"Prussia 1806-Reasons for the Collapse" Topic

Oli said: 'To play down the defeat of the Prussian Army by the absence of skirmishers or linear warfare is much too simple.'
Kevin's reply: No one is doing that. The only person that keeps bringing that up is you.'

Oliver didn't say that-VW did. Therefore, my reply was to VW, not to Oliver.

'Kevin, that's just not true. Every time the subject of 1806 comes up the same old tired, incorrect example of Grawert's division getting shot to pieces while standing immobile gets trotted out by you, Kevin. How many times has it been refuted, by how many different people, now? Yet you keep posting it on every new discussion about 1806. Why?'

If you have access to Bressonet you will find that he said the same about Grawert and also about Ruchel. So, I'm not incorrect, you are in this instance. Just because someone disagrees with a point, it does not mean that it is 'refuted'-it is merely disagreed with. If the Prussians didn't fight in lines of infantry firing volleys, then how did the Prussian line infantry fight? They certainly did not deploy large numbers in open order as the French did and the Prussian light infantry, who did fight as skirmishers, were heavily outnumbered. Further, Bressonet makes the point that the Prussians couldn't handle the French fighting in open order. Grawert's division was shot to pieces by French infantry, supported by artillery, fighting in open order. When Ruchel stopped his advance after the battle was actually lost, his infantry stood in line firing volleys at the French and were routed.

'Stop repeating the same old story and you won't keep being corrected. Being corrected seems to upset you, judging from your terse reply to Oli.'

I gave no 'terse reply' to Oliver. I merely disagreed with Oliver and Bill as to the 'simplicity' of studying military history. It is a minor point and I don't see the problem or issue of disagreement. 'The same old story' gets reused as an example because the arguments attempting to rahabilitate the Prussians in 1806 are factually incorrect. Perhaps if statements were not misinterpreted and/or taken out of context, etc., then old points wouldn't have to be repeated. You're doing the same thing here-either creating a strawman argument or perhaps you don't understand how Jena and Auerstadt were fought by the Prussians and French. There were two different tactical systems being used.

'As for military service being a prerequisite for properly understanding military history, which you imply above, I don't believe that's correct (and I have served, as you know). It may help with understanding some facets, such as the difficulty for individuals to maintain alignment when moving in line, but equally it can be said that today's experience in uniform, especially if you never reached staff rank (that's you and I), probably has no bearing on understanding what happened 200 years ago. It may even make understanding more difficult, because our experiences seem to be pertinent. But insights gained from our service in the latter quarter of the 20th Century (and in the early 21st, in my case) are very, very different from the experience of serving 200 years ago. So how helpful is modern service, really?'

First, I didn't say that military service was a prerequisite to understand military history, nor did I imply it. I did make a point of professional training, historically speaking, as well as experience in that discipline.
Second, I disagree with you that modern military service does not give insights into military history and the soldiers who served. Making a night march along rutted roads carrying 60-80 pounds of equipment, weapons, and ammunition has the same effect that it did in 1800; getting a field piece unstuck on a road march on wet and muddy roads poses the same problems faced by French horse artillerymen in 1814; emplacing an artillery battery, from the gun guides in the position first to occupying the position with the guns and vehicles poses the same problems and skill issues that it did in 1805. You could take a modern Marine gun crew to man a 12-pounder field piece of 1810 and it would take about fifteen minutes to train them how to use it. The only major difference in crew drill is that now you put the round in the other end and then the round was much lighter. The principles are the same. I do agree with Shane's points on this subject. Man is the constant in warfare and that is too often overlooked. As General Patton once said, you don't beat weapons or technology, you beat 'the soul of the enemy man.'
As for the 'staff rank' comment, I don't really understand what you're trying to get across. The only 'staff ranks' in the Marine Corps are Staff Sergeant through Sergeant Major/Master Gunnery Sergeant. If you're referring to officers, the greater majority of Marine Corps officers are 'unrestricted line' officers and can serve in either staff or command billets, or as subordinate officers in companies, especially as junior officers. There is no staff corps in the Marine Corps.

'If Kevin was making a point about research, why was he making it to Oli? Oli's qualifications as a historian would match those of just about anyone on TMP, I believe, and his books, articles and information given on various boards indicate he knows how to research a subject. Or if he was making it to Bill? Does he know what Bill's qualifications are? Reading Bill's posts, he seems to be competent enough in researching- his excerpt of Bressonet was more detailed and referenced than Kevin's, for example.'

I have the utmost respect for Oliver and Bill, no matter what their qualifications are. The only point I brought up to discuss which I disagreed with both of them was the point of view of what was simple and what was not in the study of military history in general and Jena in particular. You're making too much, and incorrectly by the way, of almost nothing. You're going to the 'ready, fire, aim' mode of replying and making too many mistakes about who said what to whom. Your accusations are incorrect in fact and are somewhat insulting, unfortunately.

And why bring up West Point and Kevin's military service as part of his argument? Unless……..

I didn't bring up my military service-you did. I mentioned only where I went to college because of the course I referred to. I don't believe that there are too many American universities that have a year-long military art course that study the Jena campaign in depth. It was germane to the subject and I used it as an illustration of why I believe the study is simple-nothing more, nothing less.

'As for military service giving us an insight into how the military of the Napoleonic Wars operated, I've been on both sides of that argument. If you have time, can you tell me exactly what insights we'd get that a good, solid historian wouldn't? We'd understand more about how an individual is likely to deal with certain situations, perhaps. But really, how is our experience today really going to allow us to understand the military of Napoleon's time?'

I've already replied to this mostly. I do believe, however, that military service is useful. It isn't mandatory to understand military history but very helpful in tryin to understand the marching and killing that is a necessary part of that study. Too many academic historians leave that part out for whatever reason. It is also very useful to know and understand horses when studying a horse-powered army. Necessary, no. Useful, yes.

'…Kevin and others who were fortunate to have Elting and Esposito teach them at West Point…'

That didn't happen. By the time I was there General Esposito was dead and Col Elting retired. General Esposito's son was there teaching military art, but I never had him as an instructor.

You assume too much that is not in evidence. You have also said some things that a little careful reading of the postings would have cleared up before you put fingers to keyboard. I would highly recommend that you do that in the future before you begin castigating someone for things they haven't done or said and to whom.

As a footnote, and because it is the topic of this thread, I've found some material in Paret's new book that might be instructive to you and everyone else. I certainly found it to be important to understanding 1806:

'In 1806 the French were the better integrated and mobile force, against which the less flexible and slower Prussians with their uncertain strategic concepts, would not necessarily lose but were at a disadvantage.' page 28

'What mattered was to recognize the enemy had adopted important new ways of fighting, and to respond to them in organization, training, tactics, and strategy, even if this required changes elsewhere as well.' page 28

'After 1806 it was as important to eliminate the formalism that ruled the Prussian army as it was to alter the army's organization, strategic outlook, and operational and tactical doctrine. Too often the army was run like a platoon. Senior commanders and subordinates alike tended to obey orders literally. At the same time individual and institutional rigidity coexisted with the acceptance of social prerogatives in appointments, promotions, and discipline, which might further diminish efficiency.' page 29.

'A very different conclusion was developed by officers of the historical sections of the Prussian, and after 1871, the German General Staff. Their usually competent publications largely ignored or even denied the significance of the French amalgamation of close and open order. The main cause of the Prussian defeat, they declared in formulations that continued to be used in official histories down to the Third Reich, was poor leadership. Flaws in organization, doctrine, and training contributed to the outcome but meant little compared to the shortcomings of the senior generals.'pages 29-30.

Interestingly, the same excuses as those histories provide are sometimes evident on the discussion boards. They certainly have been on this one.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'When I earned my MA in history 20 years ago there was an emphasis on addressing what the sources tell us and being prepared to discard whatever we thought we knew based on the evidence, if necessary. Otherwise the whole activity is pointless. Research is an ongoing process of discovery, the easily accessible source materials are only the tip of the iceberg and cogent analysis in the end is just reasoned opinion based on available facts, meaning that any analysis needs to be reconsidered as new facts (the stuff that's NOT easy to find) are brought to light. Maybe they don't teach this anymore?'

No, they still do. And some stuff is not easy to find, but to my mind that doesn't complicate the process, it just takes time and effort. To me that is a simple process. And it is also an enjoyable and fulfilling one.

'Seems to me that if you think it's easy, you're not doing it right!'

I don't think so. Just because it takes work, it doesn't complicate the process. However, I have met some academic historians who believe it isn't simple and try to convey that to their students/audience. I just don't agree with that mindset.

Sincerely,
K

I find that having military service gives me a better understanding of how soldiers and armies functioned in history.

My own background is communications and even with all the modern high capacity voice and data systems that we have including CNR and SAT comms how much the 'fog of war' is still a factor.

Being in the Canadian Army and taking part in winter operations with all this wonderful modern warm kit it admazes me how soldiers survied the Russian 1812 campaign against the elements let alone fight major battles.

Having served in a few operations I have learned the importance of logistics. I forget where I read the quote but it went like this "junior officers debate and talk about tactics, senior officers discuss logistics".

I often joke with my students and fellows that we have all this modern communication equipment but Napoleon conquered Europe with just a Field Message Pad.

cheers
Edward

I often joke with my students and fellows that we have all this modern communication equipment but Napoleon conquered Europe with just a Field Message Pad.

This is a very good point, back then things were done with such simplicity (maybe not in their eyes) that through technology today were have made so complicated. This technology was introduced to make things easier but if it fails, falling back to an older technology proves difficult.

You only have to look at your own civilian workplace to notice this truth. If the highly sophisticated system fails all hell breaks lose in the office or shop floor. We as a species apply technology and improvements to everything we do but then forget what we knew previously…

Shane

Kevin wrote:

What Scharnhorst might have meant when referring to the French system was that they really weren't aware of what they were developing overall, but that they might have considered it a 'natural' development of what they were practicing on the battlefield. It should be noted (again) that the French never produced an army-level reglement for the employment of troops in open order in their various uses.

Kevin:
My point exactly. How would the Prussians have learned about the "French System" during its development 1792 to 1805? There were pieces, but no 'System' to learn about, let alone emulate. Nothing written that could have helped the Prussians 'learn' French methods.

Producing something in writing is not necessary for practices to be employed. For example, in the French artillery schools for some time after 1765 there were no texts used or issued. The students made their own texts for their use and study from the instructors' lectures. Yet the instruction was uniform as the curriculum had been prescribed for both officers and NCOs.

And again, my point. Not that the French didn't have a system, but to ask how the Prussians could have possibly learned about it by 1805. Even Scharnhorst's analysis of Marengo before 1806 suffers from a lack of information as to render all but his most general conclusions nothing but speculation--which Scharnhorst admits.

That's all.

Bill H.

My point exactly. How would the Prussians have learned about the "French System" during its development 1792 to 1805? There were pieces, but no 'System' to learn about, let alone emulate. Nothing written that could have helped the Prussians 'learn' French methods.

Actually, the French system of Columnar warfare tactical doctrine was around long before 1792, it was first devised during the later half of the 18th century by advocates such as, Chevalier de Folard, Marshal de Saxe, Mesnil Durand and Guilbert. Some of these practices found their way into the French army during the Seven Years War on a limited scale. But because the monarchy at the time had such tight control over their armies and held all of the officer ranks in order to maintain that control relinquishing it to the less automated Columnar style of combat was out of the question. Changes like this were simply out of the question in any army ruled by a monarch at the time.

When France embraced the revolution in the early 1790's this limitation had just prior, gripped the French army as tightly as it had the Prussians. New ideas and concepts were suddenly brought forward or put on the table once more such as the Columnar concept. It first came about in the second half of the 18th century but was shelved due to the tight controls the monarchy had. Once that was gone the ideas were re-investigated and eventually took over. The French army won and lost battles using the system but eventually the new doctrine was perfected, it was just unlucky for Prussia that this perfection was during 1805-06.

Like any new or more modern technologies or ideas, once they are seen to work and give one side an advantage the concept is soon taken on board by the adversary it defeated and equilibrium is eventually re-balanced until the next breakthrough occurs and so on…

Shane

Funnily enough the unwritten French system or on need handwritten own texts were common traits in the Prussian Army and other armies as well.

Maybe I should phrase my question more precisely:
Which French was system in operation and which system was it that Scharnhorst was reacting to?
We see the very end-product in 1813-15… but the French had employed many various tactical methods unitil 1794. The sytem; was it just the French use of tirailleurs alone, was it their columns too… but then lines were used by the French (then and in 1806). Was it their tactical flexibilty they wanted to emulate?
Just to say the French were using columns and skirmishers isn`t enough – it doesn`t describe the way the system worked or will work.

Funnily enough the unwritten French system or on need handwritten own texts were common traits in the Prussian Army and other armies as well.

Very true, Frederick engaged a change in his own tactics for bringing men closer to the enemy by utilising extended (elongated) columns which allowed him to advance his lines within 500-1,000 yards of the enemy. Once at the designated deployment area they would simply turn left and right and continue to advance to their designated place in the line where they would simply turn left or right again (depending on position) to face the enemy. Although this was a very modern idea at the time, which ultimately changed tactical deployment it still ended with the forces deployed in the typical lines to carry out the conflict in the known traditional method of linear warfare.

The French on the other hand took this concept much further in utilising it more flexibly to actually engage the enemy while in column. But the concept was still little understood during the later 18th century and did not make the desired positive impact it was hoped for in reasons I stated previously. But it was not a new concept at all, it was an old idea given a fresh coat of paint…

btw, the French use of skirmishers in swarms also occured when columns were used in the early revolutionary period. The lower understanding of columns and their potential and the ability of officers to control them (as noted by many Linear armies) led to the early columns actually disintegrating into swarms of skirmishers in many of the early battles. It was not a morale issue but a loss of control dilemma. It was not until the late 1790's that this problem was rectified and proper control of columns led to much better usage and advantage in battle. By 1803-05 the tactical doctrine of column usage was perfected and the results were devestating by 1805-06 during actual battle.

However, I do not think the use of columns alone would win battles, they had to be utilised alongside of more traditional line formations to give the French the flexibility of columns but also the advantages of line fire power. One without the other often led to failure and lost battles when facing more traditional opponents.

Shane

Thanks Bill,

I'll keep an eye out for those as they come up. Rory Muir's tactics book is a constant inspiration, so I am not surprised he is a contributor to another worth effort.

FWIW in the context of this discussion though, i still think we are downplaying the simple pyisical fitness and aclimatisation to the rigours of nights in the field of the Prussians. Especially the cavalry.

"You only have to look at your own civilian workplace to notice this truth. If the highly sophisticated system fails all hell breaks lose in the office or shop floor. We as a species apply technology and improvements to everything we do but then forget what we knew previously…"

Not necessarily true Shane. Perhaps some "civilian" (whatever you mean by that) organisations may collapse, but you can't generalise quite that much.
An example, whilst Second Mate on an OBO (100,000 DWT) going through the Straits of Gibraltar, the main generator shut down. The engineers immediately started the second generator, but the consequent power surge blew up all of the electronic navigation aids on the bridge. This included the SatNav, radar, Decca, depth sounder, course recorder and log. Nevertheless, we were able to sail to our destination, near Iskenderun, in Turkey, and on to our next port, Casablanca, where the gear was repaired. We were able to do so, without any modern high tech electronics, because we hadn't forgotten "what we knew previously…"

G'day.

Kevin, I won't respond to the all the points in your post as it would be too boring for everyone (it probably will be, anyway). I thought you had said before you studied under Elting. OK, do you want me to apologise for giving you credit? Back to the original point, though, did your studies have an emphasis on logistics and strategy too? Or did you also look at the tactical and operational aspects in detail?

You know very well the point I made was about where you wrote He also states that the Prussians couldn't handle the flexible French tactics. It is also a fact that Grawert's division was shot to pieces by French infantry fighting under cover in open order. Grawert's troops stood in the open firing controlled volleys and suffered heavy casualties. Those are facts. You also attributed that to Bressonet. Bill pretty much dealt with the Bressonet part. I answered your accusation that H-K (not Oli, my mistake) was the only one bringing it up.

So I mistook your reply to H-K for one to Oli? My mistake.

I did think you were implying that you needed military service to understand military history. It wasn't the first time. Nor was I the only one to get that impression.

I agree with you, though- military service may help, particularly with understanding the way that individuals react. But I was thinking of the operational and tactical (to a lesser extent) experiences, which is where the Prussians were bested by the French. Yes, a modern artillery crew may understand what individuals were doing, as what they are doing is similar. Would modern infantry understand why they were marching, in close order, towards a waiting enemy line? Be that as it may, at the operational and tactical levels I think things are not going to be as easily understood, especially when it came to the use of cavalry and close order formations. For example, modern troops would instinctively expect the troops to open out, seek firing positions and take aimed shots at the enemy, because that's the way they've been trained. Their current training may therefore interfere with their understanding of what was happening, not help it.

Staff officers? LTCOL and above who have attended a Command Staff College or equivalent, who are employed in the planning and operations cell of a brigade or division HQ. That's where I feel there'd be as much chance of misinterpreting the mechanics of the Napoleonic period as instinctively understanding them.

In 1806 the French were the better integrated and mobile force, against which the less flexible and slower Prussians with their uncertain strategic concepts, would not necessarily lose but were at a disadvantage.' page 28

'What mattered was to recognize the enemy had adopted important new ways of fighting, and to respond to them in organization, training, tactics, and strategy, even if this required changes elsewhere as well.' page 28

Both self evident points and I agree. I don't think anyone's arguing against them. However, the next two quotes I'm not sure about. They may be part of the answer, but they're not the totality. After all, the British army was also a lot more formal than the French, but it was also a lot more successful than the 1806 Prussians.

Thanks for the advice. You may also want to try it.

Edward, I never even want to think about exercising in the snow. Give me a nice warm jungle any day. I work in one of the ADF's COMMS projects, so I know what you mean about technology not eradicating the fog of war. But it does (when it's working) allow for a (theoretical) level of coordination that Napoleon, Wellington and Bennigsen probably didn't even dream of. How would a BRIG feel these days if his next set of OPORD had to go by horsed courier? Or even by motorcycle dispatch rider (as can happen)? I think he'd be a little peeved.

Shane, If the highly sophisticated system fails all hell breaks lose in the office or shop floor. We as a species apply technology and improvements to everything we do but then forget what we knew previously…

True to a certain extent, mate. Watching a CO fume because there's no COMMS and his orders have to go by MC is informative. Worse, at times, is when the kit works- but doesn't live up to the troops' expectations. Then there's really tears before bed time. That's probably something every soldier in every time frame has experienced and would understand.

But the old skills don't always disappear. They may go rusty and be nowhere as easy or effective as we remembered them to be, but as Chouan says above, we don't completely forget. At least not yet, anyway.

Cheers

Dal.

The REAL problems start when the old skills aren't taught in the first place, then what will they do! Many ships now use electronic charts, with no "real" charts at all. What would they have done in the circumstances described?!

So it seems that Elting et al. did not read Bressonnet front to cover and got stuck with a superficial view, which Bressonnet so aptly accuses to be wrong with his work, see also his critics on the work of von der Goltz.

"These many losses undeniably contributed significiantly to the defeat. But it seems difficult to admit that it was the reason. To realize this, it is only necessary to immagine what the battle of Jena would have been like if Holtzendorf's and Rüchel's Corps, along with the Saxon Division, had fought side by side with Grawer's Division. Had these acted together, onc could immagine what Auerstädt's battle might have been if the Reserve's divisions had entered the battle in time along Wartensleben's and Schmettau's divisions.

It is important not to forget that despite these losses, the Prussian troops did not retreat from the front, and that the French lateral attackts, which the Prussian commanders had nothing to counter with, were the decisive cause for the retreat.

Therefore, the mediocrity of the superior officers is mainly to blame for the tragice turnout for the Prussians during the campaign onf 1806. (and NOT the tactics – which according to Bressonet seems to be a side or minor reason, von Winterfeldt).

Page 340

I ask myself how an isolted Division like Grawert which was so shoot to pieces – accoridng to some sources – could press home the attack at 14 heiligen and only good pushed back by a counter attack on the flanks?

In case the fire was so efficient beforehand – the attack should have collapsed which it did not.

In my opinion, Grawert did quite well against the overwhelming odds and could not have achieved anything better – regardless of what tactics he would have used, unless not attacking at all and waiting for Rüchel, but that was not his decision but Hohenlohes.

Shane, Kevin, and Bill,

Paret makes the connection between skirmishers and columns, but not it seems Scharnhorst; Scharnhorst, where quoted in "Yorck & the Era" mentions just tirailleurs, or skirmishers as the major reason for French success and/but Paret makes this quite clear.

The rest of the French "system" is not defined.

"it admazes me how soldiers survied the Russian 1812 campaign against the elements"

Mostly, they didn't – survive, that is.
Almost all the French and their Allies, and well more than half of the Russians, died.

Cossacks, partizans, and units of "native" people (Bashkir, Teptyar, Urdmurt, Kyrghiz, Kalmyk, etc.) did OK, but they were usually away from the concentrations of troops that bred disease. Increasingly, as the weather worsened, these units took a greater and greater role.

The Russian units survived rather better than the French. The Russian management of cadres and replacements was better – stemming from a slightly shorter distance from most recruitment centers to the "front", the ability to stage replacements all on friendly (as opposed to more-or-less allied) territory, a larger and more enforceable conscription, and the active propaganda support of the Orthodox Church.

Frayer

Michael,

If you look into some of Scharnhorst, and I would recommend White's Enlightened Soldier as a starting point, you can see Scharnhorst 'define' the French system as he understood it.

As an artilleryman, Scharnhorst also had very high regard for Gribeauval and what he had accomplished.

Sincerely,
K

'The Russian units survived rather better than the French…'

Russian losses were probably just as high as the French. They lost at least 450,000 plus unknown numbers of regulars. The regular Russian soldier wasn't as tough and inured to the Russian winter as sometimes portrayed. They were housed in warm winter barracks in garrison and were not used to the elements when they had to stay out in them, as they did in the winter of 1812-1813.

The Cossacks and other irregulars were-which is why they were so effective during the winter. However, they would not usually attack formed bodies of troops, especially if they had artillery.

The relative efficiency under hardship in combat during the winter of the French and Russians can be clearly seen at the Berezina in late November. Two Russian armies seemingly trapped the Grande Armee on the wrong side of the river, and the French fought through it, defeating both armies in turn. Kutusov did or would not support his comrades. Interestingly, one French Guardsman opined that if the roles were reversed, not one Russian would have escaped. Interesting to ponder, anyways.

Sincerely,
K

Hello Frayer

Thanks, I'm well aware of the low rate of survial for French and Russian troops in 1812. Maybe I should of said I am admazed of the ones that did survied well able to fight at battles, like Kevin says above, The Berezina without all the nice modern kit we have today.

cheers
Edward

"Russian losses were probably just as high as the French."
"The regular Russian soldier wasn't as tough and inured to the Russian winter as sometimes portrayed."

I agree. (I was trying to note that the "units" survived by cadre/replacements – but the men died much the same as the French.)

If you think about it, why would someone who lived their whole life south of the area of operations in 1812 ever even experience the cold of that latitude ? Let alone become somehow magically inured to it.

There was pretty good stability in garrison locations, and a preference for local recruiting. And note that this especially effected the troops under the Admiral Chichagov.

Of course, the Admiral was himself rather also at fault – "Иван Васильевич, я во время сражения не умею распоряжаться войсками, примите команду и атакуйте." and all that.

"[Cossacks, etc.] would not usually attack formed bodies of troops,"

Well, yes. But it is hard to walk an army from the Elbe to Moscow and back in a formed body. N'est-ce pas?

Frayer

Michael:

Yes, here is the quote from Paret's book, p. 77:

In his work, Basic Reasons for the French Success in 1794, he says that because of the French utility with tirailleur action, "The Commission de l'organization et du mouvement des armées de terre took account of these circumstances and based on them the system of always waging war in broken and covered terrain, where everything depends on the defense and attacks of positions, of avoiding large battles if possible, and instead wearing out the Allied armies by skirmishes, outpost affairs, and isolated attacks in woods and ravines."

Scharnhorst repeats this conclusion in his 1797 work, and then again in his unpublished 1804 essay on tactics.

Scharnhorst is saying that the French skirmishers avoided large battles, and focused on 'outpost affairs, and isolated attacks in woods and ravines.'

So Scharnhorst didn't see the actual coordination between line and light infantry as a major component of the winning tactics of French light infantry. In fact, if the Prussians believed Scharnhorst's conclusions, it would explain why they positioned groups of Schutzen, Jagers, and Fusiliers along the flanks of marches and so didn't have them available during the battles. It would also explain why the Prussians placed their light infantry in woods and on the flanks behind the battle lines as they did at Auerstadt.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Keraunos wrote:

FWIW in the context of this discussion though, i still think we are downplaying the simple pyisical fitness and aclimatisation to the rigours of nights in the field of the Prussians. Especially the cavalry.

Keraunos:
Oh, I agree. The Prussians were not in shape and a good portion [@60%] enjoyed only 16 weeks of training total for the two years [104 weeks] they had been soldiers. The rest of the time they were sent home or allowed to follow other work while living in the barracks to save money.

The contrast between the inexperienced, unconditioned, untrained Prussians compared to the battle-hardened, extensively trained and campaign-conditioned French is huge. All-in-all, it is amazing how well the Prussians and Saxons actually did. They inflicted 27% and 14% casualties on the French at Auerstadt and Jena, where the French suffered only 10% casualties at Austerlitz.

A good portion of Hohenlohe's command panicked on the night of the 12th, and it required most of the 13th to bring the troops back to order. According to Petre, one reason for the change in command arrangements on the 13th was the disorganization caused by the panick. It was easier to simply place different units under new commands than try marching them back to where they should be.

And again, knowing that, it is amazing that they stuck around at all the next day for Jena at all, let alone stood up to twice their number for eight hours+…

Best Regards,

Bill H.

A good portion of Hohenlohe's command panicked on the night of the 12th, and it required most of the 13th to bring the troops back to order. According to Petre, one reason for the change in command arrangements on the 13th was the disorganization caused by the panick. It was easier to simply place different units under new commands than try marching them back to where they should be.

This I did not know, I draw a conclusion on this that the Prussians might have been well drilled and highly skilled but with little or no experience they were prone to panic. This is an argument I have about training vs experience.

Shane

In general, I think that the whys of the Prussian collapse militarily is not fully explained with the conclusion that they had backward or staid theories of combat.

It isn't as simple as that.

For instance:

Prussian 1789 Reglément for the line regiments had a detailed section outlining the role of light infantry, specifically the Schutzen, fighting in liaison with their battalion:

"When a regiment or a battalion", says the regulation, "moves forward to take a position, the tirailleurs [the Schützen and their supports] can deploy ahead of their unit, then move forward head of their battalions to cause by their fire a certain damage in the enemy's ranks and to disorder it before the arrival of the battalion. But when one or more battalions come within musket range of the enemy, the tirailleurs must fall back on each side and follow the battalion or regiment and hence can protect the flanks."

This section goes on to mention artillery crews as possible targets and the methods for utilizing supports.

This was written two years before the French 1791 Reglément, which did not have such detailed light infantry section, and three years before the French Provisional Light Infantry Reglément that does. Reading the Prussian instructions and the Light Infantry Provisional instructions, one would be hard pressed to claim one was more 'advanced' than the other.

So as the French skirmish/light infantry operations were definitely superior to anything the Prussians were capable of, such evidence raises more questions than answers. Obviously, the Prussians weren't all that backward in their manuals and 'general understanding' of light/line operations, so why did they fail? It isn't enough to say the French were better or had better doctrine. It doesn't begin to explain why that is.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

I'm pretty sure the Cossacks were snug in their beds most every other winter… Besides, it's more a question of the endurance of their horses.

Did French light cavalry regularly attack formed troops? No wonder they lost…

How could the Russians have suffered the same high losses then the invading army in 1812, their army should have been non existend as was the Grande Armée in 1812 (the wings apart) – the center army consisted almost only of unfit cripples.

Yes – without any doubt the Russians did suffer also from the climate – as all armies do when out in the open, but they did much better than the disorganised mob – called Grande Armée.

Back to 1806, the regulations of 1788 were constantly improved and reformed.
you can read about this in Gefechtsausbildungen, the rest – the blown out of importance Tirailleur tactic – is discussed in Bressonnet – it is available now, even in English, all one has to do is to read and to understand him.

A pity the Bressonnet could not consult the Gefechtsausbildungen and had to rely and Höpfner and Lettow Vorbeck only to get most of his information about how the Prussians fought.

They had a better morale, better protection against winter, better supply and support by the people.

Hi Kevin,

As I don't have White's book, maybe just a "pivotal" quotation would make it clear to all – or rather, maybe, just to me.

The thing is we that don't have to delve too deeply to establish a connection between the Prussian re-organisation of 1812 and French tactical practices in 1806 (and before that in 1805 too), but in this case it seems far less obvious…
Looking at John Lynn's tables for the frequency of reports of formations and skirmishing modes used in various tactical situations, it's quite interesting to see the following:
1. A large number of unsupported light infantry actions listed (apparently with no associated columns) …
2. More numerous examples of lines (rather than columns) being used as "waiting" formations.
3. More examples of lines in support of light infantry than columns.
Even if you take into account the tendency for the more unusual to be remarked upon, it is true that more than one formation was used by the Nord.
This is the army however with the popular image (then and now) of skirmishing mobs and dissolved, ill-trained columns. But looking at the various examples of tactical formations listed by Lynn, one might question that popular image, even though it is attractively supported by a claim that military tactical formations are in themselves "politically significant". But "skirmishers and columns" is often how the French tactical system is generalised.

Over time these various tactical elements in the French armies were, tried (some retained, others dispensed with) and came to be brought together into an officially approved, authorized form. The French system becomes formalized in 1805 and the best tactical practices of the previous years are presented and described by de Vernon; first in the "habitual order" of battle would have been the skirmish line supported by divisional artillery, then a first (formed) line of battle proper would be deployed for fire, this first line of formed troops would then ploy to column for a shock action, once the enemy's line of battle had been sufficiently weakened.

It would clarify things if we had Scharnhorst`s comments upon French tactical formations and how they would have worked in a Prussian army. These elements should have been apparent to Scharnhorst at the time, if what Lynn notes in his conclusion is true, that; "All the major elements of the infantry tactics associated with Napoleon had emerged along the Belgian border by 1794."

von Winterfeldt,

Strange that you seem to dislike the Grand Armee with a passion (the disorganised mob) yet you chose to be a re enactor in a French Regiment the 9e Regiment d'Infanterie Legere I belive. It's a pity there were no Prussian regiments at the time you joined I think they would have suited you better.

Wagram

Wagram

I would apreciate any comments or contributions on the topic.

You might like the Grande Armée or not – it was a mob entering East Prussia in 1812.

In case you cannot stand my opinion – please use the button.

von Winterfeldt,

I didn't say that I could not stand your opinion quite the contrary I merely stated it was strange that you were a re enactor in a French Regiment and not a Prussian one as your sympathys are understandably with the Prussians. No one is denying that the Grande Armee was certainly disorganised on it's return from Russia and it took some time to re-organise. Have just finished an excelent study on this which I would recommend to you.
Rebouls Campagne de 1813 – les preliminaires 2 volumes.

BTW whats the bleep button

Wagram

This I did not know, I draw a conclusion on this that the Prussians might have been well drilled and highly skilled but with little or no experience they were prone to panic. This is an argument I have about training vs experience.

Shane:
Yes, certainly there is a difference. The panic also stemmed from the defeat of part of Hohenlohe's force suffered at Saalfeld with the death of the Prince, who was popular, and the poor logistical support.

Bill H.

'Therefore, the mediocrity of the superior officers is mainly to blame for the tragice turnout for the Prussians during the campaign onf 1806. (and NOT the tactics – which according to Bressonet seems to be a side or minor reason, von Winterfeldt).'

You're taking the disproven viewpoint of the 'historians' of the Prussian/General Staff which, may I remind you, Paret has taken to task:

'A very different conclusion was developed by officers of the historical sections of the Prussian, and after 1871, the German General Staff. Their usually competent publications largely ignored or even denied the significance of the French amalgamation of close and open order. The main cause of the Prussian defeat, they declared in formulations that continued to be used in official histories down to the Third Reich, was poor leadership. Flaws in organization, doctrine, and training contributed to the outcome but meant little compared to the shortcomings of the senior generals.'pages 29-30.

'…the rest – the blown out of importance Tirailleur tactic – is discussed in Bressonnet – it is available now, even in English, all one has to do is to read and to understand him.'

I fully agree regarding reading Bressonet in English. As I have a copy, I went over it in some detail today and it definitely shows that your conclusions on Prussian tactics and the overall effect of tactics on the battle are wrong. Perhaps the following references to Bressonet, the new volume translated expertly by Scott Bowden, will help you understand how badly the Prussians were beaten tactically at Jena:

-On page 132 it states that Tauentzien's division lost over half its strength in a two hour firefight with the troops of Lannes' V Corps.

-On page 141 Holtsendorf's infantry are formed in line and 'fired with calm and order; but their salvos did not have any effect on the French tirailleurs who were sheltered on the edge of the woods.'

-Page 160, Prussian infantry 'executed this advance as if on hte parade ground' even though they were under fire from French artillery.

-Page 165 notes, quoting von der Goltz, that Grawert's Prussians failed to advance on Vierzehnheilegen because the Prussians 'lacked the vigor necessary to make the first step. This way of fighting was neither in the tendencies nor in the habits of the Prussian people.' Hohenlohe is characterized as being, again by von der Goltz, 'completely ignorant of how to fight the French tirailleurs.' The general summation of Grawert's fight is that they greater majority of his division fought in line firing controlled volleys against French infantry in open order using every type of cover and concealment in conjunction with their artillery support to inflict heavy losses on the Prussians in the open. The Prussians 'responded to that terrible fire by first sending isolated tirailleurs to the front, then by battalion and platoon fire, mostly without results…' On the other hand 'the French fire was causing such devastation…' that one regiment started to break but was rallied. Quite literally, Grawert was shot to pieces.

-Apparently, on page 166 most if not all of the 40th Ligne, 34th Ligne, 21st Legere, and the voltigeur battalion from the VI Corps advance Guard were in open order in this portion of the fighting against Grawert. The French 'maintained their tirailleurs in the bushes while their reserves were protected byhind walls and barns…The French tirailleurs were shooting on the Prussian battalions standing still in front of them as if it were target practice.' (the references for this is von der Goltz and Foucart).

-On page 168 regarding a conversation between Hohenlohe and Grawert, Grawert's infantry are characterized as 'shaken battalions' because of 'their long exposure to enemy fire…'

-On page 175, which describes the French going over to the attack, the French tactical formation is very interesting: 'The French first line, comprising the 16th Legere and the 105th Ligne, got ''within pistol shot of the Prussian infantry'' then moved forward as tirailleurs.' Apparently, that's two infantry regiments in open order.

-On page 177 another French tactical formation is described: 'Along the entire front of the 4th and 5th Corps, a large line of tirailleurs, followed by columns, marched forward to the sound of the drums and music…'

-On page 180 under the relentless pressure of combined arms French attacks (infantry supported by artillery and light cavalry) the Prussian 'battalions began coming apart.'

-On page 181 the Prussian army is described as 'a hurricane of runaways.' This is taken from Hopfner.

-On page 191 Ruchel's march is so slow to support Hohenlohe that he marched 9 kilometers in four hours.

-Page 195 describes Ruchel as stopping his attack in line and opening fire against the French, again with volleys which are basically ineffectual.

-On page 333 some Prussian battalions did employ tirailleurs, but others did not. The French are described as employing tirailleurs with all units and supporting their troops in formed units.

-Prince August's comment of 13 June 1807 while still a prisoner of war with the French on the employment of tirailleurs is noteworthy:
'For the most, we have mistaken their tactical objective. We used them as light troops, or like a breeding ground for non-commissioned officers. To realize this, one needs only to study part of the instruction for their drills or their use in both wars against the French and in most peacetime exercises. Only in case of emergency should the tirailleurs be used as light troops; they must never be separated from their battalion. They are designed to act in junction with the line infantry, and with their fire, to prepare for the attack and back them up.'

-An interesting statement regarding the employment of tirailleurs is on page 336: 'In Prussia, the idea took longer to develop; one had to learn from the defeat to fully accept it.'

-Page 337: 'It is thus clearly established that in 1806, when the campaign began, most of the Prussian army viewed the tirailleurs only as additions to the light infantry, and that in most of the infantry, they did not fight with the line. This is also proven undeniably after a detailed study of the Battle of Saalfield and the two large battles of 1806.'

-Also on page 337: 'Therefore, if it is completely false to state that there were in 1806 two absolutely different tactics, it would also be incorrect to say that the French and the Prussians had the same tactics.'

So it appears that you are incorrect in your 'tactical' conclusions. The Prussians confused the employment of tirailleurs and light troops and did not coordinate the employment of tirailleurs with their line infantry. The French, on the other hand, did and demonstrated a tactical flexibility and superiority to the Prussians that was pronounced.

'So it seems that Elting et al. did not read Bressonnet front to cover and got stuck with a superficial view, which Bressonnet so aptly accuses to be wrong with his work, see also his critics on the work of von der Goltz.'

Again, in stating this you are wrong. What, exactly, is the 'superficial view?' Col Elting certainly got it right and without using Bressonet as a reference. The other historians, such as Paret, Petre, and Maude, also were correct in their narratives of the campaing and battle and no amount of revisionism is going to change that. Two armies with two different systems (tactical, administrative, organizational, and training) fought it out and the Prussians lost badly. After 1807 they changed based on that defeat-tactically, organizationally, training, and administratively. And the model they used was that of the French.

'It is important not to forget that despite these losses, the Prussian troops did not retreat from the front, and that the French lateral attackts, which the Prussian commanders had nothing to counter with, were the decisive cause for the retreat.'

The decisive cause of the defeat was being beaten soundly on the ground at all levels, including tactically. And that is called tactics as well as superior leadership from the company up.

Sincerely,
K

'How could the Russians have suffered the same high losses then the invading army in 1812, their army should have been non existend as was the Grande Armée in 1812 (the wings apart) – the center army consisted almost only of unfit cripples.'

The Grande Armee was undoubtedly dying on its feet but still had the cohesion and fighting ability to defeat two Russian armies at the Berezina in late November. After that the Russians stayed away from them-Kutusov undoubtedly did not support Tshitshagov and Wittgenstein at the Berezina because he did not want to face Napoleon again.
And it should be remembered that the Russians won no large battles in 1812-they were repeatedly defeated every time they stood to fight-and their losses were very heavy.

'Yes – without any doubt the Russians did suffer also from the climate – as all armies do when out in the open, but they did much better than the disorganised mob – called Grande Armée.'

If the Russians were in such great shape why did they need the Prussians and Austrians in 1813? And they were whipped at Lutzen and Bautzen in the spring of 1813 along with the Prussians and driven back to the Oder. Only the arrival of the Austrians in August 1813, along with British subsidies, keep the allies in the field.

No, Russian losses in 1812 were very heavy, undoubtedly as much as the Grande Armee lost.

Sincerely,
K

well explained Kevin, I cannot wait to read my copy now.

Thank you for the insights.

Shane

Shane,

You're welcome. It was fun looking through the book and finding that material. It also covers three of the Prussian divisions at Jena: Tauentzien's, Holtzendorf's, and Grawert's. I also looked at Ruchel, so that's four sub-units of the Prussian army at Jena. All of them fought the same.

I do have one bone to pick with Bressonet, though. He refers to Jomini as 'Colonel Jomini' which Jomini never was. Jomini was an adjutant-commandant, the staff equivalent of colonel in the line. Adjutant-commandant was a staff rank and held by a staff officer. Colonel denotes a troop commander, and Jomini never commanded troops. When he was made a governor in Russia, he proved to be incompetent. He wasn't a very good corps chief of staff, either. I don't really understand why Ney put up with him.

Sincerely,
K

I am amazed you picked that up, that shows a clear attention to detail I would not have seen. Personally, I do not like Jomini to be honest, I think he was arrogant to a point and wanted his contemporaries to see how much high esteem "he" felt he had in the French army.

As for Jena, I have studied this battle from several books looking at it hour to hour during the course of the conflict and one point that strikes me is the relentless pressure the French placed on their lines. I noticed a clear continual retrograde movement by the whole Prussian army as this pressure was applied along the line. It was inevitable that this pressure would eventually burst and the Prussians would rout. I am still equally amazed at just how well they did hold on and fight under such mounting pressure and against such odds. It is a credit to them they they did for so long.

Equally, Davout at Auerstadt did the same feat of arms and came out in the end victorious which is even a greater achievement under such pressure but I dare say the experience of Egypt and the ability to form oblique square so quickly and effectively using conventional lines between them really saved the day for them. Blucher was totally defeated in that battle.

Shane

Kevin:

I don't think anyone is suggesting that Prussians were not badly beaten--routed and driven off the field. I certainly am not. However, your quotes leave out a lot and present a very skewed impression of Bressonet, and the German authors. I have a real problem with the way you pick and chose the information.

For instance:

-On page 132 it states that Tauentzien's division lost over half its strength in a two hour firefight with the troops of Lannes' V Corps.

On the same pages:
The Tauentzien's division was outnumbered by three French divisions. Even so, the 17th Legere and elite battalion had taken so many casualties and like the Prussians, ran low on ammo. Suchet pulls them out of line after that two hours and they see no more combat. [p.133] That is four battalions.

Even after two hours, the Prussians still hold Lutzeroda and Isserstadt forest against huge odds. Tauentzien requests reinforcements all during this time, but he finally receives an order to retreat. Which he follows only reluctantly. He is still fighting an hour later and repulses Lannes first attempt to take Vielinheiligen. [Part V "The first Attack on Vielinheiligen"]

-On page 141 Holtsendorf's infantry are formed in line and 'fired with calm and order; but their salvos did not have any effect on the French tirailleurs who were sheltered on the edge of the woods.'

The beginning of the paragraph is "The French tirailleurs gave in and recoiled up to Lohholz, but there, reinforced by most of Saint Hilaire's Division, the tiraillerus stopped and began a firefight combat." Saint Hilaire's division outnumbered Holtzendorf's command 2 to 1.

What isn't mentioned is that Stanitz, commanding the infantry, deployed his entire third rank as skirmishers, which is why the French recoiled up to Lohholz. The small map on the page shows their position. It also shows Lohholz on the far side of the woods mentioned. It wasn't formed Saxon infantry that chased the French completely through the woods as far as Lohholz.

-Page 160, Prussian infantry 'executed this advance as if on the parade ground' even though they were under fire from French artillery.

On page 133, Suchet praises his troops for the same 'perfectly executed' passage of lines in the face of the enemy. The parade ground is where battlefield maneuvers were practiced. You can read British officers praising their men for the very same 'parade ground' perfection. To suggest that there is something significantly Prussian or backward about executing an advance as if on Parade basically condemns a good portion of Allied and French troops to being Prussian-like.

Leith Hay comments on the 5th Division's advance at Salamanca: "A blank was no sooner made by the Enemy's fire but it was closed up as if nothing had happened, and as much attention was paid to dressing the Line, as if it had been a common Field day." Must be Prussians.

-Page 165 notes, quoting von der Goltz, that Grawert's Prussians failed to advance on Vierzehnheilegen because the Prussians 'lacked the vigor necessary to make the first step. This way of fighting was neither in the tendencies nor in the habits of the Prussian people.' Hohenlohe is characterized as being, again by von der Goltz, 'completely ignorant of how to fight the French tirailleurs.'

The problem with this conclusion is that Hohenlohe did advance on Vierzehnheilegen. First, he stopped to rally the Sanitz Regiment. Then when he advanced the second time, Ney attacked. [Part VII] That was beaten back. [Part VIII]

The third time is what Lannes characterizes as the "crisis of the battle" and launches the 100th and 103rd in a spoiling attack, [p. 166] which the Prussians finally repulse. Artillery brought up drives the French tirailleurs from the face of the village, Garwert congratulates Hohenlohe on his victory, and then as Hohenlohe again prepares to take the village, Garwert talks him out of it because of the casualties they've taken. He wants H. to wait for Ruchel to 'complete the victory.'

The general summation of Grawert's fight is that they greater majority of his division fought in line firing controlled volleys against French infantry in open order using every type of cover and concealment in conjunction with their artillery support to inflict heavy losses on the Prussians in the open.

Not a very accurate summation other than the heavy casualties. The line infantry did fight with volleys against the French--cavalry, formed infantry, artillery, and skirmishers The Prussians mention the artillery more than the skirmishers causing casualties. The French put together a grand battery of more than 35 guns.

When Garwert arrives, the Prussians drive grenadier battalions and the 25th Legere out of the Altenburg woods to their front with their own light infantry--not controlled volleys. They do the same at Isserstadt and clear most of the forest. [pp.160-161] Bressonet chronicles that, and I have already quoted those sections.

The Prussians 'responded to that terrible fire by first sending isolated tirailleurs to the front, then by battalion and platoon fire, mostly without results…' On the other hand 'the French fire was causing such devastation…' that one regiment started to break but was rallied. Quite literally, Grawert was shot to pieces.

That is not the way the Prussians describe it, other than first sending out skirmishers, probably the Schutzen, and then they bring up artillery, 'supported by infantry fire.' The regiment that started to break was the Stanitz regiment, and that recoiled just as Garwert brought his division up to Vielinheiligen--and the artillery is given as much of the credit for that as the skirmishers. Note to that after the Stanitz Regiment was rallied, it stayed in line for the rest of the battle, even with all those French tirailleurs.

-Apparently, on page 166 most if not all of the 40th Ligne, 34th Ligne, 21st Legere, and the voltigeur battalion from the VI Corps advance Guard were in open order in this portion of the fighting against Grawert. The French 'maintained their tirailleurs in the bushes while their reserves were protected behind walls and barns…The French tirailleurs were shooting on the Prussian battalions standing still in front of them as if it were target practice.' (the references for this is von der Goltz and Foucart).

Apparently--on page 166-- the Prussians are dealing with Lannes' spoiling attack with the 100th and 103rd, so the actual troops 'in front of Vielinheiligen' is the Zastrow Regiment. The rest are either dealing with Lannes attack or facing the grand battery and French between Altenburg woods and Issertadt. No doubt the Prussians weren't advancing and certainly were getting shot up, but there was a lot more going on in the battle than that description at that moment in the battle. And for the Prussians 'standing still', that can be credited to Lannes spoiling attack on the Prussian left flank, and not the intent of the Prussians, as their advance is what prompts Lannes to attack in an effort to stop it… p.166

-On page 168 regarding a conversation between Hohenlohe and Grawert, Grawert's infantry are characterized as 'shaken battalions' because of 'their long exposure to enemy fire…'

They have beaten back three French attacks and have been fighting twice their number for over two hours. Yep, they would be understandably shaken because of their long exposure to the enemy's fire. The French had reserves for that situation, the Prussians didn't.

Now, I am more than willing to take the rest of your citations page-by-page to give some balance to the narrative/descriptions you constructed from Bressonet in your post, but you have the book and access to the accounts too.

The French beat the Prussians, beat them badly. At Jena, the Prussians really had no hope, but to avoid battle. They were out-numbered, out-generaled, out-finessed tactically overall in every engagement, but those conclusions shouldn't blind one to what actually went on during the battle, or the actual tactical successes the Prussians achieved while ultimately being completely routed.

Or blind one to the actual tactics and battlefield dynamics that occurred.

Bill

out generaled is the real word, at least this is the conclusion of Bressonnet, who by they way relies entirely on Höpfner and occationally on Lettow Vorbeck, sometimes von der Goltz to describe the actions of the Prussians.

Unfortunatly he could not consult the Gefechtsausbildungen – otherwise an even better account – from the Prussian side – would have been possible.

Tauentzien also had to conduct a retreat by passage of lines – and he did withdraw only on order of Hohenlohe – and not because he lost the tactical battle against Lannes corps.

By that creating the huge gap which also isolated the detachment Holtzendorf, all vital reasons for the Prussian disaster.

And yes, the Prussians were badly beaten in 1806 and 1807 – as well as Napoleon lost badly 1812 and then also 1813, 1814 and 1815 – not to mention the continous defeats in the Peninsular war of his suordinates against Wellington.

Seems that the discussion has returned to the details of Jena again. That`s not a bad thing; its good, even though you and Bill are interpreting the same information in your own different ways.
But anyhow, could I have that Scharnhorst quote from White that I requested in my last post please Kevin?

Regards,

Mike.

von Winterfeldt,

After such a statement:

And yes, the Prussians were badly beaten in 1806 and 1807 – as well as Napoleon lost badly 1812 and then also 1813, 1814 and 1815 – not to mention the continous defeats in the Peninsular war of his suordinates against Wellington.

Dont you think you should resign from the 9e Legere it would
be appropriate much like the Prussians in 1812 you are certainly no admirer of the Grand Armee or it's forces.

Wagram

Mike,

Yes, I'll get to that tonight. Sorry I took so long.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Bill,

The issue that VW kept bringing up, and still does, is that the Prussians weren't defeated tactically, and they were, and the other issue is that the tactical systems were practically the same.

The material I took from Bressonet definitely demonstrates that the Prussian infantry overwhelmingly fought in lines and volleyed whereas the French fought in line, column, and with whole units deployed in open order. Further, the French coordinated their troops in open order with their infantry in formations and the Prussians did not. And Bressonet's conclusion was that the tactical systems were different. That was the point of the exercise and if you have a problem with that, then perhaps we need to talk off line. The information isn't out of context that I provided and if you think so you're missing the point.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Bill,

As for the parade ground being a training ground, the Prussians took that just a little too far and their training, which was one of their problems, didn't go much further than that. Some Prussian officers went to the extreme of dressing ranks with survey instruments. Their training was not realistic nor coordinated with the other combat arms.

French training on the other hand, was. They stressed infantry/artillery coordination and actually trained their troops to operate in open order, line and light, and thery fought the way they trained. So did the Prussians. That's one of the reasons they lost.

Sincerely,
Kevin

"Dont you think you should resign from the 9e Legere it would
be appropriate much like the Prussians in 1812 you are certainly no admirer of the Grand Armee or it's forces."
You've suggested that twice now. Don't you think he'd have responded by now if he was going to?

That book can be analysed in several different ways by individuals who will all come to their own conclusions in the end based on their own judgement but I do think it a little rude to suggest one is, "blind" if one does not see things your way Bill….

If it was Kevin who said that about your summation I dare say there would be an uproar right now by several here who just wait for the chance???

Lets please keep this debate away from this kind of wording and keep things amicable please.

Shane

Kevin wrote:

The issue that VW kept bringing up, and still does, is that the Prussians weren't defeated tactically, and they were, and the other issue is that the tactical systems were practically the same.

Kevin:
He may be repeatedly bringing it up, but that is not an issue I am addressing. I have repeatedly said that the Prussians were defeated tactically, and the French and Prussian systems weren't the same.

I am simply pointing out that your conclusions on what actually is happening tactically doesn't do justice to the narrative that Bressonet is providing--or actually describe what occurred between the French and Prussians tactically. That's it. What happened tactically, and why it happened are the issues--the superiority of the French tactical system was never an issue for me.

Tactically, your view of Jena, where Garwert stands still and takes catastrophic losses doesn't explain how Davout, outnumbered 2-1 caused the Prussians some 13,000 casualties in about five hours, while Hohenlohe, also outnumbered 2-1 lasted 8 hours [Not counting Ruchel's arrival], and suffered 10,000 casualties. Nor does it help explain why Davout suffered @ 7,000 casualties, The French at Jena some 6,500.

Best Regards,
Bill H.

Shane wrote:

That book can be analysed in several different ways by individuals who will all come to their own conclusions in the end based on their own judgement but I do think it a little rude to suggest one is, "blind" if one does not see things your way Bill.

Shane:
I am not suggesting that Kevin is blind, nor am I suggesting that a book can't be analyzed several different ways. I am suggesting that the quotes provided didn't represent tactically what Bressonet was describing as a whole, nor were they representative of the tactical dynamics between the French and Prussians at Jena at the particular points that Kevin quoted.

For instance, he quotes where Holtzendorf has his infantry steadily volleying the French tirailleurs in the woods as representative of the Prussian tactical methods, when Holtzendorf has previously deployed 1,000 of his line infantry as skirmishers to deal with those French skirmishers. The Prussians/Saxons cleared the woods before them of French tirailleurs, only to be in their turn overwhelmed by Saint-Hilaire's entire division coming up. The reinforced French tirailleurs go over on the attack and drive the Saxons out of the woods. Too late, Holtzendorf realizes he is outnumbered and decides to retreat. The Saxon infantry is then seen volleying the large number of attacking French skirmishers to simply hold them off…

Tactically, that is a far different dynamic than Kevin is suggesting with his quote--which he seems to feel proves the Prussian one note response to skirmishers--volley fire.

And regardless, the Prussians were obviously tactically outclassed in any case.

If it was Kevin who said that about your summation I dare say there would be an uproar right now by several here who just wait for the chance???

Lets please keep this debate away from this kind of wording and keep things amicable please.

Shane:
I have no idea what 'uproar' would ensue. However, that is what Kevin was saying about my 'summation' with his quotes, only he feels I am taking a position I never have held--And continues to argue against it in the face of my repeated clarifications. I am not interested in proving the Prussians were tactically equal to the French. They weren't. However, I am interested in determining what did happen tactically, not isolating all the places where the Prussian infantry stood and volleyed skirmishers, then determining that is all the Prussians did tactically.

And I am all for keeping things amicable.

Bill H.

Kevin wrote:

As for the parade ground being a training ground, the Prussians took that just a little too far and their training, which was one of their problems, didn't go much further than that. Some Prussian officers went to the extreme of dressing ranks with survey instruments. Their training was not realistic nor coordinated with the other combat arms.

French training on the other hand, was. They stressed infantry/artillery coordination and actually trained their troops to operate in open order, line and light, and they fought the way they trained. So did the Prussians. That's one of the reasons they lost.

Kevin:
So it wasn't that the Prussians, or the British or other nations' armies for that matter, performed with 'parade ground' perfection under fire, but how the Prussians went about it. And *some* Prussian officers went to extremes--very true. However, *some* Prussian officers ignored the official regulations altogether and wrote their own, and *some* Prussian officers actually trained their troops to fight in open order and coordinate with formed troops as per the regulations--not as well or as extensively as the French, obviously. However, the Prussian 'system' as carried out by Prussian officers was all over the map, rather than one note. If Jena proves anything about the Prussian tactical responses to the French, that is it.

Best Regards,
Bill H.

Chouan,

Please do read the messages have only suggested it once, I doubt very much if he will heed my suggestion and continue to be a member of the 9e.

Wagram

Bill,

Above, you took Kevin's post apart citation by citation, fair enough, debate is all about this.

However, after you did so in the same post you then said:

but those conclusions shouldn't blind one to what actually went on during the battle

and…

Or blind one to the actual tactics and battlefield dynamics that occurred.

To me that is implying that because Kevin did not see things the way you did he surely must be blind…

Sorry Bill but I cannot see this any other way and I am sure Kevin would be a little peeved as well. Discussing the citations is fine but telling him he is blind for not seeing things how you see it is a little over the top. This is how debates turn ugly.

Anyway, I do not wish to drag the debate away from the intent for accurate research. I just wanted to get my point across.

p.s. yes, I am a reformed "thread" police officer now ;-p

Shane