"Skirmishers - How far out from the battalion?" Topic

In general, how far out were skirmishers sent in front of their parent battalions? Did it vary if the battalion was on defense or in attack? How about by nationality?

Thanks!

I dont know but id like to guess. Average 300 yards?

I hate to be trite but . . .

It just depends -- often at the discretion of the commander.

Just remember Skirmishers were not the uncontrolled amorphous masses you see in wargames. There was a chain of command.

Communications were often accomplished through the use of runners or musicians.

In the case of the latter, how far away can you be and hear a drum or trumpet over the din of battle. -- Not very far.

Using Runners, figure 50 to 100 yards from the Battalion CO to the Skirmish Company Co. Then another 50 to 100 yards to the platoon sergeant and perhaps another 50 to 100 yards to the corporal or skirmish section (which might be another 50 to 100 yards).

Often, not everyone in the Skirmish Company deployed. A reserve was often held back clustered around the Company Commander.

I guessing at the 50 to 100 yards. I have never seen anything dealing with the 'distance' between elements in the skirmish tree.

mjc

It can vary quite a bit. Some nationalities had their much further out than others. Others also had a "skirmish reserve" so they had skirmishers at, say, 200, a skirmish reserve at 100 and then the main line.

But like so many things, the first answer is right but unsatisfying: it depends.

About 100 paces i:e 2.5 feet times 100.

We can look at the actually published post-war recommendations to find some direction on this.

But let me just shoot off the cuff.

1. Skirmishers might be used to seize some featue not occupied or worth occupying "right now" terrain feature. This might be any distance from the front line of the line of battle and might be opposed.

2. Skirmishers might be used to shoot up and pepper the enemy's line of battle. Cause casulties. Keep them from seeing what is going on on your side of the fence. Allow your attack to move to medium range (100 yards) from the enemy line without any delay or hold-up or losses.

3. Skirmishers might be used to keep the bad guys from doing a #2 on yourself.

4. Skirmishers might be used to freeze enemy units by engaging them with mininal force from your side, while you deploy to take advantage of their wrong-foot balance.

I can understand how hide-bound, theoretical officers-turned-historians would not taste the skirmish ebb-and-flow and wish that it would go away. Success and failure in the skirmish war would not be recorded and results ascribed to hapenstance or other events.

On a more practical note – GA rules give 6 inch skirmish range when 1 inch = 100 yards. By this the author is suggesting that a brigades 'skirmish threat zone' is about 600 yards. I think this makes a good maximum.

maximum distance from formed infantry 400
maximum effective range of musket 200

Probably this would be rare in open ground where cavalry could scoop them up. To put this is perspective I think lines would deply 100-300 yards from each other (front to back).

I do remember reading about distances between the screens, reserves and the main line which pointed towards a max distance of around 300yds. So thats what we do in our games.

Shane

Howdy:

Been traveling for work for the last several days. The "It depends" answer also applies to three other issues besides circumstances:

1. Time Period
2. National doctrine
3. Experience

1. The time period. The wars lasted twenty years. Things changed. Much is made of Davout's instructions in 1810/1811 [Actually, I have seen several years given for the isntructions] because it details the French methods. These are held up as the pinnacle for light infantry practices in general and the norm for the French. Two things are overlooked in this assessment.

First, Davout felt it necessary to actually write the instructions because they weren't the norm or universally accepted practices. He was attempting to impose a norm for his corps, and in doing so actually includes debates about the advantages to deploying skirmishers from the third line and with volunteers as well as by company. If they were known to be inadequate or disproven methods, why bother?

Second, there is no doubt that the methods that Davout instructs were used before his instructions and certainly worked for his corps. But, they weren't always used by the British, who were certainly effective skirmishers, nor did other nations universally adopt them. Prussia could be said to have been on of the better reform efforts and demonstrated the most success against the French in 1813 and after, and their procedures were markedly different, utilizing the third rank.

All through the Revolution, the French employed volunteers, third rank, marked men as well as skirmishing by company, and this continued to some extent through 1807, with Ney's corps, for instance, utilizing the third rank as skirmishers. There was development, change, and more than one method utilized during the wars, by every nation.

2. National Doctrine:
Each nation, at different periods, had different distances *recommended* in their instructions and manuals.

The Russian Jager 1786 Jager Manual written by Kutuzov, noted 200 yards, though Bragration's later light infantry manual and other instructions including "Day of Battle", noted 300 or 100 paces/yards.

The French, Davout being a good example, noted the distance between the skirmish line and supports, and then reserve, the total recommended being 300 or more yards, but how far the skirmishers could or should deploy was not ever mentioned that I found.

The Prussians, starting with Hohenloe's 1803 instructions, recommended 100 yards. This was increased to 200 yards in the post-1806 reforms.

The British Rottenberg Rifle and Light Infantry manual suggests 200 paces. Yet, distances were often greater. At Salamanca, the skirmish battle before the main even had no real relationship to the front lines, and the Light Infantry that moved forward to silence the French guns in the center were much further than 300 yards from their formed line.

At Vittoria, Hill's division deployed 1/6th of the division as skirmishers, 1,600 men, and they were almost a mile ahead of the division proper.

The problem with doctrine was that it remained almost strictly focused on the defensive nature of skirmishing, so that such actions as Hill at Vittoria are not addressed before or after the wars in any manuals I have seen. Obviously, starting with the wild skirmish hordes of the French Revolution, offensive skirmishing, whether grande bande or in support of formed troops advancing would move much further forward.

3. Experience: What is obvious from the Prussian example is that distances *tended* to expand with experience, which makes sense, as less experienced skirmishers/officers would be less inclined to stray from the formed units.

However, that is a generalization. Here are two actions, one in 1806 and one in 1815. They demonstrate the difficulty if making meaningful generalizations in regards to skirmishing.

The first is an example of inexperienced, untrained troops skirmishing.

In October 1806, Lazare-Claude Coqueugniot became major and commander of the newly formed 1. Légion du Nord, whose four battalions were raised mainly from Poles amongst the Prussian prisoners of war. He writes about the combat at Dirschau (today Tczew in Poland, south of Danzig) on 23rd February 1807. The Prussian enemy is about three hundred paces away in front of the French/Polish Battalions of the Legion du Nord. :

I could not maneuver my troops by column, nor deploy them, because my troop knew nothing and [chef de bataillon and commander of the 2nd batallion] Roumette was probably the only officer who knew something about maneuvers. I brought together the officers of the 2nd Battalion to inform that I intended to throw the whole battalion forward in skirmish order towards the front of the enemy line, which appeared to be patiently waiting for us.

I directed them to explain to their troops that, when a soldier was going to fire, he should move forward 20 paces [12,9 m] and then to get between two furrows to reload his musket, fire, and continue to advance in the same manner. After this, upon a musket shot, which I had indicated as the signal for movement, the companies scattered as they ran forward. Their fire was heavy and the skirmishers continuously advanced.

After a half-hour I saw, by the clearing of the smoke, that the enemy was maneuvering by platoon. The cavalry wished to charge, but I opposed it. I advanced the mounted troops, with four companies of the 3rd Battalion. This movement fired the audacity of the skirmishers, who threw themselves against the enemy. The enemy withdrew, in disorder, to return to the village, abandoning its [four] cannons, which the skirmishers captured.

This passage is an extract from the English translation of Coqueugniot's history of the Légion du Nord, done by George Nafziger and published in the Nafziger Collection with the title "The Légion du Nord, 1806-1808, Memoir of Major Coqueugniot.". The French version, "Histoire de la Légion du Nord 1806-1808. Memoire de L.C. Coqueugniot, Major.", has been republished in 1992 by Bernard Coppens in the Editions Bernard Coppens.

This second account is from Quatre Bras 1815. Captain McKenzie of the 79th Cameron Hightlanders, Kempt's Brigade, Picton's Division:

Scarcely had the division got into position when the enemy advanced to the attack. The light companies of the first brigade, with the 8th company and the marksmen of the 79th, were ordered out to skirmish and keep down the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, which was causing heavy loss particularly amongst the officers. It was now a quarter to three o'clock. The light companies in front maintained their ground for an hour against the ever-increasing number of the enemy; but as his sharp-shooters had by this time picked off nearly all the artillerymen who were serving the only two British guns which had as yet come into action, and as he was becoming very threatening in the front, the Duke of Wellington, who was present with his staff, directed Sir Thomas Picton to detach a regiment to the front, in order to cover the guns, and drive the enemy from his advanced position. Sir James Kempt thereupon rode up to Colonel Douglas and said that the honour of executing His Grace's orders would devolve on the Cameron Highlanders.

The regiment accordingly cleared the bank in front, fired a volley as it advanced, and, charging with the bayonet, drove the French advanced troops with great precipitation and in disorder to a hedge about one hundred yards in rear, where they attempted to re-form, but were followed with such alacrity that they again gave way, pursued to another hedge about the same distance, from which they were again driven in great confusion upon their main column, which was formed on the rising ground opposite. the regiment, now joined by number 8 company, halted and formed up behind the last hedge and fired volleys at the enemy until all the ammunition was expended. Whilst in this critical position it was ordered to retire, which it accomplished without confusion, although it had to re-pass the first hedge and cross deep ditch, and formed line about fifty yards in front of its original position. Here it was ordered to lie down as it was much exposed to the enemy's fire, and it remained lying down for about an hour, when it was again ordered to its original position in the Namur road.

This is from Rory Muir's book Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon pp. 65-66. He says

In this case the losses inflicted by the French skirmishers were unusually heavy, for the Camerons lost two officers and twenty-eight men killed, sixteen officers and 259 men wounded, while all the mounted officers had their horses shot under them. But it is clear that the regiment's advance had failed to drive off the skirmishers, athough it may have brought at least temporary relief to the other units in the division. It was fortunate that it made its advance and subsequent retreat without interference from enemy cavalry: Probably the hedges and ditch helped to protect it, though it was repeatedly threatened later in the day.

There are several things to say about this skirmish engagement:

1. It was carried out by British troops at the end of an era of effective skirmish operations, but still had difficulties with French skirmishers. And yes, there were new troops in the British forces, which may have been a factor.

2. Even with all the light companies out, the British could not prevent the French from inflicting casualties over an hour's time, which means the French were probably within 200 yards of the British formed troops, if not as much as 100 yards.

3. Wellington is the one to order a divisional commander to send out a regiment, which belies any claim that army commanders 'didn't involve themselves in skirmish activities.'

4. When pushed, Wellington opts for a tactic that military historians chide the Prussians in 1806 for believing will deal with skirmishers: Formed volleys and charges to disperse them.

5. Even with the charge, the skirmishers simply came back and forced the Camerons to lay down to avoid more casualties.

6. The British in an hour's time lost a lot of men…, particularly officers and artillerymen, before the Camerons themselves suffered more casualties.

7. The fighting was within 200 yards of the British, and from the advances made by the Camerons, the French support columns were not more that two hundred and fifty yards from the skirmishers. [as estimated by McKenzie…]

Supposedly untrained soldiers shouldn't do as well as experienced soldiers. These experienced military also supposedly use 'modern' tactics of sending out more and more skirmishers. Yet, here you have examples that are exceptions to those beliefs…

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Bill,

Another interesting post.

But, with reference to:

"This second account is from Quatre Bras 1815. Captain McKenzie of the 79th Cameron Hightlanders, Kempt's Brigade, Picton's Division:"

I think that you will find Captain McKenzie wrote a regimental history of the 79th and was not actually at Quatre Bras, so this is not an eyewitness account. The whole thing is a rather bastardised version of Lieutenant Forbes' account, who was actually there, and whose tale is slightly different.

The charge was made against "constantly increasing numbers of the enemy, who had by this time displayed a force which rendered it necessary for the brigade to charge". Major Calvert of the 32nd, who also participated in this charge, saw the enemy "descending in column from the opposite hill. When this attacking force had crossed both hedges lining the meadow in the bottom, and commenced ascending our position, the 32nd regiment poured in upon it a heavy fire succeeded by a charge." His further comments make it obvious that this is the same attack that the 79th made. So is this an attack against a skirmish line, or against a formed opponent? I would guess the latter.

Captain Snort:

Now don't go dissing another Captain. The action you describe with the 32nd is later in the day once the Camerons have returned from their prone position ahead of the main line. As it was over the very same ground, the earlier action could sound like the later one.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Captain:

Are you speaking of Major Forbes of the 79th? Or was he a Lieutenant at the time? Captain McKenzie certainly took personal accounts to build the regimental history. Forbes account reads in part:

"The Light Companies of the 8th Brigade, to which were added the 8th Company and marksmen of the 79th Regiment, were immediately thrown out when the Action commenced. This movement was ordered by…Wellington in person, who was here present with his staff… These troops maintained their situation for an hour against the constantly increasing numbers of the Enemy."

The Camerons are called on to clear the skirmishers, stop at the hedge, volley for a time, and then retreat, ending up laying down for another period of time before joining the rest of the line. After which the French columns advance, probably believing the skirmishers have done their work and the Camerons, along with the rest of the Brigade charge.

Bill H.

Bill,

Forbes was a lieutenant at the time of the battle, the account that you have is the same one.

I wasn't intending to "diss" anyone, but I think it is important to point out when quotes from tertiary sources are being presented as primary, albeit unwittingly on your part.

Regarding the actual issue of skirmishers, Quatre Bras is very interesting but also shows the difficulties that we face in determining where the skirmishing ends and the close order fighting begins from the information available.

In your commentary, you see this as an example of close order troops having to desperately charge in order to swat away some pesky tirailleurs, who then proceed to return unharmed at the first opportunity to do further mischief. From the quote in Rory Muir's book, this is a fair assumption.

Study of some available primary sources paints a very different picture. It is true that the skirmishing saw many of the British regiments having to commit additional companies or marksmen to hold the French back, but the bayonet charge was only launched when the French columns approached close in the rear. Good British accounts of this can be found by Forbes of the 79th, and Calvert, Crowe and Ross-Lewin of the 32nd. It seems clear that they are all talking about the same event and that there had been no original sortie by the 79th, and that all except the 79th rallied a short distance from where the charge began. The 79th pressed the French back to their own position, and suffered accordingly, having to retire as described.

The scale of the French rout, and the fact that it was far more than swatting away a few skirmishers, can be found in Vie Militaire du General Foy by Girod de L'Ain. Foy describes the 2nd leger, which formed the head of Bachelu's column, breaking in front of the bayonet charge and sweeping away the entire division, which could only be rallied a considerable distance in the rear. Foy found it necessary to deploy one of his own regiments, the 100th ligne, in order to arrest the progress of the Highlanders who were also impeded by the terrain.

There is a tendency to see the French as either dense clouds of tirailleurs or dense columns, with no middle ground. Surely some of the musketry at Quatre Bras, particularly the fight between Foy's 100th ligne and the 79th Highlanders, must have been line against line?

From reading Napoleons finest, Davout used skirmishes for lots of things, like keeping contact between battalions if they were out of the standard range, he made a "bridge" that could be hundred of yards long with skirmishes so that battalions kept contact

Captain S:

This is where a lot of accounts falter: Skirmish actions are often ignored or glossed over. It think it is the case here. Let me show you what I mean:

Here is the account of the action from Historical records of the 32nd (Cornwall) Light Infantry … By G. C. Swiney, page 112. This is from the viewpoint of the 32nd and based on Calvert, Crowe and Ross-Lewin's accounts, among others:

"The ground we occupied for the most part swelled into gentle "slopes, and extended from the Namur road on the left to a thick" wood on the right, called the Bois de Bossu. The Charleroi road" ran through the position, and in front there were some fields of "amazingly tall rye.

When we came up the firing had almost ceased, [against whom, if the Brigade wasn't there? I think the 32nd was last to come up.] but it soon" increased again ; and shortly after we were hotly engaged with the "second corps of the French army, led by Marshal Ney.

"A heavy column [Typical of British accounts, 'column' is used both as a formation and a large body of troops, the latter here.] advanced against the fifth division, the officers" marching in front, flourishing their swords and encouraging their " men ; but they were quickly driven back, and forced through the "hedge at the bottom of the slope on which we had been drawn" up. They had to cross a long narrow field and a second hedge" before they could get under cover from our fire, and an admirable opportunity of taking a number of prisoners was lost here, while "they were making their way through a small opening. Indeed, " numbers of them had ordered their arms in the expectation of being "pursued and taken, but they escaped with inconsiderable loss, as "our troops were halted at the first hedge."

The French, when they " had all passed to the other side of the fence, lined it, instead of " retiring, and commenced from behind it a most destructive fire on " our division, which was so much exposed on the side of the hill; " in consequence, the regiments were ordered to fall back, and lie " down on the reverse slope.[away from the first hedge,obviously.] The 32nd, while retiring thither, "suffered severely from the fire of the troops that lined the fence. "Such attacks were continued with little intermission, but we maintained our ground, invariably repulsing all the enemy's efforts to "regain it.**

[Italics mine]

Now, what sort of gets lost in the description is that the Brigade was formed on the top of the slope above the first hedge, and they remained halted at the first hedge--at least the 32nd. The time sequence is a little confusing too, as when everything happened. However, there is a footnote** to the passage, which explains much:

** Kempt's Brigade, in consequence of the greater proximity of its original position to that of the enemy, was the first to overthrow the French infantry. The 79th, on the left of the line, made a gallant charge down the hill, dashed through the first fence, and pursued their opponents, who had advanced in two battalion-columns, not only across the valley, but through the second fence; and, carried on by their ardour, even ventured to ascend the enemy's position. By this time, however, their ranks were much broken ; they were speedily recalled, and as they retraced their steps across the valley they derived considerable support from the adjoining battalion in the line, the 32nd Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland), which was keeping up from the first hedge a vigorous fire against the French, who now lined the second fence.—Siborne, vol. i., p. 113.

[Italics mine again]

There were two hedges, the first, closest to Kempt's brigade, the second further down the hill across a narrow field, beyond that were two fences. The second one, furthest down is the one that the French lined to skirmish and the one the two French columns had advanced through. According to the footnote, the French columns never passed the first fence and that the 79th advance on the columns "even ventured to ascend the enemy's position", after pursuing the broken enemy.

It is clear to me, at least, that the 79th advanced separately from the Brigade AFTER the first hedge had been gained, after the 32nd arrived, but before the 32nd retired up the slope and laid down on the reverse slope.

The 79th chased the skirmishers back to the enemy's position held by the columns, returned under the cover of the fire from the rest of the brigade [and the 32nd] at the first hedge, and laid down. Then after that at some time, the 32nd too laid down to avoid the skirmish fire, but after providing support fire at the first hedge.

It is also obvious that several French advances were made, but the brigade "maintained our ground, invariably repulsing all the enemy's efforts to "regain it" I also think that last comment is important. When had the French gained the ground Kempt's brigade occupied, so that they then failed to regain it?" He is speaking of that first hedge, even though the 32nd at some point was laying down on the other side of the slope from it…

In several hours of battle, which saw several enemy advances, interspersed by heavy skirmish fire, the sequence of events can get jumbled. The skirmishing isn't as dramatic or as *important* as the formed columns advancing, so it gets short shrift in the accounts.

What I think is evident is that the 79th made an advance separate from the rest of the brigade, advanced to near the location of the Enemy columns, and then returned to the Brigade line. [Hence the special footnote] Whether this was before, after or among several French attacks by formed troops, isn't as clear…

Anyway, the lack of a 'middle ground' between dense columns and dense clouds of tirailleurs is that they came in waves, coordinated with each other's actions, so that separation in the memory is difficult at times. I doubt that the confrontation between the 79th and the French was one line versus another. That would have been unique enough to mention… I think it is just what the regimental histories suggest--a formed unit attempting to dispurse large numbers of skirmishers…chasing them back onto their supporting columns.

Bill

Gunfreak:

Yes, good point. The Jena accounts also show the French doing that. The actual uses of skirmishers in battle was far more varied than some wargames would lead you to believe.

Bill

Bill wrote:

"I doubt that the confrontation between the 79th and the French was one line versus another."

Bill,

Why do you say that? Foy states that he deployed the 100th line to cover the rout of an entire division, not a few skirmishers, and to oppose the British. He never mentions skirmishing.
Similarly, the 32nd lay down to avoid infantry fire coming from a thick line of troops behind a hedge. There is no mention of this being delivered by skirmishers. The French could, and did fight in line. There are plenty of examples from the Peninsula if you look hard enough, so why not at Quatre Bras?

Captain S wrote:

Why do you say that? Foy states that he deployed the 100th line to cover the rout of an entire division, not a few skirmishers, and to oppose the British. He never mentions skirmishing.

Similarly, the 32nd lay down to avoid infantry fire coming from a thick line of troops behind a hedge. There is no mention of this being delivered by skirmishers. The French could, and did fight in line. There are plenty of examples from the Peninsula if you look hard enough, so why not at Quatre Bras?

Captain:

Several reasons:
1. That's not what either the 79th or the 32nd histories describe. The French certainly did fight in line in several instances, but there is no mention of lines in the account. Columns yes. Skirmishers, yes--from the 79th regimental history, but no lines when the 79th advanced, and Foy deploys the 100th when there is a divisional rout, and the 79th didn't do that…not if the British 5th division, by their own admission, didn't follow, and that there is no rout described at this point, …and the French come back more several times after the 79th's adventures.

2. This wasn't a half hour engagement with only one advance, but several lasting over 2 hours as noted in the both histories, though not all are described. And while there are several, a divisional rout isn't mentioned among them, so it must have come later or remained unknown to the 79th and 32nd eyewitnesses. You certainly don't think the advance of the 79th described is following a French 'divisional rout', do you?

3.Throwing out skirmishers, particularly all the light companies, as well as the 79th's 8th company and marksmen isn't something one does when facing formed infantry in line advancing on you. They kind of get in the way of the volleys and charge… There certainly isn't any mention of fresh troops forming lines to meet the 79th advance after the French were repulsed.

4. There is no mention of fire from any location other than the second fence down the slope, far down the slope, well beyond 100 yards from the British, according to the 79th history, which suggests skirmish fire and not volley fire.

5. I doubt that you can find the British describing a line formation as 'thick' when it would always be the same thickness: three ranks. However, the word 'thick' is often employed to describe skirmisher groupings.

6. In British accounts, skirmish fire is often simply referred to as 'heavy fire' or enemy fire because there are no formed troops to mention. This is common among British accounts. "Fire" is what is described here, not lines or volleys, which when given by the 79th are called volleys.

7.As the 79th history refers to it specifically as skirmish fire and skirmishers the 79th chased, I see no reason to assume otherwise at this point. The regimental histories were built on individual accounts and vetted by participants once written, so glaring errors or real corkers of misrepresentation aren't all that common. That isn't conclusive, but certainly more substantial than any evidence suggesting the French were actually creating the heavy fire in line formation.

8. What is obvious is that between the two accounts, the 79th and 32nd, there are not only discrepancies, but internal confusion in some of the sequences. As I said, when there are multiple advances, repulses, lulls in the attacks where skirmishers snipe etc., it is hard on the memory. So, there is the suggestion in this that there were a number of French advances and they could have been some confusion between which what first, second, and some mixing of the two. This is common. It may not be the case here, but certainly a distinct possibility.

Obviously, this is taken from just two references, but considering the number of accounts they are both based on, I don't see any other way of interpreting it at the moment.

Just my view,

Bill H.

Bill wrote,

"That's not what either the 79th or the 32nd histories describe."

Bill,

Regimental histories are based on the accounts of soldiers who were there. The eyewitnesses don't describe chasing skirmishers about, or engaging lines of skirmishers with close order troops. Phrases such as "The French, when they had all passed to the other side of the fence, lined it", especially when they are the remnants of a large retreating column, could be interpreted as anything, but probably not skirmishing. A successful bayonet charge would hardly be halted by a line of tirailleurs. There is only one bayonet charge in all accounts, British and French, and that caused the rout of Bachelu's division (probably only one brigade in reality).

It's a matter of opinion in the end and we are perhaps trying to squeeze more out of these incomplete accounts than is actually there. We'll have to agree to disagree on this one :-)

Captain S:
Yes, unless we get more information, we are trying to get a quart of water out of a pint jar.

You write:

Phrases such as "The French, when they had all passed to the other side of the fence, lined it", especially when they are the remnants of a large retreating column, could be interpreted as anything, but probably not skirmishing.

That 'probably not skirmishing' is a point where we part company. I see no reason to assume that. And from the 79th history, there was no suggestion that the troops at the fence actually halted the 79th, but the threat of the columns behind.

I still see as the major issue the statements that these French advances were multiple, but only one is described, and it seems to be because the 79th went forward by itself. The other point that I can not agree with is to assume the 79th history and the footnotes of the 32nd as basically wrong because they 'disagree' with the eyewitness accounts. The regimental historians would recognize that. The histories are, among other things, an attempt to reconcile all the accounts, which included vetting from the men who were there--the eyewitnesses who wrote those accounts. The histories specifically state that…

But in the end, with out better evidence, it is a matter of opinion. But Debate sharpens the thinking and interpretation skills, which is valuable in itself.

Thanks,

Bill