"Breaking infantry squares" Topic

Carnot,

You may believe whatever you wish but attributing motive where none appears to, or needs to, exist is dangerously deconstructionist. So, I'm going to ask a question philosophers since Socrates have asked, "How do you know?" Bigarre's motive was to excuse the loss of a square and Eagle?

Fact. the square peformed very effectively when it gunned down the charge of the 1st Squadron. Fact, yet, 20 seconds later it did not stop the charge of the 2nd Squadron. Question, Why? Answer, its muskets were empty!

Neither did it run from the oncomming train, hardly the action of a disordered unit. Nor did Bigarre have anything to make an excuse for or be embarrassed about. The square gave effective fire stopping the 1st Squadron and before it could reload was overrun by the 2nd Squadron. Despite this, it stood its ground and fought and suffered 25% casualties, mostly wounds.

The dishonor is not losing but running away, which the 1/4 did not do.

Bob Coggins

Mr. Coggins,

Russian accounts describe disorder caused by artillery, Bigarré's account describes disorder caused by artillery. Why should disorder caused by artillery be considered irrelevant in the breaking of the square? There are several factors at play.

I was addressing causation in a dynamic situation where no person present would have been able to construct a complete sequence of events, let alone a definitive cause for the breaking of the square. Hence a little of A and a little of B.

I agree, the square did well in a tough situation. But Bigarré records that he was "inconsolable" over the shame of having lost the eagle. So while you and I might regard it as no great dishonor under the circumstances, the officer in command of the regiment did consider it a dishonor. This is not my invention, it is recorded by the commanding officer. Not "deconstruction" but the words of the only primary source I know of to record the specifics of the action, and since he expressed profound embarrassment in his memoirs I conclude that he was profoundly embarrassed. From there, considering the possibility that he may have wanted to present the action in the best possible light is to accept the obvious.

Edit on previous post: replace "needed" with "may have chosen to"

Carnot,

First, Bigarre's report never claimed the artillery casualties were the reason the square broke. Second, whatever the state of the battalion represented by Bigarre or the Russians it was sufficient to blow the charge of a squadron of the GdC away and there is no reason to think that had they time to reload the 2nd Squadron would have been blown away too.

If you knew the military you would understand it was not for Bigarre to defend what occurred as beyond his ability to prevent. Rather it was his duty to feign shame (he may actually have felt a little)and assume responsibility so as to give his comrades, including Napoleon, an opportunity to commiserate, "Now, now Bigarre you did all you could and there is no shame in being run down by the Russian Guards." To which he would answer its shameful to lose the Emperor's Eagle eliciding a response, don't blame yourself, that's war.

30 years later Bigarre is walking in Paris and meets an old comrade who says I remember you at Austerlitz. To which Bigarre responds but i still feel the shame for losing and Eagle. To which the response is it wasn't your fault the battalion fought magnificiently. To which Bigarre would reply perhaps it is so (knowing damn well it is so).

Its a Kabuki that has played out as long as there has been war. If you don't understand this you don't understand the military.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Mr. Coggins,

To refocus a discussion that seems to have gone off track, you are taking the position that what Bigarré states is the sole cause of the square breaking. I am suggesting that the cumulative effects of the preceding events are very likely to also have played a significant role, despite the fact that Bigarré gives them no credit.

You are also attributing something to me that I have not said – I am in full agreement that Bigarré never claimed casualties as the cause of the square breaking. It was Russian accounts that attributed the breaking of the square to disorder caused by canister fire. They do not give credit to opportune timing by their cavalry.

Basically I am taking the position that the complex dynamics of battle often involve multiple overlapping influences and different parties describing the action will emphasize different things for different reasons – the direction they were looking, the desire to put a positive spin on things. Remember, Bigarré also claimed that his square came under attack by three Russian cavalry regiments – in fact there was one (5 squadrons operating in two bodies, so conceivably two "regiments"). Bigarré's account is what it is.

Your suggestion that Bigarré may have been feigning shame out of a sense of duty is certainly an intriguing conjecture. It is equally possible that when he said he was ashamed that he truly was ashamed. Certainly there are plenty of examples of memoir writers putting a little spin on things to make themselves look better. There is a possibility of Bigarré doing this. There is also a possibility that he did not.

At any rate, our difference of opinion is whether the canister fire played a role in the breaking of the square. I believe it contributed, you believe it did not. No one, even Bigarré or his comrades in the square, would be able to say which it was with absolute certainty. On my part, I am reluctant to view the final charge in isolation from the preceding events.

If we want to agree on something, I think we can say that the square was broken because Russian cavalry penetrated the square.

BTW, on the topic of breaking squares, Rothenberg mentions a similar situation at Wagram. 20e and 7e chasseurs ŕ cheval were executing parallel charges on two adjacent squares. The square that the 7e was charging fired on the 7e and Col. Castex of the 20e angled over to hit the adjacent square obliquely, arriving after the discharge and breaking the square. The issue of timing is key, since a "hedge" of bayonets should be sufficient to thwart cavalry. A steady square should be able to present bayonets in a short period of time after firing, but if surprised … A narrow window of opportunity (unless the square has been shaken up a bit).

Carnot,

I appreciate the discussion. I have simply concluded you have overanalyzed the reason. The guys who were injuried by artillery fire were no shooting. Had they been, no doubt the fire on the 1st Squadron would have been more devastating but those guys would not have been able to reload any quicker. Thus, their addition would have not affected the outcome.

Your faith in the bayonet surprises me. A heavy horse weighs about 1200, add a rider and equipment and you're looking at 1500lbs or so travelling at 20mph. Horses have absolutely no idea what a bayonet is and a 150lb man with a bayonet on the end of a musket aint going to stop 1500lbs travelling at 20mph to a square face.

The bottom line is no square face bristeling with bayonets ever stopped a determined charge. It was with fire that cavalry was repelled.

Bob Coggins

The idea of a square stopping cavalry with bayonets is documented, and hardly a unique idea (though certainly debatable). To quote from a source readily at hand (Mark Adkins' Waterloo Companion): "Neither horses nor humans, especially the former, could be persuaded to throw themselves onto bayonets. No matter how determined the rider, how fast the approach or how sharp the spurs, the horses either swerved away or pulled up before contact." Further up he notes that "There had to be a breach in the hedge of bristling bayonets" in order for the cavalry to penetrate. As I recall, Duffy and Rothenberg say much the same. So there are others more knowledgeable than I am who disagree with you completely on this point. The breach could be caused by casualties, the notorious dead horse projectile, or men who flinched – disorder. Or by men who were not at the ready because they were in the process of reloading. Or men who flinched because they were worried about getting peppered with canister as soon as the horses went away. But "disorder" in the square resulting from the canister fire is the point, not simply the loss of muskets.

For the specifics, Russian accounts simply indicate a single final charge of both squadrons simultaneously, but Bigarré indicates that they arrived from two directions. These were the 4th and 5th squadrons, btw, not 1st and 2nd. In Bigarré's version, a first attack (the first squadron to arrive, not the 1st Squadron) was turned back, but Bigarré does not describe them as being devastated. In fact, the volley seems to have been largely ineffective in terms of causing casualties. The LG Horse lost 1 officer and 25 men during the course of the day, which includes the repulse of the first three squadrons by gunfire in the initial charge (prior to the involvement of the guard artillery) as well as subsequent action towards Krenowitz. So losses in fact were slight, but apparently sufficient to turn aside one squadron/portion.

I've had a hard time visualizing this. If the two squadrons came in from two directions, one obliquely, wouldn't another side of the square be able to fire on the second squadron coming in as it approached (at least the men nearest the corner)? Or if both are closing on one side in close proximity to each other and the muskets of the other side of the square can't be brought to bear, how sensible is it to discharge all available muskets into one squadron? If the second arrived 20 seconds after the first (and this is not reported by Bigarré, where does this come from?) would they not be visible prior to firing, or is smoke concealing them? Or is some jumpiness (disorder) playing a factor and causing all fire to be directed on only the nearest target? If the leading squadron masked the second squadron on the approach, then how does the second squadron come in obliquely considering that the first squadron moves off to one side or the other or both? Or is some portion of two squadrons attacking in unison deflected while the other continues on into the square? There may be other scenarios I haven't imagined.

In the Wagram example, the relative position of squadrons and squares is clear enough and the oblique approach catching the square off guard is readily understandable. With the 4e at Austerlitz it is much less clear.

I love the smell of deconstruction in the morning. It smells like…a web forum. Or maybe sweatsocks…

Does anyone have the casualties rolls for the French? Is the 18 fatalities 200 casualties figures for the 1st battalion of the 4th Line, or for the whole regiment?

In addition to the low fatality numbers, the fate of the eagle-bearers is odd. The first was killed by a case shot and the second by a pistol shot. The third was severely chopped up. It's hard to reconcile this with the eagle being in the center of the square.

In addition to the low fatality numbers, the fate of the eagle-bearers is odd. The first was killed by a case shot and the second by a pistol shot. The third was severely chopped up. It's hard to reconcile this with the eagle being in the center of the square.

very good point.

The first explains the artillery fire, the second explains the short ranged cavalry fire and the third explains the hacking of a heavy sword…

Turn back time to the 17thC…….

"The pike had shortened to as little as eleven feet as cavalry had ceased to use long lances and changed to shorter one handed swords. The reduction in length of the pike meant that it was now nearer the horse's chest, than up near the rider. One observant commander managed to demonstrate that horses would turn aside from a blunt stick pointed upwards at their chest. These facts and observations led to bayonet armed infantry using a method of the outer ranks kneeling with their musket butts on the ground pointing up at forty-five degrees towards the horses. The rear ranks stood and provided a bayonet barrier at the level of the horse's head. The rearmost rank was free to reload and keep up a fire against any cavalry that chose to stay around next to the infantry."

Lost the citation for the observant commander, but I am fairly sure he is referenced in a readily available modern book on the era rather than some musty tome.

We might also note the centuries long use of cheveaux de frise.

Definitely sweatsocks.

I don't recall seeing any breakdown of casualties by battalion, but the 18 fatalities for 4e ligne is off, although it could describe total fatalities x days after the battle. Quintin details the killed and mortally wounded at Austerlitz – a total of 15 killed and 18 mortally wounded. The distribution among ranks and companies are as follows:

5 Grenadier
3 voltigeur
17 fusilier
5 caporal
2 sergent
1 sergent major
33 total

There are also some cases that the Quintins identify as uncertain – either the result of succumbing to wounds/complications from Austerlitz after a long hospitalization or dying after the fact from causes unrelated to Austerlitz. There are 10 in this list from 4e ligne.

Of the 33 confirmed, 24 are from 1st battalion and 7 from 2nd, 2 unknown or unspecified. For the 24 from first battalion, the distribution by company is as follows:

Gren – 4
1st – 2
Volt – 2
3rd – 2
4th – 2
5th – 3
6th – 4
7th – 2
8th – 3

Some of the mortally wounded have specifics on the nature of their injuries: coups de sabre (1, 7th company), coup de feu (2, 4th and 5th companies), coup de boulet (1, 6th company), coup de biscaďen (1, 8th company). The rest are unspecified.

If the fatalities are proportional to the wounded, then something like 150 of the 200 or so wounded would be from 1st battalion.

One other thing, Bigarré gives the 200 figure as the number from the regiment, but in the context of losses from the breaking of the square of the 1st battalion, so very likely the 200 is an estimate of losses from 1st battalion.

I have reported regimental losses somewhere, will supply the details once I locate them.

Wow, each company with between 2 and 4 fatalities?? That's improbable if we assume completely random targeting, let alone a collapsing corner…or a breach by bombardment. Strange.

I noticed the annexes of Alombert and Colin are on line. Perhaps they have something.

Yep, oddly symmetrical. Maybe shots passing through the square (or over one side) and striking men in the back?

Is your info on the eagle bearers from Bigarré or somewhere else? Bigarré doesn't name names for the first two. If we have names we can check their company in Quintin.

A&C only covered through mid-November, so no documents relating to Austerlitz directly. The text in each volume (by Colin) was originally published in the Revue d'Histoire and covered through the end of the war. The separately published volumes added hundreds of pages of supporting documents to each chapter of text, but stopped short after Durrenstein. The Teissedre reprint of A&C includes a volume 5 with Colin's Revue d'Histoire articles covering the Hollabrunn and Austerlitz segments of the campaign and some other related articles, but no supporting documents.

La Vouivre published a collection of the after-action reports (corps-level), bulletin and official account of the battle. I checked Soult's report and the compiled tables at the back of the La Vouivre collection. In his official report Soult reported the combined losses to 1/4e and 2/24eL as "___t. and ___b." No joke. there is a footnote explaining that the blank lines appear in the original. So apparently there was never an official accounting for these losses, although it seems Soult wanted to include them in his report. The only thing would be to sift through regimental strength returns to see if there are any from immediately after Austerlitz and compare to preceding. Anyone up for a field trip?

JeffsaysHi
''These facts and observations led to bayonet armed infantry using a method of the outer ranks kneeling with their musket butts on the ground pointing up at forty-five degrees towards the horses."

Excellent point, and troops are more likely to do that with confidence if they have been trained.

ratisbon

''Fact. the square peformed very effectively when it gunned down the charge of the 1st Squadron. Fact, yet, 20 seconds later it did not stop the charge of the 2nd Squadron. Question, Why? Answer, its muskets were empty!''

Therefore gross commanders' error. They were ridden down by just 2 squadrons?!!! That's unbeliveable.

At Waterloo the British squares (which had also been pounded by cannon all afternoon) faced 10,000 cavalry, coming in in all directions, in various combinations and at various times. Not one square was overrun.

Firing in sections had been around for 100 years. Objectively, the fact his battalion loosed off all their muskets at just one enemy squadren and left no reserve….. points to gross incompetance.

Cacadores – Gross incompetence is a possibility, though an unlikely one in context, I think. These guys had been training at Boulogne and probably had as much or more training than any unit on the field that day, with considerable practical combat experience on top of that. The 4e had already beaten off a charge by 3 squadrons without much difficulty. So it seems to me that something occurred between the first cavalry attack and the second to alter the effectiveness of the battalion. Since they were on the receiving end of Russian canister fire between the two charges, this seems to me to be the likeliest explanation.

While I think incompetence might be a bit harsh, there is the possibility of a momentary panic resulting in bad judgement. Just next door to the 4e was the 24e legere, caught in line and ridden down by the LG Hussars. There is also the infamous "panique de Golymin" a year later where otherwise steady, well-trained and experienced hussars fell apart suddenly, so it can happen even with high-quality units. So maybe an officer panicked with the 4e as well, or the men panicked and fired of their own volition at the nearest target. Or smoke was thick enough that they were blind-sided and flinched.

But it seems most likely to me that the officer's account just leaves out some important details about what else was happening to contribute to this. The Russian accounts describing disorder in the square that they were able to exploit suggests that they may have had some trouble clearing the wounded in order to close ranks before the horse arrived.

Carnot93

''While I think incompetence might be a bit harsh, there is the possibility of a momentary panic resulting in bad judgement''.

That's a balanced comment. Momentary inattention shouldn't condemm Bigarre forever.

I might also remind others, that we shouldn't forget that at the end of the day, these men were conscipts, and conscipts they remained, no matter what their regiment's history. The training at Boulogne is a factor, but so is Bonaparte's reluctance to expend powder in legitimate regular fire training on campaign.

But does momentary innattention explain loosing off all your muskets? Why didn't any of the many NCOs present automatically regulate the firing? Why hadn't firing by sections been drilled into them until it was second nature, until they could do nothing else? How come the officers don't learn it from the time they're little until it's a part of their soul?

If you're not drilled, and I suggest that the French were not drilled on campaign, then it means something called 'morale', or crowd identification becomes the one, rather fragile factor that keeps them together. One reads of French officers at the head of columns, dancing about waving their hats, taking the lead and encouraging their men forwards….and one wonders why they didn't just give an order! One also reads of the sheer amount of talking in French formations and of how men discussed their orders. I wonder how much dicipline there could be, with conscripted men sometimes better educated than their officers. Loosing off your muskets in one go is a common phenomina – it happened to the Spanish at Talavera. Every time, it's just the men that did it, without orders and with inattentive officers and the common factor is lack of training.

There's a hubris about French abilities that depended so much upon the enemy to fear them. If the enemy didn't, the French formations could get into trouble. I think the main factor here, is that a Russian saw through this indicipline for the weakness it was, spotted a window of opportunity……..and took full advantage.

Agreed, there is a tendency to view the French, particularly in this period, as something very close to perfect and infallible when in fact they demonstrated all the human liabilities seen in other armies from time to time – command errors, shaky discipline, etc. One example from this period, also Austerlitz, that I forgot to mention – the case of 1/14e, also trained at Boulogne, which was surprised by a Russian battalion near Pratze (first contact in the morning) and instantly routed. So while these events seemed to have occurred less frequently with the French army in this campaign than with other armies, saying that the French troops were more solid, better trained, more experienced, etc. on average than their allied counterparts does not mean that all units will always be practically perfect in every way at all times.

But as for loosing off all muskets at once … this is conjecture. We don't actually know what happened. One theory that has been put forth is based on the comment by Bigarré in his memoirs that the square broke because they were struck by a "regiment" of enemy cavalry immediately after discharging muskets to repulse a charge by two "regiments" of enemy cavalry with musket fire. This in itself is error or exaggeration because in all there were 5 Russian squadrons present, operating in two bodies (3/2). Also, sequencing may be off, since Bigarré describes the canister fire first, followed by the two charges when other accounts (Russian) place the canister fire between charges. The charge driven off by fire could be the initial charge by Yankovich with three squadrons, the final (successful) charge being Olenin with 2 squadrons. With these inconsistencies, I don't think it makes sense to take Bigarré's account literally in every aspect.

So while Bigarré does not mention any contributing factors to the breaking of the square, leaving us to assume that he is saying that the square broke only because of the timing, it's not clear (to me) that he is stating this categorically. For Bigarré's account to be literal fact (and taking "regiment" very loosely), it would seem that all muskets must have been fired at once, pointing to indiscipline or poor command decision. But the alternative is that Bigarré could easily have omitted mention of disorder in the ranks, either deliberately (spin) or because he was just writing memoirs and didn't think about the poor souls 200 years in the future with nothing better to do than parse his words to try to decipher exactly what happened and why.

The time between the first and second squadrons' charges was no more than 15 to 20 seconds, not enough time to reload muskets in combat, thus, the empty muskets. The Guard Horse Artillery had 5 guns, poor powder and mediocre training (especially when compared to the French). They advanced with the GdC and unlimbered and fired while the cavalry was aligning itself.

The best estimate is they caused some casualties, including killing the Eagle Bearer. Given that casualties are always overestimated, especially by the Russians at Austerlitz, some casualties were caused. There is of course the moral effect of being fired at by artillery while being pinned in square.

The 4th definitely was not conscripts. It had been in the Army of Italy and charged with Napoleon over the bridge at Arcola. The heart of the regiment consisted of 25 – 35% ten year veterans. It spent 3 years at Saint-Omer training under one of the toughest drill masters in the Army, Vandamme and its well thought of brigadier Ferey. Its corps was commanded by Soult who was famous as a trainer of infantry. Its colonel was Napoleon's brother, Joseph, thus, Major Bigarre, was in command. He was a 14 year veteran who transferred from the command of a company in the Councilor Guard.

The Guard Hussars did not attack the 24th. They withdrew with the Guard Jagers prior to the arrival of the GdC. It was the remaining 3 squadrons of the GdC that ran down the 24th's line.

It was neither gross incompetence nor momentary inattention. Bigarre did what he should have done. He formed square because it was faced with 800 heavy cavalry and had no immediate support. The square was in good enough order to gun down the 1st Squadron. The square broke because the 2nd Squadron ran it down before it could reload.

You do not fire by sections and there is no regulation by the NCOs when charged by cavalry. You only get one chance to stop a cavalry charge. Fire a full volley at between 40 and 60 yards. Sooner and there is a good chance you will not knock down enough horses to bring the charge up short. Later and it is likely the wounded horses will fall in the square face.

Hubris?, based on what, other than your prejudicial supposition? The French army consisted of officers who had seen dozens of pitched battles and dozens more clashes and skirmishes. Never before or since did an army consist of so many combat veterans.

To claim these guys did not know the desperate and fickle nature of combat and how fleeting success can be, is to sell them short. From the 1799 campaign, they were well aware of the toughness and fighting ability of the Russians. They were also aware of the ignorance and stupidity of most of the Russian officers.

On the other hand the vast majority of Russian Officers, if they could see at all, could hardly see beyond their vodka and that includes Count Buxhowden who was drunk during the battle.

Bob Coggins

Let me see if I have got this straight – the French accounts must be 100% gospel truth because they are French (synonymous with well-trained, competent and incapable of human failings) while any conflicting Russian accounts must be discounted because they are by Russians (synonymous with incompetent lying drunkards). Wow. I think you might want to be careful about labeling other views as "prejudicial supposition!"

A few points: The square of 1/4e was broken, 2/24eL was run down in line. These points are not disputed. There are no claims by the Russians regarding large numbers of casualties from canister fire, only the observation of "disorder" in the square. So your claim that Russian "exaggerations" are to be distrusted refer to exactly what "exaggerated" claim? On the French side, we have an officer claiming to be attacked by three regiments who was in fact attacked by 5 squadrons. What of French exaggeration and how are you reconciling the clear and obvious inaccuracies in the literal word of the French account with your insistence that other parts of the same account are indisputably 100% accurate?

For the specifics, Kozen (of the LG horse artillery) had under his direct command 4 pieces, not 5 (again according to the Russian accounts, but maybe they were too drunk to see straight or too ignorant to count to 5). Also, according to Russian accounts the Leib Hussars were involved in the dismantling of 2/24eL. The Leib horse also participated against the 2/24eL. I can't come up with a possible motivation for the Russians to claim these things in order to "exaggerate". Surely it would be a more glorious feat for the Leib Horse to have done it all by themselves, no? Why claim that 10 squadrons + artillery were involved if 5 squadrons did it by themselves?

Finally, you seem to dismiss entirely the FACT that French troops could and did make mistakes and/or panic despite solid experience and training. Prime example: 1/14e routing earlier the same day. 1/14e had comparable training/experience and were in a less difficult situation, but when caught by surprise a single volley sent them running in panic. Regarding the 1/4e, Russian accounts place the timing of the artillery fire between the charge of Yankovich with the first three squadrons of the regiment and the charge of Olenin-1 with the 4th and 5th squadrons of the regiment. These things are documented in Russian accounts, and are not directly related to any exaggeration that I can see. Of course, if they were all so drunk they couldn't see straight I suppose they wouldn't be able to remember the sequence of events.

It seems to me that you are approaching your analysis from the perspective that anything said by the Russians is automatically inaccurate and exaggerated and must be discarded while anything claimed by the French must be 100% accurate as stated. I find this methodology to be obviously flawed, but it does make it clear that it is pretty pointless to continue discussion.

I'll prescribe two Zhmodikovs and a Mikaberidze (that would be Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars, 2 vols, and The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars). That might prove illuminating to you – or not.

ratisbon,
I take your point about conscripts, although it's difficult to put a value on a 25 – 35 percentage of veterans in a unit.

The problem is the following:

''You do not fire by sections and there is no regulation by the NCOs when charged by cavalry. You only get one chance to stop a cavalry charge''

Maybe you know something about French manuals on the subject that would support the full volley with no NCO regulation, but in practice the full volley with muskets vs cavalry is a completely suicidal technique which is why some other nations used NCO-regulated section fire to give a continuous barrage. Section fire also avoids the wastege of pumping lead into the same dead man. The British didn't use the full volley against cavalry again until the Crimeria, when they could fire longer-range rifles and could get in more shots. The accepted means of charging infantry, was for cavalry to approach in separate squadrons in echelon. That being the case, some fire must be withheld. Section fire means that the battalion is never without a shot ready. Perhaps there was a lack of drill here.

''Fire a full volley at between 40 and 60 yards. Sooner and there is a good chance you will not knock down enough horses to bring the charge up short. Later and it is likely the wounded horses will fall in the square face.''

That happened once with the KGL in Spain, it's not usual. As for the need to stop the charge, in theory it sounds necessary, but in practice, not. Waterloo is the prime example. Basically you don't need to bring down all the horses: you just need to bring down enough front runners to disorder others and make the rest shy away. And if horses after this did get through, you just need to hold your bayonets in the regulation stance.

Put it another way: if you were at Slavkov, and you saw a battalion loose off all its muskets with no NCOs trying to regulate the fire, then you'd assume they were militia or something, wouldn't you?

Whatever the reason, something was wrong with that battalion.

So, a 600 man battalion would have about 550 muskets divided by 4 faces or about 115 muskets/per face. Based on this alone your presumption that each face was divided into 2 or so sections would mean that 65 guys would be able to bring down enough cavalry to stop a charge. Bono Ventura.

Where you go wrong at Waterloo is the infantry rarely fired because the cavalry did not charge the squares. Their casualties were from artillery fire and some cavalry. Mostly they simply ran out of gas, meandering across the hill. See Wellington.

The 2nd Squadron most likely did not think anything as they were advancing/charging while the 1st was gunned down.

Finally the entire Napoleonic world does not revolve around the British in the Peninsula or in Belgium. It was not unusual for squares to break in the real world where the terrain was flat, the guns were multitudinous and the cavaly was heavy and well trained.

Bob Coggins

An addition to the discussion.

The famous British example of breaking squares is of Garcia Hernandez after the battle of Salamanca.

I have found a French eyewitness who gives a rather different account

link

Marcel commanded the skirmishers of the 69th Ligne forming the rearguard and was wounded by a light dragoon and lost consciousness for some minutes. He came to hearing the fire of a square which drove the cavalry away. He was assisted by his Portuguese batman who took him to the battalion commanded by Giraud. Having seen what had happened to the skirmisher the battalion had turned about and fired to save the voltigeur company by driving off the light dragoons.

The brigade then moved off with the 69th, 6th Leger and one battalion of the 76th Ligne acting as the rearguard. The British infantry were not in close pursuit. As Marcel's battalion crossed a stream they were warned of the presence of British cavalry by some French dragoons. Instead of forming there and then the brigade commander increased the pace in order to gain some higher ground.
The British cavalry came on rapidly and fell on the battalion of the 76th who had scattered in order to drink from the stream "almost all were captured". The cavalry then threw themselves onto the 6th Leger creating great disorder. The 6th Leger were disadvantaged by the fact that many of the officers had dispersed into a nearby hamlets in order to round up men who had gone to find food. The lack of officers preventing the 6th Leger from making any movement.

Marcel's battalion did not have time to form square but instead presented a closed up mass suffering only a few casualties on the edges including Marcel taking a sabre blow on the right arm.

The British cavalry than came upon the 2nd battalion of the 69th formed in square. The French infantry fires a volley of two ranks when the cavalry were on the points of the bayonets and this was carried out with the same precision as in an exercise. Lieutenants Turc and Chastaignac of the 2nd battalion threw stones from the interior of the squares (being unable otherwise to do much with just swords) and felling several English officers.

Footnote 22 (Girod de L'Ain) mentions the 6th Leger not knowing how to form square which is a rather interesting comment. He also mentions the cavalry failing to break the square of the 69th and being repulsed by the 39th Ligne in the other brigade of the division.

According to Oman the 76th lost 21 out of 27 officers and 650 men, the 6th 8-10 officers and 500 men.

This is a rather different account from that found in British sources, even mentioning more French losses in the march of the next 5 days than in the combat of that day.

Possibly this reflects the different perspective of the combatants, the cavalry convinced they had broken formed squares, the infantry claiming to have beaten off the cavalry with two unfortunate battalions caught in disorder. Maybe this is also an attempt to understate a disaster on the French side and overstate a success by the British / KGL.

What I draw from this is that where a brigade of cavalry engages a brigade of infantry there may be some success and some failure depending on circumstances. From a wargaming perspective perhaps we make the mistake of considering single squadron against single square with figures placed in contact where logic would dictate that the infantry almost always win. Whatever mechanism is employed for cavalry attacking infantry it perhaps need to consider the larger result – does the cavalry division or corps break through the line of battle with its attendant support or is it repulsed. Both sides will suffer losses and disorder but if the infantry are defeated (D'Erlon at Waterloo) then the losses become more significant through the numbers of prisoners taken.