"The "Command Radius"" Topic

>>>>>Do you have some historical examples of this?<<<<<

Actually, there are literally hundreds of examples of this throughout the Napoleonic period, I am not going to go hunting for them because you ask me to but I will give you an example that springs to mind when the commander goes and does things that he ought not to, i.e. plunge himself into the fight :

Take a look at Kutaizov at Borodino, he deliberately left his command when told or requested not to, as a result he was killed in action and his entire command left in the rear the entire day unattended and void of anyone who could or would take over. He left his chair and sort glory, he paid for this folly and I dare say the Russian amy lost Borodino as a consequnce.

I am pretty sure certain commanders such a Ney, Murat, Beresford and so on also did this on several occasions for their own personal reasons and their commands suffered from the results or if not their commands, those of their masters above them. It is not rare and in fact I think it was prety common.

As for the, "Rules Lawyer" syndrome I too avoid this kind of personality, I despise playing against someone who continually picks you up on everything you do. You touch a troop base and wham, he hits you with a move violation like a traffic cop fining you for going 62 in a 60 zone. Yes you did something illegal but most of the time players are not doing things on purpose, many times they might not be aware they are doing something illegal.

I have a friend who does this and although I have known the guy 30 years now I sometimes cringe at the thought of playing against him, his habit of picking people up causes friction and a few others refuse to play against him in the past. He knows he does this and tries to curtail his tendency to do this but for him it is hard. He comes from a banking back ground where everything is done with exactness and fortitude, it is not congenial for playing games with others as times but he can also be an asset when he is asked a question by others on a rules question.

Personally I tend not to worry about such trivial things on the table top, I ignore them most of the time unless it is an important aspect of the system. I am told sometimes I am too lenient on others but Like em or hate em, Rules lawyers are a two edged sword, they can actually help a situation of clarification at times..but yes, they are usually a right royal pain in the "….".

Shane

One of the major pains of TMP is when you get a good discussion going with participants at both ends of the International Time Zones.

For Europeans it is such a pain to be continually trying to comment or add to things that have already been said with out repeating it all, or sounding like an echo !

Anyway, Zippy Little Battalions – for what it's worth my definition would be a reaction carried out by said battalion that does not constitute self defence, or defence of the Brigade they belong to. This would be defence in place or at the nearest realistically suitable point.

Unless some one higher in the chain of command directly ordered other wise and they were in a position to have visual or communicated knowledge of both the whereabouts of that Battalion and sight of the objective of their order.

Note I say, higher in the chain of command, as it was possible for Brigade/Division/Corps and even Army level intervention (Wellington, Napoleon and Charles all did it at some point) but the key point is the Battalion commander would not strike out on his own.

Shane,

Apologies in advance for saying this in public but you really need to ease back a bit Mate!

I'm working my way through some really excellent posts from you over the past 24 hours and then BOOM!

It so does not, do you justice and detracts from seriously good points when you have these ‘What the F**k!' out bursts.

Sent in Good Spirit

Trajanus

yeah Traj, I know, I just got a little narky at the, "most" war gamers don't know what they are doing statment. I know it was not directed directly at me but it was unqualified and inconciderate of the guy to say such a silly throw away statment such as that.

To be honest, I did not think he would take it so seriously as he did.

Shane

Granted a higher level general can and infrequently did take over a lower unit to make it do something that had to be done. Lee rallying troops in the Wilderness against a near-breakthrough is an example. (The Confederate troops realized that an anti-zippy-brigade rule was being broken, grabbed his horse's reins and shouted "General Lee to the rear!!?).

Notice that the higher general/zippy battalion situations that we have been remembering, required a much higher level officer (with little in the way of troop managing tasks, but a higher level grasp of the situation and beaucoup intellegence) to intervene. These properties are not contained by the brigade or battalion level officer.

I think if you want to do zippy-battalion actions (basically defined as not what the rest of the brigade is doing) you should require that written orders be issued and followed. The zippy battalion should be restricted to 4 possible actions once its detached:
(1) follow the orders to the letter
(2) "hedgehog" up if validly threatened by a superior force
(3) flee back to the parent unit if threatened by a vastly superior force
(4) change the mission when contacted by a courier bearing orders fron a superior level of command.

I think brigade officers did not routinely have mounted couriers available so action (4) from the brigade level, would have to have the brigadier ride over for a turn, leaving the rest of the brigade on autopilot.

Might this approach mitigate the zippies and do it in a plausibly historical fashion?

Just on the "zippy little battalions " point. I am working with the concept of the division as the main formation which can have a number of configurations. This means you do not have 12 battalion stands to move, just 4 or 6 bases (or stands).

Now when faced with the need for a detachment if you have a senior staff officer available then he can take a stand to operate independently. If you have no such staff officer then the divisional commander has to get involved directly. I also envisage that a senior staff officer from higher command could take a detachment – so one of the corp staff could take a stand from a division as a detachment.

Assuming that during the battle you make several detachments and suffer staff losses then the operational effectiveness of the division will be reduced. Imagine you get an order from "on high" but you can only respond – my division is in a complete mess – the battalions are all over the place – I cannot fulfil the order.

I actually expect the divisions engaged in fierce combat to get to this state which will then allow the prudent player to have functioning reserves available at the crisis of the battle

I intend setting the allocation of staff officers based on the expertise of the command so Davout at Auerstadt can be flexible whilst the Prussians at Jena will mostly be constrained to keeping their divisions together and in formal lines (factoring in what we would call today "Standard Operating Procedures" for small detachment to protect the flanks).

Captain Snort, I have read both the French 1791 reglements and the British equivalents ( I have a reprint of Thos. Langley and downloaded the pdf earlier in this thread) and I agree with you that the British drill allows the same flexibility as the French.

I have the impression however that the British (and maybe others) had a tendency to use "Right in Front" as a default unless there was prior awareness of the need to go "Left in Front". I doubt that the British used any form of "column on the centre".

I also accept that filing was used to perform evolutions both deployments into line and ployment back into column.

I just have an impression (from memoirs etc.) that there was a lot of use of company columns at various distances and the processional approach was still an option. One of the difficulties with the British is of course many battles were defensive so manoeuvre in the combat area was not often described beyond "the line fired a volley, cheered and charged driving the French away". It is in the offensive battles where the deployment into a combat formation should be documented and examined.

I cannot cite chapter and verse without trawling through my files of notes but I have a very firm recollection of a brigade attack during the battle of Vittoria where the British approach in column of company, wheel the head of the column and open out the column to full distance which then halts, brings up shoulders (ie wheels into line) then advances a short distance and fires a volley etc.

As to the regulating battalion – I am accepting that this is used but I am also seeking to point out that this only applies when a division or larger formation is advancing in line be it a line of battalions in line or a line of battalions in column. The regulating battalion technique would have been indispensable for the linear era (Marlborough and the Seven Years War) but the large battle fought on more broken terrain in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars is not characterised by long linear battle arrays. The defensive position may be a line with reserves supporting the line but the method of attack certainly for the French (and I expect also for the latter Russian and Prussian armies) seems to have often been by deep and narrow columns to approach quickly to a point then deploy if necessary into a line of battalions in column and maybe deploy some of these into line for a firefight.

Having looked through Meunier and Ney's Military Studies this morning there is hardly anything about the movement of the deployed line of battle but there is a lot about the movement of the division in column.

The regulating battalion in Ney does get one mention – following the caution that the line will advance the regulating battalion is to advance three paces so that its rear rank be in line with the battalions to left and right ( I assume this means the front rank of the other battalions. The guides or camp colourmen (markers in modern parlance)) of the other battalions are to align with the regulating battalion. At the word HALT then the whole shall align themselves on the regulating battalion.

This means that when the HALT command is issued the regulating battalion and the markers for the other battalions are on the line and the other battalions have perhaps three paces to make to complete the alignment.

While I'm at it….

Another real reason (I think) why we saw relatively few zippy-battalion actions historically is that an isolated battalion was really very vunerable on the battlefield.

If it wasn't, then why wouldn't the art of war at the time make use of them, all the time? They could have organized the Divisions as a whole flock of rabid squirrels (e.g. independantly acting battalions) with a cloud of couriers to direct them,…..rather than the historical brigade system. ..and its not that we are so much smarter.

What I think we are missing/have wrong in our wargame rules is that the flanks and end of the line of an isolated battalion in line were very very vunerable to being hit by infantry in motion. This would be either by a manevuring line which would attack obliquely, or as an attack column that hit the flank or end of a line. For column attacks, the usual wargame rules ignore the deadliness of the column and make it suffer a "+1 or +2 " penalty for receiving fire. They ignore the fact that a column hitting the END of a line,(better yet coming from a slight outside angle) only can be shot at by a minority of the battalion in line and indeed most of that from outside the 50 yard extreme danger zone. ……Also, calvary was usually ubiquitously present just for the reason to defeat such actions and also to sweep away skirmishers. (Usually war gamers mass calvary and use it only like armored division and forget about "infanty-support armor").

However in a brigade, the battalion has its flanks defended by another battalion in line. There are only two flanks for a multi-battalion formation and these can be defended by your own calvary, artillery or flanking battalion in column (which can turn into a square or refused flank) or by support columns in the second line.

The "rules" need to force these things on the gamer as the best way to fight. Then you will see the zippy-battalions disappear except as an exception.

billsfan,

I think you are on the mark, a btln on a mission (zippy btln) should have written orders to act so on this mission. I do this with recording orders, movement and evolutions on my "Unit Rosters". This alone legalises the process so much so that the other side expects and understands when these situations occur rather than being annoyed when seeing it happen.

It takes a split second to reveal your unit roster to verify what you ordered your unit to do was legal and in accordance with issued orders on a turn by turn basis.

And it stops the rules lawyers dead in their tracks.

Shane

Mike,

"Just on the "zippy little battalions " point. I am working with the concept of the division as the main formation which can have a number of configurations. This means you do not have 12 battalion stands to move, just 4 or 6 bases (or stands)"

I think this is no bad thing. The dilemma has long been how much do you represent.

George Jefferies (see the VLB Thread) made an initial mistake, as did the authors of Empire in trying to play an army level game with movement of all battalions/squadrons present. It can really slow down the process and get players into a mind set where they micro manage all the time.

At the other end of things, the single stand per brigade style, while quicker to play, gives up a lot of what the Line of Battle was all about and creates false relationships around space and deployments

Mike the Mug,

"I just have an impression (from memoirs etc.) that there was a lot of use of company columns at various distances and the processional approach was still an option."

Correct, company columns at quarter distance in particular, seem to have been close to being a norm.

Mike the Mug

>>>>As to the regulating battalion – I am accepting that this is used but I am also seeking to point out that this only applies when a division or larger formation is advancing in line be it a line of battalions in line or a line of battalions in column. The regulating battalion technique would have been indispensable for the linear era (Marlborough and the Seven Years War) but the large battle fought on more broken terrain in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars is not characterised by long linear battle arrays.<<<

Two points here.

Firstly, yes the Regulating battalion etc was used primary on the advice or in manoeuvre. It's a bit hard to lose alignment when everyone is standing still.

However, the secondary function of communication still held, so Regulating battalions were still nominated for this purpose and in case the Brigade had to move at any point in the action.

Secondly, vis Marlborough and the Seven Years War. This is the misconception I refer to in my 13 Feb 2009 11:28 a.m. PST post, on page 7 of this thread.

You are confusing linear formation and linear battle arrays, I fear.

You mention "battle fought on more broken terrain in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars". Terrain has nothing to do with it.

Regulation was used in the Crimea, the American Civil War, the Wars of Italian and German unification and the Franco Prussian war. In fact it was used in WW1 until everyone started digging!

Just to quote somewhere I know. Salamanca is a billiard table compared to Gettysburg, or a dozen other ACW sites, all four armies present at those battles used Regulation.

Massive increase in weapon ranges, enforcing tactical change and the radio did for Regulation. Not the ground fought over!

Some questions, not necessarily for I/S.

I/S wrote:

"… this recent discovery of the "Regulating Battalion", something CLS players have been using since I can remember since we have to write orders for each battalion, squadron, and battery two moves in advance, using one unit as a guide with the remaining units followings absolutely makes sense since it is easier to do "ditto" marks, …instead of rewriting each units orders. "

What's the CLS ?

Empire and Chef de Battalion were based upon George Jeffries work or the Variable Length Battalion.

Empire accommodated everything from the battalion up to the army level. What about Chef de Battalion ?

Since Empire, there hasn't been a published war game which attempts the battalion through the army echelon ? Though this hasn't stopped some war gamers from creating there own or modifying existing systems to allow for it ?

PS 400 easy.

Shane wrote:
>>>>Actually, there are literally hundreds of examples of this throughout the Napoleonic period, I am not going to go hunting for them because you ask me to but I will give you an example that springs to mind when the commander goes and does things that he ought not to, i.e. plunge himself into the fight:<<<<<

>>>>Take a look at Kutaizov at Borodino, he deliberately left his command when told or requested not to, as a result he was killed in action and his entire command left in the rear the entire day unattended and void of anyone who could or would take over. He left his chair and sort glory, he paid for this folly and I dare say the Russian amy lost Borodino as a consequnce.<<<<<

Shane:
I think Kutaizov is a good example of the question here. He left his post and deliberately defied a direct order from Kutuzov. Ney's behavior at Jena is another example of this complete disregard for orders and acting contrary to all military protocol.

In Mikabericze's THE BATTLE OF BORODINO,[an excellent work] p, 125, General Yermolov is quoted as saying:

[Kutaizov]"eagerly desired to join me. I pleaded with him to return to his command and reminded him of Prince Kutuzov's earlier angry reproach that he was never around when he was needed; however, Kutaizov did not accept my advice and stayed with me."

He wasn't micro-managing one of his OWN artillery command, he'd left his post entirely--against orders--and apparently died leading an infantry or cavalry charge. This kind of behavior can be simulated, but it is an example of insubordination, a complete absence of command, not a behavior within the command structure.

The question here is the basic work of the commander WITHIN his command. Is it a command failure to work with a small part of his command? Does it 'take him out of the loop' or
render him incapable, even temporarily, of carrying out his primary duties--IF such mirco-managing is outside his primary duties? What ARE the primary duties of a Corps commander? What actions would be seen as compromising that command?

The assertion seems to be that Davout's ordering a single battalion and battery off on some mission, or Ney, Murat, or Beresford's actions within their commands kept them from doing their primary jobs as much as Kutaizov completely abandoning his post.

So we return to the basic questions: What was the primary work of a Corps and Army commander? Did 'involvement' with a subunit of his command render him incapable of carrying out his primary duties, even if temporarily?

PS: From what Mikabericze writes, while Kutaizov's death created command problems, as any commander's death would, his artillery was deployed for the most part during the battle. It seems no one took overall command, but officers did grab batteries piecemeal until almost all were deployed.

Wow, got to be close to some sort of record for the most messages per topic.

Mike de Mug writes:
>>>>>As to the regulating battalion – I am accepting that this is used but I am also seeking to point out that this only applies when a division or larger formation is advancing in line be it a line of battalions in line or a line of battalions in column. The regulating battalion technique would have been indispensable for the linear era (Marlborough and the Seven Years War) but the large battle fought on more broken terrain in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars is not characterised by long linear battle arrays. The defensive position may be a line with reserves supporting the line but the method of attack certainly for the French (and I expect also for the latter Russian and Prussian armies) seems to have often been by deep and narrow columns to approach quickly to a point then deploy if necessary into a line of battalions in column and maybe deploy some of these into line for a firefight.<<<<<

Mike:
I don't agree, for several reasons. The first is what the French regulations as well as other regulations such as the British say about it. The assumption is that all formations have a directing unit that all others follow--it certainly is EASY with a narrow, one unit, column--it's just follow the leader, but that doesn't negate the use of the directing mechanism.

A long narrow column would STILL need a lead battalion, right, center or left in front so they could:

1. Steer the column [Always by the right unit, unless specifically ordered otherwise.] Pakenham at Salamanca is a good example of a set of narrow columns, left in front, with the senior battalion acting as the regulating battalion. [I always have problems with the left and righ in front…Pakenham was prepared to face his columns left.]

2. Be able to deploy into a battle line with the regulating battalion in place. Look at all the column formations and you will see that REGARDLESS of the formation, the senior battalion or company is placed to deploy into line.

The problem for us today is that much of what was done by Napoleonic officers was tradition, custom and doctrine passed on without a national set of regulations. For instance, the British artillery did not have a book of regulations. Any instructions were actually copied in notebooks by artillery cadets at the ordinance school. Other officers like Ayde wrote out HIS version of artillery procedures, but there was no official regulations. Another example. Paget, in command of the British Hussar brigade, had his staff hand-write a compilation of British, French, Prussian and Spanish instructions for his brigade's operation in 1797, even though the British had cavalry regs published in 1792. They didn't cover Light Cavalry…

Even when regulations were written, authors, at times, did not feel it necessary to refer to they considered the really obvious stuff. Regulating units had been in use since Ancient Greece, so it was hardly news.

BD:

CLS is the old rules set "Column, Line, and Square". It was THE set back in the late 60's and 70's.

Doesn't Shako work with battalions in a brigade formation?

BD

>>>>Empire and Chef de Battalion were based upon George Jeffries work or the Variable Length Battalion<<<

Not as far as I know – and you mean Variable Length Bound!

>>>Empire accommodated everything from the battalion up to the army level. What about Chef de Battalion ?<<<

This is based at the opposite end of things, the figure scale is huge, the basic unit is the Battalion with each company represented. You might not have more than a Brigade on the table in some games.

>>>Since Empire, there hasn't been a published war game which attempts the battalion through the army echelon<<<

Shako 1&2 does work with battalions as The Scotsman said.

However these are representational to some exent, in that apart from Austrians, all nations use the same number of figures.

I note with passing amusement that we have not heard from Sam (aka Teddy The Vehement Oyster) Mustapha, since somewhere on Page 3, after him starting all this!

What do you think, too much history, or is he out there somewhere taking notes for his next set of rules?

I only ask as The Scotsman mentioned CP's a while back and it occured to me that Sam's rules have both CP's and CR's.

I wonder if his having second thoughts about them too?

Quote from Trajanus:

"I note with passing amusement that we have not heard from Sam (aka Teddy The Vehement Oyster) Mustapha, since somewhere on Page 3, after him starting all this!What do you think, too much history, or is he out there somewhere taking notes for his next set of rules? I only ask as The Scotsman mentioned CP's a while back and it occured to me that Sam's rules have both CP's and CR's.I wonder if his having second thoughts about them too?"

Its time to send out the black heliocopters to steal all his beer and spray paint all his figures.

>"by placing these formations on single blocks (or groups of blocks) means you are controlling and manipulating, setting parameters and limitations on the players that do not allow them the ability to break off stands or part thereof in order for them to act individually. This is a form of control forcing the formation to only have control over the actual space the stand uses up. This act is exactly the same as using a form of CR except the individual parts of that formation cannot break off at all even if they wanted."<

Yes, but a whole lot easier to play (fewer rules to remember, not to mention fewer stands to push). However, as Trajanus just pointed out, even Sam's GA has CRs, for army and corps commanders.

>"by placing these formations on single blocks (or groups of blocks) means you are controlling and manipulating, setting parameters and limitations on the players that do not allow them the ability to break off stands or part thereof in order for them to act individually. This is a form of control forcing the formation to only have control over the actual space the stand uses up. This act is exactly the same as using a form of CR except the individual parts of that formation cannot break off at all even if they wanted."<

Sorry, I missed who wrote this. I think we are talking about two different types of rules here. In this case is the difference in laying out how something was done with one set of rules--which do have specific forms and limitations--and writing rules that have nothing to do with how things were done simply to keep players from doing unhistorical things. All rules and procedures limit choices--that's the point of them--in life and in games. The intent of the rules and what players actually DO in relationship to them is the critical issue here.

The intent of the rules around regulating units and CRs at the Brigade and Division level are very different, and because of that the results are different in play--that is, how they are used and how the players relate to the rules. One relates to how things were done historically, one doesn't.

For instance, in one case the player uses the regulating rules in much the same fashion and formations as the actual generals to accomplish tasks while the other player limited by CRs simply keeps units within the radius in any formation to avoid the negative modifiers--that is the extent of their 'use'. Play 'looks' close to historical on the table, but the players' relationship to the game mechanics have little to do with actual history and the relationship real commanders had with the mechanics of moving and controlling troops.

It is a simple distinction with far-reaching consequences on the game table, let alone effective simulation design. Certainly both kinds of rules limit the players' actions. It is the why, how, when and where for the participant that makes or breaks successful simulation mechanics.

In the Napoleonic and ACW rules I recently wrote, in which major units (corps or divisions) are activated by the random drawing of chits, CR is accomplished as follows: When a command's chit is drawn "you may activate any or all of its stands that are within 6 inches of that unit's command stand." With a ground scale of 1" = 150 yards that 6 inches is just over half a mile. The command stand can move either before or after activating the stands -- player's choice. An advanced rule says that any stand or group of stands that is more than 12" (one mile) from its command stand should be considered a detached unit with a separate initiative chit of its own.

Not a perfect solution, but a simple one, I think.

Just responding here to the post from The Scotsman at 10:04.

I think there is not too great a gap here but maybe there are some minor differences.

Take as example a line of 8 battalions with number 1 on the right and number 8 in the left. The line advances using battalion number 3 as the regulating battalion. I pick 3 because there is a reason – perhaps it is on the crest of ridge and can still be seen by all the division or perhaps there is a good marker to the front of battalion number 3 such as a distant church spire.

The division now approaches some woods with a gap wide enough for a battalion in column of company. The gap happens to be in front of battalion number 7. The line is halted and dressed then ordered to form column by battalion in column of company on the 7th battalion "Right in Front". The 7th battalion forms column of company remaining in its current location and the other battalions form column of company and take station with battalion number 1 forming the head of the column.

In this case battalion number 7 is serving as the regulating battalion (and in some manuals this called the "base") for the purpose of the ployment from line to column.

The column now moves off through the gap with the battalion number 1 in the lead and this is follow my leader. Battalion 1 is now presumably the regulating battalion.

After passing through the gap line is formed again, this time on the 5th battalion.

Is this a description from which we can take a common view?

An interesting addition

Balck Tactics Volume 1 page 73

"All movements must be executed in an orderly manner by regiments and brigade, in any formation, without breaking up tactical units, and the entity of the whole body must be preserved at the same time by skilful use of the terrain. If necessary a base battalion may be designated."

Pages 218 – 220 describe the impact of using the base unit and some reasons why this is not a good idea.

This is originally written in 1908 and translated 1911.

[Sam (aka Teddy The Vehement Oyster) Mustapha, since somewhere on Page 3, after him starting all this!]

I lost interest when it veered off topic and turned into the same discussion I've seen on every Napoleonic thread for the past 10+ years. I've sort of paid attention, but my attention span for very long posts is similar to my attention span for interminable "simulation" rules.

[I wonder if his having second thoughts about them too?]

Oh, I'm always second-guessing my own designs and always trying to do something new the next time around. That's part of the fun.

Arguing about this sort of minutiae, though…. That's no fun.

History is what I do for a living. Very detailed research and precise citation is part of my job. I don't want it mucking up my wargames, though.

Sam

"Aides de-camp were mostly young men- sometimes very young men-of good family who woed their appointments either to a personal connection with their gernerals(sons and nephews were common) or to the recommendation fo another general. They did anything and everyting for their General from writing messages and carrying orders, to leading the dance at a ball or acting as an interpreter. Harry Smith said n jest that the only qualification needed were the abilit to ride and to eat,, which was being more realistic than James' "Regimental Companion" which required'a perfect knowledge of every militayr manoeuvere , and apitude of eye in taking round, a quick appreciation of instructions, a facility of expression adn the utmost composure of mind. He must always be throrught master of his horse and particularly so of his temper' But this was the beau ideal, not the norem.
On the battlefield the aide-deicamp's main role was to deliver orders and take messages. It was not always easy, admit the smoke and confusion to find th eright unit and accurately deliver the message and it could be even harder to find the way back to the general who might be riding from one end of the battlefield to the other. An 18th cnetruyr critic accused the young officers of the general's uite of being unable to resist the tempation of joining in any fighting which the passed on the way and of incorrectly repeating their message when aleralering just s single workd in the orders entrusted to them' And while thi sweeping gneralization was probably unfair to many, a detail account of the Kord George Sackville's experinces at Minden shows that it was not withou foundation…."

From: Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleion, Rory Muir pg 176.

But the 200 foot general passes information 100% accurately and immediately and it is acted upon instanteously accurately by the Division, Brigade, Battlion and Company. No Delay. No screwed up messages. No differences of perspective. (What guns? Oh, those guns…. Which hill, Oh the hill in front of me. (not the hill, behind it, which is slightly higher, but bigger and not visible from here.)

enough said.

billsfan,

Well said, this is exactly what I try to portray with Order Activations and the delays they cause on a regular basis when orders arrive late.

We are currently in a war game where this happened, the Brigade trying to get activated was desperately needed to block a potential French break through in the centre against the Spanish, it took the British commander (player) three attempts before it was finally activated, advanced into position and ready to face the threat. Meanwhile, the French player (me) turned the focus of the attack from another angle and the exact same Brigade was needed to go back to where it was further to the right of the line to face the new threat, it Activated its new Orders first go.

The British player was angry at himself for the delay he suffered through failures in his rolls due to communication delays through Order Activations. But at the same relieved when he finally got them going, I looked at this from a real battle perspective where a C-in-C might get frustrated at noting the apparent delay in carrying out his orders while the commander at the other end, suffering from an overwhelming number of enemy advancing on him, the unsupported General is crying out for support to come that seems to be taking a long time.

All this because the dispatch rider may have gotten lost, unhorsed, confused, wounded or worse. All of this from nothing more than failed dice rolls. It makes for some exciting games, especially for the opposite side who are desperate to break through before help can arrive.

Shane

The Scotsman wrote:

"CLS is the old rules set "Column, Line, and Square". It was THE set back in the late 60's and 70's."

Do you use CLS ? What are you Napoleonic/Horse & Musket games of preference? Which do you use, what echelons are involved and what are the command & control mechanics ?

Jim

Trajanus wrote:

"Shako 1&2 does work with battalions as The Scotsman said."

How does Shako 1 & 2 employ command & control from the battalion up through the army echelon ? Does it employ command radii, and if so, how and does it differentiate between the echelons ?

Also, what system do you prefer, what echelons are involved and what are the command & control mechanics ?

Jim

Shane Devries wrote:

"We are currently in a war game where this happened, the Brigade trying to get activated was desperately needed to block a potential French break through in the centre against the Spanish, it took the British commander (player) three attempts before it was finally activated, advanced into position and ready to face the threat."

The "order activation" procedure appears to me--a relative newbie--to be the primary command & control mechanic alternative to a Command Radius and it would appear that some war games combine them both.

Shane, is your system published? If not, do you have a base system that you use ? What echelons does it embrace ? From your posting, I think it goes from battalion to army ? Do you use order activation across all echelons ?

Jim

To summarize my three previous postings, I'm interested to know what people are playing--specifically--and how command & control is handled in each--specifically. Perhaps there are components that you don't like and have modified to suit your interpretations… so I say why not disclose what you are doing and the reasons for it ?

Some people have posted a lot of theory in this thread without posting what they are actually playing and explaining how their favorite system(s) have merits which other systems do not have. (Shane being the exception)

Personally, I'm interested to know how command & control in General de Brigade is handled. Also, interested to hear reviews on it from anyone so inclined.

General De Brigade

Its a combination of Radius and die-rolling.
CinC & brigader has a 15cm radius for charge&morale.
CinC has a 30cm radius for change of order. (For reference, infantry moves 10cm in line, 15cm in column, light calvary moves 24cm in column)

Orders written for brigades= Assult, Engage, counter-Charge, Support, Move, Retire. Must specify unit to be attacked or actual terrian feature to be achieved.

One Order change per turn by CinC. 2D6 roll. >30cm CinC to Briadier= +2. Minor plusses and minuses for nationality,personality. Instant if > target #, if = target number then delay one turn.

One Briadier may attempt to change order for things they can see. If natural 2 or 3 & trying for less agressive order, then lose nerve & execute 1 step less agressive. If trying more agressive order then panic and execute 2 steps less agressive order.

Can create new sub-brigades by CinC or ADC contacting parent brigade and 2D6 die roll>6.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Personal Chrome:

I don't like that orders are executed immediately when successful. There should be a delay of one or two turns worked into the sequence to account for seeing, thinking, reacting, transferring, understanding and then issuing battalion orders. It makes planning ahead necessary and adds a lot of tension to the game. It prevents instantaneous responses to the enemy's deployment to set up an attack. It forces you to keep supports and reserves nearby, since the defender is now a step or two behind. The spatial organization of your units, now is forced to resemble the diagrams recorded for the battles because that is now also the best way to fight on the tabletop.

Also, the straight distance for command radius takes a lot of interesting situations out of the game. I say, use a ADC courier and move him at light infantry column speed. Add a road speed bonus and you will find the CinC realistically positioned at road junctions and staying there so they can be found. Use more ADC's for better generals, which allows multiple order changes to be sent out. (Don't send them all out or you might be left silent for a while, when the dreck unexpectedly hits the fan!!!) The unit being sent an order unit might be on the other side of a mountain and hard to coordinate with. The other side of a river. The other side of a crowded bridge during an attack into a town. (Oh, which side of the bridge should the CinC be on???) Intervening Cossacks could make the trip longer, or risk capturing the message. Opps! Zippie Battalions quicklystart to get themselves out on a limb! I think that a lot of activities become more realistic without having to add a lot of clumsy, make-it-work-somehow rules, which distort other parts of the game.

Billsfan wrote:
"General De Brigade
Its a combination of Radius and die-rolling…."

So, if I were playing a division of 5 brigades, I would have a CinC (the division commander) exerting two CR's. A direct CR of 15cm/6'' for charge/morale and an indirect 30cm/12'' CR for order change. The brigade commanders exert one CR, direct 15cm/6'' for charge/morale.

Turn 1. I won the initiative. My division is defending a position. I don't want to move out of my position. Do I have to issue orders to all of my brigades regardless? You mention "One Order change per turn by CinC". Does that mean that potentially only one brigade per side can receive a new order per turn ? What about at the beginning of the game? Is there a clause that all brigades receive an order at the beginning of the game? So, that each is on order autopilot until otherwise modified?

All the orders seem to involve movement, excepting Engage. How does one issue an order to a brigade he wants held in reserve…no mov't, but wait till I call for you kind of thing?

How do brigade commanders command their battalions with only a direct command radius of 15cm/6''?

Well, there is more than one issue here. There is the command radius mechanism, activation rules, and how other folks game command and control. For the sake of brevity, I'll make those separate posts.

I am not sure what Teddy the V.O. is thinking when he feels the issue "veered off topic" and involved itself in "this sort of minutiae".

The question and the history ares hardly minutiae. We aren't talking about what ink was used in writing orders.

We are asking the basic question concerning command and control 'how was it done?', which is what Command Radius is supposed to address in some fashion.

How could that be off topic, unless there was a desire to discuss Command radius rules without reference to the history they supposedly recreate.

IF the game mechanics simulate anything, it is in presenting the players with similar challenges to those faced by the real commanders they represent in the game. If this ISN'T the goal, then ANY history is 'off topic.'

A Napoleonic or Civil War divisional commander isn't sitting on his horse figuring that any of his units more than one half to one mile away [depending on the radius] are 'out of command' and/or separate commands because of the distance. This simply isn't the way he saw the relationships or the command challenges.

Regardless of how long his front was, a half a mile or more than a mile, his brigades would be 'in command' as long as they remained 'aligned' either advancing or standing still, all keying off the directing unit, keeping aligned with the unit to their right [or left].

The ONLY two reasons that part of his division would become separated and devolve to a separate command was:

A. If because of terrain, poor command decisions, or combat, a piece of his division became detached from the line.
B. The divisional commander purposely gave part of his command a separate line of advance and/or objective, in which case it would have it's own directing unit.

IF A. occurred, the detached part of the division would chose one of three options as it's #1 priority:
1. The commander of the detached portion would either attempt to reattach to the line,
2. Continue forward on the division's line of advance, or 3. if threatened by the enemy, deal with the threat before reverting to 1 or 2.

If #B. The detachment has it's orders and operates as a separate entity for all intents and purposes. This option was not used as often as most game rules would have you believe. Most Napoleonic and Civil War Divisions attempted to move on one objective if at all possible.

This command and control pattern was true for both the Napoleonic and American Civil War, the more difficult the terrain, the more the "Basics" were followed. I'll provide a quote from a Southern General in the next post.

What is clear is the distance between the DC and units in his division wasn't the determiner of 'command control' and the Divisional commander didn't think in those terms.

Distance did concern the commander because of unit support and how thinly his command was spread out. The average frontage for a division and brigade had everything to do with mutual support and the expected frontage of an intact line, just as it is today. The Divisional commander's major control concern was NOT "too far away and command control is lost, with those units becoming independent commands."

That is basic. You can represent the process abstractly or in great detail, but it has to model the basic, I repeat Basic, command concerns and control mechanisms available to the divisional commander. Command Radius rules don't do that, even abstractly. It has the player focused on things that were neither basic command concerns or mechanisms for keeping control. It would take a heap of rationalizing to even come close to believing they did.

Historical wargames are based on history, which changes as new discoveries are revealed. Gibbon's DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE has a great deal that is wrong simply because Gibbon didn't have those facts at his disposal. It is the case with all history. Gibbon's work is great history, but no one is holding on to all his conclusions regardless of the centuries of new research simply because it was a great work.

Command radius rules for brigades and divisions was created when both simulation technology and the historical data we are discussing was not common knowledge. It is now. Do we ignore it because command radius rules are simple and still contend we are presenting players with "the way it was?"

General Harris of the Army of Northern Virginia writes:

When a regiment or brigade advanced though a heavily wooded country such as the Wilderness, the point of direction [or line of advance] was established, and the officers instructed to conform to the movements of the 'guide' company or regiment. Each regiment, moreover, was provided with a right and left 'general guide', men selected for their special aptitudes, being good judges of distance, and noted for their steadiness and skill in maintaining direction."

"The again, the line of battle was greatly aided in maintaining the direction by the fire of the skirmishers, and frequently the line would be formed with a flank resting on a trail or woods road, ravine or watercourse, the flank regiment in such cases acting as the guide. In advancing through thick woods the skirmish line was almost invariably strengthened, and while the 'line of battle' covered by the skirmishers, advanced in two deep line, bodies in the rear usually marched in columns of fours, prepared to come by a 'forward into line' to the point where their assistance might be desired. I never saw the compass used in woods fighting."

"Practical experience taught us that no movement should be permitted until every officer was acquainted with the object in view and had received his instructions. I may add that brigade and regimental commanders were most particular to secure their flanks and keep contact with other troops by means of patrols." [Remember this is in thick woods.]

Harris is giving the "Usual" and "Normal" methods here and how they apply to rough terrain. Note that the distance covered by the brigade's front is not even mentioned here concerning control--even in thick woods. THAT CONCERN ISN'T EVEN ON HIS RADAR. Nor is the exact location of the brigade in the mechanics of the advance.

WHAT IS OF CONCERN:

1.Guiding regiment or company

2.The objective of the move: The point of direction or line of advance.

3.Any terrain that could be used to guide the advance. [Remember Kershaw's attempt to maintain contact with Emmittsburg road?]

4. Using 'guides' and 'patrols' to maintain contact and direction.

Harris makes a point of noting that compasses weren't used in finding the direction of the troops. It wasn't needed with the other control mechanisms in place, even in thick woods.

Now, there are a lot of ways to simulate this with game rules, both detailed and abstractly. Regardless, they all have to present at least some of the dynamics Harris describes here, which was almost exactly the same for Division commanders, also applies to Napoleonic command. The details might be different, but the major concerns are identical because the basic mechanisms for command control were the same.

Okay Scotsman, that is all fine and good but….

As I have said in the past, each turn in a war game is usually divided into periods, turns, bounds etc which are pieces of time. This time period is a number of seconds, minutes, or even hours etc. These periods of time and how much time they represent depends on the scale the designer cares to use.

Now, knowing that each turn is made up of periods of time you thus now have a frame work to use in deciding how much motion you have, this in turn gives you a distance you can cover within that time period. Now, if a man can walk at so many paces per turn depending on the drum beat and the gear he is set at by the officers in charge you begin to see just how far he can march within that time period. This is the same with cavalry and even artillery working with their own march rates.

Now, I am speaking about Brigades here, the lowest formation of command given to a General. Now, if he is using a Regulating Btln or company and everyone else is aligned to that btln and the line of march is known that is great. However, when the General wishes to re-align the line of march by just one degree let alone 2 or more or even 10 degrees he has to get orders to the regulating btln to slightly pivot and redirect them in the new line of march right?

Okay, now if the Brigadier is with the Regulating btln all well and good but what if the General is back further for some reason, and I am sure there are many reasons he might be. Would he not need a certain period of time to get back to the Regulating btln or to send someone with realignment orders to them in order to realign them?

So, my question is, why would you not see a form of Command radius as not being an important part of this equation? Surely a CR for order relay which is equal to the distance an order can travel in a single turn would be important as a mechanic for such an event should it need to happen?

I know I am harping on the time + motion = distance thing but my whole premise is that at the lower levels this is needed to show that in a single turn an order can travel "X" amount of distance before a delay of a turn would creep into the equation. I really think many designers also have this in mind with their use of CR's…

We all know and understand the situations and circumstances you have just explained, there is no real need to lecture most of us on these things, any Napoleonic gamer of experience would understand this. What most of us are saying is that the use of a CR is more so to show the relationship for distance in a single turn for command purposes. A simple game mechanic to portray time and motion. I really do not think we are, as a whole getting hung up on the CR side of it rather than understanding that the mechanic is important for order time relay and delay. The focus on the CR is just to know the allowable distance…simple as that.

What is bugging me and forgive me for feeling like this but you have spent a great deal of effort and time explaining why you do not like the use of CR's but you have not once given an alternative that designers might be able to use and explain how you would incorporate that mechanic into a war games system. I would dearly like for you to move away from explaining why you do not like them and giving your reasoning for it but instead focus on an alternative, this is my curiosity at this point.

Shane

Just some further thoughts.

From the movement rates in General de Brigade sounds as though its designed with a 5-10 minute game turn in mind… ballpark. Must be a way to "simulate" the transmission of orders/intent/attitude less formally than written orders declaring objectives, etc…given the narrow time frame and that's not to say a written order couldn't play a part.

Don't scenario Victory Conditions stand in as the written order of the day?

Is it possible to have brigade initiative rolls as well as initiative rolls per side? There could be a ranking of brigades per their individual initiative rolls? That could also combine with initiative rolls per side. Each side rolls initiative and each brigade commander of a particular class could roll. All rolls would then be ordered according to the highest going first OR choosing their place in the sequence.

PS Scotsman, that is an interesting post. We now having "regulating water courses" and "regulating road ways" to add to our grand tactical matrix. Aren't are miniature armies predisposed for the sorts of things you are agruing for ? I mean, they're mounted on rectangular/square bases and are often required to remain in linear base to base contact with their fellow stands ? I don't dispute anything you've posted… but I'm still waiting for some concrete TABLE TOP examples.

Also,

In my system, as I bet it is the same with all systems, when you assign a formation a set of movement orders, advance orders, attack orders or assault orders you MUST show the exact line of march and target area you have chosen. This is something we do in our own Command Control Orders and you are forced to stick to them.

Example, I have ordered the 4th Division of 2nd Corps to begin an attack towards the sausage factory in town of Liverwurst. The 1st Brigade is to attack from the center left, South Western flank, aiming for the main road into town. The 2nd Brigade will start its attack 15mins later coming in from the southern flank towards the Factory itself as its direction to attack.

Orders like this are pretty straight forward and used all the time in war games, but its the mere act of Allowing time for the commands to be given the orders and preparing them for the attack and activating them that is the focus of CR's, not the simple and easily understood point of aim and direction. Most war gamers get that and understand that, I think you might be missing the point here.

Shane

I always enter into any exchange with Bill Haggart with considerable weariness, because the man never tires, and can sustain this sort of thing literally forever, but I must be feeling overly caffeinated today…

[I am not sure what Teddy the V.O. is thinking when he feels the issue "veered off topic" and involved itself in "this sort of minutiae"…. The question and the history ares hardly minutiae.]

One man's detail is another man's minutia. All this stuff about "regulating battalions" and calculating the width of different sorts of columns… To me, that's minutia.

Scotsman Bill, the next part of that post reads like a sort of Greatest Hits Album of wargamer clichιes:

"We are asking the basic question concerning command and control 'how was it done?'"

"… the history they supposedly recreate."

"If the game mechanics simulate anything, it is in presenting the players with similar challenges to those faced by the real commanders…"

"You can represent the process abstractly or in great detail, but it has to model the basic, I repeat Basic, command concerns and control mechanisms available to the divisional commander."

"Historical wargames are based on history…"

"Do we ignore it because command radius rules are simple and still contend we are presenting players with "the way it was?"

We're just on different planets here. For me, this is all blindingly obvious: we have miniatures, dice, and charts/tables. And that's it. No matter how "historical" you think you're being, we have: Miniatures, Dice, and Charts/Tables. That's All.

Now, you can re-arrange those three things in a certain way, and I can arrange them in a different way, and you can believe that your way is "more accurate," "based on history," blah blah blah… Fine. But at the end of the day, we're doing Exactly. The. Same. Thing. – Miniatures, Dice, and Charts.

Find me the most detail-oriented, obsessed wargamer on earth… and I'll bet you his rules don't have a chart for rolling the probability of recruits accidentally leaving their ramrods in the barrels, or a sub-routine for nervous raw recruits in the heat of battle accidentally dropping cartridges on the ground…

But why not? Those things happened. That's real. That's History! (dramatic music plays here). You ARE "playing history," aren't you! You DO want to force the players to do what their historical counterparts did, right? Otherwise it wouldn't be HISTORICALLY ACCURATE! (dramatic music reaches a crescendo.)

One man's minutia…

I'll agree with you on one point: ALL historical games are based upon history. But that doesn't mean that there's a "right" way to arrange Miniatures, Dice, and Charts. This isn't objective; it's subjective. It's all about your imagination. For me, I don't need to go through all the steps in order to imagine that my little soldiers are going through all the steps. If I roll a bunch of Ones for a musketry volley, then I am content to imagine that it might have been shaky hands on raw recruits, or smoke obscuring visibility, or wet powder, or surprise, or whatever.

I don't need rules, sequence, charts, dice rolls, for shaky hands, smoke, wet powder, or surprise.

Now, if the range of outcomes is the same, which one of us is doing a better job at a "historically accurate" depiction of the musketry volley?

Game mechanics do not have to be similar to real-world routines in order to give you a satisfying make-believe of the real world. In fact, it's almost impossible to do, since there's such a huge difference between the real world and the game. A smart game designer focuses on the outcome, not the process. (Here is one of the things I agree with Bob Coggins on.) Get the outcome to feel and look and play right… And get it done quickly so that there's action and tension and fun… And you've got a great historical game.

bravo Teddy, well said, that is the most logical thing I have read on this thread, including my own posts.

Activation Rules:

These tend to be abstractions of a whole lot of things from what I have read. Anything that could and did affect the speed of communication is often included in these kind of rules. Some, but not all of these factors are:

1. Message transmitting time between commands.
2. Lost or delayed messages
3. Staff efficiency
4. Time required to formulate and write messages
5. Miscommunication, both verbal and written
6. Errors in formation deployment or movement--the wrong
direction, or traffic jams etc.
7. The simply lack of immediacy. Whatever was happening, was happening far away from and/or out of sight of the commander giving the order, so when things happened and when he knew about it would be delayed.

For Corps and Army commanders communicating with each other and their divisions, I think these are very real issues. Certainly all these factors can be black-boxed into a single game mechanism to create the variations in the speed in which things happened--or didn't happen.

IF we are talking about creating a mechanism that in some way simulates a command situation for the players similar to the real commanders, we still have to know when, how, why, and where such things happened. The when is particularly important because the frequency of these glitches in real Napoleonic battles has to be approached if it is going to work at all. Too many or two few events in a game and you haven't simulated anything.

For instance. How many orders were delayed or never arrived during the Battle of Quartre Bras and Ligny? I have yet to read of one. The most famous communication glitch is the French I Corps commander receiving too many orders. The problem was created by Ney and Napoleon in sending conflicting orders. It would be a toss-up to conclude that was a command problem outside of the player's control, but certainly it could be seen as part of any Activation rules results.

However, if the Quartre Bras and Ligny battles are representative of the frequency of such mishaps, then how often should 'activation rules' provide a chance of errors or delays? If the activation is dependent on a die roll, then where should the bell curve of yes/no activation lie to model that Napoleonic command issue?

In simulation design, there are two basic ways to answer that question in regards to the environment being simulated. The designer either collects enough details of methods and events to create a frequency bell curve of events, or he creates a mechanism he thinks will work and then through simulation trials sees how closely it mimics actual battle events--in frequency, not in specific kinds as the activation mechanism represents several kinds of events. Most simulation designers use both methods.

For our purposes, this means a designer would produce:

1. A detailed study of the command communication procedures and problems would be done, comparing different armies' methods, and the results in several battles, to provide enough data to create the bell curve

2. Several trial runs of battles with the specific goal of testing the frequency of events. This means walking through historical battles with the game rules. Obviously, it isn't whether the rules recreate the actual communication problems at the same exact places, but simply how often they occur and whether the frequency keeps the wargame from following the basic movements of the battle. If the activation rules keep the armies from accomplishing the major operations of the actual battle, the frequency may be too high. Or the opposite may occur: Too much can happen without any delays etc. The designer would have to set up the test results parameters for the trials to be useful.

Some designers believe the frequency of miscommuication was rare enough that such things are ignored or limited to movement with such rules as FIRE & FURY's Maneuver Tables, where corps and army command is hardly represented at all.

Others believe the frequency is very high. The designer of GRAND PIQUET states:

"However, unless there was a change in the current situation, the commander was not about to give any unnecessary order. What we gamers often time forget, is that every order given had as much chance of being misinterpreted, not followed, or not delivered, as it had being executed properly."

Now, what historical information shapes the conclusions of any these designers is completely unknown to me. What I do know that any simulation conclusions have to be shaped by historical data. Saying 'no one can know', or offering some throw-away conclusion without any reference doesn't cut it
IF WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SIMULATE ACTUAL HISTORY and not some make-believe. I play make-believe at times and enjoy it, but the designers of those games don't claim to be simulating, recreating anything.

If our game represents 'the way it was', then the designer should know as much about 'the way it was' as necessary to recreate it--and designers must provide their basis for believing it. The players have to know that too. That is a basic necessity for a simulation to actually work. [more on that later…]

Sam wrote:
>>>>We're just on different planets here. For me, this is all blindingly obvious: we have miniatures, dice, and charts/tables. And that's it. No matter how "historical" you think you're being, we have: Miniatures, Dice, and Charts/Tables. That's All.<<<<<

Sam:
So, if a researcher attempts to simulate weather or even chemical reactions with a computer, no matter how 'accurate' he attempts to be, it is just wires and transistors? That's all?

>>>>Now, you can re-arrange those three things in a certain way, and I can arrange them in a different way, and you can believe that your way is "more accurate," "based on history," blah blah blah… Fine. But at the end of the day, we're doing Exactly. The. Same. Thing. – Miniatures, Dice, and Charts.<<<

Sam:
So, we come down to the same question. When you say in your game design notes that your game 'recreates Napoleonic Battle' and the rules present players 'with the way it was'… it really is just blah blah blah. Miniatures, Dice, and Charts?

>>>>Find me the most detail-oriented, obsessed wargamer on earth… and I'll bet you his rules don't have a chart for rolling the probability of recruits accidentally leaving their ramrods in the barrels, or a sub-routine for nervous raw recruits in the heat of battle accidentally dropping cartridges on the ground…<<<<

Sam, it isn't a question of detail. I don't like detailed games particularly. It is what they choose to present, not what they don't that is the issue. If a game only simulated ONE thing, if that was the designer's intent and the game is does simulate that one thing. Terrific.

Dice, miniatures, and charts can simulate aspects of any number of environments, including Napoleonic warfare. It's done all the time, with tested, provable mechanisms--with a variety of subjects and for a variety of purposes. It isn't all that complicated or mysterious.

This isn't about what I think is the necessary detail of a game. It is about what Designers SAY they are doing with their games, no more, no less.

If your design doesn't simulate or recreate anything of Napoleonic warfare, if it is just a fun game of dice, miniatures, and charts, I have no problem with that. I play it with that understanding. It's right up there with Battle Cry in my books.

However, I think you can understand how I might be confused by you saying your game offers 'the way it was' concerning Napoleonic battle in one breath and in the next you state categorically that wargames can't simulate anything but moving lead figures across a table.

We definitely are on different pages. I am not sure what questions you might have with command radius in this case, other than liking it or not liking it. From your comments, it certainly can't 'represent' anything with dice, miniatures and charts, can it? If it can, that's simulating by definition--if it can't, then there is no point in discussing history in relation to it.

,,

about questions about General de Brigade:

I'm not an expert on this game but will try to answer some questiond from above about the rules.

You start the game with orders written for all units.

The GdB rules allow only one CiC order change per turn.
(I would like to see more possible orders issued per turn- hence multiple couriers)

A unit in reserve would be ordered not to move.

A brigade general's 15cm radius is for charge declaration and morale bonus. The entire brigade obeys the CiC order or the Brigadier general's written order. There doesn't seem to be explicit requirements against spreading out a brigade, but all battalions must be following the same orders. An optional rule puts some restrictions on behavior of battalions >15cm away from GdB.

The game has "order markers" that can be placed next to units. But they also state that objectives must be written down as well.

The rules do not have initiative rolls for individual brigades.

Teddy The Vehement Oyster said:
"We're just on different planets here. For me, this is all blindingly obvious: we have miniatures, dice, and charts/tables. And that's it. No matter how "historical" you think you're being, we have: Miniatures, Dice, and Charts/Tables. That's All.
Now, you can re-arrange those three things in a certain way, and I can arrange them in a different way, and you can believe that your way is "more accurate," "based on history," blah blah blah… Fine. But at the end of the day, we're doing Exactly. The. Same. Thing. – Miniatures, Dice, and Charts."

Gee. A mouse eats, drinks and breathes. A man eats, drinks and breathes. Therefore a mouse is the same thing as a man.

A set of wargame rules uses napoleonic figures and atomic cannons. …."But at the end of the day,.. we're doing Exactly.. the.. Same.. Thing." Heh? Things that are different are the same?

[So, if a researcher attempts to simulate weather or even chemical reactions with a computer, no matter how 'accurate' he attempts to be, it is just wires and transistors?]

[A mouse eats, drinks and breathes. A man eats, drinks and breathes. Therefore a mouse is the same thing as a man.]

What, did I miss the announcement that today was Bad Analogy Day?

We've got miniatures, dice, and charts. That's it. You can arrange them in different ways, do things in a different order, or even throw in some extra gadgets like activating them with cards, or whatever…. But it all comes down to: Miniatures, dice, and charts.

One guy arranges them in a certain way and says that his way is "more historical" or "accurate," or whatever. Fine.

This argument is hardly unique to Napoleonics. Go check out the WW2 Boards, and you'll see guys ranting about historical accuracy, too, and it usually boils down to: "My game is more historically accurate than yours because when my Tiger shoots at your Sherman I roll percentile dice on this kind of table, and then roll a d20 on this kind of table…. Whereas your game is total fantasy because you'd resolve that with a handful of d-sixes…"

Gimme a break.

It's Miniatures, Dice, and Charts. Arrange them any way you like, that makes you feel "accurate" and "historical." Whoopee. There are perhaps 50 guys on the entire planet who will argue with you about it, no matter what you do.

Take battleship games, for instance. Most of them use a two-step process where you roll to hit, then roll to penetrate or do damage, etc. There was an old SPI game – I can't remember the title – where they'd already done the math and showed each ship with an overhead view and then a number of gun factors bearing in this direction and that direction… So you had 8 gun factors on a full broadside, and only 4 gun factors if the target was dead ahead, and so on. Thus you could resolve the whole salvo in one die roll.

Most people hated it because it didn't "feel" right. They'd gotten used to the Roll To Hit / Roll To Kill routine, so for them, that was "historically accurate." Their imaginations were insufficient for them to enjoy the new approach.

I loved it. It sped the game up, and I had no problem imagining that my turrets were bearing on the target when I fired on it. I didn't have to go through the motions of counting how many turrets with how many tubes were bearing on the target, then rolling to hit, and so on…

Two systems, both producing historically justifiable results, but most people dismissed one of them as "inaccurate" or having no "period feel," and so on.

As for whether there needs to be any difference in game mechanics between a Napoleonic 12-pounder and a 12-megaton nuclear warhead, I refer you to this discussion from a few weeks ago:

TMP link

There are only a limited number of game mechanics available, and they mostly boil down to: "Roll a die or some dice… compare against the other guy's die or dice… or against a chart… maybe with a modifier."

Since every single wargame uses some version of those mechanics, why would people think that certain mechanics are appropriate for one period or subject, but others aren't?

I guess now I've hijacked my own thread, but – since today is Bad Analogy Day – it was a Cleveland-bound train that was hijacked and re-routed to Denver, and now I've re-hijacked it and we're heading toward Bangor.

And I think I'm just going to jump off somewhere near Albany.

PS – 400.

That's Albany. My exit.