"The "Command Radius"" Topic

>>>>>Shane,

Your question is not valid. Command on the Napoleonic battlefield has absolutely nothing to do with command on the modern battlefield.<<<<<

Why are people here continueally mis-quoting passages that they somehow think originated from me ???

Bob, you are responding to a post that originated from someone else !!!

Check first mate.

After 500 posts communication can get jumbled--like on a battlefield?

I do need to clarify a few things at this point, particularly in light of what Shane is focused on:

1. I have been looking at CRs in relation to Division and Brigade command--only.

2. I have said in more than one post that I am not sure what Corps commanders and Army commanders usually did as their work or how often they sent messages, traveled, gave verbal commands etc. Not even a general idea--though I am working on it.

3. In this thread, I have assumed we are talking about Battlefield Command, not campaign. We are talking about after any battle plan had been laid out, usually before most wargame scenarios are usually begun--the major orders have been sent and now it is execution time.

4.In the case of command, we are attempting to assess what the Division commander, Brigade commanders "Usually" did to command and the mechanisms they normally used to make things work.

The writers of the regulations and instructions,[how to do things on the battlefield],were professionals writing to combat veterans, using forms perfected over centuries. We don't have to second guess how they operated--they are very plain. For instance, in Duffield's 1862 "School of the Brigade" these normal mechanics are laid out in excruciating detail--and very similar to any of the Napoleonic practices on the same points. Two examples:

Point #4 says:

"The brigadier-general will have no fixed place as the instructor of his own brigade; BUT when several brigades united in the same line manoeuvre together, the posts of general officers will be as follows:…"

Then the position of brigadier and Divisional Commanders are specified in the next four points, each to be in one of two places--regulating battalion or the center of their command. The last instruction is:

#8. In all cases [this means imperative],he [the DC] will repair to that portion of the field where he may judge his presence necessary, taking the precaution to leave in his "USUAL" or "HABITUAL" position the next in command, or the chief of his staff, charged with the execution of his orders.

[capitals mine] This means when he is not in his usual position, as specified by the regulations, he leaves his proxy to carry on as the divisional commander because the DC is leaving his post to deal with whatever he deems necessary someplace else. When a DC left his habitual position, in many ways he was placing himself out of command, which is why a proxy was so emphatically required.
The Attached rule seems to mirror this to a great degree.

Pender didn't do this when he left his post, and it cost the CSA.

And besides trying to avoid problems, they also provided instructions on what to do when things went wrong. In the general Rules of Command, #19:

"When from any cause, a colonel shall not have heard the general command, he will, on seeing the battalion next to his own executing a movement, immediately cause his battalion to execute the same movement."

I have only the slightest notion what might constitute a 'command radius' for a modern colonel of infantry in his view, but it is very clear how Divisional and brigade commanders 'radiated' commands to their units and the mechanisms that were used by close formation infantry to follow them. They are described in detail.

Silly Rabbit,

Thanks for your kind words. I am sorry if my hyperbole, which I used to make a point, confused you.

I was in the black boot army in the 60s and I can damn well testify we didn't have helmut radios. On the other hand, we didn't have generals personally delivering orders. We had 30lb radios and lots of interference.

Your general's command vehicle was the HumV and his means of communication was a cell phone. This makes my point.
On the Napoleonic battlefield, a general's method of communication was his voice and he used it by riding around. A boy general, such as Joubert and lots of others, could get shot riding around.

Battalions were kept in good order by lots of cadre who kept a close eye on the boys. It was also maintained by unit spirit; morale, elan or whatever you call it. Men's love of their comrades, then and now, goes a long way to maintain order.

Nevertheless, a fair percentage of a musket era battalion preferred survival and were most likely to run or hide behind their fellow soldiers (the evil of bunching) – thus, the girdle of cadre.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Shane,

Sorry old boy. There are so many posts….

Now I to bed,
To sleep off all this nonsense
I've just said!

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

lol,

No worries Bob, this thread has grown its own zip code I am starting to believe.

Ratisbon wrote:
>>>>>Your general's command vehicle was the HumV and his means of communication was a cell phone. This makes my point.

On the Napoleonic battlefield, a general's method of communication was his voice and he used it by riding around. A boy general, such as Joubert and lots of others, could get shot riding around.<<<<<

Ratisbon:
IF the primary method of communication for a Napoleonic commander was riding around to different points of their command and issuing command with his voice, then that mode of communication should be both the main action you see them involved in during a battle. It should also be the primary focus of regulations for commanders or discussions by military men. It isn't.

It just doesn't match what the military men of the day are saying. They certainly did ride off at times, but that is not the usual behavior described by regulations and accounts.

Commanders, particularly DCs did ride to points of a command and give orders or for other reasons, but that was the exception--rather than the norm.

I am not sure about norm or usual activities of an Army and Corps commanders. However, if riding around and giving orders was the primary mode of communication with a command, is difficult to explain the behaviors of Confederate Division and Corps commanders at Gettysburg, as it is with Napoleon's actions in any of his battles. They simply didn't do that.

Division commanders and brigade commanders were expected to be at particular positions 'normally', and when they left those positions only for specific purposes and with the intent to return as soon as such goals were achieved--that is if the regulations and military writings of the period, both French and British, along with the Allies were to be believed.

If you picked a moment in a Napoleonic battle and zoomed in on all the division commanders of both sides, the large majority of them would be in their expected and normal positions in relation to their divisions, just as both regulation and custom requires.

amazing armchair theory here.

Scotsman,

Thank you, for advancing an argument in detail finally.

Putting aside the game systems you use, which I appreciate your mentioning, I still don't think there is much of a case for regulating brigades at the divisional echelon in the ACW. I have seen evidence of regulating battalions at the echelon of the brigade and when it appears, it appears distinctly. I've also seen examples of brigade commanders---usually in the second line of an advance--maintaining their regiments in nearby alignment to make sure that when they are committed to the front line, they are committed in as a coordinated and singular fashion as possible. This second kind of alignment keeping didn't necessarily use a regulating battalion, but had the brigadier sending ADC's, staff members to particular regiments to communicate and coordinate the maintenance of alignment. You might argue that perhaps it wasn't mentioned in the reports, but the regulating battalion WAS used. I might argue, you still need to provide evidence that the "School of the Brigade" was being drilled and enforced by all the brigades of both armies in the ACW.

My impression is, is that the regulating battalion mechanic which was used by ACW brigadiers, was a tool in their command repertoire and if it worked in certain situations under certain circumstances, it didn't work under others and as such, it may have been a double-edged sword. So, to have it serve as a universal medium for C & C within an ACW system doesn't seem wholly accurate. I see it more as an option available to the brigade commander, as opposed to his telling his battalion commanders ahead of time to keep closely aligned with the rest of brigade during the advance.

Lastly, for the time being, all four of Caldwell's brigades went into action at Gettysburg on July 2nd, inverted. Caldwell didn't mention it specifically in his report, though his brigade commanders did. Either way, none say it specifically effected their combat performance once they got engaged.

Jim

Bill,

"I am not sure that I made a connection between Hood at Gettysburg and artillery fire slowing an advance, did I?"

No, you are right, you didn`t! I mis-read this late last night:

"Artillery can now slow an advance by simply slowing one brigade—or break the advance up with a 'disorder' when the DC decides to race ahead anyway, like Hood at Gettysburg."

So was this advance (Hood`s) slowed by difficult terrain?

Also, I would very much appreciate some Napoleonic examples of advances slowed by artillery fire.

Mike.

In skimming these posts I hadn't first realised they were ACW wards. With over 50 years between Jena and Gettysburg there is the probability of some progression in mechnical, technical and organisational matters, just as there was between Frederick the Greats time and Napoleon.

You don't find armies routinely operating in structured Brigades and Divisions during the 1600s, so to get 'centuries' of practice at that level the time frame lands outside Napoleonics.

It may just be Shane that you are banging your Napoleonic head against late 19th Century doctrine. I know you have better things to do with your head.

Jeff,

"With over 50 years between Jena and Gettysburg there is the probability of some progression in mechnical, technical and organisational matters"

Mechanical and Technical, yes to some degree.

Organisational, not really.

The drill books in use during the Civil War written by Hardee and Casey as well as the Union 1863 Regulations, were based on the US 1812 Regulations, which in turn were taken from the French Regulations of 1791.

The latter had the 9 company battalion organisation that was in use in the French Napoleonic Army until 1808.

The most noticeable change for the US was to up the companies to 10 (like the British) and move over to the two rank lines (again like the British).

Apart from that any French Officer Present at Jena – (who spoke fluent American and had a time machine) would have fitted in pretty well at Gettysburg, once he had gotten over the lack of flints in the muskets and artillery pieces being fired by lanyards and friction primers!

Tactics might have changed a little bit (less columns and even less cavalry) but organisation, command and control and manoeuvring, using close order drill, would have all been very familiar.

Black Powder weapons and fire by line of sight were still there, everything else was subordinate to them.

Bring our French chum back for the Wilderness and Petersburg he might be a bit confused, although in the latter case he might just regard it as some old seige!

The Scotsman,

There are no more regulations for where the DC should be than there were for how the DC should dress. I can only speak for NBs. Unless a DC was within his CR of his brigades they cannot move.

Where he is located at any one moment in the 30 minute turn within the CR is irrelevant. What is relevant is he is close enough to influence and command his brigades within the scale time of the turn.

I am mystified regarding your belief that the exact location of some officers is all important. What happens if the brigadier gets shot? Well the next ranking officer in the brigade takes over and the beat goes on. That's why they have drill.

There is a great command dividing line between grand tactics which is an art and tactics which is a science. When a brigadier goes down the next highest in rank takes over because he has the same authority to issue tactical orders as the brigadier.

When DCs go down the next highest ranker, most likely a brigadier does not simply take over without authorization from a senior officer. This is because a brigadier is strictly a tactical, not a grand tactical officer and he needs be given the authority to operate otherwise by his DC's superior.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

>"Bring our French chum back for the Wilderness and Petersburg he might be a bit confused…"<

Seems fair, since the officers and men who actually fought there were a bit confused themselves!

>"What happens if the brigadier gets shot? Well the next ranking officer in the brigade takes over and the beat goes on."<

The problem lies in getting the word to the next-ranking officer that he is now in command -- and the word to his replacement, on down the line. If either the brigadier or his senior colonel is "out of position" (hard to find) the problem is exacerbated. That's what happened when Pender was wounded at G'burg. Lee's plan was for an attack en echelon, with each brigade taking up the assault after it sees the one on its right step off. When Pender's Div. failed to advance, the whole thing broke down.

First, let me say I respect the effort of those individuals that have expressed their opinions in this thread who have made the effort to write sets of rules, published or not, covering any period, to try to put a structure to the chaos that is war in any period. You also deserve additional credit for letting yourself become a target for those who have nothing more constructive to do than criticize.

I was privileged to attend an AAR (after action report/debrief) conducted by Major General Bob Hollingsworth, DEPCOM FMFPAC, after an action involving a composite Brigade of American and British forces. During his comments MGen Hollingsworth made an interesting statement. I can't quote him exactly, but the following words are very close to what he said: "Gentlemen, the three most important words in combat are: communication, communication, communication, …in that order!

The importance of those words have remained true since the first commander issued his first orders on the first battlefield of the first war on the face of this planet.

There are some contributors to this thread who don't seem to understand those words, or their importance to the successful prosecution of battle, any battle, on any scale, by any number of troops, in any era.

Trillions of dollars, pounds, lire, marks, yen, rubles, dinars, shekels, script, and any other currency you can name have been spent to improve battlefield communication by every military that has ever existed, and yet there is always a problem with this simple concept in every conflict almost all the time. The old "rumor" game should clearly illustrate how difficult it is for people sitting in a room right next to each other to get a simple sentence correct, let alone under the duress of high speed metal flying around killing or maiming those around you. As an individual who has survived combat in a command position (senior NCO after the loss of all our officers) I can testify first hand to the difficulties of communication under fire.

Again, the fact that some of the alleged luminaries of the wargaming industry don't seem to understand this point is amazing to this fairly simple 16 year veteran of the Army with a high school diploma and two years of junior college, …who is also a woman I should add. All this discussion about command radius, regulating units, etc., appears to be nothing more than a front for more of the "Larry Dunns" of the wargaming world to pimp their favorite theories, show off their bias, their ability to recognize only supporting information, express their displeasure for a particular set of rules or some individual or individuals who have offended them at some time some where, and express their true ignorance of what happens on a battlefield IN ANY PERIOD, from 10,000 BC to 2009 AD.

Ease of communication was the reason there were regulations regarding the placement of officers, flags, headquarters, etc., etc… Despite all the regulations and careful placement designs communication failed under battlefield condition MUCH OF THE TIME. History is replete with examples. History is also full of examples of commanders who did not obey the regulations and went to where the action was to insure their orders were followed. Men like Davout, Wrede, and Deroy, just to name of few of those mentioned in John Gill's fine 1809 series all knew the importance of communication and often personally delivered orders or directed troops themselves when there wasn't time to do otherwise. These men were Corps or Division commanders whose communication via the chain of command failed them often enough for them to know the need to do whatever it took to get the job done.

How a rules writer decides to illustrate "battlefield communications failures" is totally up to them. Who gives a what they call it, …but it is a necessary part of any game that attempts to duplicate the difficulties that arise during the prosecution of war: "the transfer of orders after the initial plan (which we all know does not survive contact with the enemy) falls apart."

Thank you all for the interesting discussion. Many of you illustrate an understanding of combat decision-making, which despite the remarks contained in some of the comments on this thread, has pretty much remained the same throughout history.

Silly Rabbit (SFC Samantha Danson, JRTC)

BD/Jim wrote
>>>>My impression is, is that the regulating battalion mechanic which was used by ACW brigadiers, was a tool in their command repertoire and if it worked in certain situations under certain circumstances, it didn't work under others and as such, it may have been a double-edged sword.<<<<

Jim:
ALL command systems could be an double edged sword. Radios and computer communication have their problems.

The impression the Napoleonic and ACW regulations and actual battle accounts give suggest it was the primary mode of control for all commands up to the Division. Go through any of the ACW or Napoleonic regulations and count up how many different options they provide for commanding a brigade or division. 90% of all the regulations regarding command control focus on one form, the rest are specifically mentioned 'when the general form fails." Caseys, Hardee's, Scotts, Duffields or any others ALL say the same thing. Dundas and all the Napoleonic Regulations for brigade and division operations say the same thing.

>>>>Lastly, for the time being, all four of Caldwell's brigades went into action at Gettysburg on July 2nd, inverted. Caldwell didn't mention it specifically in his report, though his brigade commanders did. Either way, none say it specifically effected their combat performance once they got engaged.<<<<

Why do you think that ALL four of Caldwell's brigades went into action inverted? Because they were all following the same train, the regulating brigade, which was obviously why they all ended up formed in front the wrong way.

However, they probably could fight inverted as long as they didn't move, but not as well as they could fronted correctly.

This is what Dundas says about inversion:

Here is what Dundas says about inversion in his Rules and Regulations: [Part IV, para. 14.] Note that he is talking about a battalion or line, and of course Caldwell had a whole division inverted--which could only happen if he had a regulating regiment in a regulating brigade.

"Although in general the inversion of all bodies in line is to be avoided, yet there are situations where this rule must be dispensed with, and the quickest formation to a particular front thereby obtained.—The battalion or line may be obliged to face to the right about, the more readily to oppose a danger, in stead of changing its position by a countermarch; it may even be under the necessity of forming to a flank with its rear rank front."

"The fundamental case against inversion was the risk that disorientation of rehearsed evolutions would produce confusion and delay of which the enemy could take advantage, especially if further movement was to be made by the inverted body without recover of its natural order. This risk was greatest at the tactical level."

Imagine a baseball team, well-seasoned and drilled to react instantaneously. Then one day the baseball diamond is inverted, first base on the left, third on the right. They certainly could play baseball that way, but how well? Positions have changed as well as batting advantages. The intuitive dash to steal first is now a move that takes thought and a different set of moves. Start shooting at them as they play… and the whole exercise can become a circus. That is what Dundas is saying.

>>>>You might argue that perhaps it wasn't mentioned in the reports, but the regulating battalion WAS used. I might argue, you still need to provide evidence that the "School of the Brigade" was being drilled and enforced by all the brigades of both armies in the ACW.<<<<

Absolutely. I agree. First , what did military men say was 'the way to do it.' and then second, find evidence on the battlefield that they actually used those practices, and not something else.

First, I have tried to show here and am prepared to further it, that
1. All the regulations, both Napoleonic and ACW Hardee, Casey, Scott, Duffield etc. all described the very same methods for moving battalions, brigades and divisions. And ALL said that the process for moving all three WERE BASICALLY THE SAME.

2. Then it must be demonstrated that those regulations, "how it was done" actually WAS done by officers and men on the battlefield. Do brigade and division commanders use the same methods for directing their commands? What happens to those in the heat of battle?

WOW. I haven't been offended by anybody's rules or by individuals, though a couple seem to be making an effort to offend.

I simply said they didn't do what they said they did, and have been willing to demonstrate why I said it.

Arm chair *theories?* Are we talking theories here, or what the men WHO fought the wars said they did and how they did it?

Silly Rabbit wrote:

>>>>All this discussion about command radius, regulating units, etc., appears to be nothing more than a front for more of the "Larry Dunns" of the wargaming world to pimp their favorite theories, show off their bias, their ability to recognize only supporting information, express their displeasure for a particular set of rules or some individual or individuals who have offended them at some time some where, and express their true ignorance of what happens on a battlefield IN ANY PERIOD, from 10,000 BC to 2009 AD.<<<<<

First, I never said commanders didn't communicate or that communication wasn't vital, or even that generals never rode around at times to take care of business. I just laid out what I have read as the primary way THEY say they communicated to their commands, no more, no less. And it matches the accounts.

Ignorance? I have a great deal of respect for any military officer and combat veteran. I am sure that current battalion, brigade and division command and communication practices could relate to those two centuries ago.

I do believe, however, that past military men have as much veracity as the current ones. If past veterans explain 'how it was done', I should listen--I don't claim any special knowledge or experience of Napoleonic warfare, but I have been listening.

So, SR, I am more than willing to entertain counter evidence concerning Napoleonic or ACW communication practices, if you believe what I have presented is some sort of sham or front--though I don't know how you will make those comparisons without 'supporting evidence.' And if current military practices apply, just show me the similarities in past accounts.

******************

But let's talk about "WHAT HAPPENS ON A BATTLE FIELD IN ANY PERIOD, from 10,000 BC to 2009 AD."

I do agree--there are some distinct similarities--and those are identified by Napoleonic writers.

To keep it manageable, lets restrict ourselves to 900 BC to 1865 [not sure about 10,000 BC], and further limit ourselves to two points:

1.Where commanders placed themselves to communicate with their troops?

2. And how did they organize their armies?

WHERE DID COMMANDERS POSITION THEMSELVES?

--no theories here, no biases, no pimping--just the facts, Jack.

Well, according to Homer, [Fagles, Iliad, Bk 2, lines 873-6.]

"She stood on Odysseus' huge black-bellied hull,
moored mid-line so a shout could reach both wings,
upshore to Telamonian Ajax' camp or down to Achilles'—
trusting so to their arms' power and battle-strength
they'd hauled their trim ships up on either flank."

Achilles was down shore, on the right of the Greek battle line and he was the one who led the army into battle. And 'she' being the oracle in the middle so her shout could be heard. Hmmm, the right or center.

But that's just poetry. Here is another:

"The commander-in-chief, who was usually the king…, had his station sometimes in the centre (as at Mantineia, Thucydides, v. 72), more commonly (as at Leuctra) on the right wing. […] In an ordinary march the army advanced …, the first enomotia [small sub-unit of 25 men] of the right wing filing off, and the rest in succession following it…."
Smith, Dictionary of Green and Roman Antiquities, p.484.

So commanding is from the right, and what's this, the first enomotia of the right wing leading off with the rest following? Sound familiar?

Gosh. So where Napoleonic and ACW military regulations say we should find Division commanders and brigade commanders? On the right or in the right. 100 years later, Dundas says it, other Napoleonic and ACW regulations say it, and so do the accounts of those battles. I've already quoted extensively from those regs. But more on that in another post.

But hey, that's just some historian saying it. How about a contemporary. With respect to the post of Ancient Roman commanders, Vegetius recorded:

"The post of the commander-in-chief is generally on the right between the cavalry and infantry. From this place he can best direct the motions of the whole army and move elements with the greatest ease wherever he finds it necessary."

Phillips, Roots of Strategy, Vegetius, ‘Military Institutions,' p.99.

Now SR, why would this post on the right of the infantry be a place where "He can best direct the motions of the whole army?--with the greatest ease?" This is a communications issue, and Vegetius says the best place is to direct the WHOLE ARMY is on the right.

Why there? What does your military experience tell you?

Of battle at Marathon (490 BC), the great Greek victory against the Persian army, Herodotus, the proverbial "Father of History," noted:

"The right wing was commanded by the polemarch, Callimachus, for the law at that time demanded that the right wing should be led by the polemarch."

The polemarch was the commander of the Athenian-led Allied army.

Why does Alexander always place himself on the right? Only when there is a serious problem does he ever leave it--and only in one battle I know of, against Porus in India. His opponent commanders also position themselves on the right or in the center.

ORGANIZATION:

What does that have to do with a general's ability to command? The Greeks saw the organization of a battle line linked to effectiveness of the general:

"Strategy" (stratêgia) is Greek for "generalship" and "tactics" (taktika) means 'pertaining to the arrangement of troops.'

The right was the place of honor, the most honored enomotia, etc. Xenophon's description of Coronea (394 B.C.), places the Spartans on the right and their allies on the left, facing the Thebans on the right of their own battle-line and who correspondingly had their allies on the left. Both army's commanders are positioned with the units on the right.

AtPlataea (479 BC). A dispute over precedence in the line of battle arose after the Greeks shifted their camp and before the final main engagement. The collected force conceded to the Spartans the honour of the right flank, and to the Spartan commander and regent, Pausanias, the first place among the Greek generals. So the Greeks:

"…formed their battle order nation by nation near the spring of Gargaphia and the sanctuary of the hero Androcrates, among low hills and a flat piece of country."

"Then, in the matter of the lineup of the army, there was a great altercation between the Tegeans and the Athenians. For each of them claimed the right of the other wing of the army, and each of them brought forward deeds new and old to justify their claims."

Herodotus, The History, Bk. 9, lines 25-6; Diodorus Siculus, Library., Bk. 11, line 30.

Why this organization? What accounts for the primacy of the right as a position of honour?

Lacking a direct answer from the ancient sources, there is evidence. For men who carry their shields upon their left arm or shoulder, the right side is unprotected and the right flank exposed to greater danger, requiring men of greater moral fortitude.

Dependable men were also required on the right of a hoplite phalanx who could be trusted to resist the tendency to drift to the right, a battlefield characteristic that Thucydides, who might be regarded as the ‘father of military history', specifically commented upon owing to its spectacular impact on the battle of Mantinea:

"All armies are alike in this: on going into action they get forced out rather on their right wing, and one and the other overlap with this their adversary's left; because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the better will he be protected. The man primarily responsible for this is the first upon the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes the rest follow him."
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Bk. 5, line 71.

If you go to military treatises such as Saxe in the 1600s, Guibert 1782, Dundas'1792 regulations or Casey's 1862 regulations and you'll find very similar observations about this drift and reasons for a post of honor--even after a thousand years.

They all basically say the same thing, advocating the same commander positions and same organization for the same reasons as Vegetius.

Col. Dundas, in his "Principles of Military Movements" (1788)acknowledged this, saying:

"The revival of military science may be dated from the days of the NASSAUS and GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, who in their arms and tactique, blending the Grecian and Roman systems, formed armies eminent in discipline, and renowned for the great actions they atchieved [sic]."

Dundas, Principles of Military Movements, p. 1; the language remained identical in the 2nd edition (1795).

I AGREE. MANY THINGS REMAINED THE SAME OVER THOUSANDS OF YEARS. WE JUST HAVE TO IDENTIFY WHAT.

I am sorry Bill, Samantha is right, you are wrong. You obviously have no prior military background and think you have the answers from simply reading your books. Napoleon was a book reader but also at the same time was undergoing Military training, he converged the practical with the theory, you are only basing your statements on theory alone.

Samantha is totally correct, it is fine to say a General should be found in a particular location at any given point during combat but when the guns start shooting this all goes out the window, I learnt this in my own military training which lasted all of 4 years. I seriously think you should step back from your books and go talk to "REAL" military men and women who command men and women or have been commanded by men and women to better understand what you think you are talking about. You are just looking very silly right now and refuse to listen to men and women here who know the difficulties of command.

Shane

Sam wrote:

"How a rules writer decides to illustrate "battlefield communications failures" is totally up to them. Who gives a what they call it, …but it is a necessary part of any game that attempts to duplicate the difficulties that arise during the prosecution of war: "the transfer of orders after the initial plan (which we all know does not survive contact with the enemy) falls apart."

I've always thought the saying "no plan survives its first contact with the enemy" as something of a worthless platitude, the logical conclusion being, "…so, why bother planning." Who came up with that one anyway ? Never liked it.

Though I don't always agree with the Scotsman and have disagreed with him, I HAVE LEARNED FROM HIM.

There's something about having to paint your own miniatures, investigating, building or buying game systems, attempting to persuad individuals to try a particular rule set out, etc… that is satisfying in and of itself. It's called doing it the long way, rather than the easy way.

Scotsman, …if you are that desperate to have rules reflect your very stilted view of warfare why not write your own.

I would recommend contacting a self publishing firm to which end I have provided four links below that may be willing to consider doing the non-writing physical tasks, like printing, editing, etc., required for your set. Perhaps you can name them Chef de' Division, …or Corps.

link

link

link

link

All that fine theory is just that: Theory.

Once the "puck" drops everything changes. Good luck in your quest for the "perfect simulation" of warfare in the age of Napoleon, …or whatever.

Silly Rabbit.

"I've always thought the saying "no plan survives its first contact with the enemy" as something of a worthless platitude, the logical conclusion being, "…so, why bother planning." Who came up with that one anyway ? Never liked it."

Staff planning in the age of ever faster closing rates require fewer options and branch plans though it is the objective of every staff to present their commander as many options as possible taking into account all the things you (the staff) think the enemy is capable of doing. A good staff will present three or four options, from which there will be two or three branch plans for each option. It is up to the commander to pick whichever plan, or combination of plans, he deems to be his best chance of victory. The best plans are wargamed by the staff and the results are presented to the commander for his evaluation.

No matter how long you work (as a staff) on the plan of attack, or defense, there is an excellent chance the enemy will have thought of something you didn't consider. If that is the case all your work was for naught. Good command staffs know the enemy, and their commander, and his options, and his potential, and can make a pretty good guess (that is what it is until the battle begins) as to what he is going to do. So, they plan based on what they know to the best of their ability.

As soon as the battle begins everything usually changes. The winner is the commander who can adapt to the enemies plan and overcome their advantages with suitable force to be victorious.

The statement is TRUE in fact. Anyone who doubts that reality has never been in battle.

Silly Rabbit

Mike:

You asked for some examples. I think that a prime example of the kinds of delay that terrain and artillery fire can cause, even in the most successful advances, is the advance of the Leith's 5th Division at Salamanca. The division advanced with Grenville's brigade of five battalions in front, Pringle's and Spry's in support. Grenville's 9th regiment and part of the 38th had to pass through the western end of the village of Los Arapiles, becoming detached from the main line. It quickly re-formed and regained its place on the left of the brigade after some delay.

The division continued in excellent order. It impressed a number of veterans. Col. John Douglas of the 3/1st wrote , "Captain Stewart of our company, stepping out of the ranks of the front, lays hold of Captain Glover and cries, "Glover did you ever see such a line?" Douglas adds "I am pretty confident that in the Regiments which composed our lines there was not a man 6 inches out of his place."

Leith Hay, one of the division commander's ADCs, who seems to have been with Leith, observed, "A blank was no sooner made by the Enemy's fire but it was closed up as if nothing had happened, and as much attention was paid to dressing the Line, as if it had been a common field day."

Now, what is almost lost here is what is involved in the dressing of the 'Line' [Hay's capitalization.] First, dressing the line was to restore the line's order, so the artillery must have done some work on the brigade's orderliness—which may be why he mentioned dressing the line right after the effect of artillery fire. Stepping into the 'blank' on the move did tend to skew the line's dress.

While it was possible to dress a battalion's line in motion, it was very difficult when that line involved five battalions. Also, if one battalion of the line dressed independently, the 'connections' battalions could be lost so that a line could look like a the fractured snake on the "Don't Tread on Me" Flag. Invariably the brigade would have to slow or more likely stop to dress the entire brigade. And how was dressing done? Here is the British 1807 regulations for Non-Commissioned Officers:

S.9. Dressing when halted.
Dress. Dressing is to be taught equally by the left as by the right. On the word Dress, each individual will cast his eyes to the point to which is ordered to dress, with the smallest turn possible of the head, but preserving the shoulders and body square to their front. The whole person of the man must move as may be necessary, and bending backward or forward is not to be permitted. He must take short quick steps, thereby gradually and exactly to gain his position, and on no account be suffered to attempt it by any sudden or violent alteration, which must infallibly derange whatever is beyond him. The faces of the men, and not their breasts or feet, are the line of dressing. Each man is to be able just to distinguish the lower part of the face of the second man beyond him.

In dressing, the eyes of the men are always turned to the officer, who gives the word Dress; and who is posted at the point by which the body halts; and who from that point corrects his men, on a point at or beyond his opposite flank.

The faults to be avoided, and generally committed by the soldier in dressing, are, passing the line; the head too forward and body kept back; the shoulders not square; the head turned too much.
Two, or more men, being moved forward or backward, a given number of paces, and placed in the new line and direction, the following commands will be given.
By the Right, forward --- Dress.
By the Right, backward --- Dress.
By the Left, forward --- Dress.
By the Left backward --- Dress.

The order 'by the right, or by the left' depended on where the regulating battalion was. The whole brigade dressed on that battalion. The officer at the right flank would dress on the battalion's flank to his right so that the whole battalion dressed in a line with the regulating brigade, and obviously, the process ran from right to left along the entire 900 yards of the brigade.

The process could be done quickly, but it did delay the brigade. The right of the brigade took higher casualties than the left, so the relative need to dress could have been uneven.

Rory Muir does a good job in describing some of the other issues that slowed and could disorder a brigade: page 110 Salamanca:

"This good order was not achieved without effort. The troops were impatient to press forward and had to be restrained. [the faster to pass through the artillery fire too] Before the advance began Leith had sent two of his aides, Captains Belshes and Dowson, to different parts of the line to help curb the pace, while he himself rode in front of the colulours of the 1/38th in the very center of the line."

Here we see the Division commander where he should be—but forward of the main line, which Muir explains, with two aides carrying out his work with specific instructions. [As Leith had only two official ADCs, Belshes and Dowson must have been unofficial aides.]

"Leith's prominent position served several purposes: he was conspicuous, continuing to set his men and unmistakable example of courage; he was a prominent marker, determining the pace and direction of the advance of the whole line; [He could also call for the dressing of the line from there.]
and he was clear of the dust raised by the troops, able to see any sudden threat from the enemy or any irregularity of the ground." [which could disturb the division's order.]

"It was vital for the success of the attack that good order be preserved. It was not easy of a line of men nine hundred yards long to maintain its order as it advanced for about a mile under enemy fire. One the village had been passed, the ground was generally open, but even open ground contains many minor obstacles which can easily cause delay and confusion. One part of the line could press forward, another fall behind; if the advance was too fast the men would become breathless and flurried, if too slow, the attack would lose momentum. And once disorder began, it would spread very rapidly, sapping the confidence of the troops and preventing them from being able to respond quickly to any sudden threat." [If order was lost, so was the DC's ability to maneuver and engage the division as a unit]

"It was much easier for infantry to advance in a line of independent columns, which could move more rapidly and worry less about their alignment, than to advance deployed in line. But then, the infantry would either have to fight in column and stake everything on an immediate charge, which would often fail against good troops, or attempt to deploy into line when they approached the enemy, which worked better in theory than in practice." [That's what Stewart tried with Colborne's brigade at Albuera…]

Now, I know that this is only one example. I am more than happy to provide more examples if you'd like. And yes, Hood's problems were terrain [Devil's Den] and his moving Laws too far to the right [outside of orders and the ability of the brigades to maintain connections.] Both Kershaws and Robertson's brigades were separated into more than one line.

"No matter how long you work (as a staff) on the plan of attack, or defense, there is an excellent chance the enemy will have thought of something you didn't consider. If that is the case all your work was for naught. "

That doesn't sound like very good planning to me. I would think a good plan would anticipate the unanticipated and therefore would remain the same plan even when the enemy did the unexpected.

"As soon as the battle begins everything usually changes. The winner is the commander who can adapt to the enemies plan and overcome their advantages with suitable force to be victorious."

This sounds like an admission that planning was faulty to start, but after being thrown for a loop by the enemy who has gained an advantage, a quick adaptation was made which fortunately resulted in victory, rather than defeat.

If those are the TRUE facts of modern staff planning, then thank God we've got overwhelming force on our side.

SR:
So it is all just theory? whatever those Ancient, Napoleonic and ACW military men said about what THEY experienced, how THEY organized and commanded their armies, what they did when 'the puck dropped'--it's just all theory to you? Or is it just that I'm saying it?

I take it that when military men write about how they fought the Iraq war and what they experienced, later generations will be justified in dismissing their regulations and accounts as 'theory'?

So, when Dundas, an experienced professional writes at the beginning of his regulations:

"The movements and manœuvres of a considerable line are similar to, and derived from the same general principles as those of the single battalion; they will be compounded, varied, and applied, according to circumstances, ground, and the intentions of the commanding officer; but their modes of execution remain unchangeable, and known to all. The greater the body, the fewer and more simple ought to be the manœuvres required of it."

Which is repeated nearly verbatim by EVERY regulation or treatise written during the same era and until well after 1866

It's all theory and totally irrelevant? Once 'the puck drops' it has no application? Regardless of what THEY say?

Wow. I wonder who will be labeling your 'when the puck drops' theory and when.

Well there are just too many posts to read all of them plus many have nothing to do about the initial topic.

I have played games where there was a Command Radius for both Division Commanders and Bde Commanders.

The best reason for Command Radius is to stop those players who because they would if they could send the 4 Bdes of one of their Division off into four different directions.

By needing to keep them all close to the division commander they cannot do the above, and most of you know of players who would do this if given the chance.

Now I do not believe that just because one bde is outside of its Division Commander's CR by a few inches that it should be given a penalty.

In all of the above mention battles more likely than not there was a unit that was not were it was suppose to be or was delayed due to terrain or gotten ahead of it other supporting units.

Just because this happen they suddenly did not receive modifers for being out of CR. They either notice what was happening and corrected it or they continued on with whatever mission they had at the time.

WOW, I can hear (and see) the Scotsman's voice getting shriller and shriller in desperation trying to get the final word on the subject recorded for TMP posterity. OK, have at it fella.

Scotsman, after you publish your rules for the perfect Napoleonic Era simulation we (JRTC Fort Polk, LA) will be happy to test them, even providing FOC evaluations in detail with illustrations and commentary, perhaps even video with sound. Until such time as you have a set of rules published I have no further interest in your comments. Thank you.

Bottom Dollar, it is pretty obvious from your comments you have absolutely no understanding of what modern command decision-making in any formal military on the face of today's globe is all about. It is therefore a waste of my time to try to attempt to enlighten you. Perhaps your comments were an attempt at humor, …if so, you were not successful.

Shane, thank you very much for your tireless efforts to improve your rules and your patience with those individuals who never tire of hearing themselves pontificate upon the stage that is TMP. We plan to obtain a set for evaluation and comparison with the dozens of sets we are currently evaluating for our future historical combat decision-making training program.

Rastibon, currently your rules are preferred by most of the members of the training staff for our Napoleonic studies program. Second so far is Volley & Bayonet for its simplicity. Thanks for your efforts and your support.

I'm finished with this thread. Silly Rabbit

Shane:

We are trying to understand and game something of Napoleonic warfare, right?

From your statements, it seems that:

1. Having prior military experience today means that any thing written by military men in early centuries doesn't count--or can be dismissed as theory?

2. Whenever military men of ages past write about what they have done and how they did it, or what they experienced, I can't possibly know what it all means because I haven't been in modern combat?

3. Or is it that regardless of what other military men write, only today's military men know what *really* went on two centuries or even twenty centuries ago?

4. Or is it simply because a combat virgin quotes other military veterans, it is just theory because I can't possibly understand what they are writing? Even a virgin can, by listening and reading, figure out what goes where and why.

When you say:

"Napoleon was a book reader but also at the same time was undergoing Military training, he converged the practical with the theory…"

So if I have read Napoleon's conclusions or other veterans' writings on how they converged the practical with the theory… What am I doing when I quote them, take them at their word, particularly if it is echoed by many, many others?

Presto chango, my touch has rendered it WRONG and just theory?

>>>You are only basing your statements on theory alone<<<

It is interesting that I can quote both military regulations and the battle accounts and explanations of veteran officers following those regulations and it remains only 'theory.' When military men train according to the regulations, when military men relate their combat experiences to others, is that ALL just theory?

I think part of what you are trying to say is that:

1. The experience of battle isn't like reading a book.
2. That no plan or training ever goes as planned or trained in war.
3. A great deal of battle isn't 'by the books.'
4. Those who have not experienced combat can't know what it is 'really' like.

I would be the first to say 'yes' to all three of those statements, if for no other reason than that is what other combat veterans, military men, my friends and acquaintances have said, as well as what military men in centuries past have written.

Or is that all theory too because I personally haven't experienced it?

I am more than willing to accept the statements of military men about 'how it was', those things I personally haven't experienced. However, that lack of Napoleonic battlefield experience is fairly common.

For instance, no one on this list has stood shoulder to shoulder with thousands of other men in wool coats in the hot sun and marched in step across a mile of Spanish plain while iron balls ripped through their comrades left and right.

Does that mean because I and others that fall into that category [just like you], we are incapable of understanding what others wrote about the experience? Does it mean that ANYTHING we accept from their efforts to describe how things were done and why in such circumstances is simply theory to be dismissed?

There is a great deal that a simulation game can't and shouldn't capture about battle, and I for one am quite happy about it.

There is a great deal about combat that I haven't experienced, and am quite happy about that too. College football is about as close as I ever want to get to it.

I am willing to accept unconditionally that Combat devolves into confusion and chaos at some point for many reasons, where the military systems simply break down. In fact, the enemy really works hard to see that it happens.

I have to believe the Napoleonic and ACW men who experienced it when they tell me how that chaos happened and what they did in training and military practices to avoid it for as long as possible. They experienced it, lived it, and I didn't.

I have to accept what they say, particularly when so many repeat it.

What I don't understand and have no explanation for is why you and Samantha don't.

I'm wrong and you are right. So what am I wrong about concerning Napoleonic and ACW warfare?

What have I said that hasn't already been said by Napoleonic and ACW contemporaries? What have I quoted of either regulations or accounts that current military experience is just 'theory?' And realize, it's not 'my' theory, but others. I didn't just say one day, this is the way it *should* go. I simply asked "What were they doing and why? and listened."

If I've misinterpreted something, or you have other evidence, personal experience that says all the regulations and accounts I have presented are wrong and you have it right--how? If you are saying I am wrong and Samantha is right, how? What have I said about Napoleonic warfare and the control of Divisions and Brigades that is wrong?

I'm listening.

Bill wrote :>>>>>There is a great deal about combat that I haven't experienced, and am quite happy about that too. College football is about as close as I ever want to get to it.<<<<<

and that statement says it all…

Bill, footballs do not explode and tear you to shreds.

As for the rest of your words, they are just useless banter now. They are useless words of a man who thinks he understands something he has never experienced personally and thinks everyone else is wrong and only he, somehow, knows the secret to war while everyone else is just foolish.

I have never been in combat, luckily for me my service years were spent in barracks and on exercise. I learnt the processes of command, the structure and the chain of command during my own time in the army and understand the limitations with regards to order relay and delay. It might only be in the modern world but when the radio's are down all you have left is two feet and a heart beat to get the order through. I don't think the Napoleonic period was much different.

You base all your theory on regulations, this is fine, but the regulations were there to enforce and train the men to work with them. It is the enemy's job to kill you, disrupt your plans and confound your chain of command anyway they could. The regulations were pathways, guidelines and stipulations to command and control men and when the enemy disrupted your plans it often meant you could not follow the regulations and proper channels of command control. Things go wrong, when they do plans go wrong and you have to adapt accommodate, modify or simply account for these what the enemy does. It is not simply a matter that a Divisional commander will be "EXACTLY" where he should be in his formations at any given time. If you believe that you probably believe in the tooth fairy also?

Sorry to burst your bubble mate but you need to wake up; you take theory way too seriously and do not account for the improbable.

I suggest you read Napoleon's maxims or Clauswitz or Jomini or Scharnhorst, these men wrote their experiences and from a point of view that if it could go wrong, it would. You need to listen to people like Samantha who obviously understand this first hand.

Shane

Holy cow, 578 posts on Command radius. Amazing (and just a little bit scary :).

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

Well I can't resist. Shane and Samantha there is only the smallest resemblance of fighting in a Napoleonic war and that of a modern soldier fighting a guerrilla war. Shane I am so happy you marched around and I am sure you can relate that to the movement of 1000s Cavalry or artillery or how about a Division of troops shoulder to shoulder, yes that must make your rules "second to none".

Samantha I respect your experience but they only resemblance to warfare two hundred years ago is that commanders command men nothing about how to move them is the same, nothing about how they dispatched their opponents is the same. You are dealing with a volunteer army against a populations who's armed factions don't want you there Napoleonic war for the most part was a faceoff against opponents, oh well just read about it since I was not alive then I am really not qualified to comment. How on earth can you compare that to leading men drilled to move and fight in close order drill with a strict emphasis on quashing any individual initiative, and with the morals and sensibilities that are two hundred years beyond our experience. I am sure you have a good grasp of command and what it takes, and I am sure your leadership qualities will bode well for you in the civilian world but I am sure that this gives you little to zero insight to Napoleonic warfare, of course reading extensively about the period doesn't seem to count either.

What the Scotsman is saying and very doggedly is that we are modeling/simulating combat from 200 years ago, he is using examples of the drill books and personal accounts to further his point of view. I think I know what he is saying but am not sure I agree 100%. But to say he does not know what war was 200 years ago because he has not been attacked by IEDs or moved around in an armored fighting vehicle is not just ludicrous but embarrassing. If you where to talk about motivation etc and how that relates to today's troops you might have something the rest is just absurd and not even sure where it is coming from.

Your argument boils down to "since no one has fired on the scotsmen in anger then he cannot possibly know what war was 200 years ago" all that I can say is that it is a good thing that Scotsman is only talking about Napoleonic warfare imagine the contempt if he would be talking about Hoplite war or Romans geez

William

Thanks William,

You just saved me a lot of typing.

I'd add two points.

One to Shane.

Shane old mate, for a man who could clearly start a fight in an empty room:

>>>>As for the rest of your words, they are just useless banter now. They are useless words of a man who thinks he understands something he has never experienced personally<<<<

I find this wonderful in its irony.

The other to SFC Danson.

Just to say how delighted I am that the US Army is clearly maintaining the standards of training and internal education I've come to expect.

It's always difficult to get the same view of the world looking out from an institution than it is looking into it Sam but you are a credit to the US Army's enculturation process.

"No plan survives contact with the enemy" …. so why have plans?

"Nobody here has ever fought in a Napoleonic battle" …So nobody can say anything about one or have an opinion.

"Any thing you learn from a book or writting of that time is meaningless because they really didn't write what really happened"….. so I guess nothing is known about that era. I'll make my napoleonic battle spaceships all green and purple, thank you.

"Only people who have been shot at are allowed to have a valid opinion"…. So Eisenhower was not qualified to be a general.

Seems like everybody is trying to go to extremes to discredit everyone else with absolete imperative statements. Everyone has to be super qualified in order to speak. Chill out.

1968billsfan
Unless you are from above the artic circle you are not qualified to tell us to Chill out.

William

Truce guys, truce!!!

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

*A retired colonel and another illustrious memeber of the US Army's enculturation process :).

Hi Bill yes it does become amusing at times.
William

At this point it is harder to know if I should be more in agreement with 1968billsfan or TheScottsman.

Oh wait, they aren't arguing. Guess that makes life easier for me.

Honestly, someone provides a logical, well articulated, and very well supported opinion citing primary materials and the response from this board is: not possibly correct.

This is ridiculous. If I thought better of the TMP search function I'd take a swing through various old threads and find one where each of those arguing against TheScottsman had previously cited similar sources or requested information from the same regulations in order to solve their wargaming question. I'd post such references with the open question as to why the source is valid when they have sought it in the past yet is now invalid when someone else advances a logical premise with it.

No one would answer.

If someone did reply, they'd tell me to start my own message board (the equivalent to writing one's own rules).

I have often been disgusted by the notion that so many will defend a historical author or wargame rules author simply because "we owe them something for all they have done in publishing _______." I had previously, silently, blamed the authors for this idolatry and have commented on it in rare occasion. Today I realize it is not the authors at all, but those who claim no one can no anything without first hand experience.

All of it is simply a straw-man argument. Such people might be quite stricken if they were to consider all that the human race knows that qualifies as knowledge through less than first hand experience. We have threads dedicated to "what was the exact color of a cloth uniform in 1807" and we are somehow willing to refer to regulations and make statements about dyes and draw pervasive conclusions. Yet well documented and substantiated matters are simply untrue because "you weren't there." Even better "because you haven't written your own rules." I strongly feel that believing everything in a rules set is similar to "I saw it on TV" or "I read it on the internet."

The foolishness of this abounds greater than I can sum it. I have no first-hand experience of being shot, yet based on what I know, have been told, seen, and read, I venture to say it is a painful experience.

Someone please decry me for as I have not been shot so have I also not lain on a beach in Hawaii with a beautiful woman – yet (blasphemy) I am willing to conclude one experience is likely better than the other.

Disgusting foolishness,

The Bandit

The Scotsman needs no help from me. I think he has been a model of consistancy and logical argument on this thread. ("Shrill" is the last word I would use to describe him). However, like William this morning, it is hard to resist responding to some of the latest points. I don't have anything personal against anyone – it just makes it easier for me to understand and consider other points of view when they stay consistent and answer questions put to them instead of becoming defensive, or switching to personal attacks.

Silly Rabbit (AKA Idiot Savant, Samantha, or I/S) said that without a published set of rule the Scotsman's posts were worthless, that Bottom Dollar's lack of military understanding negated any contribution, and in an earlier post that her profession is "combat decision-making simulation" and "Many rules sets are written by individuals who think they know what happens when armed men square off against each other with death on their mind. Most of them really haven't a clue".
She added," Ratisbon, currently your rules are preferred by most of the members of the training staff for our Napoleonic studies program. Second so far is Volley & Bayonet for its simplicity."
My interpretation of these remarks is that Samantha is backing up those statements by presenting her credentials as a veteran, a professional military simulator, a wargamer, and someone with enough historical knowledge to judge the "accuracy" of Napoleonic games for a "Napoleonic studies program". (She had also referenced Jack Gill's book in an earlier post as illustrating her view of Napoleonic command structures).
In fact, I do not think it is too much of a stretch to assume that if there is, or is planned to be, a "Napoleonic studies program" that there must be some historical research or knowledge behind it. Certainly, when SR says "All this discussion about command radius, regulating units, etc., appears to be nothing more than a front for more of the "Larry Dunns" of the wargaming world to pimp their favorite theories, show off their bias, their ability to recognize only supporting information, express their displeasure for a particular set of rules or some individual or individuals who have offended them at some time some where, and express their true ignorance of what happens on a battlefield IN ANY PERIOD, from 10,000 BC to 2009 AD." it implies that she or her group knows what happened during that time period.
I'll continue in another post.

Bill,

"A retired colonel and another illustrious memeber of the US Army's enculturation process"

Given both your retired rank and your ablity to think outside the box, I'm not sure if it counts as a success or failure in your case! :o)

Bandit,

Nice One!

Just as a matter of interest would someone care to explain the "Larry Dunns" reference, to those of us who are outside the USA?

Its come up on other threads before and is a meaningless reference! Other than the idea that its not, a good thing!

Shane wrote:
>>>>>>>You base all your theory on regulations, this is fine, but the regulations were there to enforce and train the men to work with them.<<<<<

Shane:
No, I simply asked how did officers back the move men around, communicate with them? And then I followed what others have suggested. Read the regulations that training was based on, and then see if you actually read about them using those methods.

>>>>>>It is the enemy's job to kill you, disrupt your plans and confound your chain of command anyway they could. The regulations were pathways, guidelines and stipulations to command and control men and when the enemy disrupted your plans it often meant you could not follow the regulations and proper channels of command control. Things go wrong, when they do plans go wrong and you have to adapt accommodate, modify or simply account for these what the enemy does.<<<<<<<<<

I never suggested otherwise…And I never suggested that officers didn't adapt to the situations, but the square one of operations is what will go wrong, and it does dictate where those modifications will be needed etc. Even chaos needs something to compare with, or start from.

And the veterans of Napoleonic wars weren't shy about describing those experiences or what they did about them.

>>>>>It is not simply a matter that a Divisional commander will be "EXACTLY" where he should be in his formations at any given time. If you believe that you probably believe in the tooth fairy also?<<<<<<<

It IS a matter of where the Divisional commander is, if you have to find him. It IS if the veterans of Napoleon's wars say it was. Being able to locate the commander is a major reason given for regulations and treatises indicating the where the DC should be. It sure was a problem for Pender's division at Gettysburg.

And from my reading a good portion of the time, that is exactly where you find him. But as I said before, not all the time, just the majority of the time. And the regulations do say that the Division commander may go to wherever he deems it necessary. So it that often, on a regular basis, sometimes, or only when the wheels are falling off and all hell is breaking loose? The regulations and accounts address that question too.

But as wargames as a whole target the 'norm' as to combat practices, and attempt to identify the character and purpose of any deviations, it is all important information in determining the command control and communication methods for the period.

>>>>>Shane old mate, for a man who could clearly start a fight in an empty room:<<<<<

ahh yes, but I am sure to win the argument.

>>>>As for the rest of your words, they are just useless banter now. They are useless words of a man who thinks he understands something he has never experienced personally<<<<<

>>>>>I find this wonderful in its irony.<<<<<

Actually, it is not ironic at all, I have never experienced a Napoleonic battle either so how would I know what happened? All I am defending is the right to use "CR's" in war games as a game mechanic, I really don't need to be lectured by someone who insists what CR's are not a military term and therefore wrong to use them.

I would have thought you, of all people Traj might have seen and understood that?

Shane

Scotsman,

Like I said several times before, while the Division is marching or advancing after the orders have all been sent out you are correct. However, when the bullets start flying they "DO" tend to head towards the critical point of danger and do get lost in the fighting much more than you think. You only have to read some of the memoirs of some of the Aids, despatch riders and so on to understand this, it was a major problem for command control and caused problems when it happened.

Now, I am NOT saying it happened all the time, not in the least, I am saying it happened when the Commander went forward into the fighting and got involved, that is all. To be honest, I am starting to believe we both are agreeing with each other in a way without seeing that we are. The thing we differ on is obviously the rate of occurance.

When this happens in my system the chance is relatively slim indeed, it really depends on the Leader himself and his personality and bravery. The more fearless the guy was the more inclined to intervene in the actual fighting and as a result, make it hard(er) to locate him and thus hand over orders or change orders. This does not mean he automatically loses the ability to command but the chance of failure and break down in the chain of command increases.

Shane

Larry Dunns was/is a TMP memember that got into some truely silly arguments. The most famous was with a Wikipedia entry for the wargame hobby.

#2 post

On Feb 11 Samantha (the I/S) wrote "WOW! What a fascinating discussion. My thanks to all!!!It can be very difficult to carry on a discussion of this nature without people being offended by someone's comments that ordinarily might not offend if you could see the face of the person making the comment or their body language."
Therefore I assume her comments I referenced in my previous post were not intended by her to be offensive.

She has also made clear in earlier posts (in no particular order) her own opinion/bias/belief that "Historical Simulations and War Games are two completely different animals… It is obvious several of the more serious writers in this discussion prefer the Serious Simulation as opposed to the Gamer's view of something fun to do in a couple of hours that has a flavor of the period but is easy to learn and fun to do with like minded friends."…
" I am qualified to note the difference between "Serious Simulations" and the Games I play for fun with friends."…"My profession is "combat decision-making simulation" so it is the very last thing I want to do when I "Wargame" with my friends so I lean heavily toward Shane's view, especially after having been bored to death with Chef de Battalion and Empire after the second edition. That said, I still enjoy our CLS derivative with traditional 30mm Willie, Stadden, and the newer 28mm's that are closer to 30's, …but perhaps that has to do with the company at our games rather than the game itself."
I think it is important to note here that Samantha has her own definition of "simulation" – there is either "serious simulation" which involves a chance of death or danger, or there are the "War games" (or "simple table games") she plays for fun with friends. She says she is qualified to know the difference, and also replied to the Scotsman at one point that she had never seen a "Game" that captured any part of the "real thing" as she defined "the real thing". (Indeed, by definition, that WOULD be impossible because the "real thing would be – well, the "real thing"!)
However, she also muddies the water by using the words "Historical Simulations'; from her context I think she is using "Historical Simulation" and "Serious Simulation" as synonyms.
This is where I think the "disconnect" comes in on this TMP thread, and it revolves around the use of the word "simulation". She sees only two activities possible here – the Serious (the Real Thing that includes stress and danger), and Game (social activity with "flavor").
She is missing the idea of historical understanding or appreciation that can also make part of the Historical gaming experience. Sometimes a "game", in a 3-D sort of way, can help illustrate some of the hows and whys of history that just reading a book cannot. Not all gamers want that, or perhaps most enjoy that but in differing degrees. However, many wargamers assume that the word "simulation" can only mean Samantha's 'serious simulation", and that anyone who says "simulation" is possible on the tabletop is wrong.
The Scotsman's point, as an ex-professional simulation designer, is that there is a professional "simulation" field with its own professional vocabulary, industry, etc etc. He has made it very clear that he is speaking about that, and that for training, learning, and even enjoyable "gaming" these techniques could be harnessed for "Wargaming". He never said a whole set of rules must be a simulation – it could just be a subset. It all depends upon what the designer wants to do. There is no requirement to use computers, one can use dice and lead figures.
He also did not say that one HAS to do it this way, or that "simulation" is better than non-simulation games. He points out that for a simulation to be valid (IF YOU WISH TO DO SUCH A THING) there are certain "simulation rules" that must be followed, such as gather evidence and try to understand what happened in the real world, and then build models to illustrate that.
This could be especially useful (but not required) if you are interested in understanding more about how some things in history worked. The simulation field exists because it has advanced understanding or training for parts of the "real world" . His beef comes with those who assume "historical simulation is impossible" based upon the commonly understood dictionary definition of "simulation" as opposed to the "professional" definition of "simulation". Also, as a sort of truth-in-advertising point of view, coming from the "professional simulation field", he looks at the difference between what people claim their games do and what their games actually do, or how people may not recognize their own logical inconsistancies in how they come to a conclusion.
More in #3

Bill wrote :>>>>>There is a great deal about combat that I haven't experienced, and am quite happy about that too. College football is about as close as I ever want to get to it.<<<<<

>>>and that statement says it all…

Bill, footballs do not explode and tear you to shreds.<<<<

Shane:
Duh, that's why I said "College football is about as close as I ever want to get to it" because it WASN'T that close…

>>>>As for the rest of your words, they are just useless banter now. They are useless words of a man who thinks he understands something he has never experienced personally and thinks everyone else is wrong and only he, somehow, knows the secret to war while everyone else is just foolish.<<<

I don't remember calling anyone foolish or suggesting I have some magic secret. I simply said what current CR rules present doesn't match what is presented by Napoleonic accounts and regulations, even in the abstract, and provided a whole lot of evidence to that point. That's it.

>>>>I have never been in combat, luckily for me my service years were spent in barracks and on exercise. I learnt the processes of command, the structure and the chain of command during my own time in the army and understand the limitations with regards to order relay and delay. It might only be in the modern world but when the radio's are down all you have left is two feet and a heart beat to get the order through. I don't think the Napoleonic period was much different.<<<<<

Well, while you say "I don't think the Napoleonic period was much different", personally, I would rather not take it on faith. I'd like to find out if it's true. The differences may well be few, but wouldn't you like to know what contemporaries said about the issue and how they saw those limitations? It is kind of important, if we are going to say a game mechanic represents "the way it was."

ADub74,

Oh! Thanks for that.

I imagined that he was on TV or some other media person we don't get to hear about!

Interesting then that someone who we were led to think was a stranger in these parts knew about them !

Larry Dunns was/is a TMP memember …

"Is" currently under the screen name: "TV's Frank."

#3 and final.
Samantha wrote to the Scotsman:
"I'm happy for you that you can quote Andy, Jerry, and Dave apparently from memory, …but that doesn't change the fact that I find rules systems by individuals who haven't experienced actual combat, read Napoleon's actual recorded words (or the words and letters of the luminaries of the period in question), trod the same ground as the combatants, and fired, plunged, or rolled the weapons of the period they claim to know so well, …to be boring at best."

This goes back to the "Historical Wargaming" component of wargaming that I suggested (as opposed to the "Serious Simulation" vs "Simple Table Game" dichotomy that Samantha divides wargaming into).

The Scotsman HAS "read Napoleon's actual recorded words (or the words and letters of the luminaries of the period in question)" and that is why this thread has information about things like "regulating battalions". (he may also have trod the ground of historical battlefields, or been a re-enactor, I don't know). He puts out his evidence for historical actions for others to refute, discuss, or expand on. This is using historical evidence and trying to understand some of the history, which is a prerequisite to trying to model some of that history in a simulation IF YOU WANT TO. If you don't care for that, that is fine, you can skip that in a game.

So when Samantha says on one hand that one should read the words of the actual participants, then criticizes ""All this discussion about command radius, regulating units, etc., appears to be nothing more than a front for more of the "Larry Dunns" of the wargaming world to pimp their favorite theories, show off their bias, their ability to recognize only supporting information, express their displeasure for a particular set of rules or some individual or individuals who have offended them at some time some where, and express their true ignorance ", it seems to be a contradictory stance for her. It also implies that she has done those things or at least has the necessary historical knowledge.

Samantha also wrote:
*I have enjoyed our modifications of V/B Napoleonics large scale battles. We've done all the early campaign classics with as much accuracy as possible in the terrain and brigade strengths. All-in-all the games were enjoyable with acceptable results. I/S"

What are these opinions based on? "As much accuracy as possible", "acceptable results". If these words just mean she played a simple tabletop game where the company of her friends was the main enjoyment, and that the game itself cannot be mistaken for a simulation of the real history, then words like accuracy and acceptable results don't mean anything, except that "acceptable results" must mean she played a game and had fun.

That is perfectly fine – but don't think this game (or any existing game of this type) is of any use for your professional Napoleonic study group, or that TMP readers should assume that your opinions about any "Game" carry any more weight due to your military experience than do the opinions of anyone else on TMP. It also brings into question why you mentioned the historical or Napoleonic study group your organization has or will set up in the future. Whose historical knowledge will evaluate whether or not these games have any value? Is it based upon Jack Gill's series of books? Is it based upon having played Column, Line, Square, and having learned history from that?

Finally, Samantha mentioned"
"I'm surprised by one thing though… this recent discovery of the "Regulating Battalion", something CLS players have been using since I can remember since we have to write orders for each battalion, squadron, and battery two moves in advance, using one unit as a guide with the remaining units followings absolutely makes sense since it is easier to do "ditto" marks, …instead of rewriting each units orders."

This thread began with a discussion of a game mechanic, but whole point of the "regulating battalion" was in response to a question about how one could do this if one did not use this Command Radius game mechanic? The answer was to look at history and see, which showed that regulating units were used. This went beyond the specific "regulating battalion" because it called into question some current assumptions about how Napoleonic command and control (which involves what Samantha acknowledges as important – communication) worked. It also came from research using primary historical documents (not modern combat experience). Seeing this as a CLS shortcut misses its significance. Different perceptions of what the historical reality was can lead to different ways to model historical command and control, which then could cause changes to other processes on the model battlefield.

Shane.

>>>All I am defending is the right to use "CR's" in war games as a game mechanic, I really don't need to be lectured by someone who insists what CR's are not a military term and therefore wrong to use them.

I would have thought you, of all people Traj might have seen and understood that?<<<

Of course, I understand that bit.

They irony I was pointing out was the use of the phrases "useless banter" and "useless words" in a posting by your good self. When I'm pretty sure that you would have come out swinging, if someone else had used them in a post to you.

That's all I meant.