"The "Command Radius"" Topic

Some systems force you to have reserves but by completely different methods.
I'm thinking of fire and fury particularly there.

There's an interesting side effect from the way fire causes suppression in sg2.
I've seen a number of games where a player got his sections spread out. They then advance one by one into view of the enemy, who are of course in good cover whilst those advancing are not.
So they then get defeated in detail because they are not supporting one another.

There is a benefit to the player who keeps his sections together ( within a radius defined more by movement ). When they send sections wandering off on their own they can't expect to re-activate them and they can be overwhelmed or aren't available to mass at the point of decision.

I often run the games with attack defence and the defender map deploys. The 200 foot general can't see anything on the table until it is encountered.

There is a benefit to the player who keeps his sections together

Thats what a CR does for a lower commander (as in Shako). Sure it is physically possible for him to order 1 battalion off to the opposite of the table BUT HE NEVER WOULD (okay there are some historical circumstances where commanders have, but for the most part they don't). Just because the 414* foot general wants it, doesn't mean that it should.

The point about poker is misleading- the fact is that cards have been played for centuries- the unwritten rules can stay unwritten because we all know them. If poker was being written now, and few people had any idea what it was ("Isn't that like that GW game- 'Cards'") the 'wargame equivalent' would be something like.
You may Call, Raise or Fold. You may not try to look at any opponents cards, or have a third party try to do so on on your behalf.

And at the first game you played someone would take two aces out of their top pocket because "the rules don't prohibit it"

The same with Wargame dice rolls- no rules tell you not to cheat the dice rolls, because we all know this- its an unwritten. I have been in a long, err, 'discussion' about who can form double line in F&F- The rules state Mounted Cavalry and Infantry. My opponent tried to argue dismounted cavalry could, despite not specifically mentioned- if infantry can, why not others on foot- and he isn't particulally the sort who squeazes the rules- I've decided grey areas on a dice throw with him before.

This isn't chess- 6 pieces regulated by a 8x8 board- every situation the same. This is trying to inject some form of realism into toy soldiers. You either micro manage every last detail, or accept that your sub generals will tend to stick by the book. If you allow individual sub units to be sent away, then you need to book-keep their orders, to ensure once where their CO can't order them they don't become some 'guided missile'

(*this is correct for 1/72)

what is "D&K's Napoleonic VLB"?

sorry, I'm just getting back into wargaming after retiring.

"what is "D&K's Napoleonic VLB"?"

"Napoleonic Rules for a Large Scale Wargame (with small scale miniatures)" by Peter Dennis & Cliff Knight. Published by Hard Cover Designs back in the 1980's and (sadly) now long OOP. Probably the only playable implementation of George Jeffrey's "Variable Length Bound" (VLB) concept.

Discussed at (very great) length here:
TMP link

>>>>>Scotsman:
Actually, real war does have rules. Armies spend A LOT of time inventing them, teaching them, imposing them.<<<<<

Yes, and it is usually to do with doctrine, tactical deployment and regulation, when the bullets start flaying it all goes out the window pretty quickly. Army commanders try to enforce these rules but are not always successful. What I am really meaning is that it's not the armies and commanders who do not have rules and regulations but war itself does not have rules. War and the very act of conflict depletes the level of rules because advantages are sort while disadvantaging the enemy, this very act itself cuts corners and forces the participants to act, to varying degrees away from or digress from rules and regulations. Army commanders try to enforce or maintain these rules and regulations but are not always so successful. This is why you have rules in wargames, to force or regulate what players do, to aim or direct players to act accordingly to the vary same regulations that would be imposed by actual commanders. A Command radii is just one of these wargames tool that we use.

>>>>>Scotsman: Actually, the point I was trying to make, Shane, and one that is an accepted force of nature is that anyone who plays games will attempt to use any and all methods to gain advantages. Game designers accept that as a given. It rains and you try to stay dry.<<<<<

I agree, it is a real problem in some groups because every player is different, some players play for the social desires, some play for the pageantry of the era, some play for the challenge while many play for the win. Those that play for the win are the guys who usually try to manipulate or find loop holes in a system that can gain the some form of advantage; these are the guys who most war games designers are structuring rules against. You have to account for these guys and what they attempt to do and believe me, they will try to manipulate any rule they see or lack thereof. This is why some rules are so restrictive and structured rigidly and that is a pity.

>>>>>Scotsman: And games and simulations are not about *directing* behavior, unless that is your purpose--in which case it is much easier simply to write a script for them to follow and forget the game rules. Rules don't control behavior unless there is a real punishment involved. Game rules do provide benefits and disadvantages within the context and goals of the game, but that is the game environment. Players are free to accept or reject or simply experiment with those benefits and negatives. In historical wargames the *assumption* is that those benefits and negatives have some relationship to those experienced by the historical commanders. Command radii is not one of those. I haven't seen any evidence that it is. It's sole purpose is to stop players from acting in unhistorical ways, not to portray any positives or negatives in a battlefield environment. It began as that kind of rule in the 1970s, and continues to be one today as far as I can tell. <<<<<

I don't think rules design is about behavior curtailment but more so about circumventing such behavior, I never design rules to punish people that would be absurd. Sometimes a player, who wants to win at all costs will do something or try something that goes against the grain of the system or what should be allowable, it is these players who cause many headaches because they see the wargame not as a challenge but a competition akin to life and death, ego drives them to win any way they can. Like I said above, sometimes you have to enforce a rule to prevent someone from acting as such or at least curtailing it, that is obvious with any wargame rules design. Most designers will tell you this, they get bombarded will letters, emails and phone calls from players trying to clarify rules because one or more people interpret a rule differently from another. It does not always have to be a player trying to gain an advantage either, it is mostly simple clarification.

>>>>Scotsman:
There is a big difference between a wargame having limitations and barriers that mimic real circumstances and ones that exist simply to corral player behaviors. Granted, ALL simulations have such things. The Army's laser-tag exercises in small unit tactics have umpires that limit participant actions, judge results, usually for safety, aiding the simulation or for corralling soldiers wandering out of the prescribed parameters of the simulation. BUT NO ONE suggests that the umpire's actions somehow simulates real battlefield experiences in command and control. <<<<<

No, you are right, but that team playing laser-tag will have a leader who knows and understands the rules of play and will act within those boundaries set, hopefully. But you will always get those who will cheat, stretch or bend rules thus the Umpire… Rules designers are constantly having to know and understand this and therefore write rules with this in mind as do umpires who look out for rules wroughters.

>>>>>Scotsman:
No one has forgotten that 'important fact.' We are talking about two things: Functional game design and simulation methodology. IF the designer decides that a game mechanic, in this case command radius, mimics IN SOME WAY the dynamics of actual command process on the Napoleonic Battlefield, then there is a relationship between the two that goes beyond simple like or dislike of a particular mechanic. It is one thing to paint a picture to please yourself and quite another to say it is a historical representation of an actual Napoleonic battlefield. IF Rocco paints a AK-47 in the hands of a Napoleonic Hussar and claims it is accurate history, it isn't simply a matter of "get over it and move on to something you do like or agree with."<<<<<

I agree you might as well play fantasy games in such a situation; this is not my cup of tea though. I want to simulate as much as possible the realities of Napoleonic warfare in the systems and rules I design, so far all who have played them have told me the system I developed is very accurate and simulates much of what happened based on their own reading. This does encourage me to continue and I am lucky I have been able to gain much information and advice from many authors and historians on this over the years, all of whom were surprisingly very happy to pass on their knowledge. For this I am very grateful but I also understand that what I design is still only a game and in no way a simulation of real warfare. The only way to do that is to join a re-enactment group and fire off real rounds at each other. All I can do as a designer and player is do my best to portray the game as close to what happened as possible and this is usually much harder than you think.

>>>>>Scotsman: The only effort I am making is commenting on how realistic or accurate OTHERS are claiming a particular rules mechanic to be. IF you feel comfortable about saying "some people will agree with you, some will not, big deal, play the game" when the game designer says he is 'recreating Napoleonic command' without any evidence, then you will probably be comfortable with that AK-47 in the hands of the Hussar in a 'historical painting'. It's just personal expression, after all. You like it or you don't. <<<<<

For me? No, I prefer my musketeers to carry muskets…

>>>>>Scotsman: But that isn't why this list exists, is it? There are many ways to portray command and control that mimic Napoleonic warfare that I won't like. Fine, I don't have to, I'll play something else. But that isn't the issue here either.<<<<<

And that is your god given right and prerogative, I would not be forced to play a system I did not like either.

Regards,
Shane

From 1968bills fan: something got screwed up in the TMP system. I just entered a longish post but it didn't show up. My name came out as the header for the post below, which I didn't write. I gotta start buying better quality Scotch whiskey. Somebody else entered the post below.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Thanks guys, that is really useful! I'll sort through my boxes of nekkid greeks, celts and germans and see if I can find 2 doz. suitable minis.

Question is, can I sculpt a moustache on a 28mm figure?

Having just read the above post, I'll throw in some thoughts.

As to "Actually, real war does have rules. Armies spend A LOT of time inventing them, teaching them, imposing them.<<<<< Yes, and it is usually to do with doctrine, tactical deployment and regulation, when the bullets start flaying it all goes out the window pretty quickly…

I think you are both missing the point. Which is, there are natural RULES for how things behave, whether they are laws of physics or how systems interact with one another. A line shoots more bullets than a column, calvary can kill x number of isolated infantry but not x number of clumped infantry…etc. Armies set up their RULES, SOP, tactical doctrine so that their soldiers can win on the battlefield, where the natural RULES exist. Sometimes the nation's rules are outdated. (early Prussians, Russians and Austrians did army and tactic reorganations (e.g. new national tactical rules), when the French developed a new set of natural rules on the battlefield.
The soldiers and generals did not freelance very much when things went bad- they usually followed their rules and kept on working. You don't create perfect doctrine in the middle of a battle.
.

"Punishment" for a rules doctor trying to gain an advantage must come partly from social pressure, a referee or something in the game rules that follows what would probably have happened historically.

Using as an example, a game where a battalion is the smallest maneavure element, consider the following. If a player sends a battalion on a guided missile mission, what would have likely happened?

First, the battalion commander might not be extremely competent an independant commander. Colonels had high causulties, some were way overaged, some were Peter-principled beyond their capabilities. You can expect bad decisions to be more likely, morale to be lowered ("who is watching our flank?"),poor capability with combined arms methods, and lack of support from near by friendly units ("what the fxxx is that idiot doing?").

Secondly, the Division commanding General would have a fit if a battalion or brigade for that matter swooned off on its own. HE IS THE BOSS. He has the plan. (Try this at your job: "Hey boss, I know you told me to work on the Smith contract but screw you, I rather spend my time working on new leads. You can explain to your boss that you didn't get the Smith stuff done because you let me do whatever I wanted, rather than what HE said. Okay fathead?" hint: you would be fired). The brigadier general is responsible for controlling his brigade, not in originating army strategy! I expect the first thing to happen would be a rocket messagner with orders to stop, a halt for the entire brigade, followed by a relief of command and new acting battalion commander.

How to enforce this on the wargame table? Maybe something like:

Isolated, independantly operating battalions, must have written orders from the brigadier and follow these orders ("stop and defend" and "rejoin parent unit ASAP" are the only option to these orders)

There is a one turn delay in executing these orders once written.

Unless in fortications, they lose a morale grade.

They can not be supported by Divisional resources such as artillery fire or calvary. If these were actively engaged or deployed before the turn that the order was written, its okay.

Shane wrote:
>>>>I agree, it is a real problem in some groups because every player is different, some players play for the social desires, some play for the pageantry of the era, some play for the challenge while many play for the win. Those that play for the win are the guys who usually try to manipulate or find loop holes in a system that can gain the some form of advantage; these are the guys who most war games designers are structuring rules against. You have to account for these guys and what they attempt to do and believe me, they will try to manipulate any rule they see or lack thereof. This is why some rules are so restrictive and structured rigidly and that is a pity.<<<< [Good idea, this >>>>]

Shane:
Thanks for the reply. I have rearranged your comments simply to organize my thoughts. they run in two veins, game design and simulation design, so I'll tackle game design first. ALL games by definition are goal-driven activities, a good number of them competitive. Wargames are competitive, with two or more sides trying to win. Why shouldn't there be players who play to win? Trying to write rules to 'account for these guys' is like trying to design a hammer that won't hit anyone's thumb or that can't be used to pound woodscrews. You design a game to be a game, not manipulate the manipulators, "the guys who most war games designers are structuring rules against." You are wasting your time. Design a good game with well-written rules, produce a well-designed hammer that does the job. You start designing hammers to be used only certain ways by certain people and you quickly end up designing something other than a hammer.
This issue is not a new one or only faced be wargame designers. ALL game designers face it, and they have since games were first invented. The game design community have developed specific methods for dealing with it, but writing game rules specifically to control the manipulators isn't one of them. They have found it self-defeating—-if you are trying to design a good game.

>>>>>I don't think rules design is about behavior curtailment but more so about circumventing such behavior, I never design rules to punish people that would be absurd. Sometimes a player, who wants to win at all costs will do something or try something that goes against the grain of the system or what should be allowable, it is these players who cause many headaches because they see the wargame not as a challenge but a competition akin to life and death, ego drives them to win any way they can. Like I said above, sometimes you have to enforce a rule to prevent someone from acting as such or at least curtailing it, that is obvious with any wargame rules design. Most designers will tell you this, they get bombarded will letters, emails and phone calls from players trying to clarify rules because one or more people interpret a rule differently from another. It does not always have to be a player trying to gain an advantage either, it is mostly simple clarification.<<<<<<<

Shane, folks can and will cheat and manipulate, win at all costs etc. etc. You can't create a game that will 'curtail such things'. You end up trying to herd cats. No amount of rules will do the job. Rules interpretation is another example. You write the rule as clearly as you can and then you are available for clarification. You can't do much more than that. IF some insist on pounding wood screws, that's their problem; you still created a great hammer.

>>>>>No, you are right, but that team playing laser-tag will have a leader who knows and understands the rules of play and will act within those boundaries set, hopefully. But you will always get those who will cheat, stretch or bend rules thus the Umpire… Rules designers are constantly having to know and understand this and therefore write rules with this in mind as do umpires who look out for rules wroughters.<<<<<<

An umpire can do that. Rules can't. They can only state what can be done within the game rules. Period. And no, leaders won't necessarily understand or follow the rules. If they did, umpires wouldn't be necessary. Remember the old Star Trek movie where Captain Kirk, explains that as a cadet, he had to play the wargame 'Kobioshi Maru' at the Academy. The game was set up so there was no way to win—it was to test how the cadets responded to such a situation. Kirk broke into the computer the night before and changed the program, so he won the unwinnable game the next day. It also reminds me of the Millinium 2002 billion dollar wargame the military put on, simulating a limited war in the gulf against an 'Iraq-like' nation. The defenders, with little more than leisure craft and small ground to ground missiles sank a significant portion of the US Fleet. The US team was outraged, said the defender general wasn't playing within the 'spirit' of the game, though all his actions were within the rules. The US restarted the game and changed the rules so that the Defender had to act as expected, and of course, the US won. You can read about it in the book "Blink".
A game can lead a player to the rules, but you can't make him behave. Don't bother trying. They will only find other ways to remain 'uncurtailed.' As I said, herding cats. Such efforts do nothing to enhance a game design or make it more enjoyable.

>>>>>>Yes, and it is usually to do with doctrine, tactical deployment and regulation, when the bullets start flaying it all goes out the window pretty quickly. Army commanders try to enforce these rules but are not always successful. What I am really meaning is that it's not the armies and commanders who do not have rules and regulations but war itself does not have rules. War and the very act of conflict depletes the level of rules because advantages are sort while disadvantaging the enemy, this very act itself cuts corners and forces the participants to act, to varying degrees away from or digress from rules and regulations.<<<<

The best description I have read of battle dynamics is from John Keegan's "Face of War." In the chapters on Waterloo, he says that a battle is two sides attempting to destroy the enemy's order while maintaining their own. The first side to decide that self-preservation is better than continuing to follow 'the rules' loses. IF doctrine, tactics and training "pretty quickly goes out the window when the bullets start flying", it is a very short engagement. You might want to reconsider the notion that war does not have rules. It is horrible and chaotic, but most of it is induced in a premeditated and orderly fashion. War does have rules, which is why most folks remember, write about, and condemn those moments when they aren't followed. If war leads men to digress from the rules and regulations in order to win or survive, then you will find most competent armies training for such digressions….

>>>>Army commanders try to enforce or maintain these rules and regulations but are not always so successful. This is why you have rules in wargames, to force or regulate what players do, to aim or direct players to act accordingly to the vary same regulations that would be imposed by actual commanders. A Command radii is just one of these wargames tool that we use. <<<<<<

Okay, here is the history part. Command radii is certainly a wargame tool, but is doesn't mimic any of the regulations imposed by Napoleonic military men that I know of. It certainly doen't represent any of the things designers 'say' it does. Here are the reasons I can think of and identify that led Napoleonic battalion, brigades, and divisions to maintaining a tight front:
1. Movement: The method for moving large numbers of men was the regulating unit and battle array SOPs. It was very linear by necessity, based on lines, even if several deep with support. The benefits were the ability to move quickly in order and to respond to changes of direction, formation etc. The disadvantages in losing this order was just the opposite. Misalignment, slowing of units and the inability to change formation quickly. With this method the commander was either with the regulating unit or would send orders to it to control movement.
2. Communication: Until you get into Corps-size units, the actual distance a commander or courier had to ride was short, particularly with games that have 15 minute to hour turns. The only time that communication needed to be sent was when it couldn't be communicated through the regulating unit, which means the sections that got orders were not a part of the main body. Even so, they would be easy to find IF they maintained the battle array order. If they didn't, actual distance had little to do with them being incommunicado.
3. Combat: Tight formations were maintained because if they weren't, units could be isolated and caught unsupported. The length of formations had little to do with the actual distances between the commander and his various units, but had to do with support and combat effectiveness, which is why modern brigades, for instance, have pre-determined fronts they are expected to defend. Certainly, in the radio-age, distance has little meaning in terms of communication, yet unit frontages are still an issue.
Now, how does drawing a circle around the commander and requiring units to stay within it mimic any of these processes along with their benefits and disadvantages when ignored? It may look right on the table if the player acts within the *spirit* of the rules, but the actual battle dynamics are nowhere to be found, let alone the actual challenges and circumstances that led commanders to keep units [most of the time] within particular frontages—and not any particular distance from their august persons. Also note that most of the benefits and disadvantages can be 'simulated' without many new rules. Most are just the consequences of keeping in supporting/regulating distance or by becoming too spread out. The command radius was a command control tool, but one to control the players, not represent anything real in the way of battlefield dynamics.

>>>>>I agree you might as well play fantasy games in such a situation; this is not my cup of tea though. I want to simulate as much as possible the realities of Napoleonic warfare in the systems and rules I design, so far all who have played them have told me the system I developed is very accurate and simulates much of what happened based on their own reading. This does encourage me to continue and I am lucky I have been able to gain much information and advice from many authors and historians on this over the years, all of whom were surprisingly very happy to pass on their knowledge. <<<<<

Yes, you are lucky. And I do enjoy fantasy wargames, but historical wargames potentially offer a much different gaming experience.

>>>>>For this I am very grateful but I also understand that what I design is still only a game and in no way a simulation of real warfare. The only way to do that is to join a re-enactment group and fire off real rounds at each other. All I can do as a designer and player is do my best to portray the game as close to what happened as possible and this is usually much harder than you think.<<<<<

Shane, your comment " but I also understand that what I design is still only a game and in no way a simulation of real warfare. The only way to do that is to join a re-enactment group and fire off real rounds at each other." tells me that you don't know much about simulations. The U.S. army spends millions of dollars on simulations of 'real warfare' where there are no explosions and no real rounds going off—sometimes the soldiers don't even leave their seats. Are they all just fooling themselves? Do all those folks claiming to create weather simulations where no rain falls and no wind blows just putting us on? Are all those billions spent each year on training simulations and research simulations not really simulating anything—regardless of how successful they seem to be? Shooting at each other with live ammo is not the definition of a simulation of real warfare. It is real warfare.
Many, many designers use game mechanics to create functional simulations, and by functional, I mean they can accurately mimic and predict real events, train real skills applicable to real situations. It's done all the time. If you claim that you are 'portraying what happens' with a game, you are claiming to have built a simulation. And, I know exactly how hard it is to do—professionally.

One of the things that interests me in this debate so far are the many responses that automatically assume the carrot and stick approach of traditional wargames design is the only way of doing things.

We say that to be historical we need a rule for ‘x' when what most people actually mean is a punishment or reward, not a reason why.

I have lost count of the number of rules I have seen (and purchased) that claim to be ‘historic' yet within them there is no explanation as to why their content or structure has a claim to this label, only a list of rules that give permission, or prohibition, to activity.

At the risk of pointing a finger to give an example(not to mention repeating myself) Shako 2, which is no worse than most rules in this regard, has several game devices which are presumably meant to mirror real practice, or at least they are easily rationalised as such.

However, these items are wrapped up in such blunt terms of ‘thou shalt or thou shalt not' as to appear just ridged, rather than informed.

Sticking with the simple example of Regulating Units for a moment.

I have used these at Conventions on several occasions, putting down markers with "Regulating Battalion" on them, on the table top. It generally takes two minutes to explain to passers by what this means. The logic of why they were actually used has never been challenged, nor has the point of using them in game terms.

Why not look at making rules a template for action?

If you played against someone who insisted on bringing a Tiger tank along with his Prussian army you would tell him to stop clowning around and eventually stop playing with him.

Why accept players who send units off on lone missions, or take independent action with a Brigade, other than that which preserves its existence, when it has no current order? Rules or no rules this kind of thing is no more 'historic' than the 1st Numark Landwher, Panzer Battalion.

A choice of historical options might be an interesting alternative to creating lists of + or – points to be totalled up, which often encourage ‘rules mongers' and ‘must winner's' to go for that little trick thats just inside ‘the law' but a Napoleonic commander would never of dreamed of for a bucket load of reasons!

>>>>>This issue is not a new one or only faced be wargame designers. ALL game designers face it, and they have since games were first invented. The game design community have developed specific methods for dealing with it, but writing game rules specifically to control the manipulators isn't one of them. They have found it self-defeating—-if you are trying to design a good game.<<<<<

Sorry, you seem to have misunderstood me, I do not design a system around these players at all, I design a system based on my own historical knowledge and understanding coupled with the advice given to me by several good historians and authors. What I do have to do is set in place parameters which account for what some players will try to do. You see them find a loop-hole or manipulate a certain situation or circumstance so you have to close it or you have to re-think the situation and re-write a section of the rules. Laws of a nation are amended in the very same way in any legal system. I NEVER write a rule with rules manipulators in mind, I have to re-think a rule when they flout it…

>>>>>Shane, folks can and will cheat and manipulate, win at all costs etc. etc. You can't create a game that will 'curtail such things'. You end up trying to herd cats. No amount of rules will do the job. Rules interpretation is another example. You write the rule as clearly as you can and then you are available for clarification. You can't do much more than that. IF some insist on pounding wood screws, that's their problem; you still created a great hammer.<<<<<

It is not about herding cats or designing better hammers at all, it is about closing loop-holes that may have been missed on design. This is my point, you do have to amend rules from time to time to stop these people.

>>>>>An umpire can do that. Rules can't. They can only state what can be done within the game rules. Period. And no, leaders won't necessarily understand or follow the rules. If they did, umpires wouldn't be necessary.<<<<<

And this is why you have to, as a rules designer, close loop-holes as best you can.

>>>>>Remember the old Star Trek movie where Captain Kirk, explains that as a cadet, he had to play the wargame 'Kobioshi Maru' at the Academy. The game was set up so there was no way to win—it was to test how the cadets responded to such a situation. Kirk broke into the computer the night before and changed the program, so he won the unwinnable game the next day. <<<<<

Sorry, cannot say I ever watched much Star-Trek, not a fan at all. However, If the game was so designed as to be unwinable then all I can say is, well done to Kirk for doing what he did. However, I do not write rules to be unwinable, I write rules to be fair and realistic to simulate warfare on the table top. If I designed an unwinable system I would have designed "Empire". Unless you are French or British you cannot be expected to win.

>>>>>It also reminds me of the Millinium 2002 billion dollar wargame the military put on, simulating a limited war in the gulf against an 'Iraq-like' nation. The defenders, with little more than leisure craft and small ground to ground missiles sank a significant portion of the US Fleet. The US team was outraged, said the defender general wasn't playing within the 'spirit' of the game, though all his actions were within the rules. The US restarted the game and changed the rules so that the Defender had to act as expected, and of course, the US won. You can read about it in the book "Blink". A game can lead a player to the rules, but you can't make him behave. Don't bother trying. They will only find other ways to remain 'uncurtailed.' As I said, herding cats. Such efforts do nothing to enhance a game design or make it more enjoyable.<<<<<

And this is the problem of the US military, they designed this war game built on false ideas of just how effective the defender would, or more importantly, "should" be… I have my own little story on this one. A friend of mine who was in the Australian Navy years ago told us how one single Australian Frigate sunk half the US Fleet in the Indian Ocean (I think he said) in a navel exercise put on by the US fleet there. They had an exchange of a dozen men between the Aussie ship and the US fleet and the Aussies that spent time on the US ships got to know and understand the US systems and routines. He went on to tell us that this information was then used against the US fleet in the exercise. The Aussie ship was sent on its way and was to be tracked down (hunted) by the US fleet. So off it went and the game began.

The Aussie command stopped al communications of every kind, the ship ceased to exist, it had no signature and could not be picked up on any satellites etc. They even changed the ship number on the bow from 41 and added other digits to concur with US practice. The ship then sailed at top speed down the bottom of the Indian ocean far away from the yanks. It managed to eventually join a British fleet for awhile and re-fueled and re-supply etc. The US fleet meanwhile could not find them; they actually thought the ship must have been lost at sea and were beginning to actually worry about their safety but could not communicate with them. Meanwhile the ship continued on running silent. The aussie sailors, knowing that the US ships would be re-fueling and at 6 o'clock usually stopped to watch TV news decided to slip into the 40 ship formation and actually lined up for fuel!!! The US fleet did not think to count the ships and spot an extra ship amongst them. The Aussie ship slowly came up for its turn to re-fuel when the re-fuelers suddenly exclaimed, "who are you"? The word came over the coms, "bang bang, your dead"!!

The single Aussie ship sunk an air-craft carrier, several capital ships and minor vessels, all under the watchful eyes of several US umpires who were on the Aussie ship the entire time!! They could do nothing but watch as the Aussies did what they did and got away with it. They had to accept what had happened and call it as it happened. This single Aussie frigate sank half the US fleet and for over a week, the US fleet would not communicate with them, re-supply them or hand over mail for this time. They were so hurt that their sophisticated combat systems could not cope and deal with something as simple as ingenuity and guile.

As a result of this the US commanders ripped out all TV's in the coms rooms and anywhere else that was important and instead of set times and routines they staggered all their routines throughout the days as a result. Effectively, they changed the rules and their own parameters to compensate and adapt to the unforeseen changes that now they were made aware of. If they did not they realized that in a real war it could of happened for real. In this case the US commanders did not change the rules, they, instead adapted and modified their own behavior to prevent it happening again.

My point on this is that players will find a way to get around rules and win outside the spirit of the game or parameters. The rules designers might not account for things like this but are conscious of the fact that things will occur outside of the rules. Knowing this they go into the game with half the intent to hone skills etc but also to watch for the unforeseen events that occur that when they do make them re-think and re-write their own parameters. This is not a bad thing; this is an evolutionary process that MUST be done to find these loop-holes and occurrences that are overlooked at first design of the rules. Do you understand my meaning?

>>>>>The best description I have read of battle dynamics is from John Keegan's "Face of War." In the chapters on Waterloo, he says that a battle is two sides attempting to destroy the enemy's order while maintaining their own. The first side to decide that self-preservation is better than continuing to follow 'the rules' loses. IF doctrine, tactics and training "pretty quickly goes out the window when the bullets start flying", it is a very short engagement. You might want to reconsider the notion that war does not have rules. It is horrible and chaotic, but most of it is induced in a premeditated and orderly fashion. War does have rules, which is why most folks remember, write about, and condemn those moments when they aren't followed. If war leads men to digress from the rules and regulations in order to win or survive, then you will find most competent armies training for such digressions…. <<<<<

No, you are wrong for my mind, you're missing my point, yes, commanders work with rules and regulations, doctrines and parameters. This is a given. But when the guns start firing they also know that all of this begins to deteriorate over time. The more deadly or severe the enemy fire the quicker your own response deteriorates if you cannot match them at that point. But the point is, as much as commanders try to maintain order it is impossible, inevitably, over time this collapses and chaos, which might have had zero or negligible hold in the beginning now is at the point where it takes over.
Also, if the original plans, orders, regulations, doctrines and routines are flawed or obsolete then you are fighting a war behind the 8 ball from the start.

War is evolutionary in nature; it never stays constant and is always fluid as technology increases. Those that cannot keep up with it often perish but sometimes, just sometimes they prevail or gain wins by playing the game differently than what the more sophisticated adversary accounts for. Sometimes these more sophisticated nations lose experience and knowledge of the "older" ways to fight wars because they move on, they advance.

Those nations who cannot use new technology often have to adapt or suffice with what they have and this sometimes is enough. Look at the gulf war, in conventional war against Iran the Iraq's could not win (or lose) but against the super powers they were crushed convincingly. However, did they stop fighting? No, they adapted, many soldiers threw away their uniforms and became gorillas and fought on. They continue to fight on are more effective in this role than they could ever have been in a conventional battle.

So, what did the Yanks, Brits and Aussies do? They adapted to conform to how they fought. It was back to small unit actions, patrolling and ambushes against the very men who fought this way. Now these super powers who could not destroy the insurgents with conventional warfare are slowly winning using the very same tactics the enemy use. It was a case of adapt or continue to suffer appallingly high casualties using conventional tactics.

>>>>>Okay, here is the history part. Command radii is certainly a wargame tool, but is doesn't mimic any of the regulations imposed by Napoleonic military men that I know of. It certainly doen't represent any of the things designers 'say' it does. Here are the reasons I can think of and identify that led Napoleonic battalion, brigades, and divisions to maintaining a tight front:<<<<<

Okay, I do think you are missing the point here, for me, I use a command radius, a very simple system for it but it is used in a particular way. In my system it is not used to corral or herd units at all, and I do think many other designers use it or intended it to be used in the same fashion I will explain.
The distance of the command radius simulates time and motion = distance. Meaning that on foot in a given turn a soldier can move a certain distance which is equal to the command radius it set. This also is counted as a battlefield engagement range for eyesight for small arms fire ranges etc.

So, this imaginary radius represents all the activity within this zone of the commander and the flow of information back and forth between him and his men within that time period of a turn. Now, if a unit is found outside of the command radius for any reason all that happens is a full turn time delay in the relay of communications and the disadvantage of a -10% morale modifier for being out of control. This is in fact trifling and players are not herded in any way as a result of having units, "out of command". They just suffer delays in communications and morale as stated, big deal…they are in NO way restricted in acting or re-acting when outside of this zone. If they have previous orders they simply follow them and if not they will simply commit themselves to returning to the command zone. I do not think this is unrealistic in any way…

>>>>>1. Movement: The method for moving large numbers of men was the regulating unit and battle array SOPs. It was very linear by necessity, based on lines, even if several deep with support. The benefits were the ability to move quickly in order and to respond to changes of direction, formation etc. The disadvantages in losing this order was just the opposite. Misalignment, slowing of units and the inability to change formation quickly. With this method the commander was either with the regulating unit or would send orders to it to control movement. <<<<<

I have no problem with your summation of this, it is my understanding as well.

>>>>>2. Communication: Until you get into Corps-size units, the actual distance a commander or courier had to ride was short, particularly with games that have 15 minute to hour turns. The only time that communication needed to be sent was when it couldn't be communicated through the regulating unit, which means the sections that got orders were not a part of the main body. Even so, they would be easy to find IF they maintained the battle array order. If they didn't, actual distance had little to do with them being incommunicado.<<<<<

Agreed, read my post replay above…distance is the point, a command radius is nothing but a measured distance, if a unit is found to be outside of this measured distance then it is out of command and an order or communication delay occurs, as simple as that.

>>>>>3. Combat: Tight formations were maintained because if they weren't, units could be isolated and caught unsupported. The length of formations had little to do with the actual distances between the commander and his various units, but had to do with support and combat effectiveness, which is why modern brigades, for instance, have pre-determined fronts they are expected to defend. Certainly, in the radio-age, distance has little meaning in terms of communication, yet unit frontages are still an issue.<<<<<

You just said the magic words : ""Tight formations were maintained because if they weren't, units could be isolated and caught unsupported."""" This is WHY some rules designers use a command radius. You are actually advocating the use of a command radius which is nothing more than a measured distance…

>>>>>Now, how does drawing a circle around the commander and requiring units to stay within it mimic any of these processes along with their benefits and disadvantages when ignored?<<<<<

Easy, you are only seeing the circle and not seeing it as it is intended, a unit of measure, a distance, not a circle. If a unit falls outside of the measured distance (the command radius) delays and certain disadvantages will occur. I cannot understand how this is not realistic to you? It is simply a tool to use instead of placing a dispatch rider on the field. It is a measured distance for orders and communications and nothing else…

>>>>>It may look right on the table if the player acts within the *spirit* of the rules, but the actual battle dynamics are nowhere to be found, let alone the actual challenges and circumstances that led commanders to keep units [most of the time] within particular frontages—and not any particular distance from their august persons.<<<<<

Again, that depends on the rules designer and his understanding and concept of how it is to be used against the actual deployment of his troops and the size of the command. Like I keep saying, it is a unit of measure for time and motion = distance. I set a Brigadier's zone of command at 300yds because most, if not all brigades rarely will ever spread out more than 300yds of deployment of the brigade is followed true to actual regulations of frontage and depth. When dealing with Divisions and above the command radius increases to a greater distance to account for the increased spread of larger formations that should also be placed true to regulations. The trick here is to follow regulations and actual practice, players who do not do this will fall foul of the system and suffer these disadvantages as a result.

>>>>>Also note that most of the benefits and disadvantages can be 'simulated' without many new rules. Most are just the consequences of keeping in supporting/regulating distance or by becoming too spread out. The command radius was a command control tool, but one to control the players, not represent anything real in the way of battlefield dynamics.<<<<<

No, you think that this is what it is intended for but it is not, it is used for the exact purpose you state, ""Most are just the consequences of keeping in supporting/regulating distance or by becoming too spread out."""" These are your own words and these are the exact reasons rules designers who use command radius use them for. Like I keep saying to you, a command radius is nothing more than a, "unit of measure = to a set distance for communications" If a rules designer is using it for any other reason then he is giving "you" ammunition to continue your argument which in my eyes is a false one for me and my own rules intent.

>>>>>Yes, you are lucky. And I do enjoy fantasy wargames, but historical wargames potentially offer a much different gaming experience.<<<<<

And this is why I do not play fantasy games, I designed a system to simulate Napoleonic warfare it is as simple as that.

>>>>>Shane, your comment " but I also understand that what I design is still only a game and in no way a simulation of real warfare. The only way to do that is to join a re-enactment group and fire off real rounds at each other." tells me that you don't know much about simulations.<<<<<

I resent that remark, you are taking my comments a little out of context here. I do understand simulations and why they are needed and used after all it was simple video games that were used to train US combat pilots way back in the 80's because it was noticed that kids were shooting down enemy aircraft at an incredible rate while actual pilots did not and could not react in time. It proved to the US that action and reaction was essential for survivability because life and death chances were and still are counted in mili-seconds.

The Prussian high command of the Napoleonic wars began to learn and use war games (Kreigspiel) in their war planning and training. It was quickly understood that simulating actual campaigns and conflicts was a great tool in teaching officers about war. However, those rules were designed by actual military officers to simulate actual military situations, they were designed by men of a military back ground who understood the occurrences and appropriate responses to actions and counter actions from their experience of actual combat.
Militaries who do this today have vast amounts of experience and data behind them so as to be much better able to simulate warfare compared to rules designers like us who do not have such back grounds.

All we can do is read our books and try to understand what happened and how it happened and design rules and parameters from our understanding of this information. Thus as much as we think we are simulating combat we are doing nothing more than designing a game with toy soldier…you can't tell me anything different. I am not going to even go into the, "I wanna be Napoleon or, I "am" Napoleon" syndrome that many players have when they win several battles (games) in a row.

If we are lucky enough to design rules that work and seem to capture the essence of the period then great, well done and be proud of your work but I am not going to believe for a minute that I am simulating actual combat with a few charts and a set of dice while pushing around pretty painted soldiers on a table. I design rules to simulate but I play to have fun, actual warfare in not fun. Militaries do not play wargames for fun, they play them for training purposes so that when the real thing happens they will not become annihilated because they were unprepared.

>>>>>The U.S. army spends millions of dollars on simulations of 'real warfare' where there are no explosions and no real rounds going off—sometimes the soldiers don't even leave their seats. Are they all just fooling themselves? Do all those folks claiming to create weather simulations where no rain falls and no wind blows just putting us on? Are all those billions spent each year on training simulations and research simulations not really simulating anything—regardless of how successful they seem to be? Shooting at each other with live ammo is not the definition of a simulation of real warfare. It is real warfare. Many, many designers use game mechanics to create functional simulations, and by functional, I mean they can accurately mimic and predict real events, train real skills applicable to real situations. It's done all the time. If you claim that you are 'portraying what happens' with a game, you are claiming to have built a simulation. And, I know exactly how hard it is to do—professionally.<<<<<

Read my comments above…

Regards,
Shane

"Look at the gulf war, in conventional war against Iran the Iraq's could not win (or lose) but against the super powers they were crushed convincingly. However, did they stop fighting? No, they adapted, many soldiers threw away their uniforms and became gorillas and fought on."

But didn't the black hairy suits and rubber masks give them away? … :-)

Sorry, couldn't resist!

Joking aside, I think Shane makes a good point here about the difference between a "circle" and a "measured distance". When I said way back at the beginning of this thread that I don't play any rules that use a "command radius" (and got taken to task for it) I was thinking of the sort of rule that says if a unit is beyond the command radius of a commander it can do nothing (or very little). However, I do have rules that represent the movement of orders a measured distance. I don't think of that as a command radius.

We often say that war does not have rules. Actually it has rules in several areas.

1. The psychology of the combatants. For example, in a Greek spear phalanx, each man's right side was covered by the left side of his right-hand neighbour's hoplon. Therefore there was a tendency for phalanxes to incline to the right when moving.

2. The logic of combat. For example, isolated units are at more danger of being overwhelmed than supported units.

3. Experienced commanders came to know these factors and would make preparations for them, for, by drilling their hoplites, or by not allowing junior commanders to get themselves isolated.

4. These kinds of principles were being written down in military manuals from the time of the Roman Empire, if not earlier.

5. In more modern forces, commanders often crystallised their knowledge and experience in the form of standing orders regarding the conduct of signalling, operations and so on.

So we can see that warfare has an inherent set of rules and

The point of all this is two-fold.

Firstly, there is ample historical precedent for setting limits on the possible actions that lower level commands can perform. Why should this not be embodied in rule mechanisms?

Secondly, it would be very elegant if rules could embody principles that would let 'good' (historical) behaviour by commanders emerge of its own accord.

For example, someone above gave the case of keeping a reserve. The game rules should be set up so that keeping a reserve is useful, then better players will tend to do it. It would not need a rule that you have to keep a reserve.

All this is not directly related to command radius so forgive me for getting a bit OT.

In the interest of full disclosure, I am one of the designers of Napoleon's Battles, which uses a modified command radius. I just finished reading most of the posts which I found enlightening. Lets see if I can throw some kerosene on the fire and provide a little more light. As the posts have shown command radius is not as easy to address as it may first appear, to get to where I want to go I have to first set the table. So I may run on for a bit.

It is the job of the designer to establish a world within which gamers are presented with like problems as their historical counterparts. That world should have parameters or governors within which the players make decisions.

Today's designers, whom I classify as deconstructionist, often use modern game mechanics, which have nothing to do with the 18th/19th Century, but which the designer uses to regulate wargames from that era. Not that these ideas are brand new. They started in the late 60s with Bob Jones of all people, and for the next 20 years they snowballed into the variety of command rules we have today – all inventions and all having nothing to do with what occured on the battlefield. But all very sophisticated. (Btw, it has come to my attention BJ is working on a new set of Napoleonic rules, Bouquet or Pere Violette, where-in you send scratch and sniff cards with different aromas of flowers. If you cannot identify the flower you are not in command.).

But I digress. Written orders did not occur. Maps marked with arrows did not occur. Lost aides on the battlefield did not occur. Delayed orders rarely occurred to the extent they did not occur. Initiative Points did not exist. Command Points did not exist. COSs did not exist. Time was not perceptual nor did it collapse or expand, Brigades did not meander a mile or two from their parent unit. The only place any of these things occurred is in 20th/21st Century historical miniatures rules, where they are used by deconstructionist designers to control the play of the game and achieve the outcomes they desire (not who wins or loses but what happens).

Not surprisingly, the very complexity of some rules has been sufficient to establish their unquestionabe validity with some gamers. War after all is hard, so rules which prevent gamers for doin' stuff when they want must be valid. That they are whole cloth inventions of 20th Century man's prejudicial interpretations of what occurred on a Napoleonic battlefield and thus not supportable with empirical evidence from the era leads me to question their validity. Whether or not they work as a reasonable representation of what gamers think occurred, depends on the knowledge and beliefs of the gamers. But just for fun here's a test I use. Conduct a parade using a rules set's command rules. If your units trip over each other, which mostly they do…well you get the idea.

I am not so precocious as to presume that I am capable of determing the number of initiative or command points a general should receive. To date designers who use CPs and IPs have not been able to explain how they arrived at their numbers and determined how many CPs or IPs an army was to receive. Absent, I can only conclude they used Kentucky windage till they got the game they wanted.

Neither are justifications for CPs and IPs satisfactory, i.e. generals have only so much time to deal with the tasks before them and thus must prioritize those tasks. During that era army generals normally made from one to five decisions a battle, hardly a burden necessitating the use of IPs or CPs to govern an officer with 15 or so years experience.

Any way you slice the goose, command radius, and the attendant rules on initiative, is the primary game mechanic regarding command that has some connection to what occurred on the battlefield, officers and aides riding from one point to another carrying orders and information or commanding by riding around. Today, radius rules are defined not just by the distance from A to B but are modified by the various levels of command and supplemented by the initiative of individual officers based on their historical performance.

To understand command radius one must understand how armies are commanded as well as the relationship, including duties and responsiilities, of the general officers to each other. At any one moment in a large battle there are hundreds officers and aides riding across the battlefield. Commanding officers are personally delivering orders and information or simply checking in with their subordinates. Staff officers and aides may be delivering orders, carrying information or staking out lines of maneuver (See Ned Zuparko's reference to controlling battalions) for, unless you were English cavalry, units did not wander into the abyss without guidence. Additionally, cavalry regularly sent out scouts to see what was over the hill and to check the terrain. So the emptiness we view between formations on the table belies that a lot of business is being conducted there and, the officers were all not only mounted but well mounted. Because of this regular intercourse between formations they all mostly knew where everyone was and the chance of getting lost of delayed was so close to nil, statistically it is not worth representing..

John Elting wrote that on the battlefield speed was of essence for Orderlies and Aides. One post in this topic mentioned 20 minutes as an example of the time it took to deliver an order. On the Napoleonic battlefield Generals did not issue complex verbal orders, so given 5 minutes to instruct the aide and for the aide to repeat the order to the recipient that leaves 15 minutes during which an aide could ride 5 miles, a mighty far piece given the size of musket era battlefields. Such distances were rarely required. In the event, it was rarely necessary to deliver an order further than an aide could ride in 8 to 10 minutes with times more in the neighborhood of 5 minutes or about 1.5 miles or less.

All officers have an inate initiative and generals at different levels of command have different duties, responsibilities and a different ability to follow or not follow orders. All view the battlefield through the lens of the environment in which they operate.

Brigadiers operate within the parameters of their brigade, fighting their battalions under the direction of their division commander. They have absolutely no grand tactical authority which means if placed in a position oriented in a certain direction they don't suddenly get a better idea and wander off. Nor does the brigadier get a better idea and attack when not ordered or not advance when ordered, as some deconstructionist rules would have him do. It did not happen because brigadiers wanted to be promoted. It did not happen because brigadiers did not wish to spend the remainder of their life on half pay or on fortress duty. It did not happen because division generals closely husbanded their brigades within supporting distance where they could quickly lay their hands on them. On their own authority, brigadiers could and would place their units in square when not under immediate threat, sit them down and deploy skirmishers.

Division Generals live on both the tactical and grand tactical battlefields. To represent this, division generals are the only officers who can project their radius to directly command their combat units. Their enviornment is filled with smoke and noise and death. Thus the lens through which they view the battle is narrow and mostly confined to the distance at which they can get almost instantaneous obedience, certaily no more than 500 yards. They keep their brigades well within supporting distance because it is the prudent and professional thing to do and because they care about the well being of their men and their career, not because their brigades are on a string created by a rules writer. They also have a secondary grand tactical authority represented by their inate initiative which they can attempt to use when beyond the immediate (within the turn) command of their superior.

Corps/wing commanders receive their orders directly from the army commander. If out of the command radius they are more capable of operating on their own initiative. This is because, they have the political connections that allow them to fudge, modify or not follow orders from the army commander. Thus, gamers who play rules at this level of command should have the ability to follow their orders or not. That said, most orders were followed.

On the battlefield, the corps generals' job is to coordinate their divisions and reserve artillery in pursuit of their orders. They are seperated from the hurly burly of battles and far enough back to see their entire corps, yet they are capable of personally intervening when necessary. Thus, the lens through which they view the battlefield is much wider than at division and because of this the size of their staffs are much larger and their command radius significantly greater than a division general's. Being upper management it is not their job (it is the division general's) to fight their brigades. Rather, they use their command radius to control their subordinates. They may, as Ney too often did, get involved in the tactical commitment of a brigade by attaching directly to it. But by doing so they narrow their lens and lose their ability to project their command radius, thus, breaking the chain of command.

The army general has an unlimited initiative and views the battle through the widest lens as represented by an extended command radius. It is his job to manage the battle by commanding his direct subordinates. He commands more by orders carried by Orderlies (for Napoleon) or aides or staff officers, than by riding around. Even so he is not glued to a spot and on occasion will, intemporately rally troops or take part in a combat losing hisr ability to project his radius, breaking the chain of command.

Thus, command radius (based on the speed of a horse) governed by the lens though which generals at various levels in the chain of command view the battle and modified by the individual initiative of the various officers (based on their historical performance), within the scale time constraints of a turn, is the easiest and most straight forward, and most historical method for implementing command on the gaming table.

Regardless, poor ole command radius is periodically submitted to close examination.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

thank you Bob, could not have said it any better myself !!

A great article/post.

"Written orders did not occur."

"D'Erlon's I Corps, however, was by this time marching away from, not toward, Quatre-Bras. D'Erlon, who was proceeding northward on the Brussels Road from Gossilies, was overtaken near Frasnes by a staff officer who, according to d'Erlon, had written orders for d'Erlon to take his corps to Napoleon's assistance at Ligny. There are several versions of this meeting between I Corps and the unknown staff officer (see further down in this text): although d'Erlon insisted there was a written order from the Emperor to change his direction of march, such a document, if it existed, has never been found. Napoleon said that he knew nothing about such an order. Some authorities assume that a well-meaning staff officer who knew Napoleon's plan saw d'Erlon's unemployed corps and took it upon himself to redirect it to Ligny. Some authorities also propose that this same officer may have scribbled the "Imperial order" himself, which would explain why d'Erlon had seen a written order that the Emperor claimed had never been written."
link

Is this incorrect, then?

And this?

"Additionally the reason why Blucher's written orders, via Scharnhorst (the courier), to Zieten as he emerged from Chapel Jacques, had demanded the march of the Prussian 1st Corps to Plancenoit. Yes, on this high spot you view almost the entire battlefield and can even imagine those words of Blucher… 'forwarts mein kinder' "
link

Yes Bob,

Poor ol` command radius!

I accept all your other points (well, mostly I think?)

But… "Written orders did not occur." ?

Didn`t Wellington himself write an order, directing the defenders of Hougomont what to do and re-occupy its buildings when they had been reduced to ruins?

But wait up, "most historical method for implementing command on the gaming table." ? So, Napoleon`s grand-tactical plans, methods and orders were limited by his… how many inches? :S …reaching for my copy of the Supplementary Book of Napoleon`s Battles, 1st. Edition!

Actually, I wonder how this may have impacted upon the design for a SYW version with its almost universal use of linear battle arrays?
I heard that that was the original idea for game that became "Napoleon`s Battles"… Was that so Bob?

Mike.

Bob:
Thanks for your thoughts on Command Radius. While you said some interesting things about 'modern' sensibilities being applied to Napoleonic wargames, I'll just stick to the command radius issue for the moment. You were very clear on what you believe the command radius portrays. Your overall conclusion was this:

>>>>Thus, command radius (based on the speed of a horse) governed by the lens though which generals at various levels in the chain of command view the battle and modified by the individual initiative of the various officers (based on their historical performance), within the scale time constraints of a turn, is the easiest and most straight forward, and most historical method for implementing command on the gaming table.<<<<<

So overall, you see the speed of a horse as the basis for command radii, depending on the level of the general. For Brigades, you state this:

>>>>>Brigadiers operate within the parameters of their brigade, fighting their battalions under the direction of their division commander. They have absolutely no grand tactical authority which means if placed in a position oriented in a certain direction they don't suddenly get a better idea and wander off.<<<<<

So, Brigadiers operate within the parameters of their brigade. The questions are where they do this and how.

For Division Generals, you concluded:

>>>>Division Generals live on both the tactical and grand tactical battlefields. To represent this, division generals are the only officers who can project their radius to directly command their combat units. Their environment is filled with smoke and noise and death. Thus the lens through which they view the battle is narrow and mostly confined to the distance at which they can get almost instantaneous obedience, certanily no more than 500 yards. They keep their brigades well within supporting distance because it is the prudent and professional thing to do and because they care about the well being of their men and their career, not because their brigades are on a string created by a rules writer.<<<<

So, five hundred yards is the limit of 'instantaneous' obedience. They kept their brigades within supporting distance because it is prudent. Are you speaking of combat realities, or limitations the command radius and horse speeds when you speak of 'prudent'? If 500 yards [the front of perhaps a brigade and a half.], then two brigades in line are out of instantaneous command control unless the divisional commander is in between them, correct?

For corps commanders, you explain:

>>>Corps/wing commanders receive their orders directly from the army commander. If out of the command radius they are more capable of operating on their own initiative. This is because, they have the political connections that allow them to fudge, modify or not follow orders from the army commander. Thus, gamers who play rules at this level of command should have the ability to follow their orders or not. That said, most orders were followed. On the battlefield, the corps generals' job is to coordinate their divisions and reserve artillery in pursuit of their orders. [snip] Thus, the lens through which they view the battlefield is much wider than at division and because of this the size of their staffs are much larger and their command radius significantly greater than a division general's. Being upper management it is not their job (it is the division general's) to fight their brigades. Rather, they use their command radius to control their subordinates. They may, as Ney too often did, get involved in the tactical commitment of a brigade by attaching directly to it. But by doing so they narrow their lens and lose their ability to project their command radius, thus, breaking the chain of command.<<<<<

So, the corps commander's staff allows for a greater command radius to their subordinates. Of course, the 500 yard 'instantaneous' distance is still in play? Also, if they do get involved in a tactical commitment by 'attaching directly to it', whatever that means, they have broken the chain of command and lost their ability to project their 'command radius'. The corollary of this is that any divisional commander with more staff would have a greater 'command radius' and a corps commander with few staff would have less, correct? Do you see a relationship between the number of staff and this range of 'command radius'?

Bob, this strikes me as game speak, explaining history through game terms instead of the other way around. However, here is what I understand you expect to see as far as normal battlefield operations and SOPs, and probably outlined in the regulations and writings of Napoleonic commanders:

Brigade commanders: They stay within the boundaries of their brigade, centrally located so they can communicate with all battalions. Little in the way of initiative.
*Linear front of about 300 to 400 yards.

Division commanders: @ a 500 yard instantaneous orders range, centrally located within the division to communicate quickly with all brigades.
*Linear front from 600 to 1000 yards.

Corps Commanders: Same physical 500 yard restrictions, but a larger staff creates a greater command radius, which they lose if they become 'attached' to tactical units in combat. Again, the corps commander would make every effort to be centrally located in his corps.
*Linear front from 600 to 2000 yards.

*Depending on the formation and size of their command.

Now, Note that even at 2000 yards, we are talking about no more than 10 minutes on horse back, at just a trot, and that is conservative, which could take in rough terrain etc..

You also noted that an army and perhaps corps commander would probably issue four or five orders for an entire battle.

So, have I got that right? Is that what we should expect to see when we look at Napoleonic battles and the actions of commanders at those levels? And of course, there should be a military awareness of and concern for 'command distances' as represented by the speed of a horse, correct? It also seems you are saying the command radius [speed of a horse] is a big reason for tight formations

Ugg. Command Radius bad. Now what do? *scratch head*

Sorry, it`s in the scenario booklet: "Bonaparte. Napoleon, 23" E +3D."

Now I`m looking to page 11 of NB 1st. Edition, there is a diagram which shows only one division out of three (the 2nd division) of a corps that is in "command-control" of the corps commander himself, but fortunately in this example he`s being helped out (micromanaged?) by the proximity of the army commander who is exerting some influence on his corps commander`s 1st division!
So what`s happening here? What processes, or effects are being simulated or represented?

Shane wrote:
>>>>>Sorry, you seem to have misunderstood me, I do not design a system around these players at all, I design a system based on my own historical knowledge and understanding coupled with the advice given to me by several good historians and authors. What I do have to do is set in place parameters which account for what some players will try to do. You see them find a loop-hole or manipulate a certain situation or circumstance so you have to close it or you have to re-think the situation and re-write a section of the rules. Laws of a nation are amended in the very same way in any legal system. I NEVER write a rule with rules manipulators in mind, I have to re-think a rule when they flout it…<<<<<
Shane:
Terrific, then we don't have to take about rules to control, curtail, or manipulate them. As for loopholes, a good job of field/play testing the rules will take care of that. The more complex the rules, the more need for play testing. It is like an author with his own book, after a while he can't see all the grammar and spelling mistakes. He's too close to it. The bigger and more complex the book, the more editing is necessary.
>>>>It is not about herding cats or designing better hammers at all, it is about closing loop-holes that may have been missed on design. This is my point, you do have to amend rules from time to time to stop these people.<<<<
Well, you can close loopholes to clarify rules, and you should when you can, but you can't 'stop these people'—they will just find some other loopholes, no matter how clear your rules. That's what I mean about herding cats. Cows move in herds naturally, cats don't.
>>>Sorry, cannot say I ever watched much Star-Trek, not a fan at all. However, If the game was so designed as to be unwinable then all I can say is, well done to Kirk for doing what he did. However, I do not write rules to be unwinable, I write rules to be fair and realistic to simulate warfare on the table top. If I designed an unwinable system I would have designed "Empire". Unless you are French or British you cannot be expected to win.<<<<
What? But he wasn't playing 'in the spirit of the game' and cheating to boot!
>>>>My point on this is that players will find a way to get around rules and win outside the spirit of the game or parameters. The rules designers might not account for things like this but are conscious of the fact that things will occur outside of the rules. Knowing this they go into the game with half the intent to hone skills etc but also to watch for the unforeseen events that occur that when they do make them re-think and re-write their own parameters. This is not a bad thing; this is an evolutionary process that MUST be done to find these loop-holes and occurrences that are overlooked at first design of the rules. Do you understand my meaning?<<<<
Okay, 'the spirit of the game'? Are we going existential here? There are the rules to the game and that is it. If you, as the designer, can't express what you want to happen on the game table with the rules, calling on the 'spirit of the game' isn't going to help, even if the players were clear about what that meant. Have you ever heard someone complain that a chess player, monopoly, bridge, or poker player wasn't playing in 'the spirit of the game?' That usually meant they weren't being good sports or were cheating, not that they weren't playing the game a 'certain way' or avoiding looking for unique advantages within the written rules. When I hear that said in wargaming circles, it can also mean a player did something that was unconventional or unhistorical, but allowable within the rules. More often than not, it does. That is badly written rules, not bad wargaming. You gave a great example with the Aussie naval exercise. Did they cheat? Did they break the rules? No, they psyched out the US procedures and used them, just like a wargamer will use what he knows of his opponent to win. Same thing with the Millinium 2003 game. You better believe the US team complained that the defenders weren't playing 'in the spirit of the game.' Why, because the defenders used the rules in unexpected ways—and then the 'loopholes' were closed so the defenders would 'play right.' Yes, I think understand your meaning concerning loopholes, but it has nothing to do with 'the spirit' of the game.
Games are puzzles, and human beings enjoy solving them. When they have discovered the optimum moves, the fun is over and they move on to another game. Some games, because of the chance, variety or complexity involved, offer a wide variety of ways to win, lots of optimum moves. Players are going to try every rule, every mechanic to see what produces success. And you can certainly continue to close loop-holes [I am assuming missed consequences of rules' interactions], but that is a lot different than trying to write rules to stop players from finding them.
>>>>No, you are wrong for my mind, you're missing my point, yes, commanders work with rules and regulations, doctrines and parameters. This is a given. But when the guns start firing they also know that all of this begins to deteriorate over time. The more deadly or severe the enemy fire the quicker your own response deteriorates if you cannot match them at that point. But the point is, as much as commanders try to maintain order it is impossible, inevitably, over time this collapses and chaos, which might have had zero or negligible hold in the beginning now is at the point where it takes over. Also, if the original plans, orders, regulations, doctrines and routines are flawed or obsolete then you are fighting a war behind the 8 ball from the start.<<<<
As I said, it is the enemy that tries to produce the chaos, and the training and command control, the willingness of the troops to 'follow the rules' in tactics and command determine whether or how fast order deteriorates facing fire, and the destructive nature of the fire is dependent on that ability to maintain operations. As I said, battle is an effort to inflict chaos on the enemy while maintaining your own order. We can agree to disagree on this, but I don't see us saying anything all that different.
>>>>Okay, I do think you are missing the point here, for me, I use a command radius, a very simple system for it but it is used in a particular way. In my system it is not used to corral or herd units at all, and I do think many other designers use it or intended it to be used in the same fashion I will explain.
>>>>The distance of the command radius simulates time and motion = distance. Meaning that on foot in a given turn a soldier can move a certain distance which is equal to the command radius it set. This also is counted as a battlefield engagement range for eyesight for small arms fire ranges etc.
>>>>>So, this imaginary radius represents all the activity within this zone of the commander and the flow of information back and forth between him and his men within that time period of a turn. Now, if a unit is found outside of the command radius for any reason all that happens is a full turn time delay in the relay of communications and the disadvantage of a -10% morale modifier for being out of control. This is in fact trifling and players are not herded in any way as a result of having units, "out of command". They just suffer delays in communications and morale as stated, big deal…they are in NO way restricted in acting or re-acting when outside of this zone. If they have previous orders they simply follow them and if not they will simply commit themselves to returning to the command zone. I do not think this is unrealistic in any way…<<<<<
Yes, I understand your reasoning, the questions are these compared to Reality [that is Napoleonic history]:
1. Does this actually represent how things were done on the battlefield?
2. Does the command radius actually portray ANY of the issues, options, problems faced by brigade, divisional and corps commanders? It doesn't have to portray all of them, just some.
If you agree with all my examples, I don't see how any of them are represented by command radius in either form or function.
>>>You just said the magic words : ""Tight formations were maintained because if they weren't, units could be isolated and caught unsupported."""" This is WHY some rules designers use a command radius. You are actually advocating the use of a command radius which is nothing more than a measured distance…<<<<
Am I really? Shane, being isolated and unsupported are disadvantages in combat, just as being supported are benefits in combat. You don't need any command radius to simulate this. Any decent combat system will create real problems for units unsupported or isolated and benefits for support without any need for a command radius. These are combat issues regardless of command radii and can be, should be portrayed by combat mechanisms. The command radius doesn't do that, it simply requires something that looks like it.
>>>>Easy, you are only seeing the circle and not seeing it as it is intended, a unit of measure, a distance, not a circle. If a unit falls outside of the measured distance (the command radius) delays and certain disadvantages will occur. I cannot understand how this is not realistic to you? It is simply a tool to use instead of placing a dispatch rider on the field. It is a measured distance for orders and communications and nothing else…<<<
Shane, the issue is whether that is the way Napoleonic commanders saw 'communication' and how it was done. Does it present any of the challenges faced by them? Bob Coggins has done a great job of detailing the rationale behind the command radius as it pertains to Napoleonic warfare. You agree. The question is whether that rationale matches the historical procedures and dynamics. And there are a lot of ways to mimic whatever those communication processes were, the question here is whether 'Command Radius' does this.
>>>Again, that depends on the rules designer and his understanding and concept of how it is to be used against the actual deployment of his troops and the size of the command. Like I keep saying, it is a unit of measure for time and motion = distance. I set a Brigadier's zone of command at 300yds because most, if not all brigades rarely will ever spread out more than 300yds of deployment of the brigade is followed true to actual regulations of frontage and depth. When dealing with Divisions and above the command radius increases to a greater distance to account for the increased spread of larger formations that should also be placed true to regulations. The trick here is to follow regulations and actual practice, players who do not do this will fall foul of the system and suffer these disadvantages as a result. <<<<<<
Well, see my response to Bob. As you agreed with him, have I summarized your ideas there too?
>>>>No, you think that this is what it is intended for but it is not, it is used for the exact purpose you state, ""Most are just the consequences of keeping in supporting/regulating distance or by becoming too spread out." These are your own words and these are the exact reasons rules designers who use command radius use them for.<<<<
What I was saying is that you have created a rule to make players do things that were really consequences of other, very different mechanisms on the battlefield, done for very different reasons.
You are drawing a circle around commands because they stayed together on the battlefield and that one way they communicated was limited by the speed of a horse. I am saying Napoleonic commands didn't stay together on the battlefield because of the limits in a horse's speed. If that had been the case you would never have seen armies grow from the SYW to the Napoleonic wars. It simply wasn't the limiting factor in all this, and command radius or anything similar wasn't seen as the reason to keep formations together by Napoleonic military men.
>>>>Like I keep saying to you, a command radius is nothing more than a, "unit of measure = to a set distance for communications" If a rules designer is using it for any other reason then he is giving "you" ammunition to continue your argument which in my eyes is a false one for me and my own rules intent.<<<<
Again, is that equation, that unit of measure, which sets the distance for communication, represent anything real in terms the Napoleonic battlefield other than a horse's speed? In regards to brigades, divisions and corps, does that radius play ANY role in who those units moved and fought? Does that set distance actually represent something that commanders adhered to, dealt with or were concerned about??? I'm telling you that it isn't, on a whole lot of levels.
>>>And this is why I do not play fantasy games, I designed a system to simulate Napoleonic warfare it is as simple as that.<<<<
Terrific. Then we are talking about the same thing.
>>>I resent that remark, you are taking my comments a little out of context here. I do understand simulations and why they are needed and used after all it was simple video games that were used to train US combat pilots way back in the 80's because it was noticed that kids were shooting down enemy aircraft at an incredible rate while actual pilots did not and could not react in time. It proved to the US that action and reaction was essential for survivability because life and death chances were and still are counted in mili-seconds.<<<<
Shane, I'm sorry, but if you are telling me that men have to shoot live ammo at each other to SIMULATE 'real warfare', I can't say it any other way. If there was some other context, I'm listening. Simulations were going strong further back that the 80's as you note with Kriegsspiel, Your example is simply using a game to practice and improve reaction skills, and in that sense it could be a training simulation.
>>>>>The Prussian high command of the Napoleonic wars began to learn and use war games (Kreigspiel) in their war planning and training. It was quickly understood that simulating actual campaigns and conflicts was a great tool in teaching officers about war. However, those rules were designed by actual military officers to simulate actual military situations, they were designed by men of a military back ground who understood the occurrences and appropriate responses to actions and counter actions from their experience of actual combat.
Militaries who do this today have vast amounts of experience and data behind them so as to be much better able to simulate warfare compared to rules designers like us who do not have such back grounds.<<<<
>>>>All we can do is read our books and try to understand what happened and how it happened and design rules and parameters from our understanding of this information. Thus as much as we think we are simulating combat we are doing nothing more than designing a game with toy soldier…you can't tell me anything different. I am not going to even go into the, "I wanna be Napoleon or, I "am" Napoleon" syndrome that many players have when they win several battles (games) in a row.<<<<
Well, if I can't tell you any different, I won't. I will say that all simulation designers struggle with a lack of first hand knowledge [Georg von Reisswitz did in creating Kriegsspiel. He talks about it in his introduction] and they have found a variety of methods for creating functional simulations in spite of that lack of information, or the poor quality of it. I'd be glad to tell you how that's done if you ever feel I can tell you different. Years and Years of research and practical testing behind those methods.
>>>>If we are lucky enough to design rules that work and seem to capture the essence of the period then great, well done and be proud of your work but I am not going to believe for a minute that I am simulating actual combat with a few charts and a set of dice while pushing around pretty painted soldiers on a table. I design rules to simulate but I play to have fun, actual warfare in not fun. Militaries do not play wargames for fun, they play them for training purposes so that when the real thing happens they will not become annihilated because they were unprepared.<<<<
Simulations are artificial environments, [note: artificial, as in not real]. They are very limited environments, they are not 'actual warfare'. In fact their only real value is that they AREN'T real warfare. Your jet pilots can practice reaction times without getting shot down or crashing. And if you read Georg von Reisswitz's introduction to Kriegsspiel, one thing he says surprised him was that the officers found his wargame 'entertaining' even though it was not designed to be. Many, many of the simulations designed by the military for very serious reasons have found their way into the commercial game market, both computer and board games.
So you say, "I designed a system to simulate Napoleonic warfare it is as simple as that", "but I am not going to believe for a minute that I am simulating actual combat with a few charts and a set of dice while pushing around pretty painted soldiers on a table." So what ARE you simulating?
If you want to simulate Napoleonic warfare, it helps to know how it's done by folks who have developed the methodologies over many decades and made simulations that work based on no more than what you describe as the basis for Napoleonic warfare.
If you aren't recreating, mimicking, portraying, illustrating, copying, or simulating Napoleonic warfare, then we really don't have to have this conversation. If you feel you can 'capture the essence' of the period, and not simulate, then don't worry about the history. Do whatever you want.
I am more than happy to talk about how simulations work and what that could mean for Napoleonic wargames. I am not so good at 'capturing essences.'

In my 1981 rules I used a "command radius" system. I had distances from commanders to units, and a die roll to determine which units had "initiative" and could act, and which ones couldn't.
I came up with the system because I was trying to get away from the typical games I had encountered where a player could move any battalion any time or anywhere he wanted to. I also felt that if one just used, say, a "brigade" basic unit, or a "Division" basic unit instead of a "battalion, then one would be essentially just playing what I considered to be an Avalon-Hill-type boardgame. (Not that that was bad – I played A-H games myself, but they didn't seem to cover the tactical aspects that Napoleonic miniatures did). Furthermore, if one had 20 "divisional pieces" moving around, allowing the player to move them any time, anywhere, it didn't seem any different from the unlimited "battalion" game. That is, I knew about battalion formations and their uses (and thought, therefore that I understood their tactics), and I thought there were "Grand Tactics" (I had read the term in books!) but could never figure out what "Grand Tactics were, other than being a free-moving battalion game (where the pieces were named brigades, divisions, or corps instead of battalions). And what is to be gained if your game goes from having battalions do anything a player wanted to having "divisions" do whatever you wanted? Another problem was that even though players would claim that in history units grouped together would do better than an isolated or supported single unit would. However, with omnipotent battalions moved around by the player, there did NOT seem to be any advantage to a group sticking together. In fact, such groups became vulnerable to the single "super-battalion" who could whiz around and outflank or fight off enemy units. So my "command radius" rules tried to impose some "history" on the situation (even though I later learned that I was ignorant of what that "history" actually was).
Back then I remembered attending an Origins convention, or perhaps one of the Seminar weekends that EMPIRE sponsored where they brought out David Chandler to speak, and seeing one of the EMPIRE guys (Scotty Bowden, Charlie Tarbox, or Jim Getz – I can't remember which now, but I think it was Jim) holding a copy of Siborne's Atlas. This was a rare book, with beautiful diagrams. He had opened to a page and was showing me (maybe others, too) that there seemed to be a pattern in the way the formations were laid out on the page. In other words, they didn't seem to be operating in typical wargame fashion of a bunch of battalions all over the place, but instead there almost seemed to be almost a secret code or something if we could only break it.
I did not know the mechanics of how or why larger formations "stuck together", I only suspected from my reading that they do, so in my rules I tried to penalize troops if not within their commander's "area", which was based upon the frontage I thought those formations would occupy.
One of the reasons why I abandoned my own design so readily and began on the VLB path was because George Jeffrey was able to show me that there really was a "Grand Tactical" level that had certain formations, movements, and tasks for their generals – the "secret code" I had been searching for. This information was the basis for the Tactics and Grand Tactics book George wrote, I edited, and The Courier published in 1982.
While this thread continues to discuss "Command Radius" and its pros and cons, perhaps we should simultaneously branch off a new thread (either here or in the Nap History section of TMP) that describes what Napoleonic "Grandes Manoeuvres" actually were (I encourage the use of that term now instead of Grand Tactics after hearing Art Pendragon use the term because "Grand Tactics" has so many personalized definitions now that people sometimes argue past each other due to those definitions). In that thread people could talk about what these movements actually were and what types of command and control rules one might use if one wanted to emphasize that kind of game.
-Ned

PS: No need to read further in this long post, but if you wish to check my bona fides for once being a "command radius" kind of guy here are my Vive L'Empereur! designer's notes rationalizing them:

Designer's Notes:

Initiative

Historically, seen and unseen obstacles stood between a commander's wish, as exemplified by his orders for a unit, and the successful carrying out of those orders. Once issued, those orders may not have been received, or they may have been delayed, or misunderstood, not carried out, partially carried out, carried out in the wrong way, or perhaps, carried out perfectly.

It is not necessary, at the level of command represented by this game, to define all of the possible obstacles; only to recognize that obstacles exist and to calculate an effect they might exercise on a commander's attempt to maneuver his units from one place to another on the battlefield. These obstacles may be called fog of war or the friction that keeps the chain of command machinery from functioning efficiently.

The initiative dice roll represents that friction, which the player attempts to alleviate by the proximity of commanders to their units. Rather than differentiate between national armies in terms of distance a regiment moves, or by the number of evolutions a regiment can make, I've given a lower initiative possibility to some nations to reflect the tendency of those troops to perform less handily on the field. This still allows the individual unit to be unrestricted in its actual movement.

The dice roll system is also used because it is easy to adapt or modify for special circumstances that players may wish to portray in a certain game or scenario.

This also allows many of the "unexplained" actions to happen. In many games a player can make every unit act, fight, or fire or move on every turn. With failed initiative, units might not fire at a target that would otherwise have been fired upon, except in self-defense. Why? Perhaps it was short of ammunition, or thought the unit was friendly, or perhaps it just wasn't prepared to shoot. The point is that we should NOT explain it. There were many things on the battlefield beyond the control of the commander. The player must accept that this friction occurs, and he must be flexible enough to adapt to situations in which his units may not operate optimally.

Initiative allows maneuvering units from one place to another. Failed initiatives still allow facing and formation changes, etc., because failed initiative doesn't mean a unit is helpless. In a 30-minute turn it can still act; we are simulating the ability of a commander to maneuver units in a given amount of time. Further, failed initiatives shouldn't be interpreted as unit immobility. For example, if a unit moves, then fails initiative and can't move, then moves on turn 3, that can be interpreted as a move, stop for reordering, then moved again OR as having moved 3 turns at a slower-than-normal rate for all three turns. In the latter case the commander doesn't need to know why it took 3 turns to cross a distance that would only need two turns of normal move distance; only that it happened and that he needs to deal with it. Again, the emphasis is not on the minor tactical vicissitudes of the unit, but on maneuvering of units from position to position and that the time it takes to move to the new position may not be a certainty.

The Scotsman,

You are way to literal. If the turn is 30 minutes and the brigades are within the radius of a division general, where is the division general? You do not know and neither do I save he is where he is supposed to be, somewhere within the command radius of his unts.

Your need to know where a general, or for that matter a messanger, is at any one moment is nothing more than a wargamer's desire to control everything on the table.

In a 30 minute turn it is easily possible for a general to be in dozens of locations. But even were he at 10 different locations you would not know where he was or when he was there at any one moment, save somewhere in his radius, which as sufficient knowledge on the historical Napoleonic battlefield and also sufficient in Napoleon's
Battles.

Yet, from your perspective as a wargamer trained to think in a linear fashion you just gotta know. As you have no contol over the exact location of your subordinates and as you know they are commanding their units, within the time constraints of the 30 minutes turn, may I ask why you just gotta know? Your historical counterpart didn't.

As for the distance of the command radius of a corps general it is partially based on his staff but it is primarily based on his responsibility to command his units. As the lens through which he views the battle must be wider inodr that he can command his formations, a corps general ususally sits further from the hurly burly of battle, to widen his view.

The same is true with army generals but even more so because of their duties and responsibiles, the entire army, cover an even broader front requiring him to view the field through a even wider lens.

What never ceases to amaze is the inability of wargamers to understand these guys were the most professional soldiers who ever lived. Guys like Duhesme, Picton, Friant, Langeron, Wurtemburg et al had years of experience, fought in dozens of pitched battles and hundreds of combats and skirmishes and in between trained for the next war. Even guys such as Orange whom we consider a poor commander had more training and knowlege than any 21st Century gamer.

They studied military subjects, they drilled their soldiers almost daily by voice command, they conducted parades and maneuvers till the movements were second nature to the officers and soldiers, they daily rode cross country testing their ablility to discern everything from the construction of buildings to the number of sheep in a field at great distances. Most had a minimum of 10 and many 15 or moe years experience at all levels of command. They were promoted because they were good and they did their jobs.

Despite this 21st Century wargamers just gotta control them beyond all common or 19th Century military sense. Many wargamers believe for the rules to be valid they have to be able to precisely identify a general's or aide's locations at any one point within a turn. Contrary, in the 19th Century senior generals did not have an overwhelming need to control their subordinates.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Mike,

"Bonaparte. Napoleon, 23" E +3D."

Ah! Well at last we know why he was so often portrayed as having his hand in his coat. He was looking for his tape measure to see if a formation was within Command Radius!

"So what`s happening here? What processes or effects are being simulated or represented?"

Indeed, while you are at it you might want to ask on what rational basis all those other hundreds of commander ratings, that give rise to radii in Naps Battles, are all about.

Bob said "command radius (based on the speed of a horse) governed by the lens though which generals at various levels in the chain of command view the battle and modified by the individual initiative of the various officers (based on their historical performance)"

So, equine factors aside, on what basis was the "individual initiative of the various officers (based on their historical performance)" assessed, that allowed these myriad commanders to be allotted an inch or two, may be three, here or there, in relation to the rest of the expansive and multi national list.

Quite a few of whom must have taken a bit of hunting down, in terms of making a comparative assessment.

What was the analytical process? Was there some point scoring method? Was there some objective criteria? How was one commander who fought in a lot of actions compared with another who only took part in a couple?

What if the guy who was 2 – 0 was a klutz who got lucky, or historians liked him, compared with the one who was 8 – 4 and was always looked down on, did they still get the same rating?

Scotsman,

I'm enjoying the exchanges between Shane and yourself (good points all round) but could you please check you postings and bang in some line spaces.

The first part of Your 07 Feb 2009 1:25 p.m. PST was really hard to read in terms of replys to Shanes points.

End of Whinge

So am I actually, I am waiting for TheScotsman's response to Bob's post though…Bob did a wonderful job of explaining his concept of the command radius, much better than I did so I really want to see his reply.

I will also respond again as I get time later on.

One point I do want to make is this, a Napoleonic rules designer when deciding on a style of rules to write also has to decide on the level of functionality he wishes to portray and the level of command and also complexity within. One of the deciding factors in this is which way will he show Order relay and delay. One way is to show Dispatch riders physically on the field and the lapse in time while they ride but many players do not like this level of complexity and prefer a more abstract way, such as Command Radius rules. This is the way I went for my own system because I did not like the running around of single figures from one command level to the other all over the field, it was a simple matter of taste.

Instead I opted for the command radius and Order activation based on the national ability coupled with the individual ability shown for each commander in a fairly simple system of activation rolls coupled with a time delay based on the command radius. I really cannot see why Thescotsman has a problem with the concept but each to his own, I will continue to advocate the concept of the CR and would not contemplate going back to dispatch riders or other styles that I have played in the past. I found the CR concept best fitted what I like in a system and will use it until I no longer desire to push figures around anymore, which will not be for a very long time.

Shane

Bob wrote:
>>>>>You are way to literal. If the turn is 30 minutes and the brigades are within the radius of a division general, where is the division general? You do not know and neither do I save he is where he is supposed to be, somewhere within the command radius of his units.

>>>>Your need to know where a general, or for that matter a messanger, is at any one moment is nothing more than a wargamer's desire to control everything on the table.<<<<<

>>>>In a 30 minute turn it is easily possible for a general to be in dozens of locations. But even were he at 10 different locations you would not know where he was or when he was there at any one moment, save somewhere in his radius, which as sufficient knowledge on the historical Napoleonic battlefield and also sufficient in Napoleon's Battles.<<<<<<<

>>>>Yet, from your perspective as a wargamer trained to think in a linear fashion you just gotta know. As you have no contol over the exact location of your subordinates and as you know they are commanding their units, within the time constraints of the 30 minutes turn, may I ask why you just gotta know? Your historical counterpart didn't.<<<<

Bob:
So, if this general [are we talking brigade, divisional, or Corps here?] is all over the place, and no one can know where he or his couriers are, how does anyone find them on the battlefield, let alone us lowly wargamers?

Actually, most brigade and divisional commanders were NOT all over the place in thirty minutes, and seldom for a corps commander. Three reasons: 1. They had expected places to be so messagers could find them, and 2. they had to be where the established systems of command and control made it most efficient to be, and 3. they had to be places where they could see the action. Would you like some historical examples? At the brigade, divisional and/or corps level? Which army would you like me to focus on?

>>>>>>>As for the distance of the command radius of a corps general it is partially based on his staff but it is primarily based on his responsibility to command his units. As the lens through which he views the battle must be wider inodr that he can command his formations, a corps general usually sits further from the hurly burly of battle, to widen his view.

>>>>The same is true with army generals but even more so because of their duties and responsibilities, the entire army, cover an even broader front requiring him to view the field through a even wider lens.

>>>>>What never ceases to amaze is the inability of wargamers to understand these guys were the most professional soldiers who ever lived. Guys like Duhesme, Picton, Friant, Langeron, Wurtemburg et al had years of experience, fought in dozens of pitched battles and hundreds of combats and skirmishes and in between trained for the next war. Even guys such as Orange whom we consider a poor commander had more training and knowledge than any 21st Century gamer.<<<<

Well, aside from the Prince of Orange, I can accept that. The question is what did these professional soldiers do? They certainly didn't run all over the place. They were where they were supposed to be, PARTICULARLY divisional and brigade commanders. So, do you know where brigade and divisional commanders were expected to be in a battle line? It wasn't a dozen different places. There were very specific places, optimum locations for senior commanders in terms of communication, command and control. These were established and trained. It isn't a secret and it wasn't in the middle of their command or some radius based on the speed of a courier's horse.

>>>>They studied military subjects, they drilled their soldiers almost daily by voice command, they conducted parades and maneuvers till the movements were second nature to the officers and soldiers, they daily rode cross country testing their ablility to discern everything from the construction of buildings to the number of sheep in a field at great distances. Most had a minimum of 10 and many 15 or moe years experience at all levels of command. They were promoted because they were good and they did their jobs.<<<<

>>>>Despite this 21st Century wargamers just gotta control them beyond all common or 19th Century military sense. Many wargamers believe for the rules to be valid they have to be able to precisely identify a general's or aide's locations at any one point within a turn. Contrary, in the 19th Century senior generals did not have an overwhelming need to control their subordinates.<<<<

Well, actually NCOs were the ones that trained the troops daily by voice command. Officers didn't, particularly brigade, divisional and corps commanders. Often company officers didn't stay on the parade grounds very long. However, I am not talking about precisely identifying anything but the SOPs for brigade, divisional, and corps commanders concerning where they commanded from, and how.

Where do we find most experienced officers most of the time in battlefield situations? It is neither in the middle of some command radius or their command, nor is it running around to a dozen places in a 30 minute time span. These guys were efficient and well-trained. So where was the most efficient places to be? Where were they trained to be?

So, "19th Century senior generals didn't have an overwhelming need to control their subordinates?" Okay, if you say so. What did they need to do to sustain command control at the 'expected' levels? What did these experienced and professional military men do in all those dozens of places they were possibly running to? Why didn't they send couriers?

Bob, I am neither assuming these Napoleonic generals were unprofessional and unsophisticated, nor am I suggesting we, in designing or playing wargames, have to know exactly where the officers or their messengers were at every tick of the clock. I am saying that lots of folks on the battlefield had to know where to find them easily. I am saying there were sophisticated procedures for Brigade, Divisional, and Corps commanders, SOPs that were very similar for all armies, that we can use to determine pretty much where they would be most of the time, why, and how they exercised command control from there.

Isn't that what the command radius is supposed to represent?

Trajanus: Sorry, for some reason it took out all the spaces this time. Here it is with some spaces…. I hope it is more legible.

Shane wrote:
>>>>>Sorry, you seem to have misunderstood me, I do not design a system around these players at all, I design a system based on my own historical knowledge and understanding coupled with the advice given to me by several good historians and authors. What I do have to do is set in place parameters which account for what some players will try to do. You see them find a loop-hole or manipulate a certain situation or circumstance so you have to close it or you have to re-think the situation and re-write a section of the rules. Laws of a nation are amended in the very same way in any legal system. I NEVER write a rule with rules manipulators in mind, I have to re-think a rule when they flout it…<<<<<

Shane:
Terrific, then we don't have to talk about rules to control, curtail, or manipulate them. As for loopholes, a good job of field/play testing the rules will take care of that. The more complex the rules, the more need for play testing. It is like an author with his own book, after a while he can't see all the grammar and spelling mistakes. He's too close to it. The bigger and more complex the book, the more editing is necessary.

>>>>It is not about herding cats or designing better hammers at all, it is about closing loop-holes that may have been missed on design. This is my point, you do have to amend rules from time to time to stop these people.<<<<
Well, you can close loopholes to clarify rules, and you should when you can, but you can't 'stop these people'—they will just find some other loopholes, no matter how clear your rules. That's what I mean about herding cats. Cows move in herds naturally, cats don't.

>>>Sorry, cannot say I ever watched much Star-Trek, not a fan at all. However, If the game was so designed as to be unwinable then all I can say is, well done to Kirk for doing what he did. However, I do not write rules to be unwinable, I write rules to be fair and realistic to simulate warfare on the table top. If I designed an unwinable system I would have designed "Empire". Unless you are French or British you cannot be expected to win.<<<<

What? But he wasn't playing 'in the spirit of the game' and cheating to boot!

>>>>My point on this is that players will find a way to get around rules and win outside the spirit of the game or parameters. The rules designers might not account for things like this but are conscious of the fact that things will occur outside of the rules. Knowing this they go into the game with half the intent to hone skills etc but also to watch for the unforeseen events that occur that when they do make them re-think and re-write their own parameters. This is not a bad thing; this is an evolutionary process that MUST be done to find these loop-holes and occurrences that are overlooked at first design of the rules. Do you understand my meaning?<<<<

Okay, 'the spirit of the game'? Are we going existential here? There are the rules to the game and that is it. If you, as the designer, can't express what you want to happen on the game table with the rules, calling on the 'spirit of the game' isn't going to help, even if the players were clear about what that meant to you. Have you ever heard someone complain that a chess player, monopoly, bridge, or poker player wasn't playing in 'the spirit of the game?'

That usually means they weren't being good sports or were cheating, not that they weren't playing the game a 'certain way' or avoiding looking for unique advantages within the written rules. When I hear that said in wargaming circles, it can also mean a player did something that was unconventional or unhistorical, but allowable within the rules. More often than not, it does. That comes from badly written rules, not bad wargaming. You gave a great example with the Aussie naval exercise. Did they cheat? Did they break the rules? No, they psyched out the US procedures and used them, just like a wargamer will use what he knows of his opponent to win. Same thing with the Millinium 2003 game.

You better believe the US team complained that the defenders weren't playing 'in the spirit of the game.' Why, because the defenders used the rules in unexpected ways—and then the 'loopholes' were closed so the defenders would 'play right.' Yes, I think understand your meaning concerning loopholes, but it has nothing to do with 'the spirit' of the game.

Games are puzzles, and human beings enjoy solving them. When they have discovered the optimum moves, the fun is over and they move on to another game. Some games, because of the chance, variety or complexity involved, offer a wide variety of ways to win, lots of optimum moves. Players are going to try every rule, every mechanic to see what produces success. And you can certainly continue to close loop-holes [I am assuming missed consequences of rules' interactions], but that is a lot different than trying to write rules to stop players from finding them.

>>>>No, you are wrong for my mind, you're missing my point, yes, commanders work with rules and regulations, doctrines and parameters. This is a given. But when the guns start firing they also know that all of this begins to deteriorate over time. The more deadly or severe the enemy fire the quicker your own response deteriorates if you cannot match them at that point. But the point is, as much as commanders try to maintain order it is impossible, inevitably, over time this collapses and chaos, which might have had zero or negligible hold in the beginning now is at the point where it takes over. Also, if the original plans, orders, regulations, doctrines and routines are flawed or obsolete then you are fighting a war behind the 8 ball from the start.<<<<

As I said, it is the enemy that tries to produce the chaos, and the training and command control, the willingness of the troops to 'follow the rules' in tactics and command determine whether or how fast order deteriorates facing fire, and the destructive nature of the fire is dependent on that ability to maintain operations. As I said, battle is an effort to inflict chaos on the enemy while maintaining your own order. We can agree to disagree on this, but I don't see us saying anything all that different.

>>>>Okay, I do think you are missing the point here, for me, I use a command radius, a very simple system for it but it is used in a particular way. In my system it is not used to corral or herd units at all, and I do think many other designers use it or intended it to be used in the same fashion I will explain.

>>>>The distance of the command radius simulates time and motion = distance. Meaning that on foot in a given turn a soldier can move a certain distance which is equal to the command radius it set. This also is counted as a battlefield engagement range for eyesight for small arms fire ranges etc.

>>>>>So, this imaginary radius represents all the activity within this zone of the commander and the flow of information back and forth between him and his men within that time period of a turn. Now, if a unit is found outside of the command radius for any reason all that happens is a full turn time delay in the relay of communications and the disadvantage of a -10% morale modifier for being out of control. This is in fact trifling and players are not herded in any way as a result of having units, "out of command". They just suffer delays in communications and morale as stated, big deal…they are in NO way restricted in acting or re-acting when outside of this zone. If they have previous orders they simply follow them and if not they will simply commit themselves to returning to the command zone. I do not think this is unrealistic in any way…<<<<<

Yes, I understand your reasoning, the questions are these compared to Reality [that is Napoleonic history]:
1. Does this actually represent how things were done on the battlefield?
2. Does the command radius actually portray ANY of the issues, options, problems faced by brigade, divisional and corps commanders? It doesn't have to portray all of them, just some.

If you agree with all the examples I gave, I don't see how any of them are represented by command radius in either form or function.

>>>You just said the magic words : ""Tight formations were maintained because if they weren't, units could be isolated and caught unsupported."""" This is WHY some rules designers use a command radius. You are actually advocating the use of a command radius which is nothing more than a measured distance…<<<<

Am I really? Shane, being isolated and unsupported are disadvantages for combat, just as being supported are benefits in combat. You don't need any command radius to simulate these conditions or their consequences. Any decent combat system will create real problems for units unsupported or isolated and benefits for support without any need for a command radius. These are combat issues regardless of command radii and can be, should be portrayed by combat mechanisms. The command radius doesn't do that, it simply requires something that looks like it without any of the actual dynamics.

>>>>Easy, you are only seeing the circle and not seeing it as it is intended, a unit of measure, a distance, not a circle. If a unit falls outside of the measured distance (the command radius) delays and certain disadvantages will occur. I cannot understand how this is not realistic to you? It is simply a tool to use instead of placing a dispatch rider on the field. It is a measured distance for orders and communications and nothing else…<<<<<<

Shane, the issue is whether that is the way Napoleonic commanders saw 'communication' and how it was done. Does it present any of the challenges faced by them? Bob Coggins has done a great job of detailing the rationale behind the command radius as it pertains to Napoleonic warfare. You agree. The question is whether that rationale matches the historical procedures and dynamics. And there are a lot of ways to mimic whatever those communication processes were, the question here is whether 'Command Radius' does this.

>>>Again, that depends on the rules designer and his understanding and concept of how it is to be used against the actual deployment of his troops and the size of the command. Like I keep saying, it is a unit of measure for time and motion = distance. I set a Brigadier's zone of command at 300yds because most, if not all brigades rarely will ever spread out more than 300yds of deployment of the brigade is followed true to actual regulations of frontage and depth. When dealing with Divisions and above the command radius increases to a greater distance to account for the increased spread of larger formations that should also be placed true to regulations. The trick here is to follow regulations and actual practice, players who do not do this will fall foul of the system and suffer these disadvantages as a result. <<<<<<

Well, see my response to Bob. As you agreed with him, have I summarized your ideas there too?

>>>>No, you think that this is what it is intended for but it is not, it is used for the exact purpose you state, ""Most are just the consequences of keeping in supporting/regulating distance or by becoming too spread out." These are your own words and these are the exact reasons rules designers who use command radius use them for.<<<<

What I was saying is that you have created a rule to make players do things that were really consequences of other, very different mechanisms on the battlefield, done for very different reasons. This means in the end, players are dealing with any of the actual command dynamics the command radius is supposed to portray.

You are drawing a circle around commands because they stayed together on the battlefield. According to this, their communication was limited by the speed of a horse.

I am saying Napoleonic commands didn't stay together on the battlefield because of the limits in a horse's speed. If that had been the case you would never have seen armies grow from the SYW to the Napoleonic wars. It simply wasn't the limiting factor in all this, and command radius or anything similar wasn't seen as the reason to keep formations together by Napoleonic military men.

>>>>Like I keep saying to you, a command radius is nothing more than a, "unit of measure = to a set distance for communications" If a rules designer is using it for any other reason then he is giving "you" ammunition to continue your argument which in my eyes is a false one for me and my own rules intent.<<<<

Again, is that equation, that unit of measure, which sets the distance for communication, represent anything real in terms the Napoleonic battlefield other than a horse's speed? In regards to brigades, divisions and corps, does that radius play ANY role in who those units moved and fought? Does that set distance actually represent something that commanders adhered to, dealt with or were concerned about??? I'm telling you that it isn't, on a whole lot of levels.

>>>And this is why I do not play fantasy games, I designed a system to simulate Napoleonic warfare it is as simple as that.<<<<

Terrific. Then we are talking about the same thing.

>>>I resent that remark, you are taking my comments a little out of context here. I do understand simulations and why they are needed and used after all it was simple video games that were used to train US combat pilots way back in the 80's because it was noticed that kids were shooting down enemy aircraft at an incredible rate while actual pilots did not and could not react in time. It proved to the US that action and reaction was essential for survivability because life and death chances were and still are counted in mili-seconds.<<<<

Shane, I'm sorry, but if you are telling me that men have to shoot live ammo at each other to SIMULATE 'real warfare', I can't say it any other way. If there was some other context, I'm listening. Simulations were going strong further back that the 80's as you note with Kriegsspiel, Your example is simply using a game to practice and improve reaction skills, and in that sense it could be a training simulation.

>>>>>The Prussian high command of the Napoleonic wars began to learn and use war games (Kreigspiel) in their war planning and training. It was quickly understood that simulating actual campaigns and conflicts was a great tool in teaching officers about war. However, those rules were designed by actual military officers to simulate actual military situations, they were designed by men of a military back ground who understood the occurrences and appropriate responses to actions and counter actions from their experience of actual combat.

>>>Militaries who do this today have vast amounts of experience and data behind them so as to be much better able to simulate warfare compared to rules designers like us who do not have such back grounds.<<<<

>>>>All we can do is read our books and try to understand what happened and how it happened and design rules and parameters from our understanding of this information. Thus as much as we think we are simulating combat we are doing nothing more than designing a game with toy soldier…you can't tell me anything different. I am not going to even go into the, "I wanna be Napoleon or, I "am" Napoleon" syndrome that many players have when they win several battles (games) in a row.<<<<

Well, if I can't tell you any different, I won't. I will say that all simulation designers struggle with a lack of first hand knowledge [Georg von Reisswitz did in creating Kriegsspiel, even with the help of experienced officers. He talks about it in his introduction] and simulation designers have found a variety of methods for creating functional simulations in spite of that lack of information, or the poor quality of it. I'd be glad to tell you how that's done if you ever feel I can tell you different. Years and Years of research and practical testing behind those methods.

>>>>If we are lucky enough to design rules that work and seem to capture the essence of the period then great, well done and be proud of your work but I am not going to believe for a minute that I am simulating actual combat with a few charts and a set of dice while pushing around pretty painted soldiers on a table. I design rules to simulate but I play to have fun, actual warfare in not fun. Militaries do not play wargames for fun, they play them for training purposes so that when the real thing happens they will not become annihilated because they were unprepared.<<<<

Simulations are artificial environments, [note: artificial, as in 'not real']. They are very limited environments, they are not 'actual warfare'. In fact their only real value is that they AREN'T real warfare. Your jet pilots can practice reaction times without getting shot down or crashing. And if you read Georg von Reisswitz's introduction to Kriegsspiel, one thing he says surprised him was that the officers found his wargame 'entertaining' even though it was not designed to be. Many, many of the simulations designed by the military for very serious reasons have found their way into the commercial game market, both computer and board games.

So you say, "I designed a system to simulate Napoleonic warfare it is as simple as that", "but I am not going to believe for a minute that I am simulating actual combat with a few charts and a set of dice while pushing around pretty painted soldiers on a table." So what ARE you simulating?

If you want to simulate Napoleonic warfare, it helps to know how it's done by folks who have developed the methodologies over many decades and made simulations that work based on no more than what you describe as the basis for Napoleonic warfare.

If you aren't recreating, mimicking, portraying, illustrating, copying, or simulating Napoleonic warfare, then we really don't have to have this conversation. If you feel you can 'capture the essence' of the period, and not simulate, then don't worry about the history. Do whatever you want.

I am more than happy to talk about how simulations work and what that could mean for Napoleonic wargames. I am not so interesting in 'capturing essences.'

Shane has nailed it with his response to point 3 on page 4, made 6pm 6 Feb. (long- I won't quote it here), and Scotsman actually hinted at it in his post above it. Commanders kept their Battalions with in a certain distance of communication. CRs are used to represent 2 different things.

1) They tie lower level general- eg Shako Divisions where the individual Battalions must stay with in 12" of the DC (who is not the player). As Scotsman said- units were with in a certian distance of their leader, so he could communicate (even if by regulating battalion). This isn't just because of doctrine, but a real need to be able to command and fight a battalion.

Command radii represent not a distance to a real general, but a period of time. If a battalion breaks the regulating line then a message must be passed to it by courier, so if the commander sent it a 10 minute ride away, then its going to be a minimum of 30 minutes (even if cavalry.) before it gets back to you. Infantry take longer.

Musket Battle fields are smokey places. Visability is limited.

2) if you are commanding with the Player's general he also has to pass info. Now you may be willing to accept PLAYERS (not subordinates) can act ahistoric- sending a unit out further than was normal, even out of sight, or even say 'Yes at this battle, this battalion was sent to occupy X'. Once you do that you have to consider that there comes a point where they can not be easily commanded, and you need a system for passing orders to it. The unit that occupied X will stay their until told to otherwise.

Its not the sending them away that requires a CR, its the getting the s back that you need to regulate.

Once you abandon a form of CR, what stops players putting units anywhere, with no thought for the realities of a situation- I don't mean how it LOOKED historiacally, I mean the reasons it looked that way. Regulating Battalions still impose a CR- except it isn't centred on the CO, but rather it acts like a chain. It is still a restriction.

The only suggestion was to stop playing with opponents that don't maneuver historically. I'll get you a tin opener for that particular can of worms! How serious is the infraction before You (not we) pack take our toys home.

CR- "While is was possible for individual battalions to be sent where the CO couldn't see it, and did indeen happen, it was usual for a CO to keep units X yards from him. This game simulates this, and prevents individual units being used like fire and forget missiles, by having a CR for any lower level unit not commanded by the player himself"

Consider this. Wellington took shelter in a Square at Waterloo. At this point his CR was effectively Nil. The army was effectively out of command. Now, imagine a similar situation in a battle on the table. The General is on the left flank, and that flank is under attack. A whole division on the right flank is unengaged. The best solution is for it to march to the Left and flank the attack. With no C&C mechanism how do we simulate the passing of the order?

Fascinating stuff everyone, especially from the rules writers.

I would like to mention two minor items for consideration: first, if the use of CR is to reduce the effectiveness of the 922' tall general, doesn't it seem odd that the same imposing figure spends a lot of time leaning over the battle field with his mighty ruler doing just the opposite of what one of the intentions of a CR rule is for? 'My division commander must not stray out of 20" from my corps commander and now I've got to keep my brigade commanders within 12" of the DC!'

And second: with a CR rule in place it is simply impossible for certain historical actions to re-occur. I'm sure there are many, but I'll cite just one, from one of my favorite battles … Eylau.

At the crisis for the Russians, before Lestoq managed to get all the way from the west flank to the east flank (and how did he do that with CR rules?), the differences in the command radii of the French were extreme. Soult's Corps occupied a rontage of roughly 1.5 km, from the windmill to the east edge of the town. Napoleon was somewhere in the eastern 500m of that frontage, near the center of town. Davout, on the other hand, had a frontage of just under 4km, almost three times that of Soults. Given that Davout was somewhere within that frontage, he would have been a mimimun of 1.5 to a maximum of 5.5 km from the Emperor. (This data taken from the map on page 157 of Napoleons Finest, MHP 2006)

Now we can argue about the exact distances if you like, I used straight line measurements and rounded to the nearest half klick, but my point remains. How can you specify a CR of .75 Km for Soult (assuming a max frontage of 1.5km) and 2.2km (assuming a frontage of 4.5km?) for Davout? And taken in terms of tabletop, at 1" equals 25m, that is a healthy 30" for Soult and an amazing 90" for Davout!!! And this gives Napoleon a really stunning radius of 3.5km assuming Davout was somewhere in the middle of the frontage of his Corps. Don't like the 1:25 scale … ok, but the ratios hold true even if we go to 1:100 (Soult ~8", Davout ~23" and Napoleon ~36").

I do understand the reasons why CR's are chosen as rules devices, but the CR does hamper the simulation of some historical actions. I'm much more in favor of something along what Tom Dye was talking about (unit cohesion) in that Command formations will continue to do what they were assigned at the top of the game unless beaten up by the enemy or ordered to do other wise. A simple command die roll will do. IIRC, doesn't the Colonel's AOE do that? And as to why bother to put out leader stands if there is no CR to mess with, well don't attached commanders matter and the death of a commander and subsequent replacement by an ADC or such generated by the Army command stand at "x" distance away … that has to be traveled by the figure. Right?

I'm just saying … and listening hard, too.

Kevin in Albuquerque

BTW, Bob … got a chance to look over your NBIII two weekends ago. One of your biggest fans lives in town. Very nice presenation and the explanatory diagrams very useful. Bit much for my pocket today at the $75 USD retail, but it's on the list for the reference material if nothing else. Some day …

Kevin,

I think you are missing the whole idea of CR's. The decided radius of a CR is equal to : time and motion = distance.

Time : the amount of time allotted to a given game turn

Motion : the speed of movement in that given game turn

Distance : the length (measure) of movement resulting in the relationship between time and motion that is used in order relay and delay…

Result :

Once you arrive at the CR unit of measure you have a tool to work with to allow you to understand the relationship between the chain of command both up and down the ladder. This distance I have seen many times to be set at around 500yds for many systems but can be very different, depending on the scale and length of time etc…

Now, if a command chain has distances higher than 500yds anywhere along the chain of command then delays occur. An order that might take "X" amount of time (a game turn) to bring about an order change increases to correspond to the extended length of the distance between the various commands in the chain of command which actually equates to a delay two or more game turns because of the increased distance.

This results in order activation delays corresponding to extra "game turns" to wait before an order can be activated. It is as simple as that, my mind boggles that people are not seeing this point but instead declaring that the idea of using a CR is bad, wrong or militaristic. Refer to the post written by "Last Hussar" above, he hit the nail on the head with his explanation of it all very clearly and easily understandable.

It has been said that the use of CR's is unmilitaristic and therefor should not be used in CC rules but that thinking is totally wrong, commanders of formations calculated the relationships between time & motion = distance covered all the time!! The essence of their whole worth revolved around the ability to use this tool coupled with many other distinct abilities in order to command troops. If a commander did not understand the relationships between time, motion and distance he would have been ill posted indeed. Time management is, I would dare say, one of the most important tasks of a General to be able to excel at, so much so that his command and its relative safety relied on it many times.

If a commander did not understand how to use time management, especially in a fast moving combat situation then how would he be expected to be able to deal with and clearly make judgements, issue commands and orders, decipher incoming orders and expedite them down his own chain of command, especially as combat did not stop and situations changed rapidly. If a commander could not keep up with it all he was ill posted. Think about it, orders need time to be thought about and a plan formalized, the order then has to be written (or verbalized) and carried over a measure of distance to and from a command destination. It then has to be read or explained and a response carried out and sent down the chain to those under him.

The use of CR's is the "EASIST" and most efficient way to depict this on the table top without going to all the trouble of going through the entire process as I described above. The use of CR's cuts out all of that work and defines instead a simple formula which is : time and motion = distance covered. Once this unit of measure is defined and coupled with your scale and length of game turns you have a pretty easy format to then establish how long orders take to bound around.

Once you arrive at the length of time it takes to receive and carry out an order you come to the point in time where you begin to roll activation rolls for example and can continue the flow of the battle more easily accounting for all of the various factors I have mentioned above.

I cannot fathom why some cannot see what I am explaining, but if you do not like using CR's then go back to using dispatch riders instead. They also work but are much more long winded in their representation and tracking on the field.

Regards,
Shane

Most of the discussion lately has been based on the Napoleonic battlefield. But this thread is also on the ACW and other boards. I'm much more familiar with the ACW, and I thought I should point out that most ACW battles were fought in wooded territory where it was usually impossible for an army commander to see all of his forces. In fact, this was often true of corps commanders as well. One of the reasons Lee gave to Jefferson Davis for wanting to reorganize his army from 2 corps to 3 after the death of Jackson was that no one general could keep half his army in sight at any given time.

My point is that a mere radius does not accurately depict Shane's time-distance rationale under these circumstances, and resorting to the courier/aide figure moving on the table, following the roads/tracks, if any (and maybe getting lost), would more accurately reflect the time it took to get orders and messages back and forth.

Even more true to life would be having the various corps fighting on different tables in different rooms, where the players can't see what's happening on other parts of "field."

OK, now back to your highly interesting exchange.

Hi don,

What you say is true, we also account for this, if the actual line of sight LOS from one commander in the chain to the next is not clear but hidden then the chance to activate orders at the end of the elapsed time decreases to account for this. Commanders who are not clearly visible along that line, either up or down deduce the Activation rolls. Things such as built up areas, woods, forests and so on have a major bearing on the Activation rolls so players are reminded to ensure their commanders are not hidden unnecessarily or suffer reduced chances to active or change orders.

As a matter of interest, this paragraph I have just written is all about the dispatch riders and the difficulties they had trying to find commanders on the battlefield so using clear LOS and distance gives the best possible chance of the rider getting through and on time. If not then delays occur like I have in my rules, hidden or out of sight destination commanders in the chain reduce the chance to Activate Orders via rolls. This cuts out all the need to worry about dispatch riders in the first place and replaces it with CR's and Activation Rolls…simple.

Commanders who step into and take over any command in their chain below them also stop the chain and new orders either do not get through or suffer increased failures to activation rolls as well. The point made about Wellington inside a square in a very good case in point…

Personally, I prefer CR's than having to work out all the rules foe dispatch riders etc…just think about what is involved to get a system in place to cover all the eventualities and factors for that…give me CR's and simple Order Activation rolls any day over that mess.

Shane

p.s. please do not get me wrong, I am an advocate of the use of CR's but I do not say that using other methods are poor or wrong, I am just saying that for example, dispatch riders is way too methodical for my liking. My points in this debate is to defend the use of CR's because I feel personally very strongly about them and their worth. If people wish to use other methods then great, I would use others also if involved in such designed systems with other groups of systems I might play but for my own system CR's are my preferred tool.

Shane

Guys,

I am afraid the lack of my ability to rewrite the rules on this site has led many of you to draw incorrect conclusions, due to my omissions and short hand, as to the depth of the command rules in NBs. That's on me not you guys.

Lets take Eylau. Davout has an 80% chance of making his initiative and pursuing his orders if beyond the CR of Napoleon which is 2800 yards. If he doesn't make his initiative his formations move a half move. If his infantry division generals are beyond his CR they have a 60% to 70% chance depending on who it is to move a half move. Remember division generals don't have an equal Grand Tactical authority.

Units entering the battle strategically such as Lestoq and Ney many continue to maneuver in pursuit of their orders as long as the formations remain in march column. In any event Lestoq can continue to use his personal initiative 70% to move his units. regardless where the army commander is -Bennigsen I think.

If Soult has a 1000 yard CR the Command circumference is 2000 yards. In any event any of his divisions which are beyond his command can attempt to operate on the CR of the division generals.

As for visibility. Generals do not have to see their units to know where they are on the battlefield in relation to the other formations. They need only a map to draw a picture in their mind's eye. Its called experience and training.

Smoke is another hardy prenniel. If you are a foot soldier or company officer you are among it and it is annoying. Artillery doctrine recommends no more than one round/minute in order to allow the smoke to clear. Where the corps and army generals stood, back from the hurly burly of combat to allow for visibility, smoke was an occasional annoyance. Were it more it would be referred to as such but it is not.

Being rushed on the battlefield is a 20th Century problem. Troops moved a 2 to 3 mph and the observer had plenty of time to think about what to do. Its only within the immediacy of tactical combats that we get the typical malarky, mostly from newbies that time collapsed and oh God we're all going to die, that we all read in diaries and letters. You won't find these things in the diaries and letters and/or memoirs of senior officers because they did not view the battlefield that way as they had seen it all before.

Finally, I appreciate the kind comments regarding the physical presentation of NBsIII. The publisher and Craig and I had long discussions regarding the physical package and the price. His decision was final. Thus, the $75. USD Regardless of my concerns the rules are doing well. Seapower sells for over $125. USD WAB and its supplements easily run over $125. USD FoG and its supplements run $215 USD and the average board wargame costs on average $75 USD to $100. USD Shako checks in at $45 USD but with the scenario supplement of $20 USD it checks in at $65. USD The self published rules of GA and AoE check in at $30/$35 but with the scenario books they run an addition $20 USD or so. The last three rules are in B/W and do not offer the playing aides the NBsIII which is in full color does.

If you like Shako, GA or AoE, and many do, none of the above is relevent. You play the rules you like. On the other hand if you are also aiming at gamers who do not play Napoleonic, say FoW gamers, color and playing aides are relevent. As the publisher's marketing company pointed out, $75 USD is more than reasonable when GW children regularly spend $50/$75 week on product. We'll see.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Here's a question for you guys. Does a general have to be able to see his units to know where they are or to give them orders?

The answer is so obvious I'll ask a different question.

Do you think that the modern US army is wasting it's time with all these satellites and systems tell commanders where their troops are?
Why do you suppose they bother?

I think Kevin in Albuquerque, has made a good point Shane.

The thing with radii (and not being personal, or specific about Bob`s, Ned`s, Teddy`s or your radii) is that it shapes players grand-tactical thinking.

Just think again about those bigger battlefields and how many times commanders had to array their commands in little more than single lines of battle with little or no reserves, or in holding a line of isolated defensive positions (e.g. French in the south of Austerlitz).
But players of wargames that use radii would have it in their minds that their armies would not be controllable if they did the same and so what was possible at Austerlitz would be inadvisable if using a rule set with command radii – even though French commanders may have had longer ones.

And I`m not sure that I understand how it is that command radius and activation rolls are less long-winded than using adc/courier figures – that is unless:
you don`t bother to record the order in some way…
or you may be simply drawing an arrow on a map for the command to follow?…
or you don`t have to keep track of how many turns have elapsed between the order being issued and when subordinates attempt to follow it?
Unless the sending of orders is simply a permission for a subordinate to do anything that he wants to at the time the order arrives?

As for the implication that "old=bad and new=good" in wargames rules design: I don`t see what is wrong in "going back" to an older rule type if you think it is more realistic, or it is more appropriate to the focus of your game design.

AONeill,
I don't think the modern US Army is wasting its time with satellites. I think they have much more distance to deal with and things move an awful lot faster than they used to. Real time information is much more important as situations can change so much faster.
Phil

Michael,

Yes, I understand your points, Kevin did raise some good points but I responded to explain how my own CC rules would cope with that situation. For me personally, I see the CR's as a basic measured guide to knowing how long an order is going to take to get from A to B based on the distance the rider has to cover without ever having to place him on the board. Couple this with Activation rolls based on several factors which may reduce the chance to activate the destination formation into carrying out the order and you have a very easy and simple way to portray the chain of command.

If the distance between the Generals in the chain of command is greater than 500yds at any point along that chain then there is a FULL turn delay per extra 500yds or part thereof before the destination formation can proceed to Activate and if the LOS between the chain links is hidden or out of clear sight then the actual chance to activate drops. For us it is very simple and easy and we do not look at the CR as a circle but a length or measure of distance equal to how far a dispatch rider can cover in a single turn.

To us this system works very well and alleviates the need to place dispatch riders on the board and follow the process of moving a single figure around. We used to do this many years ago but dropped it because it was annoying to drill down to this level and actually have to follow the process through. So a measured distance (CR) coupled with Order activation rolls replaced it for us and we never looked back.

Now, I am not saying that doing it the other way is wrong or poor design because yes, it is more historical to actually place a dispatch rider figure on the field and send him off with an order, I grant you that. But like I said, it got annoying to do so and thus the change for us many years ago to our CR and Activation rolls instead.

What we do might be seen as artificial compared to placing a dispatch rider on the field but we learnt back then that eventually you are spending more time locating and moving these single figures all over the table top, trying to remember which way they are heading and with what orders. In the end it got too much to do and we found that it was taking time away from actually fighting the battle itself so designing an artificial system to replace it was an inevitable eventuality for us and although at first the change was rough and rocky we eventually smoothed it out and could not even contemplate ever going back to what we used to do.

And I also remember even before that playing Bruce Quarrie's Airfix rules in a total free for all back in the early 80's where we used just about zero CC in the games. It was then that we realised we had to curtail this bltn racing car syndrome that was being embedded into the minds of all of us in the group where you could do anything and everything you wanted without reprimand, reprisal or challenge with regards to singular bltns running around all over the place.

When I designed my own rules I wanted to capture many things I felt were correct, accurate and historically correct about the conduct of command control in battles and thus devised a very detailed set of rules around this premise. For a start, I did not like Alternate movement rules not the Hybrid overlapping style also. I very much liked Simultaneous rules systems even though it was known that people might wrought the concept as we all know. So I designed Unit rosters for every unit which demanded pre-written commands for EVERY unit committed into engagement ranges with the enemy and tracked by coordinating unit rosters with each other across the table.

Without going into the details of it all, the outcome was that each player quickly notated what his units were going to do each turn coupled with the length of time it took to carry out a specific order or action taking into account time delays for reaction and so on. As much as many people are put off by this concept because many rules these days are focused on getting away from this concept, I and my group embraced it more so because with a simultaneous system this concept works perfectly and players in my group have no worries in writing unit orders each turn.

Whenever new players are introduced into my group, and this has been expanding every year, at first I explain to them of the complexity of my system and the need to pre-write unit roster orders each turn and admit I worry about the inevitable responses but to my surprise not one player has said that he does not like it once he actually plays the system and sees how it works. Actually, the opposite occurs, of ever new player that has come over and joined my group I am proud to say not one has walked away from the group.

They all keep coming back each week on a Tuesday night knowing full well the complexity of the system and the CC rules and continue to play and the usual responses I get are that they look forward to getting back to the game each week, so I must be doing something right because most of these guys could easily run away screaming if they did not like the system and play with other groups who use far simpler systems but they don't which astounds me to be honest in this day and age of fast food, fast games syndrome.

Luckily with my group I own a home where I have had a permanent set up for the past 30 years where we can set up a battle, play it each week, leave it set up and come back each week and continue it until we reach a conclusion. I understand most people do not have this luxury so I thank god for my situation and ability to do so.

Regards,
Shane

"Thus, the $75.00 USD USD Regardless of my concerns the rules are doing well. Seapower sells for over $125.00 USD USD WAB and its supplements easily run over $125.00 USD USD FoG and its supplements run $215.00 USD USD and the average board wargame costs on average $75.00 USD USD to $100.00 USD USD "

Good grief! And I thought £20.00 GBP for a set of rules was expensive!!

All I can say is, thank goodness for those kind hearted souls who make their rules available for free to us impoverished wargamers.

This is a fascinating and interesting discussion.

It appears to me that it is becoming a little bogged down with the importance of time and distance as the driving force behind the concept of Command Radius.

I think that this is relevant, but would offer the following as something of equal importance. (This is a long thread and if it has already been mentioned I apolgise).

I have been gaming for 30+ years and have used, I think, just about all types of the systems used to reflect command and control. My view of the present systems (be they good or bad)is that what they are attempting to do is refelect the ability of any commander to control the units under his command. In doing this time, distance, etc is only a part and the CR concept is probably more a reflection (subjective probably) of both a commander's own ability coupled with the training and structure of the force under his command.

If research suggests that General A was an extremely able individual, with able commanders beneath him and with well trained troops, then it does not seem unreasonable that he ould be able to exert EFFECTIVE over a large area. This compared with General B, who is a buffoon, with poor subordinates and badly trained troops, who can only achive a similar level of effectiveness over a smaller area. The Command Radius then becomes a Command EFFECTIVENESS Radius, only part of which is determined by time and distance.

It would then seem equally reasonable that as this area of command extended beyond what is regarded as effective, penalties are applied to represent a reduction in that effectiveness. What those penalties should be and how they apply are again subjective, but once the parameters are set, gamers could modify them to their own perception of relative commander abilities.

The Davout/Soult comparison mentioned previously could be quite easily represented in this way, given that Davout and his command structure/abilities were regarded as superior to those of Soult. There would be nothing unusual in Davout then being able to exert EFECTIVE command over a greater area.

I am not sure the Lestoq comparison is entirely valid. To all intents and purposes until his force (9,000 men?) arrived on the Eylau battlefield, he was his own Army/Corps/Divisional/Brigade commander and as such could pretty well do whatever he considered appropriate to preserve his forces. Once on the battlefield, time and distance intially comes into play as he becomes 'attached' to the Russian army and must then execute orders given. After that his overall command abilities, then come into play and determine the area he can effectively command and control.

Pete

Mike and Bob,

From what I see the components of NBIII are worth the asking price from a material sense. Also, Bob is correct, is you want to attract new blood from the FOW, WH40K or Eurogame crowd, the reality is these folks are expecting a lot of glossy color and glitzy components. I buy into that, and I also think a lot of NB Grognards will buy the product regardless.

However, for Bob, I was wondering if you might put some numbers behind that "selling well" statement and if you might know what demographic is purchasing the game, how many to retailers, etc? This is not to put you on the spot, but NBIII in many respects is a "great experiment" and I'd like to know from a business perspective only.

I know you can't answer this, these are decisions made by the publisher, but from my own perspective my concerns would be:

- Will you lose and how many of folks who have no need for the extra material contained, eg, I play the 1st edition and since there is not that much change, or, I already got lots of markers, or, I get every Nappy rules set out there to study (this would be me BTW).
- Yes in AOE and Shako the scenario books are separate, but the rule of thmb from Dave Waxtel and others is that you'll sell about 1/3 as many scenario books as you will the base rules given most people do their own scenario research anyway? So is it wise to force the consumer to buy both?
- Color is great, but is another aspect that the Ospreys of the world can do it so much cheaper given their production runs?

I guess the publisher has considered these and felt the risk was worth it (and God knows, your comment about how many shekels the WH40K crowd forks over is WELL spoken), but needless to say, if I can every pick up the rules only, I'll buy a set.

NOW back on topic . . .

isn't this entire thread kinda bogus? Obviously save renting the Russian 8th Guards Combined Arms Army for the weekend a la Bodnerchuk, no one will ever be able to mimic a real Napoleonic battle exactly. The CR is simply one device that attempts to build in some of the friction of the real thing and yet keep the game fun and playable.

So vice whether the CR is good or bad, doesn't it depend on what the CR actually represents, how it is used, whether it is stand alone command-control or part of a more intgrated command system, whether you prefer process oriented mechanisms, results oriented or a hybrid?

Right now I can think of some CR systems – notably from board games (where I think CR got its bad rap) – that are absolutely hideous in design and function. Others work quite well, particulary if theay are a single part of a larger command system.

Bottom line, should each instance where CR is used be judged on its own merits vice a blankedt statement?

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

I think one of the advantages of lines is you can tell one end to advance and the line can communicate this message all the way down itself.
You can see the near end even if you can't see the far one.
The far end is attached so you have a good idea where it is.

So command distance/radius should really be measured to the near end of a line.

Bill G. wrote:
>>>isn't this entire thread kinda bogus? Obviously save renting the Russian 8th Guards Combined Arms Army for the weekend a la Bodnerchuk, no one will ever be able to mimic a real Napoleonic battle exactly. The CR is simply one device that attempts to build in some of the friction of the real thing and yet keep the game fun and playable.<<<<

Bill:
Knowing how much time and energy you spent on doing just the casualty calculations for AOE, how bogus are we talking about here?

No, NO ONE will every be able to mimic a real Napoleonic battle exactly, not even close. The question here is what the DESIGNER has chosen to mimic--not everything--and 'some friction' should display the same dynamics in *some fashion* as the real thing. So, the two questions are 1. Is CR based on actual history? and 2. Does it indeed model those chosen pieces of history?

>>>>So vice whether the CR is good or bad, doesn't it depend on what the CR actually represents, how it is used, whether it is stand alone command-control or part of a more intgrated command system, whether you prefer process oriented mechanisms, results oriented or a hybrid?<<<<

ABSOLUTELY. It depends on what the CR actually represents and how it affects game play--it should provide similar options, problems and dynamics as the real thing--in some fashion. And there are innumerable ways to do that effectively, and no one has to like them all. The question here is not whether I like them or enjoy the game mechanic The question is whether they represent what is claimed they represent, and whether the game mechanics actually do the job. If the history is wrong, if the actual methods for Napoelonic commanders has no relationship to 'command radii and the associated game mechanics, they aren't mimicking Napoleonic warfare, whether you or I like them or not.

>>>>Right now I can think of some CR systems – notably from board games (where I think CR got its bad rap) – that are absolutely hideous in design and function. Others work quite well, particulary if theay are a single part of a larger command system<<<

Yes, bad designs don't help anyone or any game mechanic's reputation, that is for sure. Again, it's not the game mechanic that is the question, but whether it actually represents something viable visa vie history.

>>>>Bottom line, should each instance where CR is used be judged on its own merits vice a blanket statement?<<<<

ABSOLUTELY. It is after all just a game mechanic and could with the right tweeking, represent a whole raft of things, depending on what it was being represented.

Having said that, a history of the mechanic's creation and use over the years does shed light on the overall logic of the game mechanic. It is obvious that it's intellectual history has, and is still, an influence considering the responses from designers on this list.

Chad47 wrote:
>>>>I have been gaming for 30+ years and have used, I think, just about all types of the systems used to reflect command and control. My view of the present systems (be they good or bad)is that what they are attempting to do is refelect the ability of any commander to control the units under his command. In doing this time, distance, etc is only a part and the CR concept is probably more a reflection (subjective probably) of both a commander's own ability coupled with the training and structure of the force under his command.<<<<

Chad:
Yep, I've been gaming for a similar amount of time. I agree that designers "are attempting to do is reflect the ability of any commander to control the units under his command."

So the question is, how did Napoleonic commanders control units under their commands? How did he use, or was limited by, time and distance, training and the structure of his command? What would that look like?

If rules are going to reflect that, they should be built on a basic understanding of how that was done, right? That reflection in the game should have some relation to the history it is representing. That's the discussion here.

I am saying that command radius rules, as described here so far, don't. They certainly are very logical, and the CR rules are easy to play, but they don't have any relation to how commanders controlled their troops, particularly at the brigade and division level. AT BEST, CR rules show the time lag involved in Corps and Army commanders communicating with divisions--but even that is questionable, depending on the rules and their purposes.

Bill,

"Well," is a direct quote from the publisher regarding sales. Thus, I do not know, and if I did I wouldn't feel comfortable releasing the figures. That is up to LBG and to be frank I don't even think the owner knows precisely. Lets just say well enough to cause the published to ask us to produce a scenario pack for Histoicon.

When A/H published the rules we did not release the sales figures 23,000 sold, plus 5,000 red supplements and 7,500 blue supplements. As FFs collapsed, I felt comfortable 1,000 printed, 950 sold (we got royalties for that number) and the remainder were handed out.

I already expressed my thoughts on the publisher's desire to POSH it up with extras, which he did. On the other hand I am ambivalent regarding sales. As Rick Nelson sang, "You can't please everyone so you've got to please yourself," and I am pleased.

Command Radius in NBs is modified and supplemented. We have rated 3000+ generals in four areas as a division general and modified the rating as they act as corps, wing and army commanders. All senior generals are rated in four areas, the distance he can project command, how he is perceive by his soldiers (Excellent, Good, Average, Poor, the next is the officer's inate initiative when out of command (d10) and the final is the commander's tactical ability, -1, 0, +1, +2, +4. For example the line on Marmont would read 10"G(7)+1.

So why rate 3000 officers? After all how necessary is it to do so? Perhaps because NBs started as the Battles of Frederick the Great, when we shifted it became evident that there was a great difference in men's philosophies between the two ages. War in the Age of Reason was characterized by cool thought, by systems and yes by reason. War in the Age of Romance was characterized by the soaring triumph of the individual, a break with the cool calculations of the Age of Reason. Beethoven, Goethe, Napoleon – giants whose very existene validated the victory of the individual over the system.

The French Generals who rode into towns all over Europe in their gold trimmed uniforms with handsome young men in their train announced a new era. The era of the superstar. Women swooned and calculated sleeping with them and men locked their daughters in their rooms and prayed for their virginity. A new age had arived, the Age of Romance!

To ignore this is to ignore one of the pillars of the age, the triumph of the individual, from Napoleon to Wellington, and their and their subordiates' influence on warfare. Thus, to ignore the generals is to fail to give the gamer the experience of operating in the world of Napoleon.

Thanks for your answer Shane,

I did find your rules for orders and order activation which luckily I had printed out, but somehow must have lost on file!
They seem to cover the activation (order transmission) at the brigade or divisional level, but what about the possible relaying of orders at the corps level – do you just use the corps general`s "c.v." alone?

Regards,

Mike.

Bill Gray wrote:
"isn't this entire thread kinda bogus?… The CR is simply one device that attempts to build in some of the friction of the real thing and yet keep the game fun and playable. So vice whether the CR is good or bad, doesn't it depend on what the CR actually represents, how it is used, whether it is stand alone command-control or part of a more intgrated command system, whether you prefer process oriented mechanisms, results oriented or a hybrid?…"

I think the short answer is yes, "this entire thread [is] kinda bogus?" if we go back to Sam's initial question and Bill's conclusion that it depends on "whether you prefer " one mechanic or another.

(On the other hand, any thread, or at least this thread, is not bogus if you agree with TheScotsman that " a history of the mechanic's creation and use over the years does shed light on the overall logic of the game mechanic. It is obvious that it's intellectual history has, and is still, an influence considering the responses from designers on this list.")

So let's return to Sam's initial question that started the thread:
"Many, many games have some sort of "command radius" mechanic.
1. In most games, the units have to stay within X distance of their superior officer, otherwise they suffer penalties…In some games, the radius is flexible… In some games (especially older designs) you send a little courier galloping off with new orders for the subordinates… We've all used perfectly reasonable-sounding rationalizations…
Recently I've found myself questioning why we need these mechanics at all. I keep reading accounts of battles…The willy-nilly dispersal of Federal reinforcements at Gettysburg, for instance, would be impossible…
And we can find plenty of examples at the tactical level, too. Time and again we read accounts… Wouldn't it be a lot simpler (and perfectly within historical logic) to say, simply.. everybody's command radius is simply, "The Table"…[Sam later added}…"I probably shouldn't have made any attempt to include historical examples, because people will get all distracted arguing about whether or not those specific examples are valid, and we'll never get around to talking about the main point…. if the whole "command radius" concept is just a wargaming Sacred Cow."

Sam is questioning if that game mechanic is expendable – if its elimination will make a simpler game (and thus implying a faster and therefore more playable and therefore easier and therefore more fun game) is there any compelling reason to keep it as is?

However, I think it is a false question because the answer for him is a foregone conclusion based upon his initial wargaming design theories. Others will agree only if they share that same philosophy, and will disagree if they don't – thus Bill's point of "what someone prefers" becomes the bottom line.

I'm saying it isn't a question of being able to furnish a better historical rationalization for the mechanic, but is deeper than that and whether or not one is willing to accept any historical rationalization for anything – which in my opinion depends on what the designer is trying emphasize or illustrate with his rules.

In historical miniatures gaming that means defining up front which part of the game is meant to simulate some historical process (and thus require the designer to put forth his historical interpretation and therefore have a scale for deciding which history to use, which to ignore, and which is inaccessible), and which parts are there as game mechanics to link the history together.

For example, as I interpret Sam's initial proposition (and I could certainly be misinterpreting this) I see:

1. Sam has used or seen the Command Radius mechanic
2. He has had historical rationalizations for it (which means the historical accuracy he thought was necessary for his game justified using that inefficient game mechanic)
3. Based on his recent reading he thinks his past historical rationalizations aren't justified by history.
4. When he weighs the inefficiency of the mechanic vs. historical justification, he believes that eliminating the mechanic is "perfectly within historical logic".

To me this means Sam must have a "philosophy" of game design that involves weighing "history" (and whatever he means by that term) against designing a game that works mechanically well (and whatever he means by that). As he formed his question, he used "Historical logic" or specific examples from history as an "authority" against which to judge the command radius rules.

He did say that he didn't want us to be distracted by arguing over the validity of specific historical examples, but that implies that he believes there was a higher level of historical logic that players could still agree on, even if they quibbled about details.

To me that is where the question becomes a circular argument. He is asking others if this game mechanic is a Sacred Cow and not justified by history. Yet the whole question came up for him by reading history. He has his notion or feeling of what "historical logic" is. So in other words, according to his own personal threshold of historical logic, the historical rationalizations for this rule don't meet his own standard of when history demands a game mechanic, even if it is inefficient.

I'm NOT saying his threshold is right or wrong – only that he must have one, and that therefore his question is not answerable other than the way Bill mentioned, that it depends on individual taste.

If Sam's personal threshold, for example (and I don't know if it is or not) is that the entire design is just a game because we cannot portray any of the history, and therefore what matters is a "playable game" (which could even be a "Fantasy" or "D&D" game or "fictional" or "alternate" history entertainment game), then his question that started this thread is what Bill might term "bogus". If the designer thinks any historical rationalization is just that – a rationalization for what is a just a "game" , then any mechanic can be used or not used based on whether or not the designer or player "likes" it.

If this is the case, then any mention of "historical logic" or specific historical examples really have no place in the discussion. "Historical logic" is just as much a self-justifying rationalization as is any rationalization for the Command Radius rule.

However, if that is true, then someone else's rule is no more a "sacred cow" than anyone else's rule. It is just what someone else "likes". If Sam's criticism is that others are claiming "historical" examples or logic for their rules and that they are wrong to do so, then he must admit that he lives in a glass house by referring to history in his own arguments.

If he is saying that no one can really justify anything in their game as history, then why did his original question come up? He said he was rethinking his own approach to rules, and it was historical reading that brought that on.

To conclude, I think this goes to the basic game design philosophy of the designer. If you believe that "it is all just a game" then you protect yourself against any and all historical criticism. You should then only be judged on whether or not you have a game that plays well mechanically as a game or a system. If you offer it to others as anything other than that, you are opening yourself up to fair criticism from others, based upon their standards and not just your own. If you believe that you can simulate or portray history accurately in some way, and specify what those ways are when you offer the game, then it is fair to judge you on that according to the way others interpret or offer data, or perhaps come up with some sort of standard definition of things like "historical logic" on those points.

Either approach seems valid to me. It is when those apples and oranges get mixed that things become unclear. So to get a meaningful answer, IMHO, any question like the one that opened this thread needs to have its design context clear. In this thread I think we have seen people from both sides of the aisle coming from their different angles which is why Bill's question of "bogus" was one I agreed with.I am not saying Sam is bogus- only that the answers to his question seemed preordained to me, based upon the basic philosophy each reader already had.