleon had emerged along the Belgian border by 1794." The reason being that French commanders modified their tactics depending on where they were fighting. Those in the Low Countries would fight differently, for example than those in Germany or northern Italy based on, for example, the terrain. All of these different experiences would later be incorporated into what the Grande Armee had in their tactical 'menu' so to speak.

That being said, there is a lot to learn from Lynn's work and it is excellent.

Here's some material from White's book, some written by Chuck and some of it quoted from Scharnhorst. Chuck is a bonafide Scharnhorst and Prussian scholar and is well worth reading and listening to.

'Exceptional political and military leadership, unrivaled troop enthusiasm, greater strategic and operational mobility, and a more flexible tactical doctrine were all by-products of the Revolution and had by 1801 guaranteed the primacy of the French army. Scharnhorst in particular saw the French experience as truly revolutionary, the wave of the future.' page 56

'From their brief experience fighting the French between 1792 and 1795, a few members of the Militarische Gesellschaft were convinced that they had confronted something new and unique in the history of warfare. What had captured their attention was the French use of light infantry. Tirailleur (skirmisher) tactics had impressed Knesebeck…During six engagements Knesebeck had seen the French deploying ''their entire infantry'' as light troops, ''and with decided superiority,'' referring to the skill of the French and not their numbers.' Page 58

'Probably never before has a greater number of light troops appeared on the battlefeild than among the ranks of the present French army, nor has military history ever been given more irrefutable examples of the essential value of such troops than during this war.'-Scharnhorst, page 59

'Scharnhorst rejected the notion held by many Allied officers that the Jager adn fusilier in the German forces 'had always done the work of the French tirailleurs.'' page 62

'Although he greatly admired Frederick, Scharnhorst understood that without changes in organization and administration, tactics and strategy, discipline and training, Prussia could never counter the French threat.'
page 64

Basically, Scharnhorst believed that the Prussian army had to change and adopt French methods which had grown from the reform movement after the Seven Years War and was employed from 1792 onwards, tactically, organizationally, doctrinally, and administratively. French tactics were new and innovative, they had the new divisional system which would be changed into the corps system in 1800 and the divisions changed from those of all arms to homogenous divisions of infantry and cavalry each with their supporting artillery. The French staff system was the most advanced of its day and the Prussians learned that lesson as well. The Prussian reform movement after 1807 was on a somewhat lesser scale than that of the French and less was done overall, but it was a great improvement over what was reality in 1806.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Bill,

Again, my lengthy response was not in reply to you but to VW who insists that it was Prussian generalship that was the reason for the Prussian loss in 1806 when in reality it was a combination of bad generalship, inferior tactics, doctrine, organization, and administration.

The examples I used were very specific showing the Prussian tactical methods against what the French were doing. The Prussians did fight in the open in linear formations firing volleys at the French who were employing different tactical formations to fit the situation. The Prussians didn't do that. It is interesting that the Prussians employed skirmishers, but they were employed as light troops independent of the line infantry in formation and not coordinated. They were fewer in number than the French and did not operate in conjunction with troops in formation as the French did. What the Prussian 'skirmishers' may have accomplished was a rope of sand as it wasn't permanent as they were not supported by formed troops and artillery for any lasting gains. The French used both line and light infnatry as tirailleurs in open order and whole regiments advanced as tiraiilleurs as shown.

I do believe we are talking apples and oranges and not coming up with two pieces of fruit.

Sincerely,
K

nvr,

If you are trying to say that Shane is doing something wrong here, that is not the case. Why don't you offer something constructive to the discussion?

Sincerely,
K

thanks Kevin,

It seems this guy only ever jumps in on a thread to expound his own unique relationship building skills but fails to add anything lasting to the conversations discussed.

/shrug I don't mind

The examples I used were very specific showing the Prussian tactical methods against what the French were doing.

Kevin:
That was my point. You were showing very specific tactical methods, basically one, volley fire, which while very real, didn't describe what tactical methods the Prussians were applying. It is like being very specific and saying a boxer had limited tactical responses because he used a left jab. If that was all he used, or if he insisted on using it regardless of the opponent's actions, I might agree with you. That just isn't the case.

The Prussians did fight in the open in linear formations firing volleys at the French who were employing different tactical formations to fit the situation. The Prussians didn't do that.

Yes, they did. I agree. They certainly didn't use columns. Of course, where else would you fight with linear formations, but in the open? If that was proof of tactical rigidity or lack of combat flexibility, what do you do with the British responding the same way while the French employed those same tactical formations? Linear formations isn't proof of backwardness if the British win with the same tactics on the attack and defense--in the open.

It is interesting that the Prussians employed skirmishers, but they were employed as light troops independent of the line infantry in formation and not coordinated. They were fewer in number than the French and did not operate in conjunction with troops in formation as the French did.

They certainly did use them independent of the line infantry in formation--in villages and woods.

So did the French…If the Prussians deployed fewer skirmishers, it is because the Prussians were outnumbered 2-1 in every instance. Another example of French tactical ability. However, percentage wise, from what I can determine, the Prussians deployed a full 25% of all their infantry as skirmishers during Jena, and that is about the percentage the French deployed--only numerically, it comes to twice as many skirmishers as the Prussians. The French certainly could have deployed more, but they didn't need to.

What the Prussian 'skirmishers' may have accomplished was a rope of sand as it wasn't permanent as they were not supported by formed troops and artillery for any lasting gains.

Kevin, I think that is stretching imagery quite a bit. Point of fact, none of the Prussian accomplishments were 'permanent' and as they lost, I have no idea how they could have been--only the victor's accomplishments have much permanency.

Even so, there were a number of French accomplishments that lacked permanency such as Ney's drive around the Altenburg, Lannes offensive with the 100th and 103rd regiments and the first French capture of Issertadt and the forest. There was a lot of rope and a lot of sand, and it was a shared experience. Such is the nature of battle.

The French used both line and light infantry as tirailleurs in open order and whole regiments advanced as tiraiilleurs as shown.

Where did whole French regiments [all the regiment's battalions] advance as Tirailleurs at Jena or Auerstadt? From your phrasing, it sounds like the entire regiment is deployed as skirmishers at the same time with the same objectives. Certainly any number of battalions were deployed in Isserstadt forest, Vier-h-lien, and inbetween.

For instance, one battalion of the 16 Legere deployed in the forest as tirailleurs, while the other two battalions attacked Prussian batteries, their columns dissolving into skirmishers at they charged. Took the guns too. But the 16th didn't deploy as skirmishers at the same place at the same time pursuing the same objectives. The only other example is the French troops deployed in Vier-h-lien. Is that what you are speaking of? They weren't advancing…

Or do you mean the numbers deployed and not formations?

For instance, Stanitz deploys the third rank of his brigade as skirmishers, that is a whole battalion or 1/3 of his brigade.

The vast majority of French skirmishers were deployed in the woods and forests, as were the Prussian skirmishers. Prussian skirmishers were also deployed in the open before formed troops, between Closewitz and Luzeroda in the morning, and before Vier-h-lien and the line between Issertadt and the Altenburg Woods after 10:30.

The Prussians didn't do all that well, but they did do it, partly because they didn't have the numbers--the French deployed far more of better quality. When the Prussians did deploy equal numbers, they did much better against French tirailleurs.

What you see is the Prussians/Saxons valiantly try to match the French numbers. For instance, at the end of the battle, when the center of the Prussian line was breached, and the Hohenlohe regiment's flank turned, the regiment held off the tirailleurs and columns with volley fire for quite a while, according to the colonel. However, the regiment also deployed two flank companies as skirmishers around the same time. This is after deploying their schutzen and several groups of volunteers previously to help clear out the Altenburg Woods to their front--easily 25% of their total strength.

The French light infantry did do things you don't see the Prussians doing. For instance, the French used the artillery gun line as shelter when threatened by Prussian cavalry, drawing them in, then advancing again when the cavalry retreated.

There is a difference between failing at something and not doing it at all. The Prussian skirmish infantry failed at a number of things the French succeeded at, but the Prussians still did the same things in a number of cases. Deploying in the open to protect formed troops is one of those things.
The Colonel of the Hohenlohe Regiment:

"The skirmishers of the regiment spurred on by those officers commanding them stopped the enemy light troops from advancing for a very long time although they were better protected everywhere by terrain which was most advantageous to them."

Outclassed, but still out in the open screening the regiment. [does that count as 'coordination'?] The colonel says that he never saw the captain of the Schutzen again after he sent him out, though volunteers were sent out several times to reinforce the Schutzen.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Kevin,

Thanks for checking that for me…

So there`s nothing in Mr. White`s book to indicate an influence on Scharnhorst of the full, tactical repetoire of the French armies of 1792-4… in all the combinations of formed troops; in columns of any sort, or deployed lines in conjunction with skirmishers in any of the theatres involved).
His remarks only refer to the use of skirmishers. There was no reaction to "a system" as such and no suggestion either as to how it may be applied in a reformed Prussian army.

Regards,

Mike.

Hey all:

Happy Collapse Day!

The 203rd anniversary of Jena and Auerstadt.

It could be interesting to list all the tactics used by the French and Prussians to get an idea of how they compare…

… catching up with this thread

Shane, the reason why Davout was able to " form oblique square so quickly " (page 3 of the thread) was not due to Eqypt.

It was due to training his corp to form this manoever repeatedly prior to the invasion.

They anticipated the Prussian cavalry doing a blucher, hardly surprising since the Prussians had the best horses in Europe.

This training was conducted by division, in the field, with the guns.

It is another example of the sort of cooperation and drill which the Prussians did not undertake, and which the French could easily do due to the semi permanent corp orgnaisation (and a bit of forward planning).

Just a follow-up:

Paret's book, The Cognitive Challenge of War, Prussia 1806 is four chapters long, 143 pages of text. The entire work is double-spaced.

The chapters are:
1. Two Battles: A general overview of the 1806 campaign and the Battles of Jena and Auerstadt.
2. Violence in Words and Images An interesting examination of artistic expressions of the Prussian loss in the years following 1806 and what it says about the social impact of the Prussian Catastrophe.
3. Responses and Reforms: This chapter looks at the Prussian political and social responses to the disaster and its effects on Army reforms.
4. The Conquest of Reality by Theory This is an examination of Clauswitz and Jomini's Theories of war, showing how their separate experiences shaped their theories, the 1806 disaster shaping Clauswitz's and what that says about Prussian 19th Century society and by extension, the development of the Prussian army up to WWI.

If you are interested in the social aspects of the Prussian defeat and particularly art, Clauswitz and Jomini in comparision, then you will find this book worthwhile.

However, if you are interested from a solely military history standpoint and its application to wargames, there isn't much there.

Even Paret's Marmon Memorial Lectures #8 "Innovation and Reform in Warfare" offers more pertinent information. It's only 14 pages of densely packed details.

I can recommend another new Book, Colonel Vachee's Napoleon & the Campaign of 1806

If you want to know what Napoleon did hour by hour before and during the Battle of Jena, in comparison to other battles and campaigns, this is the book. Vachee even notes the changes in Napoleon's command style and practices as he grows older. It is available in paperback from Amazon and other booksellers.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Also available as:

Vachée, Jean-Baptiste-Modeste-Eugène, Colonel; Lees, George Frederic William, 1872-, translator. Napoleon at work (1914):

link
link

Hurrah! Nice one Steven… especially as its on Internet Archive and downloadable for us in the UK !

"downloadable … in the UK"

Hmmmm … this service (used by many journalists, dissidents, etc.) has many volunteers in the USA -

torproject.org/index.html.en

Frayer

Bill,

Whether or not Paret's book is all you would like it to be he does list the reasons for the Prussian defeat and covers it quite well. It's another arrow in the quiver.

Regarding Vachee's work, which has been in print at least since 1995. I would take it with a grain of salt regarding the staff operations and Berthier's role as chief of staff. Vachee downplays Berthier's and the staff's contributions to Napoleon's methods of waging war to the point of irrelevance, which is grossly inaccurate. Vachee's book is more her0-worship of Napoleon than historical inquiry and fact-finding. It is far from the best work on 1806 from the French perspective.

Without Berthier and the French general staff Napoleon could not have functioned as he did. It was the best staff organization of the period and Berthier is definitely the premier chief of staff of any army of the period. Staff planning and execution did take place to a great extent with the French general staff-Napoleon definitely did not do it all himself.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin wrote:

Whether or not Paret's book is all you would like it to be he does list the reasons for the Prussian defeat and covers it quite well. It's another arrow in the quiver.

Kevin:
I wasn't criticizing Paret's Book or stating whether I liked it. [I found some of his discussion of the post-Jena art and his Clauswitz/Jomini comparisons fascinating]. I only stated what the book was about, very much focused on the social aspects of the Reforms, and most content not directly applicable to what wargamers generally look for in Military history. What information was applicable is available other places in more detail.

However, I did find a four chapter book with double-spaced wording for $22.00 USD a bit cheezy. With normal printing the book would have probably come to no more than 70 to 80 pages--WITH all the pictures.

As for Paret's list of the 'reasons for the Prussian defeat', he simply repeats his previous conclusions detailed in his books "Yorck and Prussian Reform", "Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times" and the Marmon Memorial Lectures #8 "Innovation and Reform in Warfare." The latter another thin book printed hardcover and sold for an outlandish sum.

So Paret's reasons are more like the same arrow being placed once more in the quiver, rather than a new one… repetition hardly makes for stronger arguments.

As for Vachee's book. Yes, I know it has been out for quite a while--what, 1912? I should have defined what I meant by 'new'. This is the first edition I have ever seen available in paperback--and far cheaper. But of course, when you can get it free, a la Stephen's find, that's even better.

I can see why Vachee might have downplayed Berthier's and the general staff's role in the process. He may [and I say 'may' advisedly] have 'downplayed' Berthier's and the General Staff's role inadvertently because he was focused on Napoleon's actions.

But assuming that all you say is true about Vachee's hero-worship of the Great Man [Of course, he's the only author to fall prey to that, right? ;-j], I found his descriptions of how Napoleon spent his time, particularly compared to later campaigns intriguing, and he provided a number of comparisons to other commanders like Brunswick, Hohenlohe and the Prussian King [their staffs are ignored too…], which can certainly be useful information for wargamers.

Kevin, do you know of any works that would provide the details on how Berthier and the General Staff operated during the 1806 campaign?

Best Regards,
Bill H.

Bill,

There is an excellent outline of how Berthier and the general staff operated in Chapter V of Swords Around A Throne. Chapter IV is also helpful. Van Creveld's Command in War is also a good reference, though the author sometimes confuses French and German military terms of the period.

If you can find a copy, I would highly recommend Thiebault's Manuel des Adjudans Generaux et des Adjounts employes dans les Etats-Majors Divisionnaires des Armee, Paris 1800 which was translated into English in 1801 as An Explanation of the Duties of the several Etats-Majors in the French Army. There is also the updated and expanded manual also by Thiebault published in 1813 and available on Google Books.

One of the interesting things I found in the 1800 manual was that while the French had no official 'staff corps' during the period, they actually had a law establishing the adjutants-general (later renamed adjutants0commandant) passed during the Revolution. So, no school to train them except in their staff functioning area, but a staff corps nonetheless.

Sincerely,
K

Parets arrow is not hitting, he missed some vital research not reading Gefechtsformen and by that complelty misunderstanding the Prussian battle field tactics.

As to Vachée – I don't know why he should downplay Berthier, who according to his own words was nothing else than a chief clerk anymore (contrasting to his performance in the first Italien campaign).

The with Bernadotte finally resulted in victimizing Bernadotte as cover up of a forgotten corps.

As for 1806, Foucart, he you can see the day to day amount of work and the problems of criss crossing orders.

Du service des armées en campagne par le vicomte de Préval, lieutenant-général des armée du Roi, membre du conseil supérieur de la guerre, in the Journal des sciences militaires, Volume 11 (1828), p 40-84, 353-383:

link

Note: This issue has lots of other goodies in it!

'I don't know why he should downplay Berthier, who according to his own words was nothing else than a chief clerk anymore (contrasting to his performance in the first Italien campaign).'

Berthier never referred to himself as a 'chief clerk.' That denigration came from Jomini who never missed an opportunity to criticize Berthier, especially after the latter's death. This was from a man who was never a soldier, was a failure as a chief of staff, failed as a military governor in Russia in 1812, and was a renegade to boot.

Berthier was the best chief of staff of the period. It was he who designed and operated the staffs that were employed and organized in the French armies of the period. He was also talented enough to be both the Major General and chief of staff of the Grande Armee from 1800-1807 as well as the Minister or War. An immensely talented soldier, it was he who organized the movement of the Grande Armee from the channel to Germany in 1805 and planned and organized the immense concentration before the invasion of Russia. It was also he who saved the wreck of the Grande Armee in Russia after Murat deserted and he convinced Eugene to take command. While he may not have been Napoleon's full 'partner' in planning, he was in running the Grande Armee and much of his work in staff planning and organization is still used today. Much of what he did was copied by the Prussians for their embryonic general staff in 1807-1815. Berthier was definitely superior as a chief of staff to either Scharnhorst or Gneisenau.

'The with Bernadotte finally resulted in victimizing Bernadotte as cover up of a forgotten corps.'

Bernadotte failed to get into action on either battlefield on 14 October 1806. Davout had given him copies of Napleon's orders and Bernadotte chose to ignore them and went his own way, knowing he was leaving Davout on his own to perhaps fight outnumbered on the 14th. That was not only failure on his part, but it was treachery of great magnitude. 21st century hindsight and nonsensical excuses don't help the historical situation any, and Davout blamed Bernadotte for not supporting him in any way. Bernadotte accomplished nothing on 14 October and did not obey Napoleon's orders, Foucart or no Foucart. For a soldier it was dishonorable and Bernadotte is lucky that Davout, or one of his division commanders, didn't shoot him themselves.

Sincerely,
K

Oh, NOOOOOO, not the Bernadotte script being troted out again!!!

PLEASE go back and re-read the mountains of evidence that has been presented to you, here and elsewhere, that refutes your incorrect interpretation of the facts.

Big Al

Such were Berthier's orders.
He kept strictly to them, to a blind faith in the
Emperor, and refrained from all ideas of his own.
He despatched the orders. Chief of the Staff, despatching
the Emperor's orders, such was his title and his
duty.
Vachée, page 24

'Such were Berthier's orders.
He kept strictly to them, to a blind faith in the
Emperor, and refrained from all ideas of his own.
He despatched the orders. Chief of the Staff, despatching
the Emperor's orders, such was his title and his
duty.'

And that is why I would not recommend Vachee's work with these type of generalized and inaccurate statements.

Sincerely,
K

'PLEASE go back and re-read the mountains of evidence that has been presented to you, here and elsewhere, that refutes your incorrect interpretation of the facts.'

And what about the evidence that supports it? Bernadotte's actions cannot be excused or supported. He did nothing to contribute to the French effort on 14 October and violated his orders. It's as simple as that. And I didn't bring this up in this thread-VW did.

Sincerely,
K

"Bernadotte's actions cannot be excused or supported. He did nothing to contribute to the French effort on 14 October and violated his orders."

Again, you are incorrect. It's as simple as that.

Big Al

so Bernadotte is wrongfully accused of dragging his feet? In reality it was all Napoleon's fault for forgetting about his corps?

So when Blucher suffered from the same problem in 1813 was it Schwarzenberg fault or was it Blucher's fault or was Bernadotte simply…..errr, dragging his feet once again???

ya gotta call a spade a spade sometimes, simply because, well, it is one.

Shane

You are also incorrect, mate. It's as simple as that.

Just like when you thought Hof lived in Liechtenstein.

[Y]a gotta call a spade a shovel sometimes, simply because, well, it is one.

Q. E. D.

In Gaishorn am See a municipality in the district of Liezen in Styria, Austria.

(…) c'est l'Empereur qui prépare et donne ses ordres d'Operations ; Berthier et son état-majr ne font que les transmettre; c'est leur tâche principlae; (…)

Berhtier n'est qu'un auxillaire, mais un auxilliare dévoué, connaissant la pensée de l'Empereur, habitué à la deviner.

P. 299

De Phillip : Le Serice D`'État-Major Pendant Les Guerres Du Premier Empire, re – print Paris 2002

Berthier was a hard worker, untiring and played a vital part as partner of the team – but he had no initiative – or intervered with decisions, for that Pelet and Jomini criticised him especially in the 1809 campaign.

'Berthier was a hard worker, untiring and played a vital part as partner of the team – but he had no initiative – or intervered with decisions, for that Pelet and Jomini criticised him especially in the 1809 campaign.'

Jomini is no one to pay attention to as he had made too many errors as a staff officer and was 'corrected' by Berthier more than once. In cold fact, Jomini was a failure as a staff officer and never really was a soldier.

For 1809 what is usually not understood is that Berthier was not the Commander of the Army of Germany. He was sent ahead by Napoleon as his chief of staff and Napoleon was the one at fault for the mess that followed in the early stages of the campaign. He sent contradictory messages, by both telegraph and post, and they did not arrive in sequence, thus causing the confusion. Berthier finally bluntly told Napoleon to get in theater, which he did. Luckily for both of them, Davout was paying attention and the Austrians moved slowly as usual.

Stating that Berthier had no initiative clearly demonstrates that Berthier has not been studied. Too much reliance by too many authors and historians has been given to Jomini's nonsense, when he had a personal score to settle with Berthier. If anyone doubts that Berthier lacked initiative, then read the correspondence between Napoleon and Berthier for the 1800 Marengo campaign when Berthier was the commander of the Army of the Reserve and was moving it across the Alps and into northern Italy. The letters are quite enlightening.

Here is what Ferdinand von Funck, the Saxon liaison officer, thought of Berthier:

'All the problems connected with the needs of the army and their transport…were thrown on him…The armies were scattered from Bayonne to the Bug, from Calabria to the Helder, and as far as Stralsund; they were shifting their positions incessantly, had to be supplied and directed, and the whole of it passed through [Berthier's} hands…He always was the clearing house through which all business was transacted…the infallible day book to which Napoleon was referring every minute of the day to make sure how his balance stood. For this reason he had to be in attendance on him on every battlefield, on reconnaissance, at every review…without fail on every study of terrain.

Here is a more recent assessment:

'Because he worked in the Emperor's shadow, Berthier's accomplishments seemed matters of routine. In 1800 he organized the Army of the Reserve and moved it across the St. Bernard Pass into Italy; in 1805 he planned the Grande Armee's march from the English Channel into Austria; in 1809 set up the assault crossing of the Danube before Wagram; and in 1812 handled the unprecedented concentration for the invasion of Russia…to the army and the world at large Berthier was a mixture of brusqueness and courtesy, never suffering fools gladly, but never insulting, and careful of his subordinates' self-respect. Always ready, properly uniformed, orderly in all things, he was a quiet example to a new, restless army of thoroughgoing individualists. His courage was beyond doubt, whether in rallying a broken column and ramming it home through keening Austrian musketry acorss Lodi bridge or, in 1812-just turned sixty, exhausted, and very sick-pulling the command of the retreating Grande Armee together after Murat deserted it. His position made him the handy but of both Napoleon's temper and the other marshals' anger, but neither of thise affected the even tenor of his work. His health finally failed toward the end of the 1812 campaign; he was ill during much of 1813 and 1814, but his work still was well done, his orders clearly written, his insistence on proper staff procedure unrelenting.'
-John Elting, Swords Around A Throne, pages 129-130.

After Waterloo Napoleon said of him: 'If Berthier had been there, I would not have met this misfortune.'

Berthier was the one marshal who was indispensable.

Sincerely,
K

You are again, incorrect. <:^{

Big Al

If you believe that to be the case, then merely act the marplot, but produce evidence to the contrary. I can prove my point, can you?

Sincerely,
K

"I can prove my point …."

Well, start doing it!

Big Al

ohh, so according to you Mr Smith, Bernadotte did nothing wrong in 1813?

What makes you such an authority to say he did not when history books tell us he did?

please, be my guest and enlighten us

If you believe that to be the case, then merely act the marplot, but produce evidence to the contrary. I can prove my point, can you?

Sincerely,

S

well Steve, please, prove your point, you often make rude return comments, huff and puff and blow off steam but never say anything of substance. So here's your chance to enlighten the masses as to your incredible infallible knowledge on history.

I am all ears matey

I just did! LOL

Big Al

c'mon Steve, fill the board with your intellectual prowess, show us why you are correct and all others are wrong.

I am still waiting…

C'mon Hof, stop messing with me. You are Hof, right? You live in Austria, right? C'mon Hof, I know it is you. Blow your cover and tell me it's you. C'mon Hof …….. C'mon.

<;^}

C'mon Steve, trying to avoid the question are we…

"After Waterloo Napoleon said of him: 'If Berthier had been there, I would not have met this misfortune.' "

Of course, everybody was to blame for his loss at Waterloo – either because they were present or because they were not present – that is, other than number one.

Big Al

Steve,

Who is Hof?

Wagram

Wags,

Peter Hofschröer.

Some here try to spot him posting and then turn him in so Bill will block him from posting.

Big Al

Wags,

Please note: I use 'Big Al' on this forum so no one will know my real name. You are kind of blowing it for me.

Big Al

c'mon Steve, your avoiding the question again…

'Of course, everybody was to blame for his loss at Waterloo – either because they were present or because they were not present – that is, other than number one.'

Napoleon isn't blaming Berthier for not being present at Waterloo, but regretting that he wasn't there. By the time Waterloo was fought, Berthier was unfortunately dead.

As for blame, Napoleon also blamed himself for the defeat in Belgium, stating that no one, including himself, did their duty that day.

Sincerely,
K

"… stating that no one, including himself, did their duty that day."

Now THAT IS really lame! Like the Powder River, a mile wide and NO depth. Q. E. D.

Like I said, "Of course, everybody was to blame for his loss at Waterloo – either because they were present or because they were not present – that is, other than number one."

Big Al

c'mon Steve, your really good at huffing and puffing but your words, other than being often spiteful, lack any substance and depth.

Give us your reasoning, please impart your wisdom and knowledge and prove me wrong…

I doubt that Berthier would have been of any great help, his health was run down, he was unfit for service, he tried to get an honourable discharge by the king, to whom he stayed loyal in 1815, and to add, he had no interest to serve again along with Napoleon.

Steve

Or should I say Big Al, many thanks for the info will know better when I post a message. It gets very complicated we have a Big Al your good self and Hans-Karl who goes under the name of von Winterfeldt, Kevin who is 10th Marines most confusing.

Wagram ?