"Effectiveness of Ground Attack Aircraft (Esp. Rockets)" Topic

Reading a book last night, and while it did not go into statistics or percentages, it suggested the Kill-Rate for Late War Rocket-Firing aircraft on armoured vehicles was quite small. It suggests the real problem was the havoc wrought on soft vehicle logistic support.

This flies in the face of a) what I saw at the end of SPR, ii) The way my favourite set of WWII rules sees it and 4) a lot of other stuff I have read, pictures of Jagdtigers with the tops blown off etc, etc.

But as I thought more about it, given that the Typhoon pilot had to line up on the tank and then fire his rockets without the aid of any sort of computer-jiggery, and that the rockets once fired went their own sweet way without smart technology, I am starting to find it surprising they hit much at all.

Are there any reliable Stats on the effectiveness of Ground Attack?

Pat

I would doubt the reliability of any statistics that exist. The aircraft were not around long enough to properly assess the damage they did or didn't do.

I have always been under the impression that the main effect of such aircraft was to disrupt any attempt at concentrating vehicles. Although kills on a lone tank no doubt happened, convoys would be a target they could hurt and just making convoys impossible makes their work worthwhile.

x42

Taking out tanks with rockets wasn't very easy as you often needed a good direct hit to do real damage.

Against trucks etc, it was more effective as a near miss could still take it out.

Many of the "blown up" pics are usually abandoned tanks that have been blow up by allied demolition teams.

Generally, it was a good idea to think of them as an area-effect weapon, and shoot them into a mass of targets. They sure didn't have the accuracy of machineguns.

My Dad always said they were his favorite weapon though, since he actually got to see them blow up – if he dropped a bomb or torpedo (not that he ever actually dropped a torpedo in combat) he was too busy evading/pulling up/getting the hell gone to see what happened.
-Kle.

Following the Normandy campaign there was an extensive survey of damaged/destroyed German vehicles. The damage was evaluated and checked against the claims made by aircrew. Surprisingly, the number of armored vehicles destryed by air attack was remarkably small.

Similarly, Panzer Lehr Division did not take massive casualties/damage on the Normandy approach march. Rather the greatest impact was the interdiction caused by having to constantly pull off the roads and take cover.

My old Dad was a Typhoon pilot. He thought they were completely useless and didn't think he ever hit anything with them.
Zetterling goes over this in great detail in His Normandy 44 book. In British training trials on a stationary target (not subject to combat conditions, ie ground fire, smoke, fear etc) accuracy was 4% per salvo of 8 rockets.
The morale effect on those on the recieving end is another matter.
See also Gooderson's book,: "Allied fighter-bombers versus German armour in NWE, myths and realities"

Apparently a lot of hits were verses abandoned tanks (run out of supplies or broken down).

One of the very first attempts at Operational Research was carried out by 21st Army Group and 2TAF in NW Europe towards the end of the war. It included a detailed assesment of the effectiveness of ground attack aircraft.

Sadly it's conclusions do not bear close scrutiny by modern standards. This was OR in it's very early stages.

So to answer your question, no- there are no reliable stats as the tools simply weren't available at the time.

All you can do, however, is study the overall effects of Close Support and Battlefield Air Interdiction. In particular look at the effects on morale and C3 that allied air supremacy had on the Germans. You can conclude that it was a very significant factor.

As has been said, the effects of rockets on tanks has been over-stated down the years, though their effect on the softskinned 'tail' of the armour, plus the supporting railway network and the morale effect of being under air attack, was tremendous.

One indicator of how difficult it was to score a direct hit with a rocket was that the RAF originally developed solid rockets for AP work and HE rockets for anti-shipping work. These were later swapped, as near-misses from HE rockets were far more likely to cause damage than the very slim chance of getting a direct hit with solid shot (though ships, being large targets, made solid shot the ideal weapon).

Oh, no arguments there Luddite – similarly I understand 1940 Stukas were not much cop at actually blowing stuff up – but for messing with an army's head they were top of the line.

Pat

The 21st army group study (On all causes of elimination on German vehicles, not just aircraft) was pretty exhaustive. Would love to know why it "doesn't bear close scrutiny" or by whom?
Or does a moniker like "Wg Cdr" tell its own story?

Most wargames overestimate the efectiveness of most weapon systems, at least in terms of causing actual casualties per number of rounds fired. You can rationalise the apparent over-effectiveness of ground attacks in games by stating that there are numerous planes flying over the battlefied, but only a few (the ones that are diced for) might have an actual effect.

"Are there any reliable Stats on the effectiveness of Ground Attack?"

There are certainly stats (reliable though?), and in general they are in line with the comments above that the chance of scoring a direct hit on a tank with a rocket or even a full salvo, were minimal (less than 5%). In terms of overall effect however, air attack was incredibly demoralising and disruptive, so the game effects of air attack in many rules probably aren't far off the mark. You also need to be careful if reducing air effects to their historic levels if you don't also do the same for things like artillery, AT fire, small arms etc. As mentioned above, most wargames rules overrate weapon lethality.

Interestingly (or perhaps not) in Dupuys analysis of the quantitive effects of air power, he came out with the surpising conclusion that in terms of overall enemy combat degradation general interdiction was approximately six times as effective (relative to combat potential of the aircraft employed) compared to direct ground support due to its general effects on mobility, logistics and C3. CAS effects were much more localised and temporary, although no doubt very gratifying to the troops on the ground who called them in.

During the Israeli-Arab wars, it was discovered that air attacks against armored targets was only about 2% or 3% effective. This was from 48 through 67. The survey was done by both Israeli and US memebers after the battles. Now against soft skin vehicles it went up to double digits. Many an Israeli armored commander would wonder if the damn pilots were as good as they said they were, why was there still so many tanks shooting at them.

If it was this bad in a desert, how bad was it in the woods and fields in Europe. The main effect was that everytime you saw a plane you had to get off the road and get out of the vehicle. It doesnt take a lot of planes to really slow a column down. The other thing was that resupply, refueling and reorganizing was not something you wanted to do while the enemy planes were strafing you.

Actually Wg Cdr Luddite is correct. The report by 21st Army Group while a major work would not bear up to modern scrutiny. The data was gathered, under a variety of unsuitable conditions by a number of different parties, often with no specific training. There were no real base criteria, data was gathered on an observational basis. For instance you could have Royal Artillery officers examining tanks attacked by aircraft. Often vehicles were examined after they had been picked over by scavengers, blown up by their crews or, sometimes and, allied engineers. Not only that but there has been some suggestion that the figures were skewed somewhat to suggest that anti-tank guns and artillery were more effective than they really were. Any prizes for guessing what branch of the army the officers in charge of the survey came from? ;-0 All in all a good resource, but not reliable by modern standards.

Fatman

Cheers Fatman. You've answered christot's query beter than I could.

Fair enough, thanks for that.
Doesn't change that the base hit chance In training (reliable stats) was just over 4%..So what we don't know is just how much more poorly this weapon performed in combat.

I would guess that these weapons had two chances of hitting all and next too none;-P

Fatman

I'd imagine the number of actual tank kills was pretty small. But as noted, the overall disruptive affect on supplies and communications could be significant. So the next time a Typhoon knocks out a tank on your game table, you can rationalize that, in fact, the Typhoon knocked out the tank's fuel trucks 30 miles behind the lines so that the tank never actually made it onto the battlefield in the first place :)

Ah….but then you would get players clamouring for their units to be stronger or at full strength to begin with, ….

These are some comments from 6th Airborne Division post Varsity on the effectiveness of air to ground support –

"It is considered that the air support afforded to airborne landings requires to be of a more intimate character and that the final wave of bombers and fighters should come in immediately ahead of the first wave of parachute aircraft and gliders. During the landings attacks should continue on the flanks of and as close as possible to the area in which the troops are landing.

The aim should not be so much to destroy the defenders, which is very difficult to achieve, but to attack their morale, get their heads down and keep them down. This will only be achieved by continuous and intimate air support, though the difficulties of coordinating this support if it is not to interfere with troop carrying aircraft is fully appreciated…

…(After the landings) The majority of targets were very close to our own troops (300-500 yds) and red smoke was not sufficiently accurate; on one occasion it fell 200 yds short, the aircraft attacked the smoke but fortunately without inflicting casualties to our own troops. Although about twelve targets were attacked during the day none were really good air targets. However, though the material effect may not have been great, the moral effect on the enemy was considerable and undoubtedly prevented any real counter attack from developing."

Largely in line with other comments here, it suggests that successfully targeting an individual vehicle or dugout with an unguided weapon fired from a propeller driven aircraft, itself travelling at speed, while also possibly taking evasive manoeuvres to avoid enemy fire was about as easy to achieve as digesting this sentence…in other words, good luck! There was also a post-war report that spoke glowingly of the effect of 60-lb RPs fired from Sherman tanks in the final few weeks of combat, including their effect on enemy morale and helping persuade them to surrender, and on at leasr one occasion their ability to kill by concussion without a direct hit.

Gary

I seem to recall reading somewhere that the average life expectancy for ground attack pilots was 17.5 attacks.
Jerry had a lot of AAA and the gunners often had a fair bit of practice.

The problem with the rockets was partly because they were just plain inaccurate and partly because they turned into the wind.
Both these effects could be reduced by a very steep angle of attack, a fast approach and firing them at as short a range as possible.
All of which, however, made each attack riskier.

Allied Ground Attack Notes on the (lack of) effectiveness of Allied WW2 ground attack planes. Ian Gooderson's 'Air Power at the Battlefront', London 1998, contains a couple of cases studies.

link

Robert

"But as noted, the overall disruptive affect on supplies and communications could be significant."

By disruption I meant that effect of CAS, not general interdiction. A rocket/cannon/bomb attack may well fail to hit anything or kill anyone, but it was hugely disruptive to the target unit which rendered it ineffective for some time. Against some types of soft targets they were of course physically devastating (supply columns, horse drawn artillery etc – anything which had trouble lying down;-) The morale effects of air attack appear to have lasted longer than those caused by artillery fire.

On top of that you have the general disruptive effects of air interdiction.

"So the next time a Typhoon knocks out a tank on your game table, you can rationalize that, in fact, the Typhoon knocked out the tank's fuel trucks 30"

No. The Typhoon missed the tank but the crew bailed out and legged it or suffered a mysterious 'mechanical fault' which rendered the vehicle incapable of further action for the time being.

The only anecdotal stuff my father really added was the effect of flak, which more or less boiled down to if there wasn't any enemy ground fire he (and his comrades), pressed their attack, prefering cannon and making mulitiple passes until the target was destroyed. However, at the first sign of heavy ground fire they simply dumped as much ordanance as possible in the general direction of the target and went home, and never made a second pass (the more ordanance expended also meant more time available in the NAAFI while the planes were re-armed, apparently this was important!). This wasn't a result of any official tactic or policy, but simply because his squadron were suprised at the number of pilots lost in the first week after D-Day, and those who survived intended to keep it that way.

Although, as Gooderson relates, there are examples like the Guards Armoured at the start of Operation MARKET 17 Sept 1944, when rocket firing Typhoons proved extremely effective in the tactical battle.

Stukas are still my German KGs favourite way to deal with Char Bs.

Fatman wrote:

Actually Wg Cdr Luddite is correct.

Actually, both he and you are hugely mistaken. I take it that neither of you know much about either the history or the current parctice of OR.

The report by 21st Army Group while a major work would not bear up to modern scrutiny.

Not so. A pal of mine who now works for DSTL at Fort Halstead (and previously worked for DERA and CDA) has used it in his work.

While it is true that 1944 was close to the birth of the field of OR, it is a great mistake to believe that more recent practitioners are somehow vastly better at the job than the founders of the subject. Some of the best OR papers I have ever read come from WW2, and there seems to be a noticeable decline in quality some time in the 1950s.

The data was gathered, under a variety of unsuitable conditions by a number of different parties, often with no specific training.

Gathering data in the field is the essence of OR -- it's what makes it "operational" -- and unsuitable conditions are an unavoidable part of that. As for "no specific training", are you suggesting that 21 AG's OR section was somehow professionally incompetent?

There were no real base criteria, data was gathered on an observational basis.

I have no idea what you mean by "real base criteria", so I'll have to ask you to explain it. Likewise, I'd like to know on what basis data can possibly be gathered, other than an "observational" one.

engineers. Not only that but there has been some suggestion that the figures were skewed somewhat to suggest that anti-tank guns and artillery were more effective than they really were.

What suggestion is that? Reference, please.

All the best,

John.

And now, some contemporary estimates of hit probabilities for rocket-firing Typhoons. These figures are taken from PRO document WO 291/2357, "Rocket Typhoons".

This report is dated 12 June 1945. The expected probability of hits on different targets using RPs is given as:

Target__________________Dimensions___________% hits
Small gun position______5' diameter______________0.2
Panther tank____________22'6" × 10'9" × 9'10"____0.5
Large gun position______10' diameter_____________0.8
Army hut________________60' × 30' × 20'__________2.8
Large building__________120' × 54' × 50'________10.0

"Among the hundreds of abandoned and knocked out tanks that have been examined, no instance has been recorded of a tank that has been hit by R.P. and escaped major damage."

RP are very effective on guns (20mm guns are blown to pieces), tanks, barns and huts. Brick houses have a large hole knocked in them and "considerable havoc wrought inside". Anti-personnel effects are limited, as the rocket tends to bury itself, and on concrete structures and thick masonry such as churches the damage inflicted is superficial.

The morale effects of rocket attack appear considerable. Enemy PWs report that all personnel except flak gunners hide from aircraft from 1 to 10 minutes after the completion of an attack, expecting the attackers to return for a second strafing pass.

"It appears quite definite that it is the nature of the attack that upsets the Germans and not the physical damage which it causes."

RP Typhoons are also reported to have a considerable heartening effect on friendly troops.

All the best,

John.

This is i think is Mr Kennedys report

APPENDIX "B" TO 21 ARMY GROUP AFV TECHNICAL REPORT NO 26

REPORT BY 1 ARMOURED COLDSTREAM GUARDS OF RESULT IN ACTION OF TYPHOON
ROCKETS FITTED TO SHERMAN TANKS

The results achieved by these rockets when used in action were highly
satisfactory, but before discussing these it is necessary to point out the
limitations of their use caused by lack of time for experiment, etc.

Less than 24 hours after the idea was conceived (shortly before the crossing
of the RHINE), the first tank was already fitted up with a home-made
bracket, rails and warhead.

The only resources available for this purpose were Battalion fitters and
Battalion LAD.

The brackets were roughly sighted for line with the vane sight on top of the
turret but all elevation had to be adjusted and set from outside the tank.

The "shear" wire used to gain the impetus for launching the rocket was the
same as that used in a Typhoon. The Typhoon is travelling at upwards of 400
mph when the rocket leaves whereas the tank is stationary. Therefore the
''drop" due to lack of impetus in the first 10 yards flight of the rocket
had to be overcome by a set adjustment in the bracket itself. This precluded
all possibility of actually pointing the rocket at the target even for short
range shooting.

Owing to the above and other considerations it was decided to have one
rocket set to hit anything that got in its way up to about 400 yards and the
other one up to about 800 yards. (This required the setting of

the brackets to be at 150mm and 160mm above the horizontal respectively).

EFFECT ON ENEMY.

1. Morale

The morale effect – especially against ordinary troops – was tremendous. On
occasion a strongly held bridge was captured when rocket firing tanks were
used in support of our infantry. The first 88mm gun was knocked out by a
rocket and the rest failed to fire. 12 PW came in deaf as a result. None of
the other guns fired. The enemy suffered over 40 dead and we had next to no
casualties.

This of course was not caused entirely by the rockets, but they certainly
had a lot to do with it.

On a second occasion, our infantry were being troubled by enemy infantry in
a wood. Two troops of tanks fired two rockets each from about 400 yards and
the did not fire another shot, and 30-40 Infantry, including
"Brandenburgers" came out of the wood afterwards and gave themselves up.
They were extremely shaken. There were several other occasions of this
nature.

2. Killing Effect.

In the type of fighting encountered after crossing. the RHINE, only two
types of good targets were found for the limited use of rockets – woods and
buildings.

On one occasion after a Squadron had fired all its rockets and a number of
other missiles at a barracks, it was found that there were about 40 dead in
the buildings after the battle was over. The hitting power is like that of a
shell. The explosion caused by the rocket is slightly greater than that than
that of a medium shell.

3. Other Uses.

The rocket was found effective in removing road blocks when they were
covered by fire and it had considerable effect when ordinary HE and AP did
not.

It was never possible to use them against an enemy AFV chiefly because very
few AFVs were encountered at close range and also at present they lack the
accuracy in aim. If, however, the latter defect is overcome they would
undoubtedly remove the turret from any enemy AFV with a direct hit.

APPRECIATION OF PRESENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES.

On the whole the equipment proved most satisfactory, but the results were
limited by the points already mentioned and also by the fact that a number
of tanks fitted with rockets were lost through enemy action and

through normal break-downs, etc. Thus, although we started with a whole
Squadron, we ended up with comparatively few. The weapon was obviously most
useful from a morale point of view and this was lessened when the number of
rocket firing tanks dwindled.

As far as a "non-expert" can tall, the possibilities of this type of rocket
fitted by experts to a tank either as a main armament or a subsidiary one,
are almost unlimited.

The decree of accuracy could be largely increased by use of a stronger
"shear" wire, a proper sighting arrangement, a telescope and a range table.

If used as a main armament it should be possible to carry as many rockets as
shells with added simplicity that it would be unnecessary to carry both AP
and HE. It should be stated in this connection that no "accidents" were
caused by the rockets – one went off when the wire was severed by an air
burst which must have generated the required electrical current. Two tanks
that were gutted by fire still had the rockets undischarged at the end.
Another direct hit on a war-head merely shattered it.

Should this type of rocket replace the gun it would enormously simplify the
design of a tank owing to there being no recoil, breech block, etc.

There should be no difficulty in fitting four or eight to a tank which could
all fire at the same time causing a tremendous fire power and this should
make up for any slight deterioration in accuracy.

RAC Branch, Second Army, have made the following comments on the above
report:-

1. It is emphasised that the excellent results obtained were from very rough
and ready appliances made with no technical assistance from outside.

2. It is felt that the results of the experiment may be of interest to those
concerned with the future armament of AFVs.

---

Comments by DG of A, Ministry of Supply on the expected accuracy of rockets
as tank armament.

(257/Tanks/1367/E44 dated 9 August 1945 enclosed in RAC3(b)/BM/1748).

I see little prospect of obtaining the necessary precision required from
tank armament by means of rocket projectiles. Neglecting the difficulties of
serving projectors mounted on the outside of protected vehicles and dealing
entirely with the accuracy aspect the situation seems to be as follows:-

Present accuracy of normal HV gun is of the order of 1.2 mins with its most
accurate service shot. This is not considered by the WO as surf recently
accurate. They demand a m.d. of 0.5 mins.

Rocket accuracies are still being quoted in degrees rather than minutes and
vary, according to the method of launching, from the unrotated fin
stabilised rocket at 1.2 degrees (i.e. 62 mins) to the spin stabilised
rocket fired from a machined liner with a closed breech at 0.2 degrees i.e.
12 mins.

The most favourable prediction which the CPD has recently made is that as a
ten year probable development rockets might be obtained with accuracy
comparable to present guns, which is at the present time considered by the
GS as not sufficiently accurate.

I cannot see the rocket replacing the gun as a precision weapon unless some
unforeseen development of it occurs and can only visualise its use as a
secondary armament of one shot weapons for short ratio fire against fairly
massive targets.

Somewhere I have a copy of a report done by the USAF with a rocket-firing Mustang vs a stationary T34 in 1950 or thereabouts – even with ideal conditions the chances of geting 1 hit from a salvo (6 rockets IIRC – 4.5" or 5"?) was only single figures.

That's the one Black Bull, some room for the 'pulp' gamers out there to field whole Squadrons, even Regiments, of British Shermans converted to fire barrages of rocket projectiles at…whoever they might be fighting in 1946?!

Yes--chances of hitting a tank in action might only be 2-4% at best but when you are attacked by dozens of Typphies several times a day those odds add up… as do the odds the crew abandon the vehicle as they feel death is imminent..This is the point of air power if you have it your enemy feel helpless against it and so are more likely to break…Hence why in Russia 1941, France 1940, Greece 1941 etc it had such a massive influence..

I think it was hte feeling of helplessness – it is described in all sorts of otehr situations too – there's nothign at all you can do to hit back or control your destiny.

It must have been particularly hard on tankers – imagien being in a nice invulnerable tiger or Panther, or a Mk IV or Stug hull down – all happily smacking over allied tanks and feelign invulnerable……now suddenly you are the prey….this tank that was your protection is now a liability – a massive target to enemy from above…..the only thing yuo can do to save yourself is get out and run…..

I remember the results of the British rocket tests. No hits were scored on the first pass. A few hits were scored on second and third passes.

The volume of rockets lauched off ground attack aircraft has to be taken into account. Say 200 dedicated ground attack aircraft hauled eight rockets into the sky for nasty work vs ground targets, and did Three sorties per day.
And shot all their rockets at targets. That's 4800 rockets a day. Say 1% hit. That 480 rockets hitting something. It is a bad day on the ground.

From the article I linked above just for Aug 1944. Sorties and claims.

SORTIES AND CLAIMS BY ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCES
FALAISE POCKET, AUGUST 1944

RAF 2nd TAF US 9th AF Total
Sorties 9 896 2 891 12 787
MT destroyed 3 340 2 520 5 860
Armour destroyed 257 134 391
____________________________________________________________
Total claims 3 597 2 654 6 251
Claims per sortie 0.36 0.91 0.49

link

Robert

If 1% of 4800 hit that's 48, not 480.

And if they're fired in slavoes there's probably a good chance that a few of the targets will get hit by more than 1 rocket, so that's less than 48 targets.

And not all the targets will be tanks……

200 sorties a day? – when the 2 TAF was ordered to do "all out" air attack at Mortain it managed 294 Typhoon sorties on 7 August.

The Typhoons in 2 TAF amounted to 7 wings – nominally 21 squadrons each of 12 operational a/c.

I don't know what their actual strength was, and certainly some squadrons did mroe than sortier per a/c that day, but the average is only 1.3 sorties per nominal a/c.

At Falaise the whole TAF managed an average of 1200 sorties/day…one Canadian wing is said to have averaged 6 sorties/day…if it was 30 a/c strong (nominally 36) that only leaves about 1000 for the whole of the rest of the 2 TAF – which had anything up to 1000 fighters and a few hundred bombers…..

2 TAF's oob as of D-Day vcan be seen at link – haven't been able to find anything more about them later in Normandy.

2 TAF and 9 AF (US) sorties & claims can be seen at link right towards the bottom of hte page –

Basicually 2 TAF claimed about 1 kill every 3 sorties, 9 AF about 1 kill every sortie – but 2TAF did about 3 tiems the number of sorties.

I have in my files somewhere the German tally of losses in Normandy, rather surprisingly there is little combat damage from CAS or such.

As others have noted it is the interdiction that does the damage.

G

It is important not to under-estimate the moral effects of tactical airstrikes though, even if their material effects are small. In game terms this can be a 'kill' or least a lengthy suppression.

In some of my operational rules I factor overall air superiority into movement rates, along with an attritional factor and a supply influence. While individually the effects are relatively minor, the cumulative effects are crippling – which is essentially what Dupuy found.

The inability to mass armour is a huge problem for a panzer division.
Then there's the inability to maneuvre significant mass during daylight.
Add to that frequent lack of fuel which means you need to have your panzers completely inactive for long periods.
Bit embarassing when one of those times coincides with a sherman driving round the corner.

"some room for the 'pulp' gamers out there to field whole Squadrons, even Regiments, of British Shermans converted to fire barrages of rocket projectiles at…whoever they might be fighting in 1946?!"

Why pulp and 1946? The "Calliope" and variations were operational from mid 44 on.

link

The only anecdotal stuff my father really added was the effect of flak, which more or less boiled down to if there wasn't any enemy ground fire he (and his comrades), pressed their attack, prefering cannon and making mulitiple passes until the target was destroyed. However, at the first sign of heavy ground fire they simply dumped as much ordanance as possible in the general direction of the target and went home, and never made a second pass

That was my Dad's (USN, TBM, Pacific) experience as well. Of course, he only had to worry about multiple passes when doing ground support – naval strike was always all-or-nothing.
-Kle.

Sorry John Salt. You are wrong.

Whilst I appreciate you earn a living with the MOD in the modern world and are intimately absorbed with the minutae of warfare, Fatman and I do not.

We are able to sit back, digest historical information at leisure and take a balanced veiw of the overall picture.

Quoting detailed stats from WO 291/235(which I believe is part of the 21 AG study) misses the point.

We don't contest that this detailed study exists. Merely that it is at best unreliable and at worst downright wrong.

And why the empasis only on RPs? (yes I know, they are sexy to wargamers) The vast majority of air to ground attacks in NW Europe were carried out by .303, .50cal, 20mm and iron bombs.

Wg Cdr Luddite wrote:

Sorry John Salt. You are wrong.

No need for you to be sorry. There is, however, a need for you to provide something in the way of evidence. While I understand that, as a Yorkshireman, you may well consider yourself to be the world's leading expert on everything, you must understand that your unsupported opinion doesn't count for a lot. This is especially true when you make astonishing claims that some of the founders of the discipline of OR can't do OR as well as they should.

Whilst I appreciate you earn a living with the MOD in the modern world and are intimately absorbed with the minutae of warfare, Fatman and I do not.

I work for a commercial company right now. The fact remains, however, that a colleague and good friend of mine, who still works for an agency of the MoD (and is a Fellow of the OR Society) has used the study you and Fatman were badmouthing in his work. It is also referenced in Gooderson's book. How you can continue to claim that it wouldn't stand up to modern scrutiny, when it demonstrably has done so, is quite beyond me.

We are able to sit back, digest historical information at leisure and take a balanced veiw of the overall picture.

And you therefore assume that I can't? What an astonishingly arrogant assumption. Tell me, how many OR reports, from WW2 or indeed any period, have you actually read?

Quoting detailed stats from WO 291/235(which I believe is part of the 21 AG study) misses the point.

Wrong again; it is a separate publication. I'm not quite sure what point you think is being missed, but I think a report on the effectiveness of RPs is at least somewhat germane to the topic of the effectiveness of GA aircraft, especially with RPs.

We don't contest that this detailed study exists. Merely that it is at best unreliable and at worst downright wrong.

On what grounds? What better evidence do you have? Show it. To remind you; your unsupported opinion isn't evidence.

Incidentally, I did a quick check of the P(hit) figures from the "Rocket Typhoons" paper with my P(hit) calculator, assuming an expected angular dispersion of 16 mils (slightly less than that quoted in the paper on Tulip), an initial velocity based on the Tulip paper plus 300 mph for the aircraft speed, and a 2.5m by 2.5m target at 1000 metres with zero ranging error. Under those conditions my program gave a P(hit) of 1%, and it doesn't bother resolving to less than a single percentage point, so I would class that as excellent agreement. If you want to show that the P(hit) figures are wrong, you are going to have a hard time doing it.

And why the empasis only on RPs? (yes I know, they are sexy to wargamers) The vast majority of air to ground attacks in NW Europe were carried out by .303, .50cal, 20mm and iron bombs.

The clue's in the thread title.

Now, where is all this vast mass of historical information that you claim you and Fatman have "digested at leisure"?

Enquiring minds want to know…

John.

YouTube link

John

I think it's grossly unfair of you to engage in intellectual combat with someone whose weapon is marked "replica".

Cheers