"Austrian Third Rank as Skirmishers?" Topic

I recall reading something about this somewhere but I cannot for the life of me find it, so I ask the help of the more learned members of the TMP.

1. Did the Austrians use the third rank of infantry battalions as skirmishers?

2. If so, when and which units? Just the Fusiliers or did the Grenadiers, Grenz, Landwehr etc do this as well?

3. How effective was this tactic? It looks like an attempt to counter the better trained and more effective French skirmishers with raw numbers. One-third of an infantry battalion committed to skirmishing is alot of troops. Especially if the unit in question is an oversized Austrian infantry battalion!

Thanks for all the great responses in advance!

Just from memory:

1. Yep, throughout the period.

2. I think it was just an IR tactic.

3. It could be very effective, and certainly from 1809 you stop hearing about the French skirmisher superiority. There are even descriptions of the Austrians using the third rank as a formed reserve early in the period, in addition to skirmishing. However, it did probably lack the consistency and control of a dedicated light company.

It wasn't 1/3 of the whole battalion though – if memory serves it was the third rank of a division (two companies), which when the battalion was at full strength of 1000 men could put out 100+ skirmishers, but was probably about 50-60 in most cases (at a rough guess).

Cheers,

Christopher

the French learned skirmishing in the French Revolution mainaly from the Austrians.

The Austrian used skirmishers too such extend that orders had to be issued to reduce skirmishing.

Not all of the third rank were used as skirmishers at once, but at least half of it were formed in the rear as reserve.

The Austrians used the 3rd rank to skirmish throughout the Revolutionary Wars. Coberg used the 3rd rank extensively in Holland in 1794 with marked success. And as von Winterfeldt notes, Austrian commanders felt the need to instruct officers to reduce the number of skirmishers deployed.

In 1796, Archduke Charles in his Instructions specifically notes Coberg's actions and cautions officers not limit the number of skirmisher deployed. He is talking here about line troops, not Jagers or Grenz.

Mack, in Italy during the 1800 Campaign in Italy [He was chief of staff for Melas] issued general orders, not once, but multiple times over the course of a month admonishing officers to limit the number of skirmishers thrown out. Again, he was referencing line infantry.

In 1813, Schwartzenburg [sp?] writes instructions, insisting that deploying whole battalions as skirmishers was unnecessary, and just enough to keep the enemy at bay was sufficient.

If line infantry wasn't being used extensively as skirmishers, these generals' words of caution wouldn't have been necessary.

When Radesky is quoted in 1813 saying that the Austrians and Russians shouldn't skirmish extensively because they don't understand the practice, it is forgotten that Radesky himself deployed large numbers of skirmishers [battalions] in 1809 and 1813. In general, the Russians and Austrians still deployed large numbers in 1813 and later. For instance, all three battalions of the Pavlov Grenadiers were deployed as skirmishers in woods at Lutzen, while large numbers of Austrian line infantry were thrown out during the Austrian advances at the battle Leipzig.

While the Allied nations may not have been as good as the French at skirmishing, they did it. Just as the Spanish, while not as good as the French in formed combat still fought in lines and columns…

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Dear Fox
You can find an explanation of the use of the Third Rank used by the Prussians in Prussian Infantry Volume 2. Although not Austrian, the diagrams will give you an idea of the reserve formed by the third rank etc that von Winterfeldt is referring to.

It should be remember that it was fool hardy to have all the battalion in skirmish order with a reserve or somewhere to rally to. The French rarely deployed completely in skirmish order for this reason.

Stephen

'the French learned skirmishing in the French Revolution mainaly from the Austrians'

Do you have a reference or references for this? This statement is inaccurate. The French experimented with infantry columns supported by skirmishers in the 1770s in Normandy. This practice, while not codified in the 1791 Regulations was employed by the French armies in the 1790s. The Austrians had nothing to do with it. This is succinctly brought out by Duffy in The Military Experience in the Age of Reason.

Sincerely,
K

'It should be remember that it was fool hardy to have all the battalion in skirmish order with a reserve or somewhere to rally to. The French rarely deployed completely in skirmish order for this reason.'

Dear Stephen,

This statement is incorrect. The French practice was to deploy whole units as skirmishers from the company to the regimental level. That is because their philosophy of skirmisher employment was very different from that of the Prussians, Russians, and Russians. That fact has been documented on this forum many times. There is an excellent explanation of French skirmisher practice in Napoleon's Apogee by Scott Bowden.

Further, excellent explanations can be found in The Background of Napoleonic Warfare by Robert Quimby, Swords Around A Throne by John Elting, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform by Peter Paret, The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White, and The British Light Infantry Army by David Gates. The material is in print, all anyone has to do is read it.

Sincerely,
K

Dear Kevin
Please consider that the Austrians in their use of their Grenz and Croats in the 7 Years War predates the use of skirmishers in the French Army.

If you do not look at the practices of your opponents then you are lost.

Please read what I have written upon the usage of Light Infantry and Third rank in my book on the Prussian Infantry.

I am not convinced about the lack of reserve or supports. You cannot maintain a skirmish line without rotating who is in the line. This is tactical point rather than a sweeping statement that the whole of ??? was thrown out into skirmish order. If attacked by cavalry the skirmish line would be dispersed as it did not have a focus. This is shown in Bowden (2009) 44-46 that you rate highly.

What has Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform by Peter Paret, The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White, and The British Light Infantry Army by David Gates got to do with the French tactics.

Yes indeed, look how many light battalions the French had in 1792 compared to the Austrians – including the Grenz regiments.

The French light infantry tactics were very poor in the beginning but then the pupil suprassed the teacher.

Paret, White, Gates – seem to be smoke screens in that issue.

'Paret, White, Gates – seem to be smoke screens in that issue.'

All three cover the employment of light infantry during the period and are all useful references on the subject. So, why would that be a 'smokescreen?' Have you read the material? You can also add John Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic, which is a study of the Armee du Nord, for examples of light infantry employment. You are creating a strawman argument which is not helpful.

'Yes indeed, look how many light battalions the French had in 1792 compared to the Austrians – including the Grenz regiments.'

The number of light infantry battalions is irrelevant. The employment of them is what is important. And the French employed line infantry units in open or skirmish order as well as their light troops, prompting General Duhesme to state that all the French had were light infantry.

French light infantry tactics were poor in the beginning, but they quickly learned how to coordinate infantry in open order with troops in formed units. They trained them either informally or in temporary schools-this is brought out both in Swords and Bayonets.

Again, could you please post support for your thesis that the French learned from the Austrians.

By the 1790s the Grenz were losing their effectiveness as light infantry. Please see Rothenberg's Napoleon's Great Adversary, page 33: 'In the Austrian army, light infantry missions, scouting and skirmishing, commonly were entrusted to the Grenzer, though there were complaints that training them as line infantry had spoiled thehir natural aptitude for these duties…Nonetheless, training and organization of the Grenzer continued to conform with that of the line and their combat performance declined.'

It seems to me that you are attempting to equate that all skirmishing is equal, and ignoring the fact that the French developed a new tactical system that was superior to that of the Austrians, French, Russians, Prussians, and British.

Again, please supply a reference that supports your viewpoint that the French learned skirmishing from the Austrians.

Sincerely,
K

Dear Kevin
Can you give occurences in the Peninsular that the French defeated the British with skirmishers.

The skirmisher tactics were superior for a limited period up until 1812. The Prussians and the other states caught up with these and certainly the Prussians improved upon them. The drill and methods survived into the 20th century. The introduction of the universal soldier idea who could perform duties in open and close order.

Von Yorck in 1806 beat the French at skirmishing with his Jagers. It is all about co-ordination. The French went from clouds of skirmishers as they did not have the control to specific tactics in the 1800-11 period and then degenerated through lack of experience and poor tactical leadership.

The Grenz became more regularised. The Austrian use of them was different to the French.

The French learnt a great deal from the Seven Years War including the need to overhaul their artillery and the need for light infantry. Alas the French were unable to advance their lessens from the American War of Independence due to financial restraints. They had to wait until the height of the Revolutionary Wars.

The Illyrian units in the French Army performed very well and these were Grenz.

Stephen

'Please consider that the Austrians in their use of their Grenz and Croats in the 7 Years War predates the use of skirmishers in the French Army.'

Dear Stephen,

That is generally correct. However, you are overlooking the fact that the Grenz were generally employed in the 'little war' on the fringes of battles, not in the manner the French developed combining the operations of troops in open or skirmish order with those in formed order on the battlefield. You are also overlooking the fact that the Grenz were irregulars and not subject to regular training and discipline during the Seven Years War. Further, you are ignoring the fact that the French raised irregular light units specifically to oppose the Grenz during the Seven Years War. As Christopher Duffy states ono page 279 of The Military Experience in the Age of Reason:

'Mesnil-Durand, Joly de Maizeroy and Saxe were among the authorities who called for a closer working of regular and skirmishing tactics. Marshal Broglie did something to put this notion into practical effect when he assumed command in western Germany in 1760. He upgraded the grenadiers, established a company of chasseurs in each battalion of the line, and in one of his less happy inspiration, he dealt a blow at the existing bodies of light troops by recalling the veteran Fischer to a staff appointment at headquarters.'

'Broglie and his fellows encountered much oppostion from conservative circles, but in his officially approved Regulation of 1764 he was able to explain how regulars could be employed in skirmish order to prepare the way for columns of attack. The seeds had been sown. A light infantry company was formed in every battalion of English infantry in 1771-1772, by when military Europe was being conditioned to accept that regular troops could be used in ways that had once been the preserve of the Croats and free corps.'

'What has Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform by Peter Paret, The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White, and The British Light Infantry Army by David Gates got to do with the French tactics.'

Have you read them? There is substantial information in each one on how the French operated on the battlefield and what the allied armies had to do to catch up. All are excellent references for the period.

I dont' have your books, unfortunately. Perhaps you can quote from them for this discussion.

'I am not convinced about the lack of reserve or supports. You cannot maintain a skirmish line without rotating who is in the line. This is tactical point rather than a sweeping statement that the whole of ??? was thrown out into skirmish order. If attacked by cavalry the skirmish line would be dispersed as it did not have a focus. This is shown in Bowden (2009) 44-46 that you rate highly.'

Who stated that the French units deployed in open order or as skirmishers did not have a reserve to rally on? I certainly didn't. If you are maintaining that, then you are incorrect. Col Elting certainly brings this out, that a reserve was employed, in Swords. I really don't understand what you are getting at here. The bottom line is that the French did deploy whole units as skirmishers up to and including regiments. Were reserves kept? Yes, they were, but deploying whole units lends more cohesion than merely deploying the third rank as skirmishers. It is noteworthy that the French never had a formal regulation for fighting in open or skirmish order (although some commanders did). The allied nations did. This says volumes on what skirmishing was considered in the different armies.

Sincerely,
K

Dear Stephen,

'Can you give occurences in the Peninsular that the French defeated the British with skirmishers?

Yes. Lt Blakiston of the 43d Light Infantry stated of the Battle of the Nive in 1813 that 'The brigade of Guards was on this occasion brought forward to bear the brunt of the action during which their light companies received a dreadful mauling from the French voligeurs. The great John Bulls had no notion of screening themselves from the fire of their more cautious adversaries, and suffered accordingly.' Page 172, The British Light Infantry Arm by David Gates.

Edward Costello of the 95th stated that the 85th Light Infantry were 'very roughly handled by the enemy' at Fuentes de Onoro in 1811 and at the hands of the 'old trained French tiralleurs…the 85th…suffered severely.' Gates, page 173.

French skirmisher tactics, and their tactical system was excellent throughout the wars, even in 1813-1815. One British observer admired the French skirmishers in 1814 in the south of France, French conscripts outfought allied veterans at Dresden in 1813, especially in open order in the Great Garden. The Prussians certainly learned from 1806, but they never surpassed the French tactically combining skirmishers with troops in formed units. The action by Yorck that you mention was a skirmish, not a battle and the jagers were truly an elite unit. However, it is not indicative of Prussian performance in 1806.

What is being missed here is the tactical system the French developed which was to coordinate large numbers of skirmishers offensively with troops in formed units and use them as an offensive weapon supported by artillery. Other nations did not do that up to at least 1808 and the French continued to employ the system with successes to 1815.

At Waterloo after the failure of the French cavalry charges, French infantry broke down into skirmisher swarms, supported by artillery and cavalry, and not only won the skirmisher fight from the allies, but were beginning to shoot the allied line to pieces. That can be found in both Houssaye's and Siborne's history of the Waterloo campaign.

Sincerely,
K

It is interesting that descriptions like Rothenbergs "'In the Austrian army, light infantry missions, scouting and skirmishing, commonly were entrusted to the Grenzer, though there were complaints that training them as line infantry had spoiled thehir natural aptitude for these duties…" doesn't explain a whole lot. It's a conclusion statement about a variety of events, including the fact that the Grenzers lost a lot of troops between 1792-1799, and the recruiting efforts led to revolts by those Grenzer units, so of course, they were neither trained well, being filled with new recruits, or trusted, the recruits being rebellious.

And it doesn't explain what the Austrians were actually doing. For instance, in 1800 Austrian light infantry nearly cut the retreat route of Ney's Division at Ampfing, according to James Arnold in Marengo and Hohenlinden and yet there were no Grenzer or Jagers in the Austrian command that attacked Ney. The Austrian army itself was filled with new recruits and depot units at the time.

As for Bowden's book. It is great to have a translation of Bressonet's work. However, the comparisons or perceived differences in French light operations compared to Prussian gets a little wonky at times. On Pages 44-46 Bowden notes that the French reinforced or relieved light units from other regiments and not necessarily from the parent unit.

At Saalfeld, the Prussians do the same thing according the Bressonet's accounts. Fusiliers and Jagers are reinforced by Saxon line detachments. The Prussians do the very same thing at Jena. Considering that the Prussians were outnumbered significantly at both battles, it isn't surprising that 'relieving' light units wasn't carried out.

That isn't to say the Prussians were just like the French, but often what is identified as unique to the French turns out to be something every army did, but the French did it better, or it was documented in French rather than German or Russian.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Dear Bill
Thank you for your observations. I would add to the last one. Very few in English have bothered to look at the German or Russian sources as most authors can only read French. In addition the French wrote a great deal about the theories than the German sources.

The Prussians relieved from within the battalion and the regiment which was superior to that of relieving whole battalions at one time.

It is difficult to quote from my book without the illustrations to go with it. One of the chapters is an integrated study of the Prussian infantry tactics. I think Kevin you should read this.

It is interesting that very little is written upon these matters in drill manuals.

It is interesting how the disintegration and cohesion of French infantry at Waterloo is dressed up.

Stephen

'The Prussians relieved from within the battalion and the regiment which was superior to that of relieving whole battalions at one time.'

How was it superior? If an entire unit is deployed, it is better to relieve it with another unit. Further if it is established practice and it works, there isn't a problem. I really don't understand how you can pronounce the Prussian method 'superior' without any concrete examples.

'It is difficult to quote from my book without the illustrations to go with it.'

Why? Is it mostly illustrations and little text? Or, is it so integrated that the methods and practices cannot be explained without diagrams?

'One of the chapters is an integrated study of the Prussian infantry tactics. I think Kevin you should read this.'

Agree. How can I get a copy of the book? Or, can you scan and send the chapter?

'It is interesting how the disintegration and cohesion of French infantry at Waterloo is dressed up.'

I suggest you read Ropes, Siborne, and Houssaye to see how the French fought at Waterloo. There is nothing 'dressed up' in any of these histories. Nord didn't 'disintegrate' until the Guard assault was defeated late in the day. I don't really understand what you're trying to say here.

Sincerely,
K

@KFK

My general problem with superior French skrimishers in the Peninsula campaingn simply is: The allied forces could successfully use more often than not a tactic that has as essential ingredient the screening of their formed units by a skirmisher screen. If the French forces 1809 and later would have been better in skirmish tactics than their allied opponents this important piece of Wellightons tactical system would not have been possible.

So your British eyewitness account may be the exception not the rule. Do you have accounts of British rifle officers or officers of the light units of the KGL that give the impression of superior French light infantry tactics on this TOW? I have only found in my admittedly limited reading the contrary.

For the period after the 1812 Russian debacle, especially the German campaigns of 1813, my issue with your arguments is, how could French infantry with less than 15% trained soldiers in most non-guard units out-skirmish their opponents when even French officers admit that the motivation was quite low, or in other words,how could they achieve in 1813 much more than the highly motivated infantry of the French Republic in the years after 1793?

That the French infantry of the hundred days usually consisted of trained veterans makes a good argument for the alomost successfull action at Waterloo, but can not IMHO be an argument for the period of 1813/14.

Dear Kevin
That is your reading and not mine of the same texts. We just differ. The French Infantry were not in a state to take the offensive after the mishandling earlier in the day. The French were lacking infantry and had to use cavalry that was poorly supported. This is old ground.

The Prussian Infantry Volume I and II are available from On Military Matters or Caliver Books. Explanation of the Brigade structure is in Volume I 49-64 and look at Volume II pg10-22 for tactical explanations.

I hope you have been able to purchase French Artillery to 1824: Gribeauval, AnXI and Drill Manual. DP&G have sorted out their payment system. This is certainly an interesting study that corrects many of the misconceptions and brings the research up to when it was written in 2008. Since then many other things have come to light. The speculation over the design of the M1808 version of the AnXI has been confirmed with plans. Interesting the use of the Wurst into 1805 at Strasburg.

I am just finishing my book on Saxon Artillery. All the plans are 1:24 or 1:30 scale. Much underated with interesting designs such as the Granadstuck that could fire spherical case and the M1810 guns that owed much to the excellent AnXI guns.

Adye (1813) should be out next month in paperback and hardback. I think you would be interested in Dupin's drawings of the Royal Artillery Equipment in 1816. This has been republished last month as Dupin's British Napoleonic Ordnance.

As you can see that I have not been idle.

Stephen

The Pensiular War is differnt to the above asked question, in case reading :

Griffith, Paddy (editor) A History of the Peninsular War, Volume IX – London 1999

leads to the conclusion that the British system of light infantry and skrimishing, using amonst else rifle units – which the French failed to comprehend – was vastly superior to the Fernch one.

I am not sure why the Peninsula War or the British have been brought into this thread but if nothing else, it illustrates the danger of quoting snippets from primary sources that appear out of context in secondary sources.

Every time there is a thread on skirmishers, Kevin advises us to read secondary works such as Gates, Elting, Paret etc. in order to understand how the French system was different and superior to others. He quotes from Gates above to illustrate the "defeat" of British skirmishers.

It should be pointed out that Blakiston "of the 43rd light infantry" (actually of the 17th Portuguese)finishes his description of the Guards at the Nive by stating: "This day's work terminated as before, in the retreat of the French". It should also be pointed out that Blakiston was nowhere near this particular incident so cannot be considered an eyewitness and the actual reason why the Guardsmen were so exposed to fire can be found in a letter written by John Aitchison the day after the battle. Similar comments could be made about the snippet of Costello that is cited from the same source.

I admit that this is all rather pedantic but, Kevin, you are using poor, unresearched examples to illustrate your point, which leads me to believe that the rest of your comments are equally suspect and also based on rather flimsy evidence.

<;^}

'I admit that this is all rather pedantic but, Kevin, you are using poor, unresearched examples to illustrate your point, which leads me to believe that the rest of your comments are equally suspect and also based on rather flimsy evidence.'

CS,

It isn't pedantic and some excellent points were brought out by your posting. However, I disagree with your comment that the examples I'm using are poor and/or unresearched. The evidence isn't flimsy, either. The secondary sources I have used and have recommended are ecellent historical volumes by proven authorities in the field who have depicted the French tactical system accurately and intelligently. If you don't agree with them and believe them to be poor or in error, then it is up to you to disprove them based on solid historical inquiry. That you haven't done (nor has anyone else, so don't feel alone).

Many secondary sources contain excellent primary source information. The use of credible source material is critical to any historical inquiry, which I believe this thread to be. Further, evaluating the source material itself is also critical and helpful to historical discussion and argument. Negating a source merely because you don't think it is valuable is not criteria to do that. And if the sources I listed are not accurate, then what is? Do you have a listing of source material that is both accurate and negates either what I have posted or contradicts and proves that these sources are incorrect? If you do, then I would like to see them. What I have posted on the subject is accurate and correct. If you disagree then please post other references so that we can get to the bottom of the issue. I've asked others in the thread to do that, and it hasn't been done. John Elting, Charles White, David Gates, Robert Quimby and others are all authorities on the period in some form or another and all have used primary material in their research. They definitely understand what and how skirmishers were employed by the belligerents of the wars from 1792-1815, and such scholars as Henry Houssaye, John Ropes, and William Siborne have produced excellent histories on Waterloo and the events of the day in detail. Clausewitz didn't do too badly with his history of the 1815 campaign either.

'Every time there is a thread on skirmishers, Kevin advises us to read secondary works such as Gates, Elting, Paret etc. in order to understand how the French system was different and superior to others.'

That is because the same questions arise and these references are easy to obtain and to inject into the discussion. Inaccurate information on fighting in open order and skirmishing in its various forms always comes up on the forum. The best way to explain it and to give the statements and opinions a factual basis, why not use the available work of historians who are authorities on the subject? There are other sources available, but these are generally the easiest to obtain. They certainly are more valuable and accurate than the Ospreys on the same subject, with a few notable exceptions.

'He quotes from Gates above to illustrate the "defeat" of British skirmishers.'

That was to answer a specific question regarding skirmish fighting and not the eventual outcome which I assumed to be common knowledge on the war in the Peninsula since the subject comes up so often.

Sincerely,
K

'…leads to the conclusion that the British system of light infantry and skrimishing, using amonst else rifle units – which the French failed to comprehend – was vastly superior to the Fernch one.'

Could you give an example from the text? That's a very sweeping statement which primary source evidence does not verify.

Sincerely,
K

'That is your reading and not mine of the same texts. We just differ. The French Infantry were not in a state to take the offensive after the mishandling earlier in the day. The French were lacking infantry and had to use cavalry that was poorly supported. This is old ground.'

Dear Stephen,

Actually, no. All the texts are quite clear as to the actions of the French infantry units after the French cavalry charges. The French infantry was not used up and continued to fight until the repulse of the Guard in the evening. If the French infantry was used up earlier, the battle would have ended much earlier. The situation is summed up quite nicely in the Esposito/Elting Atlas.

I am going to order your two books on the Prussians. Thanks for the advice.

Why are you bringing up artillery in the skirmisher discussion? As you know, there was no 'M1808' French artillery system. The French had only four artillery systems from 1732 to 1815: Valliere, Gribeauval, AN XI, and Vallee. If a system is improved or modified while in service, it is still the original system. And it should be noted that AN XI was only a partial implementation, ending up supplementing the Gribeavual System instead of replacing it. It should also be noted that an artillery system is more than just guns and vehicles. It also consists of organization, education, command and control, tactics and doctrine. That tends to be forgotten when discussing artillery.

Sincerely,
K

Dear Kevin
I have stated that the M1808 was a modification of the AnXI. The AnXI gun tubes upon AnXI carriages with Gribeuval 8-pdr fittings as explained in French Artillery to 1824. I am shocked that you considered the M1828 Valee system as being Napoleonic. It was not designed or introduced until 1828 being a French interetation of the British Desaguliers system as drawn by Charles Dupin in 1816. The Gribeauval system was found by the French to be inadequate.

How many Gribeauval guns other than 12-pdrs were there at Waterloo? There were no 4-pdrs and 8-pdrs. Only 12 pieces of 12-pdrs were at Waterloo. The 6.4in Long Porte was not a Gribeauval design. There was almost nothing left of the Gribeauval system by 1811 in mainland Europe. It was only used in the Peninsular due to the Spanish Gribeuval and ammunition/logistics.

Your reading of Waterloo is interest and I differ from your conclusions. We differ with definition as ever.

Stephen

Any more comments on Austrian and third rank skirmishing?
And no I am not interested in Rothenberg – this work is out of date.

von Winterfeldt:

Well, the ability to use the third rank as reserves and skirmishers was included in Austrian and Prussian regulations before 1792. Mack, in his 1803 Instructions, also includes it.

The Austrians are deploying line infantry as skirmishers from the beginning of the wars, and deployment by company is not found in their regulations from what I have seen, even in Archduke Charles' reforms. Others may know more about this than I.

As all the Austrian regulations sanctioned the use of the 3rd line and the Austrians were deploying line troops as skirmishers on a regular basis--apparently more than most Austrian commanders desired, it is safe to assume that at least some of the time, the skirmishers came from the third rank.

The Prussians deployed in 2 ranks throughout the two years they fought in the Revolutionary Wars 1793-1795.
[Scharnhorst and others comment on it.]

It was neither a new nor a radical practice for the Allies. Ney, in his 1803 Instructions insists that the third rank be used as a reserve and as skirmishers. He feels its a much better use of the 3rd rank than standing behind the first two.

Davout discusses the relative merits of the third rank as opposed to company skirmish deployments in his 1811 instructions. He comes out against the 3rd rank practice. The fact that such a veteran as Davout is still even discussing the practice twenty years into the French wars suggests that it wasn't all that strange or unacceptable to either the French or Allies. It is obvious that some of the French corps did deploy the third rank at times.

John Cook wrote on this in Empire, and I can provide a number of examples from the 1809 Krieg if you'd like.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Excellent summary.

I would be interested where Scharnhorst comments that the Prussian line infantry did fight in two ranks in the French Revolutionary Wars (Füsiler regiments apart) and also any accounts of 1809 will be appreciated.

von Winterfeldt:

Well, let's see.
Scharnhorst's statement that the Prussians fought in two ranks during the Revolutionary wars was in his Officer's Field Book of 1811 IIRC. It is mentioned by Charles White in his "The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst" and by Hans Delbrück, "The Dawn of Modern Warfare" p. 389. I don't have those books available at the moment, so I can't track down the pages.

There is also this:
"In the second expedition 1793, the Prussian and Saxon troops always stood two men deep, and nevertheless two battalions of the Prussian regiment Crousatz attacked in Bisingen by French heavy cavalry, eight hundred horsemen broke through the intervals of the battalions, and the regiment was attacked in the rear. The second line right-reversed and drove the enemy off with its lively fire." Account in the "Magazine of the Newest War Event" 7th Bd.S.189. Translated by Geert van Uythoven. He has this posted with references on his website.

link

Austrian Accounts:

Each set of Austrian Regulations, starting with 1769 and through to the end of the Napoleon, all provide for the third rank being used as a reserve or skirmishers, often formed into independent Zugs.

During the Revolutionary wars, large number of Austrians were used as skirmishers:

*Coburg's 1793 Instructions specifically turned these third rank "large Zug" units into hit squads, which were very effective when combined with light cavalry in clearing French skirmishers. It is Coburg's methods that Archduke Charles references in his 1796 Instructions when he states that in most cases such large numbers of skirmishers are unnecessary.

*A J. Gallina, writing in 1872 from Vienna in his 'Beitrage zur Geschichte des osterreichischen Heerwesens' discussed GM Mack's 1794 Instructionspunke. He states that Mack intended the third rank of the line troops to be used as a general reserve and for skirmishing, and that the practice saw use in the Low Countries in 1794 and Germany in 1796.

*The celebrated French light infantryman Duhesme writes about the effectiveness of Austrian skirmishers during the Revolutionary Wars: [He is speaking of Jagers and Grenz in 'the advanced guards', but line troops when he speaks of fresh troops throwing out skirmishers:

"These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their entrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order, they in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men." Col. E. Lloyd 'A Review of the History of Infantry' 1908 page 201 quoting a 1864 reprint of Duheme's Essai historique sur l'Infantrerie Legere page 72.

*Another translation by Geert van Uythoven is an article by H.P.R. von Porbeck, that has appeared in 'Neue Bellona' I (Leipzig 1802): "Die Schlacht bei Tourcoing". Porbeck was present during the battle the 1794 battle he describes. The article contains the complete, official 'Hauptdisposition'. It says about the Austrian "Hauptarmee"

"Hauptdisposition, fur die verschiedene Armee-theile."
Hauptquartier Valenciennes, den 1ten April 1794."(…) "Den 7ten April"

"Because the enemy is very easy being pushed back, when we can advance into his flanks or in the back, each column reserves 200 volunteers at the start [of the fighting/attack], each hundred with a captain and 2 officers, which have to be bold and determined men. These men are destined, together with the light infantry and to support these, left and right from the road [formed movement was mostly only possible along the roads, see former messages], to turn the wings and flanks, [of] the enemy troops, positions and post, to facilitate the advance of the columns, or to turn, or storm, the enemy entrenchments when present." 1)

[signed] Prinz Coburg, F.M.

For the 1809 Campaign I have these examples of Austrian skirmishing from the Krieg 1809:

* The third Zug of several line regiments are thrown foreward at the beginning of the battle (page 224, volume 2 )

* The IR33 deploys skirmishers during the engagement at Landshut, later together with IR3 they repeatedly deploy skirmishers at the orders of GM Radetsky.(vol. 2) [The same one who argues against deploying skirmishers in 1813]

* At Teugen-Hausen FML Lusignan throws out line infantry and the Peterwardein Grenzers who advance as skirmishers through Roith and across the Buchberg to engage the enemy. Lusignan then advances toward the sounds of this 'lively fire-fight' to support it.

* In volume 2 and 4, there are numerous instances of line regiments reinforcing Jager and Grenzer skirmish lines which are advancing or in firefights with the French.

* At Znaym, "The advanced pickets of the Mittrowsky IR10 engaged, and were supported by their battalion, and covered by a 12 pdr position battery, obstructed the enemy's advance, until one battalion of Kollowrath IR11, and two pi3ces of ordnance came up." Later, "a second battalion was detached to the height, and a chain of riflemen formed, to force those of the enemy back into the village."

* And they did deploy companies too: Carl Varnhagen von Ense, an officer in IR47 Vogelsang, left an account of his regiment at Wagram in Die Schlacht von Wagram , last published in 1909. In this he describes how his regiment was lying down to avoid enemy cannon fire when "almost all" the company commanded by Hauptmann von Marais was deployed as skirmishers. The company "dissolved into skirmishers, behind willow tree trunks and high corn", later "The skirmishers were called back from the Russbach and stepped back into line."

And some from 1813 and 1814:

*On October 16, 1813, Large numbers of skirmishers from Klenau's Corps carried out a two-hour fight against French tirailleurs which ended in a draw.

* In October 1813, at Hanau, 2nd battalion IR14 "moved forward to support the Bavarian skirmishers in front of the Lamberwald. When the skirmishers were driven back, skirmishers of this battalion moved forward, established a lively fire and halted the enemy advance."

*Here is a 1814 account published in Mitteilungen des kuk Heeresmuseum (1902-1907) quoted by John Cook:

An officer in 3rd battalion IR63 Bianchi recounts how the Austrian masses deploying skirmishers at Valeggio in February 1814.[where entire battalions 'dissolved']:

"GM Baron Stutterheim rode up and ordered us to form division masses, then to wheel to the left and march off towards the enemy; muskets were to be loaded on the march". The masses were drawn up in a chequer board arrangement with IR63 on the left. "Our masses sent out skirmishers (from IR3 Erzherzog Karl, IR4 Deutchmeister and IR63); the four guns, which were attached to our brigade, unlimbered and took up their firing positions and now the firing was general. The enemy deployed gradually across a longer front and forced us to dissolve the masses into open order skirmish lines."

I have others, but I don't want to write a book here…

Best Regards,

Bill H.

To provide some contrast, here is what leading Austrian generals are saying in their instructions and general orders 1796-1814:

*'This misuse [of entire units as skirmishers] must be opposed because it weakens the impetus of the attack.'
the Archduke Charles 1796

*'one always must observe the basic rule that only a small portion of the troops may be employed as skirmishers while the main body must be kept as a reserve in closed order to decide the issue.'
-the Archduke Charles 1809

*'In action troops must remember not to lose time with firing. Only a few tirailleurs are necessary to screen the front. If these are followed up by troops advancing courageously in closed formation, with bands playing, and keeping their formation, such an advance cannot be repulsed by an enemy fighting in open order.'
Zach, 1 April 1800 [I mistakenly call Melas's Chief of Staff Zach, 'Mach' in a previous post.]

*'Only a few skirmishers are necessary to the front, but behind them closed-up troops.'
Zach, several days later in April 1800

*'recent actions have shown that unnecessary skirmishing can only be detrimental…but a determined charge delivered in close order, screened by only a few skirmishers, will certainly result in victory with very few casualties.'
Zach, Austrian army order, 13 April 1800

'Regular drilled and solid infantry, if they advance in lengthened paces courageously under artillery preparation, cannot be hindered by scattered skirmishers. They must charge neither with skirmishers nor Zug fire against the enemy line, except when the latter can be most effective, and with the greatest speed while maintaining good order, attack the enemy hard and overthrow them.'
-the Archduke Charles 1809

'[Austrian troops] are not fully prepared and too incapable of helping themselves. they are too used to being in closed lines and to acting automatically on the word of command, but they must be capable of relying on their own initiative.'
-Rosenberg, 1809

'To dissolve battalions into skirmish order would…be a mistake.'
-Schwarzenberg, 1812

*'fighting en tirailleure should be done only in very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the maniere de tirailleur.'
-Radetzky, September 1813

another translation:

*'operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand that kind of fighting.'
Radetzky 1813

It is interesting to see these apparently consistent attempts to rein in the skirmish practices of the Austrian field officers, even though these very Generals, like Radetzky, were deploying numbers of skirmishers themselves.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

This is what I have read also in the past and I came to the same conclusions.

It seems to me that the Austrians were very capable of skirmish capabilities but the overall command restricted the practice so much as to make their deployment minimalistic if not "almost" non-existent.

Shane

Kevin,

I note that you state:

The bottom line is that the French did deploy whole units as skirmishers up to and including regiments. Were reserves kept? Yes, they were, but deploying whole units lends more cohesion than merely deploying the third rank as skirmishers.

I wonder if you could bring a little clarity to the discussion by explaining exactly what you mean by "reserves"?

If the whole unit is deployed what is the reserve and what does it consist of? Or if a whole battalion is deployed is the reserve another battalion?

Secondly are you able to provide any specific references or sources as to when the French deployed whole battalions or regiments as skirmishers in the Peninsular?

I appreciate that this may well have been done to a degree in mainland Europe but I'm uncertain as to this method being practised in the Peninsular.

DB

Slight confusion here: does "deploying entire regiments and battalions as skirmishers" mean that literally everyone in those units is skirmishing at the same time, or does it mean that everyone is taking part in the overall process, and that some are the firing line, some are the supporting line, and some are the reserve?

Supercilius Maximus

Yes – a very good question – and the answer would be – reading memoires – it seems that the rule was always to keep a formed reserve but it could be – when other units formed a reserve that entire battalions were dispersed (who on earth they could controll this immense line of skirmishers is beyond my understanding

Hulot (about the Tirailleurs du Po :

All my Battalion was deployed as skirmishers, except for one comapnay guarding our colours (Dempsey : Napoleon's mercenaries, p. 316)

An excellent book where he is demolishing the myth of the Tirailleur de Po uniform alas predominant in all uniform works of Knötel et al.

Hulot writes about the action at Hof in 1807

I agree otherwise – it would be very helpfull to quote exact examples other to make sweeping comments.

Shane wrote:

This is what I have read also in the past and I came to the same conclusions.

It seems to me that the Austrians were very capable of skirmish capabilities but the overall command restricted the practice so much as to make their deployment minimalistic if not "almost" non-existent.

Shane:
The problem with that conclusion is that from Austrian accounts, their deployments weren't 'minimalistic or almost non-existent.' That is the strange thing. It would seem that Austrian commanders felt it necessary, on a regular basis, to caution their officers' about their tendency to deploy what they felt were too many skirmishers.

For instance, why would Schwarzenberg warn against deploying whole battalions if no one ever did it? [That should have been 1813, not 1812] And of course, there are later accounts of the Austrians doing exactly that--the enemy 'forcing' them to 'dissolve' entire battalions.

Most Allied commanders had a hate/love relationship with skirmishing altogether. Even a premier light infantry officer like Black Bob Craufurd of the British Light Division said he hated skirmishing and felt it was a waste of men and time.

But they still did it.

Bill H.

It is hard to say what is meant by "deploying entire regiments and battalions as skirmishers." What is clear is that the entire battalion or regiment is being dedicated to the skirmish activities, but in what form isn't mentioned. Maintaining reserves was a major concern and an indication of just how sophisticated an army's light practices were.

In his book, The Essentials of Good Skirmishing by Colonel Gawler of the 52nd Light Infantry [1837] he opens by saying this:

"Skirmishing is the art of fighting, with numbers insufficient to occupy, in close order, the ground contested.

In light infantry or skirmish drill, as in all other instruction, the principal art is, to dwell forcibly on things really essential; moderately on things merely important, and lightly on things nearly indifferent.

To good skirmishing there are eight essentials:

1. Active intelligence.
2. Correct Firing.
3. Daring Courage.
4. Making the best of Cover.
5. Presenting the smallest possible Marks to the Enemy's Fire.
6. Maintaining extension from and Dependence on, a given File
of Direction.
7. Preserving a sufficient Readiness to resist Cavalry.
8. A judicious Employment of Supports and Reserves.

Very deficient in any of these qualifications, skirmishers cannot be of the first order."

What is interesting is that five essentials are skills of individual soldiers, two the maintenance of order and just one about the actual deployment. This list covers all the points I have ever read in accounts about 'effective skirmishing' and skilled skirmishers, French or Allied.

How well the Austrians did compared to this list, I don't know.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

DB,

I cannot and have not found any evidence that French commanders in the Peninsula deployed battalions and regiments in open order. That doesn't mean it wasn't done, but I have nothing on hand to prove or disprove it. Voltigeur companies were routinely deployed in open order as skirmishers, but that's all I've found so far.

Some French commanders, especially in the Peninsula merely tried to bull their way through an opposing line without 'prepping' it with either massed skirmisher fire or artillery. Wellington's skill in defensive fighting undoubtedly mystsified many French commanders. His unusually heavy skirmish line made the French believe this was the main line of resistance.

As to the reserve question, a French light infantry company would form a reserve of about twelve picked men under the company commander along with the drummer or cornet to form a reserve unit behind the skirmish line or swarm on which the company could rally if necessary.

Sincerely,
K

I have always found this passage written by Pelet describing Busaco to be interesting in reference to the French use of "skirmishers":

"Our brigade, attacked on its flank by artillery, was thrown to the left of the road. After fighting for some time, it found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it was found necessary to support this unit with the second brigade. Thus we covered the entire slope below the convent of Bussaco while the enemy successively reinforced their line of skirmishers, hidden behind the rocks and the trees, but these allied troops were not allowed to stay there very long. They were recalled by horns and replaced by fresh troops – an excellent method neglected by us for too long. Our system permitted French regiments to be dispersed during a battle and in the end only the officers and the bravest soldiers were left, and they were completely disgusted, with having to fight for an entire day. The Portuguese were interspersed among the British; they acted perfectly, serving in covered positions. Nevertheless, our skirmishers gained ground on the enemy and from time to time pushed them beyond their reserves, which they were obliged to reinforce………Thus the day passed, skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties or, as one might say – drop by drop. Two new attacks on the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly."

So here is a French officer describing the French super-tactic of mass skirmishing in some detail. It seems to me that this whole incident was more the result of a breakdown in discipline rather than a planned tactic, and this was obviously accepted within the French army as evidenced by the phrase "Our system permitted French regiments to be dispersed during a battle". This is contrasted with the regular system used by the Anglo-Portuguese, apparently not in common usage by the French at this time, according to Pelet, who describes it as an "excellent method". This is only one incident and I am not certain how typical it is, but I can't see any evidence for this French style of skirmishing leading to any superiority.

There are other examples of entire units, even divisions, being used "completely" as skirmishers in the Peninsula by both the British and French, but it is difficult to determine how many troops were in the firing line at any one time. Common sense dictates that an entire division, brigade or even battalion would never be dispersed simultaneously, as they would take up an impractical, massive frontage. A brigade of 2,500 men with an absolutely minimal spacing of 2 paces between pairs would be spread over more than a mile of frontage.

The other problem with interpreting contemporary descriptions is that it seems the phrase "skirmishing" was used to describe anything other than close order. It could equally well be applied to either regularly dispersed troops operating in pairs with reserves or to mere mobs of men fighting out of regular formation.

One of the largest employment of skirmishers in the Peninsular War occured at Vic Bigore in 1814. The action was fought mainly between the British 3rd division and the French division of Paris, both veteran formations and both "entirely" in skirmish order. Reference to this action can be found in several diaries and journals, but the best description comes from James Campbell of the 3rd division who describes the French fighting "in their own favourite manner – skirmishing on a large scale":

"Besides the 5th battalion of the 60th, a battalion of Cacadores, and our own light infantry companies, whole regiments, (and here we felt the want of knowledge of light infantry movements in all corps) only retaining some companies in reserve and for support, were engaged as sharpshooters. They were however, constantly pushed forward upon the French, and recommended not to throw away their fire in long shots, but rather, as much as possible, to endeavour to close with them; and if a halt was anywhere perceived in any part of the advancing skirmishers a staff officer was invariably sent to the point to ascertain the cause. The French, therefore, invariably gave way, and in their confused retreat they became exposed, in running from one enclosure to another, to the fire of our troops….but had we stood and fired, as usual on such occasions, this brilliant feat of the 3rd division would never have been heard of."

The entire action was fought over vineyards and enclosures which explains the exclusive use of skirmishers. There is also definite evidence of companies being left in reserve, but quite how many is impossible to say.

Campbell's suggestion that it was usual to just stand and fire on such occasions is interesting. Many commanders believed that skirmishing was both indecisive and at the same time costly to both sides in casualties, hence the call to reduce the number of men commited to the firing line at any one time, evidence of which can be found in orders such as those quoted by Bill H above for the Austrians, the instructions of Russian commanders like Barclay de Tolly, the writings of Clausewitz and the skirmish instructions issued by Davout, Reille etc..

Captain S:

Fascinating accounts. I was particularly taken with Pelet's comment: " I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties or, as one might say – drop by drop. Two new attacks on the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly."

This is almost the exact sentiments proportedly expressed by Robert Craufurd after his Light Division's actions at Bussaco. He deployed half of his 3,000 men as skirmishers, driving off the French columns with a bayonet charge from the rest. Quoted here in Modern Studies, Vol IX added to Oman's A History of the Peninsular War pp. 287-88, the author paraphrasing Craufurd, but ending with his words:

If the skirmishers resisted the French advance too successfully, and did not 'fire and retire', the enemy would simply deploy more tirailleurs, resulting in a prolonged exchange of fire for no appreciable result,

"…skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how it much it costs in casualties… Two new attacks against the position, just like the first[French columns], would not have been more deadly…The skirmishing ended on our side and the enemy started it again. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to stop bickering except by withdrawing our troops and this was not without inconveinece for either advantageous terrain or the morale of the army."

Only a volley and charge with the Bayonet could throw the enemy into confusion, break his morale and rout him in disorder

This is ascribed to Caufurd, but is referenced from Pelet pp 182-83: Donald D. Howard ed. The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810-11: An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet. 1973

It makes me wonder whether Arthur Harman, who wrote the chapter, was quoting honestly to make his point… He does put the words in Craufurd's mouth, not Pelet's.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Is there a chance that there is a fine line between a disordered line and mass skirmish order, in the worst case? Could lines sometimes just degrade their discipline, while maintaining morale, to the point where they are functionally the same as bad skirmishers?

Dear Malcolm
The answer to your astute question is yes. This could be an explanation of the early Prussian Landwehr in line. Their competance by October was a marked change.

Stephen

Bill,

The words are those of Pelet, not Craufurd. Harman must be mistaken.

Captain:

I was afraid that was the case. A sad example of misleading quotes.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

It would seem that Austrian commanders felt it necessary, on a regular basis, to caution their officers' about their tendency to deploy what they felt were too many skirmishers.

Thank you Bill H, your clarifying that has made me understand that the propensity to deploy too many skirmishers caused the ordering from above to reduce this tendency.

Thank you, this is interesting.

Shane

Shane:
You bet. When I ran across three such instructions from Zach in 1800 within a two month period, it really drove home the issue for me. Once I found those, it was surprising how many identical cautions were issues by all the Allied armies during the entire twenty years of war.

I think the real dynamic for the Napoleonic period is what Pelet points out:

1. Once started, it was hard to stop skirmishing

2. It couldn't be avoided, cost a lot, but usually
accomplished very little. [It is interesting that
skirmishing is seen as expensive, while many wargames
see it as causing little damage at all.

3. When one side deployed more skirmishers, the other side
did too, simply to avoid:

4. Losing important terrain and having enemy skirmishers
affect the morale of the army. [Fascinating that it is a
French officer saying that…]

Even the Prussians in 1793 knew they couldn't stand around and be shot at by skirmishers without real problems. They had to throw skirmishers out. The aide to Prussian General Knobelsdorf described the skirmisher dynamics during the war. He wrote in May of 1793 that the French were:
". . .still badly trained; but they were not only our equals, but our superiors in the woods where the soldier doesn't keep in his ranks, executes none of the evolutions of the drill manual and, covered by the trees, needs do nothing apart from fire his musket. Our men, accustomed to fight in closed ranks on open ground, found it difficult to put themselves into this apparent disorder which was nevertheless necessary if they didn't want to be just targets to the enemy." [italics mine.] page 208 in Paddy Griffith's The Art of War of Revolutionary Frances

The French were much more willing to skirmish in large numbers, usually forcing the Allied officers to follow suit, reluctantly, often to a degree that bothered their superiors.

The British were an exception in many cases. For instance, at Bussaco, the British deployed the light companies of all the reserve brigades, even though the formed troops remained unengaged, forcing the French to deploy more skirmishers than they wanted. It was easy to see why both French and Allied officers didn't particularly 'like' skirmish actions, particularly when they were so indecisive in themselves.

The primary, core dynamic of all skirmish actions during a battle was the tension between deploying enough skirmishers to protect your formed troops, but not so many as to reduce the real power of infantry: the formed troops. It was a balancing act that every Allied officer knew, and Pelet describes very well. And nobody got it right all the time.

At Jena the Prussians strove mightily to deploy equal numbers of skirmishers, but being outnumbered two-to-one were never able to adequately protect a good portion of the Prussian formed troops, though they did have local successes.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

For instance, at Bussaco, the British deployed the light companies of all the reserve brigades, even though the formed troops remained unengaged, forcing the French to deploy more skirmishers than they wanted.

This statement itself is very eye opening when one wants to understand why it is suggested that the British skirmishers outnumbered the French.

Knowing that this was a general tactic of the British. To deploy the cumulative light companies (in btlns) from unengaged (rear) reserve brigades into the front line fighting. Understanding this and the direct relationship this had on forcing the French to throw out even more light troops makes the picture more clear.

I do not think the French did the same thing (they may have) but to my knowledge unengaged rearward brigades and more to the point, divisions were held in that way until ordered to move forward. I don't think I have read where individual light companies or groups of them from reserve formations were ordered forward to bolster the skirmish screen.

What I have read instead is that the French had a propensity to deploy larger numbers (as seen fit) from already engaged units to thicken or maintain an already established skirmish line.

I would be happy to get citations from anyone who might know better on this or can relay information to the contrary but until then I think what I have said was normal practice for the French.

I am starting to realise that the reason why the British could match the French is:

– Because the peninsula battles were mostly very even.

– Because they deployed light companies from reserve brigades as espoused by Bill.

If the other continental armies did not copy this tactic it is no wonder they could not match the numbers of French skirmishers and thus needed to employ other methods such as 3rd rank deployments and so on which were, as stated very ineffective judging by their own officers.

The propensity to take action to counter French skirmishers by ordering such tactics became a drain on the strength of the main line and thus weakened, created situations where the main line became gradually more vulnerable to enemy action by this constant depletion. It is no wonder the superior officers tried hard to put a stop to it as much as possible.

I think I have got it right?

Shane

Shane,

I think that it is wrong to assume that deploying the light companies from reserve formations into the skirmish line was a common British tactic. Sometimes these units would be used as task forces to hold villages away from their brigade or division, but usually they supported their parent formation.

If you look at a map of Busaco, you will see that there are hardly any units in reserve anyway. The skirmishing lasted over a couple of days against a large part of the line and the light companies (and some centre companies) from otherwise unengaged, rather than reserve units, took their turn in the firing line, generally in front of their own divisions.

Kevin wrote:

"His unusually heavy skirmish line made the French believe this was the main line of resistance."

Kevin,

This is another statement that raises its ugly head on a frequent basis. Unfortunately, as we have discussed before, it is an opinion found in some recent secondary sources (Nafziger and Gates)with no historical evidence to support it. Gates references Vigo-Roussillon's memoirs on this point…..Vigo-Roussillon is silent on the matter.

CS,

Then why did the French sometimes attempt to deploy when they hit the heavy skirmish line?

Sincerely,
K