"The "Command Radius"" Topic

Hey, that was 600 not out !

Regs #1

People here can debate the relevance or usefulness of researching the Napoleonic Rules and Regulations, but just for the sake of completeness, let me record here some of the relevant sections for this discussion. The Scotsman had given some Napoleonic examples but also went into ACW regs. Here are some of the Napoleonic sections.

Snippets from the French 1791 regs (Macdonald's translation) in Section V "Evolutions of the Line":

"…In laying down the instructions for the movements of the line,
eight battalions are supposed acting conjointly; but the rules which
will be given, are equally applicable to a regiment, to a brigade, or to
any indefinite number of battalions…
… Whenever several brigades are to maneuver in line, each battalion
will be distinguished by its number, according to the rank it holds in
the line. The battalion on the right will be termed the "first", that
next, the "second", the following, the "third", and so on, in this
order, to the battalion on the left of the whole line"…
…The Situations of the Commander in Chief [Commandant en Chef]; of a
Commandant of Brigade Chefs de Brigade] , and of a Colonel, in Line, and
in column. [et de Regiment soit en ligne , soit en colonne].
In line, the commander in chief has no fixed situation assigned him;
and he is to repair to all situations where his presence may be necessary.
In column, he is to be, invariably, at its head, in order to direct its
movement according to the views he may have.
In evolutions, he will station himself where he can most advantageously
direct the execution of the grand movement. However, in all cases, the
commander in chief will repair to every place where his presence may, by
himself, be deemed requisite; placing, in his absence, another officer
in his situation, who is entrusted with the care of directing execution
of his orders.
In line, the commandants of brigades post themselves about fifty paces
in the rear of the center of their brigades.
In column, they will post themselves on the pivot flank side of the
column, opposite to the centre of the brigade. and about 12 or 15 paces
on the outside of the pivot directors…
…The commandants of brigades… in line, in column, or in going
through the various other movements, will carefully superintend the
exact and regular execution of all the orders communicated to them; and
for this purpose they are permitted to move, every where, throughout the
extent of their brigade… where they deem their presence necessary…
… When all of the battaliions of the line are to execute the same
movement, the commander in chief will give the battalion nearest to him,
the general words of command… which are to be immediately repeated by
the lieutenant colonel of that battalion …[then each bn cmdr repeats
the commands he hears in adjoining bns]… unless the commander in chief
may have given, or sent to him, a contrary order… the generals of
brigade… will superintend the promt execution… taking care that the
lieutenant colonel does not make any mistake…
…. The commander in chief will, always, give the word of command which
is to terminate the execution of the general movement… [and bn
adjutants in the rear right and left of their bns repeat the general
commands in case]… the wind, or the noise of small arms, prevent these
words… from being easily heard…
…When the line is to execute a central movement, the commander in
chief will repair to the point whhich he has chosen for the center…
and he will communicate… to the colonel of each of the nearest
battalions on the right and left, the order to give the general word of
command… In column, the repetition of words of command… [is the same]…
…Whenever a line breaks into several columns, the senior officer in
rank of each, will command it, and will discharge with respect to the
column, the duties of the commander in chief…
…332…brigadiers, will superintend the march of … their brigade,
endeavoring, principally, to preserve the intervals.
333. The attention of the commander in chief is to be, principally,
directed to the march of THE REGULATING BATTALION; but his
superintending care is, generally, to extend over, and embrace the whole
extent of the line…
…339. The commander in chief can, always, assume as the battalion of
regulation, that which he judges…the best calculated for directing the
line; but when particular reasons do not operate in favour of selecting
a batttalion on, or near the flank, a central battalion may have preference."

I will add some more details in a Regs #5 posting.

Regs #2
The British Rules and Regulations of 1808 are divided into 4 parts. Part
I= The recruit pg 1-32, Part II= Platoon or Company pg 33-62, III=
Battalions pg 63-250, ten the Inspection and Light Infantry 252-281,
then Part IV "THE LINE" 282-377. The words "Grand Tactics are not a
title, but THE LINE is the section that covers multi-battalion
movements. The following sections are from THE LINE prior to sections
describing the actual grand maneuvers. Note that the commanders of each
line referred to in the sections below would be either Brigadiers or
Division commanders.

PART IV.
OF THE LINE.

ALL great bodies of troops are formed in one or more lines.
Each line is divided into right and left wings.
Each wing is compofed of one, two, or more divisons,
Each division is compofed of one or more brigades.
Each brigade is formed of two, three, or four battalions.
Tbefe bodies have their immediate commanders fubordinte to each other.
Battalions are formed in line at a diftance of 12 paces from each other,
and this interval, is occupied by 2 cannon, which are attacbed toeach
battalion.There is no increased diftance betwixt brigades, Unless
particular circumftances attend it. In exercife fhould there be no
cannon betwixt the battalions, the interval may be reduced to 6 paces.

MOVEMENTS OF A LINE.

1. The movements and manoeuvres of a confiderable line are fimilar to,
and derived from the fame general principals as thofe of the single
battalion; will be compounded, varied, and, applied, according to
circumftances, ground, and the intentions of the commanding officer; but
their modes of execution remain unchangeable, and known to all. The
greater the body, the fewer and the more fimple ought to be the
manueuvres required of it.

2. If feveral regiments exercife or manoeuvre to-
gether, the commanding officer of the line or column
gives his fhort orders of caution or execution to the
commander of the regulating battalion of the line, or
of the head of the column, where he himfelf generally
is; and fometimes to the commander of the battalion
to which he is then neareft, and each battalion com-
mander repeats them loud without delay. When any
complicated, or combined movement is to be made.
which requires previous explanation, it muft be communicated clearly to
the commanders. of corps by detached officers, before its execution can
be ordered to commence. The feveral chiefs of brigades, etc. watch over,
and direct the interior movements of their refpective bodies; they
repeat the general orders of execution given, if they see that it is
necceffary, and announce such preparatory ones as are verbally sent to them.

3. When the general order is nor heard or understood by part of a line,
each battalion commander
(where the intention is obvious) will conform as
quickly as poffible, to the movements which he fees
executed to his right or left, according to the point
from whence the movement begins: but platoon of-
ficers execute only on the orders of their battalion
commander.

4. The commander in chief will always himfe1f loudly announce his
commands of execution, as MARCH, or HALT, and the commanders of
battalions will, without waiting for each other, endeavour in the fame
moment to repeat them: if officers are quick, obferving, firm, and
decided in their commands, fuch repetition will be inftantaneous.

5. It is impoffible to afcertain the words of command to be given in all
cafes. Where fuch are not pointed out, they muft depend on the
circumftances of the fituation, and be fhort, clear, and expreffive of
what is to be done. Where they are not comprehended, they muft be
repeated; and no operation begun, till its intention is well underftood:
otherwife that diforder, which may be originally prevented, is not
eafily remedied if once it has taken place.

6. When troops are halted, explanatory cautions are proper before they
are put in march, but when they are in motion, and in fituations where
perfect correctnefs is expected, as in the march in line, and in the
prolonging of an alignement, no caution should precede the word HALT,
but the whole fhould at once firmly halt. This is to be underftood of a
column of manoeuvre, but where a column of march is unavoidably, from
impediments of the route, a little opened out, and that its head ftops
in order to remedy fuch extenfion or to form in line, the feveral rear
battalions will be halted effively at their juft diftances.

7. The movements of all great bodies are made either in line or
column.-In line they are in general regulated by a battalion of that
flank which is neareft to, and is to preferve the appui, or which is to
make the attack: in column they are directed by its head, and the
commander of the whole is with the regulating body. There are very few
cafes in which the centre ought to regulate, although the direct march
of the line in front appears to be the easiest conducted by a battalion
of the centre. If an enemy is to be turned or an attack made, it is by
that flank that fuch move- ments are led: it is the flank that muft
preferve the line of appui in all movements in front: if the line is
thrown backward or forward, it is generally on a flank point: if the
line breaks into column, it is the head or leading flank of that column
which conducts, and whofe writhes and ternings are followed by every
other part of the body, and fuch head becomes a flank when formed into
line: it is feldom that an attack is formed from the center, and a
movement feldomer need be.-The commander will therefore be whichever
flank directs the operation of the line and by which he propofes to make
the attack, or to counteract the attempts of the enemy.

8. No confiderable body fhould ever be afffembled or formed for action,
without a proportion of it being placed in referve, or fecond line, and
more or lefs ftrong, according to circumftances.

9. Where feveral and fupporting lines of attack formed, the fecond
fhould outflank the firft, the third the fecond, etc., the advanced one
being thereby ftrengthened and fupported on its outward wing.

10. The cannon attached to battalions, whether in line or column, will
accompany in all fituations the movements of their proper
battalions.-Thofe that are brigaded, make a feparate object.

11. The general firings of the line are executed feparately and
independently of each battalion.

12. The chief commander of a line muft have feveral mounted officers, or
other intelligent perfons at his difpofal, both to circulate his orders,
and to mark and determine fuch original points as become neceffary in
movement.-The adjutants of battalions in are in general wanted to affift
in the feparate formations of their battalions.

13. Partial fignals of the drum for a battalion muft not be given in
line-But from the battalion where the chief commander is, and by his
particular direction, fuch fignal may, when proper, be made for the
whole (but not repeated): If halted and ftanding at eafe to affemble: if
affembled to be ready to march: If firing in line for a general
ceffation – and before a march to mark the proper cadence by five or fix
ftrong taps. – Signals that cannot with propriety be applied in fervice,
fhould not be ufed in exercife; and it is evident, that no loud fignals,
or even commands, or mufic, or drums, can be ufed in columns of route,
or in movements made near to, though not in prfence of, an enemy, as it
is moft important on fuch occafions to conceal them, and not
unneceffarily to difcoer them to the enemy.
14. Although in general the INVERSION of all bodies in line is to be
avoided, yet there are situations where this rule must be dispensed
with, and the quickest formation to a particular front thereby obtained.
- The battalion or line may be obliged to face to the right about, the
more readily to oppose a danger, instead of changing its position by a
countermarch; it may even be under the necessity of forming to a flank
with its rear rank in front. The column with its right in front may
arrive on the left of its ground, and be immediately obliged to form up
and support that point, so that the right of the line will become the
left. – Part of a second line may double round on the extremity of a
first line, thereby to outflank an enemy. – A corps moving to a flank by
lines, may be obliged in the quickest manner to form up to the front of
its march, so that the new lines shall be composed each of parts of the
old ones. – Many other situations may be imagined, where opposing the
rear rank admits of no choice, and where an inversion of the divisions
of the line will gain much time, and becomes absolutely necessary when
the formation is required from the point of appui, and near to an enemy.
- Troops must therefore be accustomed to such operations; but the
application of them requires great method and recollection, otherwise,
in such critical situations, confusion is very easily produced, and will
even be attended with the most fatal consequences.

Regs #3
This is not a drillbook per se, but is from John MacDonald's 1807 translation of "Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry on Actual Service Being a Minute Methodical Detail of All the Duties of General-Officers, Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Soldiers in Every Situation Incident to War." It is a Nafziger publication, so go to his site to purchase if interested. (However, there is NOT a lot of tactical detail, be warned.)

From the second volume, Section XX, "Instructions relative to Days of
Battle," pp.4- of the originally French work:

"As Troops, always, discharge their duty better when what is
required is properly explained, than when it is either not at all, or
imperfectly stated, the General will point out, clearly, to the General
Officers, his design, and his arrangements for battle. The General Officers
are to impart the plan to the Superior Officers, in order that they may be
able to point out their duty to the Subalterns; and these, again, the same
to the Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates; each rank and description,
thus, clearly understanding the part to be, relatively acted.

"Experience having ascertained that the bravest Troops are sometimes
apt to be staggered, when unexpectedly attacked, General-Officers are in
their Orders, to warn the Troops of the proximity of the Enemy. It must be
distinctly specified, whether the Troops are to attack the Enemy, or to wait
for his attack in their, then, position. In the first case, they are to
explain to the men, as well as to the Officers, the measures taken with a
view of attacking the Enemy. The point where the Enemy is likely to be
forced, and against which the main effort is to be made, is to be clearly
understood by all. The Troops must be informed how far they are to pursue
the Enemy, in following up a successful attack. The description, and number
of Troops who are to complete the discomfiture of the Enemy, must be
distinctly specified. Should the Enemy rally, and drive back their
pursuers, these last must be prepared against such possible event, and have
a position pointed out, on which they are, in such case, to fall back.--In
the second case, that is, where the attack is to be waited for ; the
strength, capability of resistance and defence, and all the other advantages
of the Post, must all be strongly urged. The many advantages afforded by
the natural position of the station, as tending to repel the Enemy, must be
dwelt on. The best mode of defending the Post, and of driving out the
Enemy, should he penetrate the Works, at one, or more points, is to be
explained to the Troops. Finally, in the event of forcing the Post, in
defiance of the best conducted resistance, the situation of the Troops are
to retire to, and the most efficacious plan for conducting the Retreat, must
be made fully known.

"All this ought to be distinctly explained, and in as few words as
possible ; avoiding the extremes of magnifying the danger and difficulty,
and of representing the enterprise as easy ; as also those of either
despising,--or fearing the Enemy too much.

"If Troops who are to attack, are inspired with a persuasion, that
the instant they appear, the Enemy will abandon the Post, it follows, that
if they meet with unexpected resistance, they will immediately think the
position has been reinforced ; or that the Generals have been completely
ignorant of the nature and strength of the Post attacked ; or that these
Generals have not made a proper estimate of the difficulties to be
surmounted, to carry it.--All these are just and natural reflections, the
consequence of which must necessarily be, to intimidate, and discourage the
Troops.

"A similar reasoning holds in the opposite case of waiting for the
Enemy's attack on the Post. If the Troops are assured that the very first
discharge of their Arms will stop the progress of the Enemy ; and if instead
of this, they see their fire has no such effect, and that the Enemy advances
steadily, in spite of their fire, and even penetrates at some point,
confusion, disorder, and terror cannot fail to be the consequence.

"The General Officers, and Superior Officers, must not, therefore,
deceive the Troops as to the degree of resistance to be expected, and even
of offensive efforts to be experienced. They must convince their men, that
every thing depends on the silence and strict order to me maintained during
the Action, and in all similar situations : on the alacrity and perfect
readiness with which they obey their Officers : and more especially, at the
same time, on their firmness and courage, which must augment in proportion
to the bravery and resolution displayed by the Enemy.
"Nothing having a more powerful influence on the minds of the men,
than the example set by their leaders, the General-Officers, and higher
Officers will calculate all their conduct, so as to animate and inspire the
Troops they command, with confidence, firmness, and daring resolution. It
is particularly during the height of a severe Action, and when Victory hangs
doubtful, that these Officers must shew the resources they possess, and an
undaunted determination to conquer: for it is quite a different thing to
order men to encounter danger ; and to lead them up to it, in a manner
shewing perfect self-possession, and a cool conduct, evidently the best
adapted to the moment.

"As the chance and fate of war are always uncertain, and as, in
spite of the most able arrangements that may have been made to ensure
success, the Battle may still be lost, the General must point out to the
Commandants of Divisions, of Wings, and of Reserves, the position to which
they are to retire, if reduced to such extremity. The General will not fail
to inculcate on their minds, that they are not to fall back, unless
absolutely reduced by hard fighting, and unforeseen misfortunes, to the very
last extremity. He is often to repeat to them this admirable maxim, which a
Soldier cannot have too deeply impressed on his mind ; viz. *that the most
resolute and determined, are always those who gain Battles*.

"The Commanding Officers of Reserves, are to be informed, what Corps
they are to support, or relieve, during the Action ; and they are more
especially, to carry it in their minds, that it is on them, and on these
Reserves that the success of the day, in a very essential degree, depends ;
by the vigour with which they are to charge the Troops of the Enemy, who may have broke the Line ; or by falling on, and attacking with vivacity, the
flanks of an Enemy who resists beyond expectation.

"The General must indicate to the Commanding Officers of these
different Corps, the situation he means, generally, to occupy, as usual,
during the Action ; that they may be enabled to communicate to, and make
understood by the General, all that passes where each Corps is posted. They
are, according ot a change in the aspect of the Action in their quarter, or
on account of any other unexpected exigency, to apply to the General for
fresh Orders adapted to the change of circumstances stated.

"However active the General may be, it is impossible for him to see,
and command the whole front of an Army ; nor can he be present in more
places than one.--His orders, hwoever particular and detailed, may not be
strictly applicable to a state of the Action that might not have entered
into the original estimate of the result.

When, therefore, General Orders are once issued, Commanding Officers of Wings, or Divisions, and Reserves, must act according to circumstances, and in the manner the best calculated, to the best of their judgment, to ensure the obtaining of the victory.

They must, in these occasional deviations from the letter of General Orders, take most especial care that they act in their spirit, adhering, as much as
possible to the plan laid down, which must be as it were, the Basis on which
they found such innovations as necessity alone can justify. They are always
to remember, that though they are permitted to exercise their discretion,
independently of their character as General-Officers, a severe
responsibility is attached to their conduct.

Continued in #4

Regs #4

"The General Officers will regulate their conduct as much as
possible, by the following general principles, on the observance of which,
the fate of Battles depends.--1st. It is necessary that the Army should be
most accurately formed in one, or more Lines; that distances of all well
known descriptions, should be carefully marked, and laid off originally,
and, afterwards, studiously maintained;--and that Corps of Reserve, should
be judiciously posted.

--2dly. Contiguous Divisions of the Army, must be so
formed, and drawn up, as readily to support each other, and to act in
concert, if necessary, according to a plan adapted to all probable mutations
in the aspect of the Action.

--3dly. The attacks at the different points,
must be carried into effect, all at the same instant, to distract the
attention of the Enemy, and to prevent him from concentrating his force
against any particular point, which he may attack on, under cover of
well-managed feints.

--4thly. The attacks and charges must be conducted with
vigour and judgment.

--5thly. Whatever success may attend an attack, it must
not be rashly followed up, so as to lead to any ambuscade, or danger of
being cut off, by pursuing unguardedly.

The Enemy, when routed, must be
followed vigorously, by detached Troops appointed for that purpose. The
main body which has been engaged, it to be rallied, and quickly formed in
Line, in order to be ready to oppose the Second Line of the Enemy, or to
turn, and fall on the rear of such parts of the First Line, as may not have
been, as yet, broken. This regulation bears more especially on, and applies
to the Wings, and to Corps of Cavalry.

--6thly A Single Attack, or Charge,
must not be depended on. Should the First not succeed, and not even produce confusion, the Troops are, instantly to be reformed, and the Enemy is to be
repeatedly charged with the utmost spirit, and alacrity ; and these attacks
must be renewed, till the Enemy is completely defeated.

--7thly. Should aRetreat become unavoidable as the very last resource, it is to be effected in good and steady order, by the junction of contiguous Corps, the Infantry,
and Cavalry mutually supporting each other. The Troops retreating, must
frequently face about, and oppose their pursuers, till they arrive at the
position assigned by the General, in the event of being forced to retreat.
"In order to accomplish all these most important objects, General
Officers, and superior Officers are to cause the following rules to be
rigidly attended to.

"The Army is, in general, to be drawn up in two Lines, at the
distance of three hundred paces from each other. Reserves are to be three
hundred paces in rear of the Second Line ; and situated where the General
may deem them eligible.

"As soon as the Brigades have arrived on their ground of formation,
they are to be quickly drawn up in Line, and dressed or aligned by their
Right or Left, as may be ordered.
"It is of the last importance [ In context where used
elsewhere, this seems to me to mean the opposite what it appears: i.e., of
the greatest importance.], more especially in regard to Cavalry, that the
Lines should be accurately formed ; for unless this is punctually attended
to, Corps of various descriptions would be apt to crowd on each other, and
to cross each other's direction, in marching to the attack, a circumstance
that might be productive of disorder, and very fatal consequences. […]

"The Officers of the different batteries of Cannon, are to be
directed, to fire on the Troops, rather than against the Artillery of the
Enemy ; more especially, when these Troops appear to be of a chosen
description, and intended, as a select body, for a particular attack. The
fire of the Artillery is to be pointedly directed against them, when
advancing to the attack. […]

"While the Lines are forming, and while the Artillery Officers are
establishing their batteries, or placing their Field Train, the
General-Officers will, with a view to discovering the arrangements of the
opposed Army, and diminishing the effects of the Enemy's Cannon, order the
Light Infantry to place themselves behind brushwood, hedges, small hollows,
or ditches, and rising grounds, according to the nature of the Country.
They are to be ordered to direct their fire against the Enemy's Gunners, and
Artillery in general. […]

"The Superior, and General Officers, are to bestow the utmost
attention in directing the march direct to the front, without any deviation
to Right, or Left. Vast care must be taken in preserving distances, and
prescribed intervals. They must prevent the Troops from marching quick,
till they have arrived within one hundred paces of the enemy. They will
then advance in double quick time. When the Enemy's Line has been broken,
the ordinary time is to be resumed, or the step may be shortened, in order
the more easily, to reform the Line with all possible haste. The Light
Infantry and Grenadiers, only, will be directed to pursue the Enemy, taking
care so to conduct themselves, as to avoid running any risk of being unable
to rejoin their Battalions in safety, from too ardent and hazardous a
pursuit. In the case of Cavalry, the best mounted Dragoons and Hussars, in
a proper proportion, are to be detached in pursuit of the Enemy. The
number, and description, intended for this Service, will be specified before
the commencement of the Action.
"If, on the contrary, the attacking Army is obliged to fall back
after being thrown into disorder, no attempt must be made to rally the
Troops, under a heavy fire kept up by the Enemy : as it is, in general,
impossible to effect this in such case, and as the attempt only tends to
produce a great loss of men, and to increase the consternation of the
Soldier.--The repulsed Troops must be rallied at such distance as they may
be less exposed at. After being reformed, they are either to be marched
back to their former position, or led on again, against the Enemy. […]
"Previously, to the commencement of the Action, the situation, and
depots of the moveable Hospital, are to be made known to the different Corps
of the Army."

A little something for everyone in this stuff.

I'd promised my boss I was going to stop posting on this thread and get back to work, but I need to clear something up before you continue.

I took over watching and dealing with TMP when the name we use changed to Silly Rabbit (which is my call sign). Idiot Savant was a different person entirely (actually five people of which I became one only recently). "He" (our boss) is much older than I with far more wargaming experience, education, command experience, and much more combat experience. It was his comments about CLS rules, not mine.

He has turned our monitoring of TMP over to me. Participation in discussions isn't required, only suggested. My knowledge of Larry Dunn is only second hand, but his name has been used throughout our training unit to represent someone "really proud of their lack of knowledge" and not to be taken seriously, so if I have insulted anyone I apologize sincerely.

Wargames (and all the rules and regulations of most military organizations) seek to bring organization to WAR. Those who understand the reality of WAR know it is impossible to organize what at its core is disorganized so what they do is drill, drill, drill, until as much order as possible is "body memory" for as many of the parts of their war machine as possible. When the machine you build in whatever period of history you are is needed, the commanders "HOPE to whatever God they prey" their machine will obey their orders in a manner that will allow their side to achieve victory.

I may return at a later date but for now I question too many participants motives for me to consider their arguments valid for me to continue here.

Thanks to all for a stimulating thread. I would have preferred the discussion to be face-to-face. Silly Rabbit

Regs #5

In my Regs#1 posting above you read "…The commandants of brigades… in line, in column, or in going through the various other movements, will carefully superintend the exact and regular execution of all the orders communicated to them; and for this purpose they are permitted to move, every where, throughout the extent of their brigade… where they deem their presence necessary… "
This should make it clear that the Regs were:
a) telling Generals what they were responsible for, and
b) recognizing that on the battlefield some flexibility might be necessary.

That being said, in other sections of the specific evolutions, the Regs also made sure to tell those Generals where the best place to do these things actually were! So the Regs told them what to do, told them where to be to do it, but knew that in emergencies some modification might be needed.
Here are some examples of the wording for telling Generals where to be in particular situations (and where a division is being spoken of I take the "commander in chief" to be a divisional general):

"168: The commander in chief, or the officer charged with the execution of his orders, will station himself, from the beginning of the formation, at the point de appui, as in the case of a formation in line to the right flank, and will there superintend the execution of the movement."

Another evolution:

"180: The commander in chief, or the officer charged with the execution of his orders, will take post, during the execution of the movement, at the point de appui of the line, as in the case of a formation into line to the right flank, and he will there superintend the general formation."

Another:
"253; The commander in chief will, afterwards, determine on which grand division of which battalion the line is to deploy, according as he may deem it necessary to extend the line, more or less, to the right, or left…
255; The commander in chief will move to that battalion, will direct two markers to be placed… and will, then, command "The line will be formed…261: when the commander in chief perceives the aids-de-camp, steadily, stationed on the right and left, he will command "MARCH"…

The March in Line (Marche en bataille)

"314: The regulating battalion being regarded as infallible by all the others, and having, thus, the greatest influence over the rest of the line, its march is watched over with the greatest care; consequently the commander in chief placed in front of this battalion (or the officer directed by him to supply his place) will unremittingly exert himself in maintaining, constantly, the center of the battalion on the perpendicular; for this purpose he must frequently proceed thirty or forty paces in front of the bearer of the colors, facing to the rear and aligning himself, correctly on the camp colormen placed behind the battalion; and in this situation, he is to adjust, if requisite, the direction of the noncommissioned officer situated in the center of the battalion, as also that of the bearer of the colors."

333. The attention of the commander in chief is to be principally directed to the march of the regulating battalion but his superintending care is generally to extend over and embrace the whole extent of the line.

358 The line being halted, if the commander in chief judges it necessary to dress it, he will move to the distance of some paces on the right of the colors of the regulating battalion.

There's more, but my eyes are getting blurry. The point is these guys had specific places to go, and things to do there, that kept them very busy and engaged. If they absolutely had to go somewhere else they could, but the 'Standard Operating procedure" which makes a good baseline for rulewriting, was well laid out and understood.

Monitoring of TMP for work? Uhm, what the heck kinda job is this? And how effective is it for 5 people to be posting under one name unless the goal is to mislead?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Regs 6 and final comment

In Guibert's Essay on Tactics ( Guibert was the one more or less responsible later for the French 1791 regs ) he remarked that it was very difficult to a nation to "change its Tactic" and doubly so because to do so the nation had to build up the number of generals it needed to carry this out. He stated that two campaigns was not long enough to do so. That put me in mind of how long many of the French Generals were fighting during the Revolution and the Empire, and how that experience with the same basic set of regs must have helped them out.

Finally, I apologize to Silly Rabbit for confusing her with the previous posters. When I looked back at previous posts, I saw her name on those posts so I thought it was a periodic name change in the same way Sam M. has changed from Gouvion to other names.

I also invite Silly Rabbit, if she wishes, to a discussion without flames on Napoleonic command and control whenever she wishes at the VLB Yahoo site ( link )

Besides armchair theorists like me there are currently serving and vets in the group who can weigh in if they wish. That might also help keep that group's members from wandering around the net and causing TMP threads to go over 600 posts and lots of aggravation.

I just noticed in my Regs #2 posting a "Bleep"… the word was successively, but was printed using the old spelling where the "s" looks like an "f". If there are other spelling errors or typos that may be the reason!

I figured that the only way to kill this thread off was to post a bunch of drillbook regulations!

Planning is useful, but plans are useless…
D. Eisenhower

"Monitoring of TMP for work? Uhm, what the heck kinda job is this? And how effective is it for 5 people to be posting under one name unless the goal is to mislead?"

What the Hell is this, some kind of Black Ops?

Great Use of the Tax Payers money!

To think … some of us do it for nothing!

All I want to say is it seems calm has restored itself presently here.

Silly Rabbit, I totally understand and know where you are coming from, I agree with and respect your take on this whole drama.

TheScotsman, It has been a long time since I read even parts of the 1791 regulations that I almost forgot them. I appreciate and also understand where you are coming from. I also apologize for getting cranky with you. I still however, will defend the right of designers to use CR's as they chose I hope you understand me and I think you do.

Ned, Thank you very much for posting all of this, I intend to re-read it thoroughly as soon as I get time. Also, please do not get offended by the comment about armchair theory, I was aiming it at all of us, including myself here. Yes I understand a little of the chain of command personally but not from a Napoleonic perspective. This is why I switched from purchasing history books years ago to memoirs and eyewitness accounts to get a more personal angle on the period.

Sam, You did indeed create a monster but for all the epic battles fought on this thread I feel it furthered Napoleonic discussion for the better, giving all of us food for thought. Thank you for a thoroughly enthralling thread, only J.R.R. Tolkien could have written a greater storyline.

PS Your comic relief is brilliant and in a single cloud of white smoke made me realise it is better to let this one die off.

Shane

Silly Rabbit wrote;
"Wargames (and all the rules and regulations of most military organizations) seek to bring organization to WAR. Those who understand the reality of WAR know it is impossible to organize what at its core is disorganized so what they do is drill, drill, drill, until as much order as possible is "body memory" for as many of the parts of their war machine as possible. When the machine you build in whatever period of history you are is needed, the commanders "HOPE to whatever God they prey" their machine will obey their orders in a manner that will allow their side to achieve victory."

SR:
And how is this different from anything anyone was saying? Myself, I was focused on the 'machine' Napoleonic and ACW men built [regulations being the schematics of that machine] I didn't read where anyone was thinking anything but that commanders "Hope to god that their machine works--takes a licking and keeps on ticking."

A lot of what we read them doing as a commanders is spending time on the 'fix it' activities, and many of those activities are outlined in the regulations. I agree, armies are organizations that plan and train attempting to conquer disorder, but are doomed to operate in chaos. The loser it is the first one to succumb to that chaos.

I am not sure why you thought this understanding wasn't shared by everyone on this thread.

Unbelievable.

Shane wrote:
>>>>TheScotsman, It has been a long time since I read even parts of the 1791 regulations that I almost forgot them. I appreciate and also understand where you are coming from. I also apologize for getting cranky with you. I still however, will defend the right of designers to use CR's as they chose I hope you understand me and I think you do.<<<<<<<

Shane: Actually, Ned Z. put up the 1791 regulations, but I am sure you can see the close similarities to it and Dundas and the ACW manuals.

Cranky, no problem. There was a lot of dust in the air, with a LOT of posts. I wasn't questioning someone's, or anyone's 'right' to use CRs or any other mechanism for that matter. Folks have the right to design a game however they want to.

I was questioning whether the use of them to represent the Divisional commanders' normal methods of command control and communication in the Napoleonic wars [or ACW].
[Actually, I flat-out said it didn't from what I could see.]

From what I understand, when the DC left the center of his division [or the regulating brigade] it is because the wheels were coming off, not because that leaving his post was the primary method of command. I even listed what I saw as the 'typical' reasons for moving--knowing that 'typical' represents a fine line in battle. All the regulations including those Ned listed make it clear that the DC doesn't 'have to' stay in one place or is even expected to, but he better leave a proxy if he does.

I suggested that the historical examples of a DC becoming involved with a brigade's operations [as opposed to the division's] might be better represented by the attached rule. That's it. I never even broached the CC or AC's methods of command.

I am more than happy to trade historical accounts to support that, or discuss what I know and don't know of Corps and army commanders. I am curious. I'd like to see what we can find.

Whatever this is about, for me it has never been about denying someone's right to do anything. However, I reserve the 'right' to say I don't see a particular game mechanic simulating what a designer says it is supposed to…

As I'm still very new to napoleonics, I don't really have anything to contribute. I just wanted to say that this has been a great thread and I have actually read the whole thing with interest (okay, I fast-forwarded few of the most heated arguments, but those were mostly about some misunderstandings anyway). Perhaps it didn't go as original author planned, but it became a very good introduction to command and control. Also, as I play RPGs too, I find the question "what is the general doing now?" very important.

Has anyone mentioned Piquet as an excellent ruleset for introducing the fog of war and command friction??

only you, please enlighten me, I would be interested for one.

The Scotsman wrote:
"ALL command systems could be an double edged sword. Radios and computer communication have their problems. "

I wasn't arguing the command system is a double-edged sword, I was arguing that using a particular feature of the command system, the regulating battalion drill, could be very dangerous once the brigade--in this case Kershaw‘s-- closed within engagement range.
Kershaw had his entire brigade tuned into his command frequency, when various components of his brigade should've been tuning into their own regimental frequencies.

I think everyone agrees that the methods contained within the drill manuals were the backbone of the command systems in the ACW and the Napoleonic Wars. The question is to what extent did officers depart from the letter of the drill manual, when, why and how often? That answer, IMO, varies for both the Napoleonic Wars and the ACW.

The Scotsman also wrote:
"The impression the Napoleonic and ACW regulations and actual battle accounts give suggest it was the primary mode of control for all commands up to the Division. Go through any of the ACW or Napoleonic regulations and count up how many different options they provide for commanding a brigade or division. 90% of all the regulations regarding command control focus on one form, the rest are specifically mentioned 'when the general form fails." Caseys, Hardee's, Scotts, Duffields or any others ALL say the same thing. Dundas and all the Napoleonic Regulations for brigade and division operations say the same thing."

You say "one form", which form is that ? I think NedZed has made the point that that one form was flexible and open to contingency. The question we're arguing is to what extent was the regulating battalion necessary for an ACW brigade to advance in line? I say it wasn't necessary, but that's not to say it wasn't used. You might argue it was necessary b/c regiments/battalions attempted to stay aligned with one another. I would agree, but then remind you that battalions which maintained alignment with one another didn't have to use a regulating battalion mechanic as describe in the drill manuals to do so. I have encountered no evidence whatsoever from Gettysburg that the regulating battalion drill was used above the brigade, but there again you might argue that brigades did try and stay aligned with one another… and I would agree… and then point out that they don't need to specifically employ the regulating battalion drill to so . And there we go around again…

I think your ideas for incorporating regulating battalion DRILL into a game system are interesting and are a spur to further thought. However, you still haven't convinced me that its worth incorporating into an ACW system. After all, though much was essentially the same in the drill manual, things DID change on the battlefield between the Napoleonic Era and the ACW.

Bottom Dollar,

If we were to agree that it (regulating units) was used and was typical then shouldn't rules represent it as typical? I believe that is actually the crux of things. The second issue is then, as you said to ask how much it was departed from and then allow players a similar amount of freedom.

Cheers,

The Bandit

BD:
Was the regulating regiment or brigade practice used in the Civil War or were the command and control mechanisms different in some form from the Napoleonic wars?

I would think that it is pretty obvious that the regulations were nearly identical from 1791 to 1865. The ACW regulations are easier to understand, but they say the same thing. I'll be glad to offer more examples than have already been listed.

Kershaw's problems weren't with how the system was or wasn't working under fire, but rather his efforts to follow conflicting orders split his brigade--which DID create problems in command. He describes this in his after action report as do a few of his colonels. The point being, Kershaw was an experienced officer, praised by Mclaws and others. He was the senior brigadier in McLaws' division. His brigade is engaged on two fronts and split, yet he doesn't:
1. See the system as the problem
2. Moves to the left part of the brigade and continues to use the system, the voice commands to move it, which is unintentionally heard by the right half. It does show how expected such orders were under fire as well as the regiments' responses to such orders.
3. Abandon the command and control system, but tries to fix the system all while engaged.

Would it make a difference if I found more examples of the regulating regiment and brigade from Gettysburg and the Napoleonic wars? How do you think all four of Caldwell's brigades end up inverted? It is easy to explain IF they were all conforming to a regulating regiment and brigade.

I don't know how many ways that regiments and brigades could maintain alignment--I do know how it was instructed to be done, and what alternatives were provided if the primary mode--such as when voice commands weren't heard.

Lets turn around this question a bit. If a Napoleonic or ACW division commander wanted to move and maneuver his division, what process do you believe would be his first choice--his second? How DID they stay aligned if they didn't conform on the regulating brigade? What methods do you see were there for moving thousands of men in some short of unison, so that there was a good chance for a timely response to commands, with reasonable control and order--what process would produce the least amount of confusion?

Obviously the troops and officers would practice this to make it a smooth process. If they weren't using the processes that have been laid out in regulations such as Dundas's manual, the French 1791 regs and the ACW manuals, what were they using?

I agree that flexibility and options were absolutely necessary, and demonstrated in the accounts. I also agree that there were times when the DC had to ride to a particular point in his line to take care of business, particularly when things were falling apart and the main command system was broken, or he needed information he couldn't get any other way.

But from my reading, those rides were fall-back options when the main mechanisms didn't work, and they were not to be indulged in by Division or Corps commanders, or they are seen as abandoning their primary responsibilities.

If a divisional commander meant to advance his division, how did he do it?

Several folks have suggested that the primary method was riding out personally, or sending orders by courier to all his brigade commanders, who then gave the orders to their regiments so the division can move isn't the methods detailed in the regulations nor seen in the accounts. The other point is that this method was the only one that worked when a division was finally engaged. Is it?

For instance: How did Birney get his entire division to move forward while engaged? When he says "I halted", how do you see him doing that with his division [with such a personal verb]in a timely and organized fashion across a mile of front?

Those are the questions I asked. The regulations, and more importantly the accounts are where we have to find the answers. The men of the period are the only ones that know.

Without command radius you have games like Warhammer Ancient Battles where each individual unit runs all over the board, in any way it wants, and yet each unit acts in perfect harmony with the other.

(Note: This is not an anti-WAB comment, just a comment on command radius and a need for a C2 constraint. I say this being a WAB player with four WAB armies to my name, and another on the painting table.)

raylev3,

Fair Point.

However you may like to know that Greeks (of all sorts) and Romans of all periods and as far as I know, any army that didn't fight as a tribal group(s) had their own version of the Regulating Battalion principal.

Horse and Musket period armies took the idea from them!

raylev3,

I agree WAB is a fun game. Heck I even played in a doubles tournament at Historicon where we finished 2nd. For that alone I began to suspect the rules. Playing Selucids I enjoyed running my heavy cav all over the table without restriction.

The Scotsman,

I know you mean well but for the life of me I haven't a clue what you are writing about has to do with game design. Other than the fact that what you are writing about is general background information that designers should build into movement and command radius rules, etc.

I'm just curious, do you play a set of Napoleonic rules and if so what, and home rules count. I ask that question because you make constant reference back to the ACW, even though this is a Napoleonic site. Mind you the ACW reflects the Napoleonic era mostly because almost every senior general was a West Point Grad and was taught extensively about Napoleon's method of conducting war.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Sam, this is amazing cutting edge wargame rulesmanship. Why don't you do a ruleset? Oh, you already have. Interesting to think about, but do we actually worry about this stuff in the middle of the game, especially if we are enjoying ourselves? Okay, new thread.

"Without command radius you have games like Warhammer Ancient Battles where each individual unit runs all over the board"

You don't necessarily need a command radius to restrict this though, just defined unit boundaries. For twentieth century operational games I usually make the players define unit boundaries for each division, corps or whatever. This works well enough and is fairly simple to manage. Most of them remember to define whether roads (which are a popular choice for boundary definitions) are inclusive or exclusive, but some don't, which causes fun for the supply trucks.

There, my contribution for 700.

I love the categories of responses:

1. It is a game, aka: you've never written your own rules, aka: you know nothing about rule design, aka: who cares we are just playing checkers with painted figures.

2. Wow this thread is great, aka: an actual discussion of the theories and methods that should be represented in wargame rules, aka: why aren't these represented in wargame rules?

3. The ACW and Napoleonics have nothing in common except the tactics, training, strategy, and methodology used by both sides.

4. Doctrine and regulation have absolutely nothing to do with how the armies fought because generals "innovated" constantly.

5. Command Radius is the only method that can provide fun game play and prevent units from acting like autonomous forces.

6. Historical accounts by officers and men that fought at these battles which support the use of doctrine and regulation are obviously useless, aka: … obviously irrelevant, aka: … boring and wargaming must be FUN!

Ahuh.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit,

I love you!

In a totally non threatening, comradely manner, of course! :o)

I would like to see an example of ANY officer who did not issue a command or order an action from his battalion/regiment because he "was out of command radius". This concept is nothing more than a wargame rules convention. IMHO of course.

I am amazed that this thread is still going on and on and on and on and on and on and on and…

After reading the details of 1791 unit regulations, kindly provided by NedZed and reflecting, I'll offer the following to our discussion.

Two reasons to disqualify the modern military from this discussion. (a little tongue in cheek)

#1 SOLDIER DENSITY
What I remember is "Don't bunch up MF's. They'll get you with one gernade/booby-trap/burst." The mantra of modern tactics is to spread out so as not to offer an easy target. Firepower of the individual soldier or entity is high and can be concentrated from a spread out unit on a small enemy location. This is drilled into modern soldier's heads and becomes instinctive…… In Napoleonic times, most soldiers were set up elbow-to-elbow, (~27 inches between files and a short step between ranks). The command was to "close up the files." This was necessary for control and to achieve worthwhile firepower, meley power and moral effect. A modern soldier when faced with intrepreting a napoleonic problem has a lot of the wrong instincts.

#2. COMMUNICATION
My wife likes to teach and is teaching high school part time. Kids these days. If you asked one of them, how a battalion would interact with a neighboring battalion or the brigade command, they would answer: (a) call on cell phone, (b) text message, (c) heh? (d)telephone? (e) CB radio, (f) walkie talkie, (g) dirt bike, (h)loud speaker, (i) air horn, (j)yell real loud or (k)have somebody else run over and talk to them.

Of these the ones that might be transferable are dirt bike= horse, yell real loud, air horn= drum/bugle, and run over and talk. The point is that modern soldiers are used to having instant communications by multiple electronic means and implicitly feel that there is no barrier to co-ordinating the activities of even the smallest tactical units.

What does all this have to do with "command radius" and "zippy battalions"?

"Command and Control" at the brigade level must have been primarily by a combination of "yelling real loud", "pre-defined musical noise commands", monkey-see-monkey-do (a.k.a. "regulating units") and run-over-and-talk. The run-over-and-talk must have been a bit limited because a brigade commanded usually had only 1-3 horses at his disposal, and battalion commanders only 0-2 horses at most. Regardless of the short distances involved (300 to 500 yards- but back and forth), this would take a far bit of time in a tactical emergency or for co-ordinating something in real time. So we are left with the m-s-m-d and the shout methods. Maybe its okay to use a command radius or better yet a "distance between battalions" rule to mimic this. Independant battalion actions should have explicit orders from the brigade general. In reality they would have been verbal face-to-face or written. For our table top battles, I think they should be written down so they can't morph into something else and also mimic the time delay in getting them transmitted.

Just some suggestions that might be incorperated into somebody's rules.

Anyone care to ask Uncle Bill how many posts we need to qualify for a Board in our own right?

Here is a little something from the battle of Albuera, a very hard fought battle with a great deal of command friction generated throughout the day due to the intensity of the fighting. Now I offer these snippets of command & control difficulties up for no other reason than debate and discussion, I want others to decide how they read these circumstances into a game mechanic.

Major Roverea noted;

((((Our Marshal bravely exposed himself, but gave no orders, and the officers on his staff acted as they thought best.))))

This to me shows an irresolute character who lost time with inaction and indecision. His staff officers having to deal with situations as they arose which probably caused great loss of time and or timing. For me, in my own system I rated Beresford with a poor CV (Command Value) so when a player is trying to activate orders through Beresford on the table they have to suffer increased chances of non-activation of orders, or the friction of command.

Henry Hardinge later wrote;

((((In this emergency, I could not refer to Marshal Beresford, who had proceeded to the left to hasten the arrival of the Portuguese brigade. I had witnessed his energetic but fruitless efforts, under very heavy fire, to prevail upon the Spanish troops to move up to the right of Hoghton's Brigade. Starved and harassed by forced marches, no effort could be expected from them. Abercrombie's Brigade was in support of Hoghton's left flank, and could not be moved; the right was entirely exposed, in consequence of the Spaniards failing to move up. Alten's German brigade was engaged in defending the village of Albuera; the Portuguese division was at least two miles off, and no appearance of its coming up; the 4th Division, therefore, which had not fired a s, was the only available force left. In this desperate state of things, not admitting of delay, but requiring an instant remedy, I rode to Sir Lowry Cole to propose to him to attack the enemy's column with his division.))))

This to me enlightens what I was saying earlier, that commanders were not always where you might expect them to be. No, this is not an example of a Divisional commander but it is clearly an example of the situation of a general thought to be in one place but in an entirely different one carrying out a task he in all probability need not have had to do if the chain of command was set in place, reliable and working well. It also shows clearly the situation of friction in getting commands to carry out orders expected of them.

also :

((((Cole rode forward again, to confer with his fellow general William Lumley. They agreed: it was now or never. Together they decided how the cavalry would be best employed, to support the 4th division in its advance.))))

This I often find in accounts, when one cannot rely on a superior to hand over orders the two subordinates will concur or agree to carry out a local mission or task of their own.

((((For supported they must be, with 26 French squadrons sitting fresh and poised less than a mile away over the undulating plain. That is a distance that a decent hand canter will cover in four or five minutes. – time and space enough for infantry in column or line to form square, but not leaving much time spare. Cole's dilemma was the need for speed, and protection from cavalry, best gained by moving in column, coupled with the need for muskets to be in line at the other end. Given the open ground and his confidence in both Lumley's cavalry and his own infantry's drills, he chose to go initially in column. It is true that, of the few eyewitness accounts, only Lieutenant John Harrison (23rd) makes a specific reference to the approach march being in column; "our division advanced in contiguous columns of battalions at quarter distance". This is weak ammunition against the likes of Oman, Fortescue, Weller and Fletcher, all of whom say or imply that the approach was in line from the outset. However, 4,300 men in two ranks, allowing for the six gaps between the seven btlns, is a line over a mile long, and then there were the columns or squares at the flanks. Such a length of line, crossing a mile of not so very smooth slope diagonally, would be hell to control, and above all it would be slow.))))

This to me shows the clear relationship between time and space and motion Cole's dilemma was the need for speed and protection, so much had to be coordinated and timing was essential. It also needed a supreme confidence in the men to carry out the order. It also clearly shows the difficulties in commanding and controlling a formation of great length given orders to advance at the enemy on such a large frontage.

(((( Cole again : In moving forward to the attack, the Fusiliers advanced in echelons of battalions from the left (regulating btln here) – a manoeuvre always difficult to perform correctly even in a common field day; and as the Portuguese brigade in advancing had two objects to effect, namely, to show front to the enemy's cavalry, and at the same time to preserve its distance from, and cover the right flank of, the fusilier brigade, its movement was even more difficult to effect than the former.))))

This passage supports the use of the Regulating btln easily enough but also shows clearly the feeling that manoeuvres like these were difficult to perform and things could go wrong. It the General in charge is to be the one in command control and direct the individual formations within the command then how do you feel this should be shown on the table top if one or more btlns stuff things up and the general is needed to go and remedy the situation before it becomes critical and grinds things to a halt. To my way of thinking a command radius shows this from a timing point of view because it relates a distance in a turn that the general can fix the problem if inside that radius without incurring a time delay into the next turn to get there and fix it.

These are just a few passages I have found to put up here, I really want to show people that command and control was and could be difficult especially in situations of duress and heavy action. I would like your thoughts on these and how a table top game should represent these difficulties, including the use of CR's.

Shane

stop magic porridge pot, stop…

Piquet Feild of Battle is a card based game--Each side has a command dice of equal or different size depending on the quality of the general, they also have differing quality of card deck depending on how good the army is..All this gives a very interesting game and replicates quite well the way in which sub commanders either obey orders, don't obey orders or don't even get orders during a battle--i played 2/3rds of Antietam and with the Federals having a bad deck of cards compared to Bobby Lee gave a good historic result..I would recommend this ruleset to anyone..

Shane,
Thanks for the transcriptions. One thing that strikes me is that these describe the "exceptions to the rule", that is when an unusual (crisis) situation arose and the normal reaction and command methods broke down. They then were worthy of writing about for a mixture of purposes of self-justifcation, self-promotion and CYA. Don't get me wrong, these are very valid incidents and for the fun and realism of the game should or could be included in our rulesets. Also it seems to be that somehow it might be a good thing if we could rule-craft that they pop up more often in stressed situations.

I think we all would also like to find a contemporary paper written for the instruction of new officers as to how things were supposed to happen. 57 examples of different scenerios for proper transmission of orders. I guess that was learned by experience and beneath the need for documentation. Learn on the job stuff. That doesn't help us poor sods now.

BTW…has anyone actually read ALL 625+ emails in this thread? (And it is an interesting thread.)

>"…even though this is a Napoleonic site…"<

This thread is posted on the ACW board as well! Also the 18th Century board and the Game Design board!

>"BTW…has anyone actually read ALL 625+ emails in this thread?"<

I had been reading all the posts, until they started quoting vast sections of drill manuals. Now I just read the ones I write. ;)

Hey Don,

I read the ones you write too!

No offence to Drill Manuals – I already have them! ;O)

Everyone is displaying their knowledge of the regs. No one is talking about applying that knowledge to design a "playable" set of rules that has something to do with what occurred on the battlefield.

Its nice to know about controlling battalions. Napoleon would no doubt give everyone a gold star. But in the middle of a battle, senior officers did not concern themselves with controlling battalions. They were only concerned with the location and the order of their units and their opponent's units. Units being brigades or divisions or corps, depending on the lens through which the general viewed the battlefield.

Good game design.

Bob Coggins

As I live and breath (virtually), this thread is a phenomenon. Sam has the "X" factor, or some derivative thereof. Fascinating….

Scotsman wrote:
"How DID they stay aligned if they didn't conform on the regulating brigade? What methods do you see were there for moving thousands of men in some short of unison, so that there was a good chance for a timely response to commands, with reasonable control and order--what process would produce the least amount of confusion?"

I think the process/methods they used were derived from and founded upon the Drill Manual, if they weren't following its letter… or perhaps they were merely maintaining alignment with its inherent flexibility…

INFANTRY TACTICS
entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1840, by WINFIELD SCOTT

EVOLUTIONS OF THE LINE—PART V. , ARTICLE 1.
To advance in line of battle deployed.

2237.  The generals of divisions and brigades being placed further in rear of the line than the colonels, may each see at once several battalions; hence it will be easy for the perceive whence the loss of intervals, and they will give prompt notice thereof to the colonels.

2238.  When the loss of interval is but slight, and the battalion does not slant in respect to the perpendicular, the colonel may confine himself to cautioning the colour-bearer to incline insensibly to the right or left, without taking the oblique step: by this means the interval may be re-established without inconvenience.  As to the general alignment, the following rules will be observed.

2239.  A scrupulous attention need not be give to the maintenance of the colours and general guides of the several battalions exactly abreast with each other; consequently, the major of each battalion placed on the flank of his colour-rank on the side opposite to the direction, will not cause the colour-bearer to shorten or lengthen the step but when this may be evidently necessary to the preservation of a certain degree of general harmony.

2240.  The two general guides of each battalion will conform themselves steadily to the direction of the colour-rank of the same battalion, and hold themselves abreast with this rank, without deference to the colours and general guides of the other battalions.

2242. To carry through the same principle, colonels will not scrupulously endeavour to maintain their battalions abreast with each other; consequently, they will not cause the step to he lengthened or shortened, the time to be marked or quickened, except when one or the other should evidently be necessary in order to preserve a certain degree of harmony in the line; if it happen that a battalion find itself a pace or two in advance or in rear of the neighboring battalions, this slight irregularity may soon correct itself without particular orders or interference.

Next Scotsman wrote:
"Obviously the troops and officers would practice this to make it a smooth process. If they weren't using the processes that have been laid out in regulations such as Dundas's manual, the French 1791 regs and the ACW manuals, what were they using?"

They might be drawing upon their experience and training… naturally, or as if.

Finally, Scotsman wrote:
"If a divisional commander meant to advance his division, how did he do it?"

He might consult with his brigadiers prior to the attack/assault and explain to them the objective(s) WITHOUT designating a regulating brigade. Also, he may or may not, depending on the circumstances, emphasize the importance of maintaining a general or specific alignment. If he didn't, then maybe the brigadiers did or didn't worry about it. If he did, then they probably worried about it. If all brigade commanders were seasoned and experienced veteran officers, i.e. the command was a well oiled machine, there was probably a lot of drill manual specificity which could/would be ignored in his instructions.

Command Radius is what ever game you are playing be it Napoleonics or ACW is really all about control.

First you want to place limits on the players because if you did not they would do what they want to do and not what would be deem realistic per that period.

So CR does this by forcing the players to keep their units close to each other so that they are not sending off the 10 different battalions of a division every which way.

Second you want to control the units on the tabletop. You want them to act in a way that would be realistic. So if a Bde was outside of a Division Cdr CR it might take longer for that Bde to get orders from the Division Cdr.

This could result in delaying the division from carrying out its order. Since the Division Cdr would need to get the orders to the Bde.

This is very realistic and that delay just might be the turning point in the battle.

Now we have had some posting of Field Regs which is all well and good. Because they are the ideal movement of troops. But doing this in a real situation is not as easy since you will have a few factors working against you, like the terrain and then you have the enemy shooting at you.

Now the armies back then worked at drilling movement into the soldier and this is the very first thing they learn. Now once the soldier has been around for a while this drilling of movement becomes ingrain into them.

Thus they are able to move as an unit fairly well until those two factors terrain and enemy pop up.

Now things that tend to improve this was commanders. Which come in many different forms. You got the really good, good, fair, not so bad and the really bad commander.

So if you wanted to use CR you could do this by the rating of the Division Cdr. If he was really good the radius would be bigger since he is capable to handling more and making good decisions. If he was really bad then it would be far smaller since the situations are more then he can handle.

Like Shane pointed out in his example of Beresford who while quite brave appears to have gotten overwhelmed by the combat situation.

But given this his staff still was able to act. Yes it was as they thought best and might have not been for the best.

Whatever the end result is it is still all about control and providing realistic results on the tabletop.

Bottom Dollar,

"I think the process/methods they used were derived from and founded upon the Drill Manual, if they weren't following its letter… or perhaps they were merely maintaining alignment with its inherent flexibility…

… They might be drawing upon their experience and training… naturally, or as if."

Weren't both of these things based on the regulations and doctrine which outlined using regulating units? Thus, following drill, experience, training would incorporate this not be an alternative to it.

Cheers,

The Bandit

People were asking who has read this whole thread? Mithmee hasn't.

Cheers,

The Bandit

"So if you wanted to use CR you could do this by the rating of the Division Cdr. If he was really good the radius would be bigger since he is capable to handling more and making good decisions. If he was really bad then it would be far smaller since the situations are more then he can handle."

Um, shouldn't that be the 'better' the commander, the more elements he can effectively control within a reasonable distance?

ie method of command & control varies the distance, and commander ability varies the # of elements therin.

Not that I agree with Command Radii (did I just invent a term?), I disaprove of them as a concept, but the above has always struck me.

>>>>>Um, shouldn't that be the 'better' the commander, the more elements he can effectively control within a reasonable distance?<<<<<

You just stated the magical words here, ""within a reasonable distance"" This is exactly what a Command Radius is…is it not?

Shane:
I've been away, so I haven't been able to reply until now. I agree that flexibility was important. And I think that most regulations recognized this, which is why regulations presented basic forms and then gave lots of details and specific instructions on maintaining those forms. Though it is LONG, I am going to go point by point with your examples.

We are still focused on how a division commander moved his division and the basic ways he communicated with it.

And as you quoted Scott's manual, I'll keep with that, though I am confident that most manual instructions are very similar to the 1791 French regulations.

Just to be clear, the meaning of three terms used here:

1. Alignment: The proper positions between the men in a company, the companies in a battalion, the battalions in a brigade, or all the brigades in a division.

2. Intervals: The spaces between the men in the company, the companies in a battalion, extra. In the sections below, it is the intervals between battalions, which was supposed to be twenty yards,

3. "The flank opposite to the direction": This is the flank of the battalion or regiment opposite to the directing battalion or brigade.
Shane wrote:

>>>>I think the process/methods they used were derived from and founded upon the Drill Manual, if they weren't following its letter… or perhaps they were merely maintaining alignment with its inherent flexibility<<<<

Shane, I am not sure what you mean about alignments 'inherent flexibility.'

The examples you provide are the rather minor details of how officers maintained order while advancing a line of battle. Only one is addressed to the DC, and that, along with the Brigadiers, refers to their assigned positions giving them a better view of possible interval problems.

The rest are how colonels, majors, guides and color ranks work to keep intervals and alignments. You have sort of pulled out the details of the machine, rather than the main structure. And yes, they do point out how 'slight' variations could be ignored.

INFANTRY TACTICS
entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1840, by WINFIELD SCOTT

EVOLUTIONS OF THE LINE—PART V. , ARTICLE 1.
To advance in line of battle deployed.

2237. The generals of divisions and brigades being placed further in rear of the line than the colonels, may each see at once several battalions; hence it will be easy for the perceive whence the loss of intervals, and they will give prompt notice thereof to the colonels.

[This is simply pointing out that because of their position behind the line, DCs and brigadiers may see a loss of intervals the regimental commanders wouldn't and because of that, should let them know. This is a fairly minor 'policing' point and doesn't have anything with actually getting a division to move or the communications that are required to carry it out..]

2238. When the loss of interval is but slight, and the battalion does not slant in respect to the perpendicular, the colonel may confine himself to cautioning the colour-bearer to incline insensibly to the right or left, without taking the oblique step: by this means the interval may be re-established without inconvenience. As to the general alignment, the following rules will be observed.

[Again, what to do with a "slight" irregularity in the interval: how to correct it and that it is up to the colonel to take care of it. Obviously, following # 2237, it is noting when colonels should be left to handle it themselves. Again, this is the intervals. It does lead into rules to maintaining the general alignment. And they should mention the directing mechanism.]

2239. A scrupulous attention need not be give to the maintenance of the colours and general guides of the several battalions exactly abreast with each other; consequently, the major of each battalion placed on the flank of his colour-rank on the side opposite to the direction, will not cause the colour-bearer to shorten or lengthen the step but when this may be evidently necessary to the preservation of a certain degree of general harmony.

[This is saying that the colors and guides out in front don't need to ALSO hold to perfect alignment. That the major in charge of controlling the alignment needed worry about them. The major referred to, placed on the flank of each battalion "opposite to the direction" was there to control the line's steps so the end of the line away from the directing battalion didn't lag behind or move faster than the flank closest to the 'direction.' ]

2240. The two general guides of each battalion will conform themselves steadily to the direction of the colour-rank of the same battalion, and hold themselves abreast with this rank, without deference to the colours and general guides of the other battalions.

[Here the guides are to conform to the direction of the colour-rank of their battalion, and not the other battalions. Again, a how to for the guides.}

2242. To carry through the same principle, colonels will not scrupulously endeavour to maintain their battalions abreast with each other; consequently, they will not cause the step to he lengthened or shortened, the time to be marked or quickened, except when one or the other should evidently be necessary in order to preserve a certain degree of harmony in the line; if it happen that a battalion find itself a pace or two in advance or in rear of the neighboring battalions, this slight irregularity may soon correct itself without particular orders or interference.

[This is instructions to the colonels, the principle being: don't go too far in maintaining their battalions abreat with each other. Note that this was the Major's job. Don't go overboard trying to make every battalion instantly correct any 'slight irregularities'. They may correct themselves. ]

These are interesting insights into the details of maintaining alignment and intervals in the advance, but I am not sure how it applies to the question of how a DC commands, moves, and communicates with his division.

Next Scotsman wrote:
"Obviously the troops and officers would practice this to make it a smooth process. If they weren't using the processes that have been laid out in regulations such as Dundas's manual, the French 1791 regs and the ACW manuals, what were they using?"

>>>>They might be drawing upon their experience and training… naturally, or as if<<<<

Might? What experience and training is that? What is the alternative?

Finally, Scotsman wrote:
"If a divisional commander meant to advance his division, how did he do it?"

>>He might consult with his brigadiers prior to the attack/assault and explain to them the objective(s) WITHOUT designating a regulating brigade.<<<

Really? Any examples? Once they have the plan and objectives, they still need to move the division. The Regulations provide the SOP in the sections below. It was to have a regulating battalion, so the DC would have to specifically tell them not to have one. IF he did, [and I'd love to see an example of this], there would be lots of complications if the division was supposed to do anything other than advance straight ahead. No maneuvering.

>>>Also, he may or may not, depending on the circumstances, emphasize the importance of maintaining a general or specific alignment. If he didn't, then maybe the brigadiers did or didn't worry about it.<<<<

If the division was going to move together, there was a general method to do that. Why would he have to emphasize that, particularly to experienced officers? It's how it's done. So, what happened to a line advancing if they 'didn't worry about it?'

Do the points #2237 to 2242 sound like no one was 'worrying' about it? They instructions are focusing on 'slight' imperfections in a line of battle and how to deal or not deal with them. However, They ALL apply to the very first section of the Article you quoted:

EVOLUTIONS OF THE LINE—PART V, ARTICLE 1.
To advance in line of battle deployed.

2218: [There is a diagram of this provided in the manual]
A line of eight battalions deployed [i.e. in line] , and correctly aligned will be supposed. [as an example] ; the general wishing to cause it to advance in this order, will choose as the directing battalion [say the fifth] the one he may deem the most favorably placed for the purpose; and he will approach this battalion, and command:

"The Fifth, Battalion of direction."

2219: This having been repeated,…
[This phrase is seen throughout the instructions and means that the order is repeated by every officer in every battalion of the division.

There is nothing ever said in Scott's manual about another way to do this, or that these instructions can be ignored. There may have been other ways to move a division, but I haven't seen it in either the military treatises or battlefield accounts.

>>>If he did, then they probably worried about it. If all brigade commanders were seasoned and experienced veteran officers, i.e. the command was a well-oiled machine, there was probably a lot of drill manual specificity which could/would be ignored in his instructions.<<<

Shane, very true. 2224 says exactly that:

The general need not occupy himself with the general alignment of the colour-ranks and general guides of the different battalions; it will suffice if those of each battalion conform themselves to what has just been prescribed.

In other words, that isn't the job of the DC, and he can expect each battalion to do their jobs.

More on the Directing battalion in a Division and the DC's relation to it:

2228 :The directing battalion being regarded as infallible by all the others, and having thus the greatest influence on them, its march will be superintended with the utmost care; consequent [v. the general-in-chief (the DC), or the officer deputed by

2233: Each subordinate battalion will maintain its interval on the side of the directing battalion.
Or how about 2245: The general will occupy himself more particularly with the directing battalion, but attention will at the same time be given to the whole line.

It seems all very straightforward and clear. [I would think that would have been a major goal for Scott] Everyone's responsibilities detailed in the task of moving a mile-long line of several thousand men in a particular order toward a particular goal. If there were other methods used on the battlefield than these, I have only seen 'fix it' suggestions when the above method for advancing a division has broken down.

That's the principle method available to a divisional commander when he moved and communicated with his brigades.

Every other communication method was secondary and built around this basic structure.