"The "Command Radius"" Topic

Bob,

Bummer. Your – or perhaps LBG's – effort is really the creation of a new paradigm and I'd like to see how well, or not, it does and why. Anyway, I'm also ambivalent about sales for the same reason, which is why I'm not too concerned about releasing numbers if I ever take the time to dig them up.

Soooooo, if you ever get comfortable and have the numbers, inquiring minds want to know:).

Generally I've no problem with the CR concept if properly used. Its just another legitimate tool in the large bag of tricks used to solve a design problem.

Ciao, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

PS: I will also confess that when I spent $ 50 on Revolution and Empire, IMHO a poor effort, I became a bit gunshy.

Bill,

I will. I would tell you one thing the publisher said which is, I am not in the business of doing market research for possible competitors. So, I wouldn't hold my breath.

Bob Coggins

ps: We all get "taken" by poor efforts – hang in there. As a playtester for A/H's version of EIA I feel comfortable saying Matrix' computer game is one of the worst efforts as converting a board wargame to the P.C. I have ever seen. It is so gamer unfriendly, burdensome, as to be unplayable and it cost $75 USD or so. Matrix should be embarrassed.

To me, the important part of C3 is not how long it takes to send an order to a subordinate unit, but how long it takes a commander to take in the situation, decide what to do about it, and convey that decision, either verbally or in writing. Unless we use a chess clock, players have all the real time they want to make these decisions, but real commanders did not. Some commanders and staffs were good at "multi-tasking" and some weren't. Or some didn't much try (think Lee at Gettysburg – make an overall plan and leave it to the corps commanders to carry it out).

But there were times when distance, woods, rivers, or something separated some units from their army and/or corps commanders. The battle of Champion's Hill, in the ACW, comes to mind. Grant's forces were traveling along different roads when they ran into the Confederates. The portion on the same road that Grant was traveling were within his "command radius" and under his control and fought most of the battle. Others, on other roads, separated from Grant by thick woods, were under McClernand, who was cautious that day, and these barely got into the fight. Grant tried sending written orders, which eventually reached McClernand, but the latter still acted cautiously. Grant was not able to effectively control those units. (He won anyway.) This was partly due to the distance, partly due to the woods, and partly due to Grant's involvement on the part of the field he could control keeping him from devoting more time and attention to the distant part, or from going over there himself. (During the time it would take him to move over there he would be out of control of both parts, and the battle might well have been decided before he got there anyway.)

Last Hussar,

F&F- The rules state Mounted Cavalry and Infantry. My opponent tried to argue dismounted cavalry could, despite not specifically mentioned- if infantry can, why not others on foot- and he isn't particulally the sort who squeazes the rules- I've decided grey areas on a dice throw with him before.

That is why the rule specifically states "mounted" cavalry. Dismounted cavalry is infantry without bayonets. It was, especially at the end of the war, mounted infantry. There are so many examples of this during the war that I want even bother. Your friend is absolutely right.

I like the Johnny Reb III command radius mechanic--in theory at least. There are three overlapping C.R.'s which operate simultaneously.

1. Direct command, 1''-3'' depending on leader level, where the leader confers immediate tactical and morale benefits to units under his direct command.

2. Indirect command, units within 12'' for open ground, 6'' for woods, 3'' for rough terrain.

3. Extended indirect command, units not within the indirect command radius but adjacent to or within a specified distance of a friendly unit that is.

My impression is that most of the Napoleonic/Horse & Musket games that are being discussed here do not include provisions for the last or third point ? If so, couldn't the Grande Armee at least do this !?! Or not ? And wouldn't it have been a major advantage to them over their opponents who couldn't ?

Napoleonic Command and Control and 'command radius'

Okay, the issue is command control in the Napoleonic wars, so here is the basic way it was done:

So how did Brigade and Divisional commanders 'command and control' their units?

It was a response to, rather than based on any time=distance issues. A brigade was organized around a regulating battalion. All other battalions followed or copied the movements of the regulating battalion and the formation the brigade was in, whether one, two or three lines. That is how a brigadier controlled his brigade. His communication was simple—he told the regulating battalion what to do and all other battalions did the same. The battalion commander's job in a battle line was to maintain contact with the battalions on either side and follow the lead of the right hand battalion to them, who in turn followed the lead of the right hand battalion until you come to the regulating battalion.

Where do we find the Brigade commander? With the regulating battalion. How does he communicate to his brigade in movement and combat? The regulating battalion. What kinds of command problems does he have? None, until battalions lose contact with their right hand battalions. That is the breakdown in communication and command control. In these instances, it is the battalion commander who contacts the brigadier for help or orders. This is the core method for controlling large numbers of troops and had been for many centuries. We see Napier at Coruna relate how he spent his time making sure that he was still aligned with the other brigade battalions. He never sees his brigadier. Moore is behind him and he goes to him and asks permission to deploy a second company of skirmishers. The battalions in Colborne's brigade at Albuera advance, all attention on where the regulating battalion, the 3rd is and what it is doing.

This is true for the Civil War. Regimental commanders spent much of their time working to maintain alignment.

A number of things could disrupt this command and control. At Albuera, Stuart, the divisional commander, directs the regulating battalion to deploy and move forward before the rest of the brigade has deployed, which leads to all the other battalions to rush to 'catch up', creating serious problems with the attack. At the second day at Gettysburg, Kershaw finds he has conflicting orders. He is to stay aligned with the regulating division, Hoods, by staying in contact with the left of Benning's brigade, but he also has orders to maintain his left flank on the Emmittsburg Road. He attempts to do both, leading to his brigade being split, and two regiments are controlled by Barksdale's brigade IIRC for the rest of the day.

The very same procedure is used by Divisional commanders and the regulating brigade. You would normally find the divisional commander with the regulating battalion of the regulating brigade. Pakenham moves his entire division this way as Salamanca. Hood uses the same method at Gettysburg, and Kershaw sees it as a critical breakdown in communication when McLaw's is not with his senior Brigadier, his regulating brigade.

At Salamanca, the reason Wellington can ride over and find Pakenham among his brigades on the march [which is stretched out for more than ¾ of a mile and 300+ yards deep] is that he knows where he SHOULD be. With the regulating battalions of the regulating brigade. When Pakenham receives his orders, he doesn't send out riders up and down his column. He rides over to the regulating brigade, turns it toward the enemy, and as each column follows, he sends a rider to the head of each of the other two columns [the Brigadier with each column's regulating battalion] [no more than 2 or 300 yards away, and tells them in one short sentence what he plans to do. He needs no more instruction because the experienced officers know the routine. When Pakenham decides to face to the division's left on the move, he doesn't send out riders, he simply begins the regulating battalion's movements and the entire division follows suit, Wallace's brigade first. This was not only done by sight, following the right-hand battalion, but also by word. The SOP for all officers and NCOs was to call out the orders given to the regulating battalions. Each company down the line would call out the movement order until it reached the end.

These processes, at the most, required Pakenham to spend a few minutes 'controlling' his division, within a 'radius' of less than 400 yards relaying informative commands not necessary to actually move his division. Pakenham never moves from the right of his division for the day, because that is where each of his three brigades' lines were regulated.

Hood did the same thing on the second day of Gettysburg. He was with his regulating brigade, Laws, and directed his division from that point. When he is wounded, Laws as the senior brigade officer, takes over, and surprise—he is in the position to continue directing the division.

The breakdowns in control for brigade or division-sized commands from the 18th through the 19th Centuries occurred when:

1. The battalions were not able to maintain their alignments
2. The commanding officer did not stay with the regulating unit
3. The officer was wounded or killed
4. The officer failed to respond to reported breaking in the alignment
5. When officers failed to follow protocol for whatever reason.

The response for the commander was to either send a runner to the point of misalignment, or ride there himself. This is no more than a 2 or 3 minute ride for a division commander. However, when he has left the regulating unit, it is like the pilot leaving the plane on autopilot. No one is in command.

That was a danger, but divisional commanders did that from time to time to get a better view of the conflict, to communicate with others, including his superiors, and of course, to shore up any problems.

From this, I think it is easy to conclude for Brigade and Division commanders:

1. Command control was done from the cockpit, not the middle of the plane. The commander had little concern about a command radius or how far away his troops were.
For a divisional commander, they were in command if he was with the regulating brigade, and any issues down the line—reported to him—were no more than 3 minutes away by horse.

2. Few riders were needed by brigade and divisional commanders with the system. The British allotted one aide for a brigadier and two for a divisional commander. Robert E. Lee had a similar number allotted for his army.

3. Every army commander could look at a division at a distance and now where each brigade was [in the battle array] and where the divisional commander would be [on the far right.] This battle array system was SO important that Stewart at Albuera waited until Colborne was in position as senior brigade before rushing to the rescue of the Spaniards. It was so important, that Longstreet waited until Laws' regulating/senior brigade was leading the march before heading out on the 2nd Day of Gettysburg.

4. "Out of Command" meant a broken line, not how far away some unit was from the middle of a division or brigade. The breakdown in control could occur very close or very far from a commanding officer. AND it was more likely that the brigade or division was out of command if the commander WAS in the middle of his command, rather with the regulating unit.

I fail to see where this matches any rationales for command radii, let alone provide the same controls and problems I just described.

It also should be obvious that command control for a brigadier or divisional commander was quite different in nature from that of a corps or army commander. One reason a brilliant divisional commander could make a lousy corps commander.

Unfortunately, most histories focus on army commanders and their orders to corps commanders, rather than the processes below that level, leading folks to see messengers running all over the place.

Usually, the vast majority of couriers needed were between army and corps commanders, and then perhaps corps and divisional commanders….

Bottom Dollar wrote:
>>>>I like the Johnny Reb III command radius mechanic--in theory at least. There are three overlapping C.R.'s which operate simultaneously.<<<<

BD:
Using the regulating regiment and brigade would be a far easier and far more historically accurate method for controlling units. It is simple--which is why it was used for so long.

This is the closest form of the three overlapping CinC radii you wrote of, but units still should move on the regulating unit. It is easy in play: Move the regulating unit and then all the units follow suit.

>>>>3. Extended indirect command, units not within the indirect command radius but adjacent to or within a specified distance of a friendly unit that is.<<<<<

Even in the woods, this method of regulating on the right was used. It is just that the woods can disrupt movement, and thus alignment.

That's the way command control was handled in the ACW, and Johnny Reb is certainly a system that could readily incorporate it.

Scotsman,

Thanks for your very interesting attempts to discredit CR, because you write it does not make it so. Much of what you write actually supports CR in NBs.

In NBs the brigadier can be anywhere within the parameters defined by the units in the brigade. Even with the guiding or controlling battalion if you like.

Foy wrote brigadiers commanded by voice. He did not write about controlling battalions because they were part of doctrine and, thus, it was not necessary to refer to them. In any event Chefs de battalion were perfectly capable of following a line of advance staked out by staff officers and aides from division or corps without the constant presence of the brigadier.

Guibert wrote formations tended to bunch together, eliminating deployment distances, as men bunched together in battalions till there were a dozen ranks hiding behind the front rank. Its called the evil of bunching.

On the grand tactical battlefield your concern for such detail is merely a minor cog that automaically occurs. Its called doctrine.

Certainly when Napoleon or Wellington viewed a battlefield the last thing they were thinking of was controlling or guide battalions. So, why should we burden the gamer with things his historical counterpart isn't?

If you want to play rules which emphasize process to the detriment of outcome, and some do, then be my guest.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

I will say, an excellent post, Scotsman. You certainly seem to doubt the usefulness of even having brigade and divisional commanders on the table top, never mind the command radius. Command at the brigade and divisional level is merely--or most easily--the maximum distance between regiments and brigades that maintains the unity of brigade/divisional command and control. In addition, the brigade and division commanders ought to be absorbed into the rightmost unit in their commands. So that, in a single line of battle, if the rightmost regulating battalion loses contact with the regiment to the left, all of the regiments to the left are out of command and control and if the rightmost regulating brigade loses contact with the brigade its left, all the brigades to the left are out of command and control. This also explains why the Confederate attack failed on July 2nd. The regulating brigade commander on the right--Law--took over for a wounded Hood who was the regulating division commander on the right--and Law therefore wasn't there when what had become the regulating regiment on the right--the 15th Alabama--paused to catch its breath on Big Round Top. There was the ripple effect from the rightmost regulating regiment up through the rightmost regulating brigade into the rightmost regulating division, and so on down the line.

So, indeed, it sounds very feasible that the Grand Army and the Brits had brigade and division commanders who could control the entire length of a battle line from one end of it--the right most end. Was it possible that they would find themselves in a situation where it might make sense to regulate the line from the left ? Or perhaps even the middle ? Was it within their military doctrine or in their military capabilities to designate any regiment within the brigade or any brigade within the division as the regulating unit ? Or would that have just caused mass confusion ?

TheScotsman,

You have done a great job of explaining the relationship within a Brigade or Division etc and how CC related to alignments and control, well done. What most of us are talking about is the communication and relaying of orders "between" the various levels of the chain of command, not "the" individual commands.

Yes most of us understand about regulating btlns and so on, this practice went all the way fown to company file closers for aligment purposes etc. It goes without saying. But this is an entirely different kettle of fish. Most palyers will not worry about this until they actually begin to move their units within a command (brigade etc) and even then probably not worry to even think about regulating btlns within the scope of the rules they play. I will admit I myself do not worry about it to be totally honest. What we do worry about is the actual Activation of a Brigade to ignite the order so to speak and get the ball rolling, I supose you could say a failed activation roll takes these alignment and other issues into account when the failure occurs.

But this is an internal thing within the command being moved and not what we use the command radius for, the CR is used like I keep saying, as a time, motion = distance (Radius) that calculates how long it will take to get the order to its destination, nothing else. (At least in my system only) The Activation rolls I use is to simulate entirely what you have just so clearly explained.

p.s. I would like to quote some of your post as a good explanation of how Activation rolls work and why if ok, what you said was very well laid out and defined.

Regards,
Shane

Bottom Dollar asked:
"Was it possible that they would find themselves in a situation where it might make sense to regulate the line from the left ?"

Short answer is yes. For example, since you would want your most advanced element to be the regulating or directing unit, an advance in echelon from the left would have your regulating element on the left in the most advanced position. Also an important part of the generalship was deciding if you wanted your formations "left in front" or "right in front" which was a calculated decision where you had to predict where you thought the enemy would be and therefore which way you expected you would have to lay out your deployment when going from Grand Column to Line of Battle.

The Scotsman wrote:
BD: Using the regulating regiment and brigade would be a far easier and far more historically accurate method for controlling units. It is simple--which is why it was used for so long. This is the closest form of the three overlapping CinC radii you wrote of, but units still should move on the regulating unit. It is easy in play: Move the regulating unit and then all the units follow suit.

I have to say, employing such a procedure never occurred to me.

Though I fully accept your historical argument that the rightmost unit was the unit of regulation in drill and also when circumstances permitted on the battlefield, I have difficulty seeing a rigid commitment to regulating on the right once things started to warm up.

I just read NedZed's post and I can see where a regulating battalion procedure could be used on the table top. Never thought of it. Hmmm… in practice though, that assumes the brigade commander is going to stay with the regulating battalion. Still, I'm not convinced, at least as far as the ACW is concerned…

Very interesting topic.

Any game systems you guys could recommend which employ it ? Or books--in English--which might describe it ? Preferably in its Napoleonic context ?

Sometimes I think there are some moving targets being set up here. Maybe we need a list of the "historical situations" any suggested rule will have to deal with, and then judge how many hits and misses that rule has for each situation.

For example, one of the "rationalizations" for Command Radius is to keep groups of units together to work against the wargamer's tendency to split off individual units all over the place.

When the Scotsman points out how regulating units for brigades and divisions work, that is at least partly to show how it was that historical commanders did move as a single command, and why individual splitting off would be the exception, not the rule. That example is really not intended deal with all other points that are raised.

When another point is raised (ie where are the generals on the field?) he shows that there actually was a place on the field where these generals were to be found, as a rule, though of course there could be exceptions. It was a specific answer to a specific question and wasn't an answer to the whole question of what a general does.

If that question does arise, TheScotsman's answer actually applies to an implied assumption that formations with regulating units would not need the General's attention, or were just part of doctrine, so the Brigadier could gallop around and do other things as his main job.

If Bob then asserts that TheScotsman is pushing process to the detriment of outcome, the target has again moved. An answer to a question like this presupposes agreement on some basic design issues like "Who does the player represent" on the field (ie, all commanders, or a particular commander, or all generals but no one else on the command chain etc); or does the game intend to "simulate"or somehow represent a particular process such as command and control. If so, when is the game mechanic justified in being more complicated – perhaps because the history or because the designer's interest is most in representing this particular part of the game.

In this case for example, I see a prerequisite for understanding what a general's job was as being necessary. If two people want to debate the history the rule represents, it would help if they first agree on what the history is that the rule must deal with. If a general at a given level spent 95% of his time babysitting his formation to make sure it moved in a certain way, his time for situational awareness, changing positions, giving orders and reacting to enemy actions would certainly be less than someone who spends only 5% of his time barking out an order to the regulating unit and then spends 95% of his time for those tasks.

Two designers might have two different historical interpretations to that situation and thus write two different rules to account for it. But if one can present evidence to the other that they (or at least an objective audience if one exists) can agree on, then that designers rules might carry more weight.

Bottom Dollar wrote:

"Any game systems you guys could recommend which employ it ? Or books--in English--which might describe it ? Preferably in its Napoleonic context ?"

I am not familiar enough with rules sets over the last decade to comment or recommend. From postings on sites like TMP I assume there are not sets like that, except that Trajanus and Mike Collins from this site do use the concept in their games. If you look back in this thread or on the Variable Length Bound and George Jeffrey thread you'll see that mentioned. I also know very little about the ACW.

If you can find a copy, there is a 1982 wargamer's book called Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars by George Jeffrey that was published by Dick Bryant's US magazine The Courier. George has about 50 pages on the topic, including diagrams and a formula in the book for figuring out how long "grand tactical" evolutions took. George used the term "directing battalions" in many places instead of "regulating" battalions. George was a soldier and a wargamer, not a scholar, but this was the first time I saw something explaining this in a way that was useful for the wargaming audience. (Perhaps the main source for George's ideas came from John Macdonald's English translation of the French 1791 drill book and from Macdonald's introduction to the translation. )However, being 1982, where most people were still working from the battalion on up, the idea of using such maneuvers didn't transfer into wargames rules. In his own rules George offered these formations and timings, and assumed that others would play his rules using that knowledge to make his rules work, but playtesters never really got out of the battalion playtest stage and the "grand tactics" part was never fully realized or understood.

Years later on the VLB Yahoo website in 2002 or so (if my memory is correct), there was a lot of discussion on the topic. Since there were NOT many books on the subject, there was a lot of examination of actual Napoleonic drillbooks. Many readers were not interested at the time, but it was from that very dry and very technical discussion and dissection of those books (ably begun by a fellow named Art Pendragon) that the ideas of regulating battalions and their implications for wargaming became clear. (And where I rediscovered that George Jeffrey had been trying to tell us that in his 1982 book). Guys like Trajanus and Mike Collins used that VLB site discussion to formulate regulating battalion rules for themselves, and guys like TheScotsman learned many of the details.

I could be wrong, but I don't think the implications of the subject got very far in the wargaming world outside of that site. ( BTW, in the British drillbook, the "Rules and Regulations", the section dealing with multi-battalion movements was called "The Line". )

George Nafziger's "Imperial Bayonets", (which was written at least partly in reaction to Jeffrey's book), is mostly devoted to battalion tactics, but does have about 20 pages on Brigade level movements. He states that despite "the significance of brigade maneuvers, they are the most poorly understood and the least documented of all army operations. Only two documents exist which contain any significant discussion of Napoleonic brigade tactics. These are Marshal Ney's Memoirs, which have an appendix with lengthy discussion of brigade tactics; and Baron Meunier's Evolutions par Brigades…"

(I have reason to believe from personal correspondence that George himself did not recognize the role of the regulating battalion or its wargame implications, but he could describe the movements of battalions within brigades, just as in his battalion descriptions he could show the reader where the companies moved in battalion evolutions, using Ney's appendix on the subject.)

Most of the 20 pages in this book, though, is just a section from a French General Meunier (whose essay about his suggested method of such maneuvers is for sale from George Nafziger's site) and then a reprint of the appendix pages from Marshal Ney's essay on the same topic.

(So you can see why the VLB site had to delve into the drill books themselves to figure out regulating battalions and how they relate to a general's job description. Only George Jeffrey's book and rules, Art Pendragon's own research, and the original Drill books themselves showed that this was really evolutions of "The Line" which was a subject that included brigades and division movements. Our discussions on the subject brought us to realize that there were implications for command and control and for how a large battle operated in the regulations of "The Line", too.)

There are some well-known books in English such as Quimby's The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, where movements of "The Line" are briefly described, but really not in a nuts-and-bolts way that a wargamer would want so he could figure out how command and control worked. With more of the world's books coming online via Google books there may be more English-language titles available that deal with the subject; though those may be more likely to be drill commentaries than anything else.

BTW, I hope I do not come off as a know-it-all who claims to have all knowledge. My intention in going into such detail is because I am of the school that thinks that there are still some insights that can be gained for wargaming by looking into certain areas that may not at first glance look promising – even drill books! That is not to say a drill book is necessarily useful for a game just because it is a drillbook but by the same token it should not be dismissed just because it is a "drillbook". It is just another resource which, when combined with other historical information, can lead to new perspectives and new information. Wargamers will still have to take such information and decide if it can or should be applied to their own game.

Bottom Dollar,

If you go to the Google Books site you can download the British Rules and Regulations or just read them on the site at:
link

You probably do not want to get into the detailed drill sections, but take a look at page 344 and a few pages after that, which is a couple of pages preceding the actual "drill" of movements of the Line. There you will see some "overview" instructions about regulating battalions and how the commander of that Line (that is, the brigadier or Divisional general) should be with the regulating unit. It also mentions left, right, or even when it is good to regulate from the center. While historical generals may have on occasion left those "prescribed" locations, I think it is fair to say that these would be, at least, the "default setting" for a general's location in a large-scale engagement.

NZ wrote
If you go to the Google Books site you can download the British Rules and Regulations or just read them on the site at: link You probably do not want to get into the detailed drill sections, but take a look at page 344 and a few pages after that, which is a couple of pages preceding the actual "drill" of movements of the Line. There you will see some "overview" instructions about regulating battalions and how the commander of that Line (that is, the brigadier or Divisional general) should be with the regulating unit. It also mentions left, right, or even when it is good to regulate from the center. While historical generals may have on occasion left those "prescribed" locations, I think it is fair to say that these would be, at least, the "default setting" for a general's location in a large-scale engagement.

I'm getting fast and furiously. Being the hedgehog I am, rather than the fox, I'm having trouble keeping up.

A free book is currently being downloaded. What a great find. Feels a bit like Christmas. Thanks for the link !

Here's my response to your earlier post.

NZ wrote:
that the ideas of regulating battalions and their implications for wargaming became clear. (And where I rediscovered that George Jeffrey had been trying to tell us that in his 1982 book). Guys like Trajanus and Mike Collins used that VLB site discussion to formulate regulating battalion rules for themselves, and guys like TheScotsman learned many of the details.

First of all, thank you, for the wealth of information !

Second, I'd be interested to know how people use the regulating battalion as a replacement for command and control, at least at the brigade level ? Or do they use it more as a brigade movement mechanism, rather than one for brigade command and control ?

What if you're regulating battalion turns tail and runs ? Worse, what if the other half of your brigade is in a wood or otherwise out-of-LOS from the other half ? Also, if your brigade commander is permitted to be places other than with the regulating battalion 95% of the time, wouldn't it still make sense for a brigade commander to exert a direct command radius ?

Third, I'd also be interested to know how General de Brigade uses command radii. More to the point, I would be interested in reading those rules. On to the shopping list it goes.

Fourth, it would appear from everything I've gathered from you gentleman today, that the regulating battalion concept was a very important one to Napoleonic brigade tactics. I'd hazard a guess that every regiment in an experienced brigade knew how to be one and what to do when following one--whether the regulating battalion was on the left, right.. or center?. As this permitted the brigade commander to be doing things like situational awareness, studying what the enemy was doing and riding around and amongst his troops, I think to some extent it validates how C.R. is used in JR III. The player might not be going through the game mechanic of implementing a more historical regulating battalion concept, but in many ways it works out to very nearly same thing I think… even more so b/c it's a different era. Of course, in a table top game of tactical Napoleonics, where the maintenance of closed order brigade level formations was more important and their varieties more numerous, you guys have made a very strong case for its implementation in some form.

Bottom Dollar:
There are a lot of things that a brigade commander could do, and did do on the battlefield. I was focused on the question of how the brigadier exercised command control over his brigade--the basic mechanisms and his location.

Obviously, as in the examples I gave, things did go wrong, and there were a number of things brigadiers did about them. Rules for such things would be very simple to devise.

So, as long as a brigade's battalions were in alignment, the brigade would continue on in formation until the brigadier changed direction or formation--or combat created breaks. If the brigadier did go to a particular spot in his line to correct or influence a particular situation, he then was 'out of command' in a very real sense and the brigade was on autopilot until he returned. He might not have to be back for some time, or he might need to remain there. Hood was pushing his division in unplanned for directions [hence Kershaw's problem with keeping in contact], swinging Laws and the rest of the division farther east than intended by Lee's orders. Of course, Hood recognized that Lee's orders were outdated and didn't match the circumstances.

As for the ACW. What kind of evidence would you find convincing concerning battle array and regulating units?

Shane wrote:
What most of us are talking about is the communication and relaying of orders "between" the various levels of the chain of command, not "the" individual commands.

Shane:
Really? So how does a command radius for a brigade or division show this in regards to how commands were communicated?

How does a command radius of a division or brigade demonstrate the relaying of orders between various levels of commands? What, within a division or brigade or between corps and divisions? From reading your posts, you were talking about brigade and divisions as well as corps and armies.

The closest thing a division or brigade had in the way of being 'in command radius' was when the commander was with the regulating brigade. The closest thing to being 'out of command' was when the brigadier or divisional commander were NOT with the regulating brigade, or the commands units became misaligned or separated--and that could happen at any distance.

If you are saying that a command radius somehow replicates these dynamics, then yes, I certainly am trying to 'discredit' the idea. If you are talking about 'activation and initiative', then that is another issue altogether and certainly not one I have addressed, or one you brought up in your first posts.

Scotsman wrote: "Hood did the same thing on the second day of Gettysburg. He was with his regulating brigade, Laws, and directed his division from that point. When he is wounded, Laws as the senior brigade officer, takes over, and surprise—he is in the position to continue directing the division."

I have to call you on this one. Hood had just left Robertson's Texas Brigade and ridden to an orchard (which one is not known, but probably near the center of his division) when he was wounded. He was definitely NOT with Law's Brigade at the time. Harry Pfanz, in Gettysburg: The Second Day, says it is not known when or where Law learned that he was in command of the division but that subordinate officers learned of it very late, and that he never appointed anyone to succeed him in command of his own brigade that day. Pfanz adds, "Evidence of Law's work as a division commander is scanty, almost too sparse to support a judgment about it. And yet extant information suggests that his control of the division as a whole that afternoon was not very active and strong." (p. 173) Law certainly was not at the right end of his line, where Col. Wm. Oates' 15th Alabama fought Joshua Chamberlain's 20th Maine. (Oates was at the top of Big Round Top when a staff officer advised him that Hood had been wounded and that Law was now in command and insisted that Oates advance and take Little Round Top.)

Bob wrote:
>>>>"In NBs the brigadier can be anywhere within the parameters defined by the units in the brigade. Even with the guiding or controlling battalion if you like."<<<<

Bob:
That's nice, but we were talking about how command radius rules represented aspects of command control, not where I like to place the brigadier.

>>>>>On the grand tactical battlefield your concern for such detail is merely a minor cog that automatically occurs. Its called doctrine.<<<<<

This is an odd statement considering your first post spent time discussing the purpose of command radii for brigades and divisions. Now they are mere cogs? So NB doesn't have command radius rules for any commands lower than a Corps?

>>>>Certainly when Napoleon or Wellington viewed a battlefield the last thing they were thinking of was controlling or guide battalions.>>>

Actually, Napoleon laid out Soult's deployment battalion by battalion the night before Austerlitz, and Wellington did the same in the days before Salamanca while Marmont and tried to outrace each other.

But as command radius is supposed to portray how brigades and divisions were controlled internally, not by Corps commanders, I am at a loss to understand your statement:

>>>So, why should we burden the gamer with things his historical counterpart isn't?<<<<<

>>>>If you want to play rules which emphasize process to the detriment of outcome, and some do, then be my guest.<<<<

The determent to outcome? First of all, games ARE process, and supposedly that is why they are played--Challenges are process, outcomes are the results of meeting those challenges. If you want to emphasize outcome, have one table for the battle of Waterloo, 60% chance of the Allies winning and roll a die. Very realistic outcome.

We are still talking about what command radii represent, remember? Guibert says some interesting things about grouping troops and Foy did say that brigadiers controlled by voice--and they certainly weren't shouting at the end of the brigade three hundred yards away. If he did control by voice, should the command radius be the range of a man's voice--in the midst of battle?

Bob C. wrote:

"…Foy wrote brigadiers commanded by voice. He did not write about controlling battalions because they were part of doctrine and, thus, it was not necessary to refer to them…"

NZ: The same goes for the positions the brigadiers were, by doctrine, expected to be in, and even the content of many of their verbal orders which he used to make sure the brigade was doing what he wanted. If a designer wants to push brigades around according to doctrine, then to be consistent he should recognize that the brigadier was part of that doctrine and therefore less likely to be splitting off battalions or even paying attention to enemy actions that were not directly facing or interfering with his work.

"In any event Chefs de battalion were perfectly capable of following a line of advance staked out by staff officers and aides from division or corps without the constant presence of the brigadier.

NZ: Especially in long lines, with intervals between battalions, I think different ground, obstacles, etc made such movement difficult as part of a group. If you are saying each battalion, if left to move his battalion on his own,could steer it to its own best advantage, I may not argue. But if they are to change when the Brigadier wants them to change direction, or if they are to maintain a particular place in the Line where the Brigadier wants them, they can easily end up out of position without a regulating battalion and a brigadier to make sure the regulating battalion is doing what he wants.

" Guibert wrote formations tended to bunch together, eliminating deployment distances, as men bunched together in battalions till there were a dozen ranks hiding behind the front rank. Its called the evil of bunching."

NZ: Is there a particular context to his remark – that is are we talking here of being in an advancing movement, or perhaps in a tactical engagement under musket fire?

"On the grand tactical battlefield your concern for such detail is merely a minor cog that automatically occurs. Its called doctrine."

NZ: That's OK with me to subsume brigadiers and at times even divisional generals into doctrine. However, I would then see it as a logical corollary that there would also then be a lot less reason to have to allow those generals individual "initiative" or detachment of lower-level units. A lot depends on the designer's intent as to which command level he wishes to portray, or which General he expects a player to represent. It also means identifying if a General is doing something that is part of SOP (perhaps when he is advancing with his brigade across the valley under orders of his superior officer) or if he is in a position where he is free of SOP duties and is instead reacting to enemy actions on his own authority.
This is where definitions of "command" and "control" and chain of command come in also – did SOP allow enough flexibility to, say, brigadiers, to take their brigades places independently or not? The answer to that depends on one's interpretation of what generals were doing on the field at any one time. Were they busy scanning for enemy threats and reacting to them, or did they have their hands full carrying out their superior officer's orders and minding their OWN business – and assuming that their superior officer or other brigadiers to their right or left or rear would take care of those threats?

"Certainly when Napoleon or Wellington viewed a battlefield the last thing they were thinking of was controlling or guide battalions."

Well, that is true, but if I remember rightly, at Waterloo it was specifically noted, then changed in the orders as to whether or not the main attack would begin from the right or from the left. Additionally, I don't think anyone on this thread stated that Napoleon or Wellington would be concerned with regulating battalions. So I think that comment doesn't apply here UNLESS each side has only one player, and that player is Napoleon or Wellington, and the rules only involve Army Level orders.

Don L. wrote:
>>>>Scotsman wrote: "Hood did the same thing on the second day of Gettysburg. He was with his regulating brigade, Laws, and directed his division from that point. When he is wounded, Laws as the senior brigade officer, takes over, and surprise—he is in the position to continue directing the division."<<<<<

>>>>I have to call you on this one. Hood had just left Robertson's Texas Brigade and ridden to an orchard (which one is not known, but probably near the center of his division) when he was wounded. He was definitely NOT with Law's Brigade at the time.<<<<

Don:
You are absolutely right. Those two sentences were unclear. I was simply pointing out that the system had the senior Brigadier Laws, in the right place to resume command. Hood had indeed ridden from Laws to Robertson because of problems the brigade was encountering--the gap appearing between Laws and Robertson east of Devil's Den, and was returning when wounded--someplace around that gap.

Obviously, Laws did not have to do much to direct the division if he was still controlling the regulating brigade, but by that time Laws came to command he had, at Hood's urging, moved directly against the Little Round Top and the division's brigades were unhinged--losing contact with Robertson, which lost much of any control Laws might have had without direct intervention--he never appeared, as you point out. That is what I gather from the Brigade after action reports.

TheScotsman,

I do not know how many times I can say it, my idea of command radius has NOTHING to do with being in or out of command, it has everything to do with time & motioon = distance =number of turns before Order Activation rolls can commense…

I don't know how much plainer or clearer I can say it. Others here might use a command radius for other reasons but for me and my own designed rules it is all about relaying of orders and the possibility of extended delay in acual activations, nothing more, nothing less. Why can you not see what I am saying?

I have a question for you know : You spend a great deal of time here trying to discredit me in particular regarding the vailidy of using CR's what I want to know is, what gives you the credibility or credentials to do so? A couple of my fellow gamers in my group want to know, so do I.

Shane

Bottom Dollar wrote:
"this permitted the brigade commander to be doing things like situational awareness, studying what the enemy was doing and riding around and amongst his troops"

My impression from reading about the subject is the opposite – the Brigadier (at least when his brigade was on the move or changing formation) had his attention MOSTLY on his regulating battalion and other units in his brigade and making sure it was going where he wanted it to, and on the topography around it. Furthermore, if something was going on, like one of his units broke, became delayed, or had any kind of a crisis he had even more to do, perhaps dealing with that specific unit's situation and therefore being even less able to react to enemy threats to his brigade or to any other local crises within his brigade.
*************************************************
On the topic of figuring out the time it took to pass orders through command levels, and if people want a simple mechanic, I suppose you could just assign a number of minutes to it, or perhaps a number plus a die roll. For example, just say it takes an order 5 minutes to pass through each level of the chain of command. Or maybe it takes 5 minutes plus a die roll, resulting in 6-11 minutes for each level before it comes into effect. I do not have any historical justification for those numbers, I'm just saying that if all one wants is a simple mechanic, that one might work.

You could design a Dispatch rider table where the distance is measured, "as the crow flies" and assign a time factor to it as Ned says which is adjusted for such things as terrain considerations, weather conditions, chance mishaps and so on. The resulting table will give you a time factor as to when the order arrives if at all.

But this is exactly what CR's and Activation rolls are for in my own rules. I have tried to explain this to TheScotsman but he keeps missing the point.

Shane

If you want to play rules which emphasize process to the detriment of outcome . . .

Personally, I prefer games that use a well-simulated and historically convincing process to achieve a well-simulated and historically convincing outcome. I enjoy a game more when events which resemble historical events happen for reasons that resemble historical reasons.

No one has ever adequately explained to me why the two would necessarily be mutually exclusive; in fact, I doubt that they are easily separable. Still, many game designers seem to be capable of it.

Thescotsman
>>>>>The closest thing a division or brigade had in the way of being 'in command radius' was when the commander was with the regulating brigade. The closest thing to being 'out of command' was when the brigadier or divisional commander were NOT with the regulating brigade, or the commands units became misaligned or separated--and that could happen at any distance.<<<<<

Mate, I am in no way trying to say this, why do you persist in thinking I am. I am talking about time & motion = distance = time delay in relaying orders and nothing else…why can you not understand me?

TheScotsman
>>>>>If you are talking about 'activation and initiative', then that is another issue altogether and certainly not one I have addressed, or one you brought up in your first posts.<<<<<

Does this finally mean you are beginning to understand my meaning of the CR as I play it ? If not, please re-read my post above.

The Scotsman wrote:
"As for the ACW. What kind of evidence would you find convincing concerning battle array and regulating units?"

After endorsing Don Lowry's assessment of where Hood and Law were or were not, I would add there is no evidence that Kershaw's Brigade was using Benning's Brigade or any brigade in Hood's Division as a regulating unit and that is not to argue that Benning did not advance with Kershaw. I also think it within the realm of possibility that Benning regulated his advance TO Kershaw. Either way, neither brigade commander--from separate divisions--refers to regulating their advance with the other.

Kershaw wheeled two regiments towards the Peach Orchard b/c the tactical situation demanded it given the fact that the orders which instructed Kershaw to attack down the Emmittsburg Road as the rightmost regulating brigade in the 1st Corps attack were for all intents and purposes, null and void, just as soon as Hood's Division passed even farther to his right. Apparently, no one needed to tell Kershaw he was no longer the right-most unit in the attack. And Kershaw's two left-most regiments drifted into Barksdale's command radius because Kershaw found himself in a conflicting tactical situation, not b/c he found himself with "conflicting orders." That said, I do see some evidence for the use of the regulating battalion concept WITHIN Kershaw's Brigade, if not between Hood's and McLaws' Brigades.

All of which is to describe very fluid situations, where the mechanistic employment of regulating battalion procedures would appear--without any further explanation--to be unrealistic beyond the brigade level and even here would demand a complexity equal to CR. In short, yes, I agree, the regulating battalion concept was present in the ACW, but I've seen no evidence produced that it should be ascribed the preponderance of power you seem to be advocating for it, especially when no details are provided as to how it might be employed or would serve as an alternative to CR.

The Scotsman,

I will reply to two points.

First: The night before Salamanca, Wellington's only concern was retreating back to Portugal and if Marmont hand not screwed up that's exactly what he would have done. For a man whose order were so matter of fact, move your division forward and drive the French or better, move your division forward. What the commander asked how, he responded anyway but move them forward.

Second: There are process oriented wargames, where designers just have to show everything, such a the precise location of brigadiers and outcome oriented games where designers are only interested in the brigade moving, not how it moves. Process oriented gamers take joy in showing how things occurred rather than the effects of what occurred. Outcome oriented gamers are more interested in the results rather than how they were achieved. A good example is that outcome oriented gamers are satisfied to roll the die for the effects of artillery fire, assuming the gunners were using the most effective type of round. Process gamers just have to make the decision regarding the type of ammunition used and need see the differing effects of the various types.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Scotsman

I accept your points, but if we accept that time, distance & speed are 'givens' (they are after all mathematical formulae), if we accept that the organisational structure of armies are known and understood and if we accept that the command structure and channels of communication are known, then what we are left with is determining how variations from those 'normal' criteria influence our game.

Most rule writers accept that weather conditions, terrain, battlefield influences, training, morale,etc. all having an impact on those 'norms',be they positive or negative. Equally the representation of specific historical personalities is a variable that has to be accounted for if you are factor that into the rules.

My point (which I obviously did not make clear) is that I think we now see a shift in focus of command and control in rules that moves away from what I would call mechanistic command and control to a method that emphasises the ability (or lack of it) of individual commanders to work within the framework of comand and control that you so clearly set out. How this change of emphasis is represented is and must be subjective on the part of the writer no matter how good or bad their research is. I would also suggest that if this is not the intended emphasis, then it would be a waste of time including lists of generals and their assumed ability in command and control within the rules. We would then be the commanders ourselves and I would suggest the command and control rules may have to be rigid and incorporate many penalties on non-compliance. After all non of us will face court martial, demotion or be shot at dawn (although we may lose a lot of friends!).

That emphasis is not in my view intended to change the fundamentals that you describe, but as I originally said is to try to simulate how EFFECTIVE certain commanders were in making use of the structures and methods of command, control and communication with which we believe they were completely familiar and fully understood.

This then breaks the question into two parts; Are the mechanics of various structural norms well represented on the table? Are the interpretations of how well individual commanders applied those 'norms' reasonable?

Finally, many of the points made refer to specific incidents in specific engagements as illustration. I am not sure that this really helps the arguments one way or the other. Invariably they represent exceptions from the norm, but we must not forget that wargame rules are intended to be all things to all men (or gamers) and to represent what we believe happened in the majority of situations under average conditions. The individual examples quoted would be those in specific scenarios for which the rule writer may well create 'special' rules to enable those things to happen. In doing so, he then turns the random variables that influence command and control into specifics for that particular game. Those variables in the generic rules are usually covered as exceptions with only a small chance of occurring.

Regards

Pete

Chad47 wrote in part:

"If research suggests that General A was an extremely able individual, with able commanders beneath him and with well trained troops, then it does not seem unreasonable that he ould be able to exert EFFECTIVE over a large area. This compared with General B, who is a buffoon, with poor subordinates and badly trained troops, who can only achive a similar level of effectiveness over a smaller area. The Command Radius then becomes a Command EFFECTIVENESS Radius, only part of which is determined by time and distance"

This is true, but more important are the quality of the decisions and the speed at which they can be implemented and carried out. The first part is hard to work into a wargame- maybe stupid pills would work, or some chance that one of several sub-units would do the wrong thing. The second (speed) can be mimiced by a chance for delay in execution.

Thank you Scotsman, re. the subject of the positioning of divisional generals!

I think everyone is agreeing that at the battalion and brigade level, the officers are pretty much in immediate control of their troops by means of "regulating units", drum, flag or personal meetings. Also that independant action by such a level, which is in responce to strategic information is unrealistic by virtue of the fact that these decisions and actions are made by higher level command levels, who have the information and authority.

I have a problem; however, with the instantaeous transmission of orders by higher level (say division/corp) command levels. New information on the success of part of a battle, or the appearance of new enemy units must have some delay in reaching the decision maker.
(a) It has to be appreciated at the point of observation.
(b) It has to be reduced to an intelligable form and
(c) memorized beyond corrubability or written down.
(d) It has to be transmitted by a couirer successfully (no horse throwing a shoe, no Cossack adventurer, no lost in smoke etc.).
(e) It has to find the right officer and get his attention
(f) It has to be understood and evaluated against other information.
(g) It has to be worked into the overall stragegy
(h) It has to be reduced to a set of orders for lower formations that is also properly coordinated,
ALL THESE 8 plus ARE BEFORE THE ORDER IS WRITTEN!!!
(i,j,k,l,m) ride order to sub'unit, find commander, comphrend order, decide on method of execution, order execution, THEN execute order by units.

I am sorry, but most everyone is ignoring the 8 plus steps which have to happen in reality before the 200foot general issues his order, let alone adding a real delay time to account for steps (i to m). If someone is using a ControlRadius that overlaps the Divisional General with the brigade, then all this happens in a split second. I do not see a way to mimmic the flow of info to the Divisional General, however a required turn delay before his issuing the order might be representative. A required delay in transmission and execution of the order to the brigade is also sensible.

One very good impact of this on the wargame, is that local reserves become useful (they are controlled by the lower command level), surprises become not only possible but EFFECTIVE and players have to plan better and more conservatively, which reduces guided missile behavior.

Pete wrote :
>>>>>Finally, many of the points made refer to specific incidents in specific engagements as illustration. I am not sure that this really helps the arguments one way or the other. Invariably they represent exceptions from the norm<<<<<

My response is going to be long winded, for this I do apologise in advance.

This could not be truer, what you have to understand is that battles are made up of many parts, a beginning, a middle and an end. Within a battle are usually high periods of great intensity followed by low periods of lulls and relative quiet. Great activity and minor activity or no activity. Action and inaction. These peaks and dips of a battle will rage on for X amount of time all the time recording events and happenings within that only those involved know and understand what happened. No one participant can tell you all of what happened but only the parts they were involved in. Many participants will be able to give you a description of the overall events as they occurred during the entire battle but usually in more vague descriptions because they were removed from each event by space and were mere spectators due to their distance from the individual situations they might have witnessed.

When you get accounts of battles described you can get very colourful descriptions of the actions all varying to some degree as to the accuracy of the re-telling of the event. Sometimes the description is even exaggerated out of all proportion to what happened or, to the other extreme, re-told in a very matter of fact way with little emphasis of its importance. National bias creeps in, validity of actual truth might slip or self absorption might cloud a persons re-telling of their involvement in the action. Outright lies might also find their way in to the story in order to keep the truth from being known. But even with all this in mind the reader gets a picture of the overall events and makes up his or her own mind.

Taking all of the above into account and finding validity in the truth and accuracy of the events is not the full story however, there is more to it, the actually telling of the story itself and the way it is written. If one was to be able to actually capture every event of a battle, each moment and involvement of every participant with 100% accuracy and validity and be able to re-tell it with 100% accuracy the story would make for a very different context and structure to what we, as readers are used to.

If an author is writing a story or narrative of a battle he will sift through massive amounts of eyewitness accounts, descriptions and previous work of others before him. He will even be able to take notes from actual participants who were there if lucky enough and gain, hopefully a clear picture of just what happened in several events within the battle. But what he might miss is data regarding certain sections of the battle which resource material was vague, sparse or non-existent in his research. He has to skip over these sections of the battle or re-tell it from a fairly removed aspect which might take very little paper space in his book.

Couple this with no need to describe the lulls or periods of inactivity in a battle that take up even less words in description and paper space and you have a very minor percentage of the overall length of the narration of a battle written to relay to the reader parts of the battle that might have actually taken up a huge percentage of the actual battle's length.

My meaning is this, if a battle could be captured 100% accurately with "every" event and happening recorded down to the very smallest detail this information would make for a very different telling of the battle than we are used to reading. If the events and non-events of a battle make up 100% of the story you could then break up the story and each minute part of that recording given equal validity and space with words between activity and non-activity you would have a completely different account and telling.

If the non-events of the record took up 60% of the words in the re-telling you would have 60% of the book re-telling of how quiet the fighting was and how the men stood there while waiting for the next period of chaos and bloody fighting. If this part of the book is devoted to the intensity of the activity periods then you would only have 40% of the books words and pages for the telling of all of these periods of activity and chaos.

But this is not how books are written, if they were then no one would read them, there is only so much time one can devote to describing these periods of relative inactivity because the descriptions of the chaotic parts of a battle needs a great deal more space so the reader gets a distorted view of how a battle is actually fought.

Sliding across to CR's now…

There is a saying in the army, hurry up and wait, this could not be truer in any army or military establishment around the world. Another description I know is 5% furious activity followed by 95% nothing or similar descriptions. These words are very telling of what I mean, in just a few words I have explained what happens in the non-activity periods of a battle which could take up most or huge chunks of real time in the overall length of a battle but a narator or author is not going to devote huge chunks of time or space (pages) in re-telling about these large periods of non-eventful passing of time. Instead he will devote all of his words and pages towards the description of the eventful periods with little space devoted to lulls in battle.

Even in the battle of Waterloo there was huge periods of relative inactivity within that battle in which authors simply skim over because there is nothing really to say. But those periods of relative inactivity could and did last for huge periods of time. Waterloo went for 10 hours, we all know that but if you research the battle you would find several periods where the antagonists did virtually nothing other than reform, re-align and get ready for the next clash while on other parts of the battlefield the action remained or continued on with heavy intensity.

It is during these periods of relative quiet that many of the bulk of the orders were sent out and committed to for the next rounds of fighting and action. It is this time that is spent by the ordinary soldier who can see dispatch riders racing about delivering orders back and forth from one command to another. They can observe the flury or activity in the upper commands while they do nothing more than reform, re-align, catch their breathe or gulp down some brandy to calm the nerves while off in the distance other forces are clashing with fury and carnage.

It is at this point where forces now regrouping are sent to a predetermined area of ground in which to form up or reform and face the enemy. This is when the commanders of the various levels of command are at their greatest activity, running around making sure each of their formations are formed up, aligned and in the right formations for the next period of intense fighting.

This is all the more important during the beginning of a battle where the upper command at each level deterine the exact starting points of each formation. Each level of command is assigned a certain space on the line of in the second line or in the reserve. As each formation is advanced to their marked out and allotted space each commander is told by the commander in the chain above where he is to form up his men. This can go on for a great deal of time and take up huge chunks of time in the overall time line of a battle.

Yes, there is no such thing as a command radius that these commanders worked to, the only tool they worked to in regards to area and length of distance was in knowing from above where they were to place their men in the line up and where the other formations were around them. They simply took up their allotted space in the line that was usually marked out for them or verbally given as descriptions such as, you will form up to the right of that village with your right flank touching that of the next division etc.

Each time a formation was allotted an area to form up from battle to battle the overall area might shrink or expand depending on the situation, the importance and the terrain etc. But essentially, the formation commander was given an allotted area relative to other formations around his.

Now, as I said, there was no such thing as a CR (command radius) for these formations, the area of ground selected for each formation was allotted for other important reasons as I have stated above, this is a given. However, all of these commanders, once they had formed up and were ready would look around them at the other formations within the chain of command. To look for support, depth, distance from each other and weak flanks, threats and many other things.

Now, once the formations are all formed up and ready each level of command within the chain of command would gaze across the allotted area at each formation under them to find their locations, who they are, and the distance away they are. An army commander needs to know where all of his Corps are. A corps commander needs to know where all of his divisions are. A Divisional Commander needs to know where all of his Brigades are. And a Brigadier needs to know where all of is units are. While this information is critical, especially for distance and location, each commander of each lateral formation wants to know where his supports are, i.e. a Brigadier needs to know who is on his left, who is on his right and how far away they are etc. The same goes for each tier up the chain of command. If it is noticed that a formation in the chain is exposed or in a location that is further away than the others this "can" become critical for timing and delay in support and a myriad of other factors.

This is where the game mechanic of the Command Radius comes into play for me, even if it is not a military term in is important to the actual commanders but known in other terms. Distance they are removed from the next in the chain of command up or down the links. Longer distance means longer time for order relay and the carrying out of orders. Each General becomes conscious of the length of distance he is from the next link in the chain and the possible critical loss of time.

A commander knows that when he writes an order it will take a certain amount of time expected before it reaches the intended recipient down the chain of command. He understands that a horse and rider can gallop only a certain distance in a given amount of time, this time becomes all the more critical as time ticks on, especially in periods of high intensity of fighting. He understands that the orders could be delayed for a number of reasons, the despatch rider gets lost, the carnage is so great that he is hindered from reaching his intended recipient in a certain length of time, terrain and weather comes into play and even smoke. But even more critical is the possibility that the intended recipient's actual location is not fully known, this becomes a nightmare for the dispatch rider who has to find him.

If you have ever been in your car and followed directions to an intended destination and had to resort to asking people to guide or direct you, you will know what I mean when I say that sometimes these well intended directions are not always correct. You make mistakes; you might even have to double back, turn left instead of right, double back and so on. The life of a dispatch rider was far from easy. Not only that but couple this with the danger of falling, resulting injury, capture and death and you have a very dangerous job description here. Once the orders finally arrive the situation might have changed or the intended commander even wounded or worse. It was not so easy as it is with radio or satellite communications these days, so much could go wrong, resulting in delays that could cost one side the battle.

All in all, order communication and the chain of command are very thin indeed and much can go wrong within each fine thread. This is why formations fought relatively closer than they do in today's warfare of advanced technology. If distance is vital between formations for communications and order relay then one would come to understand that there has to be a relationship between "Time", "Speed of Motion" and "Distance". A general of any period would understand this and take this into account in EVERY decision making process he ever makes either on the battlefield or leading up to it. All three words are critical for Time management purposes of a general's thought processes and the least delay or mishap can be the difference between life and death, winning or losing and so on.

This brings me to my whole point, the "Command Radius" or CR. It is nothing more than a length of distance radiating out from a commander towards other commanders in his chain of command. Some rules writers declare in is the distance that radiates out for his command span and controlling units within his own command but this is "NOT" my own reasoning for the CR. My meaning of the term is the distance of ground, "as the crow flies" between the links of the command levels for, "ORDER RELAY" and nothing else. The only point I add is that a unit caught outside of a Brigadier's CR is denied a +10% Morale modifier for being within 300yds of the commander of the formation and nothing else. This 300yds for being close to a commander within the chain of command is the same at every level in my rules and is purely a Morale thing, not a control rule or mechanism

The CR is nothing more than a thin thread calculated as a distance on the field equal to that of which a dispatch rider can travel in "EACH" turn and nothing more. If any one of those threads of distance between the various links of the chain of command is greater than the allotted distance of the CR then all that happens is that a delay will occur in order relay destination time, which is counted in combat turns. This is purely nothing more than a simple way to depict order relay without having to actually going so far as to place a despatch rider figure on the field. If the thread is long it means the rider had a longer distance to travel and that is it, pure and simple. It has nothing to do with using a CR as an internal artificial function within a command formation as some kind of controlling tool as TheScotsman thinks.

The CR I set in my system is 500yds for each turn which is the result of the formula I used in my, Time & Motion = Distance terminology. Every CR of every General of every tier of command in my rules has the same CR length (500yds). The only one that is different is the lowest level of General ship, that of the Brigadier. The Brigade CR being set at 300yds is solely for no other reason than to give a bonus +10% Morale when the Brigadier is within 300yds of each unit. That is all. It is a guide to let players know that if units are found outside the 300yds they are denied these units that bonus. Nothing in the rules stops or prevents a Brigadier from acting on a frontage or distance, or radius over 300yds. Forcing units to act and form only within the CR would be totally unrealistic and against any form of accurate justification on a battlefield for my mind. Formations did not have tethers attached to them like barking dogs that prevented them from freedom of movement or action so why would this be shown on the battlefield? I certainly would not play a system that does this.

In my system, if each command level is found to be within 500yds of each other, the order relay is unbroken, the delay from the issue of the orders to the act of rolling for the Activations is calculated as one turn delay per full 500yds over and above the first 500yds allowance the order travels and any part thereof's. So, if an order had to travel a total of 1350yds to its destination this would result in a delay of 2 whole turns. However, if just one part of the CR thread is as little as 1yd over the 500yd links then a delay of one turn results for each breach.

I will give an explanation of just how my CR rules work.

Hypothetically: It is 1pm – Napoleon wants to re-take a village that was just lost on his right flank in order to secure it so he can force the result in the centre. He orders General Gerard Depardieu (commander of 2nd Corps) to re-take it. The Dispatch rider he is given the direction of 2nd Corps takes the orders and off he goes. The distance to 2nd Corps HQ is 750yds away. So his ride takes more than one turn to arrive at 2nd Corps HQ. This means that already a delay of one turn has passed. General Gerard decides that he will commit is 1st Division to the task and sends an order quickly to General Jean Luke Picard of 1st Division who is 450yds to the front. Jean Luke knows the urgency of the order so he sends down another dispatch rider General Marcel Marso, commander of 2nd Brigade which is relatively still fresh due to inactivity for most of the day. This brigade is approximately 600yds to the right flank so the dispatch rider sets off to hand over the orders.

The time is now 1:45 pm, General Marso decides to commit his 57th Regiment of three battalions into the head of the attack followed by the three battalions of the 25th Ligne Regiment in support. The Orders are rolled for Activation based on his ability as a commander to carry out the task assigned to him. He has a very high CV rating of 6 which gives him a 5% chance to fail to carry out the orders in time which would cause further delays. General Marcel rolls a 27%, well above his failure rate and immediately activates his command. After an advance of about 800yds the attack begins and the village is taken in short order.

As you can see, there is noting at all about controlling issues within the command itself with activations other than to give a delay in turns for order activations due to Distance.

I hope what I have explained is clear and I do apologise for the long winded way I wrote it, it is in my nature to write in detail.

Regards,
Shane

In issuing orders, I am familiar with always writting an order, time stamping it and keeping a copy. The copy is partly to remember what was sent, partly CYA (cover your behind) and partly to help understand later, what had happened.

I know in ACW, orders were usually written and later argued over for decades. What was the protocal in Napoleonic armies? There were face to face conferences of many generals, face to face of two generals, written orders, verbal orders and hasty orders.

What was the general method for in battle orders between army and corp, corp and division, division to division, and division to brigade?

Don:

A little more on Hood at Gettysburg. I understand that Hood was wounded within something like 20 minutes of the opening of his division's advance, being hit in the arm by shrapnel from a shell exploding overhead.

From what I remember, Pfanz located it as occurring close to the Bushman farm. My impression is that that he was not wounded before being able to witness that Law's brigade was NOT wheeling in a manner that would have been entirely consistent with keeping Robertson's left flank close to the Emmitsburg Road, [this is before it became Kershaw's problem] and I believe that he would have been able to note that Robertson's brigade was already separating into two wings.

it may well be that he was wounded early enough in the attack not yet to have had an opportunity to decide to act in a way that would have corrected the developing problem. He would have had to have seen and recognized it first as a problem before deciding what could be done to rectify it.

It is a good example of what kinds of problems would compel a divisional commander to move from the regulating brigade to correct it. Either he received a report from Robertson or could conclude from Laws' movements that Robertson's brigade was losing alignment and splitting into two wings. Hood's wide stab east contrary to orders unhinged the entire corps to some degree, causing alignment problems with both divisions.

Horse Speeds

Walk: 20 to 15 minutes a mile
Trot: 8 to 6 minutes a mile
Canter/lope: 6 to 3 minutes a mile
Gallop: 3 to 2 minutes a mile
Cross-country Equestrian (US intermediate): 550m/minute, ~ 4 minutes/mile

The cross country equestrian consists largely of a slow gallop between 30 to 40 jumps, and trotting over distance with some canter and jumps. It really is meant to test for officer-courier performance. You might use this rate for open terrian and gallop for movement on road.

Bottom Dollar,
If you don't have Nafziger's Imperial Bayonets but you wish to see what Ney wrote about large formation movements, go to Google Books and download volume 2 of Ney's Memoirs at:
link
Volume I is also available at Google books.

– Ned

Bottom Dollar,
I forgot to mention that you might also like Ney's "Military Studies" at:
link

- Ned

Ned, thanks for more free books !

Jim

NedZed wrote:
My impression from reading about the subject is the opposite – the Brigadier (at least when his brigade was on the move or changing formation) had his attention MOSTLY on his regulating battalion and other units in his brigade and making sure it was going where he wanted it to, and on the topography around it. Furthermore, if something was going on, like one of his units broke, became delayed, or had any kind of a crisis he had even more to do, perhaps dealing with that specific unit's situation and therefore being even less able to react to enemy threats to his brigade or to any other local crises within his brigade.

This impression leaves me in the same mechanical quandary as I presented it to the Scotsman, i.e. the brigade and division commander becomes subsumed within the regulating battalion while on the move. Moreover, with the complete absence of a command radius--as has been strongly suggested by regulating battalion proponents--when not on the move, the table top brigade or divisional commander is relegated to an even greater functional irrelevancy. The command radius mechanic allows for--or better yet, stands in for-- a coalition of decision making that has already occurred in a compound unit. It is the established traditions and techniques by which soldiers and officers communicate with one another on the field of battle. These ought to have been well drilled into trained and experienced troops as if 2nd Nature, prior to their representation on our table top and therefore that is why CR is something of a table top abstraction, rather than a little miniature messenger scurrying around so and so inches per turn OR merely a procedural inquiry into the spatial relationship between units and formations.

>"… most everyone is ignoring the 8 plus steps which have to happen in reality before the 200foot general issues his order…"<

At last someone understands what I've been trying to interject into this discussion! We, as players, can take all the time we want. The lead/pewter/plastic figures just stand there and wait for us. But the general on the field had to work in real time. It's like the difference between a turn-based computer game and a real-time computer game. While you're thinking, stuff happens!

>"Hood's wide stab east contrary to orders unhinged the entire corps to some degree, causing alignment problems with both divisions."<

Yes, Hood went against Lee's desire for an attack up the Emmitsburg Road to Cemetery Hill by heading east -- even tho Longstreet had told him not to (or so Longstreet later claimed). And he did it because the Union left flank was not where Lee thought it was -- which was, in part, due to Sickle's disobedience of the "spirit" of Meade's order about where his corps should be. So one side's deviation from its plan led to the other side's deviation from its plan.

BTW, the only reference I now recall to the use of a directing or regulating brigade in the ACW (admittedly, I haven't been looking for one) was Col. Fry's belief that his brigade (formerly Archer's) was the directing brigade for "Pickett's Charge" -- a belief that wasn't necessarily shared by other brigades and divisions. (He was in Heth's/Pettigrew's Division.) As for a directing battalion/regiment, I don't recall ever seeing one mentioned in all the ACW literature I've read over the last half-century or so -- but, again, I wasn't looking for such.

Bottom Dollar wrote: [And this could be a response to Shane's last post]

>>>>>The command radius mechanic allows for--or better yet, stands in for-- a coalition of decision making that has already occurred in a compound unit. It is the established traditions and techniques by which soldiers and officers communicate with one another on the field of battle. These ought to have been well drilled into trained and experienced troops as if 2nd Nature, prior to their representation on our table top and therefore that is why CR is something of a table top abstraction, rather than a little miniature messenger scurrying around so and so inches per turn OR merely a procedural inquiry into the spatial relationship between units and formations.<<<<<

BD:
I have no problem with abstractions. The questions are whether this CR presents players with the command restrictions, challenges and options of, in this case a divisional commander, regardless of how it is abstracted.

First, fundamental command control at the divisional level had nothing to do with the distance a horse could ride--it wasn't dependent on it. Second, the processes I described WERE "the established traditions and techniques by which soldiers and officers communicate with one another on the field of battle."

When things went wonky, the majority of the problems were a result of a loss of alignment, not lost orders or being too far away. When a divisional commander did respond to those problems, he removed himself from the pilot's seat to fix the engine. Thus, a figure representing a Divisional commander could be very important. He would either be with the regulating brigade, so the player could direct the division, or with the division on autopilot [and the attendant consequences], he would be fixing the alignment someplace along his line requiring ---no more than a 4 minute trip.

So the basic dynamic for command control is a steering unit on the right. [or sometimes the left or center [Divisional commander's choice, though right was chosen at least 80% of the time as far as I can see, and rarely changed during a day of battle.]

The major failure of command control had little to do with the actual distance from the commander, but rather the ability of the division's brigades to stay aligned during movement and battle. And that could happen anywhere. Distance was not the 'controlling' factor that CR suggests. Control was dependent on the actual communication through the alignment and what the Commander could see himself or reach himself.

The military men of the time were quite aware of the time=distance ratios offered by horse and foot travel, as well as the problems interpreting written or even spoken orders.

So, the communication processes used by brigades, divisions AND corps [yes, there were regulating divisions too, and guess where corps commanders would often be…, particularly at the start of any corps movement.] assumed as much into the SOP as possible. [i.e training, doctrine, experience, traditions etc. etc.]

During large movements on campaign, you would see a flurries of dozens and dozens of orders to widely dispersed commands of all sizes from army and corps, down to brigade commands. However, on the day of battle, it was quite different, particularly after the initial orders were delivered--usually BEFORE the battle began.

An army commander would have maybe five or six corps to write orders for, a Corps commander, say four divisions, a Divisional commander, maybe four to six brigades, and the same for a brigade commander. They often find it unnecessary to issue any more orders during the battle, unless or because something changed on the battlefield.

For instance, two hours past from the beginning of Austerlitz before Napoleon issued any orders. He probably issues four during the actual battle. The flurry came at the end when he began directing the pursuit. Wellington spoke to his divisional commanders at the beginning of Salamanca, and then provided little direction until the French were beginning to retreat and Frey's division stood in the way.

During Novi, in 1799, the Allied general Suvorov slept for a good part of the morning among his general officers, according to Bragration, who himself felt free to leave his command, as did several others, and ride off to see what Sovorov wanted done [Having carried out the preliminary engagements and having not heard from the CinC.] Only when Suvorov heard the reports he was waiting for [laying on the ground with his eyes closed] did he jump up and issue verbal orders, which were essentially 'attack.'

Wellington felt it was better to go from division to division and tell his officers what he wanted rather than write orders. Regardless of how you interpret or size a CR, Wellington would have purposely left his commands out of command radius for a better part of the battle--in game terms--and then they would have remained out of command for much of the battle of Salamanca. In fact, other than a few instances, no one knows where he is or what he was doing.

At Bautzen, Oudinot sent three messages to Napoleon during the entire second day. Napoleon sent two, very short messages back. Oudinot had control of a third of Napoleon's army.

The same dynamic is true of corps commanders--few necessary communications to a limited number of commands. [3 to 6--that is not some arbitrary number, as it generally holds true for brigades, divisions and corps, and several organizations of battalions]

Often going to the subordinate officers was just as prudent as keeping within some distance for the sake of couriers. All I have heard is that a command radius represents the distance a horse could go in a game turn. Stay in that radius or bad things happen.

That simply isn't a relationship, abstractly or not, that you see in Napoleonic battle. Abstractly, keeping all units aligned with each other was the basic mechanism of command control, based on tradition etc. and the number one command control failure [those bad things happening] remained when that alignment was broken--whatever mechanisms you want to portray it with. Commanders issued few orders during an hour's time, particularly written orders, and when they did is was to no more than six subordinates and most often at the beginning of a battle. Even in a crisis situation, the number of orders needed to be written were limited, unless the army and corps commanders decided, usually in emergency situations, to speak directly to divisional or brigade commanders. Often is was a matter of who was closest like Napier's requests of Moore at Coruna.

Military men of the time worked very hard to do two things with command control:

KEEP IT SIMPLE and AVOID THE KNOWN PITFALLS OF COMMUNICATION. They seem to have done an admirable job overall.

Drawing a circle around a figure and requiring units to stay within it to 'be in command' is like requiring infantry to go to square on the battlefield at averaged intervals because that's what infantry did. The result might be close to the number of times it happened in a battle, but it has nothing to do with the PROCESS, or the dynamics that led battalions to go to square. The same is true of Command radii. The results of command control systems may have led units to remain close to one another, but the actual reasons for that result, and the consequences of any failure to remain close aren't represented by CRs. You can abstract it anyway you want, but if the process has no relation to the way it was done historically, the result means little.

Abstractions in simulations are used to take many variables and reduce them to one or two mechanisms. Simulation abstractions rely on two things:
1. Capturing the relationships between the appropriate simulation components while limiting the number of details or variables, and
2. Providing the participants with the same relationship of circumstances, options, decisions, and results with the abstracted mechanism. [Note I said relationship, not numbers of…]

I would have no problem with Command Radius as an abstraction of any number of command factors if those two points were accomplished. They aren't.

Chad47

"Finally, many of the points made refer to specific incidents in specific engagements as illustration. I am not sure that this really helps the arguments one way or the other. Invariably they represent exceptions from the norm,"

Invariably – Not changing or subject to change; constant, every time, without exception, on every occasion etc.

So let me see, Scotsman gives a number of examples of Regulation in use and "Invariably" they do not represent "the norm".

What was "the norm"? Please tell me. Quote me some historic example of "the norm" or why the Scotsman examples do not represent it.

And please, do not quote some rule set back to me. Examples from the real world please, not how someone has chosen to represent it.

>>>>>Drawing a circle around a figure and requiring units to stay within it to 'be in command' is like requiring infantry to go to square on the battlefield at averaged intervals because that's what infantry did.<<<<<

And I keep telling you this is NOT what I use CR's for, they are for no other purpose than to show a "delay" is order relay due to the distances measured from commander to commander in each level of the chain of command. But you stubbonly persist in your assumption that we all use CR's as a controlling feature like herding cattle or something.

Let me make this perfectly clear, not all of us use CR's to herd units within a formation, for many of us a CR is for no other reason than to portray communication delays.

I will ask again, what credentials or credability do you have to insist that those of us who use CR's are wrong and that because you say so we are doing something very unmilitary in the way we play war games? I cannot understand how you can critisize something so persistantly without backing it up with informing us why you think you are so correct and we are so wrong?

Shane

Shane,

>>>>If distance is vital between formations for communications and order relay then one would come to understand that there has to be a relationship between "Time", "Speed of Motion" and "Distance"<<<<<

Yes thats true. The problem with CRs is that they assume this relationship is a constant, you have very ably listed a whole bunch of reasons why it can't be.

Hi Traj,

Yes, thank you for your understanding of this. What I did was to make the distance equal right across the board because it is simpler. The part where this is modified is when you actually start to roll for Activations. This part of the equaion is where I show when things can go wrong. The chance of failure increases due to distance, ability and many other factors that act like friction against the order getting through and being acted on. If the Activation roll fails then another turn is lost befor the Activation can be rolled for again.

It has nothing to do with herding units like sheep as TheScotsman persists in convincing us it does.

The Scotsman wrote:
"When things went wonky, the majority of the problems were a result of a loss of alignment, not lost orders or being too far away. When a divisional commander did respond to those problems, he removed himself from the pilot's seat to fix the engine. Thus, a figure representing a Divisional commander could be very important. He would either be with the regulating brigade, so the player could direct the division, or with the division on autopilot [and the attendant consequences], he would be fixing the alignment someplace along his line requiring ---no more than a 4 minute trip."

A division of four brigades is advancing against an enemy line. They are in line abreast with the right brigade serving as the regulating unit. The division commander is with that brigade. The left most brigade is headed directly for a sizable farm house--say a chateau--with its attendant buildings, walls, hedgerows, etc.. so that, even prior to coming into contact with the enemy line, some adjustment of the brigade line will have to be made to through that sector and that means a loss of some time. The question is, will the divisional line need fixing ? If so, how is it fixed ? What if the player controlling that division decides that time is of the essence and there won't be any slowing the advance of the other three brigades to "fix" or straighten the alignment and therefore, the 4th brigade will simply have to catch up as quickly as possible. What are your penalties to either the 4th brigade, the other three brigades or perhaps the division as whole ? If any ?

The Scotsman wrote:
"The major failure of command control had little to do with the actual distance from the commander, but rather the ability of the division's brigades to stay aligned during movement and battle. And that could happen anywhere. Distance was not the 'controlling' factor that CR suggests. Control was dependent on the actual communication through the alignment and what the Commander could see himself or reach himself. "

Those same four brigades have now passed the chateau, whether they've gotten themselves into alignment is moot, as the enemy is advancing against the left most brigade and attempting to envelope it. The 4th brigade is about to be heavily engaged, how does your division commander assess the situation ? What is the correct alignment now or how is it corrected or fixed ? What if your divisional commander thinks the 3rd Brigade can support the 4th in fending off the counter-attack, while the 1st and 2nd brigade plunge ahead into a thinned enemy line ? Can two regulating units be created the same brigade or division ? Is this possible under your system of regulating commands ? If so, how does you division commander go about accomplishing that task ?

The Scotsman wrote:
"Abstractly, keeping all units aligned with each other was the basic mechanism of command control, based on tradition etc. and the number one command control failure [those bad things happening] remained when that alignment was broken--whatever mechanisms you want to portray it with."

Aren't you in part, re-stating the obvious ? Don't most war games using linear tactics and grand tactics find ways of penalizing players who don't maintain the alignments of their brigades and divisions ? Like allowing opponents who keep closed up and organized, to do bad things to those who don‘t ?

The Scotsman wrote:
"Drawing a circle around a figure and requiring units to stay within it to 'be in command' is like requiring infantry to go to square on the battlefield at averaged intervals because that's what infantry did. The result might be close to the number of times it happened in a battle, but it has nothing to do with the PROCESS, or the dynamics that led battalions to go to square. The same is true of Command radii. The results of command control systems may have led units to remain close to one another, but the actual reasons for that result, and the consequences of any failure to remain close aren't represented by CRs. You can abstract it anyway you want, but if the process has no relation to the way it was done historically, the result means little. "

I detect that you have a bone to pick with your Napoleonic colleagues who have assigned rigid command radii to upper level corps and army commanders ?

I think Wkeyer identified it when he made the distinction between lower and upper levels of command. CR, abstractly speaking is readily applied to the lower… something else should or ought to be applied to the upper. Now I suspect that you're arguing this regulating battalion thing merely to argue against the way upper echelon command radii are used in some mainline Napoleonic systems, but at the same time your not entirely sincere about removing some kind of CR from all levels of play.

The Scotsman wrote:
"Abstractions in simulations are used to take many variables and reduce them to one or two mechanisms. Simulation abstractions rely on two things:
1. Capturing the relationships between the appropriate simulation components while limiting the number of details or variables, and
2. Providing the participants with the same relationship of circumstances, options, decisions, and results with the abstracted mechanism. [Note I said relationship, not numbers of…]
I would have no problem with Command Radius as an abstraction of any number of command factors if those two points were accomplished. They aren't."

At the brigade level, these two points are exactly what the three inter-operating levels of CR accomplish in Johnny Reb III. Divisions and Corps in JR III are always assumed to be in command and control.

Shane,

I don't see Scottsman arguing with the rules you wrote, I see him arguing with the concept of CR as many of us understand it. From what you've said so far it appears that your rules depend on a number of factors beyond the standard CR concept, thus, I have trouble figuring out where the argument between the two of you lies at this point.

Scottsman,

In short: yes.

Cheers,

The Bandit