
"Austrian Third Rank as Skirmishers?" Topic
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Grognard1789 | 22 Aug 2009 10:51 p.m. PST |
The next chapter on active defense starts out; [pg.41-47] "During the wars of the Revolution a very extended formation generally prevailed. Napoleon was indebted to it for the great results of his first Italian campaigns. But in the other French armies not the slightest attempt was made to imitate his shock tactics with columns. The French divisions, not yet united into corps d'artru.e, fought now as formerly in very loose coherence. Even the results of Suwarow's bayonet attacks had not the effect of making them abandon this formation. The formation of corps d'armee in the year 1805 put a limit to this, and necessitated a change in the tactics of their opponents. The great increase of armies which then ensued had the effect itself of deepening the battle formation, so that the troops might be more in hand. This was especially conspicuous at Wagram. Napoleon was indebted to the depth of his formation for being able to repel the attack of the Austrian right wing, and the Austrians again paid for the want of depth of this wing with the loss of the battle.At Borodino, favourable circumstances gave the Russians the opportunity to make an active defence, which resulted in their making an obstinate resistance. Their right wing, which was considerably extended, was perfectly unoccupied, and was consequently enabled to be disposed of as the emergency required. The " active defence " had already previously exercised the most important influence upon the formation and first disposition of armies. Napoleon had already made the way for it in his Italian campaigns—those of Rivoli and Arcole—and by the blow which he struck against the centre of the extended movements of attack which the allies were making, produced an overwhelming effect upon the whole military world. In Spain the English were indebted to the " active defence " for their glorious results. Talavera gave the French the first foretaste of it. Albuera and Salamanca became glorious victories. Theory became at this period master of the matter. Napoleon, like Frederick the Great, knew that where it was a question of producing an effect upon a mass of men, it was not necessary to proceed as if each individual were to be affected, because the fright which seizes on a portion soon permeates the whole mass like an electric spark. It is in this respect that we find the difference between the methodical fight and the more forcible methods of the two greatest generals of modern times, shown in the clearest and strongest manner. It was in this that the justification of the first manner of fighting in the wars of Liberation, and of the preponderating employment of skirmish fighting in the French revolutionary wars, lies; as it was by this plan, that as many combatants as possible were brought into immediate contact with their opponents. These, however, are not normal circumstances. Though in principle the same, Napoleon's battles differed from those of Frederick, as we have already shown, only by the alteration which had taken place in tactical forms, and by the other scale which was brought about by the numerical increase of armies. Even the attack against the enemy's centre, which he so often made use of, was only a modification of Frederick's maxim, "To bring one's own strength against the enemy's weakness," and is only permitted where these conditions can be fulfilled in the highest degree (as at Austerlitz, Ligny). Before this time there was nowhere any object for it to direct its fire upon. The skirmish fight is being carried on in every direction ; the masses are kept in the background and avoid coming to the decision, because they have not yet measured each other's strength. There will be, of course, certain foci of the fight; but its immediate object at first is only to bring about a mutual weakening ; at the most, through some small though powerful coup a more advantageous fighting situation may perhaps be obtained ; but the greatest care is necessary in doing this, for it is exactly the economy of force that decides the day. Too much importance must not therefore be attached thereto, in order to be able to hope that finally there will be a greater force available than that of the opponent. This naturally applies to the artillery, which will have become much dispersed by these single combats ; and just as much to the cavalry, which must be omnipresent, in order that the full effect of any partial successes may be reaped. It is therefore not to be wondered at that, with a few unimportant exceptions, there is hardly any mention of the deeds of these two arms in the course of the campaigns of 1813-14-15, and that, with all their distinguished deeds in small detachments, they did not succeed in winning that glittering crown which warmed with its refulgent rays their younger brethren-in-arms, and raised them to that noble self-reliance in the force of their arms which is so necessary. The artillery, even on those occasions where it really performed insurpassable service, as at the battle of Bautzen, did not even receive from the German tacticians, that acknowledgment which their opponents would not withhold from them. For, it was it alone, which, in this battle, parried that blow of Ney, which would otherwise have brought disaster on the army. The true economy of forces consists in employing them in a suitable manner, based upon their being thoroughly competent. Each arm should have its sphere of operations thoroughly explained to it, and each must give the other support. (Active Offense) Cheers, CM |
Grognard1789 | 22 Aug 2009 11:22 p.m. PST |
Sorry for all the lengthy posts, but thought you might find this of interest as well, and I feel it rolls up this whole thread nicely covering all the topics from beginning to end? From: Napoleon; a history of the art of war, Volume 3 By Theodore Ayrault Dodge [pg.23-28] TACTICS AND ADMINISTRATION AT END OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.During this period most European nations, save France, remained under the influence of Frederick's system, which had been ill-construed, and had degenerated into formal tactics, and what is known as the cordon system. This was such a posting of troops in small bodies over long fronts as subjected the line to be broken through with ease. For battle armies were similarly marshaled, had no reserves to retrieve disaster, and battles were rarely fought out. In the American Revolution the marksmen-farmers fought in open order behind trees and walls, and won against regular troops in line. Lafayette, Rochambeau and others carried this idea to France, and the French Revolution produced large bodies of skirmishing light foot. In addition to this, to utilize the momentary courage of the French recruit, heavy columns charging with the bayonet, and backed up by plentiful artillery, were used. What this period produced was the new system of personal service and the creation of larger amounts of light foot, horse and artillery, which suited the genius of the French people, and made it easier to get value from the young conscript. In open order, sustained by columns and squares, the French soldier did wonders. The army was divided into divisions for administration. Staff duties were made more prominent. Instead of being fed from magazines, rations were requisitioned on the march. The French soldier was taught to make huts or shelters, and tents were abolished. This lightening of the train largely increased the speed of the troops. Other armies followed these movements slowly, but the French kept well ahead of them. They were a constant surprise to the enemy. Minor and Battle Tactics. At the opening of the French Revolution the influence of the Prussian tactics, which Frederick had so splendidly illustrated, was predominant everywhere, except in France. The three-rank foot and two-rank horse formation was almost universal, but in battle the third rank, in Austria and Prussia, grew to be held superfluous, and later the foot was marshaled in two ranks. In the Austrian army the third rank of each battalion was drilled to withdraw before action, and to form into three two-rank companies, which made up a species of reserve. The English infantry had for a long while stood in only two ranks, and the Spanish campaigns proved the formation equal to all demands. The Austrian cavalry still rode mostly in three; but before action the third rank also withdrew, and ployed into column to protect the flanks. Thus the formation for both attack and defense was a long thin line, in which the foot relied chiefly upon its fire. The main evolutions of minor tactics were advancing and retiring' in line, wheelings, ployments and deployments by smaller or greater bodies, forward and flank marches by platoons and sections in close or open column. The battle order of an army usually consisted of two lines of foot with light troops out in front, and a reserve too small to be efficient. Each line was under command of a general officer, and consisted of brigades of from four to six battalions each. The horse invariably stood on the flanks, unless these were leaned on obstacles which would fend off cavalry charges by the enemy ; and then the horse was stationed in the rear. Each battalion had a gun or two, and at certain places in the line batteries of reserve artillery of heavier calibre were placed. The mounted artillery was generally employed in the front with the light troops, or with the reserve; or else it accompanied the light troops, if detached; the cavalry was given but little of it to complete its efficiency. Artillery opened the action, and the skirmish line fended off the enemy's light troops. Then the first line of the attacking army advanced to within musket range of the enemy, strove to break it down by its fire, and when this was done, charged. The cavalry meanwhile sought to outflank and attack the enemy's foot and thus demoralize it. When covered by its cavalry, this had first to be driven in. If the first line did not soon succeed, it was reinforced or relieved by the second line. Should this make no better progress, and the cavalry not have beaten the opposing horse, the victory was rightfully claimed by the enemy, who had stood on the defensive. Concentric attacks were common, in front and on the flanks and rear of the enemy's army ; but unless these attacks could be timed so as smartly to work together, the result was apt to be failure. The army acting on the defensive fought in place after much the same fashion, relying on its artillery and infantry fire; and the second line and cavalry assisted the first line. The retiring of the first line was wont to have an ill effect on the second. Hence, unless the first line of the army on the defensive could stand off the enemy's first line and cavalry to good effect, this army would be apt, for fear of defeat, to break off the battle and retire to a fresh field, an operation in those days of slow manuvers much more easy of accomplishment than it is to-day, as the opponent was rarely ready to follow. Frederick had given to his battles the true flavor of his own burning genis; but as a rule, in disposition for battle and in its conduct, there had since been little homogeneity or concentration. The troops were far too much spread and out of hand. They often lay in small isolated bodies, each exposed to be separately beaten. The whole mass was wont to be put into action at once, so that no reserve was left to reestablish a waning action, or renew an attack which had failed, but which, delivered afresh, might succeed. Battles were never fully fought out, and one party or the other retired from a field half won or lost. Reserves powerful enough to give a new turn to a battle were unknown. The French troops were the first which, partly by the accident of exceptional conditions, opposed to this system the open order combined with the column of attack. The success of this new idea quite supplanted the old Prussian lineal tactics ; and it forms the most important of the tactical changes of this remarkable period. Thrice at least in our history we Americans have taught the world some valuable lessons in war. At Concord and Lexington we proved the superiority of good marksmen in open order, each one taking advantage of the accidents of the ground, over seasoned regulars who fought elbow to elbow. There had been firing in open, or skirmishing, order known as early as the first introduction of firearms. But at the beginning of the eighteenth century only the irregular foot, mostly irresponsible though brave men, thus fought. Then Frederick introduced it among his light infantry ; but as the advancing fire of the regular Prussian line was what the king relied on to win his battles, this dispersed manner of fighting never grew to great importance in his scheme. In the American Revolutionary War the open order fighting of the sharp- shooting farmers, with little discipline, lent lustre to the system by beating the marshaled lines of British or Hessian regulars, led by excellent officers. What had succeeded in America was imitated in France, many French officers who had served in America being on hand to teach the method. Such were Lafayette and Rochambeau. When the armies of the First Coalition crossed the French border, their long lines were met by irregular parties of skirmishers, who took advantage of every hedge and wall and ditch, and advanced upon them with a fire which did much harm, though these franc- tireurs suffered little; while in the rear, under cover of the horse, the new levies formed a heavy column of attack in which multitude lent confidence. And when the skirmishers had done their work, this deep column, with true French elan, preceded by artillery fire and sustained by cavalry, advanced on the long thin formation of the allies with great effect, and frequently disrupted their weakened line by a charge with the naked weapon. The effect of this novelty in action upon the old-fashioned line of battle was marvelous. Not until the Gaul met the colder-blooded Anglo- Saxon in the Spanish Peninsula did this column rush tactics fail against the line. While it is true that the use of the open order which began in Europe in the French Revolution was a direct product of American experience, and was imitated by the French under conditions similar to those which had prevailed in the New World a decade before, the ployment into a deep column of the reserve was already well known. Folard, early in the eighteenth century, made plans to draw up troops for battle in deep formation, so as to attack with the pike and bayonet. This was in "part a copy of the Greek phalanx, or of the " battles " of the Middle Ages; but it was also founded on the French national character, which Folard aptly recognized as being better adapted to a charge in column than to long- drawn-out fire in a slender line. But there was too great formality in war in Folard's time to lend his column any proper success; and at the end of his century there was far too much adherence to the Prussian line system to enable anything but an entire change of conditions to bring about a new method of infantry attack. Two other French military authors, Mesnil- Durand and Guibert, indulged in long and bitter controversies on these points; but nothing was settled until the raw levies of the French Revolution, instinct with patriotic fervor, found that some new means of overcoming the allied troops was called for. This means proved to be the above described attack in mass with the blank weapon, covered by heavy artillery fire and sustained by horse. The endless theorizing of Folard, Mesnil-Durand and Guibert was supplanted by an instant and practical object lesson. Yet their works had pointed out the way. Thus arose, in France first of all European countries, a large body of light infantry trained to fight in open order; and its success also introduced a similar training in the line infantry. Following hard upon this came, as an essential sequence, the creation of battalion columns which should attack with the bayonet, a tactics which was also learned by both light and heavy infantry. These two quite opposite yet consistent ideas were united and made to work together; and their use soon rendered them effective. Later, in Egypt, the square against cavalry, long used by Russians and Austrians in battle with the Turks and Tartars, and by the English in India, came into play, and the French grew expert in combining these three methods. (Active Offense / Defense) Cheers and thanks to you all for inspiring me to question and learn. CM |
Defiant | 22 Aug 2009 11:47 p.m. PST |
sweet information, keep it coming. |
Grognard1789 | 23 Aug 2009 12:04 a.m. PST |
O.K. Shane one last one for the night/morning. From: The American revolution In two volumes By John Fiske [pg.54-58] While busy with all these laborious reforms, the good baron found time to prepare a new code of discipline and tactics, based on Prussian experience, but adapted to the peculiar Steuben conditions of American warfare, a manual on tactics, this excellent manual held its place, long after the death of its author, as the Blue Book of our army. In this adaptation of means to ends, Steuben proved himself to be no martinet, but a thorough military scholar; he was able not only to teach, but to learn. And in the art of warfare there was one lesson which Europe now learned from America. In woodland fights with the Indians, it had been found desirable to act in loose columns, which could easily separate to fall behind trees and reunite at brief notice; and in this way there had been developed a kind of light infantry peculiar to America, and especially adapted for skirmishing. It was light infantry of this sort that, in the hands of Arnold and Morgan, had twice won the day in the Saratoga campaign. Reduced to scientific shape by Steuben, and absorbed, with all the other military knowledge of the age, by Napoleon, these light-infantry tactics have come to play a great part on the European battlefields of the nineteenth century. Cheers CM |
Grognard1789 | 23 Aug 2009 9:34 a.m. PST |
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McLaddie | 23 Aug 2009 12:15 p.m. PST |
Grognard quoted Wickam's English translation 1876: Skirmish fighting owes its origin to the American war for independence. That it had existed in an extended form some centuries ago, was all that was known about it. The experiences which had limited its use, and had finally suppressed it, were likewise lost. Consequently, in the first campaigns of the Revolution, it was carried out to such an extent that almost all cohesion disappeared. The column was considered solely as the reservoir for the skirmishers, and not as that powerful regulator of the fight which gives the decision. This is silly history and simply untrue. If all cohesion disappeared in the first campaigns of the American Revolution, it was because they were untrained and couldn't keep cohesion. The Americans worked very hard to establish and maintain that battle cohesion, starting with von Stueben, Trenton and Princeton 1777. The author contends that skirmishing was a lost art and not seen on the European continent until after 1776. It is like the French and Indian War never happened, and certainly many, many events during the SYW AND before. Any particulars he and others describe as unique elements of skirmishing in the American Revolution are found in Europe long before hand. How about this, from 1645: (Austin Woolrych, "Battles of the English Civil War," Pan Books Ltd, London; 1969). It is part of the description of the Royalists as they took up position for the battle on Marston Moor: "The second feature was the obstacle, a long ditch or drain, which divided the Moor from the fields. It was close behind this that Rupert stationed his cavalry, and such infantry as he had with him, to deny the Moor to his opponents. From about eh center eastwards, the ditch was apparently deep and lined by a hedge, but it was shallower and less formidable towards its western end, where it curved round to peter out near the junction of Kendal Lane with the Tockwith-Marston Road. Rupert lined this ditch with musketeers, choosing his own and Lord Byron's regiments of foot for the task. Such a screen was often thrown out before an army's main front; it was known as a 'forlorn hope', and its job was to harass and disrupt an enemy attack as far as it could before falling back on its main body. Posted as it was in this instance, it made the ditch a nasty obstacle to tackle – especially for the cavalry – before coming to grips with the main royalist forces close behind it." [p.67] Or 1745, at Fontenoy: 900 Arquebussiers de Grassin were deployed in the Wood of Barry and held off the British / Hanoverians for several hours forcing them, through skirmish fire on their right flank, to commit much larger numbers to clear them out of the woods. Or the Seven Years War: besides all the light infantry activity on the American Continent, there was very similar actions in Europe, a number reading like not only Concord, but the later Napoleonic wars. There were enough of these events to disprove it was a lost art and absent from the battlefield as the English translation by Wickham suggests. Lobostiz 1757: Several companies of Prussian Grenadiers dispursed and skirmished with Austrian Grenzers on the Prussian left Flank. Suderhausen 1758: Seven companies of grenadiers were dispersed in front of twelve French battalions of the line. [1,000+ grenadiers] while three other companies were placed in a small wood on the French right, while a light infantry volunteer group secured another wood on the left flank. Lutternberg, 1758: Another French regular force in line was preceded by a line of skirmishers. Lippstadt 1759: Faced with Hanoverian jaegers in skirmish order, the French commander had dragoons dismount and dispersed to face them while another 500 meter skirmish line was thrown out on the front of the main force and a 'picquet' was placed behind a hedge on the right flank to harass the Hanoverian infantry. Bergen 1759: volunteer units fought as light infantry in the woods while some of the regular units around Bergan fought alternately in line as skirmishers and then in column. I can give several examples at Minden, and Frederick's main attack at Kolin was disrupted by the skirmish fire from Croat light infantry on his flank. The best example of Austrian use of Grenzers was at the Battle of Moys, where five battalions of Grenzers, in support of grenadiers and line infantry, assaulted a position held by Prussian grenadiers. The Grenz infantry raised havoc with the tight Prussian formations through skirmish fire from behind cover, and greatly eased the task of the Austrian Grenadiers in their final assault. Only four years later, the French 1764 ordonnance recognizes the obvious need of line troops to skirmish from the French army's experiences in the SYW. It sanctions a section of tirailleurs as support for each column of attack. Later, the 1776 infantry ordinance provided a description of how the skirmishers were to conduct themselves. Officers were enjoined to use skirmishers while deploying the remainder of the troops in the traditional line. I am not sure how different the actual skirmish practices of light infantry were in formal engagements during the SYW and the American Revolution, and then following, the Napoleonic wars—aside from the numbers employed. Certaintly the irregular skirmish actions appear identical in tactics and purposes. I can find nothing that the Americans did as skirmishers that wasn't done in Europe long before the AWI. Certainly the Americans did it well and often, often to avoid formed combat at the beginning of the war, but there is little to chose between the 1645 skirmishers lining the hedge at Marston Moor and the Minute Men at Concord. The French light infantry in the woods at Barry were doing the very same thing the Americans were doing at Freeman's Farm sixty years later--with better weapons. Schornhorst, in detailing Prussian light infantry practices specifically mentioned TWO French light infantry manuals written in 1750! "Jeney – Le Partisan, ou L'art de faire de petite-guerre"; and Grandmaison, "Le petite guerre." ' IN 1810, Scharnhorst wrote: [They] "contains quite useful rules for the service of light infantry"
"those who know Jeney and Grandmaison will not find anything exactly new in it [Yorck's proposed light infantry manual.]" The light infantry practices outlined for the Fusiliers and line infantry in the 1811 regulations lift extensively from the two French authors. Paret discuses this at length in his "Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815". I agree with Brent Nosworthy when he says in his work With Musket, Cannon and Sword: "Napoleonic Warfare", rather than the product of one person's military genius, or a collective response to the emerging values and attitudes which culminated in the French Revolution, was instead simply the extension on a grand-tactical level of the properties and capabilities of the basic tactical system which ironically had been in place since the 1750's." I can find any number of authors, both respected and unknown, who conclude that the American Revolution somehow jumpstarted the development of actual skirmish combat in Europe, but when you look at the evidence that might support these conclusions, there isn't any. It's apocryphal, like the Prussian not skirmishing at Jena, or the Allies not knowing how to skirmish until after 1810, or that the French invented an entirely new form of combat never thought of before 1792. Skirmish warfare was far more evolutionary than Revolutionary
Best Regards, Bill H. |
Steven H Smith | 23 Aug 2009 3:29 p.m. PST |
Le partisan: ou, L'art de faire la petiteguerre avec succès selon le génie de nos jours. Détaillé sur des plans propres à faciliter l'intelligence des dispositions & de tous les mouvemens nécessaires au troupes légères
avec une méthode aisée pour guérir promptement les facheux accidens qui
. Author: Jeney (de, capitaine.) Publisher: H. Constapel, 1759. Length 176 pages. Le petite guerre: ou, Traite du service des troupes legeres en campagne. Author: Thomas Auguste Le Roy de Grandmaison. Published 1756. Length 417 pages: link |
Grognard1789 | 23 Aug 2009 3:36 p.m. PST |
Bill, I'd have to say I agree with all of your points. But I do believe that the AWI affected the evolutionary & French revolutionary warfighting capabilities in the art of skirmishing. It would be shear laziness by us historically to think that the French commanders (Lafayette, Rochambeau, Berthier, Etc
) did not witness the effectiveness of the continental army in successfully utilizing this tactic in defeating the worlds greatest superpower at the time (Great Britain). I believe the statement that initially the continental army was a disaster and fought the only way that it knew how, but there were several individuals, George Washington being one that had fought and learned hard lessons during the French & Indian Wars, and so had that knowledge base of previous training and history upon which to draw from. The role of Von Stuben I believe is the most important, he actually did to the continental army the exact same thing Napoleon was to do to the Army of Italy upon taking command. It is therefore only natural to see that the Fredrickian skirmishing tactics incorporated with the French & Indian War skirmish tactics came to fruition during Americas War of Independence, similar to the same with the French Revolutionary period forces to that of the Army of Italy. I served in both the RANGERS and Special Forces of the US Army from 1983 GRENADA through OIF and Afghanistan up to 2007, and by serving in these elite light infantry units, I can clearly see how these lessons learned could have transformed. I never forgot any of the initial lessons/mistakes that I learned from GRENADA by the time I retired in 2007. Ironically it was while serving in the RANGERS that I first became interested in skirmishing techniques historically. We were actually given a copy and still use today Maj Robert Rodgers standing orders developed during this period and still just as effective today; link source: i-kirk.info/tales/vnr17.html One of the pocket reference cards we received before going into the field was a reprint of the standing orders issued by Major Robert Rogers to his Rangers in 1759. More than two hundred years after Major Rogers wrote them down, they were still relevant to Vietnam: 1. Don't forget nothing. 2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute's warning. 3. When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first. 4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't never lie to a Ranger or officer. 5. Don't never take a chance you don't have to. 6. When we're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men. 7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it's hard to track us. 8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us. 9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps. 10. If we take prisoners, we keep 'em separate till we have had time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between 'em. 11. Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed. 12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout twenty yards ahead, twenty yards on each flank and twenty yards in the rear, so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out. 13. Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force. 14. Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries. 15. Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and indians attack. 16. Don't cross a river by a regular ford. 17. If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you. 18. Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree. 19. Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch. Then let him have it and jump out and finish him with your hatchet. SOURCE: link
RANGER CREED: Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and high esprit de corps of my Ranger Regiment. Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger my country expects me to move further, faster and fight harder than any other soldier. Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong and morally straight and I will shoulder more than my share of the task whatever it may be, one-hundred-percent and then some. Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well-trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, neatness of dress and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow. Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country. Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission though I be the lone survivor. Rangers Lead The Way! |
McLaddie | 23 Aug 2009 10:36 p.m. PST |
Grognard wrote: But I do believe that the AWI affected the evolutionary & French revolutionary warfighting capabilities in the art of skirmishing. It would be shear laziness by us historically to think that the French commanders (Lafayette, Rochambeau, Berthier, Etc
) did not witness the effectiveness of the continental army in successfully utilizing this tactic in defeating the worlds greatest superpower at the time (Great Britain). Grognard: I am more than happy to entertain the idea that experiences in the AWI influenced French skirmish practices, or other nations. It certainly is a reasonable possibility, even with the twenty years between the AWI and French Revolution. And if there is evidence that it influenced skirmish practices, this is the a good place to ask for them. What do folks know? I also think it would be laziness to assume the influences without any evidence of them. Myself, I know of only one French treatise, which I mentioned, that used the AWI examples in discussing skirmish methods. And as you note, today's Rangers follow rules worked up in 1759 for light infantry--not from the AWI, which I think is telling. And Hoo-rah. You have my respect. I know what Rangers have to do to become Rangers, and what they do once they are accepted. "C-One-Thirty rollin' down the strip, Airborne Ranger on a one-way trip. Mission unspoken, destination unknown, Airborne Ranger ain't never comin' home!" Best Regards, Bill H. |
JeffsaysHi | 24 Aug 2009 2:55 a.m. PST |
Lafayette – his memoirs are possibly online; though I must confess I have not looked being willing to take the word of the French General Staff writer Colin when he declared that Lafayette wrote NOT ONE SINGLE WORD commenting on US light infantry or skirmishing in all his military life. Present in the US Lafayette may have been, and certainly liked the place – but it would seem to me 'sheer laziness by us historically' (TM) not to check some facts rather than making sweeping assumptions that suit ones own prejudice. Similarly the British 1798 Light infantry regulations, although attributed to an officer based in Canada & thereby led some authors to claim 'American' influence, this officers prior military experience was in Europe with the French army. I think also Yorks manual relied heavily on Ewald, a Hessian officer with AWI experience indeed – but again as Bill notes, it was judged by Scharnhorst to contain nothing not already well known in Europe I am equally sure that the Austrian 3rd rank never served in America either. |
von Winterfeldt | 24 Aug 2009 3:29 a.m. PST |
Grognard 1789 It seems to me that the authors of your sources mentioned are very ill informed and generate the usual stereotype picture that is alas predominating the view of tactical use and development of warfare. As others pointed out – Frederick II created the light troops due to the results of the experience of the 7YW and indeed during the 7YW – where light troops already carried out raids deep into enemy territory or fought in the traditional way of skirmishing. This had nothing to do with the influence of experience at the AWI. The same could be said for the Russians, but they had plenty of enemies where light troops were in demand – they fought a lot of campaigns against the Turcs. Ewald wrote some good observations in his diary about the different nations performing in the AWI – about the French he wrote that they were the only troops left in America to be able fight in real close order. As far as I am aware – in the French Army the Chasseur companies existed pre AWI as well. Also the Crown Forces were not defeated by the Yankee skirmishers alone but mainly by their regular forces drilled by von Steuben and by their Allies the French. Of course officers would have had their share of experience in light infantry use in the AWI – but those already emerging from a light infantry back ground – like Ewald – there was nothing new to the trade – the Hessian Jäger performed very well already at the start of the war. About French Revolutionary warfare, Scherer already wrote standing orders for the Armée d'Italie well before Bonaparte and relied on "shock" troops. Bonaparte did create nothing new for the infantry of d'Italie – other than paying cash. McLaddie and JeffsaysHi gave already plenty of very good examples of genuine European development and use of light infantry. The French "light" troops leader in AWI was Lauzon – what did he write? |
Grognard1789 | 24 Aug 2009 6:07 a.m. PST |
I agree with the following statement; Present in the US Lafayette may have been, and certainly liked the place – but it would seem to me 'sheer laziness by us historically' (TM) not to check some facts rather than making sweeping assumptions that suit ones own prejudice. Unfortunately I have never learned a second language from the European continent (only Brazilian Portuguese) which doesn't help much when attempting to read French contemporary sources, so therefore I can only rely upon the English translations, or historians. I'm certainly not trying to state emphatically the the AWI changed the face of warfare in Europe, Lord knows the Europeans certainly had more practice (Actually AWI participants were merely transported Europeans fighting on a different front) mixed in with the only real North American's, the Indians from which they learned numerous techniques during the French & Indian wars, etc
So it probably is fairer to state that I believe that the F&I war and AWI possibly/probably influenced the evolutionary use of skirmish tactics that certainly had already existed in Europe and as we've seen presented by the evidence. But one thing I think that we all can agree upon is that certainly more research and possible discoveries exist out there somewhere? At this point it certainly appears to equate to the existence of the missing link. I'll definitely continue to keep digging, but for some reason "The shot heard round the World" has suddenly taken on more meaning! Cheers, CM |
Defiant | 24 Aug 2009 2:57 p.m. PST |
I do think the AWI would have played its part in the evolution of skirmish tactics in its own way just as the 7YW did and several other conflicts. I think this was a period of experiment and innovation where new concepts were used all the time. We, in the 21st century might not see these advances in technology very well but I am sure the men of those days did. Shane |
Steven H Smith | 24 Aug 2009 3:30 p.m. PST |
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Grognard1789 | 24 Aug 2009 9:40 p.m. PST |
Gentlemen, I found these contemporary sources which state similar themes. I cant explain exactly what it was but, there must have been something going on? "The way battle is waged over here is very special, and differs totally from our systems. We campaign only two men high, and one man has to act on a distance of 18 Zoll from the other, to be able to march in line inside woods and bushes. Cavalry is totally useless, and therefore our dragoons have to depend on their legs. Our colours encumber us much, and none of the English regiments has brought theirs with them. Every English regiment has a separate grenadier-, and a light company, which are formed into combined battalions which are of great use. The Corps Canadian Volunteers is not to despise. The savages cannot be trusted because of their innate bestiality. They are very brave, but also very unbridled, and therefore have to be accompanied by English or Canadian officers. Above all they wish to fight independently, not under the command of English generals or officers, as true allies and friends of the king. One certain Iroquois, called Joseph, has been in England for some time. He knows to make a correct judgement of the interests of the English and savages, and he tries to build himself a name as chief of an army of savages. One is trying to prevent this in every possible way, then God should be merciful to the colonists that will be their neighbours." Source; LETTER OF A BRUNSWICK OFFICER in the army of General Bourgoyne, to a friend in Brunswick, Fort St. Anne, March 1777 Militair-Wochenblatt, 18. Jahrgang (Berlin 1833), No. 865, pp. 4860-4862. "The way battle is waged over here is very special. We stay constantly two men strong, and do not fall down. The flankers have to take the brunt of the fighting, and as there are many watches and purses to acquire, the whole regiment wants to act as flanker. I wish to get rid of our caps; we are send into the thickest bushes, in a hot climate as well. Many of these caps of all regiments have already been lost in the bushes. The sabres are carried across the shoulder, so that the men can leave their waistcoat unbuttoned. We must melt in our puffed coats altogether. The English have been clothed according to the hot climate, with very short and light coats and long linen trousers, down to the shoes. The officers are clothed the same as the men, they wear the same distinctions. The latter we have copied, or have ordered to be copied, to secure the officers for the riflemen. These rascals [sic!] climb up trees, lie in the high grass, and lie in wait for the officers. These however march inside the closed battalion, and those that are with the flankers are armed with bayonet and musket, so that the officers cannot be distinguished from the men. Source; LETTER OF A HESSIAN OFFICER to the ruling Landgrave Frederick of Hesse-Kassel,Long Island, 1 September 1776 (most probably written by Colonel Heringen of the Regiment ‘Von Schenck') Militair-Wochenblatt, 18. Jahrgang (Berlin 1833), No. 863, pp. 4854-4856, and No. 864, pp. 4858-4859. |
Grognard1789 | 24 Aug 2009 10:27 p.m. PST |
Obviously (50 yrs) later the German military didn't think very much of skirmishing tactics; Skirmishing-fighting, adopted from the French after 1806, only came into practice with us very slowly.It is only in the last ten years that the needle-gun, the company column, and the success of the French tirailleurs on the battle-fields of Italy, have given the system an importance approximating to that of closed fighting. Still the latter remained by far the main point. Theory taught, indeed, that the quintessence of infantry tactics consisted in the most intimate connection between the two systems ; but at the same time skirmishing fighting never held any other than a subordinate place. It was the indispensable expedient for the introduction and preparation for an attack; for the occupation of the enemy; and for pursuit. But when confronted by the closed fire- fight and the closed attack, it retired humbly into the background. The war of 1866, carried on against muzzle-loaders and shock-tactics, was not very well adapted to modify our views. Where the skirmishing system of fighting had appeared too prominently (naturally with all its inherent defects) it was considered by many as very faulty. In the practice of skirmishing fighting it fared still worse. Too much of the school-exercise was still retained in the fighting-exercise, from which the latter must, with the progressing development of infantry tactics, ever recede further. The skirmishers and supports moved with accurately kept distances and strict dressing. Very few were extended ; these fired for a short time; and then the battalion advanced in a deployed line for a volley, and in column on the centre for a bayonet attack. As a finale, one manoeuvre in company columns was gone through. In some corps, certainly, there was a good deal of drill in the country with company columns. In field-day exercises the demands made by the fight and those of the ground necessitated a much more extended use of skirmishers, frequently contrary to what was actually intended. Critics always laid the greatest emphasis upon the numbers which could be brought up closed for the decision; the fighting efficacy of skirmishers was not rightly valued. The consequences were that very small distances, advances without cover under the hottest infantry fire, and attacks in attacking columns against an advantageously posted line of skirmishers, passed without blame." Source: THE FRONTAL-ATTACK OF INFANTRY TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY COLONEL EDWARD NEWDIGATE 1873. |
Grognard1789 | 24 Aug 2009 11:09 p.m. PST |
History of light troops! "There are many myths about the roots of the light infantry and its tactics, as it was used during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The following could, in a nutshell, shed some light on this matter."The fighting against the Corsicans under their leader Pascal Paoli in two campaigns, finally ending in 1769, was too remarkable for not making a huge impression in France, especially while they had to fight no other enemy at that time. During these two campaigns, the first one unlucky as well, the massive French army had been kept busy by a nation of only 175,000 inhabitants. Most of the French officers returning from Corsica had experienced a lot, and came back with new views of how one should attack or defend accidented terrain. And how troops should be trained for this kind of waging war. The necessity of trained light infantry became from now on more clear and generally accepted. The Royaux Corses Regiment was trained in running, crawling, lying down, dispersed fighting and concentrating, and as such was the first standing regiment which was trained for light service in peace time. The American War of Independence would lead to further perfection of light service. The British, who had their experiences of the beneficial use of light troops during the Seven Year's War still fresh on their minds, began this war with excellent trained troops and a substantial number of jäger units. Advantage remained on their side as long as the Americans, lacking good artillery, disciplined infantry, and brave cavalry, accepted battle in the open. They retreated however inside the woods and the accidented terrain. Here they fought like savages, with the instinct of hunters. Beside their physical abilities they possessed an extraordinary speed; found their way in the most barren forests; fought always dispersed; evaded battle when victory was unsure; never missed when firing; and used stealth to their utmost advantage. This way of waging war was new to the British. Their Hessian troops, as well as the Scots, did excellent service, and on returning to Europe they brought with them the important experience of the service of light troops. The French, participating in this war on the side of the Americans, had already learned this lesson on Corsica the hard way, and here their maxims were honed even more to perfection. However, the French as well as the Hessians did not succeed in translating their experiences into theory and practical education. After the American War of Independence, the various nations tried to remedy the lack of light troops in various ways. Prussia created twenty light infantry battalions out of two freicorps and twelve garrison regiments, under the name of fusiliers. In addition, every infantry company received a certain number of Schützen. The Austrians believed to be able to meet the demand with their Grenzer and Tyrolean's. The British and French had a light infantry company in every regiment. The Dutch had educated Jäger, armed with rifles (von Bylandt), and in 1793 a volunteer corps drawn from all regiments, which according to the situation did good service. The Hessians had a light infantry battalion and a jäger corps of two companies, formed out of sons of foresters. Hessen-Darmstadt raised in 1790 the fusilier battalion Von Wrede, based on sound principles, and in 1793 the jäger battalion Von Schäfer out of sons of foresters. The French revolution would accelerate the usual slow military evaluation of the light service. Out of necessity light service was introduced into the French army, and Europe was completely taken by surprise when the enormous advantages of this new tactic became visible to all when used in the right way. From this moment on, light infantry service could be regarded as something newly created, taking its rightful place among the other tactics used. The French, exalted by the events of their Revolution, were brave enough and had much endurance. They could make use of all means of the enthusiast nation, but they lacked trained armies and experienced generals to fend off the enemies coming from all sides. The lightly armed and badly clothed citoyens, carrying the cartridges in their pockets, not caring for the following day, did not have the right character for forced service in the line. They were in their element when able to fight in a lose formation, trusting on their bravery and skill, making good use of the terrain. To remedy the lack of training and to accustom his fresh troops to the enemy, Dumouriez raised two corps of 400 to 800 men. These made daily raids and were relieved every eight days. Because of this advantageous arrangement, in the end the whole French army possessed the ability of light service. In addition, the French tirailleurs, which constantly were relieved, were opposed by always the same Allied skirmishers, therefore finally gaining the upper hand and the advantage over the enemy which they until now had sorely missed. Training and necessity quickly created a kind of troops of which smart generals, understanding the spirit of the young troops, would know how to make good use off. Huge swarms of dispersed skirmishers, using the terrain to their utmost advantage, covered the advance of the army; prevented the enemy to make use of its vulnerability; kept the enemy busy in a painful way; while separate corps threatened its flanks and back. Especially educated nor armed with rifled muskets, these tirailleurs constantly outclassed the enemy infantry because of their rate of fire with the more efficient muskets. The tirailleur system was recognised as the most efficient in battle by all of Dumouriez' successors, as only in this way one was able to create warriors to be used for every military undertaking, out of inexperienced conscripts in such a short period of time. How big however the advantages gained by the French in waging war was with such tactics, they would succumb in a war in which this way of fighting was the second nature of the inhabitants. From the hands of their own countrymen the Republicans would gather new experiences, serving for the use and enhancing the training of their infantry, creating an arm for which no terrain was an insuperable obstacle, for which no undertaking was too difficult. The Royalist Vendeans had sworn to sell their lives as costly as possible, and in 1793 and 1794, in Bas-Poitou, Charette and his six hundred men fought a cunningly and lucky campaign against 30,000 Republican soldiers. With extraordinary physical abilities, practised marksmen as the were, they constantly outclassed the Republicans with guile and their use of the terrain: retreating; victorious; constantly evading the superior forces; instantly disappearing, reappearing again in other places; capturing isolated posts; leaving the enemy in the dark about their real strength and plans, they became the most deadly and exhausting of all opponents. Only with the utmost exertion the Republican forces scarcely managed to defeat these bands, which made themselves dreaded with tactics adapted to the terrain, and by ignoring all danger and hardships. Their order of battle was always the half moon, with both wings formed out of the best marksmen. They fired unceasingly without any command, with equal certainty when walking or standing still, so that it was difficult to resist their deadly fire. When it seemed that the enemy would be victorious, they would break off the fight. If victory would be on their side, they fell on the enemy from all sides, pursuing him with the utmost ruthlessness and speed. The Spanish War of Liberty gave another example in their guerrilla's of the use of good light infantry in suitable terrain. Compared with the Vendeans their quality was more or less the same, but they were much more numerous. Because of the lessons learned during these wars, as well as forced to it by changed tactics, all nations have paid much attention to the training of light infantry, authorised by the greater need for them. During the later years of the Napoleonic wars, every combat was started by skirmishers; they defended the most important positions; they prepared the decisive moment in battle." Main source used: "Versuch einer Geschichte der leichten Truppen", in ‘Militair-Wochenblatt‘, 6. Jahrgang (Berlin 1821) pp. 1875-1877. |
Steven H Smith | 26 Aug 2009 10:59 a.m. PST |
The 1981 edition of "Journal de campagne, 1793-1837. François Vigo-Rousillon, grenadier de l'Empire" has arrived. The first thing I note is that the texts are NOT the same. There are many missing parts and changed wording from one to the other. I will make some scans tomorrow and post here. The description of the Battle of Barossa (pp 273ff of the 1981 text) is not very different. Steve |
McLaddie | 26 Aug 2009 12:26 p.m. PST |
"After the American War of Independence, the various nations tried to remedy the lack of light troops in various ways." Grognard: Not to again question an interesting book, but
This seems to imply that there is a cause and effect relationship, but I can't find any. The French, Prussians and RUSSIANS all created their light troop battalions, Chasseurs, Fusiliers, and Jagers in the 1780s along with the German states. The outlines of the Fusilier battalions were developed while Frederick the Great was still alive, and he spoke disparagingly of most all officers and ideas coming from the American continent, including York. Yet before Frederick's death, he was describing using skirmishers as the firepower to precede an infantry attack. And the French and British had light companies as part of each infantry battalion going into the American Revolution, so the author is appears to post-date the event. The use of foresters and hunters as Jagers was nothing new at the beginning of the Seven Years War, decades before the AWI. And the slow evolution is one reason why the lessons learned in the Seven Years War were only being incorporated into the European armies in the 1770s and 1780s. 1768 is when the Prussians established that 10 picked men per company were to be skirmishers/schutzen--the rule that all NCOs must spend some time with the Schutzen before they could aspire to the rank was established at the same time. Paret mentions it in his book on York. The Schutzen were then armed with rifles in 1787. "Beside their physical abilities they possessed an extraordinary speed; found their way in the most barren forests; fought always dispersed; evaded battle when victory was unsure; never missed when firing; and used stealth to their utmost advantage. This way of waging war was new to the British. What is described was basically Major Roger's instructions to his Rangers in 1759, only with more detail. It's not like the British had never fought against indians using the very same tactics, so how 'new' could it be? I think if at all true, it just goes to show what an Army can forget in ten to twenty years, such as the time span between 1763 and 1776 or 1783 and 1793
Best Regards, Bill H. |
McLaddie | 29 Aug 2009 11:29 a.m. PST |
It probably is beholden on me to give a clear picture of why I don't think that the American Revolution made all that much of an impression on British [or European light infantry or skirmish practices], particularly when you have well-known historians saying the things that CM quoted: Thrice at least in our history we Americans have taught the world some valuable lessons in war. At Concord and Lexington we proved the superiority of good marksmen in open order, each one taking advantage of the accidents of the ground, over seasoned regulars who fought elbow to elbow
While it is true that the use of the open order which began in Europe in the French Revolution was a direct product of American experience, and was imitated by the French under conditions similar to those which had prevailed in the New World a decade before
Napoleon; a history of the art of war, Volume 3 by Theodore Ayrault Dodge And in the art of warfare there was one lesson which Europe now learned from America. In woodland fights with the Indians, it had been found desirable to act in loose columns, which could easily separate to fall behind trees and reunite at brief notice; and in this way there had been developed a kind of light infantry peculiar to America, and especially adapted for skirmishing. It was light infantry of this sort that, in the hands of Arnold and Morgan, had twice won the day in the Saratoga campaign. Reduced to scientific shape by Steuben, and absorbed, with all the other military knowledge of the age, by Napoleon, these light-infantry tactics have come to play a great part on the European battlefields of the nineteenth century. The American revolution In two volumes By John Fiske. This 'lesson' if learned, should have had an impact on British and European light infantry practices. Lets look at just the British army and what they actually did concerning light infantry between 1759 and 1803. |
McLaddie | 29 Aug 2009 11:30 a.m. PST |
1755: Within months of Braddocks disasterous defeat at the hands of half his forces numbers in French and Indian irregulars, the British formed four battalions designated the 60th regiment of foot. They were mostly composed of Germans. Swiss-born mercenaries trained the unit in "Service in the Woods." Colonels Boquet and Haldimand. Roger's Rangers were formed around the same time. Regular officers and NCOs were occasionally attached to the Rangers to learn practical skills and return to disseminate those light infantry methods. The British established a light infantry battalion that proved it's worth in putting down Pontiac's rebellion in 1763. 1763: At the end of the Seven Years War, the British did what every European nation did, they disbanded their light infantry, mostly foreigners in irregular units and returned the regular infantry experienced in light infantry combat to their regiments as line infantry. 1771: When the French established a light company with their line troops, the British quickly followed suit. At the same time, Frederick the Great established ten men in each company as skirmishers. The Russians followed the example, and though they had many of the light troops found in the Austrian army, like the pandors, the Russians established their first Jager formations. 1776-1783: The British had forgotten much of what they had learned about light infantry practices during the French and Indian Wars, and demonstrated that lack at Concord and Bunker Hill—this is stated by British officers. In response to the new American war, the British army followed the practices they had employed in the previous war to develop light infantry forces. They formed irregular units from volunteers and hired Germans. So they hired German Jagers and sanctioned volunteer units like Simcoe's Queens Rangers and Tarleton's British Legion. They did strengthen the 60th too—with Germans. Along with the regular light infantry companies formed into battalions, these troops more than proved their worth. 1783-1792: At the end of the AWI, the British did what they had done at the end of the SYW: They disbanded the irregular units and light companies, sending the 60th and the Queen's Rangers off to the West Indies and India for the next ten years to be forgotten. Even the regiments of Highlanders, considered irregulars in many quarters, and often used as light infantry, were sent off to India—all of them. The entire army was reduced to less than 50,000 men, including artillery and put on an subsistence budget until a year into the French Revolution: 1792. Other than the 400 men of the Queen's Rangers, the British army had no designated light troops at the start of the French Revolution. The French established 12 chasseur battalions before 1788. The Prussians formed twenty Fusilier battalions at the same time, giving the ten line skirmishers in each company a name, Schutzen, and a rifle. The Jagers were expanded. The Russians created a large number of Jager battalions, and finally established them as regiments in the regular army before 1790. At the same time, the British reestablished their light companies in each regiment, though each battalion was greatly reduced in size. A number of officers called for light infantry development. General Dundas countered in his Principles of Military Movements: There seems no reason why the light infantry should not conform to the same principles of order and movement, ans the battalion. The frequent dispersion and peculiarities which they are taught, should be considered as occasional exceptions. His views, while opposed by a number of British officers, did win out before the war, as his regulations and views were accepted as the official doctrine of the British army. The British had no real light infantry training before the French Revolution. 1792-1798: The British began the war with no light infantry. Like the last war, the British do the very same thing in regards to light infantry: They formed irregular units [Fensibles] and hired Germans and other foreigners to create light battalions in 1793-1799 for their war in Flanders such as Waldstein's Chasseurs Lowenstien's Fusiliers, Hompesch Chasseurs Bentinck's Corps of Dutch Riflemen. Chasseurs Britanniques When the units returned from Flanders, they were treated like other light units and sent to the Caribbean. The Fensibles were sent to Canada and the West Indies and never do see action in Europe. When what was left of them returned, they were all disbanded, never appearing on the list of army units, except for the French Chasseurs Britanniques. In 1798, the Germans from many of the disbanded units were used to form the German 5th Battalion of the 60th, who received rifles and green uniforms, instead of the red coats of the rest of the 60th. The battalion was created specifically for use in the Americas like the rest of the regiment. The expedition to Holland in 1799 is a failure and the British response to French tirailleurs often dismal. An armistice is signed in 1801 and all the light units raised are disbanded but the 5th battalion of the 60th and the French Chasseurs. As a British General in the service of the French at the time, General Money writes: My blood ran cold in my veins after that unhappy war, when it occurred to my mind the cruel situation my brave countrymen, through ignorance, had been placed in
Where bravery was unavailing; yet it is a doubt with me at this moment, notwithstanding the experience we have had in that war , whether we should not fight it over again in the same manner [because of] the cheapness with which Riflemen and Irregulars are still held in contempt. Money wrote the above to the Duke of York about the absence of trained light infantry in the British army, and the increasingly enclosed nature of the British countryside that could hide invading French light infantry. This led him to urge the Duke of York to raise more 'irregulars'. He pointed to the American Revolution, saying that Burgoyne was defeated by militia, untrained to any species of evolution and undisciplined, but that of Irregulars. When York sees the wisdom of views like Money's as well as his own experiences against the French, his first response is to raise more German 'irregular' troops. With Europe controlled by Napoleon, the access to Germans had been curtailed, though the German Legion is formed with rifled armed lights in 1803. The British believed, like most European nations, that particular nationalities had a natural 'aptitude' for skirmishing, Germans being at the top of the list, though the Scots were included. As Gates observed: [p.73] Thus, the officer corps's lack of professional knowledge regarding the work of light troops and a shortage of suitable existing formations to use as blueprints for new units helped to retard the development of a truly British light infantry arm and perpetuated a traditional, by now, dangerous reliance on a dwindling number of foreign auxiliaries. In 1801, through stated necessity, the Army decides to develop light infantry with British soldiers. Generals Stewart and Manningham offered to create such a light infantry corps. Fourteen colonels of regiments were directed to send four NCOs and thirty privates who "appear most capable of receiving the above instructions and most competent to the performance of the Duty of Riflemen." The effort failed because the colonels either thought in terms of 'irregulars' being bad line troops or the order as an opportunity to unload the worst of the regiments. It wasn't until 1803 that Moore and McKenzie form the 95th, actually modeled on the 6oth, and found two whole regiments to train as light infantry, the 52nd and 43rd that the British Army actually develops a light infantry arm made as part of the regular army, fifteen years after the French, Prussians, and Russians. Even so, the 95th is made up of a large number of Germans, and another German, Rottenburg, writes the light infantry and Rifle instructions in 1798 used by the British for the entire war. As David Gates says in his book, The British Light Infantry Arm "In Europe as well as in America, the British had been slower than their adversaries to introduce units of light troops and develop the specialized instruction and equipment they required." While any number of British officers learned the lessons of the AWI, on the whole not only did the British Army fail to remember and use them, but acting on practices from the SYW, [disbanding light infantry between wars and depending on foreign irregulars], was later than the rest of Europe in creating any truly British light infantry, with the required equipment and training. |
von Winterfeldt | 29 Aug 2009 11:48 a.m. PST |
I don't know from where the authors were drawing their wisdom. Frederick the Greats system was virtually adopted by all nations – including the American Army. In France there was a different schooladvocating columns and in the end Guibert and adherent of the linear warfare – wrote the 1791 regulation with one tactical column in it. The light infantry system in the AWI was nothing new to Europe and indeed not perfected because it was ancien regime. The combination of skirmishers and formed troops – as well in line and in column did emerge as pure European development – during the French Revlutionary Wars. Concepts of rifled troops – like Hessian Jäger in the AWI and compared to commandos – as in modern armies – did already exist in Europe before the AWI. Alone light infantry did not decide anything – it was the combination of light troops with close order units – which brought a new dimension to the tactical use on the battle field |
Major Snort | 29 Aug 2009 1:41 p.m. PST |
Bill H. I think you need to revise your view on the formation of the 95th rifles. The formation of the Rifle Corps by Mannigham and Stewart in 1800 was not the failure that you are suggesting, although it was found necessary to send back 52 of the soldiers as unsuitable. This was the unit that became the 95th in 1803. Also, where do you get the idea that the 95th was largely German from? The corps was made up from 448 detachments from line regiments and 396 volunteers from Fencible regiments. Many of the volunteers were Scottish. |
McLaddie | 29 Aug 2009 5:18 p.m. PST |
Captain: Well, we could debate whether Mannignham and Stewart's efforts were failures, but there are several points to consider: 1. Far more than 52 men were returned from the Horsham School. . On February 22,1800 The Duke of York sent letters to five of the colonels advising them that ALL of the troops detached were 'unfit for service' and were to be replaced. That is 170 men. Several other colonels were required to replace substantial numbers of men. During this time the Duke also secure Germans as some of those replacements. In all, nearly 2/3rd of the original 476 were replaced. This was not completed until May. At that time, Stewart asked to have the unit permanetly established and complained of the Horse Guard's interference in the arrangements of the battalion. The Duke of York replied: "As the corps of Riflemen was formed of detachments from different Regiments for diffusing a general knowledge of the Rifle throughout the Army and under the express condition of them returning to their own Regiments, it is impossible from the Nature of the Establishment that it should be a permanent one, and it will necessarily remain liable to such further changes as His Majesty's Service judges expedient." To say that Stewart and Manningham were disappointed would be an understatement. In July of 1800, the Horseham school was broken up and those few detachments that didn't return to their parent battalions accompanied Stewart on the ill-fated expedition to Ferrol. [At this point both Stewart and Manningham spoke of their failure.] 2. When Stewart returned, the notion of an experimental school was revived and a new camp set up at Blatchington. Manningham had to step back from most of the work and it devolved on Stewart alone. In September, Stewart received permission to retain the detachments he still had with him. [about 200 men]. He began his school again. Part of the process was combining his training with that of Bentinck's Corps of Dutch Riflemen [ About 300 men] which had impressed the Duke of York and Manningham and according to Gates, became something of a model for the 95th. Ultimately, a large contingent of that corps was added to the 95th Rifles when it was disbanded at the end of 1802. So out of something like 1000 men in the 95th's first Battalion, between 200-300 were Germans and Dutch from Bentinck's Corps. I said a large number of Germans, not that the 95th was largely made up of Germans
So we are talking about between 1/4 and 1/3 of the 1st Battalion. On the other hand ALL of the 5th Battalion of the 60th were Germans. 3. In February 1801, Manningham sought permission to recruit for the Rifle Corps, and only 14 months later was it granted--in Ireland. About that time, the Spring of 1803, Moore commanding the forces in the Southern District, ordered Stewart to move his 'experimental rifle battalion' to a new camp at Shorncliffe, which he hoped to be adapted "both to your Target practice and Field Movements." The 52nd Regiment was Moore's own regiment and included in the training. Later the 43rd was also added. It wasn't until well into the Shorncliffe school, March 1803, that the 95th actually attained the required numbers to fill out 10 companies and was established as a regular regiment of the Army. Now, were Stewart's efforts a failure. No. In fact he deserves as much or more credit for the success of the Shorncliffe school and certainly the 95th and Light Infantry regiments to come, all built on the training he developed. However, the first camp Horsham was a complete and utter failure. It required three camps and three years to accomplish Stewart's original goals, and very few of the members of the Horsham camp in 1800 were present when the experimental Rifle Battalion marched into Schorncliffe three years later. Manningham and Stewart did create the Rifle unit they desired in 1800, or 1801. Not until the winter of 1802 did that even become a possibility. So, in trying to give a quick overview of sixty years of light infantry history, I short shrifted Stewart and Manningham. They did accomplish a lot---eventually. Best Regards, Bill H. |
Major Snort | 30 Aug 2009 2:05 p.m. PST |
Bill, Where is this information from? |
McLaddie | 30 Aug 2009 2:24 p.m. PST |
Captain S: Most of it is from David Gates' "The British Light Infantry Arm", Chapter Three, but other information came from the Osprey book on British light Infantry by Campell, and the three Rifle memoirs, Kincaid, Costello and Harris. Bill H. Oops, and from primary documents that my friend has, whose titles escape me now, but I can find. I know Gates did a book on just the 95th that has some more details. |
Major Snort | 30 Aug 2009 2:51 p.m. PST |
Bill, This is interesting. For a slightly different view, have a look at The History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade by Willoughby Verner. |
McLaddie | 30 Aug 2009 4:42 p.m. PST |
Captain: I will have a look. I have a friend with a copy of the two volumes, IIRC. Thanks. Bill |
10th Marines | 30 Aug 2009 7:06 p.m. PST |
VW, You are incorrect on two counts. First, Frederick's 'system' was not adopted by the American Army (correctly first the Continental Army and second the United States Army). Von Steuben, one of the talented foreign officers (French officers such as the engineer Duportail, the light infantrymen Gimat and Fleury, as well as Baron de Kalb)that came to serve with the Americans, wrote a new set of regulations for the Continental Army (the famous 'Blue Book') and it was drawn from the British, French, and Prussian regulations and modified for use by the Americans whom von Steuben considered excellent material. His modifications took into account the American personality and the need to tell the troops 'why' when they were asked to do something, an aspect of the Continentals that was not evident among the European armies of the period. Second, while the excellent 1791 Reglement was adopted after the maneuver experiments at Metz and in Normandy (which involved columns and large numbers of skirmishers employed in conjunction with the columns), the actual employment when the shooting started fell back on the experience of those experiments in conjunction with the use of the 1791 Reglement. The actual development of the new French tactical system, which was not a derivation of Frederick's system but one that the French reformers after the disasters of the Seven Years' War were attempting to counter, was not trying to turn Frenchmen into Prussians, something that had been tried and didn't work. What finally evolved was a new system. That development is outlined excellently by Col Elting in Swords and by Robert Quimby in The Background of Napoleonic Warfare. For the Continental Army and the later tactical development of the United States Army you might try The Continental Army by Robert Wright as well as The US Army in the War of 1812 by Robert Quimby for starters. You might also try Bayonets in the Wilderness by Alan Gaff for a view of The Legion of the United States in its successful campaigns against the Indians of the Old Northwest when commanded by Anthony Wayne. The Legion of the United States, as the US ARmy was called in the mid-1790s was organized as a permanent division of all arms, something that only France had at the time. In that organization the United States was ahead of the other European nations. As another interesting note, the US Army was the only western-style army that had artillerymen as drivers and not belonging to a separate train organization. Sweeping statements, especially incorrect ones, seldom help in any discussion. It should also be noted that Winfield Scott, one of the best American generals of the War of 1812 and who learned his trade in combat on the Niagara frontier, adapted the French 1791 Reglement for American use during the war. If you have any further questions on the development of the United States Army I would be happy to be of assistance. Sincerely, K |
McLaddie | 30 Aug 2009 9:30 p.m. PST |
Kevin: The French 1791 regulations were certainly in use for a very long time, and several nations including the USA in various forms. However the 1791 regulations were not some gigantic leap away from Frederick's system of maneuver and drill, which is true of most of the European nations regulations, including Britain with Dundas'manual. The French regulations barrowed heavily from earlier Prussian regulations, even quoting them in certain places. They were Prussian enough that Col Elting in Swords around the Throne comments that: The 1791 regulations remained in use by the French throughout the Napoleonic wars, even though such officers as Duhesme and Augereau complained about the Regléments, about having French troops trained "in the Prussian style" as early as the Revolutionary Wars. [covered in p.531-34] The French certainly did some new things, but it was evolutionary in many respects, and based on what was perceived as sound, basic 'Prussian' practices by the time of the French Revolution. Best Regards, Bill H. |
von Winterfeldt | 30 Aug 2009 11:20 p.m. PST |
I agree what other than the colnne d'attaque was unique to the French regulations of 1791 – compared to those of other nations. Indeed it was backward, it did not have any basic instruction as the Prussian regulations of 1788 of Füsiliere how to deploy skirmishers. |
Kevin Kiley | 31 Aug 2009 4:52 p.m. PST |
Bill, I would suggest to read Swords in the applicable chapters (I, II, and XXVI) more carefully (and that is not meant in a condescending manner). A very careful read or reread of Quimby and the French tactical maneuvers/experiments conducted by de Broglie in the 1770s might also be of value. Colonel Elting states on page 531 that neither Duhesme nor St. Cyr cared for the 1791 Reglement. However, he also states that Lannes, Massena, and Augereau were noted having the ability as drill masters and knew how to use the Reglement (St. Cyr had too little regimental service to be a competent drill master). On page 534 Col Elting states, quoting from Volume IV of Phipps' Armies of the First French Republic that Augereau didn't like troops on the Rhine frontier being trained 'in the Prussian style' in 1797. Whether or not the new French tactical system was revolutionary or evolutionary is irrelevant. What is important is that it was different and warfare changed because of it. Christopher Duffy states in The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, for the first time light troops were being combined on the battlefield for the tactical result. The 1791 Reglement does not cover the use of battalion columns supported by large numbers of tirailleurs/skirmishers as a fire support element on the tactical offensive. That addition/supplement to the 1791 Reglement which was not written down in an army-wide regulation was first experimented with by de Broglie and revived when the wars came in 1792 and the shooting started. Colonel Elting covers that process quite well along with stating that the new tactics did not replace the 1791 Reglement, but was used in conjunction with it. What the 1791 Reglement provided to French commanders was a menu of maneuvers that could be used in combat. There were also some useless maneuvers meant for show. The French were not pedants and slave to the Reglement as, for example, the Prussians were to theirs. The French reformers after 1763 were more innovative than the Prussians after 1806, though their motivations were the same. The French developed something new, the Prussians merely played catch-up. They also had to have a regulation to demonstrate how to skirmish and train skirmishers. The French did not. Sincerely, Kevin |
McLaddie | 31 Aug 2009 7:39 p.m. PST |
Kevin wrote:
Second, while the excellent 1791 Reglement was adopted after the maneuver experiments at Metz and in Normandy (which involved columns and large numbers of skirmishers employed in conjunction with the columns), the actual employment when the shooting started fell back on the experience of those experiments in conjunction with the use of the 1791 Reglement. Kevin: I wasn't questioning the French system as being new, I was questioning your assertion that the 1791 regulations were something new or formed a basis for that innovation. It wasn't and didn't. 1. The very thing you describe as a cornerstone of the new system: "What is important is that it was different and warfare changed because of it. Christopher Duffy states in The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, for the first time light troops were being combined on the battlefield for the tactical result"
isn't even addressed in the 1791 Regulations. In fact, the Prussian 1789 regulations with the Schutzen instructions says more about light/line infantry cooperation. And having read both, the 1792 Provisional Light Infantry Instructions say little more about light infantry operations than the Schutzen instructions. If I read you correctly, the 1791 Regulations weren't a part of the innovations that the French developed. And apart from a few minor changes, couldn't have because it reads exactly like the Prussian regulations except for some sections. 2. The Prussians, for all their faults, were hardly slaves to the 1789 regulations, or any regulations for that matter. After the death of Frederick the Great in 1786, each Inspectorate did pretty much what they wanted, regiments left to their own devices.Neither the 1788 Fusilier regulations or the 1789 infantry regulations were followed in any rigid fashion. In fact, there were more 'regulations' and regimental drill manuals floating around the Prussian military establishment than any other European army of the time. The Polish uprisings exposed the complete lack of consistency in military training. And the Prussians were 'unrigid' that they deployed line units in two ranks for the entire time they fought the French, 1793-1795--following the Duke of Brunswick's 1793 Instructions rather than the 1789 regulations. The situation was so bad by the time the new King Frederick William came to the throne that he wrote his 1798 Instructions in the expressed attempt to enforce some 'uniformity.' If innovation is the creation of new methods not seen before, the Prussians were innovating up a storm before the French Revolution. Not with any success or army-wide coherency, but innovation none the less
And nothing I have said about the French Regulations and their part in French tactical innovations is contradicted by Colonel Elting and the chapters you mention. I wasn't questioning the French tactical innovations--they were very real. I was questioning the part played by the French Regulations themselves. Certainly a competent document, but reading it, one would never realize the tactical system the French actually came up with. Reading it, you would imagine pretty much the Prussian system being the result. No question that French military men knew how to use it, and when to add to it, and when to ignore it--which obviously they did, but the regulations are what they are, and they weren't all that innovative. In fact, some of the most innovative things in the proposed French 1789 Regulations, like deploying in two ranks, were dropped and the 'Prussian' three-rank deployment was reverted to. Best Regards, Bill H. |
McLaddie | 04 Sep 2009 10:01 p.m. PST |
Captain Snort: I got a chance to read Verner's history of the Rifle Brigade and dived in. When I saw it was two volumes, I had hopes it would give far more detail on the origins of the Rifles. It does after a fashion, but Verner also demonstrates a massive enthusiasm for reading intentions and results back into the history where they didn't exist. He has an obvious need to establish that starting in 1800, the Rifles existed and they were a unit, and that was always the army's goal. What I find amazing is the information he provides demonstrates the very opposite. It's like he didn't pay attention to the facts he included in his effort to prove that the rifles blossomed full-grown in 1800. It is so stark a contrast, I can't resist sharing some examples: All from Chapter Two: Formation of the Experimental Corps of Rifles. pp. 18 to 32 Verner quotes in full the page-long circular sent by the Horse Guards in January 17, 1800 calling for detachments from 14 picked regiments. Here is just an excerpt: p.19-20 These non-commissioned officers and privates are not to be considered as being drafted from their regiments, but merely as detached for the purpose recited [training]; they will continue to be borne on the strength of their regiments, and will be clothed by their respective colonels
[Officers are requested under the same conditions] These officers are to be considered as detached on duty from their respective regiments, and will share in all the promotion that occurs in them during their absence. Verner's first sentence after the quoted directive is: [p.20] It will be thus be seen that from its first inception, it was the intention of the authorities to form the Regiment as a corps d' elite. I had to read the sentence and rest of the following paragraph several times, thinking I'd gotten a bad print or were missing pages or *something.* Anyone reading the directive would know that no such Regiment was considered, let alone that it was to be an elite unit. It wasn't going to be a unit at all and the 'eliteness' was simply a request for those with an aptitude for skirmishing--and we know what several colonels did with that invitation. Then there is 'when' the detachments arrived. On page 20 he quotes the 92nd Highlander's Regimental Orders, published a month later, February 24th, concerning the Horse Guard directive, directing the men of the 92nd's detachment to "appear as respectable in the corps they are to join, as the regiment has always done among other regiments." Just 'corps', not Rifles, or Rifle Corps etc. On page 21 he states that only 52 men are sent back as inefficient on March 22, from six of the regiments. Then the very next sentence, he writes, "Again, on 15 July, a sergeant is detached to return with 'rejected men' via Bristol to Ireland. It's like he is determined to disprove or ignore his own statements as he makes them
He also notes on page 22, 'the ways the various regiments viewed the status of the men thus detached', calling their perceptions 'amusing.' However, it obviously shows the various ways the regiments viewed the 'experimental corps', not their own men. Thus seven regiments note them as with "the Rifle Corps," one as on the "Rifle Detachment", one as "Detached on command," , the 27th writes off each one of their men as "Gone to Horesham (sic) as Rifle Man", whilst the 92nd note each one as a "Riffle Man."(sic) Each of those designations fits within the description given by the Horse Guards of the temporary, detached service for the purpose of training as riflemen. His next sentence is [page 22]: "The Corps may be considered to have been now fairly started. The first parade of the 'Experimental Corps' at Horsham was held on April 1, 1800." He indicates that the corps is fully manned by this time. This is fascinating when at the end of the same paragraph he notes that in 1909 a Colonel Boyle came across "an entry in the Marching Order Books of 1800, dated May 13, in which a detachment of the 92nd Highlanders is noted as being 'on the march from Arundel to Caesar's Camp near Bagshot, to join the Rifle Corps there." That is over a month after the first parade and three months after the 92nd's Regimental Orders, and one month after Verner claims all the detachments were present. So who made up this detachment if the 92nd's detachment was already in Horseham? Obviously, they weren't all there, for whatever reason, and the "Rifle Corps" was obviously not being trained with all the original detachments present by even May. On July 15th, the Marquis of Buckingham mentions the Rifles as "Being good, and much more useful" than some other regiments then in that camp. What camp is this and what other regiments is he talking about? He's talking about Swinley camp where several units are being trained. The Rifles, assuming they were fully assembled by May with the arrival of the 92nd detachment, spent a little over one month at Horseham before ending up with other units at Swinley. NO discussion of the training during this period is mentioned in Verner's book
This is when Gates claims the Rifles are visiting Benidicks' rifle corps. He does say this though: [page23] Before narrating the events of this expedition, I must describe the steps taken to fill the ranks of the newly raised corps to its effective strength, since they were carried out contemporaneously with the traning of the detachments at Swinley Camp. There has always been a certain amount of difficulty in tracing the various steps connected with the first raising of the Rifle Corps in 1800. I'll bet. Now this is very strange. He has already said that the Rifles had their full complement of men, the 32 rank and file from 14 regiments, or 448 and lists them. The expedition is the Ferrol expedition that left in early August of 1800. So what is this 'effective strength' that the unit needs to be raised to? It isn't a battalion at all. When the six detachments are sent with Stewart to Ferrol, Verner categorically details how the other 8 detachments were returned to their regiments, and then after the Ferrol expedition returns at the end of September, Verner states those last detachments are also sent back to their regiments. He explains this process on p. 27 and 39. According to Verner, the entire Corps is returned to their respective regiments by October. Somehow this doesn't matter. Verner insists that the "Rifle Corps" never ceased to exist, even saying about another military man: Thus Major Lawrence Archer in his British Army says absurdly enough "another Corps of riflemen was however once formed." This has been taken by some as a proof that "the Experimental Corps of Riflemen" and its outcome "the Rifle Corps" were two distinct creations. Even Fortescue when writing of this incident says "what then happened to them is somewhat of a mystery." On page 24-25 Verner claims that this mystery is solved by a March 2, 1800 order from the Horse Guards to recruit from 33 Fencible Regiments in Ireland, asking for volunteers to serve with the Rifle Corps with a 10 guineas reward, their services to be unlimited as to time and place. This is two months before Stewart and Manningham in May request that their Corps become a permanent unit and are separately told in no uncertain terms that the unit is temporary. The Duke of York's reply to Stewart in May ends with "If under these circumstances, you prefer joining your R'gt. to continuing your services in the Corps of Riflemen, H.R. Highness has commanded me to signify his acquiescence." [Gates, page 88] So, it is clear that the Fensible Regiment volunteers were going to be the 'second wave' trained, the first group 448 and the second 396. And the same month, August, when the Fencible volunteers show up, the first 8 detachments are released to go home and the other 6 sent off to Ferrol, only to be released in September. The Fensible volunteers, 290 of them at the start, are sent to Blatchington Barracks, and remain there from August 1800 to April 1801. Another 100 show up in October and November. 230 of them are Scottish. It isn't surprising as the British held the Highland regiments as being 'adept' at light infantry work, and therefore Fencible units are raised in Scotland--because of their natural aptitude for individual combat etc. It is evident that the second group of volunteers were very different from the first detachments in character and the processes used to collect them. Stewart is seriously wounded in August on the Ferrol Expedition, but by February 1801 is off again with Nelson and a company of Riflemen, who act as marines during Nelson's destruction of the Danish Fleet at Copenhagen in March. Verner has Captain Beckwith commanding the company. Where he comes from is not stated. He is not among the list of officers for the Rifle Corps on page 29 dated October 11, 1800, three months before. There is a lot of circulation in this experimental corps that Verner documents indirectly, but never comments on. Again nothing is said of training from October 1800 through 1801 or exactly where that Copenhagen company of Riflemen came from. Other men beside the Fensibles are there though, because Verner talks about Charles Napier's experiences at Blatchington during this time, and Napier doesn't like the camp, the training or Stewart. Obviously a number of other regiments to are sending their 'detachments' to Blatchington for training--and not staying, but other than vague statements on p. 51-52, it is unclear who is being trained, who is coming and going while Stewart recovers his wounds, and then only a few months later, goes off with Nelson. So, while I find a lot about Verner's work commendable, particularly his second volume, his narrative of events between 1800 and 1802 up until chapter VII and Shorncliffe, make little sense, and his assertions/conclusions about them even less. He definitely wants the Rifle Corps to be a a full-blown unit before it is actually installed as an Army regiment in 1803, yet continually provides evidence that until at least the last half of 1802, it was considered and operated as a training way-station for detachments of other regiments. It is obvious that Stewart is working hard to prove the rifleman's work with his little expeditions in the face of total rejection regarding the Rifles becoming an actual British army unit. The first part of Volume I of Verner's book is really frustrating, particularly when it is a military man writing the volumes. Best Regards, Bill H. |
McLaddie | 04 Sep 2009 10:47 p.m. PST |
I made an error. Captain Beckwith was in the October 1800 list of officers, a lieutenant promoted to captain. Verner makes another statement immediately after the officer list that makes a hash out of his previous statements. "It is well to reiterate here that every one of these officers had served in the original 'Experimental Corps of Riflemen." Only pages before Verner had chastised another military man for making a distinction between the 'original experimental corps' and the subsequent Rifle Corps. The officers are 'gazetted' into the Rifle Corps in August, just when all the original detachments are released back to their regiments. That Gazetted itself suggests an impermanence, particularly when every officer promoted is being promoted in their original regiment. For instance, Beckwith is promoted to captain in the 71st, not the experimental corps. The January 1801 'establishment' listed by Verner is interesting in what it reveals. There are 442 on the muster roll, and 318 'waiting to complete'. Complete what? The training of course. No other British regiment has such a muster. Only a training unit would. Verner also states that part of the Rifle Corps is off in Egypt, which is misleading, and those were detachments returned to their regiments, not listed as belonging to the rifle corps. Anyway. Enough of my annoyance with the book. Bill |
Major Snort | 05 Sep 2009 3:33 a.m. PST |
Bill, I admit that Verner's chapter on the formation of the rifle corps is difficult to follow, but it is, I believe, factual. It represents the best coverage available, unless you are prepared to spend hours in the museum at Winchester that is, and is far more comprehensive than the necessarily limited coverage given by Gates. Kincaid, Costello and Harris say nothing about the formation of the corps as they were not involved, and neither do any of the other famous diarists of the 95th. I originally questioned your view on the formation of the 95th because: 1. You stated that it contained a large amount of Germans. 2. And that the original experimental rifle corps was a failure with the 95th being raised in 1803. I have found no evidence that there were Germans in the 95th, and out of all the muster rolls and sources of manpower presented by Verner, no Germans are mentioned. I cannot see that the experimental corps was a failure as the intention was to return the detachments to their parent regiment after being trained. It certainly represents the nucleus of the 95th rifles, with many of the detached officers staying with the Rifle Corps. I don't think that the Fencible volunteers can be viewed as a completely separate entity. Whichever way you look at it, the 95th began its life in 1800. |
Kevin Kiley | 05 Sep 2009 4:41 a.m. PST |
'I wasn't questioning the French system as being new, I was questioning your assertion that the 1791 regulations were something new or formed a basis for that innovation. It wasn't and didn't.' I never said the 1791 Regulations were. What I stated was that the new tactics that were being experimented with by de Broglie were what was new in the French system and that they were used to supplement the 1781 Reglement. Further, I also stated that they weren't written down. 'The very thing you describe as a cornerstone of the new system: "What is important is that it was different and warfare changed because of it. Christopher Duffy states in The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, for the first time light troops were being combined on the battlefield for the tactical result"
isn't even addressed in the 1791 Regulations.' No, it isn't, and that's the point. The French never had an army-wide regulation on skirmishing and developed their system through experimentation and use. It was developed into institutional excellence without the need or use of a written regulation. I disagree with your assertion that the Prussians were not slaves to regulations. It was exactly the opposite which was one of the great problems in 1806. It is also quite apparent in Scharnhorst's writings in that he was frustrated with the Prussian tactical stagnation before 1806 even though some officers, Scharnhorst and Knesebeck among them, who were pushing for tactical reform. There is an interesting scene in the comedy/farce 'Those Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines' about the first air race from London to Paris. The German officers who accepted the challenge were discussing the race after the air accident that killed their pilot. One asked the other how he was supposed to learn how to fly. His superior stated 'like we learn everything else-by the book.' ;-) Sincerely, K |
McLaddie | 05 Sep 2009 10:38 a.m. PST |
Kevin: If I misunderstood your post concerning the place the 1791 Regulations held in the French tactical reforms, then I appreciate you setting me straight. On the Prussians, though, it looks like I did understand you. To state that the Prussians were slaves to the regulations, suggests that the Prussians actually followed the regulations. Paret and others state categorically that the Army couldn't get universal acceptance and adherence to either the Fusilier or Line infantry regulations at any time after 1788. The King in 1798 writes his instructions with the explicit purpose of ordering/enforcing adherence to the regulations and his instructions--and it is obvious that he didn't achieve it. Please, name me one regulation, doctrine or Frederickian methodology that was followed 'slavishly' in 1806. Set up by Frederick the Great when he could no longer visit each military district for review, each Inspectorate was allowed to do pretty much what they wanted to from their very inception. While Frederick lives and his appointees were in charge, inspectorates experimented with new forms, but did hold to the King's doctrines and regulations. When Frederick died, his nephew took the thrown, someone who cared little for the army or took any interest in oversight in what was a one-man government. A sea of individual regimental and inspectorate 'instructions' grew, and by the time Frederick William took command, they existed in far more numbers than anything seen in any of the other armies, including the French army, the innovative military system, where commanders added to the regulations when they deemed it necessary. Observing the state of the Prussian army and the plethora of written instructions, Prussian Minister Karl Stein, wrote to Frau v. Berg in April 28, 1799: "We amuse ourselves with displays of the art of the Military Dancing—master and tailor, and the State ceases to be a military state, and changes into a drilling and writing state." There certainly was tactical stagnation within the Prussian army, but it wasn't from slavish adherence to any particular regulations or doctrines. Read Shannahan, Paret, and White. They all note this condition within the army. The Prussian Army couldn't seem to get their own soldiers to do anything uniformly, let alone slavishly. A good example was the Jager regiment. Paret describes how a new commander began training the jagers as line troops, even though there were written regulations on jager operations. The King had to step in and place York in charge simply to enforce was should have been the regulations. As the Jagers were a singular unit in purpose and position, such straying from regulations was far more noticible. Chandler notes in his Campaigns: ""In doctrine, however, the Prussian army was hopelessly outdated in its concepts. Everything was related to the days of Frederick the Great, and deviations from the Master's precepts were not countenanced." p. 454 It's a myth. The Prussians' problem was that there was a whole lot of deviation from the Master's precepts and regiments and inspectorates did as they pleased, which is why Paret and others can say few if any regulations or doctrines were followed in anything close to uniformity. In doctrine, Frederick's precepts were forty years in the past. Any reading of events in Prussian between the death of Frederick the Great and 1806 would make that abundantly clear. Best Regards, Bill H. |
McLaddie | 05 Sep 2009 11:14 a.m. PST |
Captain S. wrote:
I admit that Verner's chapter on the formation of the rifle corps is difficult to follow, but it is, I believe, factual. It represents the best coverage available, unless you are prepared to spend hours in the museum at Winchester that is, and is far more comprehensive than the necessarily limited coverage given by Gates. Kincaid, Costello and Harris say nothing about the formation of the corps as they were not involved, and neither do any of the other famous diarists of the 95th. Captain: I don't doubt the information he presents is factual, only what he does with it
For nstance, Verner had access to the letters sent out to the regiments from the Horse Guards, but fails to mention Stewart and Manningham's requests to make the corps permanent or the Duke of York's replies. He makes statements about the corps being compete, and the numbers sent back limited to 56 in March 1800, then mentions the 92nd's detachment showing up after the middle of May, and rejects begin escorted back to their regiments in July. I have no doubt that those facts are true, but what Verner does or doesn't make of them. That's the frustrating part. I originally questioned your view on the formation of the 95th because:1. You stated that it contained a large amount of Germans. Yes, I am beginning to see that I will have to reconsider that, as to *when* this was and for how long. It supposedly was at the same time the 5th Rifle battalion of the 60th was created, in the wake of all the German light units being disbanded, but it is obvious that a whole raft of detachments and volunteers were going through the 'experimental corps' training during that time. 2. And that the original experimental rifle corps was a failure with the 95th being raised in 1803. Yes, it is hard to tell how much of a success it was before 1802. I was thinking that it failed to be an actual unit--Stewart and Manningham failing to create one. In the context of the directives from the Horse Guards that the corps be a training unit, no it wasn't a failure
it did train the detachments
though it is not clear what those riflemen did once they returned to their units. I have found no evidence that there were Germans in the 95th, and out of all the muster rolls and sources of manpower presented by Verner, no Germans are mentioned. I will get that for you. And again, under what auspices the Germans were included, as volunteers, detachments from other units or such, needs to be determined. I cannot see that the experimental corps was a failure as the intention was to return the detachments to their parent regiment after being trained. It certainly represents the nucleus of the 95th rifles, with many of the detached officers staying with the Rifle Corps. I don't think that the Fencible volunteers can be viewed as a completely separate entity. Whichever way you look at it, the 95th began its life in 1800. Agreed. The experimental corps was not a failure in that it did what it was commissioned to do. As for the Fencibles volunteers being a completely separate entity. By what criteria are you deciding that they weren't? 1. They were raised/found using a completely different method of recruitment from the first 'batch' of rifle trainees--no effort to determine those with ability, other than the majority were Scots reputed to be good skirmishers. 2. They did not form part of the corps until the first batch had been released back to their regiments. 3. The Rifle Corps, with its officer positions was not Gazetted with a decernable command structure until October 1800, several months after the first detachments were gone. 4.So different soldiers, different command structure, different training camp
Different entity. The only things that suggest the rifle corps was the same 'entity' were the two commanders, when they were available, some of the officers from the first batch in the command structure--and the commission, to train riflemen, remained the same. To call it a school, yes, but to call it a unit at this point is stretching things too far. If all the soldiers in the 1st regiment were replaced and the command structure changed, one could say it was the same regiment, but really would it be other than in designation? All the officers remained on the books of their parent regiments, and all promotions at the time remained through those regiments. Beckwith becomes a captain in the 71st through their seniority processes etc., not the Rifles. The Rifles don't become a 'unit' in any army sense of the word until a year later. Best Regards, Bill H. |
10th Marines | 05 Sep 2009 12:59 p.m. PST |
Bill, Instead of naming one regulation the Prussians followed slavishly or to the letter, name one they didn't follow-that would be more in line with Prussian practice before and during 1806. Reading Craig, Paret, Shanahan, White and Elting the impression that is definitely presented on the Prussians is that they were slaves to Frederick and what they believed were Frederick's methods. Their organization was out of date-even when they adopted divisions before the 1806 campaigns they were the all-arms divisions that the French had abandoned in 1800. Their general staff was badly organized and grossly inefficient. Their general officers with few exceptions were ossified from the neck up and looked with disdain on how the French operated and fought. Their artillery and engineers were neglected and looked down upon, which was another legacy left over from Frederick. And their training and tactics were old, inefficient, and inflexible. And they chose to go to war against France. Scharnhorst is noted in saying before 1806 that if the Prussians did not adopt French organization, administration, and tactical systems they couldn't defeat them. What is myth (and I use that overused term reluctantly) is that the Prussian army was efficient in 1806 and their only problem was their senior leadership. That idea has been presented as a Prussian viewpoint but only to my mind by Prussian apologists who continue to maintain that the Prussian military system in 1806 was efficient and reform-minded. I believe that view to be incorrect. Sincerely, Kevin |
LORDGHEE | 05 Sep 2009 3:00 p.m. PST |
Intresting, "Their organization was out of date-even when they adopted divisions before the 1806 campaigns they were the all-arms divisions that the French had abandoned in 1800." The corp system gave the French great flexablity at the army level, but the lost of tatical flexablity did not become appearant unti 1812 and 13. this is real intresting to wargaeme. Marenago, neerwinden vs Ekcmul and Lepzig vs the 1813 battles. I belive that the Prussian Divional system of late Napoleonic period is the logical developoment of the whole period. With the introduction of all moderen weapons in WWI we seen the process of thought of combines arms start up and developed all over again. Lord Ghee |
McLaddie | 05 Sep 2009 3:06 p.m. PST |
Captain Snort: Just an after thought. The Rifle Corps from it's inception was quite different in process than any other unit formations, either militia or regular army. It was a quasi-unit, with neither it's own troops or even a place in the army lists for over two years. In other words, it was 'kind of a unit', but not. This makes it not only very different from other rifle and infantry units created during this time, but also beginning with a unique mission statement [training] among other army units. Giving the group of detachments a unit name rather than a camp name or school also confused the issue--but it can be seen, that regardless of the Army's purposes Manningham and Stewart both meant to see the Rifles as a regular army unit from the beginning. Best Regards, Bill H. |
McLaddie | 05 Sep 2009 3:47 p.m. PST |
Kevin wrote:
Instead of naming one regulation the Prussians followed slavishly or to the letter, name one they didn't follow-that would be more in line with Prussian practice before and during 1806. Kevin: Okay: 1. Deploying in two ranks on a regular basis, with the third rank as reserves or skirmishers. 1793-1796 The Prussian forces fighting the French followed the Duke of Brunswicks' 1793 Instructions to his own regiment.
2. During this same time, Prussian General Favrat[Who fought under FtG] created and drilled his troops in a star-shaped grouping on the parade ground, like the outline of a Vauban fort. Favrat called these mutually supporting infantry squares the ‘crox foudroyante.' During the Polish campaign in 1794-5, he actually attempted to maneuver his troops in this formation against peasants armed with farm tools and failed miserably. 3. Drill was not followed according to Frederick's dictums. Maude notes in his book on Jena, p.17
"It is
a certainty that not a single squadron that took the field in 1806 could have come up to the great King's requirements in 1754, when he sent the celebrated Baireuth Dragoons, the heroes of Hohenfriedberg, to three months extra drill for failing to reach his standard at the camp at Neisse." The reason is that neither Fredericks' regulations or drill were followed, seldom were battalions and brigades even exercised together. Part of the reason is that Frederick's mandatory drill period each year had been cut in half by 1806. 4. The efficient army administration, run by Frederick personally had ceased to exist. As Shanahan concludes in his study, "The Prussian army had a decentralized and even chaotic administration
The lack of integration reflected the absolute monarch's practice of creating administrative organs form time to time and fitting them haphazardly into the framework of the existing government. And by 1806, offices which had only a cursory significance under Frederick the Great, had become under his successors centers of independent authority." Neither Frederick's administration nor the means to enforce his doctrines existed in 1806. Frederick was still held up as the ideal in the Prussian Military, but his doctrines and regulations weren't followed in any uniform manner, let alone slavishly. If the army was slavish about anything, it was their willingness to ignore the fact they weren't Frederick's army anymore, allowed to go in any number of directions, partly because of the administration. As Clausewitz concluded in his Nahrichten über Presussen inn seiner grossen Katastrophe, "no minister of war stood at hand to guide the evolution of the army; military and civil administration was a many-headed hydra. 5. There was no uniform adherence to Frederickian drill or doctrine. As Paret notes on page 61 of his book: A number of Inspectors-Generals "came to grant the units under their surveillance a surprising latitude in drill and administration. Many commanders reacted by pressing for further refinements of parade-ground evolutions like Favrat; others strove to prepare their men for conditions that might reasonably be expected in the next war." These autonomous inspectorates created the exact opposite of any rigid adherence to a distinct ‘Frederickian' doctrine: each inspectorate, and often individual officers within the inspectorates, felt free to train and experiment as they pleased, which meant that any number of military men ignored official regulations and created their own instead. I have given several examples of that. John Cook noted in one Empire article on the Prussians, "The most rigidly Frederickian army suffered from the most free-wheeling plethora of regulations of any of the armies." Yes, the Prussians did neglect their artillery, but the also neglected their Cavalry and infantry too. The cavalry had to give up their horses for the planting and harvesting seasons. The infantry too was run on a subsistence budget, where the only thing the unit could do was drill on the parade ground--there was seldom any ammunition for real volley drill. And army reforms like creating another brigade of Fusiliers or doubling the number of Schutzen [both mandated in 1801] could not be carried out because there was no money for arms or men. Did the Prussian military men suspect they were out of date? You better believe they did. Why else did the Prussians avoid fighting the French in the beginning of 1806. Only after Napoleon embarrassed them into it, did they declare war. Why else would there be so many last minute attempts to improve the army with such French items as the 'division'? As Rottemburg points out in his book on the "Art of Warfare" Last minute attempts were made, in the words of the King, to "make our army more like the French." Does that sound like the Prussian command, from the top down, was rigidly Frederickian, let a lone all that confident in it's superiority? When John Elting says this on page 517 of his Swords: "That army marched away to Jena and Auerstadt, tried gallantly to fight its battle in Frederick's style: Stiff lines of musketeers trampling slowly forward or standing in the open while Lannes' scarce-seen skirmishers used them for target practice;" It simply isn't the case at all at Jena, either in the tactics used or style employed. Even their behavior was hardly 'stiff', nor does Etling's brief sentence describe what happened. In fact, the event he describes, even if it were true, represented less than 1/6 of Hohenlohe's command at Jena--and that portion didn't do anything of the sort either. It is Myth. Repeated by many historians, but never really questioned. Bressonet, the French officer who did the Army Study of Jena concluded that the French and Prussian tactics weren't all that different, just that the French carried them better, far better. It isn't a matter of my opinion, it is simply not what the primary sources say, either about the Prussian army, it's doctrines, or its behavior at Jena. Certainly the Prussians were backward in many things, but it wasn't from emulating Frederick's army of sixty years previous. A lot happened to the Prussian army during that six decades. Best Regards, Bill H. |
10th Marines | 06 Sep 2009 2:20 a.m. PST |
Bill, Bressonet isn't a primary source. And Craig, White, and Paret have done as much work in primary German source material as Bressonet did if not more. French training consisted of infantry/artillery cooperation, what today would be called combined arms training and operations. The Prussians did not. Tactically, which Prussian battalions at either Jena or Auerstadt deployed in open order and fought under cover? I haven't found any yet. Those two facets of tactics alone make a great difference in tactical doctrine and application. Perhaps Bressonet is wrong in his tactical conclusions? Sincerely, Kevin |
McLaddie | 06 Sep 2009 10:37 a.m. PST |
Kevin: No, Bressonet isn't a primary source, any more than Craig, White and Paret are, but a military man making a conclusion in a tactical study. Craig, White and Paret didn't make a study of Jena and Auerstadt, Bressonet did. But no matter, that isn't the point. I am not suggesting that the Prussians were coordinated at all, only that they used the same tactics as the French. In fact, the Prussian Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry at both Jena and Auerstadt fought separate, totally uncoordinated battles on a tactical level, with few exceptions. But the actual tactics were much the same. For instance, Garwart deployed his division and advanced in echelon against Vierzehnheiligen, Suchet's division does the same. The French mass 30 artillery pieces in the gap between Isserstadt and Vierzehnheiligen and the Prussians attempt the same--with mixed success. Tactically, which Prussian battalions at either Jena or Auerstadt deployed in open order and fought under cover? I haven't found any yet. Well, let me help you with a few examples: 1. All of the Fusiliers, Jagers, and Schutzen of Taunentzein's fought in open order, most under cover of Closewitz and Lutzeroda, and the associated woods for three hours against the French, included were three grenadier battalions that fought In Lutzeroda and the woods with the Fusiliers, and at least one regiment, Zweiffel, deployed all of their third rank as skirmishers. That is better than 25% of the total infantry force under Taunentzein. 2. Stanitz' brigade in Holtzendorff's command deployed all of their third rank to counter the French tirailleurs in the Heilingen Holtz [the woods south of his position] and drove them back until the French were reinforced. That is 33% + Schutzen of the infantry in Holtzendorff's command deployed as skirmishers, most in the woods. [under cover?] 3. Suchet's first attack on Vierzehnheiligen is repulsed by the Prussians and Saxons, and much of the force is in the town--it wasn't abandoned outright. In fact, of the six towns on the battlefield, only one isn't defended at all, Krippendorf. And Garwart's main objective in advancing is to recapture Vierzehnheiligen. 3. When Garwart arrives at Vierzehnheiligen, his first act is to deploy skirmishers in open order. They, of course, are no match for the more numerous French tirailleurs in the town and are withdrawn, and artillery is brought up to shell the town. 4. The Prussian skirmishers drive the French Tirailleurs out of most of Issenstadt Forest and the smaller Altenburg Holtchen to the front of the Hohenlohe Regiment @ 10:30am. Both the French and the Prussians note this. Colonel von Kalckreuth, commander of the Infantry Regiment Prince of Hohenlohe No. 32: "Right in front of the position that the regiment had now occupied was the large Isserstedt Forest, and a bit closer to the left was another copse, both of which were occupied in strength by enemy skirmishers. From the smaller copse [Altenburg Holtchen], the enemy was very soon dislodged by the Schuetzen of the regiment, however, the Isserstedt Forest would not be completely cleared of the enemy as it reached into the enemy position
" As far as I can tell both the French and the Prussians had more than 4,000 men a piece in the forest during that time. The colonel states that his Schutzen were reinforced 'several times' with volunteers from the regiment. At the end of the battle, the regiment deploys two flank companies as skirmishers. This one regiment in the middle of the Prussian line, conservatively, deployed 25% of their regiment as skirmishers in open order, many in the woods, during the battle. Of the total infantry force engaged at Jena, the Prussians and Saxons deployed 1 out of every 4 infantry as skirmishers. This is close to the percentage the French deployed of their army--25%--only the French outnumbered the Prussians more than two to one in every engagement listed above. All it takes is reading the after action reports and one gets a very different impression of the battle of Jena compared to the mythic tale of Frederick the Great's army standing in tight lines stoically being targets for wiley French tirailleurs. The French certainly beat the Prussians, and beat them good, but it didn't happen the way it is too often portrayed. Best Regards, Bill H. |
Kevin Kiley | 07 Sep 2009 9:55 a.m. PST |
Bill, '
Bressonet isn't a primary source, any more than Craig, White and Paret are, but a military man making a conclusion in a tactical study. Craig, White and Paret didn't make a study of Jena and Auerstadt, Bressonet did. But no matter, that isn't the point.' White, Elting, and Shanahan were all military men studying either Jena/Auserstadt or the Prussian army either before and during 1806 of before, during, and after 1806. Gordon Craig is a respected scholar of the Prussian army and his views and opinions on the Prussian army, using primary source material, are valid for before, during, and after 1806. Scharnhorst's views, especially before 1806 are chronicled excellently by Chuck White and the general conclusion that Scharnhorst had was that they needed more light troops and needed to adopt French methods or that they would lose. Paret has done two excellent studies on the Prussians where Jena/Auerstadt are covered and his study of Clausewitz is the definitive work on the subject. THe portions on 1806 definitely state that Prussian and tactics were different and that they actually had some battalions, including the one Clausewitz served in at Auerstadt, that were trained in the French manner which definitely indicates that the training was both different and taken from Prussian experiences fighting the French. The bottom line is that French tactical employment was different. Elting speaks of the French forming their first line, not by the 1791 Reglement in three lines, but in a heavy skirmish line. You won't see the Prussians doing this. Further, no one has stated that the Prussians didn't use skirmishers, the question is how many were deployed as tirailleurs and how were they used? Grawert deploying skirmishers is nice, but they were too few and were there to protect his main line. They were not used as the French used them-as a fire support element in large numbers to support attacks, or to attack in open order. Prussian light infantry were either the fusilier units or the schutzen from a line battalion. Their regulations were very specific on how these troops were to deploy-they were not employed flexibly, as a main unit as the French did, and they were not as effective, nor did they fight like, the French did. The French would deploy if the situation dictated whole companies, battalions, or regiments as tirailleurs. The same units would reform to fight and advance in line or column, or combinations of all three, always covered by swarms of skirmishers and supported by artillery. Grawert, whether or not he deployed his limited number of skirmishers, still fought his battle in formed units firing volleys at four French regiments fighting behind cover deployed as tirailleurs. No amount of revisionism can change that. Lastly, you have admitted yourself that the Prussians 'that the Prussians were coordinated at all.' That is a tactical question and admits that the tactics were different between the Prussian and French armies. The employment of skirmishers was very different, as was the doctrine of fighting in open order. Prussian line units generally didn't or couldnt'. In general, French line units could and demonstrated that tactical flexibility, the combination of the 1791 Reglement combined with the new open order fighting techniques to enable the battlefield and tactical close coordination between line and light troops on the battlefield. The Prussians couldn't do that and that is one of the reasons for the Prussian defeats in 1806. Not only could the Prussians not coordinate the tactical cooperation between infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the battlefield, they could not coordinate the tactical operations of line and light troops on the battlefield. Those are significant differences in the tactical systems between the two armies. That was also a catalyst for the reform movement from 1807 on. Paret gives primary examples of this in his book on Yorck and the Prussian reform movement. Sincerely, Kevin |
McLaddie | 07 Sep 2009 12:17 p.m. PST |
Kevin: I have not read any battlefield study of Jena or Auerstadt by Craig, Shanahan, Paret or white. The question wasn't how the French used skirmishers, but how the Prussians used them and how many. I answered that question. Garwart did not fight his battle with volleys. If you read Marwitz and Massenbach's reports, Garwart at best used volley fire to support first his skirmishers, and then the artillery, and the artillery is what finally drives the French from the outbuildings of the Village. The rest of the line sent out skirmishers to clear the woods in front and on the flanks. Between the arrival of Garwart and Napoleon's general advance, the Prussian line fought off two attacks, one by Ney and one by Lannes. Also within that time, Hohenlohe, not once, but twice decides to take up the advance, only to stop, once because of Lannes attack [which Lannes characterizes as the 'crisis of the day's battle] and once when Garwart talks him out of taking Vierzehnheiligen until Rachel arrives. Nowhere in the Prussian accounts do they 1. Use Frederickian tactics of volley and charge or advancing fire, and 2. do they state that the troops were attempting to win the battle by volley fire. In fact numerous statements are made about the error of standing in the open without moving--which wasn't anything but hesitation on the part of the Prussian command, not any purposeful tactic. Certainly Garwart's actions with Vierzehnheiligen prove he hardly depended on volley fire to defeat the French in the village. As for the French forming skirmish lines and not three rank. I'd love to know where you or Etling found that. I have read the after-action reports, and the only thing close to that is a battalion of the 16th Legere attacking some Prussian batteries first in column and then dispersing into skirmish lines. Nowhere else do the French describe that in my readings. They describe deploying into lines. While I am sure the French infantry *could* do that if desired, I don't see them actually doing it, except by necessity on entering the various woods surrounding the battlefield. The Prussian and French tactics are similar, certainly not exactly the same. For instance, the French led with their light battalions, both in advancing, and particularly attacking woods and towns. The Prussians do the same in the defense and attack. The cavalry tactics used by both sides were very much the same, and very much a stalemate until the end of the day. Even the devastating skirmish fire that the Prussians supposedly shot the Prussians to pieces is questionable. There were other, more serious causes. In all but one account, the French artillery fire from that grand battery of 30+ guns is mentioned first, with then an aside about the skirmish fire. For example, this account: Again, Col. Kalckreuth, commander of infantry Regiment Prince of Hohenlohe (No. 32) at Jena (printed in Jany's "Gefechtausbildung", pp. 123ff.):
"The skirmishers of the regiment spurred on by those officers commanding them stopped the enemy light troops from advancing for a very long time although they were better protected everywhere by terrain which was most advantageous to them. It could not be otherwise, for in this standing battle which we had to endure for several hours, we had heavy losses of men due not only to the far more numerous enemy artillery but also due to the skirmish fire." Is is the fire from those guns that cause the *stoic* Stanitz regiment to reel back in the first advance, not the skimrishers, which the Stanitz regiment then endures for at least 90 minutes afterward without reeling back. The Stanitz retreat is what makes Hohenlohe hesitate at the very beginning--not the skirmish fire. Yes, Garwart didn't deploy enough skirmishers. The point is that was his first response, not volley fire. Nor is it his second response, which was to bring up artillery. He could see that the village was heavily occupied and a frontal assault would not be successful, volley fire or not. You insist that the Prussians didn't use skirmishers as the French used them. Here is how the French used them: 1. To lead divisional advances 2. To take and occupy woods and towns. 3. To screen the formed troops. 4. To attack both infantry and artillery. 5. To deploy whole companies and battalions as skirmishers Now, the French did the above much better than the Prussians and Saxons--no question. And they did it with more light infantry, not only as a percentage of the infantry available [but not by much], but also because they arranged to have twice the troops at every engagement point of the battle. Certainly an example of superior French tactics and poor Prussian tactics. However, I can give you examples of the Prussians/Saxons carrying out all five of those tactics listed at some point during the battle of Jena. [For instance, whole battalions of Fusiliers and grenadiers were used to defend the towns and woods. And that is exactly where the French deployed whole battalions in the traditional arena of light infantry: towns and woods.] Not in the same numbers, not with anything like the French success, but they did it
Lastly, if you read the Prussian conclusions about how their army needed to improve after Jena, and how that was translated into reforms, Paret describes it: The Prussians felt they needed: 1. Better training for the light infantry 2. A larger light infantry capability 3. A line infantry force with skirmish capabilities That's it. No new tactical system was envisioned for the light infantry--and York's and others' 1807+ light infantry doctrines all were based on works written before 1806. What I find interesting is the three points to reform are exactly the same three that the Prussians saw as needed at the end of their involvement in the French Revolution. I think you need to re-read Paret and Clausewitz about units being trained 'in the French manner.' What you think he is saying isn't what I've have read. However, it is another proof that the Prussians hardly had anything like a strict adherence to, or confidence in, Freddy's way of war. Best Regards, Bill Haggart |
Steven H Smith | 07 Sep 2009 1:23 p.m. PST |
Julius August Reinhold von Grawert, 1746-1821. |
McLaddie | 07 Sep 2009 7:07 p.m. PST |
Julius August Reinhold von Grawert, 1746-1821. Yep, that's the man, depending on which book you're reading
Grawart or Grawert
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Steven H Smith | 07 Sep 2009 10:19 p.m. PST |
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