"how many of us use regulating battalions in their rules?" Topic

"That gets down to determining the level of control. Afterall, a battalion commander can do anything he likes at that point. What you are really looking for is an artificial intelligence system to kick in when a unit is no longer following orders. You can map out a simple AI that forces the unit to stop, move toward its regulating unit, or whichever, and those might all reflect S.O.P., but they shouldn't really be hoping to describe what that battalion commander can do."

Yes, exactly. If the regulating unit (battalion) mechanism is working correctly then I, as a wargamer, move the regulating battalion where I want it to go and then move all the other battalions up alongside it. What we need is a mechanism or rule that tells us what happens when a battalion can't for some reason do that (e.g. inhibiting terrain) and so "breaks the chain".

Mike S.

>>>I think "regulating battalions" are actually a means and not an end in themselves<<<"

>>>Hey, I didn't say that, it was NedZed!<<<

Oh Bloody Hell! Only 51 posts into this thread and I'm mucking things up already!

What will it be like when we pass 700?

Mike,

>>>What we need is a mechanism or rule that tells us what happens when a battalion can't for some reason do that (e.g. inhibiting terrain) and so "breaks the chain"<<<

Well truth to tell, that shouldn't happen. The Brigade commander was at liberty to change directing unit whenever he wanted to account for this.

Although a lot of examples quoted on the Command Radius thread spoke of the Division/Brigade ‘moving by the right' for instance, you could in fact just as easily do it by the left, or on the centre.

As long as alignment was kept with the brigades on either side a shift of regulating unit was accounted for.

Within the brigade an individual battalion was expected to drop one Wing back or even alter formation to compensate and then make up ground afterwards.

Trajanus,

I used the term "means not an end" and I see I should have explained better. You are correct that Regulating Principles are a means to deliver the formation into combat, and that once the units are engaged regulation for that movement is no longer the focus.

I meant that in the game design the chain of command and the command and control philosophy that caused the historical use of regulating battalions would be the "end" goal for the game design.

For example, a general's "job description" would include having to do some work of his own to supervise that regulated attack formation to get it to the enemy line, and not just assume in the rules that it is on autopilot (and therefore the general can run around the field giving +1's to other units willy-nilly, or remain free to make instant changes to the direction of his regulated brigade or division attack line to create an uber-zippy-battalion and run all over the field with it).

"Well truth to tell, that shouldn't happen. The Brigade commander was at liberty to change directing unit whenever he wanted to account for this."

But only if the BC knew it had happened. I thought a lot of the examples on the meag-thread were illustrating exmaples of where the commanders were unaware that the "links" had broken?

"Although a lot of examples quoted on the Command Radius thread spoke of the Division/Brigade ‘moving by the right' for instance, you could in fact just as easily do it by the left, or on the centre."

Yeah, I know that, but surely the BC has to physically move to the new regulating unit, so that he can direct the brigade?

On the other thread Symbiotic Relationship had asked:
"Did it ever happen that the regulating battalion got smashed to pieces / bogged down / chased away, and what provisions were there for coping with this?"
Here, Trajanus says: "lot of examples quoted on the Command Radius thread spoke of the Division/Brigade ‘moving by the right' for instance, you could in fact just as easily do it by the left, or on the centre.

As long as alignment was kept with the brigades on either side a shift of regulating unit was accounted for."

Again I concur with Trajanus, but add that if any such changes are to happen due to enemy action, disruptive terrain, etc etc, the general is going to have to get the word out to everyone. If instead of just having the "next" unit in line take over the regulating, (which might be fairly simple) the general wants to switch it to the opposite end or the center, he will likely have to halt everyone or else incur some kind of delay before the line can realign itself effectively.

Should the enemy hit the brigade while it is in an "unformed properly" state, perhaps it should suffer a penalty.

If the remainder of the brigade is still in good order and about to hit its target, he may not need (or have time) to name a new regulating unit. If his line is ragged when it hits the enemy it could be that its combat power would be lessened (again, depends on the scale you are working on).

I mentioned in an earlier posting that I thought a calculation for "Situational Awareness" would be useful as a way to restrict Generals from being to react to threats too quickly, and that it "fits" well with the regulating battalion system.

Another design point that fits with this command and control philosophy is the idea that a general or his troops will try to carry out their current set of orders and therefore do not need them given each "turn". They stay in force until changed by their superior in the chain of command. A temporary threat or "change of situation" may cause a general to temporarily suspend carrying them out, or for a brigadier to make some internal adjustments to keep his force moving, but the "default" situation would be for his "mission" orders to stay in force.

This does not answer the question of how much latitude to allow subordinates to take – that is another discussion. I'm just saying that as a "default situation" units will keep doing what they were told to and not need a new order or special activation given to them.

For example, if a corps commander is ordered to take a ridgeline, and his first division is routed in its attack, corps commander would be expected to keep trying with other divisions until he had carried out his task, without having to receive "new" orders to do so.

While brigades and divisions using regulating units act in the same way a battalion does to change from column to line and back again, or for a change of front, etc, the time it takes them to complete such "grandes manoeuvres" is much longer than it is for a battalion to do. This time-distance factor could be substantial, depending upon the timescale or turn structure the rules are using. This is another mitigation against the "zippy little battalion" or even "zippy brigade" syndrome.

Planning ahead for the generals will require fewer "tricky moves" on their part. Instead, just an oil tanker needs more time and space to turn in the ocean than a sailboat does, the general will have to expect his orders and intentions to take some time to complete. And if something goes wrong, he better have some reserves ready because it will be harder for a committed brigade to protect himself.

If there is a difference between, say, 1806 Prussians and French in battalion timings, that may not amount to much – but it could be that the "formation-change timings" are significant at the higher levels. This is different than saying French troops are better than Prussian troops which might lead to rules that give a +1 to French troops and a -1 to all Prussians. It instead gives a venue for a difference to become a factor.

If 1805 Austrian HQ are sending out individual orders to each regiment who are then put under one Wing commander, his task of "regulating them" would become more difficult than his opposite number on the French side. It would probably take the Austrian more time to herd all of the cats into a semblance of order, or to put them back together again in case of a reverse, or to reassign new regulating units during the battle. This is another way to illustrate historical command and control systems without making every Austrian battalion an automatic -1 in all situations.

I think these ideas fit well with the command and control approach symbolized by the regulating battalion philosophy. I'm not saying they are impossible for any other system – only that they are consistant with a game design that includes regulating battalions.

Mike S:
>>>What we need is a mechanism or rule that tells us what happens when a battalion can't for some reason do that (e.g. inhibiting terrain) and so "breaks the chain"<<<
Trajanus:
Well truth to tell, that shouldn't happen. The Brigade commander was at liberty to change directing unit whenever he wanted to account for this.

…or to halt, or alter the pace of the command as well?

Scotsman wrote:
"DETAILED RULE SET: This has been done by other gamers. The regulating battalion here also is formed right or left in front, which controls which way it can from a line facing the enemy from a column… If you don't approach the enemy on the correct side, then when you face the enemy, you are inverted."

I think this an excellent description of a detail that is worth having and fits naturally with the regulating battalion system. The regulating system shows that brigadier and division generals had to do more than issue orders and ride around to raise the morale of individual units. They had to spend time and attention on supervising their troops.

They also had to worry about planning ahead and committing themselves, through their orders, to certain actions ahead of time. That involves risk and the ability to look ahead to earn their pay. This does lessen a player's control because he won't be able to change this every turn but these generals didn't always have that luxury when moving around large-scale formations.

This relates very well to the regulating battalions and the command and control idea that generals had to often leave their much of their own security in the hands of other generals to their left or right, or to superior officers. This is why generals often emphasized the order of battle and the importance of disrupting the enemy's positions.

For example, suppose neighboring brigades or divisions were advancing and their generals had already had to commit them to left in front or right in front. If their generals had mistakenly assumed the enemy would come from a certain direction, but the enemy came up from somewhere else, they would be at a disadvantage.

Or, suppose one of the advancing divisions was left in front, and the other was right in front, together they could be formidable and able to react to a change in the enemy situation. But then, if one of those divisions ran away in a panic, the other division might be more vulnerable than usual because his general had committed him to go in in a formation that would give him extra flexibility IF his left flank were covered. With his left open he is now in a worse position to deal with that weakness.

A designer would have to decide if the detail is worth forcing players to understand how "left or right in front" is worth it for the playability of his game. However, if he decided to use it, it is compatible with regulating battalions game design, large scale maneuver, and issues Napoleonic generals were concerned with and were judged by. While it could be a "new" piece of knowledge players would need to learn, the game mechanics to implement them are not complicated.

Sorry to post so much – just trying to get the ideas submitted before the weekend ends to encourage future discussion on their pros and cons and how the whole "regulating battalion" package might fit together.

BD wanted me to post this on the CR thread, but it is more pertinent to here. This is about how alignment and conforming and the regulating unit affected the Confederates 2nd Day attack, specficially Wofford and Semmes brigades in McLaw's second line.

BD:
Okay, if you insist. Again, I have capitalized the important points.

To set the scene:

Longstreet wrote:
"As McLaws's division came up on line, Barksdale's brigade was in front of a battery about six hundred yards off. He appealed for permission to charge and capture it, but was told to wait. On his right was Kershaw's brigade, the brigades of Semmes and Wofford ON THE SECOND LINE.

Kershaw:
"Along this wall the division was then formed, Semmes IN RESERVE TO ME and Barksdale ON MY LEFT, SUPPORTED BY Wofford in reserve. Artillery was also placed along the wall to my right, and Colonel DeSausseure's 15th South Carolina regiment was thrown beyond it to protect it. Hood's division was then moving in our rear towards our right to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging round towards Peach Orchard and AT THE SAME TIME ESTABLISHING CONNECTION WITH Hood ON MY RIGHT and CO-OPERATING WITH HIM. It was understood he [Hood] was to sweep down the enemy's line IN A DIRECTION PERPENDICULAR TO OUR THEN LINE OF BATTLE. I was told that Barksdale would MOVE WITH ME AND CONFORM TO MY MOVEMENT. These directions I received in various messages from the Lieutenant-General and the Major-General commanding, and in part by personal communication with them."

The reason for reposting these two quotes is to establish what Barksdale, Semmes and Wofford were understood to be doing. Part of the reason is that Barksdale's move out of line and the swing to the left creates serious problems for Kershaw, Semmes, and Wofford. Another problem is that neither Semmes or Wofford submitted after action reports.

SEMMES' Brigade

Kerhsaw's brigade was engaged in two wings, Kershaw present with the right. As pressure increased on the right, he reports:
"I then hurried in person to General Semmes, then 150 yards in my right rear, to bring him up to meet the attack ON MY RIGHT, and also to bring forward my right regiment, the 15th [SC – which had been posted further rightward to cover a battery]…. General Semmes promptly responded to my call, and put his brigade in motion TOWARD THE RIGHT, preparatory to MOVING TO THE FRONT. While his troops were moving he fell, mortally wounded."

Bradley M. Gottfied wrote a book titled "Brigades of Gettysburg," and in it gives a decent account of Semmes Brigade's actions. p. 415-418. You can actually read them on Google.

Semmes advances behind with Kershaw and comes under heavy artillery fire when the brigade halts on the right of Rose Farm. When Kershaw came to him for support, Kershaw needed him on the right because his connection with Robertson had been broken and his flank was threatened by Caldwell's Division.

Semmes is wounded, and the brigade moves right and then forward into the gap between Kershaw and Robertson/now Benning. However, because of Semmes' loss, or other reasons, a gap opens up in the middle of the brigade when the left hand regiment, the 5oth GA moves ahead faster than the right, which is the regulating battalion [Remember Benning having to fix a similar problem with his left-hand regiment.]

Into this gap charged the Irish Brigade of Caldwell's Division, the 50th GA and Kershaw's 7th SC fell back. Brook's Brigade meets the rest of Semme's Brigade and it buckles and falls back. Gottfied says:

"Some of the remaining members of the 50th GA become mingled with the 7th SC, weakening the overall command structure."

Semmes and Kershaw are saved by Wofford's advance on their left taking Caldwell's division in the flank.

Kershaw reports: "On emerging from the wood AS I FOLLOWED THE RETREAT, I saw Wofford riding at the head of his fine brigade, then coming in, his left being in the Peach Orchard, which was then clear of the enemy. His movement was such as to strike the stony hill on the left, and thus turn the flank of the troops that had driven us from that position. On his approach the enemy retreated across the wheatfield, where, with the regiments OF MY LEFT WING, Wofford attacked with great effect, driving the Federals upon and near to Little Round Top. I now ascertained that Barksdale had advanced upon the Peach Orchard after I had become engaged; that he had cleared that position with the assistance of my 8th South Carolina regiment, driving all before him, and, HAVING ADVANCED FAR BEYOND THAT POINT, UNTIL ENVELOPED BY SUPERIOR FORCES, had fallen morally wounded, and been left in the Federals' hands."

WOFFORD's Brigade

Longstreet reports:

"The enemy's first position along the Emmitsburg road was but little better, in point of strength, than the first position taken by these two divisions. Our batteries were opened upon this position, Hood's division pressing upon his left and McLaws' upon his front. [An 'L' shaped attack] He was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent. Numerous stone fences about its base added greatly to its strength. The enemy, taking shelter behind these, held them, one after another, with great pertinacity. He was driven from point to point,

"I had one brigade—Wofford's—that had not been engaged in the hottest battle. To urge the troops to their reserve power in the precious moments, I RODE WITH Wofford. The rugged field, the rough plunge of artillery fire, and the piercing musket-shots delayed somewhat the march, but Alexander DASHED UP WITH HIS BATTERIES and gave new spirit to the worn infantry ranks. By a fortunate strike upon Ayres's flank we broke his line and pushed him."

"…however, until nearly night, when a strong force met the brigades of Major-General [R. H.] Anderson's division, which were co-operating upon my left, drove one of them back, and, checking the support of the other, CAUSED MY LEFT TO BE SOMEWHAT EXPOSED AND OUTFLANKED. Wofford's brigade, of McLaws' division, was driven back at the same time. I thought it prudent not to push farther until my other troops came up."

What is interesting here is that Wofford, like Semmes, Benning and Brigadier Anderson were all in the second line and supposed to follow the brigade they were supporting. Wofford was supposed to follow Barksdale as Semmes followed Kershaw. Wofford didn't. Longstreet was with Wofford, if only because he was the last reserve Longstreet possessed.
Wofford was committed on the left of Kershaw, not only to take the pressure off of his and Semmes brigades, but because of the gap Barksdale had created in the line.

William Youngblood was a member of Longstreet's Staff. This is what he reports:

"The peach orchard was on Wofford's left and Barksdale's right. General Longstreet from the minute he came into the open where could see Round Top, had his field glasses constantly upon that end of his line, deeply interested in Hood's efforts. Upon approaching the peach orchard the Union forces had fallen back beyond the orchard; our people were driving them, but General Barksdale's Brigade had halted behind the small breastworks which the enemy had abandoned, [Facing North] while Wofford's men HAD GONE ON. I called General Longstreet's attention to this, and said, 'Do you want General Barksdale to halt?' He turned his head and said, 'NO; GO TELL HIM TO RETAKE HIS POSITION IN THE LINE.'"

While Longstreet moved Wofford forward, he ordered Barksdale to return to his proper position in line.

"I turned my horse and dashed to Barksdale's, jumping a fence to do so, when I fell, pulling myself back into the saddle by my horse's neck. I found General Barksdale on his horse standing behind a brick milkhouse, and giving him the order from General Longstreet he put spurs to his horse, dashed a little ways along his line, giving the order to CHARGE AT THE DOUBLE-QUICK, when I distinctly heard a shot strike him and saw him fall from his horse."

It is inexplicable that Barksdale would respond to such an order by ordering a charge that would take him father away from the position Longstreet had instructed him to return to, expect that he was engaged to the front and had to clear it before returning "to his position in the line."

"I went back to General Longstreet, who was guiding his horse into the peach orchard, told him of Barksdale's fall; when he said, "Go on beyond this orchard and tell General Alexander TO ADVANCE HIS ARTILLERY, AND TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH WOFFORD'S LEFT."

Seeing that Barksdale would not be able to cover Wofford's left, he instructs Alexander to follow Wofford on the left.

"I hunted my way to this battery. The smoke, noise of shells, thunder of cannon, the hissing of balls so thick and so great that one of the artillerymen led my horse to General Alexander, whom I found a few feet in front of his own guns, his glasses to his eyes, standing the bravest of the brave. I gave the order; he pointed and said, "Tell General Longstreet that as soon as I drive back this column of advancing enemy, I WILL ADVANCE." This column was COMING INTO THE VACUUM CAUSED BY BARKSDALE'S HALT.

That is, Barksdale was halted and not moving back into position.

"Simultaneously Wofford's men HAD SEEN THAT THEY WERE NOT PROTECTED ON THE LEFT AND HAD BEGUN TO RETREAT, which Longstreet's and Wofford's personal appearance on the field prevented from becoming a panic. I aided in rallying Wofford's men get the line re-established and rested for the night.
Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 38, pages 312-318 William Youngblood, of Alabama.

The actual times that these events occurred are not clear, but what is clear is the basic sequence.

Kershaw moves out with Barksdale on his left as expected. At some point Barksdale moves off and exposes Kershaw's left. Kershaw tries to cover the widening area between Robertson's left and the Emmittsburg Road by dividing into two wings. He is unable to do so, looses his connection with Robertson, and is threatened on his right flank, even though Benning has moved into the gap on the left of Robertson.

He calls on Semmes to fill that void, and because of errors in conforming, probably in the rush to fill the void and Semmes death during the advance, the brigade ruptures and is driven back by Union forces taking advantage of the split.

Barksdale is facing North and had just defeated Humphrey's Union Division with Anderson when he is killed, because of that, the connection was lost and as Longstreet reports:

"After carrying the Peach Orchard hill and moving to the attack of the enemy to the right of that position Barksdale's left WAS JOINED ON THE LEFT by Anderson's division of Hill's corps. But by one of the many misadventures of the day, after the breaking up and dislodging of Humphreys' division, THAT CONNECTION WAS LOST."

Barksdale is now without either left or right flank support, and as McNeily of his brigade concludes: that Barksdale had 'isolated success" and as Kershaw reports, that he was "enveloped."

McNeily says this about Wofford's commitment:

"When Wofford reached there [Peach Orchard], Alexander's batteries occupied Peach Orchard Hill. Advancing through the Peach Orchard after Barksdale, HE SWUNG AWAY TO THE RIGHT AND MOVED TO CONNECT WITH KERSHAW'S LEFT, they together driving the enemy from the wheat field." McNeily ascribes Wofford's redirection to Longstreet orders: "But the EXIGENCIES OF BATTLE FORCED LONGSTREET TO LEAD WOFFORD TO THE SUPPORT OF KERSHAW AND SEMMES; thus depriving Barksdale's penetration through the enemy's line of the driving power that would have reached his vitals."

Gottfield, in his book gives this description of Wofford's commitment. pp 419-423

Longstreet ordered Wofford straight forward East, and rode with him. A hundred yard gap opened up in the middle of his line within the 24 GA because they had to advance around an artillery unit. Wofford rides over and hurries them back into alignment.

Wofford then rode over to Kershaw's line and asked the 2nd SC to conform to his right, Kershaw being with the right wing of his brigade and not available.

Wofford's brigade, 400 yards long, takes Caldwell in his right flank, routs him, wrecks Swietzer's brigade with Kershaw and Semmes' help and makes it to the base of the Little Round Top.

Here the brigade is ordered to retire. Wofford is angry and complains to McLaws, who repeats what he says is Longstreet's order. Colonel Bryan of the 16th GA writes about how angry he is and seeing Longstreet, asks for permission to attack. Longstreet refuses and repeats the order.

It is interesting that Wofford suffered 22.7% casualties and Semmes brigade, which did much less, suffered 32.4% casualties, which speaks to the artillery fire and cost of the breakdown of the unit's alignment.

Also, it is noteworthy that Longstreet and then McNeily of Barksdale's brigade claim, that Wofford's left was exposed and part of his brigade, at least, was nervous about it…
I haven't read any other primary source referring to that, or even Wofford's attack.

I would think that it is pretty obvious that the connections between brigades was very important, that generals spent a lot of time on those kinds of issues, and that the regulation, conforming, and alignment processes were what made it all work.

Scotsman,
ACW is not my field, but I have to compliment you on the clarity and excellence of your postings in your discussion with BD. I think it is a model of how to present the arguments. I don't know if BD is convinced that your presentation of regulating units shows they are the norm or merely an option (you did convince me, but that is to be expected!). However, I think he will agree that you have clearly laid out at least some examples of "regulation" in action, enough to give TMPers a picture of what a game might look like using a regulating system game design.

I think a simple process would work to capture the regulating mechanism. AOE or F&F could be used to try it out--while there are other things about conforming that *could* simulated.

The rule is that the regulating brigade is identified for a division. The brigades can be in line or behind in support, one behind the other, or any other kind of formation, but they all move on the regulating brigade. Let's assume the player has chosen the right and it is a formation similar to Hood's on the 2nd day of Gettysburg for three divisions in line.

The maneuver table would have to be adjusted to account for being in regulation and no Command Radius is operating for DC stands.

The player moves the first right-hand stand of the regulating brigade, then he moves the rest of the FIRST stand of each regulating brigade on the table. THEN from the right, each brigade is rolled for and moved, starting with the regulating brigade.

If the second brigade of the front line can only move 1/2, or because of terrain doesn't move as far as the first brigade, it is

1. Out of alignment
2. and ALL divisions on the left will conform to that slower brigade…

Now divisional and Corps commanders can attach to that errant brigade to move it along next turn, but if the DC attaches, the regulating brigade MUST move straight forward that turn. IF the DC is unattached, he can maneuver the regulating brigade as he wishes…

Some of the consequences of being out of alignment for the game would be:

1. An exposed flank lowers morale in combat. [however you might want to represent that.]
2. Unaligned troops must roll, 50/50. The next turn, they must do one of two things: move to the right to re-establish the connection or move straight ahead 1/2 move [No turning allowed] This is including rolling on the maneuver table.

If engaged [has been fired on by enemy infantry], the unit can stay in place or attempt to move with the 50/50 roll.

Once alignment is re-established, the units don't roll for that 50/50 roll.

Now, DC and CC stands can attach to brigades and lead them and anyone who is on the left, in a different direction any time they want. However, once they leave, the conforming brigades again will move straight ahead. The unit that the DC or CC was moving independent of the old regulating unit is now a new regulating unit for ALL units to the left, as they are 'guiding on the right.'

Units never have to move except with the 50/50 rule.

That is very simple and fits F&F and AOE fairly easily. It also provides *some* of the benefits and negatives to regulating battalions and conforming. There certainly are other things like that aren't simulated here, like the brigades forming on the left or right, but the real question for a simulation isn't what has been excluded, but what has been effectively included. There will always be a huge amount that is excluded.

Just an example of what I think can be done.

Mike S:
>>>What we need is a mechanism or rule that tells us what happens when a battalion can't for some reason do that (e.g. inhibiting terrain) and so "breaks the chain"<<<

Mike C. wrote:
>>>Well truth to tell, that shouldn't happen. The Brigade commander was at liberty to change directing unit whenever he wanted to account for this.<<<

Mike C.
It happened all the time. The brigade commander did have the liberty to change the directing unit, but they seldom did because of the potential problems within a divisional operation, and they would never do it when terrain, combat or command errors caused the broken chain. You have to reconnect all the train cars before you change engines.

For instance, at Gettysburg, the 2nd day. Out of the twelve brigades [three divisions] in the attack, of which nine suffered one or more breaks during the three hours of battle, but only one, Barksdale's, seems to have changed regulating battalions, and that lost him his right-hand regiment, or he changed because he had lost it. [That isn't clear…] All THREE division suffered breaks, and Longstreet never attempted to change the regulating division [Hood].

>The regulating process is why all four brigades of Anderson's division could all move within 30 minutes."<

Anderson's Division had 5 brigades, one of which did not advance far enough and another of which failed (refused) to adavance at all.

Malcolm,

I am sorry you are outraged that units, brigades in NBs, that that are beyond command of officers with Grand Tactical authority cannot move. Especially as it was most likely a gamer's decision that placed the brigade out of command.

In NBs the player who moves a brigade beyond the CR of its general suffers the consequence of no movement and the lack of support. It also represents the almost total lack of authority of brigadiers on the grand tactical battlefield.

While brigadiers would probabily eventually move, towards command and the support of their brother units, the no move also reflects the historical fact that brigadiers had to be very careful not to abuse an authority they did not have lest their careers come to an abrupt end – a consequence that gamers do not fear suffering but which is allowed for in the no move rule.

Of course, Craig and I could have designed all sorts of rules to allow brigades beyond the control of their division generals to move. Indeed we looked at it, but rejected it because it unduly slowed the play of the game while adding nothing to the simulation. This is because when given a choice gamers take it. What you wind up with is gamers figuring the odds of moving dozens of brigades a half or quarter move when beyond control and dozens of brigades haltingly crawling across the table like so many snails, slowing the play of the game.

On the other hand if given no choice gamers will, to the best of their ability, adhere to the doctrine represented by the rules by keeping their brigades within supporting distance of each other, in command.

What amuses is that many want their units to have authority to mosey around the table without regard to command while requiring gamers to adhere to rules on contolling battalions which are only one ingrediant in the sausage known as movement/maneuver.

The bottom line is gamers will play the rules which they think gives them the game most fun to play even if some rules such as those governing controlling battalions appear to be inconsequential – at least to me.

After thousands of hours of study and contemplation I know precisely what CR does and does not do in NBs. I suspect you have not devoted the same time to the study of CR, yet you are "outraged." This is sad because outrage is an enemy of truth and an indicator of a closed mind.

As for me, I have not devoted thousands of hours to the study of controlling battalions and not being smart enough to be outraged, I am only curious.

Why is it necessary for your rules to represent controlling battlions?

Can you provide me/us with a copy of your game's movement rules including those which govern controlling battalions?

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Someone suggested, way back (can't find it now) that a battalion that becomes separated from its brigade's regulating battalion must either hurry to reconnect or else stand still (I think it was). But if we examine the same 2nd Day at G'burg attack we've been using as an example, on more than one occasion separated battalions (regiments) did something other than either of these 2 choices. For instance, the right-most regiment of Barksdale's Brigade, which, while the rest of the brigade turned to the north and attacked Humphreys' (Union) flank, continued east and attacked Union formations in an entirely different area.

>"It was understood he [Hood] was to sweep down the enemy's line IN A DIRECTION PERPENDICULAR TO OUR THEN LINE OF BATTLE."<

That was Longstreet's plan, after discovering that Sickles' advance had placed the Union 3rd Corps in a position that prevented Longstreet from carrying out the original plan (in which Hood would support McLaws). However, IT IS NOT WHAT HOOD'S DIVISION DID. It kept moving east, searching for the end of the Union line, so it could turn same. In doing so it disconnected from McLaws' Division, which had to also move farther east than planned. Finally, it was Barksdale's Brigade (or most of it) that turned to the north and "sweep down the enemy's line" (Humphreys' division of the 3rd Corps) in a direction perpendicular to the original Confederate line. (The Confederates had been facing southeast, and Barksdale attacked up the Emmitsburg Road, to the northeast.) This was pretty much simultaneous with three of R. H. Anderson's brigades attacking Humphreys' front (Humphreys had only 3 brigades, and 1 of them had been sent to support Birney.)

Malcolm,
I am sorry you are outraged that units, brigades in NBs, that that are beyond command of officers with Grand Tactical authority cannot move. Especially as it was most likely a gamer's decision that placed the brigade out of command.

It should be noted that I LIKE command radius and understand that good command radius rules don't simply have units out of command radius shut down. NB has fine mechanics for dealing with it. I was referencing the perception that some vocal elements of the anti-Command radius faction seem to have, that the auto-arrest is what makes Command radius a bad simulation. My argument was that if that is the reason to discard comand radius systems then it would likewise be a reason to discard regulating battalions as a mechanic.

The problem of what out-of-command units do is not very much solved by changing the way that determines if something is in or out of command.

Why is it necessary for your rules to represent controlling battlions?

It isn't necessary for my rules to use regulating battalions. They were working quite fine without it. I am looking at the regulating battalion system though to see if I can implement it into my mechanics to see if it does add anything but also as a bit of a test to see how flexible my system might be. My rules set is intended to focus on the notion of coordinating and encouraging the men to accomplish their missions so seeing what might be done with regulating battalions is relevent.

An issue that I'm looking as if it I allow players the choice to assign a regulating battalion or not, there ought to be good reasons for either case.

It has occured to me that if you are using a regulating infantry battalion and that battalion is halted by a threateneing cavalry unit that forces it into square, should you not be obliged to flip every following on unit into square as well, all the way down the line? If we can freely choose to have our robot units disobey their orders and not follow the lead of the regulating unit, what again is the point of it?

Malcom wrote:

"It has occured to me that if you are using a regulating infantry battalion and that battalion is halted by a threateneing cavalry unit that forces it into square, should you not be obliged to flip every following on unit into square as well, all the way down the line? If we can freely choose to have our robot units disobey their orders and not follow the lead of the regulating unit, what again is the point of it?"

I don't have examples for you, but only a few first thoughts off the top of head about some factors to consider in this hypothesis . First, that the regulating battalion is not necessarily determining the formation of the battalions, but in keeping them aligned. Second, the "norm" would be that the General officer would be there and he could tell other units to go into square if he wished. Third, if the other battalions were advancing in deployed line formation, then halting (to keep aligned with the regulating battalion) then the regulating battalion's square has secured the flank of the next battalion in line, which perhaps gives him time to go to square if so ordered, or to present a front in line with a square on the flank. Fourth, if the regulating battalion formed square and the other battalions were NOT staying aligned but instead marched forward ignoring their regulator, then their flank would be exposed to the cavalry. Fifth, what distance are you thinking of for this cavalry? Cavalry can move pretty quickly and the Brigadier might order his command (the entire brigade) into square when the cavalry is well distant. Sixth, there might be a different situation if the brigade has its battalions in columns during the advance, and the initial choice of the formation would have been made by the generals before the grande formation started its march. Finally, is this the brigade on the end of the battle line? Are there neighboring or reserve infantry or cavalry brigades tasked with protecting this brigade's flank?

DonLowry wrote:
Someone suggested, way back (can't find it now) that a battalion that becomes separated from its brigade's regulating battalion must either hurry to reconnect or else stand still (I think it was). But if we examine the same 2nd Day at G'burg attack we've been using as an example, on more than one occasion separated battalions (regiments) did something other than either of these 2 choices. For instance, the right-most regiment of Barksdale's Brigade, which, while the rest of the brigade turned to the north and attacked Humphreys' (Union) flank, continued east and attacked Union formations in an entirely different area.

Don L:
I suggested it, but made the proviso that the unit wasn't engaged. the 21st MS was facing a secession of batteries and still advancing on what HAD been Barksdale's intended line of advance. Col. Humphrey's also expressed concern about Kershaw's brigade that he was supposed to have been connected with.

I guess it would be a matter of what constituted 'engaged', but I think I also said later that the disconnected unit could continue on the line of advance IT was on at the time of the disconnect. I have also played it where the disconnect units roll with a 50/50 chance of continuing on the same line of advance or attempt to re-attach. Or the player can simply not move it.

That seems to have been the only three decisions made by those units that were disconnected. On the other hand, Barksdale seems to have chosen to swing left, whether because he believed that was still the plan or saw a Union flank of opportunity and took it, screwing up the entire thing, along with Hood's wide swing East.

That kind of dustup might require some sort of IA mechanics to really capture.

The battalion commander could, if he thought it necessary, go to square without orders. That was generally an emergency situation though. If the regulating battalion went to square, the rest of the battalions would stop, but whether they went to square or not would be based on the commanders and circumstances. They might even leave the battalion and designate another regulating unit.

French battalion commanders in a line of columns advancing would go to line if they felt threatened enough, often to the annoyance of the brigade commanders. That kind of action is an example of how combat could really screw up a brigade's ability to move at all.

Don L. wrote:
>>>>>That was Longstreet's plan, after discovering that Sickles' advance had placed the Union 3rd Corps in a position that prevented Longstreet from carrying out the original plan (in which Hood would support McLaws). However, IT IS NOT WHAT HOOD'S DIVISION DID.<<<<<

Yep, my point too.

>>>>It kept moving east, searching for the end of the Union line, so it could turn same. In doing so it disconnected from McLaws' Division, which had to also move farther east than planned. Finally, it was Barksdale's Brigade (or most of it) that turned to the north and "sweep down the enemy's line" (Humphreys' division of the 3rd Corps) in a direction perpendicular to the original Confederate line. (The Confederates had been facing southeast, and Barksdale attacked up the Emmitsburg Road, to the northeast.) This was pretty much simultaneous with three of R. H. Anderson's brigades attacking Humphreys' front (Humphreys had only 3 brigades, and 1 of them had been sent to support Birney.)<<<

Yep. After the attack, Wilcox kept moving forward toward the ridge and Barksdale lost that flank connect too.

The Scotsman wrote:
"BD, Okay, if you insist. Again, I have capitalized the important points.
To set the scene
Longstreet wrote…"

Scotsman, thanks for Semmes & Wofford.

If I were going to give "regulations" to my battalions, I think the first step is to establish a maximum distance between units within which the units are "regulated". That range could vary depending on terrain. For rough terrain and woods it would decrease, while unfordable rivers and streams would break up regulating alignments. I'll reference Johnny Reb III for this one, which does a fine job of regulating its battalions via the above method, but also incorporates CR by giving every officer figure the same radius regardless of ability, but modifies CR distance due to terrain.

Jim

Malcolm wrote:
"It isn't necessary for my rules to use regulating battalions. They were working quite fine without it. I am looking at the regulating battalion system though to see if I can implement it into my mechanics to see if it does add anything".

I think that is the best approach to this thread. Introduce and suggest some ideas, play around with some rules suggestions, and then people can discard or keep the notion as they see fit.

Mike C. asked at one point for some opinions about artillery fire effect on advancing troops.

I don't have an answer but that is a question that could use someone making a survey of the Napoleonic battles to get an idea of how many times (and in what circumstances) brigades or Divisions were halted, destroyed, or thrown back during their advance to tactical engagement range.

I have read about units already in tactical range who are trying to cross that last 100 yards by a "mad minute" of artillery, perhaps abetted by infantry fire. There was a famous example (was it Eylau?Was it Augereau?) of a formation coming through the snow, I think, and getting blown apart by a line of guns.

I have read about pre-assault bombardments of defensive lines, and of tactical doctrine to emplace batteries so they will have a crossfire on attacking enemy troops.

The British manual even gives the suggested distance from which to launch the attack and how many minutes it would expect its attack to take to reach the enemy line.

But I don't have a feel for whether or not, in "most situations" in an "average large battle" (if there was such a thing) advancing brigades and divisions would be turned back by artillery fire.

If the regulated march across 1000-1500 yards usually succeeded, leaving the make-or-break effect of artillery to be determined in the final 100 or 200 yards (at which point regulation isn't much of an issue anymore), then we can probably assume that artillery losses in a regulating unit are not significant and can avoid the "game-tactic" where a player might try to fire only at enemy regulating battalions (which I've never read of historically).

So I, too, would be interested to hear historical examples and opinions about artillery's effect against brigades and divisions as they advanced to get into some sort of tactical engagement range.

I like that you'all are getting into details of how the rulesets might be written to get closer to what we generally think was real back then. Truck on!

Rules that use PIPs, and allow 'groups' of units to move in unison for the same PIP cost as single units, are pretty much using the idea of regulating battalions, yes?

BD/Jim wrote:
If I were going to give "regulations" to my battalions, I think the first step is to establish a maximum distance between units within which the units are "regulated". That range could vary depending on terrain.

BD:

The established distance between battalions, brigades, and Divisions when operating together was 20 yards. That was during the ACW. I have some memory of it being tighter during the Napoleonic Wars, but honestly, I don't know.

The range that folks started worrying about it was over fifty yards. The 2nd Day breaks were described as 100 yards or more. They were also broken by any blockage to LOS.

It does put a different spin on moving through and around obstacles. Wofford's brigade had a 100 yard gap in its middle after passing around an artillery battery. the gap that developed in Semmes Brigade was about 150 yards. Kershaw's left and right wings were 150-200 yards apart at one point, but it was a loss of sight that caused the original break. Robertson spread one regiment over a 200-300 yard gap in an unsuccessful attempt to cover it. He lost control of two regiments to Laws, I think. Or was it Benning? Can't remember.

Does that give you some idea?

wow,

I am away for a day and this thread has exploded, I thought I had too much time on my hands lately…

Guys, all this talk and debate about Regulating Battalions is more than I can take, it is making a mountain out of a mole hill. The mechanic for regulating battalions should be placed directly into the Movement Phase of any rules set and that is it. Yes it can be mentioned in the Command and Control facet of most rules but really only for reference. A note should say, "For more information regarding Regulatory Battalions see the Movement Rules".

Stipulations, regulations, directives or parameters should be in place in the Movement sections of all rules systems to incorporate the term and the limitations this legitimate part of army regulations suggests. If I were most of you I would take the important parts of these and the other thread and write them into your Movement rules, leave the rest of the dialog on the cutting floor.

Shane

Symbolic Relationship wrote:
Rules that use PIPs, and allow 'groups' of units to move in unison for the same PIP cost as single units, are pretty much using the idea of regulating battalions, yes?

SR:
Are you thinking of "Polemos?" It works in some respects, but not entirely. The command cost notion it there--it was easier to move a large group of units with a regulating unit, but a core point of conforming and a regulating battalion was that the battalion comprised THE mechanism for MOVING a brigade, a Division, and in some cases Corps, alone or together IN A LINE or SERIES OF LINES.

It was the steering wheel for the whole line, if you will.
Mike Collins quote of James Cunningham's book is a great description.

That steering had some specific dynamics in itself--not just a bunch of unit moving 'together'. What could 'break' those 'groupings' was fairly specific too.

So I would say, the PIP mechanism captures some of dynamics of a regulating unit process, but some kind of rules would have to model on 'how' those units were grouped, how they moved, and what could break them--in some fashion.

Shane wrote: [I got it right again!]
>>>Guys, all this talk and debate about Regulating Battalions is more than I can take, it is making a mountain out of a mole hill. The mechanic for regulating battalions should be placed directly into the Movement Phase of any rules set and that is it.<<<<

Shane:
Is it making a mountain out of a mole hill? The questions here--at the divisional level and lower, and even sometimes at the corps level--are how did divisions move and how were they controlled? You know, the basics.

Is that a minor set of questions?

IF the idea is to model 'how it was done' during the Napoleonic Wars in some fashion, the designer had better have a pretty solid idea of how it was done. They also have to pay attention to the veterans who used the processes during battle. Did THEY consider them mountains or mole hills?

I think the answers to those questions are fairly clear from the accounts--and that is about all we have to go on in deciding what is and isn't a Napoleonic mole hill. Or even a Civil War Mountain.

The Scotsman wrote:
"Does that give you some idea?"

Yes, it does. It gives me the idea that one ought to also have rules for attachment and detachment also.

I think the 4th & 5th TX went to Law's side of the Plum Run valley, which was the Round Top or eastern side.

Jim

To explain my point a little more that the hype around the use of Regulatory Battalions is way more than it need to be and the resulting importance people are placing on it compared to much greater command issues that could and did take place on the field.

The following are passages from a book about the battle of Albuera, it could be any book about any battle but it just happens I am reading it right now and it clearly defines to me much more the importance of commanders who knew what to do and understood time management. Any commander could place and space battalions on the field in peace time and march them in full deployment across pretty fields but it is when these commanders got into combat situations and had to do the same while under fire that the man was tested:

The following extract from D'Urban's report points to the official finger:

(((((These dispositions were promptly and precisely carried into effect, with the exception of that of General Blake, whose delay in executing it had very nearly led to the most fatal consequences; for so much time had been lost, that instead of being prepared upon the ground he was to hold, his troops had scarcely placed themselves there when the enemy fell upon them… Even late as it was, Sir William Beresford was obliged to move and post them in person, no orders having been sent to that effect by General Blake, who impressed with an idea that the real attack was upon the centre, took upon himself to delay the execution of the first order he received to front to his right, and sent to Sir William Beresford to say so; thus losing nearly half-an-hour of time that was very precious. )))))

To me the problem here is in NO way to do with the set up and execution of the orders to advance but has all to do with Command and Control at the General level itself, the individual and or his staff. Decisions are made by Generals to execute an order or not and when to execute it. If the General loses time contemplating or musing over it he can lose the ability to act fact and carry out what possibly is, "the" all important order of the day. This is the friction that as gamers, rules writers and player we should be focused on, not the description of the simple function of how the units were marched around.

Yes Regulatory Battalions and or brigades etc were important but this is nothing compared to the skill, experience, bravery and intrepidness of the General himself to execute an order as it should be executed, i.e. in a timely and orderly fashion. The act of actually carrying out the order comes second in both importance and timing when it comes to receiving the order, interpreting it and acting on it, assigning the Regulating Battalion or Brigade comes after all of this and control of the whole reliant on that btln (brigade) being directed towards the focal point of the goal of the mission. This all comes under the actual carrying out of the order within the Movement parameters of the orders to the command and everyone should know their place in the line.

When actual combat begins to take affect on the formation and losses begin to rise, units become engaged and things start to become chaotic then the focus of the Regulatory Btln ceases to be of importance and the mere act of surviving and keeping the individual units formed, cohesively aligned to one another and holding the line becomes the primary importance to the Brigadier or DC. For me the concept of the R/Btln or R/Brigade is legitimate and important but it is also a mechanic that "ALL" of us have used ever since we began playing Napoleonics. We are all aware each time we move our figures, battalions, regiments, Brigades and Divisions of the sequence of movement and the set way we move our troops. I have often picked a single btln, usually on the right or left of the line, measured how far it can be moved and pushed the figures to that point and set them down, only to then repeat the same with the next btln in the line and so on until the formation is completely moved for that turn, providing I was legitimately allowed to do so as a result of my orders to do so. How many of you know what I am saying and meaning?

This goes with the game and goes without saying, it is unconsciously a part of our gaming experience every time we touch our figures to advance them with accordance to our orders. What many of us are guilty of doing is not doing so with regards to tactical doctrines, regulations and realism. We tend to react suddenly to enemy movements and actions that in all reality should take time to react to but because we want to second guess the enemy all the time we are, at times, guilty of carrying out adjustments to our line to react, compensate or prepare for an enemy movement which in all reality should not be allowable until a proper amount of reaction time has elapsed.

This is not so important with Divisional or even Brigade sized systems but down at Btln level it is the most important part of the game and a rules set that does not take into account reaction times and related mechanics fails the test. For me, it is the Generals themselves, who come to the fore in this level of the scale at Btln level and their ability to react, perceive and calculate correctly and in a timely fashion the consequences of their actions or inaction. If they act poorly or not at all or too late then things go wrong and battles are lost. Regulatory Btlns have nothing to do with it, it is the ability to act with great precision and timing that is the primary important role of the general of the formation under him, it also means that he "will" at times leave his post, and he "will" be needed to act to control individual btlns within his command to ensure they carry out orders resulting from his initiative in response to enemy actions.

When a general does this he "will" leave his post and he "will" lose control of the whole, even if momentarily or temporarily to save a flank, adjust the line or become involved in a crisis situation. When he does this he knows that the ship has no "helm" while he is busy and other things can and will go wrong, this is all part of Generalship and the ability "not" to lose his head when multiple crisis occur. A General who can do this and jump from one hot spot to another is one who is successful; it is those who cannot that eventually sink the ship from within. And in some cases it will sink anyway because the pressure was simply too much. When the collapse occurs he can do nothing but run with the remnants to recover them and reform them in the rear, providing he is still alive, unwounded and has not himself lost his head.

Rant over.

Shane

Jim:

Yeah, what constitutes attachment or detached units would have to be very clear. With F&F, PoW or Polemos or a game the scale of Volley and Bayonet, it could simply be bases touching or not.

At around the scale of Johnny Reb, that distinction would be more complicated between regiments and brigades. Within the regiment, it could still be by stands touching.

And speaking of which, one reason I am adverse to the use of CRs in this case is that communication within a division or brigade was first and foremost by conforming. Units knew what to do and when by conforming.

What you see is a brigadier or division commander communicating in person or by courier WHEN the connections were broken and needed to be re-established. Even a good portion of the communication between brigades revolved around the same thing. Just the accounts of Kershaw, Wofford and Semmes brigades demonstrate that.

Bill

How about we move from discussion of the concept to actually putting up mechanics that we can all see ans valid for a set of rules i.e. parameters and or guidelines that a rules designer or player can understand and incorporate into their games?

do's and don't as you see it…

Also from the same book :

(((((It has been fairly said, however, that Lord Wellington – had he been in command – would not have sent the order to Blake and then disappeared north to talk with General Hamilton, but would have himself have taken Blake precisely to his ground, and pointed it out, and watched the deployment get under way. Surely the priority, if one can only do one thing at a time, is to do that which has primary importance while sending others with orders to cover secondary needs.)))))

These are not my words but those of the author of the book, Peter Edwards, a General himself in the British army (from memory). Even he tells us that commanders often left their posts to carry out orders or follow those given to others to make sure they were carried out. They ought not too but history tells us they did and when they did things went wrong. I do not buy it that Generals were to always be found at their posts no matter what level they commanded at. Circumstances often arose for one reason or another that forced a General of any level to act or react to occurring situations that needed (in their minds) their personal attention. These generals often feel that only they could possibly know what is best to do and what course of action best suited the situation. It is at this point when dealing with one crisis, that if another occurs the situation can and did become critical beyond the point of a single crisis, Regulatory btlns become irrelevant and individual btlns remaining steady and holding the line become everything, the General switches from steering the ship to maintaining cohesion, steadiness and Morale is everything.

Steering a formation using the regulatory btlns etc yes, is important but like a helm on a ship it only needs one to observe the situation most of the time, at a certain level of risk you can let it continue on its course for awhile. The ship will still steer and glide through the water while the Captain takes his hands away for awhile, he need only take control again when obstacles are noticed and possibly are going to get in the way or a course change is needed. When the formation gets into combat the importance of steering the whole takes a back seat. He now becomes involved in observing the situation and watching for crisis to occur or advantages to come his way that he can take initiative from. He often gets involved into the conflict for one reason or another and will leave the helm to involve himself more closely with his formation. This is the important relationship between General and formation calculating in his own mind a level of importance of everything he sees going on along his line or within his formation. Giving priority to the entire scope of the conflict within his sphere of influence and putting him into the best possible vantage point to deal with each crisis as they occur or taking advantage of any initiative he sees. While doing this he totally understands that in doing so he is affectively away from his post as leader of the whole and instead leader only of the units within that critical point for however long he remains there.

He cannot be everywhere at once and must make quick decisions as to the priority of his time and be where most needed. It is at these critical decision points that Generals either shine or show poorly, sometimes it is not their own fault but that the situation was so explosive and critical that the pressure so strong that the line breaks and there is not a damned thing he could do about it. So the extensive discussion of Regulating btlns, although important is but a minor problem for, ""Players"" and movement orders and carrying them out which becomes redundant compared to when the bullets begin to fly for a General in command.

Shane

Shane,
I`m all for testing things on table and seeing how they "play out" and for getting to the practicalities as to how we can use this method in our games too!
But hopefully first I can provide an example of how important the directions given by the regulating battalions were to division, corps and ultimately army levels…
You mention the delays that were experienced by the Spanish at Albuera. At Albuera the French too lost time in making the actual flank attack and it is said that they lacked the necessary direction of their generals after crossing the brook… it was this delay which bought the Spanish time to redeploy.
This delay may have been to do with confusion as to how the commands were to be arrayed in the actual assault of the allied right flank.
In this would be implied; decisions as to which were the leading and regulating battalions and the positions of each division.
The second division (Gazan`s) was behind the first (Girard`s) in the initial advance, and in the actual battle it moved through the first, but it could well have originally been planned to have it move beyond the first and finally arrayed to the left of the first division in the assault.
I think this may have been quite possible because of the order of march of Gazan`s division: the 21st Legere and 100th Ligne, the senior regments in the second division were on the left of that division in order to take up their positions (of seniority) on the left flank of V Corps.
But vital time had been lost and Girard pushed on without making a deployment, hoping that there would be little opposition from an out-flanked Spanish force (given that it was known to Soult that the Spanish were there).
But it was the right flank that was attacked (the flank where the brigade generals would be stationed to lead off their commands to new positions) and for a redeployment, which this was fortunate for the allies.
It may have been easier to attack a left flank where it would have been understood that the wheeling and de/ployment of the second division would be practically simultaneous with the first division… given the lead, direction and regulation of the first division.

…just to add (looking at Guy Dempsey`s book) that it would appear that Girard`s division was ployed in columns and in lines of brigades whereas Gazan`s brigades were in columns.

Hi Michael,

I also have Dempsey's book (but have not yet read it) but on page 107 it is explained that after crossing the ford, the 1st Division stopped to re-order itself while the 2nd Division crossed behind. Girard waiting close to an hour to allow for 2nd Division to cross. In order to gain time that was slipping away he was ordered to start the attack on the Allied right flank with all haste. (not a quote but how I read it).

This to me says that there was no confusion at all, Girard knew exactly what he had to do in order to form up his troops, in what formations and where to stand. He held back only to allow enough time for 2nd Division to clear the Ford. It has nothing really to do with confusion at all nor regulating btlns, other than the usual time delays of crossing water obstacles (or any obstacle for that matter).

In a gaming situation most players would do the exact same thing, race the Cavalry over, secure as much ground as possible, cross over with the first division, form it up while the cavalry advanced. While second division crosses over the 1st division advances to attack so that the enemy is given less time to react and complete its own re-positioning.

I myself have been in this position many times on the table top and in fact we are just about to re-create a similar situation in a new battle of ours. River crossing can be vital situations to be able to master and one should learn the correct way to do so, as an entire corps in battle array has to funnel into an area no wider than the width of a ford then expand back out to battle deployment with as little confusion and fuss as possible. This situation has very little to do with Regulating Btlns and all to do with rapidity of command coupled with speeding up motion to gain more time.
Shane

As opposed to Command Radius, does not regulating battalions boil down to not having to be in CR of a commander, but instead having to be in some radius of a designated other unit?

…and this all leans perilously close to having to track which unit is regulating which other unit.

You could even boil it down to some nations (or regiments) having longer leashes due to superior training and doctrine. Either way, once they are outside of that distance from their assigned unit they are 'out of command' and suffer some effect that restricts their movement options.

Shane,

Girard was the Corp commander too, did he need orders to attack? Dempsey says the order to advance was made by Girard himself.

The account which strongly suggests delay and confusion is Thiers, "Histoire du consulat et de l'empire" Vol.12 page 689-90; saying that their generals were not with their commands at the crossing point:

"Par malheur, en l`absence des chefs,.."

and for confusion goes on to say…

"…un certain defaut d`entente dans les mouvements amena une heur d`immobilite au dela du ruisseau,…"

so, after an hour`s delay in forming up and after Girard had ordered his first division forward, he finds the Spanish just forming line at the same time that they arrive.

The point which I think I may have not made clear enough is that regulating battalions perform basic and specific functions in battle arrays… it is a very basic point of all nations` doctrines. They are an essential part of how
commands operate in battle arrays.

A flanking move by division in lines rather than columns may have been easier to perform too because it only requires the simutaneous wheel folowing the lead of a regulating battalion, brigade and so on…. Take Bill`s example of Salamanca from "The Other Thread":
"At Salamanca, …Wellington can ride over and find Pakenham among his brigades on the march [which is stretched out for more than ¾ of a mile and 300+ yards deep] is that he knows where he SHOULD be. With the regulating battalions of the regulating brigade. When Pakenham receives his orders, he doesn't send out riders up and down his column. He rides over to the regulating brigade, turns it toward the enemy, and as each column follows, he sends a rider to the head of each of the other two columns."

If Girard had things totally under control and had all that time available to him you might reasonably think that he would have formed his first division in a proper battle array.

Mike.

Yes, you are correct, girard was in command. His orders were to cross and attack so after a delay of first crossing with his division and secondly, forming it back into battle array he could wait no longer and gave the order for 1st Division to attack himself.

Yes, the very act of forming up the division encompasses the use of the Regulating btln to place at the point where he wishes the rest of the division to mark off from and once ready signal the attack. I agree, but I do not agree that there was really any apparent confusion as such, the act of crossing the ford and reforming is a natural obstacle that commanders have to account for in coordinating their formations and clearing the obstacle. He was under no apparent threat nor was he under fire, he simply crossed over, reformed and signalled the attack while the 2nd division was still reforming. I see no confusion here other than the normal confusion associated with clearing an obstacle.

Shane

>>>>>If Girard had things totally under control and had all that time available to him you might reasonably think that he would have formed his first division in a proper battle array.<<<<<

Yes, you are correct, but it is fairly clear he did not so he did what he could with the time he had. It is clear that he wanted to wait for 2nd Division but as their progress was taking valuable time away he decided to signal the attack after deploying his division in the formations he chose. I don't think this was confusion, rather, it was making the best use of the time he had available.

I am sure when pressed for time in the same situation I would have done the same thing. Indicision or delay can be much more fatal if one delays.

Shane

Malcolm,
It is not about "a radius", it is about the functions of the brigade-general and the regulating unit. The intervals between the units should really be little more than (including formal intervals between units) the space required to deploy each battalion to line. More than this would leave flanks of the brigades` battalions open to attack.
So, all you need is a brigade-general figure placed behind your regulating battalion and all the other battalions follow its directions.
Mike.

But Shane,
Neither the first, nor the second divisions of V Corps were in a battle array before crossing the brook.

I know, they were still in march order on the advance up to the Ford crossing. I am talking about the re-forming after the crossing into battle array. This had to be done obviously before signalling the attack, it just happens that Girard could not wait long enough for the 2nd Division to be ready, he went in without waiting for them.

I'm still not seeing the mechanic.

It is not about "a radius", it is about the functions of the brigade-general and the regulating unit. The intervals between the units should really be little more than (including formal intervals between units) the space required to deploy each battalion to line. More than this would leave flanks of the brigades` battalions open to attack.

..as mechanicly described by a distance that a unit can be from its regulating unit aka a radius.

So, all you need is a brigade-general figure placed behind your regulating battalion and all the other battalions follow its directions.

Unless you want them to do something else? All indications are that people still want the ability to deviate from being bound to copy the regulating unit. Formations and facings can change at will just so long as they do not pass the regulating unit or move outside of its follow radius.

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In any system where a player is limited to issuing a certain number of orders each turn, they might economize on their activations by choosing to exactly copy the moves of a regulating battalion by all eligible following on units.

Malcolm
It is an interval that I recommend. I take a recommended interval to be "the space required to deploy each battalion to line + interval"… this I recommend for tactical reasons.
So, it is a certain number of base lengths in my rules + the interval recommended in the game for flank support; so units can go to and from column or line.
In have changed my rules to it being a case of "should be no further away" than this interval… with line of sight with the next battalion being more important because it would allow them to reconnect again.
Mike.

Malcolm,
Regulating battalions did not have a "follow radii" within which battalion commanders could do anything they wished to.
Regulating battalions were a method of moving troops; orders, general`s abilities and decisions are separate issues.

But I think you are right when you say:
"In any system where a player is limited to issuing a certain number of orders each turn, they might economize on their activations by choosing to exactly copy the moves of a regulating battalion by all eligible following on units."

That`s why regulating battalions were used because the tactical options of subordinate commanders were limited.

Mike.

Malcolm,

>>>All indications are that people still want the ability to deviate from being bound to copy the regulating unit. Formations and facings can change at will just so long as they do not pass the regulating unit or move outside of its follow radius<<<

There is no reason why formations cannot change, as I've pointed out before, sometimes they needed to so as to allow the continuation of forward movement. So units are not "bound to copy the regulating unit" if there is clear reason for them not to.

The difference here is that players in rules that do not include Regulation have no constraint on there actions in this regard where real battalion commanders did. Therefore they can change at will and for no other reason than they feel they might.

The matter of "move outside of its follow radius" needs to be treated with caution as that makes it sound too much like ‘Command Radius' in the accepted wargames sense – a fixed measurement on the table top – when its not.

It was a variable determined by the frontage of the Brigade and the formation (one or two lines) of it and its battalions (all in column, all in line or even a mix).

You don't need to measure it you need to designate the formation(s) and the Regulating battalion and it should follow on naturally from there. Spacing and therefore distance being determined only by the need for deployment room as Mike C has mentioned.

There is nothing to be gained by exaggerating these distances as all it achieves is to leave the Brigade strung out and vulnerable.