"how many of us use regulating battalions in their rules?" Topic

nikola,

I`d be interested in hearing some more once you have reread Marmont`s memoires.

mike.

I have Marmont's "Spirit of Military Institutions" and don't remember specific 1809 references but he did say that a General who commands 10,000 men will often be within musket shot of the enemy, a General who commands 30,000 will more often be within cannon range, while General of 80,000-100,000 will be in a central position and sometimes in cannon range, though there will be some times of emergency where he might get involved at a closer range.

Hi Ned, could you email me a copy of that, or at least show me the link to it ?

Me too, Ned~

I'd gladly translate the section, but I doubt I will find a copy of the book soon.
I was writing about his description of the advance through Dalmatia to join the army. He describes in detail how, in one battle, he arranged his two divisions, and how he chose to be with one divisional commander in whom he had little faith. That is all I can remember, but after what I have learned in this discussion I am certain I could find more precious information in it.
I'll look up in the Military encyclopaedia if it has something useful.
Also, if any of you are interested, several years ago I collected and compared information I could find about that campaign and thought about posting them somewhere. I will have to dig through old files to find the article.

I own the reprint of the Marmont book I referenced, so I have never looked for it on the internet. It is "The Spirit of Military Institutions" by Marshal Marmont. An interesting side note is that it is an 1864 translation into English by a Condeferate officer, Frank Schaller. Schaller has copious footnotes about the American Civil War in his translation. (Warning, the type in this book is very small, and my eyes tire easily when I read it!).
The reprint is part of "The West Point Military Library" and published in 1974 by Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut. ISBN 0-8371-5018-3.
You might try Abe Books or or other used book sellers. It is a useful book and I have a lot of pages bookmarked. It was on page 132 that Marmont made the remarks about the generals, though I didn't give the exact quote, just a paraphrase.

"A general who combats with ten thousand men should be in the midst of his troops, and often exposed to the fire of small arms.
A general commands thirty thousand men; he orders the movements of his troops and reserves, and if he is habitually, with the exception of extreme cases, out of the range of musketry, he should be constantly within that of cannon, and remain within the limit of the space where the balls yet fall."
-Marmont

"A general directs eighty or one hundred thousand men; he determines the plan, gives the orders before the battle, opens the movement, and awaits the events in a central position. During the action he becomes a kind of personified providence; he makes dispositions for unforeseen cases, and provides remedies in case of great accidents. He should expose himself before the battle, so as to see for himself, and judge with precision the actual state of things; these duties fulfilled, he gives his orders, and lets everyone perform the part assigned to him. If matters progress favorably, he has nothing further to do; if accidents happen, he should guard against them by those combinations in his power; if matters progress very badly, and some great catastrophe is to be feared, he must place himself at the head of the last troops and throw them upon the enemy, and his presence, in this critical moment, gives an impulse to them, and the moral effect produced doubles their valor.

It was thus Napoleon commanded. His operations having been nearly always crowned with success, and the armies he commanded being very numerous, he has but seldom been exposed to any imminent danger. But at Lutzen, when matters were culminating in a crisis, and the nature of the army, composed of young soldiers, was augmenting the danger, he rallied the troops himself before Kaya, and led them to the charge under a murderous fire."
– Marmont

Books I read years ago like Marmont and others made me very receptive when George Jeffrey and his VLB rules came along and George described his interpretation of Napoleonic command and control. It began with a plan by the army commander-in-chief, the orders going down the chain of command, the next subordinate writing his initial orders to try to put his superior's plan in place, and so on down the line – and those orders (and the movements or activities in those orders) continuing until a "change of situation" took place.

For George that "COS" would be receiving a new order or encountering a "threat" that required a temporary adjustment. When the threat was disposed of, orders would revert back to those in effect before the threat appeared – in other words, to continue to try to carry out the plan.

So when I hear people imply that plans are useless because they do not survive the first shot, (and therefore are perhaps unimportant or unnecessary in a game) I do recognize the common-sense element of military truth behind that.

However, I think that battle "plans" in this period were an important part of contemporary battle-handling technique that need to be reflected in game design. They were part of the guiding principle that a general used to try to reduce the inevitable Clausewitzian friction.

The fight for the commanding general's subordinate officers was against the enemy and against their own men, both of whom can be seen as trying to screw up the commander-in-chief's plan; to defeat it or to not get themselves shot… but there was a plan. That is why officers sometimes received orders that might seem suicidal and felt they had to carry them out – they had to assume that those orders were part of a "plan" of some sort and that it was their duty to do their part so the plan could succeed elsewhere on the field.

Google has a 1862 Translation of Marmont by a Henry Coppee 3.7 MB

Just search books for "The Spirit of Military Institutions" by Marshal Marmont.

Thanks for the electronic link to Marmont. There are lots of interesting sections here, including Marmont's opinion about two ranks vs three ranks. One of my favorite parts, though is from his Ch. IV Tactics section (which I think I may have posted on the VLB site before):

"Tactics is the art of handling troops upon the field of battle, and of manoeuvring them without confusion. The end to be attained is to preserve order, in the midst of the apparent disorder produced by such a multitude of men, horses and machines, the combination of which forms an army,—and to obtain from them the greatest advantage.

Tactics is the science of the application of manoeuvres. One may be a great tactician without any genius; but one does not become so without great practice: nothing is more simple to conceive than the theory; but the practice is not without difficulties. The general must be familiar with the means foreseen and calculated by the regulations ; he must at one glance know how to judge of a field, estimate distances, determine clearly the direction, appreciate the details, combine the links in the chain of circumstances.

This kind of merit was incomplete in Napoleon; a fact explained by the first part of his career.

Simply an officer of artillery, up to the moment when he was placed at the head of armies, he had never commanded either a regiment, a brigade, a division, or an army corps.* He had not been able to acquire that power of moving troops upon a given space which is developed by daily habit, ceaselessly varying the combinations. The wars in Italy offered him scarcely any application of this nature, the habitual actions being reduced in general to combats of posts, to the attack or to the defence of defiles, and to operations in the mountains.

Later, when he had attained to the supreme power, the strength of the armies which he led, requiring their organization into army corps, rendered the application of tactics less necessary to him. A general, at the head of eighty, one hundred, or one hundred and fifty thousand men, only gives the impulsion; he fixes the principal points of the movements; he establishes the general conditions of the battle; he provides, in fine, for the great accidents which may occur; he is the living providence of the army. The generals who manoeuvre and fight are those who command thirty thousand men, and the generals under their orders; these latter should be familiar with tactics. If I have acquired some reputation in this respect, I owe it to my long sojourn in the camp of Zeist, where, for more than a year, I was constantly occupied in instructing excellent troops, and in instructing myself,with that emulation and fervor which a first separate command in the palmy days of youth, affords.

* Brigadier-General Chanez, former sergeant of the Gardes Franchises, commanding officer of Paris during the winter of 1795-96, taught the manoeuvres to General Bonaparte, who was then general-in-chief of the army of the interior.—M."

The necessity for good tactical-fighting generals to know the "means" from the regulations, have an eye for distance and frontage and ground is shown here quite clearly. Very interesting to see Bonaparte being tutored, too. Hmmm, maybe this is why he had to ask Soult at Austerlitz how long it would take his troops to reach the Pratzen. :^)

Thanks for the info Ned, I will read this with glee indeed.

But…I cannot but help but remember the outcome of a certain battle in 1812 called Salamanca so I read his ideas with a spoonful of scepticism also.

Shane

Shane,
Here is how Marmont explained Salamanca on page 184:

"…army was obliged to make a retrograde march. Its return upon the Agueda, and its re-entrance into Portugal, would incontestibly have been the immediate result of that part of the campaign, if a movement had not been executed without orders in the French army, and if the marshal who commanded it had not received a severe wound three- quarters of an hour before the battle; from this, want of certainty occurred in the command which hindered the timely repairing of mistakes, and brought on an action which should not have been risked until later, and under better auspices. In spite of these drawbacks, the loss was equal in the two armies."

Hmmm…

Criticising the great man himself; this is controversial!

But how different are things now, when company C.E.O`s understand only about the abstract concept that is "management", but have little concrete understanding and experience of how their respective buisiness work and how their sub-ordinates duties are carried out?

But maybe it was true then too?

Massena had worked his way to the top though (see the detailed orders for his corps commanders in Oman, Volume 3) – but for a lack of reconnaisance, there`s an understanding of the buisiness.

>>>Google has a 1862 Translation of Marmont by a Henry Coppee 3.7 MB<<<

>>>Just search books for "The Spirit of Military Institutions" by Marshal Marmont<<<

Thanks for that! Love Google Books when it works!

I hope this works.
I have played out an advance by a division of two brigades and photographed the main events in this…
The brigade generals are behind the first battalions in each line on the right and the divisional general (with the rounded base) is with the regulating battalion in the first line.

In the first picture,

picture

…the third battalion in the first line has been "staggered" by artillery fire (blue marker), consequently the fourth battalion has had to slow, maintaning its alignment with the third battalion, to its right. The second line has halted behind the first (it being considered within sight of the second line`s regulating unit).

In the second picture:

picture

…the third battalion in the first line is still having difficulties from artillery fire and by the need to dress and step up to regain its position in the line; it is still disordered.
In the meantime, the brigade general and indeed, the divisional general being within sight, first line has been slowed to allow the rest to catch up!
Closing to normal range the morale of the third battalion becomes affected by this continual fire and disorder.

In the third picture:

picture

…the battalion has regained its postion in the line but is disordered by the advance.

The net result in this is that the advance of the division has been slowed and one of its battalion`s morale has been damaged.

In my rules the battalion being fired upon is made to roll one dice each for dressing (rallying & regaining order) and doubling (manouevre) to regain its position in the line.

This is only a simple example without other factors that may well come into play; like terrain features, or enemy skirmishers.

Shane –

Not to take this too far off topic, but remember that Marmont and Wellington were both maneuvering in very close proximity to one another in the days leading up to the battle and that Marmont was holding his own against a VERY good general. Marmont also took a serious wound at Salamanca. Just things to keep in mind before dosing him with salt.

Michael C:

A great pictorial. That is generally how I imagine a regulating process to work. And it works for both the Napoleonic wars through to the ACW.

Marmont makes some interesting observations. One is that a divisional commander [leading 10,000] is far more likely to be wounded than a corps or army commander [30,000+] and only if they chose to get close to the front.

There are others, including an argument for a 'command radius' for Battalions as it limits the size of a battalion:

"To conditions are observed in the numerical composition of a battalion. It should be easy to move, and when deployed, the voice of the commander should be readily heard at both extremities of the line. Observing these limits, the number of companies and the personnel of each company may be increased more or less, at will. " pp. 60-61

He also makes some points about command structure:

"Thus an army, composed as I have just indicated, is divided into four fractions; the general-in-chief can move these with facility; he has in hand four corps, of which three form his line of battle, and the fourth his reserve.

"In all grades of military hierarchy, it is by placing a commander in communication with a small number of immediate subordinates that the exercise of authority is facilitated. " p. 147

With your pictorial example, he speaks to supporting lines as opposed to a reserve:

"I will, however, make one observation upon general dispositions; it is that the command of troops should be devised so as to embrace the two lines at once; that is, that these corresponding parts be under the direction of the same commander. The reason for this is easily conceived. As the second line is destined to sustain the first, it is necessary that the movements of the corresponding fractions in the two lines agree perfectly. It is not the same with the reserve; it forms a complete and independent corps, which should have all its means united to act according to the circumstances. " p. 178

This makes perfect sense in looking at the CSA dispositions on the 2nd day of Gettysburg. The second line of brigades are each given the brigade they will align with, and support. In the descriptions Wofford isn't given that instruction, and is called a reserve. If the second line's mission is to support the first, it makes perfect sense that Kershaw could go to Semmes and ask for that support without checking with the DC, while it is Longstreet himself that commits Wofford instead of McLaws.

Here is an SOP that could easily be a set of game mechanics, where the second line could, without direct orders, commit to support [which seems to mean form on one or the other flank or exchange places], but a 'reserve' couldn't, but needed a direct order/commitment from the local over-all commander.

I am just wondering now if anyone knows how one should handle an advance of battalions in a checker-board array?
Duke Eugene von Wurttemburg said that checkerboard order was infrequently used because it was difficult to maintain proper intervals between battalions during an advance in this formation (source: Zhmodikovs` Tactics of the Russian Army).
Can someone say if this is mentioned somewhere in the regulations of the period?

I guess the problem is one of maintaining the direction of advance of a second line of battle, at an angle to the battalions in the first line.
Perhaps the answer is to measure the movement of the first line regulating battalion but to simply move the rest including all the second battalions "by eye"; that is without measurement.

Michael:

I will have to dig this up, but from what I understood, the second line regulated on the directing battalion for the second line, which regulated on the directing battalion in the first line, so that the second line battalions only had to keep intervals in their line and maintain the instructed distances from the first line. The checkerboard pattern would be 'set up' by the positioning of the directing battalions in each line, but from what I remember, the second line was always staggered toward the side away from the directing battalion in the first line

--So wherever the first line battalion was left, right or center [the French preference] the second line directing battalion would be stationed in the gap between the first [directing] and second battalions in the line in front--often away to the deploying. So if the deployment was 1-2-3-4-5-6, from the left, the second line #1 would position itself in the center of the gap between #1 and 2.

And no, I don't think it was easy to maintain on the move, but they did it apparently. ;-7

Hi Bagration,

Yes I know mate, that is why I said, "a spoonful" of scepticism. And yes, I know about the manoeuvring of both armies and his wounding early on. My problem with Marmont is that he allowed his troops to become strung out in order to race ahead of the Brits. He should not have allowed this to happen in such close proximity to the Brits. But yes, this is another story.

Hi Michael,

Very nicely shown in your pictures mate, this is pretty much what I see every game we play also. If one unit suffers from incoming enemy fire or action the rest of the formation grinds to a halt until the btln sorts itself out. Its all to to with the exposure of flanks etc and being caught so halting to await the re-ordering of the effected unit is paramount. This also happens with units affected by terrain considerations which slow the formation down.

I am in a battle right now where I have a Division in two lines advancing which has terrain features partially slowing down the path of the attack in places, having to await the clearing of these features has caused the division to halt at least twice which has given time to the enemy to re-align themselves in order to better receive the attack.

The unforeseen slowing down of the attack speed has greatly affected my chances of success in this attack but because no orders have been received to call off the attack I am committed to continue it until otherwise ordered. The situation has caused me great concern but the change of situation and the sacrifice of this division may have a bright side, the enemy has now committed forces to halting this attack which is very quickly opening up a hole on their flank which is expanding each turn. Another order to push through this hole with the 3rd division just might win the day for us.

Shane

The net result in this is that the advance of the division has been slowed and one of its battalion`s morale has been damaged.

And the moral of the story is: If your enemy is using a regulating battalion, you can slow up his entire line by concentrating all you artillery on a single battalion until it is slowed and disordered.

don wrote :

And the moral of the story is: If your enemy is using a regulating battalion, you can slow up his entire line by concentrating all you artillery on a single battalion until it is slowed and disordered.

My question is, if a full division is on the march forward towards the enemy and one single btln gets into trouble after suffering loss from incoming fire of any kind does the rest of the division grind to a halt to wait for them to sort themselves out? Somehow, I really doubt it…

Shane

My question is, if a full division is on the march forward towards the enemy and one single btln gets into trouble after suffering loss from incoming fire of any kind does the rest of the division grind to a halt to wait for them to sort themselves out? Somehow, I really doubt it…

Shane

Shane:
I've read of both. Stewart didn't wait at Albuera, for instance, even though the 66th was still trying to correct a misalignment when he sent the 3rd and 45th forward [I think those were the regiments…}

Others did halt and sort themselves out. Often it gets missed because the officers are calling 'dressing the line'. Leith's division at Salamanca takes artillery fire and dresses the Line because of it. [the writer's capitalization]

It think that was one of the questions, do you sacrifice order for speed? Do you forge a head with some of your troops when some have fallen out?

This issue of concentrating arillery on one portion of a line to slow it up was a real tactic. It is one reason that Wellington was willing to scatter his artillery brigades in groups of two or three guns along the line, particularly in 1808 through 1811.

I do know that the British generally were willing to maintain order over speed. Dundas insists on this priority in his regulations.

And as Ned quoted Marmont saying:

"The end to be attained is to preserve order, in the midst of the apparent disorder produced by such a multitude of men, horses and machines, the combination of which forms an army,—and to obtain from them the greatest advantage."

So you might be able to say that nations who followed the Traditional Linear style warfare regulations might lean towards slowing down to dress the line while other nations who pursued a training style close to the French way might be more interested in speed?

I have often felt this but cannot justify it without some kind of evidence that is consistent.

Shane

Shane:

I don't think you will find any consistency per se, as it was a decision of the tactical moment. It does seem clear from Marmont's quote and British authors that they tended to err on the side of order.

Michael C's pictures illustrates the effects of a battalion getting slowed in a divisional formation very well. My question is why the 1st battalion was chosen as the regulating one? Is the Division's objective something other than the enemy guns? Is there a Division on the right that it's conforming to?

It seems to me that the regulating battalion would be chosen to spear head the attack (i.e. be the position to first contact the enemy). Otherwise, the Division will be split apart when the 3rd battalion engages the enemy guns while the regulating battalion marches on.

James V:

Good question. Michael C. pictorial was a demo, so to speak, but while the regulating battalion was often the senior and most reliable btn, the chose of which would regulate had a lot to do with the SOP, and then what the brigade/division expected to do in the way of maneuvering before combat.

That's one of those interesting decisions… Often the left flank brigade would reverse their array, with the regulating, senior battalion on the left in the most exposed position. If there was the expectation of an advance pretty much straight ahead, then the center battalion would be a good choice…each had their benefits and dangers…

James,

In the pictorial I was assuming an enemy line of battle would be positioned thereabouts, or behind the enemy guns.
I placed the regulating battalion on the right because this was the habitual place of seniority.
I would suppose that the objective of the division would have been to attack the enemy`s line of battle, or the positions that it occupied.

If the second battalion was chosen as the regulating battalion (there is no "centre" in this 4 battalion brigade) the results would have been the same.
The first and fourth battalions would be in the same positions.

The choice of a flank would allow the command as a whole to wheel on the pivot of the regulating battalion. This would not be immediately possible if the commanding officer/s (brigade & division) and the regulating unit was in the centre.

Mike.

This would not be immediately possible if the commanding officer/s (brigade & division) and the regulating unit was in the centre.

Why? I thought in both case the regulating battalion (pivot) halts. The difference in the center case, is one wing is thrown forward while the other is thrown back.

Is wheeling backwards slower than forward?

you got me… I`m quite unsure about pivoting a brigade on the the centre of the regulating battalion.

Here's an example from the "EVOLUTIONS OF A DIVISION" chapter of Infantry tactics, double and single rank, adapted to American topography and improved fire-arms By Emory Upton (1875):

739 (Pl. 6) To execute a central change of front on the first battalion of the centre brigade advancing the left wing the general sends orders: To change front (so many degrees) on first battalion, centre brigade, left wing forward.

link

MichaelCollinsHimself wrote:

I am just wondering now if anyone knows how one should handle an advance of battalions in a checker-board array?

I am not at all certain why battalions would advance in checker-board (en echiquier)as it would make more sense to advance in line.

To retreat however makes perfect sense not as a chequer-board moving as a whole but by alternate batallions retiring and standing. The alternative of retiring the line as a whole is an invitation for the enemy to charge you whilst your back is towards the enemy!!

Ney mentions en echiquier in his writings for retreat. Cooper mentions this at battalion level (A Practical Guide for the Light Infantry Officer). I would imagine that the battalion method would scale up to brigade level.

This is how it is described in Cooper (my interpretation from my notes).

First the light company splits into four sections and these sections are placed in the rear of the odd numbered companies. The left companies (of the division – so this means the even numbered companies)then retire to the new line or an intermediate line. As these companies retire then the skirmisher companies file across from behind the odd numbered companies and form in the intervals dressing with the right companies (the odd numbered ones).

At this point we then have a front line of all the odd numbered companies with skirmishers filling the gaps. As this is still a contiguous line then it could still be managed through a regulating company.

When the even numbered companies have halted and turned to face the front then we have the chequer-board with skirmishers filling the gap in the front line.

Now the odd-numbered companies retire and the skirmishers move across to cover their retirement. The skirmishers will also retire by files (firing if necessary).

At some point the odd-numbered companies arrive on the line occupied by the even-numbered companies and the line can be dressed

OR

the odd numbered companies continue the retirement and the skirmishers dress on the even-numbered companies.

This allows the line to retire in some safety as at all times there is half a battalion facing forwards able to fire plus a company of skirmishers able to warn of any offensive movement by the enemy. If attacked the companies currently retiring can halt and face front whilst the other companies move forwards at the double to close the gaps in the line.

I would imagine that for a brigade line to retire in a similar manner the retreat takes place by alternate battalions and they use their skirmish companies to cover their retreat.

Michael, again not sure I agree with the concept of the line of battle performing a wheel. I believe it would perform a "change of front". One unit is selected as the base (thereby regulating the manoeuvre)and wheels or changes front to take up the new alignment. The other units wheel and then march to the new alignment. If the base is selected the flank battalion then it may be interpreted as a wheel but this change of front allows the line to rotate on any unit selected as the base so it could be in the centre of the line.

Taking the four battalions in a line as in your photos then to change front to the right on the second battalion from the right what has to happen is that the base (second battalion) wheels 90degrees, the two on the left wheel 45 degrees, march to the new alignment and wheel another 45 degrees into line.

The battalion to the right of the base is now in front of the new line and has to manoeuver to its new position. It could do this by performing an about face, wheel 45 degrees, march to the new alignment and wheel again then face to the front.

From the "EVOLUTIONS OF THE BRIGADE" chapter:

Central change of Front
692 The general commands: 1. Change front on second (or such) battalion 2. Right (or left) wing forward 3. MARCH.

link

And the moral of the story is: If your enemy is using a regulating battalion, you can slow up his entire line by concentrating all you artillery on a single battalion until it is slowed and disordered.

As both sides know which are the others RB. I'm surprised no one has asked how you stop players contriving to blow the crap out of it – as if by magic?

Mike, apart from a slap in the chops, how do you handle that?

I think I can answer a couple of questions here.

The reason that it is harder to change front with the regulating battalion in the center are for the following reasons:

1. Half the line follows one order 'wing forward' while the other follows a separate orders to move rearward--and two overseers have to be 'in charge' to make sure each wing responds effectively.

2. In most cases the regulating battalion wouldn't be in the center, but off to one side, as with four battalions in line, which increases the difficulty. This increases the alignment problems in wheeling.

3. The line has to stop to dress and align after such a process before moving. In fact, the practice was to form battalion columns and march to place on any wheel/change of front involving more than about 20-25% during the Napoleonic wars.

4. Unlike a wheel on the left or right flank directing battalion, the line of battalions moving on the center are not aligned during the move and thus at a disadvantage if attacked.

5. While a wheel/change of front can certainly be done with the regulating battalion in the middle, it would take significantly longer and leave the line unprepared to meet an attack while in the process.

The checkerboard formation had the advantage that the front line could, while in column retire through the second line without any reshuffling of the second line OR the second line could come up and extend the first line. The second line could also add their firepower to the front without endangering the first line, and It was also popular because the Roman Legions did it….

Thank you Bill for answering these questions… my mental abilities impaired; I have been basing stuff in the garage this afternoon and I think the PVA and superglue fumes got to me!

James… i`m in the UK so unable to get the full view of that book… maybe you could cut and paste some more to make clear what`s happening with the right-hand brigade?
Cheers!

Mike the Mug… Yes, I take your point that a change of front could be a faster way of doing this… but in this each battalion is manouevring independently and control may be impaired and intervals may be lost.

Trajanus… apart from ducking to avoid a slap in the chops or the occasional bouncing roundshot, I have a number of little rulettes for artillery target priorities to help prevent players sniping at regulating battalions!

Michael:

I know that most military men were aware of the enemy's regulating process just by observation. However, I've never read where the regulating battalion was targeted…

Was it done?

I don`t know Bill… but targeting the centre of an enemy line would, in most cases, be the best way to fragment an advance wouldn`t it?

Perhaps if they targeted a flank regulating battalion, the general accompanying and directing it could leave it behind to reorganise, move to the next battalion and proceed with the rest of the division?

"Perhaps if they targeted a flank regulating battalion, the general accompanying and directing it could leave it behind to reorganise, move to the next battalion and proceed with the rest of the division?"

I think that Bill described an ACW example of this happening on the "CR" thread, or maybe something very like it?

Or we could now start another topic about the ability of artillery officers to select targets and concentrate fire.

The more I think about it I get more intrigued. How did officers formulate orders? Just define how the battery is to deploy and leave else to commanders of individual guns (doubt it), define an area or a grouping of enemy to be beaten, or recognise a particular unit – shoot the one left of the corn field.
Besides ordering opening of fire, probbably select ammunition and perhaps determinerate of fire?
Or even if they did not concern themselves with the choosing of targets, maybe their subordinates could conclude similarly?
I am always prone to believe that regulations enabled officers to exert much more influence than we assume.

Michael C:

Yes, I think it was Barksdale. He lost his regulating regiment, the 21st, in the orchard. As Barksdale was leading his old regiment the 13th, which was the next one in line on the right, it was probably very easy to change the regulating battalion/regiment. The other two regiments didn't have to do anything different, just the 13th…

I was wondering if I need to add a "distant point" in a brigade`s/division`s orders for its "axis of advance"?
…a question then for other "regulators" – would this be necessary?
I was only thinking that it may be useful in terms of changing weather conditions… and deviation from the line of march… what do you other chaps think?

Mike,

"distant point"

From what I have read is a must have. It's the point of alignment you aim the Regulating Unit at.

Colours of the Regulating Battalion are to be lined up on it we are told.

Often made me wonder if you needed to aim off to the left or right of the intended centre point of the Brigades arrival, to make sure everyone got there properly spaced?

Watching ‘Gettysburg' had me scratching my head when Longstreet tells his commanders to head for the famous clump of trees.

I've always assumed that the centre battalion of the centre brigade of the middle most division was supposed to have ended up there, otherwise the whole of ‘Pickett's Charge' would have ended up in one spot! :o)

Difficult to apply on our tables? We would need much more features that could be used for reference, and as they would be small, they may wonder the table after a roll of some dice. Hmm.
Perhaps make a small and very heavy base, with a rubber or even sandpaper bottom, and place it wherever you want whenever you need to distinguish a point on the battlefield?

If I had the good fortune to be a defender in a wargame in which my opponent had to place markers on the table indicating all the distant spots his regulating battalions were aiming for, then I'd have a merry old time with that omniscience.

A defender who sees markers pop up here and there, giving him many turns' advanced noticed of the exact destination of all the enemy attacks, will of course now rush reinforcements to those spots, including presumably great quantities of artillery, waiting patiently for you to get into range.

I suppose you could create some ahistorical rules preventing the defender from "knowing" what he obviously can see on the table. Or create some artificial limitations on his ability to react to the knowledge. But gamers being gamers, they will find ways around this, just as they always found ways to skirt around all those game systems that had written orders or "order chits" supposedly limiting their activities.

And it seems that all of your ruminations thus far have assumed a simple, tidy scenario in which one side is moving and the other is standing still, awaiting him. But more common wargame practice is to have units on both sides in various states of motion, sometimes directly at each other, but often something much more complex. How will your "regulating battalions" account for things like the unexpected opportunity to conduct a cavalry charge? Or the fact that two battalions are now in square on the far right of the division as a result of that enemy charge? Or the fact that the enemy has just withdrawn from the position you ordered your regulating battalion to attack, but has taken up a new position oblique to your left flank?

Dear "Becks",

I haven`t yet suggested the habitual use of markers for these points, but should a scenario, or a historical re-fight require it, one would need some basis to determine the deviation from the intended line of advance (e.g. as per Augerau at Eylau).

The limitations to how generals and subordinate generals are able to react should be very much the same factors that limit the ablities of players to react in the game; line of sight, delays in issuing orders and their being acted upon, and also upon the role of the general who can see the opportunity.

That we have not discussed other areas of our rules does not count as an error on our parts, but the error seems to have been made by others who have assumed that regulating units are a substitute for command radii.
Regulating battalions do not account for anything other than the manouevre and control of commands.
Regulating unit rules are not means of keeping generals honest, nor are they a means to limiting the growth of the 100, 1,000, or 10,000 ft general.

As I mentioned above, other rules will come into play when such a contact has been made with enemy cavalry, an advance has encountered difficult terrain, or circumstances have changed.