"The "Command Radius"" Topic

I love the "go write your own" posts, those are really useful to everyone. I didn't like the Bush Administration, perhaps, rather than take part in the public discussion and debate, I should have run for president. Or maybe, just maybe, discussion and debate of the thing in question does actually serve a useful purpose that, "do it yourself" may not achieve.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Come to think of it, fast food kinda sucks. I mean sure, some places have higher quality than others, some are more healthy than others, but no fast food chain that I am aware of matches the quality of food I make at home. Rather than provide this feedback to the market and industry, I think I'll spend thousands of dollars starting my own fast food chain, because, if you're not happy with how something works, the only acceptable answer is to go do it yourself.

Can ya feel the sarcasm in your bones yet?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Well, "silly rabid" has said that she will refuse to post anymore. Thanks. If not, go back to the original early most gibberish. It's easlier to skip over.

I think that we should at least mention "command radius" if we're going to post on this thread.

Silly Rabbit,

No, they do not like Command Radius because it places the burden on them, the gamers, rather on rules such as missing aides, cards or IPs.

On the one hand the gamer is responsible for his decisions, the fault is in himself not the stars while on the other hand a bad die roll or an unfavorable card and the stars are at fault, not the gamer.

That's fine, many gamers and non-gamers believe more in fate rather than their own decisions. That the "let's sacrifice a chicken" players feel threatened by the you are responsible for your own decisions rules is natural because no one wants to be responsible for the possibility of failure.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

The Scotsman wrote:

"I'll post the evidence."

I look forward to it.

BD

Bottom Dollar:

So, the evidence for the use of Regulating/Directing Brigades and Battalions/regiments on the Second Day of Gettysburg:

I will capitalize the pertinent comments in the Divisional accounts, as I can't highlight.

First, I want to provide some 'definitions' to what is being said when certain words are used:

1. Connect and Disconnection: ACW officers like Caldwell used these terms specifically in reference to joining the flank of one brigade or division to another. The idea was that they would support each other, move with each other, and of course, the failure to hold on to the units on the flanks created a 'disconnect'.

2. Move by the Right or Right Flank: The is a reference to where the directing unit is in relation to the rest of the brigade or division. It be by the left, but on the second of July all the directing battalions and thus brigades were on the right.

3. Support: Officers use this word in two ways, almost meaning the same thing. In all the accounts I give below, 'Support' refers to the units on the their flanks, OR the units behind theirs, which then moves to the flanks to 'secure' it. A lack of support always means other commands have not come up and 'connect' with theirs.

To oriented, Longstreet's attack was to be done by two divisions, each with two brigade in front, two in support. Anderson and Pender were to protect the I Corps Flank. So Hood's front brigades were Robertson and Law, McLaws' Barksdale and Kershaw. Law and Kershaw were the right-hand/directing brigades for their divisions. Anderson's right hand brigade was Wilcox.

The Lee's orders for the 2nd day attack were based on his belief that "the enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one south-east and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town, which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmettsburg road, with a steep [p.596] ridge in rear, which was also occupied."
Report of General R.E. Lee of the Gettysburg Campaign, June to August, 1863," dated January 1864, in Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (1886), pp.595-6.

From all accounts, and we will see a few reference this, McLaws and Hood were to attack perpendicular to Anderson's Division, with their left flank anchored on the Emmittsburg Road. The advance would then would drive North against what was perceived as the Union's left FLANK laid out along the road.

Anderson reports "Shortly after the line had been formed, I received notice that Lieutenant-General Longstreet would occupy the ground on the right; that his line would be in a direction nearly at RIGHT ANGLES with mine; that he would assault the extreme left of the enemy and drive him toward Gettysburg, and I was at the same time ordered to put the troops of my division into action by brigades as soon as those of General Longstreet's corps had progressed so far in their assault as TO BE CONNECTED WITH MY RIGHT FLANK." OR 27 (2), 614;

Anderson's report of 7 August. Pfanz, 114-5, described this as: "Anderson's division would attack by brigades as soon as Longstreet's assault reached its right."

Obviously, the attack didn't develop that way. On the morning of the 2nd, McLaws and Longstreet were present to hear Lee's orders, but not Hood. No orders were written. Longstreet finds that the Union flank is refused when Hood heads out to the right.

Longstreet reports:
"As soon as he passed the Emmitsburg road, he sent to report of the great advantage of moving on by his right around to the enemy's rear. His scouting parties had reported that there was nothing between them and the enemy's trains. He was told that the move to the right had been proposed the day before and rejected; that General Lee's orders were to guide my left by the Emmitsburg road." Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896), p.367.

So Longstreet insisted on following Lee's orders even though the situation had changed. This is a major reason for the whole attack to go wonky. Some attempted to follow the original plan, even though a flank attack and become a frontal assault, while others like Hood didn't, still seeking the flank.

Now the evidence for the regulating unit by Division: [I'll do them by divisions in separate posts simply because of the length, even though I am not using all the quotes I have, not be a long shot.]

BD:

Here is Anderson's Division. I threw in Pender's because of the comments. McLaws and then Hood's Divisions. Again, I'm capitalizing the pertinent statements because I can't highlight.

ANDERSON'S Division:

" At the Brick House, away from his right, General Sickles had a detachment that had been reinforced by General Hancock. THIS FIRE DREW ANDERSON'S BRIGADE OF DIRECTION (WILCOX) A LITTLE OFF FROM THE SUPPORT OF BARKSDALE'S LEFT." Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896), p.369-74.

Anderson reported, on 7 August [OR 27 (2), 614] : "About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the engagement between the artillery of the enemy and that of the First Army Corps commenced, and was soon followed by furious and sustained musketry; but it was not until 5.30 o'clock in the evening that McLaws' division (BY WHICH THE MOVEMENT OF MY DIVISION WAS TO BE DIRECTED) had advanced so far as to call for the movement of my troops. The advance of McLaws' division was immediately followed by the brigades of mine, IN THE MANNER DIRECTED.

And did they worry about this? Anderson further reports: " Strong re-enforcements pressed upon our right flank, WHICH HAD BECOME DISCONNECTED from McLaws' left, and the ridge was untenable. The brigades were compelled to retire. They fell back in the same succession in which they had advanced--Wilcox's, Perry's, Wright's, and Posey's.

WILCOX's Brigade:

"This cannonading continued until 6.20 p.m., when McLaws' troops advanced to the attack. "My instructions were TO ADVANCE WHEN THE TROOPS ON MY RIGHT SHOULD ADVANCE, and to report this to the division commander, in order that the other brigades should advance in proper time. OR 27 (2), 617-18; Wilcox's report on 17 July.

PERRY's Brigade:

The commander, Col. Lang reported "About 5 p.m. I received an order from General Anderson to the effect that General Longstreet was driving back the enemy's left, and that Wilcox would advance whenever General Longstreet's left advanced beyond him. I was ordered to throw forward a strong line of skirmishers, and ADVANCE WITH GENERAL WILCOX, holding all the ground the enemy yielded.
"At 6 p.m., General Wilcox having begun to advance, I moved forward,…"
OR 27 (2), 631-2; Lang's report of 29 July.

In that report it is also interesting to note that on July 3rd Lang states [p. 632] "Throwing forward pickets, the brigade remained quietly in this position until daylight of the 3d, when I received orders from General Anderson to connect my right with General Wilcox's left, and CONFORM MY MOVEMENTS DURING THE DAY TO THOSE OF HIS BRIGADE. I was at the same time notified that I WOULD RECEIVE NO FURTHER ORDERS.

WRIGHT'S Brigade:

"About noon, I was informed by Major-General Anderson that an attack upon the enemy's lines would soon be made by the whole division, commencing on our right by Wilcox's brigade, and that each brigade of the division would begin the attack as soon as the brigade on its immediate right commenced the movement. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH PERRY'S BRIGADE, WHICH WAS ON MY RIGHT, AND INFORMED THAT POSEY'S BRIGADE, ON MY LEFT, WOULD MOVE FORWARD UPON MY ADVANCE.
"THIS BEING THE ORDER OF BATTLE, I awaited the signal for the general advance, WHICH WAS GIVEN at about 5 p.m. BY THE ADVANCE OF Wilcox's and Perry's brigades, on my right. I immediately ordered forward my brigade,…" OR 27 (2), 622-4; Wright's report of 28 Sept.

Did Wright worry about the regulating battalion and conforming?

"Just before reaching this position, I had observed that Posey's brigade, on my left, had not advanced, and fearing that, if I proceeded much farther with my left flank entirely unprotected, I might become involved in serious difficulties, I dispatched my aide-de-camp, Capt. R. H. Bell, with a message to Major-General Anderson, informing him of my own advance and its extent, and that General Posey had not advanced with his brigade on my left. To this message I received a reply to press on; that Posey had been ordered in on my left, and that he (General Anderson) would reiterate the order.

POSEY's Brigade:
"On the morning of July 2, my brigade was placed in position before Gettysburg, in the rear of Major Pegram's battery of artillery, in an open field, with a woods on my right and left flanks. My position was to the right of the cemetery, about which the enemy's lines of battle were formed. In the afternoon, I received an order TO ADVANCE AFTER BRIGADIER-GENERAL WRIGHT, WHO WAS POSTED ON MY RIGHT in a woods before the advance was made. I received an order from the major-general, through his aide-de-camp, Captain [S. D.] Shannon, to advance but two of my regiments, and deploy them closely as skirmishers. [Two whole regiments deployed as skirmishers!]

MAHONE's Brigade

"About noon I was informed that an attack upon the enemy's lines would soon be made by the whole division, COMMENCING ON OUR RIGHT BY WILCOX'S BRIGADE, AND THAT EACH BRIGADE OF THE DIVISION WOULD BEGIN THE ATTACK AS SOON AS THE BRIGADE ON THE RIGHT COMMENCED MOVEMENT. I was instructed to move simultaneously with Perry's brigade [commanded by Lang], and informed that Posey's brigade, on my left, would move forward upon my advance.
Jesse B. Young, The Battle of Gettysburg: A Comprehensive Narrative (1913), 262-7.

PENDER'S DIVISION:

It would seem that Pender never received specific orders to support Anderson. According to William Joseph Peele in his "Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians" (1898), p. 451, he writes:

‘It was during this attack of Longstreet that General Pender received the wound which resulted in his death. Anderson's Division was ordered in to support Longstreet. Just before the advance was begun, General Pender and his Adjutant-General, Major Joseph A. Engelhard, and General W. G. Lewis, who was then Lieutenant-Colonel of the Forty-third North Carolina Regiment, were on the extreme left of Fender's line, engaged in a friendly talk, sitting on a large granite boulder, when suddenly the enemy's artillery opened upon our right.

Immediately General Pender turned to Major Engelhard, and said: " Major, this indicates an assault, and we will ride down our line."

‘In Major Engelhard's official report of this we find this account: "Late in the afternoon, during the attack of Longstreet and a part of Anderson's Division, General Pender HAVING RIDDEN TO THE EXTREME RIGHT TO ADVANCE HIS DIVISION, did the opportunity occur, received a severe wound in the leg from a fragment of a shell."'

So where does the DC go to advance his division?

Shock horror Bob but you might find thats its not all about winning and loosing to everyone. Theres things like flavour and drama etc. Whats your problem with using ADC's?? They are historical. Are suggesting they are the last refuge of lousy gamers?
Both of the sets I use have command radius. Doesn't mean others can't discuss alternatives.

SR wrote:
YOU keep talking about "YOUR" definition of a game/simulation. "YOUR" reality has nothing to do with mine, or most of the Napoleonic gamers I associate with. WE are satisfied with the "tool" many rules writers use in what they call "command radius". Quite frankly I don't care if YOU don't like it, or think it doesn't reflect "YOUR" ideals of the way Napoleonic games/simulation should be played. To me YOU are not an expert in anything, let along the Napoleonic period. YOU can keep on keep'n on all YOU want, but fewer and fewer people are listening.

SR:
Gad, I just answered your questions. I didn't say what I 'liked.'

SR wrote: "YOU keep talking about "YOUR" definition of a game/simulation. "YOUR" reality has nothing to do with mine, or most of the Napoleonic gamers I associate with."

I take it that you feel that the technical definition of a 'simulation' is a matter of opinion?

It is a very specific tool used by thousands of simulations designers to design very real simulations that have to work as such, technically, not according to someone's opinion.

Those thousands of professional simulation designers are using the very same definitions and concepts I offered. Go to Amazon.com and type in a search for the books on 'Simulation Design' or even 'Game Design'. OR look up the BAs that can be earned in those two subjects. I can even recommend some basic books if you like. I defy you to find any book among those hundreds that doesn't agree:

1. Simulations are technical creations with specific requirements, which are universally recognized by the Simulation Designers community [Internationally] It is neither a secret or complicated. It is a 'working definition', one that is actually used in building such things.

2.There is a general technology that provides tools for creating functional simulations, regardless of the medium [i.e. games, computers, pencil and paper, RPGs, etc. of any combination of the same.] AND regardless of the subject or purpose. [i.e. research, training, business and production, behavioral studies, etc. for everything from biology and weather to military and education, social sciences, business and manufacturing.

3. There is nothing particularly special about wargame design or history that keeps wargame designers from using all this technology to build simulations. Professional simulators do it all the time, with other mediums…outside the wargame hobby. Why game designers inside the hobby haven't noticed the last forty years of development is beyond me. It's like RC airplane modelers ignoring the principles of aircraft design and aerodynamics while attempting to build airplane models that fly.

This isn't rocket science, but neither is it simply an opinion I happen to have that you don't agree with.

If a game claims to model some part of Napoleonic history, there are techniques for doing that, but simply doing whatever feels good is a very hit or miss approach to what is a technical endeavor. There are ways that will and will not build a functional model. No one creates a model of an A-1 Abrams Tank on opinion, and neither do can you build a model of Napoleonic warfare on it either.

You may like a purple and pink Abrams with a rumble seat, but that ain't an accurate model…

Shane wrote: [By gad, I think I've got it!]
With regards to "Regulating Battalions" as I already discussed much earlier, I feel that this belongs to the act of the very moving of the figures by the players. When you are at the stage in a turn sequence where you are physically touching the units and moving them is simply the game mechanic of regulating the btlns. Yes it is part of command control because the actual player is having to control the progressive movement of the units in the command by touching them, directing them and physically moving them from one location to another.

When he does this he is using a game mechanic which is the duel task of movement and control, it is up to that player to direct his units via set boundaries within the system for movement allowances, formation changes, direction changes and reaction. He also has to enforce to himself the act of directing these units to coordinate their movement with each other, usually by moving one units and the rest conform to that movement and so on. This is all part of Regulating battalions in a command control environment subject to the limitations I have discussed. When the player does this he conforms to the idea of the, "Regulations" of the drill manuals if he does this correctly and by the book, if not then problems arise such as from movement restrictions due to terrain, junior commander stuff ups in coordination and confusion or from problems arising from enemy actions etc.

Shane:
I can see what you are thinking, and it is true to a degree. It is like playing trains. You first move the engine forward, and then the cars one by one up behind the engine. Very much like the movement of the train in the order it would move.

However, the engine is connected to the cars in real life, so the physical dynamics of moving and stopping is lost with that kind of play movement. The benefits and problems of moving the train are lost in the simple game movement. Simulations have to provide the benefits and problems of the real event if the purpose is to provide them for the player.

The purposes of the regulating battalion and conforming were, particularly at the brigade and Division level:

1. It provided a method of communicating quickly with and maneuvering large bodies of men. If the conforming was broken, that ability was lost. It wasn't a matter of distance from the CinC, but the actual 'disconnect' from the units on the flanks regardless of the distance, that broke the communication, and wrecked the support provided.

2. The conforming process in moving thousands was far more rigid, and fragile than your process models. Units rarely left the 'line' without orders, and when the connection was broken, that created a great many problems that aren't addressed by either the movement process you describe or any Command radius mechanisms I've seen.

So, the model of moving a division should somehow represent the same communication and control dynamics between commander and their subordinate units, not to mention the combat consequences.

For instance, from all the examples I have and will give in this thread for regulating units at Gettysburg, 'the broken off' parts of the brigades and divisions do only one of two things:

1. They scramble to 'reconnect' and regain that support and direction, or:

2. They try to carry out the original orders in isolation to the best of their ability--which means that their coordination with surrounding formations is non-existence and and support given or gotten is by chance or direct intervention--which doesn't happen much at Gettysburg.

That is what it means, in game terms, to be 'out of command'.

Another example of why the Command Radius mechanic is inaccurate as a historical representation is that in real life, units that become "out of command" try to rejoin their parent formation. While the CR mechanic typical penalizes their movement speed making them less likely to move towards regaining their position in the parent formation. That is to say, using CR can actually cause a player to move units in a way that less historical rather than more historical.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Some ways that doctrine of deployment and regulating battalions can be used in a game can be seen in Legacy of Glory. While LoG relies heavily on ADCs / couriers for communication between the Army and Corps Commanders as well as between the Corps and Division Cmdrs., divisions act as a single formation even though there are battalions on the tabletop. When the division as a whole receives an order to deploy, X amount of time (game turns, etc) are required for that process to be completed. At the end of that time the division is magically deployed with its battalions arrayed per the training doctrine of that army.

Players are encouraged to maintain the historical deployments because the combat effectiveness of the division as a whole is penalized if doctrine is not followed.

Why?

Because if battalions are too close they can't deploy into line. Now if you don't want to deploy into line it becomes largely a non-issue. You can march against the enemy line in close columns hoping to come to contact – no penalty for doing that. But you will find that if you seek to deploy your battalions into line you can't because they are too close and they don't magically expand the gaps between the battalions because you will it. Nope, instead, much like real life battalions did their best to maintain their deployment distances, thus, if you deploy tight – they are going to stay that way, if you deploy open, they will stay that way.

Sure a player can move their battalions farther apart as they close on the enemy, expanding the gaps between battalions so they have room to deploy into line, but doing such is against the spirit of the rules and would be considered "gamie" by those who are polite enough not to consider it essentially cheating.

Cheers,

The Bandit

BD:

Here we are:

McLaw's Division:

Longstreet:
General Lee at the same time gave orders for the attack to be made by my right – following up the direction of the Emmitsburg road toward Cemetery Ridge, holding Hood's left as well as could be toward the Emmitsburg road, McLaws TO FOLLOW THE MOVEMENTS OF HOOD, attacking at the Peach Orchard the Federal Third Corps, with a part of R.H. Anderson's division FOLLOWING THE MOVEMENTS OF McLaws to guard his left flank. As soon as the troops were in position, and we could find the points against which we should march and give the guiding points, the advance was ordered–"
Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896), p.367.

KERSHAW's Brigade:

"Hood's division was then moving in our rear towards our right to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging round towards Peach Orchard and at the same time establishing connection with Hood on my right and co-operating with him. It was understood he was to sweep down the enemy's line in a direction perpendicular to our then line of battle. I was told that Barksdale WOULD MOVE WITH ME AND CONFORM TO MY MOVEMENT. These directions I received in various messages from the Lieutenant-General and the Major-General commanding, and in part by personal communication with them."

Kerhsaw, B&L (1888), iii/1:332. Kershaw's report of 1 October 1863 is very similar in Southern Historical Society, Papers, "Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg" (1877) v4, 178-82:

Kershaw restates this again on the next page of Battle & Leaders:

"In the meantime General Hood's division was moving in our rear to the right, to gain the enemy's flank, and I was directed to commence the attack as soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the Peach Orchard, and AT THE SAME TIME ESTABLISHING CONNECTION WITH HOOD ON MY RIGHT, AND COOPERATING WITH HIM. It was understood that he was to sweep down the Federal lines in a direction perpendicular to our line of battle. I was informed that Barksdale WOULD MOVE WITH ME AND CONFORM TO MY MOVEMENT; that Semmes would follow me, and Wofford would follow Barksdale. These instructions I received in sundry messages from General Longstreet and General McLaws, and in part by personal communication with them."
Kershaw, B&L (1888), iii/1:333.

Did Kershaw worry about this conforming? Kershaw in Southern Historical Society, Papers, "Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg" (1877) v4, 178-82 :

"Meanwhile, to aid this attack, I changed the direction of the Seventh regiment, Colonel Aiken, and the Third, Major Maffett, to the left, so as to occupy the rocky hill and wood, and opened fire on the battery. Barksdale HAD NOT YET APPEARED, but came up soon after and cleared the orchard with the assistance of the fire of my Eighth South Carolina, Colonel Henegan, on my left, and James' battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Eice, the next in order of battle. THIS BRIGADE [Barksdale] THEN MOVED SO FAR TO THE LEFT AS NO LONGER TO AFFORD ANY ASSISTANCE.

"In a few minutes after my line halted the enemy advanced across the wheat field in two lines of battle, with a very small interval between the lines, in such a manner as to take the Seventh South Carolina in flank. I changed the direction of the right wing of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, to meet the attack, and HURRIED BACK TO GENERAL SEMMES, THEN SOME 150 YARDS IN MY RIGHT-REAR, TO BRING HIM UP TO MEET THE ATTACK ON MY RIGHT, and also to bring forward my right regiment, Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel DeSaussuere, which, SEPARATED FROM THE COMMAND BY THE ARTILLERY AT THE TIME OF THE ADVANCE, was now cut off by Semmes' brigade."

[Note that Barksdale was 'supposed' to conform to Kershaw and when artillery battalions gets between him and some regiments of his brigade, and then Semmes, and calls the regiments 'cut off.'

And note that when Kershaw he realizes that Barksdale will not be following him and that his left would be in the air, he is worried and acts to correct the problem.

Here is the voiced order that screwed up Kershaw's brigade. It was called out without authorization and taken up by the whole brigade, causing the Left wing, split from the right with Kershaw to stop it's attack on the artillery.

"After passing the buildings at Rose's, the charge of the left wing was no longer visible from my position; but the movement was reported to have been magnificently conducted until the cannoneers had left their guns and the caissons were moving off, when the order was given to ‘MOVE BY THE RIGHT FLANK,' by some unauthorized person, and was immediately obeyed by the men. The Federals returned to their guns and opened on those doomed regiments a raking fire of grape and canister, at short distance, which proved most disastrous, and for a time destroyed their usefulness."
Kershaw, B&L (1888), iii/1:334-6

Major Maffett (3rd SC) reported this same mistake: OR, 27 (2) 372, Maffett's report of 31 July.

"At 3 p.m. our artillery opened upon the enemy's position at the foot and upon the sides of a mountain range, and at 4 o'clock our regiment, with others, was ordered forward to the attack, across an open plain, 1,500 yards in width."

"Our orders from General Kershaw were to gradually swing round to the left until nearly facing an orchard, from which the enemy were pouring a deadly fire of artillery. The wheel was accomplished in gallant style by the regiment, when we moved forward under a galling fire of grape, shell, and canister. When within 300 or 400 yards of the batteries, THE ORDER WAS PASSED ALONG DOWN THE LINE FROM THE RIGHT TO MOVE BY THE RIGHT FLANK DOUBLE-QUICK. The regiment moved, in obedience to this order, to the cover of a piece of woods, and formed upon the left of the Seventh South Carolina Regiment, WHICH WAS THE BATTALION OF DIRECTION. In making this move, we lost several men from the enemy's artillery fire. Sheltering ourselves behind some rocks and trees, the left was directed to open fire upon the artillery of the enemy, while the right was instructed to open fire upon their infantry in our front."

BARKSDALE's Brigade:

" The brigade was placed in battle line—formed with the 21st, Col. B.G. Humphreys, ON THE RIGHT, then the 17th, Col. W.D. Holder, next the 13th, Col. J.W. Carter, with the 18th, Col. Thos. M. Griffin, on the left—under the crown of a low ridge, five or six hundred yards distant from the position of assault. […] General Barksdale's appearance, riding rapidly along in rear of the line, was the signal to the respective regimental commanders to get alert. […]…General Barksdale turned the right of the line and rode as rapidly down the front, to take his position at the head of his old regiment, the 13th. As he turned he called out to Colonel Humphreys [21st MS] THE WORDS WHICH DICTATED THE DIRECTION FO THE ATTACK—to move forward and ‘swing to the left.'" [Note: The 21st MS was the regiment on the right flank and as the directing regiment would be the one to receive the order for the direction of movement.]

"Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade at Gettysburg", by J.S. McNeily (21st MS), Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, v14 (1914), 235.

"Barksdale's release was by order. Wrote McLaws (in 1878): "Barksdale was standing in front ready to give the word and to lead. He was not far from me; and so soon as it was signified to me I sent my aid-de-camp, captain G.B. Lamar, Jr., to carry the order to General Barksdale…."
(Longstreet's account confirms the order: "I rode to McLaws, found him ready and Barksdale chafing in his wait for the order to secure the battery in his front. […] After additional caution McLaws ordered Barksdale in."

"Driving the routed enemy before him Barksdale, with three of his regiments, swung to the left so as to flank the adjoining (Humphreys') division. The 21st Mississippi swinging to the right became separated from the brigade [as will be explained below.] After carrying the Peach Orchard hill and moving to the attack of the enemy to the right of that position Barksdale's left WAS JOINED ON THE LEFT by Anderson's division of Hill's corps. But by one of the many misadventures of the day, after the breaking up and dislodging of Humphreys' division, THAT CONNECTION WAS LOST."
McNeily (21st MS), v14 (1914), 235-241.

Barksdale was not released until almost one hour after Kershaw had moved off. No explanation has been forthcoming. It appears that Barksdale moved his brigade by the center battalion [the 13th] away from the right without informing the directing battalion, the 21st MS, who continued to follow his original orders. In an effort to take on targets of opportunity, Barksdale not lonely lost ¼ of his brigade, but the connection with Anderson.

The 21st charged Bigelow's battery at the Trostle House and later took Watson's battery This is what Humphreys commanding the 21st says he did:

McNeily of the 21st writes: "…Colonel Humphreys found himself the center of a remarkable situation. Looking to HIS LEFT, SOME HALF A MILE DISTANT, HE SAW THE OTHER REGIMENTS OF THE BRIGADE engaged with Willard. Behind him about the same distance was Alexander's guns making trouble for the enemy in two directions. To our right, toward Round Top, half a mile off, was a disorganized mass of apparently some thousands of the enemy, fleeing before Hood with Wofford and other brigades of McLaws' division."

Then McNeily quotes from an unpublished manuscript of Col. Humphreys' memoirs which illuminate how he led his regiment off to the right from his brigade:

"I discovered that a federal battery to my right had rallied and was annoying Kershaw to our right and rear, and would soon turn on Barksdale's brigade as enfilade fire. I immediately wheeled the 21st to the right and headed directly against the battery which was captured…. "…. I NOW WANTED TO REJOIN THE BRIGADE.. But just then another battery was seen in position three hundred yards off, beyond the ravine. The order was given to charge it. On the brave regiment moved—yelling and firing and captured the battery of five guns [Watson's battery?]. From the position I occupied then, no enemy could be seen or heard in my front. Nor a gun was being fired at me. The federal army was cut in twain."

"Eight hundred yards, to my right a confused mass was retreating, driven by McLaws, and Hood. […] Eight hundred yards to my left, the enemy's line was kept busy by Barksdale. Soon a long solid line of infantry was seen advancing down the road towards us. The work [sic – ‘word'?] for retreat was given, and the regiment fell back to the stone fence where we captured the first battery."
J.S. McNeily (21st MS), v14 , p. 249.

And there Humphrey's regiment stayed until he learned of Barksdale's death, and as the senior colonel, assumed command of the brigade—but being isolated so far from the brigade, he was late in returning to it--and the brigade failed to do any more than hold it's position.

This is McNeily's conclusion about Barksdale's actions:

"…the brilliant isolated success of Barksdale's brigade at Gettysburg [was] rendered fruitless, alas, by its isolation…. Thoughts of Gettysburg have never crossed the writer's mind, unaccompanied by the sad reflection of what might have been had the plan for Wofford to support Barksdale, and for Anderson's brigades, whose strength was wasted to the west of Emmittsburg [sic] road, to cling to Barksdales left not miscarried. Meade's retirement on the night of the 2nd would have followed and the 3rd of July, that dies irae of the Confederacy, would not have been closed in disastrous defeat."
"Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade at Gettysburg", by J.S. McNeily (21st MS), Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, v14 (1914), 262.

Barksdale's actions left him isolated, disconnected and unsupported, not a good thing--and it happened because he disregarded the conforming mechanisms for his brigade and the division.

Having spent so much time on Kershaw and Barksdale's actions, I will forgo Semmes and Wofford, but can provide examples there if you would like.

I have saved the best for last, Hood's Division.

I don't see the breakdown of Longstreet's 2 July attack coming with any disconnect between Barksdale and Anderson's right and center brigades (Wilcox, Lang/Perry, and Wright), all of whom wound up attacking Cemetery Ridge, but in the failure of Anderson's next brigade, Posey's, to advance beyond the Bliss farm buildings and the next brigade beyond that, Mahone's, refusal to attack -- leaving Wright's left (no pun intended) exposed, and leaving Pender's Division waiting for the rest of Anderson's Division to advance before it would be its own turn. So even if Pender had not been wounded his division might not have attacked, since it was supposed to do so only after all of Anderson's brigades advanced.

No, no, don't forgo Semmes and Wofford. Post away.

Jim

"I will forgo Semmes and Wofford, but can provide examples there if you would like.

I have saved the best for last, Hood's Division."

"No, no, don't forgo Semmes and Wofford. Post away…. " please. Thank you.

Have enjoyed your analysis, but before I respond to it, would like to read your full descriptions, including Hood's Division.

Jim

The Scotsman wrote:

"On the morning of the 2nd, McLaws and Longstreet were present to hear Lee's orders, but not Hood. No orders were written. Longstreet finds that the Union flank is refused when Hood heads out to the right.
Longstreet reports:
"As soon as he passed the Emmitsburg road, he sent to report of the great advantage of moving on by his right around to the enemy's rear. His scouting parties had reported that there was nothing between them and the enemy's trains. He was told that the move to the right had been proposed the day before and rejected; that General Lee's orders were to guide my left by the Emmitsburg road." Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896), p.367.
So Longstreet insisted on following Lee's orders even though the situation had changed. This is a major reason for the whole attack to go wonky. Some attempted to follow the original plan, even though a flank attack and become a frontal assault, while others like Hood didn't, still seeking the flank."

Did the attack go "wonky" or did it proceed as planned ? The plan was to open the general engagement of July 2nd with an attack on the right by the 1st Corps (2 divisions) plus 1 division from the 3rd Corps (Anderson)… to be followed or made nearly simultaneously with an attack on the left by the 2nd Corps- Ewell. The center 3rd Corps--A.P. Hill--was to await the "opportunity" to attack.

The assault was to proceed from the right, THEN the left, with the center in reserve awaiting "opportunity". This doesn't conform with your assumptions about how the attack was meant to proceed which mistakenly includes Pender's Division as regulating itself to Longstreet's attack on the right. Your regulating brigade/division hypothesis wouldn't appear to conform to what the Army of Northern Virginia had decided to do on July 2nd.

Report of Gen. R.E. Lee, C.S. Army, commanding ANV, O.R.-Series 1-Vo. XXVII/2[s#4]
In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position WHILE GENERAL EWELL ATTACKED directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. GENERAL HILL was instructed to threaten the center of the Federal line, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail of any OPPORTUNITY that MIGHT PRESENT ITSELF TO ATTACK. After a severe struggle, LONGSTREET SUCCEEDED in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark.
These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day… "

Longstreet followed Lee's orders and took the high ground desired… the Peach Orchard. Hood departed from his attack UP the Emmittsburg Road because the tactical situation HAD changed and IT LOOKED as though the Federal flank could be obtained and turned. The direction of Hood's assault was a tactical alteration that WAS very much WITHIN Lee's strategic directions for the right wing. Because Hood's alteration wasn't successful does not mean that the attack of the right wing of the ANV under Longstreet was unsuccessful. There was no "disconnect" between Hood's and McLaws Division, nor for that matter with Anderson's Division even though they advanced at different times. Moreover, even if Barksdale's Brigade or maybe just the 21st Mississippi was "isolated" in the middle of the right wing, the attack in echelon by division on the right proceeded as planned AND achieved the objectives as outlined by General Lee. Your assumptions about the failure of the right wing of the ANV on July 2nd to maintain regulating "connections" and hence the failure of the attack are incorrect.

BD:
Here is the last 'installment'. I can't take credit for the research. Most of this research was done by a friend of mine, Howie Muir.

HOOD's Division

I rode to McLaws, found him ready for his opportunity, and Barksdale chafing in his wait for the order to seize the battery in his front. Kershaw's brigade of his right first advanced and struck near the angle of the enemy's line where his forces were gathering strength. After additional caution to hold his ranks closed, McLaws ordered Barksdale in. With glorious bearing he sprang to his work, overriding obstacles and dangers. Without a pause to deliver a shot, he had the battery. Kershaw, joined by Semmes's brigade, responded, and Hood's men, feeling the impulsion of relief, resumed their bold fight, and presently the enemy's line was broken through its length. But his well-seasoned troops knew how to utilize the advantage of their grounds and put back their dreadful fires from rocks, depressions, and stone fences, as they went for shelter about Little Round Top.

That point had not been occupied by the enemy, nor marked as an important feature of the field. The broken ranks sought shelter under its rocks and defiles as birds fly to cover. General Hood fell seriously hurt, and General Law succeeded to command of the division, BUT THE WELL-SEASONED TROOPS WERE NOT IN NEED OF A CLOSE GUIDING HAND.. The battle was on, and they knew how to press its hottest contention.
Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896), p.369-74.

Later, Alexander came to appreciate the huge number of Union divisions that were thrown at Longstreet's two divisions, he wrote:

"And, as I heard of the successive corps, divisions, brigades, & batteries concentrated on those two lone divisions—for whom there was no possibility of help or reinforcement, for there was absolutely nothing in their rear but Walton's nine guns, & they over two miles away—there came to my recollection a story I had heard at the time but had long forgotten. One of our infantrymen said that he had overheard the enemy's commands that afternoon & that they were ‘UNIVERSE FORWARD, BY KINGDOM'S INTO LINE, NATIONS GUIDE RIGHT!'

Even the jokes included the typical orders regarding where the directing battalion was located: 'guide right.'

E.P. Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Gary W. Gallagher editor, pp.238-42.

LAW's Brigade:

Law wrote: [Law, B&L (1888), iii/1: page 323.]

"Our order of attack – issues as soon as the two divisions of Longstreet's corps came into position on the line already described – was, that the MOVEMENT SHOULD BEGIN FROM THE RIGHT, BY BRIGADE ON THAT FLANK LEADING, THE OTHER COMMANDS TAKING IT UP SUCCESSIVELY TOWARDS THE LEFT. It was near 5 o'clock P.M. when we advanced to the attack."

If that isn't clear enough, what Law means by "By brigade on that flank leading" is that his brigade, being on the far right of the two division line was the directing brigade for the entire attack.

Col Perry of Law's brigade reported of his 44th AL:

"It [his regiment] occupied the place of the second battalion in the line formed by the brigade on the heights, which ran parallel with and fronting the enemy's position. Having advanced with the brigade down the long slope and through the intervening meadow, IT WAS DETACHED FORM ITS PLACE IN THE LINE, by order of General Law, and by a flank movement was brought to the extreme left of the brigade. [Later this movement would cause confusion in both Law's and Roberston's brigades]

"When at a short distance from the stone fence near the base of the mountain, General Law informed me that he expected my regiment to take a battery which had been playing on our line from the moment the advance began. This battery was situated, not on the mountain itself, but on a rugged cliff… [the valley inbetween], not more than 300 paces in breadth, and the cliff on which their artillery was stationed, were occupied by two regiments of the enemy's infantry.

"…As the men emerged from the forest into the valley before mentioned, they received a deadly volley at short range, which in a few seconds killed or disabled one-fourth their number. Halting without an order from me, and availing themselves of the shelter which the rocks afforded, they returned the fire. Such was their extreme exhaustion-having marched without interruption 24 miles to reach the battle-field, and advanced at a double-quick step fully a mile to engage the enemy--that I hesitated for an instant to order them immediately forward. Perceiving very soon, however, that the enemy were giving way, I rushed forward, shouting to them to advance. IT WAS WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY THAT I COULD MAKE MYSELF HEARD OR UNDERSTOOD ABOVE THE DIN OF BATTLE. THE ORDER WAS EXTENDED ALONG THE LINE, AND WAS PROMPTLY OBEYED. The men sprang forward over the rocks, swept the position, and took possession of the heights, capturing 40 or 50 prisoners around the battery and among the cliffs.

OR 27 (2), 393-4: Perry's report of 8 Aug.

I give this as an example of a regiment being taken out of the conforming line and why. It requires an order. Second, it has real consequences for communications because regiments are where they are expected to be, and last: Here is an example of a regiment engaged and forced to ground by the fire, yet the regimental commander uses voice commands which are repeated along the line as in the regulations.

ROBERTSON's Brigade:

"The division arrived on the ground in front of the position of the enemy that we were to attack but a few minutes before we were ordered to advance. I therefore got but a glance at the field on which we had to operate before we entered upon it. I WAS ORDERED TO KEEP MY RIGHT WELL CLOSED ON BRIGADIER-GENERAL LAW'S LEFT, AND TO LET MY LEFT REST ON THE EMMITTSBURG PIKE. I had advanced but a short distance when I discovered that MY BRIGADE WOULD NOT FILL THE SPACE BETWEEN GENERAL LAW'S LEFT AND THE PIKE NAMED, and that I must leave the pike, or disconnect myself from General Law, on my right.

"Understanding before the action commenced that the attack on our part was to be general, and that the force of General McLaws was to advance simultaneously with us ON MY IMMEDIATE LEFT, and seeing at once that a mountain [Devil's Den] held by the enemy in heavy force with artillery to the right of General Law's center was the key to the enemy's left. This caused some separation of my regiments, WHICH WAS REMEDIED as promptly as the numerous stone and rail fences that intersected the field through which we were advancing would allow."

"…we advanced through this field, for a mile and a half ….

"As we approached the base of the mountain General Law MOVED TO THE RIGHT, AND I WAS MOVING OBLIQUELY TO THE RIGHT TO CLOSE ON HIM when my whole line encountered the fire of the enemy's main line, posted behind rocks and a stone fence..

"On discovering this heavy force on my left flank, and seeing that no attack was being made by any of our forces on my left, I at once sent a courier to Major-General Hood, stating that I was hard pressed on my left; that General McLaws' forces WERE NOT ENGAGING THE ENEMY TO MY LEFT (which enabled him [Hood] to move fresh troops from that part of his line down on me), and that I must have reinforcements…

"For an hour and upward these two regiments maintained one of the hottest contests, against five or six times their number, that I have witnessed. The moving of Colonel Work [1st Texas]TO THE LEFT, to relieve Colonel Manning [3rd Ark.] while the Fourth and Fifth Texas were closing TO THE RIGHT on General Law's brigade, separated these two regiments from the others. They were steadily moving TO THE RIGHT AND FRONT, driving the enemy before them, when they passed the woods and ravine to my right. After finding THAT I COULD NOT MOVE THE FIRST AND THIRD TO THE RIGHT, I sent TO RECALL THEM, ordering them to move TO THE LEFT until THE LEFT OF THE Fourth SHOULD REST ON THE RIGHT OF THE FIRSTt; but my messenger found two of General Law's regiments on the left of my two (the Fourth and Fifth Texas), and did not find these regiments at all. [the 1st TX and 3rd ARK were lost because of Law moving regiments out of the order of battle.]

"I sent a messenger to Lieutenant-General Longstreet for reinforcements, and AT THE SAME TIME SENT TO Generals [George T.] Anderson and Benning, URGING THEM TO HURRY UP TO MY SUPPORT. They came up, joined us, and fought gallantly."

Robertson's report, 17 July, in Norton, The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top (1913), 150-2.

Here is some flexibility. Roberson calling on and GETTING the two rear brigades in support. There is no indication that Law sent them but that they came themselves. They did that on Robertson's urging because they were 1. Placed to support him, 2. they had their role defined by the conforming and formation mechanics, including where to enter the line, and 3. and needed no order to fulfill the responsibilities Hood had already assigned for them with placing in the second line.

Col Manning, 3rd AK, reported: [Manning's report, 8 July 1863, in Norton, The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top (1913), 155.]

"About four o'clock in the evening of July 2 I was ordered to move against the enemy, KEEPING MY RIGHT WELL CONNECTED TO THE LEFT OF THE FIRST TEXAS REGIMENT, AND HOLD MY LEFT TO THE EMMITTSBURG ROAD, then some 200 yards to my front AND OUT OF VIEW.
"Upon reaching this road I discovered, FROM THE DIRECTION THE DIRECTING REGIMENT WAS TAKING, that I could not with the length of my line carry out the latter order; hence I decided to keep my command on a prolongation of the line FORMED BY THE TROOPS ON MY RIGHT."

LtC Work, 1st TX, reported:

"The regiment, together with the brigade, having been ordered forward to the attack about 4 p.m., continued to advance by the front for a distance exceeding half a mile, the Fourth Texas upon the right and the Third Arkansas upon the left.

"Owing to the failure (as informed by Brigadier-General Robertson) of the troops that were assigned to the position ON THE LEFT of this (Robertson's) brigade to arrive promptly, neither this nor the Third Arkansas Regiment was able to advance, without advancing against a vastly superior force, and with the left flank of the Third Arkansas (protecting my left) exposed to attack.

[Here is another example of delay and lack of command control. The regimetns did not advance because of the absence of conforming units on their left.]

"After the lapse of several minutes, Benning's brigade made its appearance, but instead of occupying the ground TO THE LEFT of Robertson's brigade, so as to enable the latter to move forward with its left flank secured from attack, it occupied the ground still occupied by a portion, at least, of this brigade, the Fifteenth Georgia Regiment falling in and remaining with the First Texas Regiment."

Major Bane, 4th Texas, reported on Robertson's advance:
[OR 27 (2), 408-9; LtC Work's report of 9 July.]

Even the Major recognized the problem inherent in Benning placing his division between Law and Robertson, even though it was necessary, and complicated by the rupture of Robertson's brigade.

"About 4:30 P.M. the 2d instant we were ordered to advance on the enemy, who occupied the heights about 1 1-4 miles distant, the Fifth Texas, THE DIRECTING BATTALION, ON MY RIGHT, and the First Texas on my left.. . "After a short pause while repelling his skirmishers, I was ordered by General Robertson to MOVE BY THE RIGHT FLANK, so as to cover ALL THE GROUND BETWEEN US AND THE DIRECTING BATTALION. [Lots of attention is being given to conforming, and keeping connected to the right.]

Lt-Col Bryan, 5th Texas (who replaced Col Powell, and was replaced by Maj Rogers), reported, 8 July:

"About 4 P.M. on the 2nd instant General Hood's division was drawn up in line of battle fronting the heights occupied by the enemy. The Fifth Texas regiment occupied the RIGHT OF THE BRIGADE, RESTING ON GENERAL LAW'S LEFT, WHOSE BRIGADE WAS THE ONE OF DIRECTION. At the word ‘Forward!' the regiment moved forward in good order.
Bane's report, 9 July 1863, in Norton, The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top (1913), 16-162.

BENNING's Brigade. [He is in reserve. His description indicates how hard it is to conform in broken ground. It also shows how Hood's drive to the right against the prevailing orders skewed the whole formation, Robertson and the supporting brigades.]

"About 2 or 3 P.M. on July 2 ultimo, I was informed by Major-General Hood that his division, as the right of Lieutenant-General Longstreet's corps, was about to attack the left of the enemy's line, and that IN THE ATTACK MY BRIGADE WOULD FOLLOW LAW'S BRIGADE at the distance of about 400 yards. In order to get to the place they assigned me, in the rear of General Law, it was necessary to move the brigade 500 or 600 yards farther to the right. Having done this, I advanced in line of battle. A wood intervened between us and the enemy, which, though it did not prevent their shells from reaching us and producing some casualties, yet completely hid them from our view."

"… The intervening spur over which we had to march to reach the first line was nearly all open. Our own first line also became visible, advancing about 400 yards in our front. THE PART OF IT IN OUR FRONT I TOOK TO BE LAW'S BRIGADE, AND SO I FOLLOWED IT. IN TRUTH IT WAS ROBERTSON'S, LAW'S BEING FATHER TO THE RIGHT. This I did not discover until late in the fight, a wood on the right concealing from me most of Law's brigade. MY LINE CONTINUED TO FOLLOW THE FIRST LINE, HALTING ONCE OR TWICE TO PRESERVE ITS INTERVAL [The distance between the front line and his supporting brigade—400 yards]. At length I saw that the first line would not be able alone to carry the peak, so I advanced without halting again.

Benning's report, 3 Aug 1863, in Norton, The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top (1913), 167-9.

Col. Waddell, 20th GA, reported: [Here is where, because of Hood's decision to swing wide right, that his order of battle becomes unhinged and Benning has to 'fix' it.]

"About 5 p.m., having reached the intended point, we advanced in line of battle to the assault, the regiment moving in excellent order and spirit. We had not advanced far before it was ascertained that there was A CONSIDERABLE SPACE INTERVENING BETWEEN LAW'S AND ROBERTSON'S BRIGADES, unoccupied by any Confederate troops save very few belonging to the First Texas Regiment. Near to the center of this comparatively unoccupied ground, upon a steep, rocky, rugged hill, the enemy had posted a battery of six guns, from which a destructive and vigorous fire was poured into our ranks.

"To cover this ground and to support Brigadier-General [J. B.] Robertson, who was pressed severely at the time, a left and oblique movement was made and continued until the Twentieth Regiment fronted this battery, when the brigade was ordered to advance forward."

OR 27 (2), 426; Waddell's report of 27 July.

Col. du Bose, 15th GA, reported: [Here is the brigadier stepping in to repair or maintain the alignment of his brigade—It was important. The 15th was the tag end of the brigade's line the left and because of the ground had lost its connection. Note that 'again', as Benning had done it more than once. The speed of the advance was delayed to maintain alignment.]

"After getting within 150 yards of the advanced troops, I WAS AGAIN HALTED BY GENERAL BENNING FOR A FEW MOMENTS, MY REGIMENT HAVING GOTTEN A SHORT DISTANCE AHEAD OF THE ANOTHER PORTION OF OUR BRIGADE LINES, OWING I SUPPOSE TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THE NATURE OF THE GROUND OVER WHICH WE HAD TO MARCH. General Benning then left the position which he was near, toward my right, and went toward the right of the brigade.
"I rested a few minutes in this position, UNTIL I SAW THE BALANCE OF THE BRIGADE HAD MOVED UP EVEN WITH MY POSITION AND WERE STILL ADVANCING. I IMMEDIATELY ORDERED A FORWARD MOVEMENT,…
OR 27 (2) 421-2: Col. du Bose's report of 27 July.

The Benning didn't need an order to advance because he was following protocol—you follow the other regiments to the right.

ANDERSON's Brigade:
For the wounded Anderson Col.White filed the brigade's report. Anderson was the other supporting brigade. Benning and Anderson's actions so what a support did and how in regards to conforming.

"The position of the brigade was on the extreme left of Hood's division, and when ordered to advance on the enemy's position was to the rear and supporting the Texas brigade. Soon after the Texas brigade became engaged, this brigade MOVED FORWARD ON A LINE WITH IT. [Supports 'regulated' or conformed on the front brigade.]

"The supports not coming up in time, and the enemy coming up on our left flank, General Anderson changed the front of the left wing of the 9th Georgia regiment (which occupied the extreme left of the brigade), but soon found they could not hold the enemy in check. He then ordered the brigade to retire to the crest of the hill in the edge of the timber, where the charge commenced. BUT A SHORT TIME ELAPSED BEFORE McLAW'S DIVISION CAME UP ON OUR LEFT, when General Anderson ordered another advance, which was executed with spirit and loss to the enemy."

Southern Historical Society, Papers, Col White's report, in "Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg" (1877) v4, 165-6.

Capt Hillyer, 9th GA, reported on 8 July:

"The regiment occupied its USUAL POSITION in line on the left of the brigade and the extreme left of the division, having for nearly an hour and a half NO SUPPORT ON ITS LEFT, the advance of McLaws' division being for some reason thus long delayed, which left the flank while advancing nearly the distance of a mile very much exposed to an enfilading fire of the enemy's batteries, and also to the fire of a flanking party of the enemy, who were prompt to take advantage of the exposed condition of the flank. To meet this flanking party, I changed the front of three companies, and for nearly an hour, against great odds, HELD THEM IN CHECK UNTIL relieved by the advance of McLaws' division, which finally came up on our left.

"…I BELIEVE THAT HAD MCLAW'S DIVISION ADVANCED WITH OUR LINE SO THAT WE COULD HAVE ARRIVED AT THIS POINT BEFORE WE BECAME WORN OUT WITH FATIGUE, WE WOULD HAVE CARRIED THE POSITION."
OR 27 (2), 399-400: Hillyer's report of 8 July.

Because McLaws was very late in giving orders to Kershaw and then Barksdale to advance, Anderson AND Benning were committed to maintain the line worn out rather than being available for the extra punch which would have 'carried the position.' Even with Anderson in place, Kershaw still had difficulty maintaining a connection and he lost Barksdale. Hood's swing to the right, McLaw's inexplicable delay [over an hour] in releasing Kershaw and Barksdale, along with Barksdale's swing north, much of the momentum of the attack was lost, that wouldn't have if everyone had indeed conformed as ordered. That is how the wheels come off. Even so, because the Union's efforts at conforming were much worse, the Confederates did better overall. It is also evident how different commands attempted to maintain alignment and conforming, what kinds of problems caused alignment to fail, as well as the consequences.
The whole issue of the conforming and regulation process and the consequences of failure are no clearer than Law's report after he took command of Hood's division.

Law explained that after clearing Round Top on the division's right and "changing front to the left":

"Up to this time I had seen nothing of McLaws's division, which was TO HAVE EXTENDED OUR LEFT AND TO HAVE MOVED TO THE ATTACK AT THE SAME TIME. I therefore HALTED MY LINE, which had become broken and disorganized by the roughness of the ground over which it had been fighting, and placing it in as advantageous position as possible for receiving any attack that the Federals might be disposed to make, I hurried back to the ridge from which we had originally advanced. I found McLaws still in position there, his troops suffering considerably from a severe fire of artillery from the opposite hills.

"I was informed by General Kershaw, who held the right of this division, that although he understood the general instructions that the forward movement was TO BE TAKEN UP FROM THE RIGHT, he had not yet received the order to move from his division commander. I pointed out the position of Hood's division, and urged the necessity of immediate support on its left. General Kershaw requested me to designate the point ON WHICH HIS RIGHT FLANK SHOULD BE DIRECTED, and promptly moved to the attack, the movement being taken up by the whole division."

"As McLaws advanced, WE AGAIN MOVED FORWARD ON HIS RIGHT, and the fighting continued in ‘see-saw' style – first one side and then the other gaining ground or losing it, with small advantage to either, until dark."

Law, B&L (1888), iii/1:325-326

I think there is plenty of evidence that regiments, brigades and divisions used the directing procedures to move.

BD wrote:
>>>>There was no "disconnect" between Hood's and McLaws Division, nor for that matter with Anderson's Division even though they advanced at different times.<<<<

BD:
PLease read Law's analysis of that 'disconnect' between Hood and McLaws Division and what he needed to do about it. Longstreet and and Wilcox both state that the loss of Anderson's connection to Barksdale was a misfortune.

>>>>Moreover, even if Barksdale's Brigade or maybe just the 21st Mississippi was "isolated" in the middle of the right wing, the attack in echelon by division on the right proceeded as planned AND achieved the objectives as outlined by General Lee.<<<<

Did it? Lee wanted the two divisions perpendicular to Emmittsburg Road. He wanted them to attack the flank of the Union army. He wanted them to march north between the road and the ridge. That simply didn't happen, regardless of how well the attack went.

The analysis of Barksdale's own men see his brigade's isolation as a failure.

>>>>Your assumptions about the failure of the right wing of the ANV on July 2nd to maintain regulating "connections" and hence the failure of the attack are incorrect.<<<

"MY Assumptions?"

Gadzooks, BD, I've just given you several dozen expressions of the veterans involved who say that the failure to maintain the connections seriously hurt the final outcome of their attacks. However, no one, including me said the attack was a failure [a judgment call] I said,

1. The attack did NOT follow Lee's plan for the attack. McLaws division was supposed to swing in it's entirety to face north BEFORE the attack commenced--that never happened. Only Barksdale's three regiments ever faced north, and even the returned to face east…

2. The attack was seriously weakened by the failures to maintain connections to the regulating units.

In several places, veterans say they could have carried their objectives IF they had support on their flanks. I just quoted them. They are the ones saying it. I am at a loss to see how that is an 'assumption' on my part.

THE MAIN ISSUE HERE WAS YOUR INSISTENCE THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ACW ARMIES, AND SPECIFICALLY THE CONFEDERATE UNITS ON THE SECOND DAY USED THE REGULATING/DIRECTING MECHANISM TO MOVE AND COORDINATE ATTACKS.

With the rest, I was simply stating Lee's orders to put some context to what actually happened, not putting forth some argument that the Confederate attack 'failed'.

The Scotsman wrote:

THE MAIN ISSUE HERE WAS YOUR INSISTENCE THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ACW ARMIES, AND SPECIFICALLY THE CONFEDERATE UNITS ON THE SECOND DAY USED THE REGULATING/DIRECTING MECHANISM TO MOVE AND COORDINATE ATTACKS.

No, the main issue was to what extent Confederate units explicitly used the regulating/directing mechanism to move and coordinate attacks, as opposed to attempting maintain linear alignments while engaged. There are many more successes in this regard than "disconnects" on July 2nd.

The Scotsman also wrote:

"With the rest, I was simply stating Lee's orders to put some context to what actually happened, not putting forth some argument that the Confederate attack 'failed'."

Stating the attack went "wonky" is putting forth an argument that somehow the attack didn't succeed. You then proceeded to note where everyone from the regiment up to the division made a reference to losing formal linear alignment with a unit adjacent. Longstreet said it was the best assault delivered by the ANV during the war. (don't have the quote in front of me right now, but will find it). If one of the best assaults went "wonky", what are the implications for your drive to regulate every unit on the field to a drill taken from the field manual ?

This is about all the time I have right now to write on the matter. Apologies. But thanks for the further citations. Look forward to reading them later.

Jim

BD wrote:
>>>>No, the main issue was to what extent Confederate units explicitly used the regulating/directing mechanism to move and coordinate attacks, as opposed to attempting maintain linear alignments while engaged. There are many more successes in this regard than "disconnects" on July 2nd.<<<

BD:
That is an interesting either/or. So maintaining linear alignments had nothing to do with the regulating/directing mechanism, that one was not dependent on the other, one could work and the other not?

I would agree, regiment by regiment, there were more successes than failures in the 'connections'. When you get to the brigades involved, it was 50/50. All three divisions lost their connections to each other.

Hi Shane,
I see Jeff Lewis responded to your request for links to French Regulations. Take a look at plate XXVII ( "planche" ) in the "Line" section,

( link )

and you'll see a Note:

"Planche XXVIII

Figure 1

"Nota. On a représenté dans cette figure la ligne de bataille deux fois, pour montrer comment le commandant en chef ( k ) doit se placer pour établir les deux aides de camp ( a et b ) sur cette ligne avant de faire commencer le mouvement, et les moyens que ces Aide de camp doivent employer pendant l'exécution du mouvement pour jalonner la ligne, conformément à ce qui est prescrit dans les évolutions de ligne n° 167…"
…Le Commandant en chef ( k ) dirige de la droite les deux drapeaux de la droite sur le point gauche ( f ) "

Your French may be better than mine, but in light of our discussion of whether or not Generals were expected to occupy certain positions as a standard operating procedure ( or what we might call a "default position" that would be the norm, and left only if some emergency or special need arose ) , I thought I would point out where the "commander in chief" of this action would be. A very rough translation of the pertinent part of this excerpt is:

" The letter "k ) " represents where the commander in chief should be to establish the line upon which his two ADC's ( "a ) " and ( "b" ) need to be before beginning the movement, and the means that these Aides ought to use during the execution of the movement to align the line, to conform with the requirements prescribed in the regulations for Evolutions of the Line # 167… The Commander in Chief ( k ) directs the two Colors…"

( BTW, corrections gratefully accepted from better French speakers. )
If I understand this right, you may wish to look at other evolutions for additional evidence that the Regs did give expectations for the location of general officers.

I would then speculate that if a general felt he really had to leave his post, he would need to leave someone in charge of that duty while he went elsewhere. Even then, if something went wrong ( the subordinate guided the formation to the wrong place, or he got himself killed while replacing the general ) , it would still be a black mark for the general,because it was his responsibility to direct the operation.

>"Lee wanted the two divisions perpendicular to Emmittsburg Road. He wanted them to attack the flank of the Union army. He wanted them to march north between the road and the ridge. That simply didn't happen, regardless of how well the attack went."<

Unfortunately for Lee, he wanted two self-contradictory things. His troops could not attack the flank of the Union army by marching up the right side of the Emmitsburg Road, because that's not where the Union flank was! When his attack had been planned, the Union left flank had been back on Cemetery Ridge, not along Emmitsburg Road. (He probably saw a skirmish line there.) By the time Longstreet's corps reached the Emmitsburg Road, Sickles had advanced to the Peach Order (on that road) so that Longstreet had to move Hood's Division even farther south in order to get beyond that point.

Yet the Peach Orchard wasn't the Union flank, either, it was just a salient, and two brigades of Birney's division held positions to the southeast of the PO. Hood's front line brigades moved across the Emmitsburg Road but discovered that in order to attack the Union left they had to move even farther east. However, Union reinforcements were arriving as fast as the Confederates were moving, so that in the end it came to Oates and Chamberlain fighting it out on the south slope of Little Round Top, a long way from the Emmitsburg Road.

In short, the attack could not succeed the way Lee had planned it, because he did not understand the Union position. It certainly did succeed in clearing the Federals off the high ground along the Emmitsburg Road and giving Lee the position he wanted for his artillery, so that it could bombard Cemetery Hill. It also succeeded in wrecking Sickles' 3rd Corps and damaging parts of 2nd and 5th Corps, but at the cost of considerable damage to Hood's, McLaws' and Anderson's divisions.

BD:

Here is the point where I offered to provide evidence:

>>>>Yes, in fact. There's no evidence that either Barksdale or Kershaw needed a regulating brigade to advance. McLaws only says Kershaw and Semmes worked together. Barksdale seemed to be operating as something of an independent force, not to mention Wofford. That equals a division, under one commander, McLaws who attacked without specifically using a regulating brigade DRILL. Why ? Because he didn't need to.<<<

>>>Did Barksdale worry about a regulating brigade drill or procedure ? I don't think so. Is there any evidence that he went out of his way to maintain an alignment with the brigades on either side of him?<<<<<

I said "I'll post the evidence."

So,
1. McLaws did indicate that Kershaw was the regulating brigade, and Kershaw states that was his understanding--and when released attempted to perform that task.

2. I provided evidence that Barksdale did use the regulating procedure within his brigade, and was SUPPOSED TO maintain the alignment with the brigades on either side of him, Kershaw and Wilcox. Everyone involved understood Barksdale was supposed to regulate on Kershaw, and Wilcox on Barksdale. Kershaw expected it, Barksdale 'didn't worry about it' when finally released, and his isolated operations helped screw up both McLaws's and Anderson's advances--according to those that were there from accounts by Longstreet, Anderson, McLaws, Laws, Kershaw, etc. and even officers in Barksdale's own brigade.

Wolford and Semmes accounts would be pertinent here too, yes?

I keep forgetting to post this but just in case any of you are under impression that only footsloggers had to be aware of the joys of Regulation.

Cooke's US Cavalry Tactics (1862)

Has a chunk in the back of the book on how to drive a cavalry brigade – using Regulation.

Worth a look.

Perhaps it would be better if the entire topic of regulating battalions, and the command and control philosophy it represents, on TMP be moved to Mike Collins' "how many of us use regulating battalions in their rules?" thread from the "Command Radius" thread? That way the Command Radius thread could revert back to debate, attack and defense of that game mechanic. Readers who wish to focus on that mechanic can do that there without distraction. I suggest we move our discussion of "regulating" etc there.

I posted the following there:

"Anyone interested in delving more into the "Regulating Battalion" ideas could do so here; thus those who have no interest in this discussion can easily avoid it, while those who wish to dive into it in detail have a venue to do so.
I made a suggestion early in the Command Radius thread to create a thread specifically for "regulating battalion" but it died for lack of a second. Would this impede on what you wanted for this thread?

I'm just trying to decide the best place to post more on regulating battalions and since you have a new thread started… ;^)"

I think that would help this Command radius thread unclog and prevent cross-postings and misunderstanding, and make it easier for those who want to learn more about "regulation" to find it, and for those who have already heard more than they want to hear to avoid it easily.

-Ned

I am sorry guys, regardless of all the citations, instances of people, regulatory information and discussion here I do feel that Regulatory Btlns and the formations and movements of troops is and should be part of the Movement Orders phase of a game turn. The relay of orders comes before the actual deployment or movement of the troops so I think that many people (including myself) are getting the whole thing confused and meshed together.

As far as I am concerned, Orders and Order relay is a phase in the beginning of a turn, or game hour where units are given their orders and they are acted upon (activations). This is often delayed by time and distance but eventually they get to the receiver.

Once he has them he acts upon them in the best way he feels he should corresponding with the drill manual, doctrine and deployments to best carry out those orders. This part of the game comes under the "Movement" phase of a turn which is usually well after the receiving of the orders. For me and it will always be the same for me is that receiving the orders and acting on them are two distinct phases of a turn which can be delayed with time and distance on he field and so on.

Once the orders are received and acted upon then the Regulatory argument rings true and the actual deployment and movement of those troops comes into play. The mere act of touching and moving the troops (figures) by the player is where all of this is found and should be worked out. Not during the orders receiving phase. We can debate til the cows come home all the regulatory evidence we want but I feel most of us already know and understand all of this anyway, even if many players do not follow it. The point of this thread now it seems is to instill in players the importance of proper movement formations and sequence, great, but this thread is really going over the top now and going off on tangents that it need not do.

Shane

Shane wrote:
>>>This part of the game comes under the "Movement" phase of a turn which is usually well after the receiving of the orders. For me and it will always be the same for me is that receiving the orders and acting on them are two distinct phases of a turn which can be delayed with time and distance on he field and so on.<<<

Shane:
This has all been about movement, how DC and Brigadiers move their commands once the orders have been received. That's it.

As James Cunningham writes in 1804 in his "The Tactics of the British Army."

"When any number of corps assemble to act together, a regulating Battalion is named, by which the others are guided in their dressing, and from which every movement has its origin. This Battalion as the Regulations term it, becomes the helm of the whole."

The HELM. This is about the steering mechanism for the regiments, Brigades, and Divisions. It isn't about the orders that tell them where to go or who to navigate by.

Scotsman,

Yes, it would be great if you could post your information on Semmes and Wofford.

The main issue was/is to what extent Confederate units specifically used a regulating/directing unit to move and coordinate attacks, as opposed to attempting to maintain general linear alignments while engaged. You would have them obsessed with it and have cited several instances when either Robertson, Kershaw, Humphreys or Wright are complaining about a lack of support, especially on their left. I might refer to that officially as "CYA"-speak, probably something our modern professional soldiers are familiar with as well. Barksdale was late in regulating his brigade to Kershaw's, correct? You said it took one hour for Barksdale to initiate his assault, I say it was probably less, but one way or the other Kershaw was expecting it sooner. When your soldiers are getting torn apart by grape shot and cannister, you want that support sooner and sooner often isn't soon enough. Kershaw did advance specifically with a regulating battalion--according to the reports-- and then after an order given to the regulating battalion was inadvertently sent down the line to the left, it did cause havoc b/c those regiments were facing a different tactical situation than the one Kershaw saw to the front of the regulating battalion. Either way, neither Kershaw, nor any of his battalion commanders make any mention of using a regulating battalion after this incident… and by all accounts they had a good deal of fighting ahead of them. It's like using the regulating battalion was a good, formal and comfortable thing to do in the advance to combat, but once they got engaged… well, people could killed get by following drill book protocols too closely.

Now from the evidence you provide about Barksdale's brigade, I'm not entirely convinced that he used the 21st--the rightmost--as a regulating battalion. After all, if it was, how do you explain the 21st swinging right, while Barksdale's other three regiments swung left ? According to McNeily unpublished account of Humphrey's the 21st swung right and then back toward the center ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN INIATIVE and this is what broke the connection with the rest of Barksdale's command. How could this happen if they were in fact the regulating battalion ? How could they do this if they weren't the regulating battalion ? Let's not forget that Barksdale's troops played a major role in smashing Graham Brigade, (Birney's right-most brigade) and rolling up Humphrey's 2nd Division of the Federal 3rd Corp IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANDERSON"S DIVISION on the left. The "disconnect" between Anderson and Barksdale occurred later after the first line and probably others had been smashed. In either case, if Barksdale used a regulating battalion to initiate his advance, which it isn't even clear if he did, then that comfortable parade ground drill was tossed right quick as soon as the bullets started to hit home.

Jim

Before I forget, H. Pfanz, Epilogue, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pg. 425

..the "best three hours' of fighting ever done by any troops on any battle-field"
J. Longstreet

TheScotsman wrote :

>>>>>The HELM. This is about the steering mechanism for the regiments, Brigades, and Divisions. It isn't about the orders that tell them where to go or who to navigate by.<<<<<

Exactly, this is why the discussion and apparent relationship between Command Radius and Regulatory Btlns is, in my opinion mute, they are dicussing two distinctly different things. Cr's are about command control or the sphere of influence with regards to order relay and activations while Regulating btlns or the, "HELM" as you call it is after the fact, the phase when these orders are put into action and the actual art movement of the units begins. Yes this is part of Command control but is part of command control for movement in formations to corrospond and carry out the actual orders for movement and nothing more.

The CR discussion was more about the general's immediate sphere of influence in a given turn and nothing more. It was you and others who went along with you who tried to mesh the two together. All a CR does is give the player a mechanic to allow him to understand how far out a general's sphere of influence radiates around him in any given turn and nothing to do with actual movement orders as such. For those systems that give movement penalties etc for the use of CR's I agree, they are wrong, especially if those units are already engaged in carrying out previous orders. But the radius is just a mechanic to allow players to know how far out the general's control expands in a single turn or phase in a table top game.

So all you have really done from my point of view is confuse the entire issue by trying to relate both together but on the up side you have highlighted that "one" part of the use of CR's as a game mechanic is wrong. That is the propencity of some game systems to use the CR as a device to slow down or grind to a halt units that stray outside of the radius. This is clearly wrong and an ill use of CR's but the only ill use I can see.

You discussion as to the merits of Reglatory btlns for movement orders is valid and to the point and should be used instead of the negative aspect of grinding to a halt a unit that strays but the other uses of CR's are for my way of thinking still valid and perfectly OK for a system to use command control with the uses of CR's.

I know you are going to again explain to me the ills of CR's and how wrong they are but like I have said many times earlier, I use them and will continue to use them as a valid game mechanic and neither you nor anyone else can legitimately tell me their use is not realistic nor a valid simulation mechanic. I have already stated several passages that show battlefield situations where things could and did go wrong with respect to chain of command breakdown and could probably hunt down and place in here hundreds more but for now, for me, CR's are valid and a very lewgitimate way to show command control and possible confusion both. "Before" and "During" movement orders.

Like I also said, I use and stipulate to my players the proper use of historical formations both for layout, spacings and distances and during our movement rules we enforce the proper spacings for deployments and so on, this goes without saying but this is during the actual act of movement, what we use CR's for is to show the chain of command and control before the act of movement is carried out and during the movement act as well to show control in other ways such as time and motion and time delay in order relay and changes.

If other systems use CR's for simply halting and or handicapping units that stray outside of these distances then I am in agreance with you that that kind of use is wrong and should not be used but that is as far as I am willing to go on the subject.

Shane

donlowry wrote:

"I don't see the breakdown of Longstreet's 2 July attack coming with any disconnect between Barksdale and Anderson's right and center brigades (Wilcox, Lang/Perry, and Wright), all of whom wound up attacking Cemetery Ridge, but in the failure of Anderson's next brigade, Posey's, to advance beyond the Bliss farm buildings and the next brigade beyond that, Mahone's, refusal to attack -- leaving Wright's left (no pun intended) exposed, and leaving Pender's Division waiting for the rest of Anderson's Division to advance before it would be its own turn. So even if Pender had not been wounded his division might not have attacked, since it was supposed to do so only after all of Anderson's brigades advanced."

According to the historical records I think its pretty clear that of Anderson's division, Wilcox, Perry/Lang, Wright and Posey were set on auto-pilot to attack in echelon or near simultaneously--though not Mahone--to McLaws' advance. That Posey didn't and only sent two regiments forward is interesting b/c Posey's brigade report states that the brigade had orders to attack in full. More interesting still is that according to Wilcox--the "regulating brigade" of the division--Wilcox was to send word to the DC--Anderson--of his advance. If his was the brigade of regulation, why would he need to send word to the DC of his advance? Shouldn't the DC be near or with the "regulating brigade"? This sheds light on the location of DC Anderson. Anderson never intended to be with the brigade of regulation. Why would he when 4 brigades of his division are on "auto-pilot" attack orders ? Instead he is somewhere further down the line, perhaps in the center or near the left to gauge the attack and the Federal response while his 4 brigades are attacking and it is DC Anderson who sends an ADC to Posey hold his advance to only two regiments. That's a DC exercising his Command Radius, NOT a DC exercising his command & control via the regulating brigade.

An exception, yes, to a divisional attack in echelon by brigade, but an important exception. The division commander made the call to not commit a brigade-in-full on the left of his attack.

If I'm not mistaken, let's also remember that most brigade-division level war games have 30 minute Game Turns. IMO, ALL FOUR brigades of Anderson's Division got their attacks off easily within 30 minutes of one another which means that using a "regulating brigade" mechanic on the table top for a game like ACW Fire & Fury is sort of a moot point, i.e. they would all "appear" to advance simultaneously anyway.

BD:

Perhaps this discussion could/should be moved to the regulating thread.

Anderson requested Wilcox to inform him of the move because Anderson didn't know when McLaws would move, and the actual wait time was several hours before Barksdale moved.

You are right though, Anderson didn't have to be with Wilcox, because Wilcox already had his direction and orders. The regulating process is why all four brigades of Anderson's division could all move within 30 minutes.

And the regulating brigade mechanic is hardly a moot point for games like F&F because regardless of appearances the actual game mechanics and complications are different and far more representative of what actually happened.

Scotsman,

Be glad to move AFTER you post Semmes and Wofford.

Jim

I second Ned's idea on switching Regulating discussion to Mike's thread.

It probably more appropriate to have a thread on something as a positive, than a thread on why you shouldn't have something else!

Command Radius.

BD:
Okay, if you insist:

To set the scene:

Longstreet wrote:
"As McLaws's division came up on line, Barksdale's brigade was in front of a battery about six hundred yards off. He appealed for permission to charge and capture it, but was told to wait. On his right was Kershaw's brigade, the brigades of Semmes and Wofford ON THE SECOND LINE.

Kershaw:
"Along this wall the division was then formed, Semmes IN RESERVE TO ME and Barksdale ON MY LEFT, SUPPORTED BY Wofford in reserve. Artillery was also placed along the wall to my right, and Colonel DeSausseure's 15th South Carolina regiment was thrown beyond it to protect it. Hood's division was then moving in our rear towards our right to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging round towards Peach Orchard and AT THE SAME TIME ESTABLISHING CONNECTION WITH Hood ON MY RIGHT and CO-OPERATING WITH HIM. It was understood he [Hood] was to sweep down the enemy's line IN A DIRECTION PERPENDICULAR TO OUR THEN LINE OF BATTLE. I was told that Barksdale would MOVE WITH ME AND CONFORM TO MY MOVEMENT. These directions I received in various messages from the Lieutenant-General and the Major-General commanding, and in part by personal communication with them."

The reason for reposting these two is to establish what Barksdale, Semmes and Wofford were understood to be doing. Part of the reason is that Barksdale's move out of line and the swing to the left creates serious problems for Kershaw, Semmes, and Wofford. Another problem is that neither Semmes or Wofford submitted after action reports.

SEMMES' Brigade

Kerhsaw's brigade was engaged in two wings, Kershaw present with the right. As pressure increased on the right, he reports:
"I then hurried in person to General Semmes, then 150 yards in my right rear, to bring him up to meet the attack ON MY RIGHT, and also to bring forward my right regiment, the 15th [SC – which had been posted further rightward to cover a battery]…. General Semmes promptly responded to my call, and put his brigade in motion TOWARD THE RIGHT, preparatory to MOVING TO THE FRONT. While his troops were moving he fell, mortally wounded."

Bradley M. Gottfied wrote a book titled "Brigades of Gettysburg," and in it gives a decent account of Semmes Brigade's actions. p. 415-418. You can actually read them on Google.

Semmes advances behind with Kershaw and comes under heavy artillery fire when the brigade halts on the right of Rose Farm. When Kershaw came to him for support, Kershaw needed him on the right because his connection with Robertson had been broken and his flank was threatened by Caldwell's Division.

Semmes is wounded, and the brigade moves right and then forward into the gap between Kershaw and Robertson/now Benning. However, because of Semmes' loss, or other reasons, a gap opens up in the middle of the brigade when the left hand regiment, the 5oth GA moves ahead faster than the right, which is the regulating battalion [Remember Benning having to fix a similar problem with his left-hand regiment.]

Into this gap charged the Irish Brigade of Caldwell's Division, the 50th GA and Kershaw's 7th SC fell back. Brook's Brigade meets the rest of Semme's Brigade and it buckles and falls back. Gottfied says:

"Some of the remaining members of the 50th GA become mingled with the 7th SC, weakening the overall command structure."

Semmes and Kershaw are saved by Wofford's advance on their left taking Caldwell's division in the flank.
Kershaw reports: "On emerging from the wood AS I FOLLOWED THE RETREAT, I saw Wofford riding at the head of his fine brigade, then coming in, his left being in the Peach Orchard, which was then clear of the enemy. His movement was such as to strike the stony hill on the left, and thus turn the flank of the troops that had driven us from that position. On his approach the enemy retreated across the wheatfield, where, with the regiments OF MY LEFT WING, Wofford attacked with great effect, driving the Federals upon and near to Little Round Top. I now ascertained that Barksdale had advanced upon the Peach Orchard after I had become engaged; that he had cleared that position with the assistance of my 8th South Carolina regiment, driving all before him, and, HAVING ADVANCED FAR BEYOND THAT POINT, UNTIL ENVELOPED BY SUPERIOR FORCES, had fallen morally wounded, and been left in the Federals' hands."

WOFFORD's Brigade

Longstreet reports
:
"The enemy's first position along the Emmitsburg road was but little better, in point of strength, than the first position taken by these two divisions. Our batteries were opened upon this position, Hood's division pressing upon his left and McLaws' upon his front. [An 'L' shaped attack] He was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent. Numerous stone fences about its base added greatly to its strength. The enemy, taking shelter behind these, held them, one after another, with great pertinacity. He was driven from point to point,

"I had one brigade—Wofford's—that had not been engaged in the hottest battle. To urge the troops to their reserve power in the precious moments, I RODE WITH Wofford. The rugged field, the rough plunge of artillery fire, and the piercing musket-shots delayed somewhat the march, but Alexander DASHED UP WITH HIS BATTERIES and gave new spirit to the worn infantry ranks. By a fortunate strike upon Ayres's flank we broke his line and pushed him."

"…however, until nearly night, when a strong force met the brigades of Major-General [R. H.] Anderson's division, which were co-operating upon my left, drove one of them back, and, checking the support of the other, CAUSED MY LEFT TO BE SOMEWHAT EXPOSED AND OUTFLANKED. Wofford's brigade, of McLaws' division, was driven back at the same time. I thought it prudent not to push farther until my other troops came up."

What is interesting here is that Wofford, like Semmes, Benning and Brigadier Anderson were all in the second line and supposed to follow the brigade they were supporting. Wofford was supposed to follow Barksdale as Semmes followed Kershaw. He didn't. Longstreet was with Wofford, if only because he was the last reserve Longstreet possessed.
Wofford was committed on the left of Kershaw, not only to take the pressure off of his and Semmes, but because of the gap Barksdale had created in the line.

William Youngblood was a member of Longstreet's Staff. This is what he reports:

"The peach orchard was on Wofford's left and Barksdale's right. General Longstreet from the minute he came into the open where could see Round Top, had his field glasses constantly upon that end of his line, deeply interested in Hood's efforts. Upon approaching the peach orchard the Union forces had fallen back beyond the orchard; our people were driving them, but General Barksdale's Brigade had halted behind the small breastworks which the enemy had abandoned, [Facing North] while Wofford's men HAD GONE ON. I called General Longstreet's attention to this, and said, 'Do you want General Barksdale to halt?' He turned his head and said, 'NO; GO TELL HIM TO RETAKE HIS POSITION IN THE LINE.'"
While Longstreet moved Wofford forward, he ordered Barksdale to return to his proper position in line.
"I turned my horse and dashed to Barksdale's, jumping a fence to do so, when I fell, pulling myself back into the saddle by my horse's neck. I found General Barksdale on his horse standing behind a brick milkhouse, and giving him the order from General Longstreet he put spurs to his horse, dashed a little ways along his line, giving the order to CHARGE AT THE DOUBLE-QUICK, when I distinctly heard a shot strike him and saw him fall from his horse.
It is inexplicable that Barksdale would respond to such an order by ordering a charge that would take him father away from the position Longstreet had instructed him to return to, expect that he was engaged to the front and had to clear it before returning "to his position in the line."
"I went back to General Longstreet, who was guiding his horse into the peach orchard, told him of Barksdale's fall; when he said, "Go on beyond this orchard and tell General Alexander TO ADVANCE HIS ARTILLERY, AND TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH WOFFORD'S LEFT."
Seeing that Barksdale would not be able to cover Wofford's left, he instructs Alexander to follow Wofford on the left.
I hunted my way to this battery. The smoke, noise of shells, thunder of cannon, the hissing of balls so thick and so great that one of the artillerymen led my horse to General Alexander, whom I found a few feet in front of his own guns, his glasses to his eyes, standing the bravest of the brave. I gave the order; he pointed and said, "Tell General Longstreet that as soon as I drive back this column of advancing enemy, I WILL ADVANCE." This column was COMING INTO THE VACUUM CAUSED BY BARKSDALE'S HALT.
That is, Barksdale was halted and not moving back into position.
"Simultaneously Wofford's men HAD SEEN THAT THEY WERE NOT PROTECTED ON THE LEFT AND HAD BEGUN TO RETREAT, which Longstreet's and Wofford's personal appearance on the field prevented from becoming a panic. I aided in rallying Wofford's men get the line re-established and rested for the night.
Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 38, pages 312-318 William Youngblood, of Alabama.

The actual times that these events occurred are not clear, but what is clear is the sequence.

Kershaw moves out with Barksdale on his left as expected. At some point Barksdale moves off and exposes Kershaw's left. Kershaw tries to cover the widening area between Robertson's left and the Emmittsburg Road by dividing into two wings. He is unable to do so, looses his connection with Robertson, and is threatened on his right flank, even though Benning has moved into the gap on the left of Robertson.

He calls on Semmes to fill that void, and because of errors in conforming, probably in the rush to fill the void and Semmes death during the advance, the brigade ruptures and is driven back by Union forces taking advantage of the split.

Barksdale is facing North and had just defeated Humphrey's Union Division with Anderson when he is killed, because of that, the connection was lost and as Longstreet reports:

"After carrying the Peach Orchard hill and moving to the attack of the enemy to the right of that position Barksdale's left WAS JOINED ON THE LEFT by Anderson's division of Hill's corps. But by one of the many misadventures of the day, after the breaking up and dislodging of Humphreys' division, THAT CONNECTION WAS LOST."

Barksdale is now without either left or right flank support, and as McNeily of his brigade concludes: that Barksdale had 'isolated success" and as Kershaw reports, that he was "enveloped."

McNeily says this about Wofford's commitment:

"When Wofford reached there [Peach Orchard], Alexander's batteries occupied Peach Orchard Hill. Advancing through the Peach Orchard after Barksdale, HE SWUNG AWAY TO THE RIGHT AND MOVED TO CONNECT WITH KERSHAW'S LEFT, they together driving the enemy from the wheat field." McNeily ascribes Wofford's redirection to Longstreet orders: "But the EXIGENCIES OF BATTLE FORCED LONGSTREET TO LEAD WOFFORD TO THE SUPPORT OF KERSHAW AND SEMMES; thus depriving Barksdale's penetration through the enemy's line of the driving power that would have reached his vitals."

Gottfield, in his book gives this description of Wofford's commitment. pp 419-423

Longstreet ordered Wofford straight forward East, and rode with him. A hundred yard gap opened up in the middle of his line within the 24 GA because they had to advance around an artillery unit. Wofford rides over and hurries them back into alignment.
Wofford then rode over to Kershaw line and asked the 2nd SC to conform to his right, Kershaw being on the right of his brigade and not available.

Wofford's brigade, 400 yards long, takes Caldwell in his right flank, , wrecks Swietzer's brigade with Kershaw and Semmes' help and makes it to the base of the Little Round Top. Here the brigade is ordered to retire. Wofford is angry and complains to McLaws, who repeats what he says is Longstreet's order. Colonel Bryan of the 16th GA writes about how angry he is and seeing Longstreet, asks for permission to attack. Longstreet refuses and repeats the order.

It is interesting that Wofford suffered 22.7% casualties and Semmes brigade, which did much less, suffered 32.4% casualties, which speaks to the artillery fire and cost of the breakdown of the unit's alignment.

Also, it is noteworthy that Longstreet and then McNeily of Barksdale's brigade claim, that Wofford's left was exposed and part of his brigade, at least, was nervous about it…
I haven't read any other primary source referring to that, or even Wofford's attack.

I would think that it is pretty obvious that the connections between brigades was very important, that generals spent a lot of time on those kinds of issues, and that the regulation, conforming, and alignment processes were what made it all work.

My last post on this issue here… Reposting to the Regulating thread.

>"The "disconnect" between Anderson and Barksdale occurred later after the first line and probably others had been smashed."<

Exactly so!

>"Instead he [R. H. Anderson} is somewhere further down the line, perhaps in the center or near the left…."<

The following quote from Pfanz's Gettysburg: The Second Day (pp. 386-7) is illuminating: "Wilcox commented that `could the division commander have seen [his brigade's situation and need] with his own eyes, he would have without being asked sent other brigades forward.' This suggests that, insofar as Wilcox knew, Anderson had not seen, and therefore was in no position to see, what was taking place on Wilcox's front. This in itself is not condemning, for Anderson could have been with another brigade farther to the left and out of immediate touch with his right. But, when Capt. Walter E. Winn of Wilcox's staff rode to Anderson for aid, he found Anderson and the division's headquarters in a `ravine.' Anderson's horse was tied to a tree and the staff was stretched on the ground as though nothing was happening. On the other hand, Lieutenant Shannon, one of Anderson's aides, went to Mahone with orders to advance, but Mahone declined to do so, saying that Anderson had told him to stay in his position. After the battle, when the Southern press voiced criticism of Posey and Mahone for not moving forward, Anderson responded that if there was any blame, it was his -- his brigadiers were acting under his orders. Something was clearly amiss, and Wilcox and Wright always believed that their brigades had not received the support they deserved."

I, too, will now switch my "allegiance" to the regulating battalions thread.

I've been keeping up with this thread. The wheels in the back of my head have been crunching on what everybody is saying. Pardon the apparent arrogant upcoming statement but I think what we really are trying to get to is a very simple fact. All the ACW stories above are trying to tell us the following:

IT REALLY SUCKED TO HAVE YOUR FLANK DANGLING IN THE MUSKET ERA (ACW OR NAPOLEIONIC).

WE NEED TO PUT INTO THE FIRE AND MELEE RULES BIG ADVANTAGES FOR FIRING/MELEE INTO THE FLANK OF A BATTALION/REGIMENT BRIGADE.

All the examples, show that experienced officers might be chaffing to throw themselves on the enemy, but would grab themselves and stop unless their flanks were covered. Recent examples above are ACW, Napoleonic stuff is also there. 7YW with more stogy manavrouing capability were famous for being hide-bound for this restriction.

The fire and melee advantages of crunching up an unprotected end of a line of battle are tremendous if you bother to draw up some geometries which include the limited range of muskets, limited range of melee and the 3-1, 5-1 10-1 advantages of attacking a flank of a dangling unit.
(Sorry but just do an analysis of a "division" column hitting the flank of a line of battle in napoleionics. Only about 25% or less of the LOB can fire effectively because of the short range of the muskets, but the attacker is trucking in a 10-1 soldier advantage. (ACW terrain, slopes, walls, dips in ground, groves of trees usually make ACW not too different). )_

It really suked to be attacked on the flank- either from the flank or just head on. This is why good officers didn't allow their troops to be made vulerable by an open flank and also why THEY STAYED IN ALIGNMENT WITH UNITS TO THEIR LEFT AND RIGHT.

If we set the fire and melee result tables to reflect this, then all these "artifical" (pardon- I can't find a better word right now), CR and Regualting Battalion questions will disappear like a fart in a hurricane. Of COURSE you will write regulating battalion orders or policies because you don't want to expose a flank and get your ask chopped off. Of course, you don't want to get a battalion out on its own without an infantry buddy to secure a flank, or a flank infantry column in column to secure the unit flank or a set of cannon to sweep away somebody trying to get at your flank or a bunch of horse to do the same.

The answer is to make an attack on the flank of a unit very deadly. (I think this replicates the reality of those times). Get this right and the CC Radius and use of regulating units flows right out of the simpliest and most effective solutions to this weakness.

Might I add that the rules become simplier?

Bill,

I`m for simple rules too… and I agree that flank attacks could be devastating, but maybe all the more so if made by cavalry on infantry, rather than infantry on infantry with smoothbore weapons.

But really, which is more an example of artifice… a regulating battalion or a command radius?

Mike.

In my opinion, neither are artifices. Both embody techniques that were actually used. An analogy is that in the future, year 2584, there are a bunch of gamers arguing over whether race car drivers drove with their left hand, right hand or both hands. The reality is that drivers use a combination of these, sometimes for valid reasons and sometimes out of happenstance. The overriding principle is to keep control of the car and steer it.

I believe that sometimes the brigadier instructed his colonels to guide on the unit that he was with (or another) as the easiest way to get the timing and formation correct. Line of sight to the regulation battalion or flag was all that was needed. Sometimes this wasn't given as a prior order, but if the brigadier's flag moved, I bet all the colonels understood to move the same way. {{a.k.a. regulating battalions}}

I believe sometimes orders were obtained by shouting from unit to unit or given by observing the "hand & officer orientation" of a neigboring unit. These work only at a shorter distance than observing the motions of a 400-700 man battalion. This "chain of order transmission thu peers" establishes a "CR" between units of the same brigade.

I believe that sometimes the brigadier general HisSelf went around and/or sent his ADC{s} around to transmit the orders. (He might also use some music or a flag signal to call in his colonels or their representatives). He would do this if there was a lot of time for an update and if he wanted to check in on his units. He would have to do this (or it would be wise) if there was going to be a sequence of actions. Such as we will advance in column to beyond that corpse of trees, then deploy into line, pivot and assult the enemy in the trees on the crest of that hill that I'm pointing at. {{I say this can be represented by the CR mode of operation}} Any battalion that was far from the brigadier, would require people to wait for someone to ride over, fetch the colonel and then ride back. He would have to have independant orders issued in a wargame and if the parent brigade CHANGED what they were doing, you gotta put in a rule to determine what the isolated battalion would do. Maybe it should then stop and send a courier or try to rejoing the parent unit ASAP.

The above are plausible explainations has to how a brigade would be controlled. It is also sensible that we can look at recorded history and note that brigades DID NOT spread out all over the map as the 95%(?) rule. One reason for that must be, that was as far apart as they could be controlled and be useful as a military unit. Maybe a horse could gallop 5 miles in a game turn carrying orders. That doesn't count for me- whatever was caused the more compact formation to be the rule.

Another line of thought is that the brigade unit had adequate resources to allow control in the manner above and that they spread out to. Notice that they could have assigned 5 extra horsed ADC's to each colonel and brigadier to allow the battalions to disperse. They didn't. They had an optimum balance of command resources and unit abilities. Stick with it. They knew their business better than we can.

Getting back to the vulerability of the flank of units, this is an additional consideration and ALSO serves to force units to stay in contact. See next post.

In my opinion, neither are artifices. Both embody techniques that were actually used. An analogy is that in the future, year 2584, there are a bunch of gamers arguing over whether race car drivers drove with their left hand, right hand or both hands. The reality is that drivers use a combination of these, sometimes for valid reasons and sometimes out of happenstance. The overriding principle is to keep control of the car and steer it.

I believe that sometimes the brigadier instructed his colonels to guide on the unit that he was with (or another) as the easiest way to get the timing and formation correct. Line of sight to the regulation battalion or flag was all that was needed. Sometimes this wasn't given as a prior order, but if the brigadier's flag moved, I bet all the colonels understood to move the same way. {{a.k.a. regulating battalions}}

I believe sometimes orders were obtained by shouting from unit to unit or given by observing the "hand & officer orientation" of a neigboring unit. These work only at a shorter distance than observing the motions of a 400-700 man battalion. This "chain of order transmission thu peers" establishes a "CR" between units of the same brigade.

I believe that sometimes the brigadier general HisSelf went around and/or sent his ADC{s} around to transmit the orders. (He might also use some music or a flag signal to call in his colonels or their representatives). He would do this if there was a lot of time for an update and if he wanted to check in on his units. He would have to do this (or it would be wise) if there was going to be a sequence of actions. Such as we will advance in column to beyond that corpse of trees, then deploy into line, pivot and assult the enemy in the trees on the crest of that hill that I'm pointing at. {{I say this can be represented by the CR mode of operation}} Any battalion that was far from the brigadier, would require people to wait for someone to ride over, fetch the colonel and then ride back. He would have to have independant orders issued in a wargame and if the parent brigade CHANGED what they were doing, you gotta put in a rule to determine what the isolated battalion would do. Maybe it should then stop and send a courier or try to rejoing the parent unit ASAP.

The above are plausible explainations has to how a brigade would be controlled. It is also sensible that we can look at recorded history and note that brigades DID NOT spread out all over the map as the 95%(?) rule. One reason for that must be, that was as far apart as they could be controlled and be useful as a military unit. Maybe a horse could gallop 5 miles in a game turn carrying orders. That doesn't count for me- whatever was caused the more compact formation to be the rule.

Another line of thought is that the brigade unit had adequate resources to allow control in the manner above and that they spread out to. Notice that they could have assigned 5 extra horsed ADC's to each colonel and brigadier to allow the battalions to disperse. They didn't. They had an optimum balance of command resources and unit abilities. Stick with it. They knew their business better than we can.

Getting back to the vulerability of the flank of units, this is an additional consideration and ALSO serves to force units to stay in contact. See next post.

Mike wrote:
But really, which is more an example of artifice… a regulating battalion or a command radius?

Mike:

I am not sure what you mean here. I think the question here is whether the distance from the commander and his units was at all perceived as some/any kind of limit on communication and particularly control.

A major point of a regulating unit was that the commander DIDN'T HAVE TO communicate with each and every unit all the time. The communication was far faster than a horse when all units were conforming, they all could act together in a *predictable* fashion at distances down the line much farther than any command radius rule I have seen. ALL the arguments and reasons for having a limited front have to do with the number of men and support.

I have yet to read an account that suggests that the length of a line or particular formations are restricted specifically because for communication purposes, particularly based on the distance a horse-mounted courier could run. That doesn't mean there aren't any, just that I haven't seen that kind of reasoning among contemporary accounts. For the division or lower, it just doesn't seem to be an issue.

ALL simulation/game rules are artificial, artifice, if you will. The question is what they represent and whether the decisions presented the players have ANYTHING to do with the actual circumstances, dynamics and challenges of the environment chosen to be simulated.

1968billsfan,

i could not agree more, you very succinctly explained the validity of both Cr's and Reg Btlns and the reasons why both are used. But more so you explained why it all comes down to covering flanks and why the entire discussion means nothing without first realising the entire debate is about covering each other's flank.

Thank you, I did not see it from that angle but it clearly is that simple. I have tried to explain why I think the whole argument for using Regulating btlns is hyperbole and nothing more than simply the act of moving troops in alignment during the Movement Phase of a turn. You have explained much better than I did the real reasoning behind it all.

Bravo.

an artifice = something that someone "makes up".

NEXT POST. Why you do not want to have a dangling end of line.

Let me make some comments on the horrible mismatch that happens when an unit is attacked on the end of a line by a column. Worse yet, if the end of a line being attacked from an exterior angle. The purpose is to support the wargame philosphy of keeping brigades in a close spatial association.

The conventional "wisdom" is that a line of battle will have all guns shooting at an approaching column, whereas the column will only have a few guns shooting. So there's a tremendous mismatch in firepower and columns don't stand a chance. What is missing from this is that a battalion in line is LONG compared to the range of the smooth barrel musket and that soldiers who are in LOB but far from the point of attack are not really in the fight. What's also missing is that if a column can hit the end of a line in some fashion, the advantage is all with the column.

I've run some analog calculations (a.k.a. drawing up to-scale little squares and different templates on an excel spreadsheet the size of a battalion in line and of a close column of attack) and considered a number of cases. For discussion here consider three simple cases:
------------------------------------------------------

[1] a close column of attack hitting the center of a battalion line of battle ("LOB")
[2] a close column of attack hitting the end of an unsupported line and
[3] a close column of attack hitting the end of an unsupported line from a 45 degree oblique angle, from the outside.
--------------------------------------------------------

The line of battle is 215 files wide and each file is 30 inches wide. Each soldier can fire at an angle of 45 degrees from his front (otherwise he blows the head off of one of his own people). The attacking column is 22 yards wide and 30 yards deep. Only the first two ranks can fire- actually I'll be counting the number of "files" that can fire.
----------------------------------------------------

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
          AAA 
          AAA 

[1] If the attacking column comes directly perpendicular into the LOB with the center hitting the center of the LOB you have approximately the following proportions of the LOB able to fire.

AT CONTACT Many of the LOB troops can't get a shot at the column because they can't twist and fire through their own troops. 50 files can shoot at the sides of the incoming column at ranges between 0 and 43 yards. 25 files shoot at zero range. 35% of the defenders can shoot.

AT 50 YARDS 213 out of 215 files can fire. The ranges are between 50 and 99 yards. This is a good killing zone. 99.1% of the defenders can fire.

AT 100 YARDS 100% of the defenders can fire. The ranges are between 100 and 124 yards.

AT 150 YARDS 100% of the defenders can fire. The ranges are between 150 and 167 yards, which is getting a little long for the muskets.

=================================================

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
 
                       AAA 
                       AAA   

[2] If the attacking column comes directly perpendicular into the LOB with the center hitting the end of the line you have approximately the following proportions of the LOB able to fire.

AT CONTACT 40 files out of 215 can fire. 18%

AT 50 YARDS 90 files out of 215 can fire. 42%
The average range is ~ 65 yards

AT 100 YARDS 136 files out of 215 can fire. 62% total can fire. However 23% of the defenders are firing at greater than 150 yards. This is very long range and largely ineffective. Only 40% are firing in the 100 to 150 yards range, which isn't that hot either.

The attacking column is only firing one eight of its files. (12%) but all are firing at the minimum range, not at a variety of longer ranges. Also as the front ranks get killed, they are replaced by back ranks who bring up loaded muskets. This increases the firepower.

===================================================

  DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
                           AA
                            AA 

If the attacking column comes in at a 45 degree angle from the side of the LOB and hits the end of the LOB you have approximately the following proportions of the defending LOB able to fire.

AT CONTACT 3.5 files out of 215 can fire. 9%

AT 50 YARDS 3.5 files out of 215 can fire. 9%

AT 100 YARDS 3.5 files out of 215 can fire. 9%

The attacking column is only firing one seventh of its files. This is 12% of its files. 12% is greater than 9%. The attacking column wins the gunfire contest on the way in. As to the melee, it starts off about 10 to 1 odds.

===========================================
My point is that any wargame rules should make an attack on the end of a line by a column be a really really bad experience for the defender. This will limit the "
zippy battalions" and force brigadiers and colonels to keep units together with flank support. A close column of attack should be able to curve around and hit the end of a LOB- it doesn't even have to be directly from the side or rear to be deadly. Put attacking skirmishers in front of the attackers to hide the direction of the column. Bad news for the defender. Pin the defender by moving another LOB close to them in front. Bad news for the defender. If the defending LOB refuses the flank, they have weakened themselves because the attacking column can hit the hinge and now the defender has a lot of guns facing empty space and not the attackers.

Scottsman:

"I think the question here is whether the distance from the commander and his units was at all perceived as some/any kind of limit on communication and particularly control."

YES! That is exactly the question of Command Radius. Does the distance actually matter, was it actually perceived by the commanders and units as an issue. My belief is no.

Cheers,

The Bandit

A couple of quotes come to mind, but I can't recall their sources, and the wording is not exact:

"A green unit is as sensitive about the flanks as a virgin."

"Attacking a unit's flank is like firing down a crowded sidewalk."

Well said Billsfan, I have the same discussion with a guy many years ago.

In the system I developed I use the exact same formula when deciding how many muskets of the enemy can fire, it is very simple math for anyone willing to spend the time to understand it. Problem is, not many people wish to delve that far into the question.

I am working on a calculator which takes into account distance, angles, length of line and column position to determine just how many defenders can fire. Also, I have read that Wellington's positioning of troops on ridge lines, although great strategy had its own inherent problems. If the ridge was high or steep enough the rear ranks of a column could and did fire over the tops of the forward ranks thus doubling (or more) the incoming firepower of the column. The same goes for the defender if he positions more than one line on the forward slope as the enemy advanced from below (which was for that common of an occurrence). But it proves that columns could increase their firepower at an enemy on higher ground on many occasions which people seem to overlook.

Shane